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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 30, 2025
October 30, 2025, 7:00 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:45 pm ET on October 30. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 31 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
US President Donald Trump called for the United States to resume tests of its nuclear weapons, likely in response to Russian President Vladimir Putin's ostentatious announcements of recent tests of Russian nuclear weapons. Trump stated on October 29 that the United States will start testing its nuclear weapons "on an equal basis" since other countries have been testing their weapons.[i] Trump's decision comes against the backdrop of recent Kremlin announcements about tests of the nuclear-powered and nuclear-capable Burevestnik missile and Poseidon unmanned underwater vehicle, whose ability to deliver nuclear warheads the Kremlin has been highlighting.[ii] Trump did not specify if the United States would test nuclear warheads or the delivery systems. Russian officials, however, largely claimed that the United States would begin testing nuclear warheads, alleging that Russia therefore would have a "free hand" to test its own nuclear warheads.[iii] Russia tested the Burevestnik and Poseidon delivery systems without nuclear warheads, but Kremlin officials have been publicly talking about the devastating effects the Burevestnik and Poseidon warheads would generate, flaunting the systems as powerful "doomsday" weapons that have no equal and that should force the West to "bow down" to Putin.[iv]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced a unilateral micro-ceasefire near Kupyansk and Pokrovsk but provided no clarity on the timing of the micro-ceasefire. The Russian MoD stated on October 30 that Russian President Vladimir Putin issued an order for a temporary ceasefire to allow journalists to enter and see Ukrainian forces whom Russian forces have allegedly encircled in Kupyansk, Pokrovsk, and Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk).[v] The Russian MoD claimed that the Russian military is willing to observe a five-to-six-hour ceasefire to ensure that journalists receive unimpeded entry and exit corridors to these towns, but that the ceasefire is contingent upon security guarantees for the journalists and Russian forces. ISW does not assess that Russian forces have encircled Kupyansk, Pokrovsk, or Myrnohrad at this time. Putin first offered such a micro-ceasefire on October 29, likely in part to claim that Russia is not the impediment to the peace process.[vi] The Kremlin likely intends to use the discussion of this unilateral micro-ceasefire to highlight Russia's claimed gains in the Kupyansk and Pokrovsk directions and to falsely portray a Russian victory as inevitable. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger notably acknowledged that the micro-ceasefire is part of a concerted Kremlin informational effort, commenting that the ceasefire is an "unusual step in the [Russian] information war."[vii]

Ukrainian military sources continued to provide details about the difficult situation in the Pokrovsk pocket. Ukrainian soldiers and commanders operating in the Pokrovsk direction continued to indicate that Russian infiltration missions and force accumulations are complicating Ukrainian assault and defense operations and efforts to control Russian movements within the Pokrovsk pocket.[viii] The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported that Russian forces are taking advantage of poor weather to resume infiltration tactics in the Pokrovsk direction to inflate the extent of Russian gains.[ix] A Ukrainian brigade commander reported that heavy autumnal rains are preventing Russian forces from establishing logistics in Pokrovsk, however.[x] Both Ukrainian sources indicated that Russian drone operations are successfully interdicting Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to and within Pokrovsk and to Myrnohrad.[xi] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies have established a drone equivalent of "air superiority" in the Pokrovsk direction.[xii] The Ukrainian military sources reported that Russian forces, including drone operators, continue to dress as civilians – perfidy under international law – to conduct infiltration missions without detection.[xiii] An image from German outlet BILD shows a Russian soldier dressed as a civilian and wearing no military insignia in a high-rise building in Pokrovsk.[xiv] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi visited Ukrainian commanders operating in the Pokrovsk direction and reported on October 30 that Russian claims of encircling Ukrainian forces within Pokrovsk or Myrnohrad are false.[xv]
The Russian military command is currently prioritizing offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction, having reportedly concentrated 11,000 personnel for the Pokrovsk effort.[xvi] The Russian rate of advance in the area, however, remains slow even as Ukrainian forces face increasing challenges in defending the area. Ukrainian forces in the Pokrovsk direction have struggled with Russian infiltration missions and drone strikes against Ukrainian GLOCs for weeks, but continue to slow the pace of Russian advances, particularly on the eastern flank near Myrnohrad.[xvii] The rate of Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction may change if some factor influencing Russia's offensive capabilities or Ukraine's defensive capabilities changes. The changing nature of drone warfare and the increasingly porous nature of the frontline in the Pokrovsk direction make it difficult to assess the degree of control that Russian or Ukrainian forces exert within and around Pokrovsk. ISW is therefore unprepared to offer any assessments or forecasts at this time about the rate at which Russian forces may collapse the Ukrainian pocket near Pokrovsk.
