2 days ago

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 4, 2025

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:45 am ET on October 4. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 5 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

German officials reported more unidentified drone sightings near airports and military facilities. The Munich Airport reported on October 4 that authorities closed the airport on the night of October 3 to 4 due to unidentified drones operating near the airport — the second time in less than 24 hours that the airport closed due to drones.[1] German outlet Bild reported on October 4, citing unnamed security sources, that authorities determined that the unidentified drones operating near the Munich Airport were military reconnaissance drones and that German authorities also detected an unidentified small aircraft flying near an ammunition depot near Jever on October 3.[2] Bild reported that German authorities arrested a Croatian man piloting a drone roughly 700 meters from the Frankfurt Airport on October 3 and that three unidentified drones flew over the Federal Police Aviation Squadron Headquarters in Gifhorn on October 2. These unidentified aerial incursions near critical German infrastructure come against the backdrop of Russia's ongoing attempts to destabilize Europe and undermine NATO’s cohesion.[3]

 

Russia continues to challenge and probe NATO states' capabilities, possibly as part of preparations for a potential future Russia-NATO war. UK Space Command Head Major General Paul Tedman told the BBC in an article published on October 2 that Russia has been trying to jam British military satellites with ground-based systems weekly.[4] Tedman stated that Russia is "flying relatively close" to the UK satellites and is trying to collect information. Tedman noted that this Russian activity is deliberate and has increased since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Tedman noted that Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC) have tested anti-satellite weapons and that Russia is developing the capability to put nuclear weapons in space. Tedman assessed that the PRC has more sophisticated capabilities, but that Russia has a greater will to use its counter-space systems. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius reported on September 25 that Russia had used two Olymp-K satellites to track German military Intelsat satellites.[5] Pistorius stated that Russia and the PRC can jam, blind, manipulate, or kinetically disrupt satellites.

 

Russian forces conducted a combined missile and drone strike against Ukraine that resulted in civilian casualties and damaged critical energy infrastructure. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched three Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Rostov and Voronezh oblasts and 109 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones from the directions of Bryansk, Oryol, and Kursk cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai on the night of October 3 and 4.[6] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 73 drones over northern and eastern Ukraine, that three missiles and 36 drones hit 21 locations, and that drone debris fell on four locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck a civilian train in Shostka, Sumy Oblast, during the day on October 4 with Shahed-type drones, killing one civilian and injuring at least 30 others.[7] Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne reported on October 4 that Russian forces conducted a Shahed-type drone strike against agricultural enterprises in Sumy Oblast, damaging two warehouses storing 700 tons and 1,000 tons of grain, respectively.[8] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes disrupted power supplies in Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Chernihiv oblasts and injured civilians and damaged residential infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv oblasts.[9] Russia is likely prioritizing strikes against civilians and energy infrastructure to continue its long-standing campaign to degrade Ukraine's energy security ahead of Winter 2025-2026 and demoralize the Ukrainian populace.[10]

 
Ukraine continues to conduct long-range strikes against Russian oil refineries, exacerbating ongoing gasoline shortages in Russia and occupied Ukraine. The Ukrainian General Staff and Special Operations Forces (SSO) reported on October 4 that Ukrainian forces, with support from the Russian insurgency group Chernaya Iskra, conducted a strike against the Kirishinefteorgsintez Oil Refinery in Kirishi, Leningrad Oblast, on the night of October 3 to 4.[11] The SSO reported that Ukrainian forces, in coordination with Chernaya Iskra, struck the oil refinery's installation that produces linear alkylbenzenes and linear alkylaromatic sulphonates, and the installation that filters impurities from the oil. The SSO reported that this is the third Ukrainian strike against the facility in 2025 and that the oil refinery has an annual processing capacity of roughly 20.1 million tons. Ukrainian Center for Combatting Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported on October 4 that the Kirishinefteorgsintez Oil Refinery is one of Russia's five largest refineries.[12] Geolocated footage published on October 4 shows fires near the oil refinery in Kirishi, and NASA Fire Information for Resource Management (FIRMS) shows heat anomalies in the area. Leningrad Oblast Governor Alexander Drozdenko claimed on October 4 that Russian forces downed seven drones over Kirishi and that a fire started in the industrial zone.[13]

