Note: The data cut-off for this product was 3:30 pm ET on October 17. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 18 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and US President Donald Trump met at the White House on October 17 and discussed ongoing US support for Ukraine and efforts to the war.[1] Trump expressed confidence in his ability to end the war and assessed that both Zelensky and Russian President Vladimir Putin want to end the war in Ukraine. Zelensky reiterated that he remains open to a bilateral or trilateral meeting with Putin. Zelensky reiterated during the meeting and the following press conference that Ukraine is interested in acquiring US-made Tomahawk missiles to use against Russia in tandem with Ukrainian-made long-range strike drones.[2] Zelensky noted that striking legitimate Russian military targets requires missiles in combination with "thousands of drones" and that Ukraine does not yet have enough missiles. Missiles can carry larger payloads and fly at faster speeds than long-range strike drones, increasing their chances of penetrating Russia’s air defense umbrella and causing more damage to higher-value, better-defended military objects. ISW previously noted that US Tomahawk missiles’ long-range capabilities and sizable payload would enable the Ukrainian military to inflict substantial damage on key Russian military assets located deep within Russian territory, including the Shahed drone factory in Yelabuga, Republic of Tatarstan, and the Engels-2 Air Base in Saratov Oblast, from which Russia sorties the strategic bombers that fire air-launched cruise missiles at Ukraine.[3] Ukraine can likely significantly degrade Russia's military capabilities by targeting a vulnerable subset of key rear support areas, such as Yelabuga and Engels, that sustain and support Russia's frontline operations and long-range strike campaign against Ukraine.[4]

Zelensky stated that Ukraine would be willing to trade Ukrainian-made drones in exchange for the US provision of Tomahawk missiles, and Trump expressed interest in the exchange.[5] The United States and Ukraine are reportedly negotiating an agreement in which Ukraine would sell millions of battle-tested drones to the United States in exchange for Ukraine purchasing weapons from the United States.[6] Zelensky stated that he and Trump discussed the possible future US provision of Tomahawk missiles but that both leaders agreed to not publicly comment on their discussion.[7] Trump urged Putin and Zelensky to end the war soon and pursue peace in a social media post after the meeting.[8] Two sources briefed on the meeting told Axios on October 17 that Trump told Zelensky that the United States does not intend to provide Tomahawk missiles for now.[9]

Zelensky also met with US Energy Secretary Wright and executives of several US energy companies on October 17 to discuss strengthening cooperation to bolster Ukraine's energy sector amidst Russia's intensified strike campaign targeting Ukraine's power system ahead of Winter 2025-2026.[10] Zelensky also met with representatives from US defense companies Raytheon and Lockheed Martin to discuss strengthening Ukrainian air defenses, including long-range capabilities.[11]

The Kremlin continues to employ a dual-handed rhetorical strategy, leveraging economic proposals and veiled military threats in an effort to simultaneously pursue normalizing US-Russian relations and deterring US support for Ukraine. Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO and key Kremlin negotiator Kirill Dmitriev used a series of English-language X (formerly Twitter) posts on October 16 and 17 to promote a possible joint US-Russian economic venture, likely in an attempt to persuade the Trump administration that normalization of US-Russian relations would economically and politically benefit the United States and Russia without engaging in peace talks with Ukraine.[12] Dmitriev functions largely as a persuasive agent that the Kremlin leverages to strengthen relations with the Trump administration, and Dmitriev’s use of the proposal likely aimed to generate media attention and underscore existing Kremlin narratives that bilateral economic cooperation is preferable to a negotiated peace in Ukraine. Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Head Sergei Naryshkin reiterated on October 17 that Russia would perceive the provision of US-made Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine as a "hostile move" that would threaten global security.[13] Naryshkin repeated consistent Kremlin accusations that European states advocating for the provision of Tomahawks to Ukraine are a "war party" that opposes lasting and just peace.[14] Russian President Vladimir Putin and other Kremlin mouthpieces have repeatedly portrayed the possible provision of Tomahawk missiles as a significant "escalation" in an effort to deter support for Ukraine.[15] The Kremlin has consistently relied on veiled and explicit threats, including nuclear saber rattling, and began offering economic incentives to deter Western aid to Ukraine.[16] ISW continues to assess that the US provisioning of Tomahawk missiles would not engender a significant escalation in Russia’s war against Ukraine, and instead that the provisioning of long-range Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine would mirror Russia’s own use of commensurate Russian long-range cruise missiles against Ukraine.[17]