The Kremlin is activating plans to use active reservists to protect infrastructure in the Russian rear. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on October 29 that authorities in Danilovsky Raion, Yaroslavl Oblast are advertising positions for "trained" Russian citizens to work in mobile fire teams that are protecting the Yaroslavl Oil Refinery from drone strikes.[xviii] Regional authorities are offering recruits 3,000 rubles (about $37) per month for serving in the reserve and 40,000 rubles (about $500) per month for participating in training, and the refinery is promising an additional 50,000 rubles (about $625) per month. Mobile fire team participants will undergo 15 days of training before embarking on a 45-day tour of duty. The advertisement notes that Russian authorities will not send the reservists to fight in Ukraine. Nizhny Novgorod Oblast Military Commissar Sergei Agafonov stated on October 24 that regional authorities have formed a Russian Combat Army Reserve (BARS) unit of reservists who have started to train on how to defend local factories from drone strikes.[xix] Agafonov also highlighted that the BARS reservists will only serve in Nizhny Novgorod Oblast and will not deploy to Ukraine. A Russian milblogger claimed that authorities in Tambov Oblast are also recruiting reservists to protect local critical infrastructure from drones.[xx] The Russian State Duma recently approved a bill allowing Russian authorities to recruit members of Russia's active reserve to protect critical infrastructure in Russia.[xxi] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is using the deployment of active reservists to protect critical infrastructure in the Russian rear to set conditions to mobilize active reservists for combat in the future, including in Ukraine, while also bolstering defense of the infrastructure.[xxii]
Karelia Republic Head Artur Parfenchikov stated on October 30 that the republic authorities are working to form "volunteer squads" from conscripts returning from their mandatory military service.[xxiii] Parfenchikov stated that the volunteer squads would work with border guards along Karelia's border with NATO member Finland. The Russian military conscripts men semi-annually, at which point the conscripts undergo training and typically serve for one year.[xxiv] The conscripts become part of the Russian inactive reserve (also known as the "zapas") following their training and service.[xxv] Russian authorities may be looking for ways to use members of the inactive reserve to protect the Russian rear, as they are doing with the mobile fire teams made up of active reservists. Inactive reservists guarding the border of the Karelia Republic would gain valuable knowledge to use in a possible future NATO-Russia war.
Russian forces conducted a large-scale series of missile and drone strikes including over 700 projectiles against Ukraine on the night of October 29 to 30. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 653 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones – about 400 of which were Shahed-type drones – from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[xxvi] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched four Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles from Nizhny Novgorod Oblast; five Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Rostov Oblast; eight Kalibr cruise missiles from unspecified areas; two Iskander-K cruise missiles from Kursk and Voronezh oblasts; 30 Kh-101 cruise missiles from Saratov Oblast; two Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from Saratov Oblast; and one Kh-31P anti-radiation missile from the Black Sea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 623 of the 705 air targets, including 592 drones, seven Kalibr missiles, one Iskander-K missile, 21 Kh-101 missiles, and two Kh-59/69 missiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that 16 missiles and 63 drones struck 20 locations and that downed drone and missile debris fell at 19 locations. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that three missiles were "lost in location," likely referring to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russian forces struck residential infrastructure in Zaporizhzhia City, injuring five children.[xxvii] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck energy and residential infrastructure in Vinnytsia, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Cherkasy, Poltava, Dnipropetrovsk, Chernihiv, Sumy, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Lviv oblasts.[xxviii] Ukraine's largest private energy company, DTEK, reported on October 30 that Russia struck DTEK thermal power plants (TPPs) in unspecified Ukrainian oblasts, seriously damaging TPP equipment during Russia's third massive strike against DTEK TPPs in October 2025.[xxix] The Polish Armed Forces Operational Command reported that it scrambled two fighter jets and an early warning aircraft in response to the overnight Russian strikes.[xxx]

Polish fighters intercepted a Russian reconnaissance aircraft over the Baltic Sea for the second time in three days. The Polish Armed Forces Operational Command reported that a pair of Polish MiG-29 fighters intercepted a Russian Il-20 reconnaissance aircraft over the Baltic Sea before 0900 on October 30.[xxxi] Polish fighters also intercepted a Russian Il-20 over the Baltic Sea on October 28.[xxxii] The Polish Armed Forces Operational Command noted that the Russian aircraft in both instances were operating without registered flight plans or active transponders but did not violate Polish airspace.
