Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12 pm ET on October 24. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 25 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces continue to advance in central and western Pokrovsk, although the exact contour of the front line in and around the town remains unclear. Geolocated footage published on October 23 and 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central and western Pokrovsk and seized positions along the Pokrovsk railway line.[1] ISW has observed footage of small Russian infantry groups operating in central and western Pokrovsk over the last week (since roughly October 17) and therefore assesses that Russian forces likely maintain isolated but enduring positions south of the railway line in western Pokrovsk.[2] ISW defines the Assessed Russian Advance layer as verifiable areas in which Russian forces have operated in or conducted attacks against, even if they do not maintain control. Russian forces almost certainly do not maintain control over any positions in Pokrovsk, which is defined as “a tactical mission task that requires the commander to maintain physical influence over a specified area to prevent its use by an enemy or to create conditions necessary for successful friendly operations.”[3] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger acknowledged that the situation within Pokrovsk is unclear and that it is impossible to determine where Russian forces may hold enduring positions in the town.[4] Ukrainian forces continue to operate in Pokrovsk, although Russian forces appear to be undertaking significant efforts to consolidate advances and seize Pokrovsk in the coming months. Additional geolocated footage published on October 23 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in southeastern Pokrovsk after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[5] ISW assesses that this infiltration mission did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.

Russian forces are also attacking Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk), although Ukrainian forces appear to be defending more successfully in Myrnohrad at this time. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on October 24 that elements of the Russian 5th and 9th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly the 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are attacking Myrnohrad from Novoekonomichne, Myrolyubivka, and Mykolaivka (all northeast of Myrnohrad).[6] Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces recently pushed the limited number of Russian forces in Myrnohrad back from the eastern and northern outskirts of the town. ISW has yet to observe geolocated footage indicating that Russian forces have conducted successful infiltration operations beyond Myrnohrad's eastern outskirts, suggesting that Russian forces are struggling to penetrate Myrnohrad despite recently advancing into Pokrovsk. Mashovets stated that Russian forces are also struggling to hold positions in eastern Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk) and in Krasnyi Lyman (northeast of Pokrovsk).[7] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade recently advanced in southeastern Myrnohrad.[8] Other Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have temporarily paused their attacks in Myrnohrad and are advancing within Rodynske.[9] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Promin (east of Pokrovsk), and a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced further west of Promin.[10]

Ukrainian forces are also reportedly conducting limited infiltration missions into the Russian near rear northeast of Pokrovsk, underscoring the high degree of permeability of positions in the Pokrovsk direction. Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces recently infiltrated into the Russian near rear near Sukhetske (northeast of Pokrovsk) and ambushed Russian forces.[11] Mashovets stated that Ukraine's ability to also conduct infiltration missions indicates that Russia's forward line of owned troops (FLOT) is similarly porous to Ukraine's and that Russian forces are unable to deny Ukrainian forces access to all territory currently under ISW's Assessed Russian Advances layer. The increasingly porous front line near Pokrovsk and throughout Ukraine reinforces for both sides the importance of being able to seize on an opportune moment or defend against a surprise attack. The fact that Russian and Ukrainian forces occupy non-contiguous intermingled positions in and near Pokrovsk also complicates assessments on the timeline by which Russian forces may seize Pokrovsk. Pokrovsk had a pre-war population twice that of Toretsk, another large urban settlement in Donetsk Oblast that Russian forces expended over 14 months to seize after initially establishing positions in Toretsk in June and July 2024.[12] Russian forces may engage in several more months of combat before they fully capture Pokrovsk, assuming Russian forces do not collapse the flanks around Pokrovsk. Russian forces will also have to clear or force Ukrainian troops to withdraw from Myrnohrad before Russian forces will be able to fully exploit the seizure of Pokrovsk, as enduring Ukrainian positions in Myrnohrad would complicate Russian operations in the area.