 

A Russian insider source claimed on October 3 that the Khabarovsk Krai Prosecutor's Office is intervening to assess the actions, particularly those related to pricing, of government agencies and selling fuel that are affecting the worsening gasoline shortages in the region.[14] The insider source claimed that Khabarovsk Krai Governor Dmitry Demeshin claimed that private gas stations were unable to purchase enough gasoline, which has exacerbated shortages and price increases. The insider source claimed that private gasoline stations are closing in order to avoid profit losses. The insider source claimed that Russia's Far East, eastern Siberia, northern Caucasus region, and occupied Crimea are at an increased risk of gasoline shortages and that ongoing Ukrainian strikes against oil refineries west of the Ural Mountains coincided with scheduled maintenance, leading to a 10 to 11 percent reduction in anticipated gasoline and diesel fuel production in September 2025. The insider source claimed that 16 of Russia's 38 oil refineries, many of which Ukrainian forces have struck repeatedly in recent months, are in regions that are experiencing rising gasoline costs. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on October 4 that residents in Biysk, Altai Krai, are reporting acute AI-92 and AI-95 gasoline shortages that are resulting in long lines and local complaints about rising gas prices. Astra reported that residents noted that roughly half of the gasoline stations in Biysk have closed.

 

Key Takeaways:

  • German officials reported more unidentified drone sightings near airports and military facilities.
  • Russia continues to challenge and probe NATO states' capabilities, possibly as part of preparations for a potential future Russia-NATO war.
  • Russian forces conducted a combined missile and drone strike against Ukraine that resulted in civilian casualties and damaged critical energy infrastructure.
  • Ukraine continues to conduct long-range strikes against Russian oil refineries, exacerbating ongoing gasoline shortages in Russia and occupied Ukraine.
  • Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Siversk, Pokrovsk, and Velykomykhailivka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

 

  • Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
  • Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
  • Significant Activity in Belarus

 

 

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

 

Ukrainian forces reportedly struck Russian military assets in the Republic of Karelia and Kursk Oblast. The Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) reported that SSO elements struck the Russian Grad Buyan-M-class corvette on Lake Onega, Republic of Karelia, on the morning of October 4, damaging the vessel's power plant compartment.[15] The SSO reported that the ship was sailing from the Baltic Sea to the Caspian Sea at the time of the strike and noted that the ship's main armament is the Kalibr missile system. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 4 that Ukrainian forces struck a Harmony radar system and a transport-loading vehicle from an Iskander missile defense system in an unspecified area of Kursk Oblast.[16]

 

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on October 4 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Kindrativka, Oleksiivka, and Kostyantynivka, and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, on October 3 and 4.[17] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Oleksiivka, Kostyantynivka, Andriivka (north of Sumy City), Yunakivka, and Sadky (northeast of Sumy City).[18]

 

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on October 4 that the Russian military command is attempting to prepare an offensive in Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) but that almost no Russian forces are reaching the staging areas due to Ukrainian strikes.[19]

 

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on October 4 but did not advance.

 

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City toward Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Synelnykove, Vovchansk, and Vovchanski Khutory on October 3 and 4.[20]

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on October 4 but did not make confirmed advances.

 

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced from Milove (northeast of Velykyi Burluk) toward Khatnie (west of Milove).[21]

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on October 4 but did not advance.

 

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; north of Kupyansk near Radkivka and toward Kutkivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe and Kamyanka; and southeast of Kupyansk toward Pishchane on October 3 and 4.[22] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked within Kupyansk.[23]

 

An officer in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction stated on October 4 that Russian forces are no longer conducting mechanized or motorcycle assaults due to Ukrainian drone strikes.[24] The officer stated that the area 20 kilometers from the frontline is no longer safe for logistics. The officer stated that Russian forces are conducting guided glide bomb strikes consistently three times each morning. The officer stated that Russian drone operators frequently target civilians when their drone batteries are low and they are unable to find military targets. The officer stated that Russian forces are not destroying railway stations as they advance, indicating that Russian forces plan to use the stations in the future. Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Synehubov stated on October 4 that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are operating within Kupyansk.[25] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted an unguided glide bomb strike against Kivrashivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[26] Another Russian milblogger complained that many Russian milbloggers are rushing to follow the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) illogical claims about Russian successes within Kupyansk and criticized Russian forces for submitting false reports about advances to their superiors, resulting in unnecessary losses.[27]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (south of Kupyansk).[28]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Borova direction on October 4 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on October 3 and 4.[29]

