Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 3, 2025

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:45am ET on October 3. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 4 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces conducted a large, combined missile and drone strike against Ukraine on the night of October 2 to 3, increasingly leveraging missiles in large but infrequent strike packages. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched seven Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles; 21 Iskander-K cruise missiles; seven Kh-59/69 cruise missiles; and 381 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones from the directions of Kursk, Bryansk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsk-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defenses downed 303 drones, 12 Iskander-K cruise missiles, and five Kh-59/69 guided air missiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that 18 missiles and 78 drones struck 15 locations throughout Ukraine and that drone debris fell in six locations. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that the Russian drones and missiles primarily targeted critical energy infrastructure in Kharkiv and Poltava oblasts and struck Sumy, Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, and Kyiv oblasts. The Ukrainian Ministry of Energy and Ukrainian state-owned gas operator Naftogaz reported that Russian drones and missiles intentionally targeted critical energy infrastructure during the October 2-3 strike, including gas transportation infrastructure that has no military purpose, to deprive Ukrainian civilians of the ability to heat their homes leading into the winter of 2025 to 2026.[2] Naftogaz Board Chairman Serhiy Koertskyi reported that the October 2-3 strike significantly damaged unspecified Ukrainian energy facilities.[3] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned in August 2025 that Russia was increasingly targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure to undermine Ukraine’s preparations for the winter heating season.[4]

Russian forces likely stockpiled ballistic and cruise missiles throughout September 2025 to conduct a few large scale drone and missile strikes on select days. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on October 2 that Russian forces launched 6,900 drones against Ukraine in September 2025, including more than 3,600 Shahed-type drones.[5] Russian forces do not regularly launch missiles in nightly strike packages against Ukraine and often go several days without using missiles in these packages. Russian forces appear to be stockpiling ballistic and cruise missiles most days and then launching large numbers of missiles in conjunction with large numbers of drones, likely to overwhelm Ukrainian air defense systems. Russian forces notably only conducted four overnight strikes containing over 10 missiles in September 2025 and have conducted one overnight strike containing over 40 missiles roughly every two weeks since late August 2025, underscoring Russia's recent pattern of intermittently conducting a few large, combined strikes between Russia's most consistent, smaller drone strikes.[6] Russian forces are continuing to use more cruise missiles and fewer ballistic missiles in combined strikes and are likely continuing to rely on ballistic missiles to conduct pinpoint strikes on specific targets while using drones and cruise missiles to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses. Ukraine’s Patriot air defense systems remain Ukraine’s only air defense systems capable of downing Russian ballistic missiles, and Russian forces may be specifically targeting cities and energy infrastructure not actively defended by Ukraine's Patriot systems to increase the chances that Russia successfully strikes its intended target.

Russian forces are likely leveraging recent upgrades to Russian ballistic missiles to improve their ability to penetrate Ukrainian air defense systems. The Financial Times (FT) reported on October 3 that Russia likely recently modified its Iskander-M and Kinzhal ballistic missiles to execute unexpected diversionary maneuvers during the terminal flight phase to “confuse” Ukrainian Patriot interceptor missiles.[7] FT reported that a Western official familiar with Ukraine’s Patriot systems’ interception rates attributed the recent “marked” decrease in Ukraine’s Patriot interception rates to this new “pattern” in Russian missiles’ terminal phase maneuvers. The FT noted that Ukraine’s air defenses may also be degraded due to ongoing Russian strikes targeting Ukraine’s Patriot air defense systems. A US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report published in August 2025 stated that modifications that enable Russian ballistic missiles to change trajectories and perform maneuvers atypical of a traditional ballistic trajectory have impeded Ukraine’s ability to leverage Patriot air defense systems against Russian ballistic missiles.[8]

Russia continues to escalate its destabilization efforts against Europe as European officials continue to report unidentified drones operating in their airspace. Reuters reported on October 3 that Danish intelligence indicates that Russian warships have repeatedly sailed on collision courses with Danish vessels and pointed weapons at Danish military helicopters and naval vessels during passage through the Danish straits.[9] Reuters reported that Danish Defense Intelligence Service Director Thomas Ahrenkiel stated that Danish intelligence indicates that Russian warships equipped with sonar and jamming equipment have sailed through the Danish straits and that it was “highly probable” that the ships have jammed signals and caused significant GPS interference in Denmark at least once. Belgian outlet VRT reported on October 3 that a Belgian aircraft observed 15 unattributed drones above the Elsenborn military base in East Cantons, Belgium, and that the drones then flew into German airspace on the night of October 2 to 3.[10] VRT reported that the Belgian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is investigating the matter to identify the actors behind the most recent aerial incursion, and Belgian Defense Minister Theo Francken assessed that the drone incursion is characteristic of Russia's broader ongoing hybrid warfare campaign to destabilize Europe. The New York Times (NYT) reported on October 2 that German authorities closed the Munich Airport overnight due to several unattributed drone sightings, forcing authorities to ground and divert several flights.[11] It remains unclear if the German and Belgian aerial incursion incidents are connected. Danish intelligence on Russia's naval provocations and the recent aerial incursions cohere with ISW's ongoing assessment that Russia is conducting a pervasive hybrid warfare campaign against Europe designed to destabilize the continent and undermine cohesion.[12]

