Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 27, 2025

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on October 27. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 28 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Kremlin is intensifying its cognitive warfare effort aimed at coercing the United States to make decisions about the war in Ukraine that are favorable to Russia, including by blaming the United States for Russia's own failure to meaningfully engage in negotiations. Kremlin officials and prominent government voices in the Russian information space are beginning to more directly accuse US President Donald Trump of impeding peace negotiations in Ukraine by refusing to acquiesce to Russia's long-held maximalist demands. The Kremlin voices are aiming to push the Trump administration to engage in economic cooperation with Russia and cease US support for Ukraine. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov gave a lengthy interview to Hungarian channel Ultrahang, published on October 26, wherein he claimed that the Kremlin was ready to cooperate with the United States to end the war based on previous discussions before the August 2025 bilateral Alaska summit, but blamed the Trump administration for pulling away from negotiations.[i] Lavrov claimed that Russian President Vladimir Putin is still willing to meet with Trump but that the Kremlin will wait for the United States to initiate further negotiations. Lavrov is attempting to shift blame away from Russia's own unwillingness to compromise by falsely accusing the Trump administration of being the impediment to peace. Lavrov also used the interview to advance several boilerplate Russian informational lines that attempt to sow division between the United States and Europe and to deprive Ukraine of support from its Western partners. Lavrov accused European states of impeding the peace process by pressuring Trump. Lavrov reiterated Russia's demands that Ukraine not join NATO and insinuated that Ukraine is attempting to use peace negotiations to "buy themselves some time" before Russia seizes more territory.

Other Russian officials and information space voices amplified similar narratives, including direct criticisms of Trump, on October 27. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that US-Russian relations are at a "minimum level" and that there are "timid efforts" to improve bilateral relations.[ii] Other Russian officials publicly claimed that Russia remains ready for a leader-level meeting but that there is no progress in scheduling this meeting.[iii] Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa claimed that pressure from Ukraine is causing the United States to change its position on the war.[iv] Russian state business outlet Kommersant amplified political observer Dmitry Trenin, who claimed that Trump is not interested in a peace deal and that internal US political pressure is influencing Trump.[v] Russian state newspaper Izvestia amplified political commentator Vadim Trukhachev, who falsely accused European states of undermining the possibility of a Trump-Putin meeting in Budapest out of their own self-interest.[vi] The Kremlin has intensified these various rhetorical lines back into both the Russian and international information spaces after US officials recently cancelled the Budapest summit and imposed new sanctions on Russia's energy sector.[vii] The Kremlin likely aims to coerce the United States into bilateral rapprochement and lifting the recent economic restrictions against Russia. The Kremlin likely also aims to justify its refusals to compromise and negotiate an end to the war to the domestic Russian audience.

Kremlin officials continued to reject Trump's proposed ceasefire while reiterating Russia's commitment to its original war aims. Lavrov rejected Trump's recently proposed ceasefire on the current frontline, while agreeing with Trump's statement at the August 2025 US-Russia summit in Alaska that Ukraine and Russia need to not just reach a ceasefire but reach a war termination agreement.[viii] Lavrov claimed that European leaders only support an immediate ceasefire without preconditions in order to allow Ukraine to rearm and attack. Chepa similarly claimed that a ceasefire would give Ukraine the chance ”to catch its breath” and attack Russia in the future.[ix] Chepa claimed that Russia would accept a ceasefire only if the West stops weapons supply to Ukraine and if Ukraine withdraws from Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts - essentially reiterating some of Russia's war termination demands as a precondition for a ceasefire.

Kremlin officials continue to demonstrate Russia's unwavering territorial aims in Ukraine, including claims that extend beyond the four illegally annexed oblasts. Lavrov claimed that Russia recognizes Ukraine’s independence but that Russian control over Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts is enshrined in the Russian Constitution.[x] Lavrov attempted to use Russia’s sham and illegal referendums in occupied Ukraine in 2014 and 2022 as evidence that most of the population "voted" for Russian annexation. Lavrov claimed that Russian-speakers in the four oblasts have faced persecution from the Ukrainian government and that the people in occupied Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts "welcomed Russian soldiers." Lavrov claimed that Russia is seizing territory in Ukraine not out of "imperial spirit" but out of concern for the people "who feel part of Russian culture." Lavrov claimed that the war is not about territory but about the people and the cities they have built and specifically referenced Odesa City at the time of Catherine the Great in the late 18th century. Kremlin statements demanding all of Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts undermine other Russian offers to cede territory in southern Ukraine for all of Donetsk Oblast.[xi] Continued Kremlin references to Odesa City, which Russian officials have called a "Russian" city, demonstrate Russia's territorial ambitions even beyond the four illegally annexed oblasts.[xii]

Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO and key Kremlin negotiator Kirill Dmitriev notably acknowledged on October 24 in an interview with CNN that Ukraine has altered its negotiating position and offered compromises by agreeing to a ceasefire along the current line.[xiii] Dmitriev reiterated on October 26 to Russian audiences, however, that Russia remains committed to its original war aims and desire to seize all of the four oblasts in eastern and southern Ukraine.[xiv] Dmitriev's statements are an implicit acknowledgment that Russia is responsible for the lack of progress toward peace and that Russia wants the United States, Ukraine, and the broader West to capitulate to Russia's demands.

Russia continued nuclear saber-rattling efforts in response to Trump's dismissal of the Russian Burevestnik missile test. Trump stated on October 27 that Putin should end the war in Ukraine instead of testing a nuclear-powered missile and noted that the United States has a nuclear submarine stationed close to Russia that “does [not] have to go 8,000 miles” (in reference to Kremlin claims that the Burevestnik missile flew 14,000 kilometers, or 8,700 miles).[xv] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that Russia’s missile test should not strain US-Russia relations, especially as the relations are at ”a minimal level” already.[xvi] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev, who frequently represents fringe Kremlin positions and directly communicates the subtext of messages from other Russian officials, congratulated ”Russia’s friends” on the test of the Burevestnik missile on his English-language X account in an attempt to threaten Russia's adversaries.[xvii] Kremlin officials amplified the tests and issued subtle threats to deploy the missiles against the United States, claiming that the missiles could reach ”anywhere" in North America should the United States supply Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles.[xviii]  Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov claimed that ”it will be too late” by the time European states "understand" the Burevestnik.[xix] Russia's parading of the Burevstnik and veiled nuclear threats are part of wider Kremlin efforts to use a combination of carrots and sticks unrelated to the war in Ukraine to push the United States to give in to concessions about the war.[xx]  The Kremlin similarly paraded the Oreshnik ballistic missile following testing the missile in Ukraine in November 2024 as part of nuclear saber-rattling efforts to convince the West to dial back support for Ukraine, but this effort fizzled out after it failed to achieve the Kremlin's intended effect.[xxi]

Both Ukrainian and Russian forces continue to advance in the Pokrovsk direction, underscoring the fluid and interspersed nature of the frontline on this sector of the front. Geolocated footage published on October 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced on Nakhimova Street in western Pokrovsk.[xxii] Additional geolocated footage published on October 27 shows Ukrainian forces assaulting Russian positions in eastern Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk), indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the area.[xxiii] The Ukrainian brigade that published the footage reported that Ukrainian forces control Rodynske and that limited Russian infantry have entered the settlement's outskirts.[xxiv] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed all three Russian armored vehicles in a recent platoon-sized mechanized assault near Krasnyi Lyman (just southeast of Rodynske) but that small Russian infantry groups subsequently entered southern Rodynske.[xxv] Mashovets stated that the small Russian groups are attempting to hold positions within the settlement and that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on October 27 that elements of the Russian 2nd Combined Arms Army (Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are advancing near the railway station within central Pokrovsk and are destroying the allegedly encircled Ukrainian group in Pokrovsk – reiterating Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov's October 26 claim that Russian forces had encircled Ukrainian forces near Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk).[xxvi] Russian milbloggers, including a Kremlin-affiliated milblogger, continued to label Gerasimov's claim as premature[xxvii] The Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces have not physically interdicted the Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the area but have fire control over several dirt roads.[xxviii]

Ukrainian sources continue to note the porous nature of the frontline and Russia's reliance on infiltration missions within Pokrovsk. The commander of a Ukrainian platoon operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that around 200 Russian troops have accumulated within Pokrovsk, where they are engaging Ukrainian forces in firefights.[xxix] The platoon commander reported that Russian forces penetrated the town in fireteams of two to three personnel and are waiting in shelters and basements for reinforcements. The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on October 27 that Russian forces who have accumulated within Pokrovsk are not entrenched in a defensive position with cover and concealment.[xxx] Mashovets noted that it is difficult to determine the location of Ukrainian and Russian positions within Pokrovsk as Russian forces are conducting small group infiltration missions between Ukrainian lines, often resorting to perfidy to disguise themselves as Ukrainian civilians.[xxxi] Mashovets reported that Russian forces are operating in central Pokrovsk near the railway station and throughout southern Pokrovsk but that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the Sobachovka neighborhood (eastern Pokrovsk), in the city center, and at the railway station. Mashovets assessed that Ukrainian forces assuredly control the area north of the railway station.[xxxii]

