Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 19, 2025

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12 pm ET on October 19. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 20 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly reiterated his demand that Ukraine cede all of Donetsk Oblast as a condition for ending the war, and suggested that Russia would be willing to "surrender parts" of occupied southern Ukraine. Ceding Donetsk Oblast to Russia would set conditions for Russia to renew its aggression against Ukraine from more advantageous positions at a time of its choosing. Two senior officials told The Washington Post in an article published on October 18 that Putin told US President Trump on October 16 that Ukraine must cede the remainder of unoccupied Donetsk Oblast to Russia "as a condition for ending the war" and that he "would be willing to surrender parts" of occupied Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts in exchange.[1] The exact terms of Putin's reported offer are unclear. It is possible that Putin may have been referring to Ukrainian-controlled parts of Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts that Russia illegally annexed and does not occupy. Putin previously demanded the remainder of Donetsk Oblast in exchange for a ceasefire in August 2025, and ISW has continuously assessed that ceding the remainder of Donetsk Oblast disproportionately favors Russia.[2] Donetsk Oblast contains territory that is strategically vital for Ukraine's defense and defense industrial base (DIB), including the fortress belt – Ukraine's main defensive line in Donetsk Oblast since 2014, which  Ukraine has developed into a significant logistical and defense industrial hub.[3] Russian forces currently have no available means of rapidly enveloping or penetrating the fortress belt, which would likely take several years to seize at their current rate of advance. Ceding Donetsk Oblast to Russia would allow Russian forces to avoid a long and bloody struggle and continue fighting into deep rear areas of Ukraine from new positions along the Donetsk Oblast border.[4] Russian forces would have advantageous positions from which to launch attacks into eastern Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia oblasts or southern Kharkiv Oblast – areas that are significantly less fortified than the fortress belt. Such a withdrawal would also set more advantageous conditions for the ongoing Russian offensive to advance across the Oskil River in eastern Kharkiv Oblast and approach Izyum. Russia would have its choice of multiple, mutually supportive offensive operations to undertake should Ukraine cede Donetsk Oblast to Russia, especially if there is no guarantee that Russia will not resume offensive operations in Ukraine.

Russian officials and pro-Kremlin sources are attempting to portray limited Russian offensive operations in the Kherson direction as an ongoing offensive to recapture Kherson City — efforts that are incompatible with Putin's claimed readiness to make territorial concessions in southern Ukraine. Kherson Oblast occupation governor Vladimir Saldo claimed on October 19 that Russian forces control an industrial part of Kherson City in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast and several dacha areas on the Dnipro River Delta islands, so "therefore the [seizure] of Kherson [City] itself has already begun."[5] The administrative boundaries of Kherson City are limited to west (right) bank Kherson Oblast, so it is unclear which areas of east bank Kherson Oblast Saldo is referring to. Russian forces withdrew from all of west bank Kherson Oblast as of November 2022 following a successful Ukrainian counteroffensive and interdiction campaign.[6] Kremlin newswire TASS framed Saldo's statement to imply that Russian forces have begun a new concerted offensive effort to seize Kherson City itself — a significant undertaking that would require Russian forces to ford the Dnipro River and dedicate more manpower and materiel than is currently operating in the Kherson direction.[7] Russian State Duma Defense Committee Member Andrei Kolesnik claimed that Russian forces will seize Kherson City as it is a "constituent entity" that "must be returned to Russia," but noted that Russian forces will not do so "anytime soon."[8] ISW has yet to observe any indicators to assess that Russian forces are likely preparing for or have launched a renewed significant offensive operation against west bank Kherson Oblast.

Russian officials also downplayed the seriousness of Putin's reported proposal, likely in an effort to condition Russian society to accept the Kremlin's intent to continue its war effort in Ukraine. Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa claimed to Russian state media outlet Lenta on October 19 that occupied Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts "are recognized regions of Russia," following Russia's September 2022 sham referenda, and that any territorial concessions that Russia may have proposed "were expressed in a more relaxed manner."[9] These Russian officials are messaging to domestic Russian audiences that the Kremlin maintains its territorial claims over Kherson City and likely all of west bank Kherson Oblast, and that Putin did not seriously make territorial concessions in Ukraine as Western reporting suggests.