The Kremlin continues efforts to undermine Western-brokered peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, likely as part of a larger campaign to divide and distract Europe. Russian President Vladimir Putin met with President of Republika Srpska (the Serbian political entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina) Milorad Dodik, on October 2, following Putin's speech at the Valdai Club, an international discussion forum that the Kremlin has used in its decades-long efforts to influence Western policy in Russia’s favor.[13] Dodik told Russian state media outlet Russia Today (RT) that he asked Putin not to leave Republika Srpska “at the mercy” of the European Union (EU), which is “strangling” the country.[14] Putin and Dodik have now met eight times since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, and last met on April 1, 2025.[15] The Kremlin has previously leveraged its relationship with Republika Srpska to undermine the US-backed Dayton Accords, likely in an effort to throw the Balkans into turmoil.[16] Putin’s meeting with Dodik, amidst ongoing unidentified drone incursion over North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) airspace, is likely part of the Kremlin’s ongoing effort to sow divisions in Europe and prevent a coordinated NATO response if Russia invades a NATO country.

Norway and Ukraine's European partners opened the largest training center for Ukrainian military personnel in Poland on October 1. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on October 2 that NATO and Ukrainian officials participated in an opening ceremony of Camp Jomsborg, the largest training center for Ukrainian military personnel in Poland.[17] The Ukrainian MoD reported that the facility can accommodate up to 1,200 military personnel and is designed to augment the exchange of combat experience between Ukraine and NATO. Ukrainian broadcaster Armyinform reported that military personnel from Estonia and other NATO member states may join the 250 Norwegian military instructors already stationed at the Polish training ground.[18]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted a large, combined missile and drone strike against Ukraine on the night of October 2 to 3, increasingly leveraging missiles in large but infrequent strike packages.
• Russian forces likely stockpiled ballistic and cruise missiles throughout September 2025 to conduct a few large scale drone and missile strikes on select days.
• Russian forces are likely leveraging recent upgrades to Russian ballistic missiles to improve their ability to penetrate Ukrainian air defense systems.
• Russia continues to escalate its destabilization efforts against Europe as European officials continue to report unidentified drones operating in their airspace.
• The Kremlin continues efforts to undermine Western-brokered peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, likely as part of a larger campaign to divide and distract Europe.
• Norway and Ukraine's European partners opened the largest training center for Ukrainian military personnel in Poland on October 1.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and Velykomykhailivka, and Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukraine continues to conduct long-range drone strikes against Russian oil refineries and other critical infrastructure amid worsening gas shortages in Russia and occupied Ukraine. Sources in Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) told Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne on October 3 that the SBU conducted a long-range drone strike against the Orsknefteorgsintez Oil Refinery in Orenburg Oblast.[19] The facility has four primary refining units and an annual refining capacity of 6.6 million tons of oil. Geolocated footage published on October 3 shows a drone striking the Orsknefteorgsintez refinery.[20] Orenburg Oblast Governor Yevgeny Solntsev acknowledged that there was an attempted strike against the facility and that there were no casualties.[21] BBC Verify and BBC Russian reported on October 2 that Ukraine has struck 21 of Russia's 38 largest oil refineries since January 2025 and that Russian authorities have partially or fully suspended operations for at least 10 refineries since August 2025.[22] Geolocated footage published on October 2 shows smoke rising from the Azot Uralkhim Chemical Plant in Berezniki, Perm Krai; Perm Krai Governor Dmitry Makhonin claimed on October 3 that Ukrainian drones struck the city and that the Azot plant experienced a temporary disruption.[23]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 3 that Ukrainian Special Operations Forces conducted drone strikes against a Russian P-14F Lena long-range radar and a Sopka-2 path-finding radar complex in Buturlinovka and Garmoshka, Voronezh Oblast that were designed to counter Ukrainian drones.[24]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on October 3.