The Kremlin continues its multifaceted cognitive warfare effort aimed at influencing US decision makers in Russia's favor in response to recent US sanctions. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on October 24 that Russian President Vladimir Putin "promised a stunning response not only to the Tomahawk missile deliveries...but to [any] attempt to carry out strikes deep into Russian territory."[13] The Kremlin has recently been engaged in a cognitive warfare effort framing the potential US provisioning of long-range Tomahawk missiles or any long-range missile strike against Russia as a red line, including by issuing overt threats regarding Russia's ability and desire to respond militarily to Tomahawk missile provisions.[14] The Kremlin's threat of a military response to Tomahawk missile provisions is the most recent line in its long-standing rhetorical effort to convince the West that a Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable due to Russia's supposed military prowess and advantages over Ukraine and the wider West. Russia's ongoing cognitive warfare effort to portray Russian victory as inevitable ignores the reality that Russian forces continue to make only minimal, grinding advances at disproportionately high casualty rates and that Russia is unlikely to obtain its strategic objectives in Ukraine by force in the short- or medium-term.[15] Russia often leverages threats, including nuclear saber-rattling, in order to obfuscate Russia's own military weaknesses and false claims that the West and Ukraine are escalating the war in order to justify Russian escalations. ISW has observed the well-demonstrated pattern that Russia escalates its war in Ukraine as soon as it develops new weapons systems and tactics that Russia assesses will help its war effort. ISW assesses that Russia will continue to escalate the war at any moment of its choosing in the future, regardless of whether the West provides Ukraine with military assistance. The Kremlin notably has not offered any assurances that Russia will refrain from escalating its war in Ukraine even if the United States were to refrain from provisioning Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles.

Peskov also blamed Ukraine on October 24 for the "protracted pause" in negotiations and claimed that Europe is encouraging Ukraine's unwillingness — a long-running Kremlin narrative designed to dually distract from Russia's continued intransigence and discredit the current Ukrainian government and Europe.[16] Russia has repeatedly attempted to deflect blame for its lack of substantive progress toward peace in Ukraine, despite the fact that Russia remains unwilling to compromise on its war aims in exchange for peace.[17] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov recently acknowledged that the West views Russia's negotiating position as "maximalist" and stated that "Russia has not altered its positions" and that Russia expects that the "root causes" of the war to be addressed.[18] Lavrov has continued to define the root causes of Russia's war in Ukraine as NATO's eastward expansion and Ukraine's alleged discrimination against Russian-speakers - similar reasons to those Russian President Vladimir Putin gave on February 24, 2022 when he launched the full-scale invasion.[19] Russian officials have repeatedly stated that Ukraine's neutrality, alteration of NATO's integral open-door policy, and the installation of a pro-Russian proxy government are the only conditions by which Ukraine and the West can address the supposed "root causes" of the war.[20] Zelensky, in stark contrast to Russia, has continually demonstrated Ukraine's willingness to engage substantively in the peace initiative, including most recently by articulating his alignment with US President Donald Trump on implementing an immediate ceasefire.[21]

The Kremlin is attempting to weaponize reinvigorated US interest in bilateral cooperation with Russia and involvement in initiatives to return Ukrainian children to pressure the US administration.[22] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on October 24 that Ukraine and its allies are promoting an "anti-Russian smear campaign on the children's issue" and that the US Senate is considering several "anti-Russian bills," including a bill recognizing Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism for the "abduction of Ukrainian children."[23] Kremlin-appointed Russian Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova recently implicated herself in the forced deportation and re-education of a Ukrainian teenager and admitted that she "stole" and re-educated the teenager into a pro-Russian ideology.[24] The Yale Humanitarian Research Lab estimates that Russia has likely deported upwards of 35,000 Ukrainian children, and ISW continues to observe reports that Russia maintains many "re-education" and militarization camps in occupied Ukraine and Russia.[25] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov reiterated Russia's desire to extend the New START Treaty despite recent US sanctions and claimed that "the first step toward cooperation could be the re-establishment" of dialogue on the treaty, which is set to expire in February 2026.[26] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin remains committed to attempts to engage the United States on issues unrelated to Russia's war in Ukraine in an effort to stall or bypass the negotiation progress and extract additional economic and political concessions.[27]

Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO and key Kremlin negotiator Kirill Dmitriev announced on October 24 that he is traveling to the United States to meet with Trump Administration officials.[28] CNN, citing sources with knowledge of the visit, reported that Dmitriev will visit with Trump Administration officials to continue discussions about the bilateral relationship.[29] Axios and Kremlin newswire TASS reported that Dmitriev will meet with US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff on October 25.[30]

The Russian Central Bank lowered its key interest rate for the fourth time since June 2025, likely in an attempt to increase capital available for the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) and to maintain the facade of domestic economic stability against the backdrop of new US sanctions and continued unsustainable wartime spending. The Kremlin continues to push the Russian Central Bank to pursue economic policies that will likely exacerbate Russia’s economic instability. The Russian Central Bank announced on October 24 that it lowered its key interest rate from 17 to 16.5 percent.[31] The Russian Central Bank acknowledged that it recorded significant cooling in sectors oriented toward external demand, likely referring to international trade. The Russian Central Bank assessed that current inflationary pressures will temporarily increase in late 2025 and early 2026 due to a number of external economic factors, in line with ISW's ongoing assessments.[32] The Russian Central Bank acknowledged that there are persistent tensions in Russia’s labor market, but noted that wage inflation is growing more slowly than in 2024. The Central Bank has largely leveraged monetary policy to cope with the economic consequences of Russia’s wartime economy and expanded the Russian money supply through military payouts, social projects, and investment in the DIB.

Ongoing intensified Western sanctions against Russia and Russia’s ongoing labor issues brought on by Russia’s war in Ukraine have significantly contributed to Russia’s economic instability. Russia’s strategy of incentivizing volunteer recruitment by offering large one-time payments to recruits alongside efforts to rapidly expand its DIB since 2022 has required Russia to significantly increase government spending to both sustain military recruitment and to augment the DIB’s labor force.[33] Russia has leveraged large federal and regional one-time bonuses (some of which are over ten times Russia's annual average salary) to incentivize Russians to sign military contracts rather than take other civilian jobs, and competition between Russia’s DIB and civilian enterprises is causing wage inflation for civilian positions and inflating prices in service industries writ large.[34] The Kremlin, however, recently began setting conditions to involuntarily mobilize reservists to fight in the war in Ukraine, which, if activated, would allow the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to reduce payments to soldiers and could potentially lower inflation by reducing one source of large government spending, which also exacerbates structural wage inflation.[35] ISW has not yet observed confirmation that Russia has begun compulsory mobilization of reservists at this time; however, the Kremlin is setting conditions for the possibility of such.

Russian forces recently launched a series of long-range strikes with modified glide bombs against Ukrainian cities, underscoring Ukraine’s urgent requirements for long-range air defense systems. The Ukrainian Southern Air Command reported on October 24 that Russian Su-34 fighters launched three long-range guided glide bombs against Odesa Oblast.[36] Odesa Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Kiper reported that the strikes were the first Russian glide bomb strikes against Odesa Oblast.[37] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces conducted strikes with modified long-range glide bombs against Poltava Oblast on October 20, against Lozova, Kharkiv Oblast on October 18, and against Mykolaiv City, Mykolaiv Oblast on October 16.[38] Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported on October 24 that Russian forces employed UMPB-5R precision guided glide bombs with an extended range of 100 to 180 kilometers and a payload of 100 kilograms — significantly smaller than the 500-to-3,000-kilogram payload of typical Russian glide bombs that Russian forces use against frontline and near rear Ukrainian positions and settlements.[39] Beskrestnov noted that the UMPB-5R glide bombs are a cheaper analogue to jet-propelled Shahed-type drones and missiles and are similar to previous Russian developments, such as the Banderol cruise missile and the D30 guided glide bomb. Beskrestnov previously reported that Russia relies on Chinese-produced jet engines to increase the glide bomb's range and that Russian aircraft launch the bombs from an altitude of at least 10 kilometers.[40]