Key Takeaways:
- US President Donald Trump called for the United States to resume tests of its nuclear weapons, likely in response to Russian President Vladimir Putin's ostentatious announcements of recent tests of Russian nuclear weapons.
- The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced a unilateral micro-ceasefire near Kupyansk and Pokrovsk but provided no clarity on the timing of the micro-ceasefire.
- Ukrainian military sources continued to provide details about the difficult situation in the Pokrovsk pocket.
- The Kremlin is activating plans to use active reservists to protect infrastructure in the Russian rear.
- Russian forces conducted a large-scale series of missile and drone strikes including over 700 projectiles against Ukraine on the night of October 29 to 30.
- Polish fighters intercepted a Russian reconnaissance aircraft over the Baltic Sea for the second time in three days.
- Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast. Russian forces advanced near Siversk, Pokrovsk, and Hulyaipole.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Nothing significant to report.
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 30 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in eastern Kostyantynivka (north of Sumy City on the international border).[xxxiii] The footage indicates that Ukrainian forces likely liberated Kindrativka (just south of Kostyantynivka) at an earlier date.
Fighting continued in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Oleksiivka, on October 29 and 30.[xxxiv]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are operating TOS-A1 thermobaric artillery in the Sumy direction.[xxxv]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division and the Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) reportedly continue to operate in Sumy Oblast.[xxxvi]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on October 30 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced within Vovchansk, near Synelnykove and Tykhe and toward Vilcha (all northeast of Kharkiv City).[xxxvii]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Synelnykove on October 29 and 30.[xxxviii] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked west of Synelnykove.[xxxix]
The Russian milblogger, reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces, claimed that wounded servicemembers of the Russian 1009th Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) operating in central Vovchansk complained that the Russian military command continues to order attritional assaults despite high losses in the regiment.[xl] The milblogger claimed that Russian soldiers in this unit are still wearing summer uniforms and have limited rations and that soldiers must use their own funds to pay for equipment and supplies as the Russian military command fails to provide these in sufficient quantities. The milblogger claimed that the Russian company commanders extort money from servicemembers to purchase drones and communications equipment. The milblogger claimed that the 1009th Regiment remains undermanned after suffering heavy losses in 2024.
Order of Battle: SKAT-350M reconnaissance drone operators of the Russian 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], LMD) reportedly continue to operate in the Kharkiv direction.[xli]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on October 30 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced northwest of Bolohivka (east of Velykyi Burluk).[xlii]
Russian forces conducted ground attacks northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Milove, Ambarne, and Khatnie on October 29 and 30.[xliii]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Odradne (east of Velykyi Burluk).[xliv]
A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are firing TOS-1A thermobaric artillery at Dvorichanske (southeast of Velykyi Burluk).[xlv]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on October 30 but did not make confirmed advances.


Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed on October 30 that Russian forces seized Sadove (south of Kupyansk) and advanced in southwestern Kupyansk.[xlvi] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest and northeast of Sadove and that Osynovo (just south of Sadove) is a contested "gray zone."[xlvii] ISW has not observed evidence indicating that Russian forces have advanced south of Kupyansk.
Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; northeast of Kupyansk near Fyholivka and Kamyanka and toward Kolodyazne; east of Kupyansk near Pishchane; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka, Hlushkivka, and Pishchane on October 29 and 30.[xlviii] Тhe Russian MoD and Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kupyansk, Myrove (west of Kupyansk), and Osynovo.[xlix]
Geolocated footage published on October 29 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian-occupied building in southern Kupyansk after what ISW assesses to be an infiltration mission.[l] ISW assesses that this infiltration mission did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (GTA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk) and Kurylivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[li]
Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Borova near Bohuslavka and southeast of Borova near Novovodyane on October 29 and 30 but did not advance.[lii]
Ukrainian forces maintained positions or recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on October 29 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintain positions or recently advanced in southern Novoselivka (northwest of Lyman), in an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[liii]
Unconfirmed claims: A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Lyman.[liv]
Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Drobysheve and Novoselivka and toward Korovii Yar; north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Karpivka, and Stavky; east of Lyman near Zarichne and Torske; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil on October 29 and 30.[lv]
Geolocated footage published on October 29 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian-occupied building in southeastern Lyman after what ISW assesses to be an infiltration mission.[lvi] ISW assesses that this event did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.
Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps (AC) Spokesperson Oleksandr Borodin reported on October 30 that Russian forces continue to conduct small group infantry attacks in the Lyman direction and reduce the intensity of assaults when bad weather degrades Russian drone effectiveness.[lvii] An officer of a Ukrainian drone unit operating in the direction reported that Russian forces lose over 12 servicemembers a day in constant attacks in the direction.[lviii]
A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that drone strikes against Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and field depots and vehicles have been integral to Russian forces' ability to advance in the Lyman direction and have forced Ukrainian logistics further behind the front line.[lix] The milblogger noted that Russian forces' presence within Lyman is limited and far from consolidated.
Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast Military Administration Head Vadym Filashkin reported on October 30 that a Russian multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) strike against Slovyansk killed three civilians and injured one.[lx]
Order of Battle: Molniya loitering munition operators of the Russian 45th Engineer Brigade (144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], MMD) are striking Ukrainian positions in Novoselivka.[lxi] Drone operators of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces in the Lyman direction.[lxii]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 30 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Vyimka (south of Siversk).[lxiii]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced farther southwest of Vyimka than the geolocated footage indicated, and south of Siversk, Dronivka, (northwest of Siversk), and Zvanivka (south of Siversk).[lxiv]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka, southeast of Siversk near Vyimka, and south of Siversk near Pereizne and Zvanivka on October 29 and 30.[lxv]
A Russian milblogger published footage on October 30 reportedly showing Russian forces striking Ukrainian forces near Siversk with a Kh-38 air-to-surface missile.[lxvi]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Vyimka.[lxvii]
Ukrainian forces maintained positions or recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on October 29 indicates that Ukrainian forces hold positions or recently advanced east of Volodymyrivka (southwest of Druzhkivka), an area in which Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[lxviii]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Volodymyrivka.[lxix]
Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; north of Kostyantynivka toward Vyrolyubivka; east of Kostyantynivka near Stupochky and Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Ivanopillya, Pleshchiivka, Shcherbynivka, and Novospaske; south of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka and Oleksandro-Kalynove and toward Berestok; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka on October 29 and 30.[lxx]
Ukrainian Eastern Command Spokesperson Captain Hryhorii Shapoval refuted Russian claims that Russian forces maintain a presence within Santurinivka Microraion (southeastern Kostyantynivka) and that fighting is ongoing on the outskirts of Kostyantynivka and near Santurinivka Microraion.[lxxi] A Russian milblogger claimed on October 30 that there is insufficient evidence to confirm that Russian forces maintain a presence in Santurinivka Microraion.[lxxii]
Ukrainian 19th AC Spokesperson Major Oleh Zelinskyi reported on October 30 that Russian small infantry groups continue unsuccessful attacks toward Kostyantynivka.[lxxiii] Kostyantynivka City Military Administration Head Serhiy Gorbunov reported that about 5,000 civilians remain in Kostyantynivka under constant Russian artillery, air, and drone strikes.[lxxiv] Gorbunov reported that Russian first-person view (FPV) drone operators are systematically targeting civilians. ISW previously observed reporting that Russian FPV drone operators have deliberately killed almost 3,000 civilians in Kherson Oblast as of late September 2023.[lxxv]
The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on October 29 that Russian forces are employing female servicemembers dressed as civilians to carry ammunition and radio batteries near Klishchiivka and Chasiv Yar (both east of Kostyantynivka) in acts of perfidy.[lxxvi] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area reported that fighting continues in Chasiv Yar, which the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized as of August 1.[lxxvii]
A Russian milblogger published footage on October 30 reportedly showing Russian forces striking Ukrainian forces near Kostyantynivka with a FAB-3000 glide bomb.[lxxviii]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Rusyn Yar and Sofiivka.[lxxix] Elements of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) reportedly continue to operate in the Kostyantynivka direction.[lxxx]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on October 30 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and Nove Shakhove and southeast of Dobropillya near Novotoretske, Zapovidne, and Dorozhnie on October 29 and 30.[lxxxi] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked west of Mayak (southeast of Dobropillya) and from Shakhove.[lxxxii]
Russian forces recently advanced in Pokrovsk.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 30 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along the Donetska Railway in central Pokrovsk.[lxxxiii]
Unconfirmed Russian claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in eastern Pokrovsk, southeast of and in northeastern Myrnohrad and central Rih (both east of Pokrovsk), and north and east of Novopavlivka (south of Pokrovsk).[lxxxiv]
Russian forces continued ground attacks near and within Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Novoekonomichne and Krasnyi Lyman; east of Pokrovsk near Hnativka, Rih, Myrnohrad, and Balahan; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Chunyshyne and Novopavlivka; southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Udachne, Kotlyne, and Molodetske; and northwest of Pokrovsk toward Hryshyne on October 29 and 30.[lxxxv]
Geolocated footage published on October 28 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions at the intersection of the Donetska Railway and the T-0515 Pokrovsk-Dobropillya highway in eastern Pokrovsk after what ISW assesses to be a Russian infiltration mission.[lxxxvi] ISW assesses that this event did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).