The Kremlin is reducing its financial incentives used to recruit volunteer soldiers, likely as part of the Kremlin's efforts to restructure force generation efforts and centralize control over Russian recruits in an effort to sustain its protracted war in Ukraine. Ukraine's Center for Countering Disinformation reported on October 17 that Russian federal subjects (regions) are reducing and canceling one-time enlistment bonus payments for new contract military service recruits.[18] Ukraine's Center for Countering Disinformation reported that the Russian authorities in the Republic of Mari El recently lowered their regional one-time enlistment bonus for new recruits from three million rubles (roughly $31,600) to 800,000 rubles (roughly $9,800); in the Republic of Chuvashia from 2.5 million (roughly $26,300) to 800,000 rubles; and in Samara Oblast from 3.6 million (roughly $37,900) to 400,000 rubles (roughly $4,900). Ukraine's Center for Countering Disinformation noted that regional governments are also reducing payments in Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, and the Republic of Bashkortostan and that the St. Petersburg officials retroactively canceled the governor’s one-time payment of 1.6 million rubles (roughly $16,800).[19] St. Petersburg-based outlet Fontanka reported on October 16 that it obtained information that St. Petersburg canceled already-promised one-time payments for volunteers and that servicemembers in BARS (Russian Army Combat Reserve) reported issues receiving their enlistment payments.[20] The BARS servicemembers stated that officials told them that the St. Petersburg government issued a decree on August 26, 2025, stating that the regional government would not pay the 1.6 million rubles designated for one-time enlistment bonuses starting August 1 -- retroactively depriving new recruits of bonuses promised when they signed their contracts. One source stated that the regional government retroactively terminated the payments, and regional officials told Fontanka that the decree is classified "for official use only," but that the regional government only canceled one-time payments for volunteer servicemembers (dobrovoltsi). Regional officials stated that servicemembers who sign regular military service contracts (referring to contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) will continue to receive one-time payments.

The Kremlin is likely coordinating this cross-regional policy and appears to have realized that its financial incentive system and decentralized force generation campaign, which has been in place since 2022, is unsustainable and ineffective in generating sufficient manpower for its war effort in Ukraine. The Kremlin now appears to be disincentivizing service in BARS, likely in an effort to centralize control over BARS and form a new, MoD-controlled active reserve. The Kremlin originally intended in late 2021 for BARS to function as Russia's active combat reserve by recruiting volunteer reservists for a three-year contract service and maintaining their mobilization readiness while maintaining civilian jobs, similar to US reserves.[21] The Kremlin, however, committed BARS units to the battlefield in Ukraine as irregular formations, often under the supervision of Russian businessmen and officials, at the beginning and throughout the full-scale invasion because it did not initially declare mobilization in Winter 2022.

The recent reductions in financial incentives for Russian volunteers may be part of the Kremlin's recent effort to mobilize members of the Russian active reserve on a rolling basis. ISW recently assessed that Russia may begin to mobilize members of Russia’s active reserve on a rolling basis to sustain its combat operations in Ukraine, but it is unlikely to conduct a large-scale involuntary reserve mobilization to expand the size of the Russian military dramatically at this time.[22] The Kremlin has traditionally relied on financial incentives and sign-on bonuses to attract volunteers to fight in Ukraine and to avoid mass compulsory mobilization, and regional governments' decision to decrease or cancel these financial incentives indicates that the Kremlin may be shifting away from this strategy. Russia's existing “pay-to-play” system for generating recruits is likely hitting diminishing returns, which may compel the Kremlin to adopt an alternative approach using rolling compulsory mobilization of reservists to sustain its manpower in the face of its continuing high casualty rate in Ukraine.