The Russian military command is reportedly deprioritizing offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area to focus on Pokrovsk itself. Mashovets reported that the 2nd CAA is Rusia's main "striking force" in the Pokrovsk direction and has been advancing in southern and western Pokrovsk over roughly the past two weeks.[xxxiii] Mashovets stated that the 2nd CAA received significant manpower reinforcements – reportedly between 6,000 and 10,500 troops in several waves - at least two weeks ago.[xxxiv] Mashovets stated that the 51st CAA (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) sharply reduced its activity in the Dobropillya salient west of the Kazennyi Torets River in the past week and shifted to focus to the Myrnohrad and Rodynske areas. Mashovets stated that there are unverified reports that naval infantry elements, which the Russian military command recently redeployed to the area of responsibility (AoR) of the 8th CAA (SMD) in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, are reinforcing the 51st CAA. Mashovets stated that no more than a brigade's worth of forces and means from the 41st CAA (CMD), which is operating in the Novopavlivka direction, are participating in assaults in the 2nd CAA's AoR south of Pokrovsk. Mashovets noted that elements of the 2nd CAA southwest and south of Pokrovsk are advancing more rapidly than elements of the 51st CAA near Rodynske and Myrnohrad.[xxxv]

Ukrainian strikes on the Belgorod Reservoir dam (southeast of Belgorod City and 11 kilometers from the international border) along the Siverskyi Donets River are reportedly degrading Russian positions in the border areas northeast of Kharkiv City. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on October 26 that Ukrainian forces struck the Belgorod Reservoir dam and that the dam’s water level dropped by one meter.[xxxvi] Magyar reported that the water flooded Russian positions near Grafovka (immediately southwest of the Belgorod Reservoir Dam). Ukrainian Joint Forces Group Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported that the flooding threatens positions of the Russian 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), 116th Rosgvardia Special Purpose Brigade, and  136th Motorized Rifle Brigade (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) in the area.[xxxvii] Trehubov reported that the flooding reduced some of the Russian forces' combat capabilities, complicated logistics, and flooded areas of advance, and will therefore require Russian forces to change plans and reduce offensive operations in the area. A Ukrainian army corps operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast reported on October 26 that the strike on the dam cut Russian logistics across the Siverskyi Donets River in the area, as Russian forces had previously taken advantage of  shallow water levels following a dry summer.[xxxviii] A local Russian media outlet claimed on October 26 that the water levels ”rapidly” receded from the Belgorod Reservoir dam after Ukrainian forces struck the dam with HIMARS.[xxxix] Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov claimed on October 27 that the situation at the Belgorod Reservoir dam is stable.[xl]

Balloons flying into Lithuania from Belarusian airspace are impeding operations at the Vilnius Airport. The Vilnius Airport reported that Lithuanian authorities temporarily suspended all air traffic at the airport on the night of October 26 to 27 due to an unspecified number of balloons flying toward the airport.[xli] Lithuanian Prime Minister Inga Ruginienė noted that the balloons flew from the direction of Belarusian airspace and that this was the third consecutive day and fourth total time this past week that balloons from Belarusian airspace have forced the Vilnius Airport to temporarily cease operations.[xlii] The Lithuanian Border Service reported that it closed land border crossings with Belarus as of the evening of October 26 due to the Belarusian balloons, and Lithuanian Interior Minister Vladislav Kondratovich stated that the border with Belarus will remain closed indefinitely.[xliii] The Lithuanian Border Service reported that the border closure will not affect Lithuanian citizens, European Union (EU) citizens, and diplomats.[xliv]  Ruginienė stated on October 27 that Lithuanian forces will take all necessary measures to shoot down these balloons in order to “[send] a signal to Belarus that Lithuania will not tolerate hybrid attacks.”[xlv] ISW continues to assess that Russia is increasingly engaging in covert and overt attacks against Europe and that ongoing Russian airspace violations and non-conventional activity are likely part of ”Phase Zero” — Russia’s broader informational and psychological condition-setting phase – to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[xlvi] ISW continues to assess that Belarus is Russia’s de facto cobelligerent in the war in Ukraine, thus, Belarusian incursions into NATO airspace are part of Russia’s broader Phase Zero effort.[xlvii]  