Order of Battle: Assault elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in central Pokrovsk.[lxxxvii] Elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly operating in Myrnohrad.[lxxxviii] Elements of the 1210th Rifle Battalion of the 1232nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (15th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 2nd CAA) and drone operators of the Sparta Battalion (51st CAA) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[lxxxix]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on October 30 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked southeast of Novopavlivka near Dachne and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya on October 29 and 30.[xc]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, CMD) reportedly continue to operate near the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border.[xci]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on October 30 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Oleksiivka (south of Velykomykhailivka) and south of Novooleksandrivka, north of Vyshneve, and north and south of Yehorivka (all southwest of Velykomykhailivka).[xcii]
Russian forces attacked east of Velykomykhailivka near Sichneve and Novoselivka; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Sosnivka and Ternove; south of Velykomykhailivka near Verbove and Stepove; and southwest of Velykomykhailivka near Pryvillya and Vyshneve on October 29 and 30.[xciii]A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Oleksiivka, Sosnivka, and Novoselivka.[xciv]
A Russian milblogger claimed that fiber-optic FPV drone operators of a Russian tank brigade - likely the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) - are striking Ukrainian positions in Pokrovske (west of Velykomykhailivka), roughly 30 kilometers from the launch site.[xcv]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA) and 5th Tank Brigade are reportedly operating in the south Dnipropetrovsk (Velykomykhailivka) direction.[xcvi]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)
Russian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 30 shows a Russian servicemember raising a Russian flag in central Krasnohirske (north of Hulyaipole), indicating that Russian forces recently advanced to southern Krasnohirske and west of Krasnohirske and Pryvilne to the east (left) bank of the Yanchur River.[xcvii]
Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed on October 30 that Russian forces, including elements of the 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]), seized Krasnohirske and advanced west of Poltavka (northeast of Hulyaipole).[xcviii]
Russian forces attacked north of Hulyaipole toward Rybne; northeast of Hulyaipole near Novohryhorivka, Pryvilne, and Novovasylivske; and east of Hulyaipole near Zelenyi Hai on October 29 and 30.[xcix]
Ukrainian Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration Head Ivan Fedorov reported that a Russian first-person view (FPV) drone strike injured a civilian in Hulyaipilska Hromada.[c]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 30 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka; southwest of Orikhiv near Lobkove and Nesteryanka; and west of Orikhiv near Stepove, Kamyanske, Prymorske, and Stepnohirsk on October 29 and 30.[ci]
Ukraine's Southern Defense Forces reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian Osa air defense system in an unspecified area in southern Ukraine.[cii]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 74th Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Military Base, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions north of Mala Tokmachka.[ciii] Elements of the 3rd Assault Company of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA) reportedly continue to operate near Orikhiv and Novodanylivka.[civ]
Russian forces continued limited assaults in the Kherson direction, including east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi roadway bridge, on October 29 and 30.[cv]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are consolidating positions in the Dnipro River Delta Island zone and operating on Karantynny Island (immediately southwest of Kherson City).[cvi]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Lvove (northeast of Kherson City).[cvii]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
See topline text.
