Iran Update, November 2025

Iran Update, November 28, 2025 

Israel reportedly gave the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) a deadline of December 7 to make progress in its disarmament of Hezbollah amid ongoing Israeli preparations for a potential operation in Lebanon.[i] An Israeli Channel 13 journalist reported on November 28 that the LAF has until after Pope Leo XIV and US Deputy Special Envoy Morgan Ortagus’s upcoming visits to Beirut to show unspecified progress on its disarmament plan.[ii] Pope Leo XIV will visit Beirut between November 30 and December 2, and Ortagus will visit Beirut on December 5 and 6.[iii] Israel has simultaneously continued to prepare for a potential operation in Lebanon. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu held a “special discussion” with Israeli defense officials on November 27, during which the defense officials presented operational plans to continue “enforcement activities” and prevent Hezbollah reconstitution.[iv] Israel’s reported deadline comes amid Israeli officials’ frustration with the LAF’s lack of progress on its plan to disarm Hezbollah and repeated warnings about a potential Israeli operation in Lebanon.[v] Israeli officials told Israeli media on November 27 that Israel is “running out of patience” over the LAF’s continued delays and reiterated how Hezbollah is working to reconstitute its military capabilities and infrastructure.[vi] The officials warned that Hezbollah’s reconstitution activities may lead to increased Israeli operations along Israel’s northern border.[vii] Israel has consistently conducted air and drone strikes in Lebanon as well as targeted killings to prevent Hezbollah reconstitution since the November 2024 Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement.[viii] US officials have also expressed frustration over the LAF’s lack of progress.[ix] US President Donald Trump recently warned the Lebanese government that Israel will launch an operation if the LAF does not disarm Hezbollah by the end of 2025, according to the Israeli Channel 13 journalist.[x]  

The LAF has continued to reject Israeli and US statements about its lack of progress in disarming Hezbollah, claiming that the LAF has made significant progress in its disarmament plan.[xi] LAF Southern Sector Commander Brigadier General Nicholas Tabet stated on November 28 that the LAF has implemented 80 percent of its disarmament plan in southern Lebanon and noted that the LAF will not request an extension for its end-of-year deadline.[xii] CTP-ISW has not observed any reports that the LAF has seized arms from Hezbollah fighters or raided any active Hezbollah sites with Hezbollah personnel present, however. Tabet claimed that Israel has failed to cooperate with the LAF and the Lebanese state, stating that Israel has not provided the LAF with evidence that new weapons are entering southern Lebanon.[xiii] Israel has consistently stated that Hezbollah is replenishing its weapons stockpiles in southern Lebanon.[xiv] Tabet also claimed that most of the private homes in southern Lebanon that Israel has recently targeted were civilian homes.[xv] Hezbollah has historically used civilian homes to store weapons.[xvi] The LAF reportedly requested that the ceasefire monitoring committee inspect the private homes prior to Israeli airstrikes.[xvii] Israel reportedly rejected this request and “insisted” on targeting the private homes, according to Tabet.[xviii] Lebanese and LAF officials have consistently stated that continued Israeli operations in Lebanon are preventing the LAF from fully deploying to southern Lebanon and hindering the LAF’s ability to disarm Hezbollah.[xix]

Iran Update, November 26, 2025 

A Financial Times investigation unveiled that an Iranian company claimed to possess Western-origin nuclear-related technology, which highlights how Iran continues to adapt its procurement network to advance its nuclear program despite sanctions. The Financial Times reported on November 25 that an Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND) front company, Imen Gostar Raman Kish, claimed that it uses US and European equipment in some of its products.[i] The SPND played a leading role in Iran’s nuclear weapons research program before 2003.[ii] Imen Gostar Raman Kish said that it uses radiation-detection tubes from United Kingdom-based company Centronic and components from United States-based company Elijen Technology for its radiation-detection devices.[iii] The Financial Times stated that there is no evidence that Elijen or Centronic were aware that they sold technology to Iranian entities.[iv] The United States sanctioned Imen Gostar Raman Kish’s chairperson and vice chairperson in October 2025 for contributing to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.[v] Imen Gostar Raman Kish’s chief executive, Javad Ghasemi, was part of an Iranian delegation that secretly traveled to Russia in August 2024 to visit Russian research institutes specializing in dual-use technologies that can be used in nuclear weapons development.[vi] A second Iranian delegation traveled to Russia in November 2024, possibly to seek “laser technology and expertise that could help [Iran] validate a nuclear weapon design without conducting a nuclear explosive test,” according to a former CIA analyst speaking to the Financial Times.[vii]

