Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 15, 2025

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:15 pm ET on October 15. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 16 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Kremlin remains committed to its rhetorical effort to dissuade the United States from selling Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine amidst critical policy debates. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov told Russian business outlet Kommersant in an interview published on October 15, entitled "Europe wants to turn the conflict in Ukraine into Trump's War," that a US sale of Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine "would be an escalation, and a very serious one at that."[i] Lavrov claimed that such a move would "cause colossal damage" to the normalization of US-Russian relations and undermine the bilateral improvements made since the Biden administration. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is waging a reflexive control campaign to deter the United States from authorizing the sale of Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine by threatening a deterioration in US-Russian relations.[ii]

ISW assesses that the US provisioning of Tomahawk missiles would not engender a significant escalation in Russia's war against Ukraine, and instead that the provisioning of long-range Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine would mirror Russia’s own use of commensurate Russian long-range cruise missiles against Ukraine. Russia regularly leverages a wide variety of long-range cruise missiles that are comparable to the US Tomahawk missile, such as Kh-series cruise, Kalibr cruise, Kinzhal aeroballistic, and Iskander ballistic and cruise missiles that Russia uses in its regular weekly, sometimes nightly strikes against Ukraine. Russia has leveraged most of these missiles since 2022 to strike Ukraine and began deploying Iskander-K cruise missiles in 2023.[iii] Russia escalated its war in Ukraine by conducting an unprecedented intermediate-range ballistic missile strike against Ukraine with its Oreshnik ballistic missile system with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV) in November 2024 and vowing to deploy Oreshnik systems to Belarus by the end of 2025.[iv] US Tomahawk missiles' long-range capabilities and sizable payload would enable the Ukrainian military to inflict substantial damage on key Russian military assets located deep within Russian territory, such as the Shahed drone factory in Yelabuga, Republic of Tatarstan, and the Engels-2 Air Base in Saratov Oblast, from which Russia sorties the strategic bombers that fire air-launched cruise missiles during Russian strikes on Ukraine.[v]

The Trump administration continues to voice support for additional military support for Ukraine ahead of the October 17 meeting between US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Trump stated on October 15 that Zelensky “would like” the United States to sell Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine and that he has spoken to Zelensky about the issue.[vi] US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth stated on October 15 that the United States “will take steps necessary to impose costs on Russia for its continued aggression” if Russia does not soon agree to negotiations to end its war in Ukraine.[vii] Hegseth urged allies to increase military aid to Ukraine, stating that a ”combat-ready Ukrainian army and strong European-led NATO are critical for deterring Russian aggression” and that the United States “stands ready to do its part“ to aid Europe.

The Kremlin continues to advance its messaging strategy designed to separate the United States from Ukraine and Europe to undermine NATO cohesion and support for Ukraine. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov further claimed during the October 15 interview that Europe seeks to turn the conflict in Ukraine into "[US President Donald] Trump's war" and that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Europe want to lead Trump "astray."[viii] Lavrov also claimed that Europe and Zelensky are giving Trump "ultimatums" and that he is shocked by Europe's attempts to make this "Trump's war." Lavrov appears to be seizing on the Trump Administration's repeated efforts to distance itself from the beginning and causes of the war in Ukraine.[ix] Lavrov's statements cohere with ISW's long-standing assessment that the Kremlin seeks to leverage narratives designed to undercut Ukraine and Europe in an effort to undermine NATO cohesion and support for Ukraine.[x]

Dutch officials recently observed unidentified drones operating near a NATO military exercise in Poland that may have disrupted military-grade communication systems, marking the latest incident in a trend of drone incursions across Europe. Dutch outlet NOS reported on October 14 that the Dutch Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed that Dutch soldiers participating in a NATO military exercise in Poland observed unidentified drones flying overhead and reported communication system disruptions.[xi] It is unclear whether the drones themselves or anti-drone countermeasures disrupted the communications systems. Authorities have yet to publicly identify the source of the drones or the identity of the pilots. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova denied any Russian involvement on October 15 in the recent drone incident and claimed that Denmark has not submitted a formal inquiry to Russia regarding the event.[xii] This incident marks the latest development amid an increasing trend of unidentified drones collecting actionable intelligence near NATO military facilities and civilian infrastructure across Europe.[xiii] ISW continues to assess that the unattributed drone sightings are likely associated with Russia's “Phase Zero” campaign — the informational and psychological condition-setting phase — to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[xiv]

