Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 5, 2025

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30 pm ET on October 5. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 6 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues attempts to deter the US from sending Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine by linking improvements in the US-Russian bilateral relationship to concessions from the United States on the war in Ukraine. Putin claimed in an interview published on October 5 that US provisions of Tomahawk missiles would "lead to the destruction" of the "emerging positive trend" in US-Russian relations - linking the prospect of improved US-Russian relations with limits on US support for Ukraine.[i] Putin is continuing to dangle the prospect of incentives that are unrelated to the war in Ukraine to extract concessions from the United States about the war in Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that Putin has been trying to facilitate US-Russian rapprochement, including by pressuring the Trump administration to engage in arms control talks, to secure Russia's desired demands in Ukraine.[ii]

Putin has been promoting various rhetorical lines to try to deter the Trump administration from providing Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles. Putin threateningly warned the United States against selling Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine on October 2, claiming that American military personnel would have to directly participate in Ukrainian Tomahawk strikes.[iii] Putin also claimed that such strikes would mark a "new stage of escalation" but would not change the battlefield situation. Putin made similar arguments when the United States was considering sending Ukraine ATACMS missiles, F-16 jets, and Abrams tanks. Putin appears to be trying different approaches – from threatening worsening bilateral relations to downplaying the missiles' usefulness – to influence US decision-making.

The Kremlin is trying to prevent the United States from providing Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine in order to retain the sanctuary that Russia enjoys in its rear. Ukrainian forces are able to conduct long-range drone strikes against a significant portion of Russia's rear, but the payloads on these drones are limited and not suitable to destroy specialized objects. Ukraine's ability to launch missile strikes deep into Russia's rear with larger payloads would allow Ukraine to significantly damage - if not destroy - key military assets in Russia, such as the Shahed drone factory in Yelabuga, Republic of Tatarstan, or the Engels-2 Air Base in Saratov Oblast from which Russia sorties strategic bombers that fire air-launch cruise missiles at Ukraine. Russia has been able to significantly scale up its Shahed drone production by expanding the factory in Yelabuga, allowing Russia to launch increasingly large and more frequent long-range drone strikes against Ukraine. Russia's nightly strike packages in September 2025 featured an average of 187 long-range drones (many of which are Shahed-type drones) per night, whereas similar strike packages in January 2025 only featured an average of 83 drones, for example. Russia notably started launching overnight strike packages that included over 500 drones more frequently in September 2025. ISW assesses that there are at least 1,945 Russian military objects within range of the 2,500-kilometer variant Tomahawk and at least 1,655 within range of the 1,600-kilometer variant. Ukraine likely can significantly degrade Russia’s frontline battlefield performance by targeting a vulnerable subset of rear support areas that sustain and support Russia’s frontline operations.[iv] Ukraine has reportedly launched mass production of its new, domestically produced FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile with a 3,000-kilometer range and 1,150-kilogram warhead, but the system remains unproven, and Ukraine will need time to scale up production.[v]

Russia launched its largest combined drone and missile strike against Lviv Oblast on the night of October 4 to 5 with 163 combined projectiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 53 missiles, including two Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles from the airspace over Lipetsk Oblast; 42 Iskander-K/Kh-101 cruise missiles from Samara, Kursk, and Bryansk oblasts; and nine Kalibr cruise missiles from the Black Sea.[vi] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 496 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones from the directions of Bryansk, Oryol, and Kursk cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and occupied Kacha, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 439 drones, one Kinzhal missile, 32 Kh-101/Iskander-K cruise missiles, and six Kalibr missiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that eight missiles and 57 drones struck 20 locations and that debris fell on six locations. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that six missiles did not reach their targets either because they were "lost in location" (likely referring to Ukrainian electronic warfare [EW] interference) or because Ukrainian authorities were still specifying their impact location as of 1400 local time. Lviv Oblast Military Administration Head Maksym Kozytskyi reported that Russian forces launched 140 Shahed-type drones and 23 cruise missiles against Lviv Oblast, killing four civilians, injuring eight, and damaging civilian and energy infrastructure.[vii] Lviv City Mayor Andriy Sadovyi reported that Russian strikes disrupted power supplies in the city and damaged the Sparrow civilian industrial park.[viii] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes also killed one civilian and injured 10 others in Zaporizhzhia City and disrupted power supplies in Zaporizhzhia City and Zaporizhia, Sumy, and Chernihiv oblasts.[ix]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukrainian state-owned gas operator Naftogaz Board Chairman Serhiy Koretskyi noted on October 5 that Russian strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure are a deliberate attempt to deprive Ukrainian civilians of heating ahead of Winter 2025-2026.[x] Russia's October 4 to 5 strikes targeting Ukrainian civilian and energy infrastructure are the latest in Russia's long-standing campaign to degrade Ukraine’s energy security ahead of Winter 2025-2026 and demoralize the Ukrainian populace. ISW recently assessed that Russia had likely been stockpiling ballistic and cruise missiles throughout September 2025 to conduct a few large-scale drone and missile strikes on select intermittent days.[xi]

Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Yuriy Ihnat stated on October 5 that Russia has modified its ballistic missiles to fly on quasi-ballistic trajectories and approach targets from multiple directions, decreasing the effectiveness of Ukraine’s Patriot air defense systems.[xii] Ihnat's October 5 statement confirms recent reporting from the Financial Times.[xiii]

The pro-Russian Georgian Dream party secured widespread majorities in municipal elections in Georgia on October 4, sparking mass protests that Georgian Dream officials tried to blame on Ukraine. Georgian security forces clashed with protesters in Tbilisi following local elections in which the Georgian Dream party won majorities in every municipality.[xiv] Kremlin officials, Georgian Dream officials, and Russian milbloggers baselessly accused foreign intelligence services of organizing the protests to launch a coup and destabilize the country.[xv] Georgia's State Security Service claimed that it confiscated weapons and explosives that protestors planned to use for sabotage missions on election day and that a Georgian representative of an unspecified Ukrainian military unit supplied the weapons.[xvi] ISW will continue to monitor the ongoing protests as the situation continues to develop.

Russia is likely leveraging its close relations with Serbia and Republika Srpska to threaten to destabilize the Balkans and undermine European cohesion. Former President of Republika Srpska (the Serbian political entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina) Milorad Dodik claimed on October 5 that the United Kingdom (UK), France, and Germany are planning to stage a "color revolution" in Serbia to destabilize and dismember the country and to weaken Serbia and the entire Balkan region.[xvii] Dodik claimed that European officials are misrepresenting the recent spate of unidentified drone incursions into European airspace to discredit Russia and promote confrontation.[xviii] Dodik claimed that the West is forcing Republika Srpska to hold illegitimate snap elections in order to undermine the US-backed Dayton Accords (which ended the 1992–1995 Bosnian War).[xix] Serbian President Alexsandar Vucic claimed on October 5 that NATO's decision to require each member state to allocate five percent of their GDP to defense spending is an indicator that the world is preparing for war and stated that Serbia would like to avoid such confrontation.[xx] Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) recently claimed that European officials were preparing to stage a "color revolution" in Serbia, mirroring Russia's rhetorical attempts to justify its invasions of Ukraine and aggression towards NATO members.[xxi] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is attempting to undermine the Dayton Accords to destabilize the Balkan region and undermine European cohesion.[xxii]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues attempts to deter the US from sending Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine by linking improvements in the US-Russian bilateral relationship to concessions from the United States on the war in Ukraine.
• The Kremlin is trying to prevent the United States from providing Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine in order to retain the sanctuary that Russia enjoys in its rear.
• Russia launched its largest combined drone and missile strike against Lviv Oblast on the night of October 4 to 5 with 163 combined projectiles.
• The pro-Russian Georgian Dream party secured widespread majorities in municipal elections in Georgia on October 4, sparking mass protests that Georgian Dream officials tried to blame on Ukraine.
• Russia is likely leveraging its close relations with Serbia and Republika Srpska to threaten to destabilize the Balkans and undermine European cohesion.
• Russian forces advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Nothing significant to report.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on October 5 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southwest of Glushkovo near Tetkino; northwest of Sumy City near Bezsalivka; and north of Sumy City near Oleksiivka and Varachyne on October 4 and 5.[xxiii] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Tetkino, Bezsalivka, Yunakivka, and Sadky (both northeast of Sumy City).[xxiv]

The Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian drone strikes are impeding Russian attempts to transport infantry in small boats across the Filinshchyna River in Kindrativka (north of Sumy City) to create a bridgehead on the opposite bank.[xxv] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces committed elements formed from Strategic Missile Forces personnel to reinforce elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) attacking near Oleksiivka, which the milblogger assessed indicates that Russian forces lack infantry in reserve. The milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division have been operating near Yunakivka for roughly two months without rotation or evacuation.[xxvi] The milblogger claimed that Russian companies with 20 to 30 servicemembers are considered at strength and that newly arrived servicemembers are often severely wounded. The milblogger added that Yunakivka is a contested “gray zone.”

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on October 5 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced near Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[xxvii]

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City toward the Travyanske Reservoir and Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Synelnykove, Vovchansk, and Vovchanski Khutory on October 4 and 5.[xxviii]

An analyst in a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Kharkiv direction reported on October 5 that the Russian military command recently deployed drone crews of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies and electronic warfare (EW) systems to the Ukrainian battalion’s area of responsibility (AoR) and that the Rubikon drone operators' goal is to disrupt Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs).[xxix]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on October 5 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Milove and toward Khatnie and east of Velykyi Burluk near Odradne and toward Bolohivka on October 5.[xxx]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on October 5 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; north of Kupyansk near Zapadne and toward Kutkivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe and Kamyanka and toward Kolodyazne; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on October 4 and 5.[xxxi]

Ukraine's Northern Group of Forces reported that Russian commanders are ordering subordinates to fire on civilians in and near Kupyansk.[xxxii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian unmanned ground vehicles, equipment, and personnel near Kupyansk with fiber optic drones.[xxxiii]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground attacks in the Borova direction on October 5.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advance: Geolocated footage published on October 4 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced along the railway north of Yampil (southeast of Lyman).[xxxiv]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in northern Drobysheve (northwest of Lyman) and northwest of Zarichne (east of Lyman).[xxxv] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to the railway and C051022 Lyman-Yarova highway southeast of Yarova (northwest of Lyman), threatening Ukrainian logistics in Drobysheve and Lyman.[xxxvi]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Drobysheve, Novoselivka, Shandryholove, and Serednie; north of Lyman near Ridkodub and Karpivka; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Myrne; east of Lyman near Torske; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil on October 4 and 5.[xxxvii]

Russian milbloggers claimed on October 5 that Russian forces conducted a FAB-3000 glide bomb strike against a bridge over the Siverskyi Donets River in Raihorodok (southwest of Lyman), and geolocated footage published on October 5 shows a strike against a bridge just northeast of Raihorodok.[xxxviii] An OSINT-analyst on X (formerly Twitter) reported that Russian forces built a makeshift bridge over the Zherebets River in the Lyman direction, allowing Russian forces to transfer at least five tanks, one infantry fighting vehicle, and one self-propelled artillery system over the river while windy weather prevented Ukrainian reconnaissance drones from flying.[xxxix] A geolocated image of the makeshift bridge indicates that Russian forces were able to transfer the equipment west of Nevske (northeast of Lyman in the Russian near rear).[xl] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have established fire control over the C051022 highway and the C051021 Zarichne-Drobysheve highway.[xli] The Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are striking the T-0514 Lyman-Slovyansk highway. The Russian milblogger claimed Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces out of Myrne, restoring the Russian supply route across the Zherebets River from Yampolivka (just east of Myrne across the river).