Iran has made minimal progress in repairing its three main nuclear sites that were damaged during the Israel-Iran War but has conducted “extensive” clean-up efforts at several nuclear weaponization sites, according to satellite imagery analyzed by the Institute for Science and International Security.[viii] The Institute assessed that Iranian clean-up efforts at four nuclear weaponization sites that were struck during the war “may be the prelude to rebuilding or related to sanitization activities.”[ix] The sites where Iran has conducted clean-up activities include:

• Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND) Headquarters, Tehran City: Iran is demolishing the top floors of the SPND headquarters on Fakhrizadeh Street, according to satellite imagery taken on October 23.[x] The Institute added that there are piles of rubble and salvaged equipment around the headquarters. Israel launched several airstrikes targeting the headquarters’ main building in June 2025.[xi]
• Shahid Meisami Research Center, Alborz Province: The Institute reported that Iran has cleaned up several damaged buildings at the Shahid Meisami Research Center, according to satellite imagery taken on October 21.[xii] The Institute assessed that the clean-up efforts may be a “possible prelude to rebuilding” the center.[xiii] The Shahid Meisami Group is an Iranian chemical engineering and research group that is involved in Iran’s chemical weapons program and is a subsidiary of SPND.[xiv] Israel launched airstrikes during the war that targeted a small building in the southwest of the Shahid Meisami complex that was likely used as a laboratory or administrative center.[xv] Israel also struck a nearby hangar-looking building.[xvi] The hangar-looking building’s “high bay metal frame” remains intact, and Iran has collected piles of debris next to it.[xvii] Israeli intelligence previously assessed that the hangar-looking building housed “plastic explosives and advanced material for nuclear detonation testing.”[xviii]

CTP-ISW previously reported that Iran has conducted limited clean-up and rebuilding activities at other nuclear sites, including Lavisan 2 (Mojdeh) and  Taleghan 2.[xix] Iran has also continued construction at the Mount Kolang Gaz La Facility near Natanz following the war.[xx] The Institute assessed that Iran has conducted “little activity” at Iran’s main nuclear sites—Natanz, Fordow, and the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center—since the war.[xxi]

Key Takeaways

• Iranian Nuclear Program: A Financial Times investigation unveiled that an Iranian company claimed to possess Western-origin nuclear-related technology, which highlights how Iran continues to adapt its procurement network to advance its nuclear program despite sanctions.
• Iranian Nuclear Program: Iran has made minimal progress in repairing its three main nuclear sites that were damaged during the Israel-Iran War but has conducted “extensive” clean-up efforts at several nuclear weaponization sites, according to satellite imagery analyzed by the Institute for Science and International Security. The Institute assessed that Iranian clean-up efforts at four nuclear weaponization sites that were struck during the war “may be the prelude to rebuilding or related to sanitization activities.”

Iran Update, November 25, 2025 

Unspecified Iranian officials told The Telegraph on November 25 that the Houthis and some unspecified Iranian-backed Iraqi groups have become less responsive to Tehran.[i] The Iranian officials mischaracterized Iran’s relationship with the Houthis and Iraqi militias by misrepresenting how the Axis of Resistance functions, however. The Telegraph, citing unspecified Iranian officials, reported on November 25 that Iran has lost control over the Houthis and struggles to maintain cohesion among groups within its Axis of Resistance.[ii] The officials claimed that the Houthis have rejected Iranian directives and have “gone rogue for a while and are now really rebels.”[iii] These officials‘ claims misrepresent the fundamental nature of the Iran-Houthi relationship. The Houthis view themselves as a coequal partner to Iran rather than as an Iranian proxy.[iv] Iran and the Houthis share strategic alignment over key objectives, but the Houthis have historically pursued objectives for their own benefit as well as Iran’s.[v] Both Iran and the Houthis aim to decrease US influence in the region to impose their own vision of a regional order.[vi] Iran has long viewed the Houthis as a partner that can help implement this vision, even though the Houthis sometimes have divergent aims. This relationship is consistent with Iran‘s relationship with many other Axis of Resistance organizations. The Axis of Resistance ”makes decisions and coordinates through [informal] channels, making the alliance appear amorphous and opaque to external observers.” The informal and amorphous nature of the alliance is by design, and it enables Iranian officials to disavow its partners when politically convenient to do so.[vii]