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin is intensifying its cognitive warfare effort aimed at coercing the United States to make decisions about the war in Ukraine that are favorable to Russia, including by blaming the United States for Russia's own failure to meaningfully engage in negotiations.
• Kremlin officials continued to reject Trump's proposed ceasefire while reiterating Russia's commitment to its original war aims.
• Russia continued nuclear saber-rattling efforts in response to Trump's dismissal of the Russian Burevestnik missile test.
• Both Ukrainian and Russian forces continue to advance in the Pokrovsk direction, underscoring the fluid and interspersed nature of the frontline on this sector of the front.
• Ukrainian sources continue to note the porous nature of the frontline and Russia's reliance on infiltration missions within Pokrovsk.
• The Russian military command is reportedly deprioritizing offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area to focus on Pokrovsk itself.
• Ukrainian strikes on the Belgorod Reservoir dam (southeast of Belgorod City and 11 kilometers from the international border) along the Siverskyi Donets River are reportedly degrading Russian positions in the border areas northeast of Kharkiv City.
• Balloons flying into Lithuania from Belarusian airspace are impeding operations at the Vilnius Airport.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Pokrovsk, and Hulyaipole and in the Dobropillya tactical area. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and near Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Please see topline texts for reports of Ukrainian operations in the Russian Federation.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Sumy direction on October 27 but did not advance.

Fighting continued in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, on October 26 and 27.[xlviii]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian Geran-2 drone strikes near Chornoplatove (northwest of Sumy City) damaged a Ukrainian train.[xlix] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces fired Geran drones at Konotop and Krolevets (both northwest of Sumy City).[l] Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported that a Russian drone struck a bus on the P-44 Sumy City-Bilopillya highway, injuring two children.[li]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that elements of the 382nd Separate Naval Infantry Battalion (810th Naval Infantry Brigade, Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) are struggling with large numbers of soldiers abandoning their units or stations without authorization near Kostyantynivka (north of Sumy City).[lii]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 26 indicates that Russian forces advanced at a prior date on the western outskirts of Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[liii]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on October 26 indicates that Ukrainian forces hold positions in western Vovchansk in an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[liv]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Synelnykove (northeast of Kharkiv City) and advanced near Synelnykove and within and near Vovchansk[lv][lvi]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Synelnykove and Vovchansk and toward Bochkove on October 26 and 27.[lvii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Synelnykove.[lviii]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) continue to operate in central Vovchansk.[lix]

Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Velykyi Burluk near Bolohivka on October 26 and 27 but did not advance.[lx]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 26 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk).[lxi]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Myrove (northeast of Kupyansk) and southeast of Pishchane.[lxii]

Russian forces attacked near and within Kupyansk itself; northeast of Kupyansk near Stroivka and Kamyanka and toward Dvorichanske; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Stepova Novoselivka and toward Kurylivka on October 26 and 27.[lxiii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Pishchane.[lxiv]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted an FAB-500 glide bomb strike against Ukrainian positions near Kupyansk.[lxv][lxvi]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Borova direction on October 27.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on October 27 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Zarichne (east of Lyman).[lxvii]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Derylove, Shandryholove, Serednie, Novoselivka, and Karpivka and toward Oleksandrivka; north of Lyman near Stavky; east of Lyman near Zarichne and Torske; northeast of Lyman near Myrne; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil on October 26 and 27.[lxviii]

Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against an oil depot and a fuel depot in occupied Luhansk Oblast on the night of October 26 to 27. Geolocated footage confirms reporting from the Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian military frontline fuel depot in occupied Starobilsk and an oil depot in occupied Luhansk City, causing fires.[lxix]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on October 27 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Siversk; in and near Dronivka (northwest of Siversk); near Vyimka (southeast of Siversk); and near Zvanivka (south of Siversk).[lxx]

Russian forces attacked near Siversk itself; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; and south of Siversk near Zvanivka, Pereizne, and Fedorivka on October 26 and 27.[lxxi] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zvanivka.[lxxii]

Ukrainian forces maintained positions or recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on October 27 indicates that Ukrainian forces hold positions in southeastern Kostyantynivka, an area in which Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[lxxiii]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; east of Kostyantynivka near Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Ivanopillya, Pleshchiivka, Kleban-Byk, and Shcherbynivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Kalynove and Yablunivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka on October 26 and 27.[lxxiv]

[lxxv]