 

Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

 

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 4 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Stavky (north of Lyman).[30]

 

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest and northeast of Drobysheve, in southeastern Novoselivka, and near Derylove (all northwest of Lyman).[31]

 

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Drobysheve, Derylove, Novoselivka, Shandryholove, Serednie, and Karpivka; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; east of Lyman near Zarichne and Torske; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil on October 3 and 4.[32] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Myrne (northeast of Lyman) and Zarichne (east of Lyman).[33]

[34]

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on October 4 that Ukrainian forces are conducting strike and search missions against Yampil to destroy remaining Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups in the settlement.[35] A Russian milblogger claimed that the contested “gray zone” near central Yampil is expanding.[36]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly operating near Novoselivka.[37]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 3 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Siversk.[38] Geolocated footage published on October 4 shows elements of the Russian 85th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) raising Russian flags in western and northern Fedorivka (southwest of Siversk), indicating that Russian forces recently seized the settlement.[39]

 

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces entered Siversk and advanced north of Dronivka (north of Siversk).[40]

 

Russian forces attacked toward Siversk itself; northwest of Siversk near Dronivka; northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; and south of Siversk near Pereizne and Zvanivka on October 3 and 4.[41] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Platonivka (northwest of Siversk).[42]

 

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Serebryanka.[43]

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on October 4 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Nelipivka (southeast of Kostyantynivka) and toward Sofiivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[44]

 

Russian forces attacked east of Kostyantynivka near Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Bila Hora, Oleksandro-Shultyne, Dyliivka, Pleshchiivka, Ivanopillya, and Shcherbynivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Katerynivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Poltavka and Volodymyrivka and toward Novopavlivka on October 3 and 4.[45]

 

Geolocated footage published on October 2 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian forces on the Donetska railroad line southwest of Oleksandro-Shultyne (southeast of Kostyantynivka) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[46] ISW assesses that this event did not advance the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).

 

The Ukrainian General Staff stated on October 4 that Ukrainian forces struck the command post of the Russian 8th CAA (SMD) at an unspecified location on the night of October 3 to 4 and noted that elements of the 8th CAA are operating in Donetsk Oblast.[47]

 

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area reported on October 3 that a Russian first-person view (FPV) drone strike near Druzhkivka killed French journalist Antoni Lallican and injured Ukrainian journalist Hryhoriy Ivanchenko, both wearing vests designating them as journalists.[48]

 

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian logistics near Rayske (southwest of Druzhkivka).[49] Drone operators of the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) and elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly coordinating strikes against Ukrainian forces in Sofiivka.[50] Elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue to operate near Chasiv Yar (northeast of Kostyantynivka) and Kostyantynivka.[51] Drone operators of the 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka direction.[52] Drone operators of the Burevestnik detachment (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Bakhmut (Chasiv Yar) direction.[53]

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on October 4 but did not make confirmed advances.

Refinement of area under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on October 3 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintain positions or advanced south of Nove Shakhove (east of Dobropillya), an area which Russian sources previously claimed to be under Russian control.[54]

 

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in western Shakhove (east of Dobropillya); toward Hruzke (northeast of Dobropillya); and near Mayak and Pankivka (both southeast of Dobropillya).[55]

 

Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya near Kucheriv Yar, Zolotyi Kolodyaz, Vesele, and Hruzke; east of Dobropillya near Vilne, Novyi Donbas, Nove Shakhove, and Shakhove; and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne and Pankivka on October 3 and 4.[56] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zapovidne, Vilne, Novyi Donbas, Nove Shakhove, Shakhove, Zolotyi Kolodyaz, Vesele, and Hruzke.[57]

 

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on October 4 that Russian forces lost 47 casualties in the last day in the Dobropillya salient, including 32 killed.[58] Syrskyi reported that Russian forces have lost about 3,520 servicemembers, including 1,988 killed, and 991 pieces of weapons and equipment, since the beginning of the Ukrainian effort to eliminate Russia's Dobropillya salient.