Russian forces likely seek to restore their long-range strike capabilities, allowing Russian aircraft to operate farther from the front line and beyond the range of Ukrainian air defense systems. ISW observed that Russian forces reduced glide bomb strikes in late 2024 in response to higher rates of Ukrainian air defenses shooting down Russian aircraft.[41] The recent longer-range glide bomb strikes indicate that Russian forces are launching these new glide bombs without the same risk of Ukrainian air defenses, exploiting Ukraine's scarcity of air defense systems that have a long range and are capable of downing aircraft covering the front line. ISW continues to assess that a denser Ukrainian air defense umbrella, including an umbrella that uses more Patriot systems, would degrade Russia’s ability to conduct airstrikes, underscoring the critical necessity of timely Western provisions of Patriot air defense systems to Ukraine, as the system is the longest-range air defense option in Ukraine’s current arsenal.[42] ISW observed that Russian forces are attempting to use medium-range Lancet loitering munitions to counter Ukrainian unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) in the Black Sea at ranges over 50 kilometers, which may be part of Russian efforts to reestablish low- and high-altitude superiority to enable long-range glide bomb strikes against southern Ukraine from airspace over the Black Sea.[43]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is reportedly increasing its purchases of domestically produced cruise and ballistic missiles despite Western sanctions that aim to contain Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) production. Ukrainian military-focused outlet Militarnyi reported on October 24 that it received access to leaked Russian military procurement documents about Russian missile procurements from 2024 to 2027, indicating that Russia is scaling up its purchases of missiles.[44] Militarnyi reported that the Russian MoD ordered about 303 Iskander-K cruise missiles from Russian manufacturer Novator Design Bureau in 2024-2025 at a cost of between 135 to 142 million rubles ($1.6 to 1.7 million) per missile. Militarnyi reported that the Russian MoD ordered 95 modernized 9M729 Iskander-K missiles with a range of over 2,000 kilometers for 146 million rubles ($1.8 million) per missile. Militarnyi reported that the Russian MoD ordered 240 Kalibr sea-launched cruise missiles for delivery in 2022 to 2024 and ordered another 450 for delivery in 2025 to 2026 for a cost of about 168 million rubles ($2.1 million) per missile. The Russian MoD reportedly ordered 56 nuclear-capable Kinzhals for delivery in 2024-2026. Militarnyi noted that the cost of Kinzhal missiles may increase from 168 million rubles to between 175 and 190 million rubles ($2.2 to 2.3 million) per missile during the production period. The Russian MoD reportedly ordered 525 Kh-101 cruise missiles in 2024 for a cost of 164 million rubles (about $2 million) per missile and ordered 700 Kh-101s for 2025 for a cost of 171 to 194 million rubles ($2.1 to 2.4 million) per missile. The Russian MoD reportedly ordered four different Iskander-M ballistic missile variants totaling 589 missiles in 2024 and 643 in 2025 for a cost of 189 to 238 million rubles ($2.3 to 2.9 million) per missile. The Russian MoD reportedly ordered 18 "9M723-2" missiles, which Militarnyi assessed could refer to the "Iskander-1000," a new reported Iskander variant with an intended range of about 1,000 kilometers. The Russian MoD reportedly ordered 44 Kinzhal hypersonic missiles in 2024 and 144 missiles in 2025 for a cost of 366 million rubles ($4.6 million) per missile. The Russian MoD reportedly contracted indefinite numbers of Zirkon anti-ship missiles, which Russian forces use to strike ground targets in Ukraine, with planned deliveries of 80 missiles per year for a cost of 420 to 450 million rubles ($5.2 to 5.6 million) per missile. The extent to which these reported leaked documents reflect the Russian DIB's ability to deliver missiles to the Russian MoD on the contracted timelines and the planned deliveries of some of these missiles are unclear. The leaked documents, if authentic, indicate that the Russian MoD believes that Russian missile manufacturers are capable of increasing production of the cruise and ballistic missiles that Russian forces regularly launch at Ukraine despite Western sanctions that aim to curtail the Russian DIB's production capacity. Russian forces likely seek to rebuild their stockpiles of cruise and ballistic missiles and will very likely use increased production lines to launch larger and more devastating strike packages against Ukraine, underscoring Ukraine's critical need for air defenses.