Russian forces attacked in Sumy and Kursk oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Kindrativka and Andriivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka and Sadky on October 2 and 3.[25] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Sumy City near Kostyantynivka and Oleksiivka and northeast of Sumy City near Sadky.[26]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on October 3 that the Russian military command appointed Colonel Anton Konzachakov as the new commander of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]).[27] The milblogger claimed that Russian servicemen worry that Konzachakov's appointment will result in more chaos in the Sumy direction and amplified claims that the regiment's previous commander needlessly sacrificed Russian infantrymen in assaults. The milblogger also claimed that the commander of the 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th AC, LMD), Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Mikhailov, is resigning, but it remains unclear who will replace Mikhailov.[28]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are striking Ukrainian equipment near Nova Sich (north of Sumy City).[29]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 3 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along the Pivdenna Railroad in western Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) and seized the Vovchansk Railway Station.[30]

Unconfirmed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in the forested areas near Synelnykove (west of Vovchansk).[31]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Synelnykove, Vovchansk, and Vovchanski Khutory on October 2 and 3.[32] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in central Vovchansk.[33]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Black Raven Drone Detachment are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[34]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported fighting in the Velykyi Burlurk direction on October 3.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Piratov Moryaka (Pirates of the Sea) Assault Detachment (7th Motorized Rifle Regiment, 11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions near Odradne (east of Velykyi Burluk).[35]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on October 3 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on October 3 that Russian forces advanced westward and southward along the P-07 Kupyansk-Chuhuiv highway in Kupyansk, and other milbloggers claimed on October 2 that Russian forces control roughly a third of the city.[36]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; north of Kupyansk toward Kolodyazne; northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka, Novovasylivka, and Krasne Pershe; and east of Kupyansk near Pishchane on October 2 and 3.[37] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kindrashivka (northwest of Kupyansk) and Holubivka (north of Kupyansk).[38]

The commander of a Ukrainian unmanned systems regiment operating in the Kupyansk direction reported that Russian forces have significantly reduced sabotage and reconnaissance group activity due to Ukrainian defenses on Kupyansk's northern and northwestern outskirts and that poor weather is affecting drone usage.[39] The commander noted that Russian forces continue to employ infiltration tactics and are experimenting with using heavy bomber drones. The commander added that Russian forces began using Molniya fixed wing first-person view (FPV) drones as mothership drones to strike Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs).

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[40]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on October 3 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Bohuslavka, Borivska Andriivka, and Zelenyi Hai, and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on October 2 and 3.[41]

A servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Borova direction stated that Russian forces operating in this direction are leveraging foliage to constantly conduct small infantry group assaults of two to three personnel and attempting to undermine Ukrainian GLOCs in the rear.[42] Kupyansk Raion Military Administration Head Andriy Kanashevich reported that Russian forces conducted a FPV drone strike that injured two civilians in Lisna Stinka (north of Borova).[43]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on October 3 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Serednie, Shandryholove, and Drobysheve; north of Lyman near Karpivka; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; east of Lyman near Torske and Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil on October 2 and 3.[44] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zarichne and Yampil.[45]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Ukrainian forces are using unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) to perform logistical tasks and evacuations and to inflict fire damage and capture prisoners of war (POWs).[46] The spokesperson added that Russian forces are trying to copy and scale Ukraine's successful use of UGVs on the battlefield. The spokesperson noted that Russian forces continue to conduct small infantry-led assaults with six to eight soldiers with drone escorts that provide fire and reconnaissance support.[47] The spokesperson reported that Russian forces attempted to advance overnight using anti-thermal imaging tents and cloaks to protect against Ukrainian drone strikes, but Ukrainian aerial reconnaissance thwarted such attempts.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Lyman direction.[48]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on October 3 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian source claimed that Russian forces entered the southern outskirts of Zvanivka (south of Siversk), and a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces entered northern Dronivka (northwest of Siversk) but that discussions regarding a full scale assault on the settlement are premature.[49]

Russian forces attacked near Siversk itself, northwest of Siversk near Dronivka, northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka, and southeast of Siversk near Vyimka and Ivano-Darivka on October 2 and 3.[50]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on October 3 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in central and northern Volodymyrivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[51]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kostyantynivka near Chasiv Yar; east of Kostyantynivka near Predtechyne and Oleksandro-Shultyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka, Shcherbynivka, Toretsk, Kleban-Byk, and Ivanopillya; south of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Kalynove; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Poltavka and Volodymyrivka on October 2 and 3.[52]