 

A Russian milblogger claimed on October 3 that Russian forces struck the road bridge over the Kazennyi Torets River between Shakhove and Volodymyrivka (south of Shakhove).[59]

 

Order of Battle: An OSINT analyst reported on X (formerly Twitter) on October 3 that the Russian military command has deployed elements of the 1st, 5th and 110th motorized rifle brigades (all of the 51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD); 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet); and 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) to the Dobropillya tactical area since September 2025.[60] The OSINT analyst reported that elements of the 88th Separate Rifle Regiment and 114th and 132nd motorized rifle brigades (all three of the 51st CAA, SMD) are operating in the Dobropillya tactical area. Drone operators of the 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA, SMD) are striking Ukrainian forces south of Nove Shakhove.[61]

 

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 3 and 4 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southern Pokrovsk and on the northeastern outskirts of Krasnyi Lyman (northeast of Pokrovsk).[62]

 

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced further within southern Pokrovsk and in southern Novopavlivka (south of Pokrovsk).[63]

 

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Krasnyi Lyman, Razine, and Novoekonomichne; east of Pokrovsk near Promin, Myrolyubivka, Mykolaivka, and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novopavlivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and Zvirove on October 3 and 4.[64] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked within Pokrovsk.[65]

 

A Ukrainian non-commissioned officer (NCO) operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces are currently attacking one at a time after having previously attacked in groups of 10.[66] The NCO stated that the individual Russian soldiers are conducting reconnaissance-in-force missions to identify Ukrainian firing points. The NCO stated that Russian forces are installing anti-drone protections and electronic warfare (EW) systems on their armored vehicles and are using mothership drones to carry and extend the range of several first-person view (FPV) drones. The NCO reported that Russian forces in the area are using Starlink to ensure communications and to coordinate assaults. The NCO assessed that Russian forces are preparing for new assaults while studying how Ukrainian forces are likely to react. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian drone brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces attack in groups of up to two servicemembers.[67] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces have increased their use of glide bomb strikes against the frontline and Ukrainian near rear and that Russian glide bomb strikes are more accurate, suggesting that Russian forces have technically improved the bombs. The spokesperson stated that the Russian military command is regularly replenishing personnel, pulling limited numbers of battalions off the frontline to recover and replace other units. A Canadian journalist reported that the commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating near Novoekonomichne stated that Russian forces are attacking with one or two personnel and almost always conduct major assaults on motorcycles.[68] The commander reportedly stated that Russian forces are increasingly using civilian clothing to bypass Ukrainian positions — an act of perfidy, a war crime under the Geneva Convention to which Russia is a signatory.

 

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) and 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[69]

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on October 4 but did not make confirmed advances.

 

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Ivanivka (southwest of Novopavlivka).[70]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Dachne; south of Novopavlivka near Yalta and Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai on October 3 and 4.[71] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Filiya.[72]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted a glide bomb strike against a bridge in Novopavlivka.[73]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Velykomykhailivka direction.

 

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 3 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along the H-15 Donetsk City-Zaporizhzhia City highway southeast of Andriivka-Klevtsove (northeast of Velykomykhailivka).[74]

 

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Piddubne; east of Velykomykhailivka near Sichneve; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Sosnivka, Vorone, and Ternove; south of Velykomykhailivka near Novomykolaivka; and southwest of Velykomykhailivka near Verbove on October 3 and 4.[75]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Verbove.[76]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on October 4 but did not make confirmed advances.