Russian manned aircraft violated NATO airspace for a second time on October 23. The Lithuanian Armed Forces reported that a Russian Su-30 fighter jet and a Russian Il-78 Aerial Tanker illegally entered Lithuanian airspace on October 23, and NATO scrambled two Spanish Eurofighters from a Lithuanian base in response to the aerial incursion.[45] The Eurofighters are part of NATO’s ongoing Baltic Air Policing Mission. Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda condemned Russia’s incursion into Lithuanian airspace as a ”gross violation of international law.”[46] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) rejected accusations that Russian aircraft violated Lithuanian airspace, claiming that the Su-30 and Il-78 aircraft were conducting "scheduled training flights over Kaliningrad Oblast.”[47] ISW previously reported that three Russian MiG-31 interceptor jets violated Estonian airspace on September 19.[48]

German media outlet Kieler Nachrichten reported on October 23 that the Russian amphibious Ropucha-class landing ship Aleksandr Shabalin anchored near the entrance to Lübeck Bay off the German coast and blocked a shipping lane.[49] The outlet reported that the Russian ship is obstructing commercial vessels traveling a key shipping route linking the Baltic Sea to the North Sea. The Lübeck Bay is notably roughly 55 km from Kiel, the capital of the northern German state Schleswig-Holstein, where German authorities identified several unknown drones flying overnight on September 25 to 26.[50] German Federal Police stated that the Russian ship is currently operating in international waters and is neither violating international law nor international navigation regulations.[51] ISW continues to assess that Russia is increasingly engaging in covert and overt attacks against Europe and that ongoing Russian airspace violations and non-conventional activity are likely part of ”Phase Zero” — Russia’s broader informational and psychological condition-setting phase — to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[52]

Belarusian security officials are supporting Russian cognitive warfare efforts against Poland and Lithuania. Belarusian State Security Committee (KGB) First Deputy Chairman Sergei Terebov claimed on October 23 that NATO and Ukrainian military personnel are training a 9,000-15,000-strong “Belarusian Liberation Army” to attack Belarus.[53] Terebov claimed that the supposed "Belarusian Liberation Army" includes Belarusian "radicals," is recruiting additional members from the Baltics, Czechia, Poland, and Ukraine; and is training personnel in Poland and Lithuania. Belarusian officials have historically made absurd claims about alleged NATO efforts to destabilize the Union State – and therefore Russia — and previously amplified the claim of this "Belarusian Liberation Army" threatening the Union State in February 2024.[54] Terebov’s most recent statements come against the backdrop of Russia’s intensifying Phase Zero cognitive warfare operations and a previous Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) warning from September 30 that Ukraine could conduct a false flag attack against Poland to implicate Russia and Belarus.[55] Russia and Belarus could exploit Terebov's claim to justify future aggression against Poland and Lithuania, including sabotage operations and airspace incursions against NATO members near Belarus.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces continue to advance in central and western Pokrovsk, although the exact contour of the front line in and around the town remains unclear.
• The Kremlin continues its multifaceted cognitive warfare effort aimed at influencing US decision makers in Russia's favor in response to recent US sanctions.
• Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO and key Kremlin negotiator Kirill Dmitriev announced on October 24 that he is traveling to the United States to meet with Trump Administration officials.
• The Russian Central Bank lowered its key interest rate for the fourth time since June 2025, likely in an attempt to increase capital available for the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) and to maintain the facade of domestic economic stability against the backdrop of new US sanctions and continued unsustainable wartime spending.
• Russian forces recently launched a series of long-range strikes with modified glide bombs against Ukrainian cities, underscoring Ukraine’s urgent requirements for long-range air defense systems.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is reportedly increasing its purchases of domestically produced cruise and ballistic missiles despite Western sanctions that aim to contain Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) production.
• Russian manned aircraft violated NATO airspace for a second time on October 23.
• Belarusian security officials are supporting Russian cognitive warfare efforts against Poland and Lithuania.
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Kupyansk and Lyman. Russian forces advanced near Velykyi Burluk, Siversk, Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, and Velykomykhailivka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Recent Ukrainian strikes reportedly forced the Ryazan Oil Refinery to halt some of its refining units. Reuters reported on October 24, citing two industry sources, that Ukrainian strikes forced the Ryazan Oil Refinery to halt one of its primary crude distillation units after Ukrainian strikes damaged the unit on October 23.[56] Reuters noted that the primary crude distillation unit can refine up to 80,000 barrels per day or four million metric tons per year. The industry sources stated that the Ryazan Oil Refinery also halted operations at some adjacent units, including a reformer, a vacuum gasoil hydrotreater, and a fluid catalytic cracker. The Ryazan Oil Refinery is Russia's fourth-largest oil refinery and has annual refining capacities of 13.1 million tons of crude oil, 2.3 million tons of gasoline, 3.4 million tons of diesel, and 4.2 million tons of fuel oil.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Sumy City near Varachyne on October 24 but did not advance.[57]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian naval infantry units are concentrating near Kindrativka (north of Sumy City) in preparation for future assaults.[58] The milblogger claimed that existing Russian command-and-control (C2) problems near Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City) are worsening because the Russian units operating in the area - including elements of the 22nd and 33rd motorized rifle regiments (both 72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) - are not coordinating effectively and likely have competing areas of responsibility (AORs).[59] The milblogger claimed that these units will occasionally "beat up" and "purge" servicemembers within the units. The milblogger claimed that the Russian military command had hoped that appointing Colonel General Yevgeny Nikiforov as the commander of the Northern Grouping of Forces would result in the military command assigning Russian brigades and regiments clear areas of responsibility (AoRs) but that this has not happened yet.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) and elements of the 5th VDV Battalion of the 137th VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate in the Sumy direction.[60]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on October 24 but did not advance.