The Iranian officials also mischaracterized Iran’s relationship with some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. An unspecified senior Iranian official told the Telegraph on November 25 that “it’s not just the Houthis,” noting that some Iranian-backed groups in Iraq are also behaving as though Iran has “never had any contact with them.”[viii] The source added that some Iraqi militias have repeatedly ignored Iranian directives to pause training until “tensions subside.”[ix] The source’s statements obscure the reality that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias demonstrate varying degrees of responsiveness to Iran rather than total independence. Iraqi groups operate on a spectrum of alignment with Iranian objectives and directives. Kataib Hezbollah is Iran’s most tightly controlled Iraqi militia and the closest Iraqi group to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force.[x] The Badr Organization is often described as Iran’s “oldest proxy in Iraq” and is a powerful paramilitary actor.[xi] The Badr Organization is also a major Iraqi political party whose leader, Hadi al Ameri, plays a central role in Iraq’s political system, giving the organization more overt Iraqi political interests and constraints than Kataib Hezbollah.[xii] Asaib Ahl al Haq identifies as part of Iran’s Axis of Resistance yet “stubbornly maintains a degree of independence” and has openly disobeyed Iranian instructions.[xiii]

These Iranian officials probably cast the Houthis as an “independent” actor to encourage Saudi-mediated negotiations with the United States to move forward. Iranian officials have repeatedly stated that Iran will only negotiate on the nuclear issue and will not expand the talks to its missile program or Axis of Resistance.[xiv] Iran, by claiming its relationship with the Houthis no longer exists, would be able to assuage some Saudi concerns about the threat that the Iranian-supported Houthis pose to Saudi Arabia. Unspecified Western sources told Lebanese Hezbollah-affiliated media on November 25 that US President Donald Trump gave Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman a “mandate” to mediate a US-Iran agreement.[xv] The sources stated that Saudi Arabia and Iran agreed to convene a high-level meeting in Paris in the coming days.[xvi] The report stated that bin Salman previously asked Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani about Iran’s position on Saudi mediation. Larijani reportedly responded positively but emphasized that Iran cannot offer unspecified concessions.[xvii] Unspecified sources added that Saudi officials also discussed with US officials the need to reach an understanding with Iran to facilitate Yemeni reconciliation.[xviii] Saudi Arabia seeks an end to the Yemen conflict that would weaken the Houthis, which Riyadh views as a threat. Iranian officials could calculate that by casting the Houthis as unassociated with Iran, they would secure Saudi Arabia as a mediator and the resumption of negotiations without needing to make concessions on the Yemeni civil war.

Syrian authorities dismantled an Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)-affiliated cell in Latakia Province, indicating that ISIS-affiliated groups may seek to conduct clandestine activities or attacks in coastal Syria. The Syrian General Security Service (GSS) raided an ISIS-affiliated cell’s safehouse in al Badrousiya, Latakia Province, on November 24.[xix] The Syrian Ministry of Interior (MoI) reported on November 24 that the GSS killed two fighters and arrested the rest of the cell.[xx] The cell injured one GSS member during the raid.[xxi] The GSS also seized “medium and light weapons” from the cell’s safehouse, according to Syrian media.[xxii] The GSS Latakia Province commander said on November 24 that the cell “was planning to carry out terrorist operations on the Syrian coast.”[xxiii]

The MoI’s characterization of the cell in Latakia Province indicates that the cell was part of Salafi-jihadi group Saraya Ansar al Sunnah rather than ISIS. The MoI said the cell in Latakia Province espoused “the ideology of the ISIS terrorist organization” but did not directly attribute the cell to ISIS, which the MoI has done previously.[xxiv] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah is a Salafi-jihadi group ideologically aligned with ISIS that seeks to establish an Islamic State in Syria that excludes Alawites, Druze, Christians, Kurds, and Shia.[xxv] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah conducted several sectarian-based attacks targeting Alawites in coastal Syria between April and June 2025.[xxvi] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah also claimed responsibility for the suicide attack on the Mar Elias Church in Damascus that killed 25 people in June 2025.[xxvii] The MoI also referred to the attacker and the cell that planned the attack on Mar Elias Church as “ISIS-affiliated.”[xxviii]   Saraya Ansar al Sunnah has not claimed individual attacks in Syria since July 2025 but continues to threaten violence against Syrian minorities.[xxix] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah threatened to attack Alawites and Christians in Hama, Homs, Latakia, and Tartous provinces in a video on October 15.[xxx]