Russia’s short-range and long-range drone strike campaigns continue to disproportionately impact civilians in Ukraine. The United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (UNHCR) released a report on October 10 discussing the impact of Russian strikes on civilians in Ukraine.[23] The UNHRC noted that the total number of civilian casualties from January to September 2025 increased by 31 percent compared to the first nine months of 2024. UNHRC reported that short-range drones, mostly with first-person view (FPV) capabilities, killed 54 civilians and injured 272 and are the leading cause of civilian casualties near the frontline. The UNHRC estimated that FPV drones account for 29 percent of all civilian casualties in Ukraine. The UNHCR reported that 69 percent of deaths and injuries occurred near the frontline, particularly in Donetsk and Kherson oblasts. Russian forces have indiscriminately targeted both civilian and military vehicles traveling in frontline oblasts, and the indiscriminate strikes on vehicles complicate or block medical services and civilian evacuations from the frontlines, in addition to impairing Ukrainian military logistics.[24] Russian forces have long targeted civilians with FPV drones in isolated frontline areas, including in Kherson City, and Russian forces have extended this practice across the entire front line over the last year and a half.[25]

The UNHCR reported that Russia’s long-range strikes also continue to pose a serious threat to civilians, especially those living in large cities such as Kyiv, Zaporizhzhia, and Dnipro.[26] The UNHCR reported that Russia struck Ukrainian energy infrastructure 31 times in September 2025, marking a 15 percent increase in the number of strikes on energy infrastructure in August 2025. Russian forces have recently increased strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure in an attempt to disrupt the Ukrainian power system on a large scale ahead of Winter 2025-2026, and Russian strikes have caused widespread power outages for civilians living in Ukraine. Russian overnight long-range strike packages also purposefully target Ukrainian cities and disproportionately impact civilian infrastructure.

Ukraine's European allies continue to provide military aid and support Ukraine's growing defense industry. The Council of the European Union (EU) and members of the European Parliament approved a provisional agreement on defense industrial investment on October 16, which would allocate 300 million euros ($350 million) to fund Ukraine's defense industry.[27] Finland announced on October 17 that it will provide Ukraine with a military assistance package worth roughly 52 million euros ($60.6 million), most of which are new orders for Finnish-made military equipment.[28] Ukrainian Defense Minister Denys Shmyhal met with Luxembourg's Defense Minister Yuriko Backes on October 17 and announced that Luxembourg will supply Ukraine with a new military aid package, including tactical vehicles, drones, and night vision devices.[29]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and US President Donald Trump met at the White House on October 17 and discussed ongoing US support for Ukraine and efforts to the war
• The Kremlin continues to employ a dual-handed rhetorical strategy, leveraging economic proposals and veiled military threats in an effort to simultaneously pursue normalizing US-Russian relations and deterring US support for Ukraine.
• The Kremlin is reducing its financial incentives used to recruit volunteer soldiers, likely as part of the Kremlin's efforts to restructure force generation efforts and centralize control over Russian recruits in an effort to sustain its protracted war in Ukraine.
• Russia’s short-range and long-range drone strike campaigns continue to disproportionately impact civilians in Ukraine.
• Ukraine's European allies continue to provide military aid and support Ukraine's growing defense industry.
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Velykomykhailivka and in northern Sumy Oblast. Russian forces advanced near Lyman and Siversk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continue to strike power supply facilities in Russia. An OSINT analyst reported on October 17 that Ukrainian drones struck the Vladimirskaya substation in Vladimirovka, Vladimir Oblast, which is a key facility in Russia's central power grid system.[30] Other OSINT analysts reported on October 16 that Ukrainian drones struck a substation of the Tolkay railway in Kinel-Cherkasy, Samara Oblast, causing a fire to break out.[31]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 17 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in central Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City).[32]