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on October 24 indicates that Ukrainian forces hold positions on Proletarska Street in western Vovchansk — an area in which Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[61]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on October 23 and 24.[62]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 116th Rosgvardia Special Purpose Brigade are reportedly operating near Vovchansk.[63] Elements of the 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), Russian Chechen 349th Akhmat-Russia Motorized Rifle Regiment, and 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th CAA, LMD) reportedly continue to operate near Vovchansk but are taking heavy losses.[64] Elements of the 2nd Battalion of the 82nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating near Hatyshche (just northwest of Vovchansk). Drone operators of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Vakha Battalion are reportedly coordinating with elements of the Russian 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) to strike Ukrainian positions in the Kharkiv direction.[65]

Russian forces recently advanced near Velykyi Burluk.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into central Bolohivka (east of Velykyi Burluk).[66]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces, including elements of the Storm Detachment of the 11th Tank Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th AC, LMD), seized Bolohivka.[67] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced toward Khatnie (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[68]

Russian forces attacked east of Velykyi Burluk near Bolohivka and Odradne on October 23 and 24.[69]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces recently conducted a mechanized assault in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 24 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently seized Myrove (northwest of Kupyansk) and advanced northwest of Holubivka (north of Kupyansk).[70] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a mechanized counterattack from positions southwest of Kupyansk and that elements of the of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and drone operators of the 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) repelled the counterattack.[71] One Russian milblogger acknowledged that Ukrainian forces had advanced in the area.[72]

Russian forces attacked near and in Kupyansk itself, east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and Pishchane on October 23 and 24.[73]

Order of Battle: Assault elements of the Russian 68th Motorized Rifle Division are reportedly operating in Kupyansk.[74] Drone operators of the 375th Separate Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion of the 47th Tank Division (1st GTA) are reportedly striking vehicles near Kivsharivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[75]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on October 24 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Novovodyane (southeast of Borova).[76]