Iran Update, November 24, 2025 

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) killed Hezbollah’s “de facto chief of staff” and senior commander Haitham Ali Tabatabai in Beirut’s southern suburbs on November 23.[i] Tabatabai’s death will likely disrupt Hezbollah’s reconstitution for a short period because of Tabatabai’s significant experience at many echelons of command in fighting against Israel and engaging with Hezbollah’s Syrian partners. His experience at many echelons of command and in Syria would enable him to intimately understand the assets that Hezbollah needed to replace after the Fall 2024 Israeli campaign in Lebanon to defend southern Lebanon against renewed Israeli operations. His experience in Syria would have also allowed him to build relationships with many cross-border smugglers and other actors that can support Hezbollah’s reconstitution. The IDF stated that it killed Tabatabai in order to prevent Hezbollah’s reconstitution.[ii] Tabatabai was considered one of Hezbollah’s three highest-ranking military officials after the Israel-Hezbollah conflict in Fall 2024, and he has reportedly led Hezbollah‘s efforts to reconstitute after the war.[iii] Tabatabai has held numerous senior positions within Hezbollah’s military command since the group’s founding in 1982.[iv] Tabatabai helped establish Hezbollah’s Radwan Force and reportedly commanded Hezbollah’s Southern Front in Fall 2024 after Israel killed the previous commander.[v] Tabatabai helped train Hezbollah’s partners in Syria and Yemen and commanded Hezbollah special forces in both countries.[vi] Tabatabai would have been able to use his experience planning and leading defensive operations against Israel in southern Lebanon, in addition to his engagement with Syrian partners and knowledge of Lebanon-Syria supply lines, to plan Hezbollah’s reconstitution and any future attacks against Israel.[vii]

Tabatabai’s death may only have a limited impact on Hezbollah’s reconstitution processes, however, because he reportedly shared responsibility for Hezbollah’s military and reconstruction processes with another commander. This commander, Mohammad Haider, is the most likely replacement for Tabatabai due to Haider’s experience handling the reconstitution portfolio. An Israeli military correspondent reported that Haider and Tabatabai shared military and reconstitution roles. It is unclear which Hezbollah commander will replace Tabatabai because Israel killed the majority of Hezbollah’s senior commanders in Fall 2024.[viii] Tabatabai reportedly shared the command over Hezbollah’s military and reconstruction with senior Hezbollah commander Mohammad Haidar.[ix]

CTP-ISW has identified multiple ways in which Hezbollah may respond to Israel’s killing of Tabatabai. The IDF has “significantly” increased the alert status of air defense systems in northern Israel and the readiness of forces following Tabatabai’s killing.[x] The following potential scenarios are laid out from most likely to least likely, with the least likely scenario also being the most dangerous:

1. Hezbollah does not launch an attack on Israel or Israeli forces. CTP-ISW assesses that this is Hezbollah’s most likely course of action. Hezbollah officials have stated that the strike crossed the group’s “red line” but did not explicitly vow to retaliate for the strike.[xi] Any Hezbollah retaliatory attack targeting Israel or Israeli forces would prompt a large Israeli response, as the IDF has promised to respond to any direct threats or plans to attack Israel with force. Such an Israeli response would possibly disrupt Hezbollah’s current efforts to regenerate its forces and replenish its weapons stocks. Hezbollah fighters, weapons stockpiles, and smuggling routes are common Israeli targets in Lebanon. Hezbollah may decide to issue threats to distract from its inaction, such as threatening to halt cooperation with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) or to redeploy forces to southern Lebanon. Hezbollah has repeatedly threatened the LAF and Lebanese government in 2025 to slow LAF disarmament efforts but has not yet escalated militarily.[xii] Hezbollah could pursue a similar tactic with Israel.
2. Hezbollah launches a few projectiles towards open areas of northern Israel in a symbolic attack. Hezbollah has a precedent of conducting small-scale, symbolic attacks that target uninhabited areas of northern Israel so as not to provoke a large Israeli response.[xiii] Hezbollah fired two rockets at an IDF border position in the Israeli-controlled Shebaa Farms in early December 2024 as a “warning” against Israeli ceasefire violations, for example. Israel responded aggressively to the December 2024 ”warnings,” however, and Hezbollah has not conducted any major ”warnings” since.[xiv]
3. Hezbollah fires munitions targeting an Israeli position in Lebanon. Israel currently maintains forces at five outposts in southern Lebanon. These forces are more exposed relative to Israeli units in Israel, and Hezbollah can frame any attack on Israeli forces in Lebanon as “resistance” against an “occupier.” A direct attack on Israeli forces would risk a limited but serious Israeli response, however, which could increase the risks of discontent among Hezbollah supporters in southern Lebanon who are still slowly recovering from the fighting in Fall 2024. Any resumed conflict in Lebanon that could be blamed on the group would likely have major repercussions for the group’s image among Lebanese civilians and its Shia support base.[xv]
4. In a most dangerous course of action, Hezbollah attempts an infiltration attack in northern Israel or an IDF outpost in Lebanon. A Hezbollah infiltration—whether successful or not—could trigger a major Israeli response that would imperil both Hezbollah’s rebuild and continued support from southern Lebanese civilians. Hezbollah could miscalculate and feel pressured into enforcing its “red line” mentioned above by triggering an infiltration. This option risks triggering major Israeli operations in the air over southern Lebanon at minimum, but the IDF has practiced offensive operations in response to major Hezbollah infiltrations in recent weeks as well.[xvi]

An unspecified senior IDF official told Israeli media on November 24 that the IDF must work to degrade Hezbollah to a point where the LAF is militarily stronger than Hezbollah, which would presumably enable the LAF to disarm it with greater ease.[xvii] The IDF has conducted numerous airstrikes in recent days that have targeted Hezbollah reconstitution efforts in southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley.[xviii] The IDF’s priority is to ensure that Hezbollah cannot build infrastructure within five to ten kilometers of Israel’s northern border, according to a senior IDF official on November 24.[xix] Senior Israeli officials have also continued to threaten that Israel will not allow Hezbollah to reconstitute its forces, particularly given the LAF’s slow and tepid progress in disarming the group.[xx] An unspecified senior IDF official said that Israeli military action alone will not achieve Hezbollah’s disarmament and that the IDF must degrade Hezbollah so that the LAF is militarily stronger than Hezbollah.[xxi]

The IDF has continued to threaten that it will launch an expanded operation against Hezbollah in Lebanon if the LAF does not disarm the group.[xxii] IDF officials told Israeli media on November 24 that Israel is on the verge of launching a ”short, preemptive operation” to deter Hezbollah and degrade the group’s capabilities.[xxiii] The IDF has also continued to conduct drills to prepare forces and reservists for various “sudden” events, including a reservist call-up drill on November 23 and a multi-division drill on November 24 to practice responses to ”sudden events on the northern border.”[xxiv] IDF Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir visited the 210th Regional Division during the drill and was updated on preparations along the Israel-Lebanon border and the division’s increased operational alert status.[xxv] The IDF 210th Regional Division is responsible for Israel’s northern border in the Golan Heights and Mount Hermon area adjacent to Syria and Lebanon.[xxvi]

Iran Update, November 21, 2025 

Some Syrian General Security Service (GSS) units are improving their counter-insurgency approach in rural minority areas by relying on relationships with locals. The GSS arrested a large Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Assadist cell in Sheikh Bader, Tartous Province, on November 12.[i] Independent Syria researcher Gregory Waters reported on November 21 that locals originally tipped off the GSS to the cell’s presence at their compound in Sheikh Bader.[ii] The two GSS officers who led the investigation said that the local tip-off and local community support were critical to the GSS’s dismantlement of the Assadist cell and to stability in the surrounding area.[iii]

The approach used by GSS in Sheikh Bader indicates that the GSS is experiencing some level of regional organizational learning across tactical units. The GSS officers in Sheikh Bader said that they observed and imitated the local engagement strategies that GSS officers employed to build relationships with the local Ismaili and Alawite communities in the neighboring town of Qadmous, which indicates some level of organizational learning.[iv] GSS officers who first deployed to the Sheikh Bader area in December 2024 contacted local notables and established a civil council to liaise between security services and the community.[v] This council worked to ease tensions with the GSS over time and build better community relationships.[vi] This strategy has been successful outside of the arrest of the Assadist cell. GSS officers reportedly responded rapidly to defend locals from abuses committed by Ministry of Defense personnel during the March violence targeting Alawites.[vii] This GSS unit’s success is a positive example of how units can apply lessons to improve counterinsurgency operations in minority areas in communities that hold distrust of the Syrian government. It is not clear to what degree the GSS is integrating these lessons at the national level, however.