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Oleksiivka, Kindrativka, and Andriivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, on October 16 and 17.[33] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Oleksiivka.[34]

Russian state media outlet Russia Today (RT) claimed on October 17 that Russian forces extended the range of the Molniya drone to 72 kilometers to enable deeper strikes on the frontline and that Russian forces recently used the modified drone to strike an unspecified bridge in Sumy Oblast to complicate Ukrainian logistics.[35]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in central Oleksiivka.[36] Drone operators of the 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian military equipment with fiber-optic drones in Sumy Oblast.[37] Drone operators of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Kashtan Detachment are reportedly operating in the border area of Kursk and Belgorod oblasts.[38]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on October 17 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to the southern outskirts of Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) and toward Vilcha (south of Vovchansk).[39]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, and Synelynkove on October 16 and 17.[40]

The Derhachi Hromada Administration reported on October 17 that Russian forces continue to hide mines disguised as logs along the international border, particularly near Kozacha Lopan (north of Kharkiv City) where gas supplies are low and civilians rely more heavily on firewood for heat.[41] ISW first observed reports that Russian forces began dispersing mines discreetly attached to logs near Kozacha Lopan in August 2025.[42]

Order of Battle: Assault groups of the Russian 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Tykhe (northeast of Vovchansk) and reached a destroyed bridge in Vovchanski Khutory.[43]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on October 17 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Velykyi Burluk toward Obukhivka on October 17.[44]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th CAA, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking bridges near Ambarne (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[45]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on October 17 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on October 17 that elements of the 47th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) seized Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk).[46] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Kupyansk.[47]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself, north of Kupyansk toward Kutkivka and Kolodyazne, northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka and toward Bolohivka, east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Kurylivka on October 16 and 17.[48] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Sobolivka (west of Kupyansk), Myrove, and Radkivka (north of Kupyansk).[49]

Geolocated footage published on October 17 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position on Rivenska street in Kupyansk in what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[50] ISW assesses that this event did not advance the forward edge of battle area (FEBA).

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on October 17 that the Russian military command is trying to simultaneously consolidate Russian positions in Kupyansk and seize the rest of the town.[51] Mashovets stated that the Russian military command of the 6th Combined Arms Army ([CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) is trying to provide logistical support to forward units attempting to cross the Oskil River and other units attempting to consolidate positions north of Kupyansk. Mashovets stated that the Russian 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th CAA) is currently split and attempting to hold positions along the Kindrashivka-Radkivka line (both north of Kupyansk) while also attacking in central Kupyansk.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 96th Separate Reconnaissance Brigade (1st GTA, MMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces fortifying positions near Spodobivka (southwest of Kupyansk) with Lancet loitering munitions.[52]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on October 17 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked toward Borova itself, northeast of Borova toward Bohuslavka, and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and Druzhelyubivka on October 16 and 17.[53] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Kolisnykivka and Zahryzove (both northeast of Borova).[54]

 Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Mashovets reported on October 17 that Russian forces recently seized Shandryholove (northwest of Lyman).[55]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of and in western Novoselivka and in northern Drobysheve (both northwest of Lyman).[56]

Russian forces attacked toward Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Karpivka, Shandryholove, Korovii Yar, Derylove, Novoselivka, and Drobysheve; north of Lyman near Ridkodub and toward Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; east of Lyman near Torske and Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil on October 16 and 17.[57]

Mashovets stated on October 17 that the Russian 20th CAA (Moscow Military District [MMD]) and 25th CAA (Central Military District [CMD]) are facing difficulties in the Lyman direction.[58] Mashovets stated that the 20th CAA is trying to break through along the Novoselivka-Drobysheve-Pryshyb-Yarova area to complicate Ukrainian forces’ ability to defend Lyman from the north and northwest. Mashovets stated that the 25th CAA is placing frontal pressure along the Zarichne-Lyman line while simultaneously attempting to capture Yampil in order to help the Russian 3rd CAA (formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) advance southeast of Lyman that would help with an assault. Mashovets stated that elements of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA) and some elements of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st GTA), along with several motorized rifle battalions and units from the mobilization reserve, are currently operating in the Lyman direction and unsuccessfully attacking Novoselivka. Mashovets claimed that elements of the 25th CAA are fighting for Yampil.