Ukraine’s European partners announced new military assistance to Ukraine amid the October 15 Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein Format) meeting. U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth stated at the Ramstein meeting that the U.S. “expects” European NATO member states to “donate [and] purchase even more to provide for Ukraine” through NATO’s new Prioritized Ukrainian Requirements List (PURL) initiative.[xv] Finnish Defense Minister Antti Häkkänen announced that Finland will join the PURL initiative.[xvi] Lithuanian Defense Minister Dovilė Šakalienė announced that Lithuania will allocate $30 million for the PURL program.[xvii] The Netherlands announced that it will provide Ukraine with 90 million euros (roughly $104.7 million) for the production of reconnaissance and strike drones in Ukraine.[xviii] The Norwegian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced that it will allocate 5.9 billion euros (roughly $6.86 billion) of its 2026 national budget for military aid to Ukraine.[xix]

European officials report that UK sanctions and NATO joint military operations are inhibiting Russia’s illicit shadow fleet. UK Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper announced on October 15 that the UK imposed sanctions on the Russian state oil company Rosneft and the private Russian oil company Lukoil, as well as 44 tankers involved in the Russian shadow fleet, to “tighten the pressure on Russia’s economy.”[xx] Oil sales by Rosneft and Lukoil support the Russian government's ability to fund the war in Ukraine.[xxi] A NATO military representative reported on October 14 that NATO's Operation “Baltic Sentry” – which enhances NATO’s protection of critical undersea infrastructure – is forcing the RUAF Navy to expend “significant” resources to protect Russian shipping vessels and is degrading the effectiveness of Russia's shadow fleet.[xxii]

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin remains committed to its rhetorical effort to dissuade the United States from selling Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine amidst critical policy debates.
• The Trump administration continues to voice support for additional military support for Ukraine ahead of the October 17 meeting between US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.
• The Kremlin continues to advance its messaging strategy designed to separate the United States from Ukraine and Europe to undermine NATO cohesion and support for Ukraine.
• Dutch officials recently observed unidentified drones operating near a NATO military exercise in Poland that may have disrupted military-grade communication systems, marking the latest incident in a trend of drone incursions across Europe.
• Ukraine’s European partners announced new military assistance to Ukraine amid the October 15 Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein Format) meeting.
• European officials report that UK sanctions and NATO joint military operations are inhibiting Russia’s illicit shadow fleet.
• Russian forces advanced in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast and near Pokrovsk and Velykomykhailivka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. 

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces executed a costly hack attack against a prominent Russian Internet provider. Unspecified Ukrainian intelligence sources told Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne on October 15 that Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) hackers attacked the infrastructure of Russian regional internet provider Orion Telecom, causing roughly 66 million rubles (approximately $839,000) in losses and compromising users' private data.[xxiii] Suspilne noted that Russian law requires that the provider pay a 15 million ruble (roughly $190,000) fine related to the data leak.

Ukrainian forces continue to conduct long-range strikes against Russia's energy sector to exacerbate chronic gasoline shortages in Russia and occupied Ukraine. OSINT analysts published footage on October 15 showing smoke rising from the Bashneft-UNPZ oil refinery in Ufa, Republic of Bashkortostan and reported that Ukrainian forces conducted their fourth strike against the refinery within a month.[xxiv] The analysts noted that the facility is one of Russia's largest refineries that supplies the Russian military. The facility is located 1,400 kilometers from Ukraine, and the analysts noted that it has an annual production capacity of approximately 23 to 26 million tons and consists of three smaller oil refineries: the Ufimsky, Ufaneftekhim, and Novoil refineries. Ukrainian forces last struck the facility on October 11, which damaged the facility’s AVT-5 unit - a critical component of the oil refining process.[xxv]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on October 15 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Kindrativka (north of Sumy City) and in southern Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[xxvi]

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Kindrativka and Oleksiivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, on October 14 and 15.[xxvii] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Oleksiivka.[xxviii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Aida Detachment are reportedly operating near Oleksiivka and Kindrativka and elements of the 1434th Akhmat-Chechnya Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division [ADCON]) and of the 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating near Novomykolaivka and Varachyne (both north of Sumy City).[xxix] Elements of the 810th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are reportedly operating near Kindrativka.[xxx] Elements of the 1st Battalion of the 119th VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) and elements of the 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in Yunakivka.[xxxi]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on October 15 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in western Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[xxxii]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchanski Khutory, Synelnykove, Tykhe, and Vovchansk and toward Okhrimivka on October 14 and 15.[xxxiii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Tykhe.[xxxiv]

Russian security forces claimed that Russian forces used a Geran-2 drone to strike a Ukrainian first-person view (FPV) production facility in Kharkiv Oblast.[xxxv]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), including its 1009th Motorized Rifle Regiment, and the 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], LMD) are reportedly attacking in Vovchansk.[xxxvi]

Ukrainian forces maintained positions or recently advanced in the Velykyi Burluk direction.