The IRGC-affiliated Assadist cell does not appear to have strong local support in the Sheikh Bader area, given that locals tipped off the GSS to their location.[viii] CTP-ISW noted on November 14 that the cell’s activity, attempts to recruit, and the lack of GSS action against the group suggested that the cell had at least some local support in the Sheikh Bader area.[ix] Waters reported instead that locals initially mistook the Assadist cell for GSS personnel because GSS members often initially occupied villas abandoned by Assad regime generals who fled the area, and the insurgents had been invited by an Assadist general and occupied his house.[x] Locals reported the Assadist cell’s presence to local GSS officers as soon as they realized its nature. The GSS investigated and monitored the cell for three months, which explains part of the lag in action against the groups.[xi]

The IRGC-affiliated Assadist cell may have had foreign support, including possibly from Iran. Waters reported that the GSS recovered laptops and cellphones from the cell in Sheikh Bader on November 12 that provided evidence of the cell’s “domestic and international connections.”[xii] The GSS also recovered IRGC certificates that members of the cell had received during the Syrian civil war.[xiii] Iran may seek to exploit similar well-equipped cells of Shia insurgents in the future, even if Iran did not support this specific cell.[xiv] A senior IRGC officer deeply involved in past Iranian operations in Syria claimed that the IRGC is rebuilding its militia networks in Syria in a December 2024 speech.[xv]

NOTE: A version of this text also appears in ISW and AEI’s November 21 China & Taiwan Update.

Syrian Foreign Affairs Minister Asaad al Shaibani met with PRC Foreign Affairs Minister Wang Yi for the first time in Beijing on November 17. The PRC's highlighting of security issues during the meeting indicates that PRC policy toward the new Syrian government will be shaped primarily by counterterror and security concerns. Shaibani said that Syria would not allow any entity to use Syrian territory as a base to harm or undermine PRC interests.[xvi] Wang said that Beijing was considering participating in Syria’s economic reconstruction.[xvii] Wang also mentioned the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) in reference to the Syrian promise to disallow any entity from using Syrian territory to harm PRC interests.[xviii] The ETIM is an anti-PRC Uyghur militant group linked to the militant Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP), which fought in Syria against the Assad regime until its fall in December 2024.[xix] The distinction between the ETIM and the TIP is debated, and a United Nations sanctions monitor has described them as the same group.[xx] TIP announced its disbandment in June 2025, and the new Syrian army reportedly absorbed several thousand Uyghur ETIM/TIP fighters as a brigade in its 84th Division.[xxi] Uyghur militants have also assumed senior Syrian military positions, including a brigadier general and two colonels.[xxii]

The new Syrian army’s formal integration of Uyghur militants into its ranks, including high-ranking military officials, is likely extremely concerning for the PRC. Thousands of Uyghurs have left the PRC’s Xinjiang province since 2013 to train and fight in Syria’s civil war.[xxiii] Many of these Uyghur militants fighting in Syria hoped to return to Xinjiang and use their combat experience and extremist connections to wage an insurgency against the PRC.[xxiv] The PRC has used the rhetoric of counterterror efforts to justify its repressive crackdown on Uyghur communities in Xinjiang.[xxv]

The PRC appears particularly concerned about ETIM/TIP militants operating in Syria and elsewhere in the Middle East and Central Asia, having accused them it has accused of terrorist attacks in Xinjiang.[xxvi] PRC engagement with the Taliban government in Afghanistan has largely centered on containing and combating ETIM/TIP militants operating there.[xxvii] The PRC cooperated closely with the Assad regime on counterterrorism efforts targeting ETIM/TIP, and CDOT-ISW previously assessed that PRC policy towards the new Syrian government would heavily focus on containing and combating ETIM/TIP.[xxviii]  The PRC is likely to make significant economic participation in Syria’s reconstruction contingent upon a continuation of PRC-Syria counterterror cooperation targeting Uyghur militants in the region.