Order of Battle: Mashovets claimed that elements of the Russian 67th Motorized Rifle Division, 164th and 169th motorized rifle brigades, and 11th Tank Brigade (all 25th CAA, CMD) are operating near Zarichne and Yampil.[59]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 17 indicate that Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Vyimka (southeast of Siversk).[60]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk near Dronivka, northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka, and south of Siversk near Zvanivka on October 16 and 17.[61] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Siversk direction reported that the Ukrainian forces’ counterattacks near Serebryanka has expanded the contested ”gray zone” and to some extent the kill zone (an area immediately near the frontline where a mass of tactical strike and reconnaissance drones pose an elevated risk to any equipment or personnel that enters the area).[62]

The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Siversk direction reported that weather conditions have not yet impacted Russian tactics near Serebryanka as the foliage still provides camouflage for Russian forces attempting to approach Ukrainian positions.[63] The spokesperson stated that Ukrainian forces are using higher-quality drones in the Lyman direction, but that Russian forces have an advantage in quantity of drones. The spokesperson specified that Russian forces are using Krylo, Molniya, and Lancet strike drones and heavy bomber drones in the Siversk direction.

The Donetsk Oblast Prosecutor’s Office reported on October 16 that Russian forces dropped a FAB-250 glide bomb on Raihorodok (southwest of Lyman), injuring four civilians, including one child, and damaging several residential buildings.[64]

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions south of Dronivka.[65]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on October 17 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Oleksandro-Shultyne and Predtechyne (both east of Kostyantynivka), in southern Ivanopillya, and north of Kleban-Byk (both south of Kostyantynivka).[66]

Russian forces attacked toward Kostyantynivka itself; east of Kostyantynivka near Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Shcherbynivka and toward Berestok; southwest of Kostyantynivka toward Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar and Poltavka; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Volodymyrivka and Sofiivka on October 16 and 17.[67]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone battalion reported that Russian forces in the Kramatorsk (northwest of Kostyantynivka) direction reported that Russian forces continue infiltration missions in groups of one to two personnel wearing anti-thermal imaging cloaks in order to gain footholds in contested “gray zones.”[68] The Ukrainian commander reported that the loss of foliage due to changing weather conditions is depriving Russian infantry of concealment and making them more vulnerable to Ukrainian drone strikes. The commander stated that Russian forces are attempting to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into Slovyansk (north of Kramatorsk) and Kramatorsk, and that Russian sleeper drones continue landing along GLOCs to wait and strike passing vehicles. The commander stated that Russian drones use radio bridge antennas placed in the Ukrainian rear in an attempt to connect to WiFi signals and to relay information at extended ranges.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC, reportedly under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Kostyantynivka.[69] Drone operators of the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces and adjusting fire for elements of the 381st Artillery Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division) near Sofiivka.[70] Drone operators of the 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian communication equipment near Novoandriivka, Raiske, Novohryhorivka, and Mykolaipillya (all west to south of Druzhkivka).[71]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on October 17 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne and Dorozhnie on October 16 and 17.[72]