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on October 11 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintain or recently advanced north of Bolohivka (east of Velykyi Burluk) — an area in which Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[xxxvii]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Odradne (east of Velykyi Burluk).[xxxviii]

Russian forces attacked east of Velykyi Burluk near Odradne and toward Bolohivka on October 14 and 15.[xxxix]

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th CAA) and Federal Security Service (FSB) Border Guards reportedly struck a bridge in Ambarne (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[xl]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on October 15 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; north of Kupyansk near Zapadne and toward Kutkivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka and toward Kolodyazne; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Stepova Novoselivka on October 14 and 15.[xli] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Radkivka (north of Kupyansk).[xlii]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone regiment operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on October 15 that Russian forces continue attempts to cross the Oskil River and are striking bridges across the river with artillery and drones while employing “shoot and scoot” artillery tactics to avoid Ukrainian drone surveillance.[xliii] The regimental commander stated that Russian forces shifted tactics to exploit foliage and swampy terrain near the Oskil River during crossing attempts after Ukrainian forces identified and defeated Russian attempts to infiltrate northern Kupyansk through a gas pipe in early September 2025.[xliv]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Tiger drone detachment of the 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Pishchane.[xlv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on October 15 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Borova toward Novoplatonivka and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on October 14 and 15.[xlvi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on October 15 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Shandryholove and into northern Drobysheve and Novoselivka (all northwest of Lyman).[xlvii]

Russian forces attacked toward Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Serednie, Drobysheve, Derylove, Novoselivka, and Shandryholove; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; east of Lyman near Torske; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil on October 14 and 15.[xlviii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Lyman direction.[xlix]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on October 15 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in southeastern Dronivka (northwest of Siversk).[l]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk near Dronivka and toward Zakitne; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka and Hryhorivka; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; and south of Siversk near Zvanivka, Pereizne, and Fedorivka on October 14 and 15.[li]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions north of Svyato-Pokrovske (southwest of Siversk).[lii] Drone operators of the Smuglyanka Detachment and Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Siversk.[liii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on October 15 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Orikhovo-Vasylivka; east of Kostyantynivka near Stupochky and Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka, Bila Hora, and Toretsk; south of Kostyantynivka near Shcherbynivka, Oleksandro-Kalynove, and Ivanopillya and toward Berestok; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar and Poltavka; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Volodymyrivka and toward Sofiivka on October 14 and 15.[liv]

The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka area reported that Russian forces are trying to disrupt Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the near rear but that there have been few changes to the frontline in the Kostyantynivka direction since June 2025.[lv] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are leveraging sleeper drones along intersections and remotely mining Ukrainian logistics.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 13th Rusichi Assault Detachment (former 13th Assault Detachment of Wagner Group) of the 1194th Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd CAA, formerly 2nd LNR AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Pleshchiiivka.[lvi] Drone operators of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Ivanopillya (southeast of Kostyantynivka).[lvii] Reconnaissance elements of the 163rd Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) and drone operators of the 57th Spetsnaz Company (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Volodymyrivka.[lviii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on October 15 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked toward Dobropillya itself; northeast of Dobropillya near Zolotyi Kolodyaz, Vesele and Hruzke; east of Dobropillya near Shakhove, Nove Shakhove, and Novyi Donbas; and southeast of Dobropillya near Drozhnie, Zapovidne, and Bilytske on October 14 and 15.[lix]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian logistics near Dorozhnie and Novyi Donbas.[lx]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 14 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southern Pokrovsk.[lxi]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are advancing near Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk) and into the high-rise buildings in southern Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk).[lxii] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized the entirety of Novopavlivka (south of Pokrovsk).[lxiii]

Russian forces recently attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Sukhetske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Krasnyi Lyman, Myrolyubivka, Novoekonomichne, and Mykhailivka; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Promin and Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Chunyshyne and Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on October 14 and 15.[lxiv] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in Rodynske.[lxv]

Geolocated footage published on October 14 shows a servicemember of the Russian Siberskyi Vityaz (Siberian Knight) Motorized Rifle Regiment (55th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) holding a flag in central Novopavlivka (south of Pokrovsk) in what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[lxvi] ISW assesses that this event did not advance the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).

The deputy commander of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces are increasingly integrating mechanized assaults with infantry assaults in this direction.[lxvii] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian drones can reach over 20 kilometers beyond the FEBA in the Pokrovsk direction and that some of Russia's best drone operators are operating near Pokrovsk.[lxviii] The brigade assessed that the "kill zone" (an area immediately near the frontline where a mass of tactical strike and reconnaissance drones pose an elevated risk to any equipment or personnel that enters the area) will only expand in the coming months. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces struck Ukrainian forces with Molniya-2 loitering munitions in the Pokrovsk direction.[lxix]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian Storm Special Purpose Detachment of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating along the T-0515 highway north of Pokrovsk.[lxx]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on October 15 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself, east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka, southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove and Novoukrainka, south of Novopavlivka near Filiya and Yalta, and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai and Ivanivka on October 14 and 15.[lxxi] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces are repelling Ukrainian counterattacks near Ivanivka.[lxxii]