The deputy commander of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Kostyantynivka reported on October 27 that Russian forces are constantly rotating personnel to replace losses and are attacking in fireteams of two to three with penal recruits and poorly trained and equipped personnel.[lxxvi] The deputy commander stated that most Russian drone elements can only provide logistics support due to poor training. The deputy commander noted, however, that drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are well trained and maximally equipped and are constantly striking Ukrainian logistics. The deputy commander stated that Russian forces are mostly relying on their quantitative drone advantage. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted KAB guided glide bomb strikes against Kostyantynivka on October 27.[lxxvii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1307th Motorized Rifle Regiment and the 27th Artillery Regiment (both of the 6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC], reportedly under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are reportedly striking Ukrainian ammunition depots and vehicles in Kostyantynivka.[lxxviii] Drone operators of the 174th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Sofiivka.[lxxix] Drone operators of the Berkut Group of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian artillery guns near Mykolaipillya (southeast of Druzhkivka).[lxxx]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 26 that Ukrainian forces liberated Kucheriv Yar (northeast of Dobropillya) in the past ten days.[lxxxi] The Ukrainian General Staff's report, coupled with observed Ukrainian activity southeast of Zolotyi Kolodyaz (just northwest of Kucheriv Yar), indicates that Ukrainian forces likely cleared the slag heap south of Zolotyi Kolodyaz.

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: The Ukrainian General Staff report about the liberation of Kucheriv Yar and a Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger's claim on October 23 that Ukrainian forces regained control over the settlement indicate that Ukrainian forces hold positions in Kucheriv Yar in areas where Russian sources previously claimed Russian forces maintained a presence.[lxxxii] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 17 that Ukrainian forces liberated Zolotyi Kolodyaz, and ISW has not observed recent visual evidence indicating that Russian forces maintain positions within the settlement since August 12.[lxxxiii]

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and Nove Shakhove and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne and Pankivka on October 26 and 27.[lxxxiv] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zolotyi Kolodyaz, Kucheriv, Yar, Shakhove, Nove Shakhove, and Zapovidne.[lxxxv]

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

See topline text for reports of assessed Ukrainian and Russian advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in northern and southern Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk).[lxxxvi]

Russian forces conducted ground attacks within and near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Sukhetske, Myrolyubivka, and Krasnyi Lyman; east of Pokrovsk near Promin, Myrnohrad, and Novoekonomichne; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Novopavlivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Molodetske, Udachne, and Kotlyne on October 26 and 27.[lxxxvii] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Sukhetske and within Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.[lxxxviii]

Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 5th, 9th, and 110th motorized rifle brigades (all of the 51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD), partial elements of the 1st Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA), and possible elements of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are operating near Rodynske and Myrnohrad.[lxxxix] Mashovets stated that elements of the 35th and 55th motorized rifle brigades and possibly elements of the 137th Motorized Rifle Brigade (all 41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are operating south of Pokrovsk. Mashovets reported that elements of the 2nd CAA (CMD), including of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division), the 1437th Motorized Rifle Regiment (15th Motorized Rifle Brigade), and the 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade; the 1431st Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th AC, Leningrad Military District [LMD]); and the 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade are operating within central Pokrovsk.[xc] Mashovets stated that likely elements of the 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 1441st Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely comprised of mobilized personnel) are operating near Udachne. Drone operators of the Irlandtsy Strike Detachment of the Grom-Kaskad Drone Brigade are reportedly striking Ukrainian logistics in the Pokrovsk direction, and elements of the Vega Spetsnaz Detachment (24th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade, Russian General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[xci]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on October 27 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Novomykolaivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[xcii]

Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself, south of Novopavlivka near Filiya, and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai on October 26 and 27.[xciii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on October 27 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Verbove (southwest of Velykomykhailivka).[xciv]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Piddubne; east of Velykomykhailivka near Oleksandrohrad and Novoselivka; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Sosnivka; south of Velykomykhailivka near Stepove; and southwest of Velykomykhailivka near Verbove and Oleksiivka on October 26 and 27.[xcv]

Order of Battle: Tank crews of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade and assault and reconnaissance troops of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the south Dnipropetrovsk (Velykomykhailivka) direction.[xcvi]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Ukrainian and Russian forces both recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage posted on October 27 shows Ukrainian forces raising a flag in Yehorivka (north of Hulyaipole), indicating that Ukrainian forces recently liberated Yehorivka.[xcvii] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on October 27 that elements of the Russian 64th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) seized Yehorivka.[xcviii]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 27 shows Russian forces raising flags in multiple locations within Pryvilne and Novomykolaivka (both northeast of Hulyaipole), indicating that Russian forces likely seized Pryvilne and Novomykolaivka.[xcix] The Russian MoD credited elements of the 60th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) with seizing Pryvilne and Novomykolaivka.[c]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Zlahoda and east of Krasnohirsk (both northeast of Hulyaipole).[ci]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Rybne, Novomykolaivka, Novohryhorivka, Pavlivka, and Uspenivka; and east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka and Zelenyi Hai on October 26 and [cii][ciii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 27 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv toward Novodanylivka; southwest of Orikhiv near Novoandriivka; and west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk, Plavni, Prymorske, Stepove, and Kamyanske on October 26 and 27.[civ]

The Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that Ukrainian forces struck Russian drone operators in Zaporizhia Oblast on October 15, killing the platoon commander of the 108th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) near Plavni.[cv]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the BARS-Sarmat Unmanned Systems Special Purpose Center (formerly BARS-Sarmat Detachment, subordinated to the VDV) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Stepnohirsk.[cvi]

Russian forces attacked in the Kherson direction, including east of Kherson City near the Antonivsky Bridge, on October 27, but did not advance.[cvii]

A Russian milblogger who frequently reports on Russian strikes in the Kherson direction and is amplifying claims of an ongoing offensive operation in Kherson City claimed that the Russian Dnepr Group of Forces has been attempting to conduct an offensive to seize Kherson City for about a year.[cviii] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces have gradually been able to deploy artillery closer to the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River to strike Ukrainian artillery and drone crews, which the milblogger claimed allowed Russian infantry to begin operating near and within Kherson City. The milblogger claimed that the main objective for Russian forces in Winter 2025-2026 is to degrade Ukrainian forces operating in Kherson City including by interdicting logistics from Mykolaiv City. ISW continues to assess that Russian sources are running a cognitive warfare effort aimed at creating the false impression that limited Russian sabotage and reconnaissance operations are a new, ongoing Russian offensive against Kherson City, an effort likely aimed at convincing Ukraine and the West that Russia will recapture all of west (right) bank Kherson Oblast and should just cede the territory to Russia.[cix]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on October 26 to 27. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 100 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other types of strike drones, including about 70 Shaheds, from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[cx] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 66 drones in northern, eastern, and southern Ukraine, and that 26 Russian drones hit nine locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes hit residential areas and energy infrastructure in Kharkiv City, Sumy City, Zaporizhzhia Raion, and Pavlohrad Raion, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; and a railway station in Chernihiv Oblast.[cxi] Ukrainian Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration Head Ivan Fedorov reported that Russian strikes against Zaporizhzhia Raion left 1,700 subscribers without energy.[cxii]

Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported on October 27 that Russian forces launched several Shahed-type drones carrying two anti-tank mines on the underside of their wings at [cxiii] Beskrestnov reported that these mines detonate after an unspecified period of time and advised civilians not to approach any fallen drones.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[i] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2055699/; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/10/ 27/sergey-lavrov-zayavil-o-radikalnoy-peremene-pozitsii-ssha-po-ukraine-vinovaty-evropeytsy

[ii] https://nsn dot fm/policy/peskov-rossiya-otkryta-dlya-nalazhivaniya-otnoshenii-s-ssha

[iii] https://nsn dot fm/policy/peskov-rossiya-otkryta-dlya-nalazhivaniya-otnoshenii-s-ssha; https://t.me/tass_agency/345926; https://t.me/tass_agency/345905 

[iv] https://news dot ru/vlast/v-gosdume-raskryli-kakuyu-koncepciyu-ssha-po-ukraine-gotova-prinyat-rossiya

[v] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/8158919

[vi] https://iz dot ru/1978344/vadim-truhacev/vengerskii-otstupnik

[vii] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-22-2025/

[viii] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2055699/

[ix] https://lenta dot ru/news/2025/10/27/v-rossii-otsenili-buduschee-peregovorov-s-ssha-po-ukraine/

[x] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2055699/

[xi] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031925 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-20-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-19-2025/

[xii] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-29-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-22-2025/ ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-22-2025;

[xiii] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-25-2025/

[xiv] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-26-2025/

[xv] https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/trump-says-putin-should-end-ukraine-war-not-test-missiles-2025-10-27/

[xvi] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/27/10/2025/68ff3e7d9a79472a9bddec47;

[xvii] https://x.com/MedvedevRussiaE/status/1982471712265445811; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-23-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-31-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-8-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_30-9/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_19-22/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_3-17/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-31-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_16-23/ [8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-14-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-29-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/primer-russian-cognitive-warfare