Mashovets reported that the Russian military command redeployed elements of the Russian 40th and 155th naval infantry brigades (both Pacific Fleet) to the Dobropillya penetration area to conduct assaults toward Shakhove and Sofiivka within the last week (since October 10).[73] Mashovets stated that Russian forces failed to break through to either settlement and that the troops who survived the assaults are likely hiding east of Volodymyrivka (east of Dobropillya on the east bank of the Kazennyi Torets River) or near the Novyi Stavok reservoir (southeast of Dobropillya). Mashovets assessed that elements of the 51st CAA (formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) that had been fighting in the Dobropillya direction are now combat ineffective, necessitating the redeployment of these naval infantry elements for combat operations.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 40th and 155th naval infantry brigades, 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA), and 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) reportedly participated in four mechanized assaults in the Dobropillya tactical area and Pokrovsk direction since October 1, though it is unclear which units participated in which assaults.[74] Elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade reportedly participated in the October 16 reduced battalion-sized mechanized assault toward Volodmyrivka and Shakhove.[75] Drone operators of the Russian 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Novovodyane (northeast of Dobropillya).[76]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on October 17 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in central and western Pokrovsk, west of Pokrovsk, and northwest of Novopavlivka (south of Pokrovsk).[77]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and toward Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Krasnyi Lyman; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad, Novoekonomichne, and Balahan; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novopavlivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on October 16 and 17.[78] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Rodynske and near Shevchenko (south of Pokrovsk) and Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk).[79]

Geolocated footage published on October 16 and 17 shows Russian forces within western and central Pokrovsk, respectively, in what ISW assesses as infiltration missions into Pokrovsk.[80] ISW assesses that this event did not advance the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces assaulting into Pokrovsk conduct assaults in parallel with other assault groups to provide cover for each other, adjust artillery fire, and launch tactical drones.[81] The milblogger claimed that these tactics have allowed Russian forces to bisect Pokrovsk into northern and southern halves and prevented Ukrainian forces from leaving Pokrovsk. The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are leveraging poor weather, electronic warfare (EW), and strikes against Ukrainian drone operators to advance.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 55th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) reportedly participated in the alleged seizure of Novopavlivka, which the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed to have seized as of October 15.[82] Drone operators of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly fighting in the Kostyantynivka and Pokrovsk directions.[83] Elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, CMD) are reportedly fighting in Pokrovsk.[84] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Myrnohrad.[85]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on October 17 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Filiya (south of Novopavlivka).[86]

Russian forces attacked south of Novopavlivka near Filiya and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai and Novokhatske on October 16 and 17.[87]

The senior non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian fire support company reported that Russian forces in the Oleksandrivka (northwest of Novopavlivka) direction are using drones to guide paths for Russian infantry and continue attacking in fire teams of one to two soldiers.[88] The NCO stated that Russian forces attack daily but that the terrain prevents Russian forces from gaining a solid foothold, so Russian forces instead continue infiltration missions into settlements and efforts to advance into Ukrainian near-rear areas.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintain positions in the Velykomykhailivka direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Mashovets reported on October 17 that Ukrainian forces liberated Sosnivka (southeast of Velykomykhailivka) and that Ukrainian forces maintain control over Novoselivka (east of Velykomykhailivka) and Khoroshe (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[89]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers credited elements of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) with seizing the entirety of Pryvillya (southwest of Velykomykhailivka).[90] Other Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced southeast of Pryvillya into northern Vyshneve (immediately north of Pryvillya).[91]

Russian forces recently attacked east of Velykomykhailivka near Sichneve and Oleksandrohrad and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Novomykolaivka, Vorone, and Sosnivka and toward Orestopil on October 16 and 17.[92] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Vyshneve and Sosnivka and southwest of Velykomykhailivka near Oleksiivka.[93]

Geolocated footage published on October 15 shows Russian forces raising a flag in northern Pryvillya in what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[94] ISW assesses that this event did not advance the FEBA.

Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th CAA, EMD) recently advanced near Verbove (southwest of Velykomykhailivka) and that elements of the Russian 57th and 60th motorized rifle brigades (5th CAA) recently retreated from Sosnivka.[95] Mashovets assessed that Russian forces are likely attempting to seize Velykomykhailivka, break through to Pokrovske (west of Velykomykhailivka), and interdict the T-0401 Pokrovske-Hulyaipole highway in order to complicate Ukrainian GLOCs in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast. Mashovets' assessment coheres with ISW's forecast that Russian forces are conducting an offensive toward Pokrovske in order to facilitate further Russian advances in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.[96] Russian forces have recently made a series of further advances and infiltration missions in southern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast that support the assessment that Russian forces intend to interdict the T-0401 highway.[97] Russian forces appear to be forming a penetration southwest of Velykomykhailivka from which Russian forces can pressure Velykomykhailivka, Pokrovske, and Hulyaipole.

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on October 17 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Poltavka (northeast of Hulyaipole) and west of Malynivka (east of Hulyaipole).[98]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Novohryhorivka, Uspenivka, and Poltavka and toward Krasnohirske and east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka and toward Vesele on October 16 and 17.[99]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently conducted a FAB-3000 glide bomb strike against Hulyaipole.[100]

Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are also attacking along the Novoivanivka-Uspenivka line (northeast of Hulyaipole).[101] Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) reportedly struck Ukrainian positions near Pershotravneve (north of Hulyaipole).[102] Elements of the 305th Artillery Brigade (5th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Poltavka.[103]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 17 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Kamyanske, Stepnohirsk, and Stepove and northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske on October 16 and 17.[104] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Prymorske.[105]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Grom company of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions with Lancet loitering munitions in the Zaporizhia direction.[106]

Russian forces continued attacks in the Kherson direction, including east of Kherson City near the Antonivsky railway and roadway bridges, on October 17, but did not advance.[107]

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported that Russian forces are repeatedly attacking near the Antonvisky railway and roadway bridges and trying to gain a foothold in the Dnipro River Island Delta.[108]

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces posted footage on October 17 showing Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Smerch multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) in occupied Kherson Oblast.[109]

Ukrainian forces struck Russian infrastructure in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian oil storage facility near occupied Hvardiivske (north of Simferopol) and caused a fire on the night of October 16 to 17.[110] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Hvardiivske Combined facility of Rosrezerv in occupied Karernoe (northwest of Simferopol), a fuel and lubricant depot in occupied Dzhankoi (north of Simferopol), and a Nebo-U radar station in occupied Yevpatoria (northwest of Simferopol).

Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk reported that Russian friendly fire downed a Russian Su-30SM aircraft over occupied Crimea on the night of October 16 to 17.[111]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 16 and 17. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 70 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones, including roughly 50 Shahed-type drones, from the directions of Kursk City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[112] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 35 drones and that 31 drones hit 10 locations, and drone debris struck two locations. Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strikes damaged residential infrastructure and an agricultural enterprise in Kharkiv City and Kharkiv Oblast; civilian infrastructure in Zaporizhia Oblast; a logging enterprise in Chernihiv Oblast; and civilian and energy infrastructure in Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, leaving roughly 22 settlements without power.[113]

Ukraine’s State Emergency Service reported on October 17 that Russian forces conducted a double-tap strike with drones to target first responders as they worked to extinguish a fire in Kherson Oblast after an initial Russian drone strike.[114] Ukraine’s State Emergency Service reported that the strike did not injure any first responders.

A Russian milblogger claimed on October 17 that Russian forces launched a FAB glide bomb equipped with UMPK at a range of 150 kilometers for the first time, likely using a new version of the D-30 universal joint glide munition (UMPB) that can reach over 160 kilometers.[115]

Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate’s (GUR) Aratta Special Unit reported on October 17 that Russian forces are expanding the Engels-2 Air Base in Saratov Oblast.[116] Aratta reported that satellite images show that Russian forces are pouring concrete in preparation for 12 new parking lots for Tu-95MS, Tu-160, Su-34, and Su-25 aircraft. Aratta reported that Russian forces use the Engels-2 base to sortie strategic bombers that carry out massive strikes on Ukrainian cities, and Ukrainian drones have previously struck the facility.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.