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[i] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/115460423936412555
[ii] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-29-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-26-2025/
[iii] https://t.me/tass_agency/346393; https://rtvi dot com/news/tramp-ne-slishkom-ponimaet-v-gosdume-napomnili-ssha-o-posledstviyah-yadernyh-uchenij/; https://t.me/tass_agency/346395
[iv] https://t.me/tass_agency/346285; https://t.me/tass_agency/346407; https://t.me/DeputatZhuravlev/14047; https://news dot ru/vlast/v-gosdume-rasskazali-s-kakim-umyslom-tramp-zagovoril-o-yadernyh-ispytaniyah; https://t.me/slutsky_l/4007; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-29-2025/; https://t.me/tass_agency/346288; http://duma.gov dot ru/news/62378/
[v] https://t.me/mod_russia/57998
[vi] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-29-2025/
[vii] https://t.me/sashakots/57320
[viii] x https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1151500-voroga-duze-bagato-zataglosa-v-pokrovsk-so-vidbuvaetsa-u-misti-ta-dovkola-nogo/; https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=122129260874972946&id=61579188399794&rdid=6kKEjImpqSfrxbah; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30861; https://youtu.be/CAe-HA8YdG8?t=1374; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/10/30/vysuvayutsya-a-lystya-vpalo-dereva-goli-poblyzu-pokrovska-vorozhi-shturmy-upovilnyuye-vologa-zemlya/;
[ix] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1151932-vidnovili-taktiku-flagostokiv-zsu-likviduvali-cotiroh-vijskovih-rf-bila-steli-v-pokrovsku/ ; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1369768994767404?locale=uk_UA ; https://t.me/corps7DSHV/701 ;
[x] https://youtu.be/CAe-HA8YdG8?t=1374; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/10/30/vysuvayutsya-a-lystya-vpalo-dereva-goli-poblyzu-pokrovska-vorozhi-shturmy-upovilnyuye-vologa-zemlya/
[xi] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1151500-voroga-duze-bagato-zataglosa-v-pokrovsk-so-vidbuvaetsa-u-misti-ta-dovkola-nogo/; https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=122129260874972946&id=61579188399794&rdid=6kKEjImpqSfrxbah; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30861; https://youtu.be/CAe-HA8YdG8?t=1374; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/10/30/vysuvayutsya-a-lystya-vpalo-dereva-goli-poblyzu-pokrovska-vorozhi-shturmy-upovilnyuye-vologa-zemlya/;
[xii] https://t.me/rybar/74805
[xiii] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/29/world/europe/ukraine-russia-street-battles-pokrovsk.html;
[xiv] https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/russian-troops-use-goat-tactic-disguising-soldiers-as-civilians-near-pokrovsk-7th-airborne-forces-corps/; https://x.com/JulianRoepcke/status/1983473495427424689
[xv] https://t.me/osirskiy/1300
[xvi] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-29-2025/
[xvii] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-26-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-28-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-20-2025/
[xviii] https://t.me/milinfolive/159466
[xix] https://t.me/astrapress/95944; https://pravda-nn dot ru/interview/voennyj-komissar-nizhegorodskoj-oblasti-rasskazal-o-formirovanii-bars-nn/
[xx] https://t.me/milinfolive/159466
[xxi] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-28-2025/
[xxii] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-22-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/warning-the-kremlin-is-preparing-to-mobilize-reservists-on-a-rolling-basis-to-fight-in-ukraine-for-the-first-time/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-28-2025/
[xxiii] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/25498259
[xxiv] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/explainer-on-russian-conscription/
[xxv] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/warning-the-kremlin-is-preparing-to-mobilize-reservists-on-a-rolling-basis-to-fight-in-ukraine-for-the-first-time/
[xxvi] https://t.me/kpszsu/46009
[xxvii] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1983825350543978892
[xxviii] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1983825350543978892; https://suspilne dot media/chernihiv/1151592-u-cernigovi-prolunav-vibuh-armia-rf-atakuvala-obekt-kriticnoi-infrastrukturi-v-centri-mista/ ; https://t.me/chernihivrada/2603 ; https://t.me/bryzynskyi/3670 https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/25290; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/10/30/rosiya-vdaryla-po-ob%ca%bcyektu-krytychnoyi-infrastruktury-v-czentri-chernigova/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/10/30/dnipropetrovshhyna-vnochi-zaznala-raketnoyi-ataky-pid-pryczilom-opynylosya-pidpryyemstvo/; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1152046-vijska-rf-vdarili-po-dnipru-raketou-poskodzenij-infrastrukturnij-obekt/ ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/25264 ; https://t.me/andriyshTime/46003; https://suspilne dot media/ivano-frankivsk/1132180-rf-atakuvala-ivano-frankivsinu-dronami-ta-raketami/ ; https://www.facebook.com/ruslan.martsinkiv/posts/1419580169738235?ref=embed_post; https://t.me/synegubov/18001; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/10/30/vorog-atakuvav-harkivshhynu-raketoyu-kabamy-ta-bpla-postrazhdaly-dvoye-czyvilnyh-ova/; https://t.me/Mykola_Kalashnyk/7573; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/10/30/u-boryspoli-cherez-obstrily-rf-postrazhdala-lyudyna-i-vynykla-pozhezha/; https://suspilne dot media/vinnytsia/1151658-rf-atakue-kriticnu-infrastrukturu-na-vinniccini/ ; https://www.facebook.com/ZabolotNAtalia/posts/pfbid02LYLFWJW3aThJTSCc9KXk2bg2T9WUbhV6R2x9Nz6qikZmXBhTJkjHES9HzuEg5GLl ; https://suspilne dot media/vinnytsia/1151778-na-vinniccini-pid-cas-masovanoi-ataki-rf-travmuvalisa-patero-ludej-sered-nih-ditina/; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/27674; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/27701; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/10/30/kombinovana-ataka-na-zaporizhzhya-11-postrazhdalyh-ye-vluchannya-u-gurtozhytok/