The Kremlin has also failed to prime the Russian information space, particularly Putin's main constituency of ultranationalists, to accept anything less than a full victory in Ukraine. A Russian milblogger characterized Putin's reported proposal as "utter nonsense" and noted that there is no reason for Putin to willingly trade a "convenient defensive line" on the Dnipro River and a land corridor to occupied Crimea through southern Ukraine in exchange for the remainder of unoccupied Donetsk Oblast.[10] Russian officials — including Saldo — similarly opposed making possible territorial concessions to Ukraine around the August 2025 Trump-Putin summit in Alaska.[11] Putin has held firm to his original war aims and territorial claims for over three and a half years of war, and ISW has not observed any indications that he is willing to make meaningful concessions on any of these aims for a lasting peace in Ukraine.[12]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that Ukraine made bilateral energy proposals to the United States. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on October 19 that Ukraine made proposals to the United States for gas infrastructure, nuclear power generation, and several other unspecified projects to contribute to Europe's energy independence from Russia.[13]

Ukrainian forces struck Russian oil infrastructure in Samara and Orenburg oblasts on the night of October 18 to 19. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Novokuibyshevsk oil refinery in Samara Oblast, and geolocated footage published on October 19 shows large fires and smoke plumes near the refinery's oil storage tanks.[14] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the primary oil processing unit and are still clarifying the damage. The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the Novokuibyshevsk oil refinery produces over 20 types of commercial products and processes about 4.9 million tons of oil per year. The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Orenburg natural gas processing plant in Orenburg Oblast as part of the October 18-19 strikes, and geolocated footage published on October 19 shows a fire at the plant.[15] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Orenburg natural gas processing plant is one of Russia’s largest natural gas processing complexes, processing up to 45 billion cubic meters of natural gas and 6.2 million tons of gas condensate and oil per year. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the strikes hit one of the gas processing and purification units. Orenburg Oblast Governor Yevgeny Solntsev claimed on October 19 that Ukrainian strikes caused a fire at and “partially damaged” an unnamed gas plant’s infrastructure in the oblast.[16] Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne reported that the Orenburg gas processing plant is the largest gas and chemical complex in the world.[17] The Kazakhstan Ministry of Energy, citing information from Russian state energy operator Gazprom, reported on October 19 that a drone strike caused the Orenburg gas processing plant to temporarily stop receiving gas from Kazakhstan’s Karachaganak oil and gas project, which uses the Orenburg facility to process Kazakh-produced raw natural gas.[18] Bloomberg reported on October 19 that Karachaganak is one of Kazakhstan’s top three oil and gas projects and that the Karachaganak oil and gas project cannot cut gas output without reducing crude oil, as the plant co-produces gas and oil.[19]

German officials reported observing unidentified objects resembling drones over Munich Airport on October 18. The Associated Press (AP) reported on October 19 that German authorities temporarily closed Munich Airport twice on the evening of October 18 due to several reports of unidentified drones operating nearby.[20] The AP reported that German authorities were unable to verify either instance and reopened the airport. The drone incidents, if confirmed, would mark the latest incident in an increasing trend of unidentified drone incursions near critical civilian infrastructure and military facilities throughout Europe.[21] ISW assesses that these unattributed drone sightings are likely associated with Russia’s “Phase Zero” campaign — the informational and psychological condition-setting phase — to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[22]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly reiterated his demand that Ukraine cede all of Donetsk Oblast as a condition for ending the war, and suggested that Russia would be willing to "surrender” parts of occupied southern Ukraine. Ceding Donetsk Oblast to Russia would set conditions for Russia to renew its aggression against Ukraine from more advantageous positions at a time of its choosing.
• Russian officials and pro-Kremlin sources are attempting to portray limited Russian offensive operations in the Kherson direction as an ongoing offensive to recapture Kherson City – efforts that are incompatible with Putin's claimed readiness to make territorial concessions in southern Ukraine.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that Ukraine made bilateral energy proposals to the United States.
• Ukrainian forces struck Russian oil infrastructure in Samara and Orenburg oblasts on the night of October 18 to 19.
• German officials reported observing unidentified objects resembling drones over Munich Airport on October 18.
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Pokrovsk and in the Dobropillya tactical area. Russian forces advanced near Lyman and Hulyaipole and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

See topline text.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on October 19 but did not advance.