Russian forces attacked east of Borova near Nadiya on October 23 and 24.[77]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 24 shows Ukrainian forces raising a flag in central Torske (east of Lyman), indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced into Torske and advanced in southern Zarichne (east of Lyman).[78] The Ukrainian regiment that published the footage reported that Ukrainian forces liberated Torske.[79]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Drobysheve, Shandryholove, Novoselivka, Serednie, and Karpivka and toward Yarova; northeast of Lyman near Myrne; east of Lyman near Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil on October 23 and 24.[80] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Drobysheve, Novoselivka, and Yampil.[81]

A source affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence reported on October 23 that some Russian forces have reached the eastern outskirts of Lyman and updated on October 24 that the eastern outskirts of Lyman's Skhidnyi Microraion are contested.[82] The Ukrainian source reported that Russian forces are concentrating infantry in the forests between Yampil, Lyman, and Zarichne for infiltration missions.[83] The Ukrainian source reported that Russian forces have drone superiority in the Lyman direction and that Russian drone operators frequently target Ukrainian drone operators or interdict Ukrainian logistics at drone operators' positions.[84] The Ukrainian source reported that Russian battlefield commanders only equip Russian infantry conducting infiltrations with grenades and small arms and do not provide additional provisions or weapons. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces hold positions in Ridkodub and that parts of Novomykhailivka (northeast of Lyman), Karpivka, Stavky, and Novoselivka are contested.[85]

Ukrainian news outlet Suspline reported on October 23 that Russian forces intensified their first-person view (FPV) drone strikes against the M-03 Izyum-Slovyansk highway in September 2025 and that Ukrainian forces have installed anti-drone nets along the highway.[86]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recently conducted a glide bomb strike with a unified planning and correction modules (UMPK) on Raihorodok (southwest of Lyman) and a FAB-1500 glide bomb strike on Lyman.[87]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Vyimka (southeast of Siversk).[88]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on October 24 that Russian forces seized Dronivka (northwest of Siversk) and credited elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) with the seizure of the settlement.[89] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Verkhnokamyanske (east of Siversk).[90]

Russian forces attacked near Siversk itself; northwest of Siversk near Dronivka; north of Siversk near Serebryanka; and southeast of Siversk near Vyimka on October 23 and 24.[91]

The Russian MoD reported on October 24 that Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov inspected the Southern Grouping of Forces in the Siversk direction.[92]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 85th and 123rd motorized rifle brigades (both of the 3rd CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating south of Zvanivka (south of Siversk).[93]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on October 24 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in southeastern Ivanopillya (southeast of Kostyantynivka).[94]

Russian forces attacked east of Kostyantynivka near Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Shcherbynivka and Ivanopillya; south of Kostyantynivka near Katerynivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Poltavka, Volodymyrivka, Sofiivka and Toretske on October 23 and 24.[95] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Sofiivka and Toretske (southwest of Druzhkivka).[96]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on October 24 that the Russian military command recently redeployed elements of the Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Division (18th CAA, SMD) to the Chasiv Yar (northeast of Kostyantynivka) area in preparation for a future attack toward Kostyantynivka.[97] ISW observed reports on September 6 that the Russian military command redeployed elements of the 70th Motorized Rifle Division to Chasiv Yar.[98] Mashovets added that unspecified Russian Naval Infantry elements are attacking from Poltavka (southwest of Druzhkivka) toward Novopavlivka (north of Poltavka) in an attempt to tie down Ukrainian forces near Shakhove and Volodymyrivka (both southwest of Druzhkivka), while other unspecified Russian forces break through to Novopavlivka to cut the C-050828 road that links Shakhove and Sofiivka with Druzhkivka.[99]

A Ukrainian official reported on October 24 that Russian forces conducted a drone strike against a wind turbine in Kramatorsk (northwest of Kostyantynivka) for the second time in the last week (since October 17).[100]