[xxix] https://t.me/dtek_ua/2790
[xxx] https://suspilne dot media/1151666-ataka-rf-po-ukraini-polsa-ta-souzniki-pidnimali-v-povitra-aviaciu/ ; https://x.com/DowOperSZ/status/1983751392251498738
[xxxi] https://x.com/DowOperSZ/status/1983871992051761402
[xxxii] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-29-2025/
[xxxiii] https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/246952; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10395
[xxxiv] https://t.me/severnnyi/5565 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30860 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30826 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30824
[xxxv] https://t.me/dva_majors/82292
[xxxvi] https://t.me/mod_russia/57976; https://t.me/epoddubny/25340
[xxxvii] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35577 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/30192 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/82292 ; https://t.me/rybar/74785 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/346424
[xxxviii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30826 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30824 ; https://t.me/rybar/74785 ; https://t.me/rybar/74790; https://t.me/dva_majors/82292
[xxxix] https://t.me/severnnyi/5564
[xl] https://t.me/severnnyi/5570
[xli] https://t.me/voin_dv/17470 ; https://t.me/armycorp44/288
[xlii] https://t.me/rybar/74785
[xliii] https://t.me/severnnyi/5564 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/82292 ; https://t.me/rybar/74785
[xliv] https://t.me/severnnyi/5564 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/82292
[xlv] https://t.me/rybar/74785
[xlvi] https://t.me/mod_russia/57991; https://t.me/dva_majors/82309; https://t.me/mod_russia/57993; https://t.me/sashakots/57307; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/68525; https://t.me/motopatriot78/43853
[xlvii] https://t.me/motopatriot78/43853
[xlviii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30860 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30826 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30824 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/25306
[xlix] https://t.me/rybar/74790; https://t.me/dva_majors/82292 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/68525 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/30192 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/57993
[l] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1983670298928185783; https://www.facebook.com/reel/703461318867772; https://x.com/creamy_caprice/status/1980698700507935214
[li] https://t.me/mod_russia/57993
[lii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30860 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30826 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30824
[liii] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1983627909815554236 ; https://t.me/operationall_space/7356
[liv] https://t.me/rybar/74803
[lv] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30860 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30826 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30824 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/185178 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/30192 and https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35600
[lvi] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10390 ; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1833588587243919
[lvii] https://youtu.be/CAe-HA8YdG8?t=2207; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/10/30/budemo-prykryvaty-ne-lyshe-perednij-kraj-ekipazhi-brygady-k-2-oboronyatymut-mista/
[lviii] https://youtu.be/CAe-HA8YdG8?t=2207; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/10/30/budemo-prykryvaty-ne-lyshe-perednij-kraj-ekipazhi-brygady-k-2-oboronyatymut-mista/
[lix] https://t.me/rybar/74803
[lx] https://t.me/VadymFilashkin/12018
[lxi] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1983627909815554236 ; https://t.me/operationall_space/7356
[lxii] https://t.me/voin_dv/17455 ; https://t.me/Secrets_of_Vinakos/11089
[lxiii] https://t.me/OGHB_108/538; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10393
[lxiv] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35600; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/102782 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/30192 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/185179 ; https://t.me/rybar/74809
[lxv] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30860 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30826 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30824 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/102782 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35600 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/30192
[lxvi] https://t.me/motopatriot78/43848; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/26474
[lxvii] https://t.me/rybar/74809
[lxviii] https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/1983619569928503648 https://t.me/komykserega/743
[lxix] https://t.me/rusich_army/26546