 

Unconfirmed claim: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces entered Novohryhorivka (northeast of Hulyaipole).[77]

 

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Hulyaipole near Novohryhorivka, Novoivanivka, and Poltavka and toward Novovasylivka on October 3 and 4.[78]

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 4 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian force advanced southeast of Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv) and along the T-0815 Polohy-Orikhiv highway southeast of Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv).[79]

 

Russian forces conducted offensive operations southwest of Orikhiv near Novoandriivka and south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka on October 3 and 4.[80]

 

The Ukrainian National Police reported on October 4 that Russian forces conducted first-person view (FPV) drone strikes against a civilian in Malokaterynivka (northwest of Orikhiv).[81]

 

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Viking Drone Detachment are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[82]

 

Russian forces continued attacks in the Kherson direction on October 4 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in the Kherson direction on October 3 and 4.[83]

 

Kherson Oblast Military Administration Head Oleksandr Prokudin reported on October 4 that Russian forces struck a civilian car in Tsentralnyi Raion, Kherson City.[84]

 

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

 

See topline text.

 

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

 

Nothing significant to report.

 

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.


 

[1] https://www.munich-airport dot com/press-another-drone-sighting-at-munich-airport-35720233

[2] https://archive.ph/m4N8u ; https://www.bild dot de/regional/muenchen/geheimer-lagebericht-drohnen-alarm-ueber-ganz-deutschland-68e0e358c9fcb483178b7585

[3] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-3-2025/

[4] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c4gkyl1j6n9o

[5] https://apnews.com/article/germany-space-defense-russia-8045acd1eafaf47ac2bbcdb63a27ef40; https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/german-defence-minister-warns-against-growing-russian-threat-space-2025-09-25/

[6] https://t.me/kpszsu/43815

[7] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/16389 ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/50713 ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/50709; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/50713; https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid0LF1GYMUFAY1qQchM1cL5CtjT16yNS374CfWbwStiRNJZvinEsPrdV966Qwa5nfcFl&id=100064533106477&__cft__[0]=AZVpKIyvylw4jARGDcXYdkQ1BM7mMzEBCl86-5tf2e25_k-t_BwZLvYIxR1_Nc7QwbpdyMBuvf4cdDdzNw1CNmoATcvE4Be7vBpq9dPfposgywscNz_d6UlyHvD_69qCsGCVjXMZBzzMpgYUEziSqmK11ruuNKzue_roqMk1qCdajdS1dL1PG6tFSqc9gFDm_YM&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; https://t.me/prokuraturasumy/4652; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1130834-rf-atakuvala-potag-sostka-kiiv-na-zaliznicnomu-vokzali-e-postrazdali-pasaziri/ ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29824 ; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1130834-rf-atakuvala-potag-sostka-kiiv-na-zaliznicnomu-vokzali-e-postrazdali-pasaziri/ ; https://t.me/hryhorov_oleg/885 ; https://t.me/prokuraturasumy/4652; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1974409193139396940; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/10/04/v-sumskoy-oblasti-pod-udar-rossii-popal-poezd-raneny-bolee-30-chelovek

[8] https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1130706-na-odnomu-zi-skladiv-bulo-700-tonn-zerna-rosijska-armia-vdarila-po-silgosppidpriemstvu-u-cerneccinskij-gromadi/

[9] https://t.me/dsns_telegram/50689; https://meduzado dot io/news/2025/10/04/rossiya-udarila-po-ob-ektam-energetiki-v-chernigovskoy-oblasti-ukrainy ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1130618-zlatopil-na-harkivsini-znestrumlenij-cerez-ataku-rf/ ; https://t.me/MykolaBaksheev/10696 ; https://suspilne dot media/chernihiv/1130708-vnaslidok-ataki-rf-poskodzeni-odrazu-kilka-vazlivih-obektiv-elektropostacanna-situacia-zi-svitlom-na-cernigivsini/ ; https://t.me/chernigivoblenergo/4134 ; https://t.me/synegubov/17562 ; https://www.facebook.com/MNSCHERNIGIV/posts/1235077225317946 ; https://t.me/VadymFilashkin/11588 ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/50685; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/10/04/nichna-ataka-na-dnipropetrovshhynu-poraneno-zhinku-ta-zrujnovano-budynok/

[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-20-2025/

[11] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29821 ; https://t.me/ukr_sof/2151

[12] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9868

[13] https://t.me/drozdenko_au_lo/8497 ; https://t.me/drozdenko_au_lo/8496

[14] https://t.me/rucriminalinfo/5246

[15] https://t.me/ukr_sof/2150

[16] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29821

[17] https://t.me/wargonzo/29634 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/341996 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29825 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29802 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29800