A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces in the Kostyantynivka direction prioritize targeting Ukrainian drone operators before conducting ground assaults.[101]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Sofiivka.[102] Drone operators of the 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian logistics near Toretske.[103] Drone operators of the 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC, reportedly under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are reportedly striking Ukrainian logistics near Kostyantynivka.[104]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on October 24 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Shakhove (east of Dobropillya) and north of Kucheriv Yar (northeast of Dobropillya) and seized Vilne and Ivanivka (east of Dobropillya).[105] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced up to the T-0514 Dobropillya-Kramatorsk highway near Zolotyi Kolodyaz (northeast of Dobropillya).[106] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces recently liberated Kucheriv Yar (northeast of Dobropillya).[107]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya near Zolotyi Kolodyaz and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne, Dorozhnie, and Mayak on October 23 and 24.[108] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked east of Dobropillya near Vilne, Ivanivka, Novyi Donbas, and Shakhove.[109] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Kucheriv Yar is a contested "gray zone."[110]

Mashovets stated that the Russian military command is trying to build up its force grouping near Zolotyi Kolodyaz and Kucheriv Yar and that elements of the Russian 8th CAA and unspecified naval infantry units are leading this effort with support from elements of the 114th and 132nd motorized rifle brigades (51st CAA).[111]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly operating near Shakhove.[112]

See topline text for reports on Russian activity in the Pokrovsk direction on October 24.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1435th Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely comprised of mobilized personnel) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction and experiencing a shortage of Mavic drones.[113]

Russian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into central Ivanivka (southwest of Novopavlivka) and southwest of Filiya (south of Novopavlivka).[114]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Novopavlivka near Dachne, south of Novopavlivka near Filiya, and southwest of Novopavlivka near Ivanivka on October 23 and 24.[115]

Russian forces recently advanced near Velykomykhailivka.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 24 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Zlahoda (formerly known as Pershotravneve, southwest of Velykomykhailivka).[116] The Russian MoD and Russian milbloggers credited elements of the Russian 64th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) with seizing Zlahoda.[117]

Russian forces attacked east of Velykomykhailivka near Oleksandrohrad; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Sosnivka south of Velykomykhailivka near Kalynivske and toward Orestopil; and southwest of Velykomykhailivka near Verbove, Vyshneve, and Oleksiivka on October 23 and 24.[118]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Novohryhorivka, Pavlivka, and Novovasylivke and east of Hulyaipole toward Zelenyi Hai on October 23 and 24 but did not advance.[119]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 24 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka; west of Orikhiv near Stepove, Stepnohirsk, Plavni, and Novoandriivka; and northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske on October 23 and 24.[120]

Ukrainian Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration Head Ivan Fedorov reported on October 23 that a Russian first-person view (FPV) drone struck a Ukrainian emergency service vehicle in Polohivskyi raion, Zaporizhia Oblast.[121] A Russian milblogger claimed on October 23 that several unspecified regiments of the Russian 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) participated in a recent mechanized assault against Mala Tokmachka.[122]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 328th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (104th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces southeast of Stepnohirsk.[123]

Russian forces attacked east of Kherson City near the Antonivsky railway and roadway bridges on October 23 and 24 but did not advance.[124]

The Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on October 24 that GUR forces identified and destroyed the firing installation of a Buk-M3 air defense system and two 1L119 "Nebo-SVU" air defense radars in occupied Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts and Crimea on October 23 and 24.[125]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted another series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on October 23 to 24. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 128 Shahed-type and Gerbera-type drones, including roughly 90 Shahed-type drones, from the directions of Kursk and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiivske, Crimea.[126] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 72 drones and that 47 drones struck 10 locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian KAB guided glide bomb strikes against Kharkiv City injured at least eight civilians.[127] The Kirovohrad Oblast Military Administration and Ukrainian railway operator Ukrzaliznytsia reported that Russian strikes against Novoukrainka disrupted the local power supply and damaged railway infrastructure.[128] Ukrainian state electricity transmission operator Ukrenergo reported that 12 Ukrainian oblasts introduced power outage schedules due to damage from Russian strikes, particularly on October 22.[129]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Belarus finished a Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) military exercise. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced that the four-day CSTO Indestructible Brotherhood-2025 and Barrier-2025 military exercises in Tajikistan ended on October 24.[130] The Belarusian MoD claimed that military contingents from Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan participated in the exercises, which involved about 1,500 servicemembers and 200 pieces of equipment.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.