[xviii]  https://t.me/vv_volodin/1280; https://tass dot ru/politika/25465275; https://t.me/DeputatZhuravlev/14030; https://www.pnp dot ru/politics/v-vashingtone-otreagirovali-na-poyavlenie-novogo-sverkhoruzhiya-u-rossii.html

[xix] https://tass dot ru/politika/25465501

[xx] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-26-2025/; ]https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-25-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-22-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-8-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_20-25/

[xxi] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-22-2024/

[xxii] https://t.me/corps7DSHV/684; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10365

[xxiii] https://t.me/ChervonaKalynaBrigade/3811; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1982792723707937129;

[xxiv] https://t.me/ChervonaKalynaBrigade/3811

[xxv] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3060

[xxvi] https://t.me/mod_russia/57914; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-26-2025/

[xxvii] https://t.me/rybar/74687; https://t.me/bayraktar1070/5736

[xxviii] https://t.me/rybar/74687

[xxix] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/10/27/stysnuty-z-dvoh-bokiv-zamknuty-kolo-v-pokrovsku-tryvayut-strileczki-boyi-z-infiltratoramy/

[xxx] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1148842-vijska-rf-ne-kontroluut-zoden-rajon-pokrovska-7-korpus-dsv/

[xxxi] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3060

[xxxii] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3061

[xxxiii] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3059; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3062

[xxxiv] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3059

[xxxv] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3062

[xxxvi] https://t.me/robert_magyar/1497

[xxxvii] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1149156-proriv-dambi-v-belgorodskij-oblasti-rf-pidtopiv-pozicii-kilkoh-rosijskih-brigad-so-diut-poblizu-vovcanska/

[xxxviii] https://t.me/corpsarmy16/1228; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/10/27/u-zsu-zayavyly-shho-pidrozdily-rf-opynylysya-vidrizanymy-cherez-pidjom-vody-na-siverskomu-donczi/ ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1148686-vze-e-povidomlenna-pro-pidtoplenna-blindaziv-u-rosian-16-armijskij-korpus-pro-situaciu-na-vovcanskomu-napramku/

[xxxix] https://t.me/belpepel/15137

[xl] https://t.me/vvgladkov/16946

[xli] https://www.facebook.com/VilniusAirportOfficial/posts/pfbid02udRPCTKuzxcMoYfe8zjHVY6RfT9nSrvspWm62sFo29GgFe1Ea2RFUhpAuby5PGeAl; https://suspilne dot media/1148724-vilnuskij-aeroport-zakritij-cerez-nevidomi-povitrani-kuli/

[xlii] https://www.lrt dot lt/ru/novosti/17/2727119/ruginene-o-bor-be-litvy-s-meteozondami-granitsa-zakryvaetsia-shary-budut-sbivat-sia

[xliii] https://suspilne dot media/1149014-litva-pidgotuvala-plan-povnogo-zakritta-avtomobilnogo-kordonu-z-bilorussu/; https://www.lrt dot lt/ru/novosti/17/2727119/ruginene-o-bor-be-litvy-s-meteozondami-granitsa-zakryvaetsia-shary-budut-sbivat-sia; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/10/27/litva-snova-zakryla-granitsu-s-belarusyu-iz-za-vozdushnyh-sharov-teper-na-neopredelennyy-srok

[xliv] https://vsat.lrv dot lt/lt/naujienos/salcininku-punktas-nebeveiks-per-medininku-punkta-vykti-gales-tik-kelios-kategorijos-asmenu-bd5/

[xlv] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cp8em20q975o

[xlvi] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-21-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-19-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2025/

[xlvii] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-14-2025/

[xlviii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30755; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30727; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30724; https://t.me/wargonzo/30120;  https://t.me/dva_majors/82114

[xlix] https://t.me/mod_russia/57922

[l] https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/246648; https://t.me/dva_majors/82114

[li] warning graphic footage: https://t.me/serhii_flash/6489

[lii] https://t.me/severnnyi/5527

[liii] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1982713729625305397; https://t.me/ompbr57/1283; https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/1982497161624576045; https://x.com/PauliusZaleckas/status/1982716044751016297

[liv] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1982713729625305397; https://t.me/ompbr57/1283; https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/1982497161624576045; https://x.com/PauliusZaleckas/status/1982716044751016297

[lvi] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35472 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/14466 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/26502 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/30120

[lvii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30755 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30727 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30724 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/26502 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/30120

[lviii] https://t.me/rusich_army/26502

[lix] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1982529363796218281; https://t.me/pionergrupa/8942 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/82103

[lx] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30755 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30727 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30724

[lxi] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/1982621018352132391; https://t.me/taran_Z_war/15