Order of Battle: Infantry and artillery elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, drone operators of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), and elements of the Pyatnashka International Volunteer Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are reportedly operating near Kostyantynivka.[53] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Raiske and Sofiivka (both southwest of Druzhkivka).[54]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on October 3 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Toretske, east of Kucheriv Yar (both northeast of Dobropillya), into northwestern Shakhove (east of Dobropillya), east of Dorozhnie, and west of Zapovidne (both southeast of Dobropillya).[55] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west and northwest of Pankivka (southeast of Dobropillya).[56]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya near Kucheriv Yar, east of Dobropillya near Nove Shakhove and Shakhove, and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne and Dorozhnie on October 2 and 3.[57]

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) and 174th Reconnaissance Battalion of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Shakhove.[58] Drone operators of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA), the 100th Brigade (possibly referring to the 100th Separate Guards Reconnaissance Brigade, 58th CAA, SMD), and the 3rd Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Dobropillya tactical area.[59]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 2 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced into the northern outskirts of Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[60]

Refinement of area under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on October 3 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintain positions or advanced in southern Pokrovsk, areas which Russian sources previously claimed to be under Russian control.[61]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in southwestern Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk); south of Krasnyi Lyman (northeast of Pokrovsk); in northern, eastern, and southeastern Pokrovsk; and west of Pokrovsk.[62]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Novotoretske, Krasnyi Lyman, Razine, and Novoekonomichne; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Myrnohrad, and Promin; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Molodetske, and Zvirove on October 2 and 3.[63]

The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian infantry casualties increased by 30 percent in September 2025 as compared to August 2025, and Ukrainian drone operators have extended the “kill zone” (an area immediately near the frontline where a mass of tactical strike and reconnaissance drones pose an elevated risk to any equipment or personnel that enters the area) and can launch FPV drones several kilometers behind Russian positions.[64] The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps reported that Ukrainian drone interceptors destroyed 50 percent more Shahed drones over Pokrovsk in September 2025 than in August 2025. The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps reported that Russian forces are most active near Zvirove and Myrnohrad and that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance units continue attempts to infiltrate Pokrovsk.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1438th Motorized Rifle Regiment (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions in Lysivka.[65] Elements of the Russian 14th Artillery Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Kozatske (east of Pokrovsk).[66] Drone operators of the 80th Sparta Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[67]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 3 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced to eastern Ivanivka (southwest of Novopavlivka).[68]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Yalta (south of Novopavlivka) and into central Ivanivka.[69]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka, southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove, south of Novopavlivka near Filiya, and southwest of Novopavlivka near Novokhatske and Zelenyi Hai on October 2 and 3.[70]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Velykomykhailivka direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 3 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently retook Sosnivka (southeast of Velykomykhailivka) and Verbove (southwest of Velykomykhailivka).[71]

Russian forces attacked east of Velykomykhailivka near Sichneve and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Komyshuvakha, Novomykolaivka, Sosnivka, Vorone, and Berezove on October 2 and 3.[72]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly dropping three-ton aerial bombs on Ukrainian positions in Havrylivka (north of Velykomykhailivka).[73]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on October 3 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north and southeast of Novohryhorivka, east of Novovasylivske, and east of Okhotnyche (all northeast of Hulyaipole).[74]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Poltavka, Novoivanivka, Vyshyneve, and Novohryhorivka and toward Uspenivka and Novovasylivske on October 2 and 3.[75]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 3 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; southwest of Orikhiv near Pyatykhatky and Lobkove; west of Orikhiv near Stepove, Plavni, and Kamyanske; and northwest of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk and Prymorske on October 2 and 3.[76]

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn stated on October 3 that Russian forces recently conducted a reduced company-sized motorized assault on the western outskirts of Stepove using at least six motorcycles.[77] Voloshyn assessed that Russian forces attacked near Stepove in an effort to bypass Stepnohirsk from the east and that Russian attempts to advance along the former Kakhovka reservoir could threaten Ukrainian GLOCs towards Zaporizhzhia City. Voloshyn assessed that the seizure of Stepnohirsk would allow Russian forces to use drones to strike Zaporizhzhia City and key GLOCs in the area.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Chechen Vostok-Akhmat Battalion are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Robotyne (south of Orikhiv).[78]

Russian forces continued limited assaults in the Kherson direction, including toward the Antonivsky Bridge (east of Kherson City), on October 3 but did not advance.[79]

Ukrainian forces continue to strike infrastructure in occupied Crimea.

Geolocated footage published on October 3 indicates that Ukrainian forces likely struck the Syren railway station in occupied Syren, Crimea.[80] A local Crimean source reported on October 2 that residents in occupied Crimea reported several explosions near occupied Feodosia, Kerch, and the Belbek military airfield.[81] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on October 3 that Russian air defenses downed four Ukrainian drones over Crimea and 11 Ukrainian drones over the Black Sea.[82]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.