Fighting continued in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Andriivka, Oleksiivka, and Kindrativka on October 18 and 19.[23]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on October 19 that medical staff of the Russian 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and reportedly under the operational control of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces) operating in Kursk Oblast are poorly organized, unable to provide quality medical care, and have low combat effectiveness.[24] The milblogger implied that VKS elements are actively participating in ground assaults and are sustaining more casualties than VKS medics are trained to treat. The milblogger claimed that North Korean forces in Kursk Oblast are actively testing North Korean weapons, including multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), in the Ukrainian theater to gain transferable insights into modern warfare.[25] The milblogger claimed that the Russian military command deployed a second battalion of the 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade to reinforce the brigade‘s reconnaissance battalion, operating in Varachyne (north of Sumy City). The milblogger claimed that the second battalion redeployed after Russian Northern Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Yevgeny Nikiforov found that officers of the reconnaissance battalion submitted false, exaggerated reports about positions on the frontline.[26] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are concentrating forces to attack in multiple unspecified areas of northern Sumy Oblast, and conducted airstrikes against Ukrainian forces near Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) and Ryzhivka (just south of Tetkino).[27]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Kursk Oblast border area.[28] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate in the Sumy direction.[29]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on October 19 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Tykhe (northeast of Kharkiv City).[30]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, and Tykhe on October 18 and 19.[31] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Tykhe.[32]

Order of Battle: Elements, including drone operators, of the Russian 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), the Chechen Zapad-Akhmat Battalion (reportedly of the Southern Military District [SMD]), and Kurchaloyevsky Rayon (Republic of Chechnya) Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) Detachment reportedly continue to operate in the Kharkiv direction.[33]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on October 19 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Ambarne (northeast of Velykyi Burluk) and Odradne (east of Velykyi Burluk).[34]

Russian forces attacked east of Velykyi Burluk near Odradne and toward Bolohivka on October 18 and 19.[35]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on October 19 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk).[36]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka and toward Dvorichanske; northwest of Kupyansk toward Mala Shapkivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Stepova Novoselivka on October 18 and 19.[37]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Kupyansk direction.[38]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Borova direction on October 19.

Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 19 indicates that Russian forces advanced southwest of Myrne (northeast of Lyman).[39]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces seized Myrne; and advanced north of Drobysheve and northwest,west, and south of and in central Novoselivka (both northwest of Lyman).[40]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Drobysheve and Serednie; north of Lyman near Novyi Myr and Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Myrne; east of Lyman near Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil on October 18 and 19.[41]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are attacking southeast from Kolodyazi rather than west of Yampolivka (both northeast of Lyman), refuting a Russian source’s claim that Russian forces’ geolocated positions southwest of Myrne indicate that Russian forces seized Myrne.[42] The Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces still control parts of southern Myrne.

Ukrainian 11th Army Corps (AC) Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported that Russian forces are building fortifications in the Serebryanske forest area (southeast of Lyman).[43] Zaporozhets reported that the number of combat engagements that Ukrainian forces reported dropped to 10 per day in October 2025, roughly half of the September 2025 daily average. Zaporozhets stated that Russian casualties increased to 98 killed and wounded per day in October 2025 from 93 killed and wounded per day in September 2025. Zaporozhets stated that the Russian military command is amassing infantry in the Serebryanske forest area and plans to attack Yampil with larger forces after tactics of sending small groups of two to three personnel to attack in waves failed to generate sufficient gains. Zaporozhets stated that Russian forces occasionally advance through Ukrainian lines on motorcycles.

A Ukrainian battalion operating in the Lyman direction published footage on October 18 of its drone operators destroying a Russian TOS-1A thermobaric artillery system.[44]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Hyperion Unmanned Systems Battalion of the 25th CAA (Central Military District [CMD]) are striking Ukrainian forces in Yampil.[45] Drone operators of the 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Lyman direction.[46]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on October 19 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk near Dronivka, northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka, southeast of Siversk near Vyimka, and south of Siversk near Pereizne on October 18 and 19.[47]

Ukrainian forces maintained positions or recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on October 18 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintain positions or recently advanced in southeastern Ivanopillya (south of Kostyantynivka) — an area in which Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[48] A Russian milblogger published a map on October 18 that indicates that Ukrainian forces maintain positions or recently advanced east of and in northern Volodymyrivka (southwest of Druzhkivka) — areas in which Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[49]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Orikhovo-Vasylivka; east of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Toretsk, Pleshchiivka, and Shcherbynivka; south of Kostyantynivka toward Berestok; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Volodymyrivka on October 18 and 19.[50] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Volodymyrivka.[51]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Chechen 78th Sever-Akhmat Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are striking Ukrainian forces in southeastern Ivanopillya.[52] Drone operators of the 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Volodymyrivka.[53] Elements of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) reportedly continue to operate in the southern Kostyantynivka direction.[54]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: A Russian milblogger claimed on October 18 that Ukrainian forces recently advanced south of Shakhove (east of Dobropillya).[55]

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and Ivanivka and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne on October 18 and 19.[56]