[lxii] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35493

[lxiii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30755 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30727 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30724 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/14466 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/30120

[lxiv] https://t.me/motopatriot78/43764

[lxv] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35493

[lxvi] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35493

[lxvii] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35495

[lxviii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30755 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30727 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30724 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35510 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35495

[lxix] https://t.me/ukr_sof/2204 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/10/27/front-strike-sso-znyshhyly-pryfrontovyj-sklad-palyva-ta-naftobazu-okupantiv-na-luganshhyni/; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1148990-na-okupovanij-lugansini-bijci-sso-vrazili-rosijsku-naftobazu/ ; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/special-operations-forces-destroy-invaders-fuel-depot-and-oil-base-in-luhansk-region/ ; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1982747201349595319; https://x.com/Maks_NAFO_FELLA/status/1982746568186003766 ; https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/12204

[lxx] https://t.me/rybar/74685 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/30120

[lxxi] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30755 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30727 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30724 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35510

[lxxii] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35510 

[lxxiii] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1982727665787252988; https://t.me/stepnoi_veter/20675

[lxxiv] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30755 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30727 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30724 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/30120

[lxxvi] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/10/27/mozhut-nastupaty-bez-broni-bez-kasok-bez-nichogo-poblyzu-kostyantynivky-rosiyany-kydayut-v-shturmy-nenavchenyh-zekiv/

[lxxvii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30755

[lxxviii] https://t.me/gmsp1307/59; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1982724443635134598 ;  https://t.me/milinfolive/159277 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/25285 

[lxxix] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14470

[lxxx] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14472 

[lxxxi] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27901

[lxxxii] https://t.me/rybar/74621; https://t.me/yurasumy/25259

[lxxxiii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27901 ;  https://zaxid.net/ukrayinski_biytsi_vibili_rosiyan_z_sela_zolotiy_kolodyaz_na_donechchini_n1617216 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-12-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2025/

[lxxxiv] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30755 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30727 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30724 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35499 ; . https://t.me/rybar/74687 ; . https://t.me/wargonzo/30120

[lxxxv] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35499 ; https://t.me/rybar/74687 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/82114 

[lxxxvi] https://t.me/motopatriot78/43783

[lxxxvii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30755; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30727; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30724; https://t.me/wargonzo/30120\

[lxxxviii] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35499 ; https://t.me/rybar/74687  ; https://t.me/wargonzo/30120; https://t.me/dva_majors/82114

[lxxxix] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3059

[xc] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3060

[xci] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/184789; https://t.me/sashakots/57242

[xcii] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/184847

[xciii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30755 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30727 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30724

[xciv] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/102628

[xcv] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30755 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30727 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30724

[xcvi] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/184877

[xcvii] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1982502888988692840; https://t.me/AFUStratCom/31611

[xcviii] https://t.me/mod_russia/57913

[xcix] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1982723926334820671; https://t.me/voin_dv/17412; https://t.me/voin_dv/17414; https://t.me/osintpen/1976; https://t.me/voin_dv/17415; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10361; https://t.me/osintpen/1979

[c] https://t.me/mod_russia/57913

[ci] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/102628; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/102628; https://t.me/rybar/74710  

[ciii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30755; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30727; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30724

[civ] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30755; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30727; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30724; https://t.me/dva_majors/82114

[cv] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/likvidatsiia-okupanta-marzoieva-syna-rosiiskoho-henerala-ekskliuzyvne-video-vid-spetspryznachentsiv-hur.html ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/25707 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/23159

[cvi] https://t.me/rogozin_do/7743   

[cvii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30755; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30727; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30724

[cviii] https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/30015

[cix] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-19-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-23-2025/

[cx] https://t.me/kpszsu/45718

[cxi] https://www.facebook.com/kommander.nord/posts/pfbid0LkHaBivs9p2rGeH7ZGkKV1tVFovUanuakh4avRzsxsinVpiSM31Mmjsger2HEbpKl?rdid=9FdrTYOgQbcrkOo1#; https://suspilne dot media/chernihiv/1148814-vijska-rf-atakuvali-zaliznicnu-stanciu-u-korukivskij-gromadi-sonajmense-visma-sahedami/; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/25170; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1148744-ataki-na-infrastrukturu-ta-robota-ppo-ak-na-dnipropetrovsini-minula-nic-proti-27-zovtna/; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/51976; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/10/26/rosiya-vdaryla-po-bagatopoverhivczi-v-sumah/

[cxii] https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/50886 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/27541;

[cxiii] https://t.me/serhii_flash/6496