[lxx] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30860; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30826; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30824; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35591; https://t.me/wargonzo/30192
[lxxi] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1151084-zaihati-v-misto-zahitta-zaihati-u-rajon-santurinivka-skladno-so-vidbuvaetsa-u-kostantinivci-ta-santurinivci/
[lxxii] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35591
[lxxiii] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1151084-zaihati-v-misto-zahitta-zaihati-u-rajon-santurinivka-skladno-so-vidbuvaetsa-u-kostantinivci-ta-santurinivci/
[lxxiv] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1151084-zaihati-v-misto-zahitta-zaihati-u-rajon-santurinivka-skladno-so-vidbuvaetsa-u-kostantinivci-ta-santurinivci/
[lxxv] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-16-2025/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kuTo94TnMPo; https://www.dw.com/en/russias-drone-attacks-target-civilians-in-ukraine/a-70043788
[lxxvi] https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/russian-troops-use-goat-tactic-disguising-soldiers-as-civilians-near-pokrovsk-7th-airborne-forces-corps/
[lxxvii] https://youtu.be/CAe-HA8YdG8?t=480; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/10/30/postijno-hodysh-ozyrayeshsya-hovayeshsya-vid-droniv-vorog-peretvoryuye-kostyantynivku-na-misto-prymaru/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025/
[lxxviii] https://t.me/motopatriot78/43848; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/26474
[lxxix] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14489
[lxxx] https://t.me/dva_majors/82299
[lxxxi] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30860; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30826; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30824 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/30192
[lxxxii] https://t.me/rusich_army/26546
[lxxxiii] https://x.com/TuiteroMartin/status/1983590421860176224
[lxxxiv] https://t.me/motopatriot78/43849; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35607; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/185179; https://t.me/rusich_army/26546; https://t.me/wargonzo/30192;
[lxxxv] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30860; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30826; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30824; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35607; https://t.me/wargonzo/30192; https://t.me/rybar/74805; https://t.me/rybar/74790; https://t.me/dva_majors/82292; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/102779; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/102801; https://t.me/yurasumy/25304; https://t.me/rusich_army/26546
[lxxxvi] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10389
[lxxxvii] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/102779
[lxxxviii] https://t.me/mod_russia/57994; https://t.me/tass_agency/346430 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/58001
[lxxxix] https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1Br7TPSwka/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f2CNoT1XkUo; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/10/29/samotnij-lejtenant-iz-racziyeyu-yak-bijczi-chervonoyi-kalyny-vzyaly-v-polon-oficzera-rf-bez-zbroyi/; https://t.me/nm_dnr/14490; https://vk dot com/wall-216160169_200953
[xc] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30824 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30826 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30860
[xci] https://t.me/sashakots/57294
[xcii] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/68521 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/185123
[xciii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30860 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30826 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30824
[xciv] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/68521
[xcv] https://t.me/voin_dv/17473
[xcvi] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/185205
[xcvii] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1983811582703649058
[xcviii] https://t.me/voin_dv/17466; https://t.me/mod_russia/57992; https://t.me/mod_russia/57994 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/185123 ; https://t.me/rybar/74795; https://t.me/voin_dv/17466 ; https://t.me/sashakots/57307 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/102824
[xcix] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30826 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30824 ;
[c] https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/27687 ; https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/1151728-armia-rf-atakuvala-gulajpilsku-gromadu-na-zaporizzi-e-poranenij/
[ci] https://t.me/wargonzo/30192 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30860 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30826 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30824 ; https://t.me/rybar/74790; https://t.me/dva_majors/82292
[cii] https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13295
[ciii] https://t.me/wargonzo/30188 ; https://t.me/War4RSO/88
[civ] https://t.me/dva_majors/82321
[cv] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30860 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30826 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30824
[cvi] https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/30075; https://t.me/pionergrupa/8980 ; https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/30079
[cvii] https://t.me/dva_majors/82303