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on October 5 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on October 5 that Russian forces seized Kuzmynivka (south of Siversk).[xlii] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Vyimka (southeast of Siversk), Zvanivka (south of Siversk), and Fedorivka (southwest of Siversk).[xliii]

Russian forces attacked near Siversk itself; northwest of Siversk near Dronivka; northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka; and southwest of Siversk near Fedorivka on October 4 and 5.[xliv]

A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) only recently seized Vyimka, refuting the Russian MoD’s claim that Russian forces seized the settlement in September 2024.[xlv] The milblogger attributed the seizure of Vyimka to changes in the Russian command, likely referring to the reported removal of commanders within the 3rd CAA in late 2024 following false reports of Russian advances in the area.[xlvi]

Slovyansk City Military Administration Head Vadym Lyakh reported on October 5 that Russian forces struck an apartment building and an art school in Slovyansk with three guided glide bombs on the night of October 4 to 5, injuring eight civilians, including a 13-year-old.[xlvii]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 3 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southern Volodymyrivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[xlviii]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations east of Kostyantynivka near Predtechyne and Oleksandro-Shulytne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Toretsk; south of Kostyantynivka near Shcherbynivka, Pleshchiivka, and Ivanopillya; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar and Poltavka; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Volodymyrivka on October 4 and 5.[xlix]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka direction.[l] Drone operators of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Volodymyrivka and Koptieve (southwest of Druzhkivka).[li] Drone operators of the 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Torske (southwest of Druzhkivka).[lii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on October 5 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Zolotyi Kolodyaz (northeast of Dobropillya) and advanced east of Ivanivka (east of Dobropillya).[liii] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced east of Dorozhnie (southeast of Dobropillya) after a successful counterattack.[liv]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Dobropillya near Zolotyi Kolodyaz; east of Dobropillya near Shakhove; and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne on October 4 and 5.[lv]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Petrivka and Rubizhne (both northeast of Dobropillya).[lvi] Drone operators of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Toretske (northeast of Dobropillya).[lvii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on October 5 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Lazurnyi Microraion (in southern Pokrovsk) and advanced in southwestern Novopavlivka (south of Pokrovsk) and northern Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk).[lviii]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near and within Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Krasnyi Lyman, Novoekonomichne, and Mykolaivka; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Kozatske, Promin, and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novopavlivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on October 4 and 5.[lix]

A spokesperson of a Ukrainian airborne assault corps operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces cannot conduct frontal assaults and are instead trying to strike Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and attack from the flanks of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne and Rodynske.[lx]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 80th Sparta Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Myrnohrad.[lxi] Drone operators of the Smuglyanka Detachment and Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly coordinating with the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) to conduct strikes against Pokrovsk and Malynivka.[lxii] Drone operators of the Vega Spetsnaz Detachment (24th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade, Russian General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) and 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[lxiii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on October 5 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked south of Novopavlivka near Filiya and Yalta and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai on October 4 and 5.[lxiv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on October 5 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Piddubne; east of Velykomykhailivka near Sichneve; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Sosnivka, Berezove, Vorone, Ternove, Novomykolaivka, Komyshuvakha, and Maliivka; south of Velykomykhailivka near Kalynivske; and southwest of Velykomykhailivka near Verbove and toward Vyshneve on October 4 and 5.[lxv] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Verbove and Vyshneve.[lxvi]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Verbove.[lxvii] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (VKS and EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Vyshneve with glide bombs.[lxviii]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on October 5 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Novohryhorivka and Poltavka and toward Novovasylivske on October 4 and 5.[lxix]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Poltavka.[lxx] Drone operators of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Uspenivka (northeast of Hulyaipole).[lxxi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 5 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka; west of Orikhiv near Stepove and Plavni; and northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske on October 4 and 5.[lxxii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions with fiberoptic first-person view (FPV) drones in the Zaporizhia direction.[lxxiii] Drone operators of the 328th VDV Regiment (104th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate in the Orikhiv direction.[lxxiv] Elements of the 429th Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Stepove.[lxxv]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on October 5 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in the Kherson direction, including east of Kherson City toward the Antonivskyi Bridge, on October 4 and 5.[lxxvi]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 31st Separate VDV Brigade and the 299th VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[lxxvii] This data supports ISW’s October 1 report that the Russian command may have redeployed elements of the 98th VDV Division that were previously operating in Chasiv Yar towards Kherson.[lxxviii]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.