The commander of a Ukrainian mechanized battalion operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported that Russian forces are starting to use more motorized vehicles in the area since falling foliage is providing less concealment from drones for Russian infantry.[lxxiii] The commander stated that Russian forces have achieved some recent success in the Novopavlivka direction due to their manpower advantage.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 91st Rifle Regiment (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian equipment in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[lxxiv]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Velykomykhailivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 15 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Oleksiivka (southwest of Velykomykhailivka).[lxxv] The Russian MoD credited elements of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) with seizing Oleksiivka.[lxxvi]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Oleksiivka.[lxxvii]

Russian forces recently attacked near Velykomykhailivka itself; northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Andriivka-Klevtsove; east of Velykomykhailivka near Oleksandrohrad and Sichneve; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Maliivka, Sosnivka, and Vorone; and southwest of Velykomykhailivka near Verbove and Oleksiivka on October 14 and 15.[lxxviii]

Geolocated footage published on October 15 shows that elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) recently struck a bridge over the Vovcha River near Pokrovske (west of Velykomykhailivka).[lxxix] ISW previously forecasted that Russian forces may leverage advances in western Donetsk Oblast to launch an offensive operation toward Pokrovske, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[lxxx] Further Russian advances into southern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and Russian interdiction efforts in the area support this forecast.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 16th Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Defense Brigade (EMD) are reportedly operating in the Vremivka (Velykomykhailivka) direction.[lxxxi]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on October 15 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintain positions or recently advanced west of Malynivka (east of Hulyaipole) — an area in which Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[lxxxii]

[lxxxiii]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 15 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Novomykolaivka (northeast of Hulyaipole).[lxxxiv]

Russian forces attacked north of Hulyaipole toward Krasnohirske, northeast of Hulyaipole near Poltavka and Novohryhorivka and toward Uspenivka, and east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on October 14 and 15.[lxxxv]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 305th Artillery Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Zelenyi Hai (east of Hulyaipole).[lxxxvi] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Uspenivka (northeast of Hulyaipole).[lxxxvii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 15 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka; southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove and Kamyanske; and west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk, Plavni,and Prymorske on October 14 and 15.[lxxxviii] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Prymorske and Stepnohirsk.[lxxxix]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Orikhiv direction reported that Russian forces are trying to recapture Maly Shcherbaky (west of Orikhiv), attacking in waves of small groups with drone and artillery cover.[xc]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Nemets group of the 3rd Assault Company of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions along the T-0408 Novodanylivka-Orikhiv highway.[xci] Elements of the 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) reportedly continue to operate in Zaporizhia Oblast.[xcii]

Russian forces continued assaults in the Kherson direction on October 15 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces crossed the Dnipro River and advanced onto Karantynnyy Island (just southwest of Kherson City on the west (right) bank).[xciii]

Russian forces attacked in the Kherson direction on October 15.[xciv]

The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed on October 15 that Ukrainian forces struck the Feodosia Offshore Oil Terminal in occupied Crimea on October 13, damaging 16 fuel tanks and causing a large-scale fire that is ongoing.[xcv] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a Russian drone control point in occupied Oleshky, Kherson Oblast, and a Russian P18 radar system in occupied Krasna Poliana, Crimea, on the night of October 14 to 15.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 14 to 15. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 113 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones – including about 50 Shahed-type drones – from the directions of Bryansk and Kursk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[xcvi] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 86 drones, that 26 drones hit 11 locations, and that drone debris fell at one location. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck energy and civilian infrastructure in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, and Sumy oblasts, leaving over 100,000 households in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast without electricity.[xcvii] Ukrainian state electricity transmission operator Ukrenergo announced on October 15 that it placed electricity consumption limits on all regions of Ukraine except Donetsk Oblast and parts of Chernihiv Oblast due to damage from Russian strikes.[xcviii]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Russia and Belarus continue to platform deepening military cooperation within the Union State framework. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov met with Belarusian Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin on October 15 in Moscow City to discuss creating and strengthening the necessary military potential to counter threats to the Union State.[xcix] Belousov claimed that Russia and Belarus are enhancing combat capabilities with unified regional air defense systems. Belousov noted that Russia and Belarus conduct over 150 joint military exercises annually and that Russia and Belarus in May 2025 held a conference in Minsk on Russian-Belarusian military readiness, which incorporated lessons learned from the war in Ukraine.[c] Belousov claimed that Russia and Belarus will approve the bilateral Strategic Partnership Program for 2026 to 2030 in the near future.[ci]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.