Order of Battle: Assault groups of the Russian 1st Slovyansk Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) reportedly continue to operate near Nove Shakhove (east of Dobropillya).[57] Drone operators of the 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Shakhove.[58]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the northern outskirts of Leontovychi (south of Pokrovsk).[59]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced within Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk).[60]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Novoekonomichne, Krasnyi Lyman, and Myrolyubivka; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Sukhyi Yar and Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on October 18 and 19.[61]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to infiltrate into Zvirove and Leontovychi (south of Pokrovsk) and complained that Russian forces need more drones in the Pokrovsk direction.[62] Another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian drones are significantly disrupting Russian logistics near Razine and Boikivka (both northeast of Pokrovsk).[63]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Bilytske (north of Pokrovsk).[64] Assault groups of the 27th Motorized Rifle Division (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in southeastern Pokrovsk.[65] Elements of the Storm Special Purpose Detachment of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Malynivka (northeast of Pokrovsk).[66]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on October 19 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself, east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka, and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya on October 18 and 19.[67]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating near Filiya and Horikhove (southeast of Novopavlivka).[68] Drone operators of the 433rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, CMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in unspecified areas of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[69]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on October 19 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of the Vyshneve-Yehorivka line (both southwest of Velykomykhailivka).[70]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Andriivka-Klevtsove; east of Velykomykhailivka near Voskresenka and Sichneve; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Vorone; and south of Velykomykhailivka near Sosnivka on October 18 and 19.[71] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kalynivske (south of Velykomykhailivka).[72]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) reportedly continue to operate near Kalynivske.[73]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 19 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Poltavka (northeast of Hulyaipole).[74] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers credited elements of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]), supported by elements of the 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA, EMD), with the seizure.[75]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Novomykolaivka, Novohryhorivka, and Malynivka on October 18 and 19.[76]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) reportedly conducted an FAB-3000 glide bomb strike against Ukrainian positions in Uspenivka and near Nove (both northeast of Hulyaipole).[77] Drone operators of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) and 5th CAA reportedly continue to operate in Zaporizhia Oblast.[78]

Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 19 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southeastern Prymorske (northwest of Orikhiv).[79]

Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk, Plavni, and Stepove and northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske on October 18 and 19.[80]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 4th Military Base (58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian equipment with Lancet loitering munitions near Preobrazhenka (just north of Orihkiv) and first-person view (FPV) drones near Orikhiv.[81] Drone operators of the Nemets group of the 3rd Assault Company of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Zaporizhia Oblast.[82] Drone operators of the 65th Airborne (VDV) Battalion (7th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian transport in the Zaporizhia direction.[83]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 19 that Ukrainian forces struck a fuel and lubricants depot in occupied Berdyansk on the night of October 18 to 19.[84]

Russian forces continued limited assaults in the Kherson direction, including east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi Bridge, on October 18 and 19 but did not advance.[85]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on October 18 to 19. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 62 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other strike drones, including about 40 Shahed drones, from the directions of Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Kursk and Oryol cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[86] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 40 Russian drones and that 19 drones struck seven locations. Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Military Administration Head Vladyslav Haivanenko reported that Russian drones struck apartment buildings, a store, and civilian cars in Shakhtarske, injuring 11 civilians.[87]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces launched a new glide bomb against Lozova, Kharkiv Oblast on October 18, about 130 kilometers from the frontline.[88] The milblogger claimed that the glide bomb is either a UMBP-5R rocket-propelled missile or a UMPK with a rocket engine. Ukrainian officials confirmed that a Russian glide bomb struck Lozova, damaging 12 buildings and injuring six civilians.[89] A Russian milblogger claimed on October 17 that Russian forces launched a FAB glide bomb with a UMPK at a range of 150 kilometers for the first time.[90]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on October 19 that Russian forces have launched 3,720 strike drones, 1,370 guided glide bombs, and almost 50 missiles against Ukraine since October 12.[91]

Ukrainian Main Directorate of Electronic and Cyber Warfare Head Colonel Ivan Pavlenko told the BBC in an interview published on October 16 that Ukraine needs to further develop its electronic warfare (EW) capabilities to counter navigation systems on Russian Shahed drones and glide bombs.[92] Pavlenko stated that Russian long-range drones use a Mesh system that relies on repeaters to transmit information between the drone and its operator, allowing Russian forces to increase the accuracy of drone strikes by using other drones as repeaters, instead of relying on local cell networks for navigation. Pavlenko stated that Russian forces increased the number of CRPA antennas in KAB glide bombs in response to Ukrainian EW effectiveness and that the large payload of jammed glide bombs still presents a threat when the bomb impacts, regardless of EW suppression. Pavlenko noted that CRPA antennas and the Mesh system are not cost-effective, however.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.