[18] https://t.me/severnnyi/5274 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/80601

[19] https://t.me/severnnyi/5275

[20] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29825 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29802 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29800 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/29634 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/5274 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34564 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/80601

[21] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34564

[22] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29802 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29800 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/67906 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/29634

[23] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/67906

[24] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=238-RphCerY; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/10/04/front-u-povitri-na-kupyanskomu-napryamku-rozgornulas-tehnologichna-vijna-droniv/

[25] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1130628-u-kupansku-mozut-perebuvati-diti-ale-ce-moze-buti-dezinformacia-voroga-oleg-sinegubov/

[26] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/181937

[27] https://t.me/yurasumy/24967

[28] https://t.me/epoddubny/25003

[29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29800 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29802

[30] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10155; https://t.me/OMIBr_60/1185

 

[31] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32558 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34550 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34552

[32] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29825 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29802 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29800 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/341948 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/100981 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34550 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34552 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/29634

[33] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34550 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34552

 

[35] ttps://t.me/osirskiy/1285

[36] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34550 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34552

[37] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/100981

[38] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10145; https://t.me/SkyFury3mb/1126

[39] https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/1974382194526466188; https://t.me/operators85RB/296; https://t. me/osintpen/1867; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10150

[40] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32561; https://t.me/tass_agency/341934; https://t.me/tass_agency/341940; https://t.me/tass_agency/341994

 

[41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29825; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29802; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29800; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34552; https://t.me/wargonzo/29634; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/67921

[42] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/67921

[43] https://t.me/tass_agency/341985

[44] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/67907; https://t.me/wargonzo/29634

[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29825; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29802; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29800; https://t.me/dva_majors/80601; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/67907; https://t.me/wargonzo/29634

[46] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1974244715533926444; https://t.me/kurt_compani_group/758

[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29821

[48] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1130536-poblizu-druzkivki-vid-rosijskogo-drona-zaginuv-francuzkij-zurnalist-antoni-lallikan/ ; https://www.facebook.com/4ovmbr/posts/pfbid01AhwJ6NAwTwLXzm5QKeBbXChtPCgsgv9pnbHVW6PqpJDf2aEtE2Jnr5WaE3n9Ydvl?locale=uk_UA

[49] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14372

[50] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14373

[51] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34539

[52] https://t.me/dva_majors/80614

[53] https://t.me/wargonzo/29652

[54] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1974180694831309014; https://t.me/rian_ru/320206

[55] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/67907; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34529

[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29825; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29802; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29800; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/67907; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34529; https://t.me/wargonzo/29634

[57] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/67907

[58] https://t.me/osirskiy/1285

[59] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/67907

[60] https://x.com/WarUnitObserver/status/1974225851655848287

[61] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1974180694831309014; https://t.me/rian_ru/320206

[62] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1974480219898794024; https://t.me/ombr_155/750; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10147; https://t.me/taifun_army/427

[63] https://t.me/motopatriot78/42915; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34543

[64] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29800; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29802; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29825 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/67908; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34543; https://t.me/wargonzo/29634

[65] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34543

[66] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/10/04/odyn-ide-reshta-dyvlyatsya-vorog-perehodyt-do-myasnoyi-rozvidky-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku/

[67] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1130762-aviacia-ce-te-so-duze-doskulae-vijskovij-rozpoviv-pro-situaciu-na-pokrovskomu-napramku/

[68] https://x.com/NeilPHauer/status/1974212121308057603

[69] https://t.me/mod_russia/57251; https://t.me/wargonzo/29630

[70] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34528

[71] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29825; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29802; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29800; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/100983

[72] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/100983

[73] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/181956

[74] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10148; https://t.me/raid_413/325

[75] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29825; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29802; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29800

[76] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/101008

[77] https://t.me/vrogov/22029

[78] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29800; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29802; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29825; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/100997; https://t.me/vrogov/22029

[79] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32555; https://t.me/motopatriot78/42932

[80] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29825; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29802; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29800

[81] https://t.me/UA_National_Police/50442;

[82] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/181863

[83] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29800; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29802 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29825

[84] https://t.me/olexandrprokudin/10429

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