Key Takeaways

• Coastal Insurgency: Some Syrian General Security Service (GSS) units are improving their counter-insurgency approach in rural minority areas by relying on relationships with locals. GSS officers who arrested an IRGC-affiliated Assadist cell in Tartous said that local tip-off and local community support were critical to the dismantlement of the cell and to stability in the surrounding area.
• Sino-Syrian Relations: Syrian Foreign Affairs Minister Asaad al Shaibani met with PRC Foreign Affairs Minister Wang Yi for the first time in Beijing on November 17. The PRC's highlighting of security issues during the meeting indicates that PRC policy toward the new Syrian government will be shaped primarily by counterterror and security concerns.
• Iraqi Government Formation: At least some Shia Coordination Framework parties may be imposing conditions for the next prime minister that seek to constrain or restrict the actions of the next Iraqi prime minister after Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s increased independence from the framework during his term. The framework may seek to exclude prime minister candidates like Sudani due to fears that the candidates will act against the framework’s interests.

Iran Update, November 20, 2025 

Iran has reportedly signaled its willingness to resume negotiations with the United States if its “rights” — which refers to its right to enrich uranium on Iranian soil — are guaranteed.[i] Iran’s demand violates the stated US red line that Iran must halt all domestic uranium enrichment to resume negotiations.[ii] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian asked Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman in a letter to convey Iran’s openness to negotiations with the United States, “provided its rights are guaranteed,” on his recent visit to Washington, DC, according to two regional sources with knowledge of the matter who spoke to Reuters on November 20.[iii] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi said on November 20 that Iran will not negotiate its right to enrich uranium in an interview with The Economist.[iv]  

Iran Update, November 19, 2025 

An Iranian Defense Ministry-affiliated delegation covertly traveled to Russia in November 2024, possibly to seek “laser technology and expertise that could help [Iran] validate a nuclear weapon design without conducting a nuclear explosive test,” according to a former CIA analyst speaking to the Financial Times.[i] This report corroborates CTP-ISW's assessment from November 2024 that Iran had restarted its nuclear weapons research program. CTP-ISW cannot independently assess the status of this program following the Israel-Iran War. The Financial Times reported on November 19 that the Iranian Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND) used a front company, DamavandTec, to organize a trip for Iranian laser specialists to go to St. Petersburg, Russia, in November 2024.[ii] The SPND played a leading role in Iran’s nuclear weapons research program before 2003.[iii] The United States sanctioned DamavandTec in October 2025 for procuring “items applicable to the development of nuclear explosive devices from foreign suppliers.”[iv] The Iranian laser specialists visited the US-sanctioned Russian military technology company Laser Systems. Iran has previously sought assistance from Russia to develop its nuclear program.[v] The Financial Times previously reported that four Iranian nuclear scientists and an Iranian counterintelligence officer traveled to Moscow in August 2024 to visit Russian research institutes that specialize in dual-use technologies that could be used for nuclear weapons development.[vi] Iranian nuclear scientists’ visits to Russia in August and November 2024 came amid other indications, such as reports that Iran had begun running computer models and conducting metallurgical research that could support the development of nuclear weapons, that Iran had resumed its nuclear weapons research program.[vii] CTP-ISW cannot independently assess the status of this program following the Israel-Iran War.

Iran is continuing to develop parts of its nuclear program that could potentially support the development of a nuclear weapon. CTP-ISW has not observed any evidence that the Iranian regime seeks to develop a nuclear weapon, however. The Institute for Science and International Security reported on November 18 that Iran is constructing a possible high-explosive containment vessel at the former Taleghan 2 nuclear research site at the Parchin Military Complex in southeastern Tehran Province.[viii] The Institute noted that high-explosive containment vessels are necessary for the development of nuclear weapons but that they can also be used for “many other conventional weapons development processes.”[ix]  The Iranian regime previously used the Taleghan 2 facility to test explosives that are needed to detonate a nuclear device before the regime suspended its nuclear weapons program in 2003.[x] International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director Rafael Grossi stated on November 19 that there is nothing that currently necessitates an IAEA inspection at Taleghan 2 when asked about the construction of a possible high-explosive containment vessel at the site.[xi]

Iranian officials continue to express openness to resuming nuclear negotiations with the United States, but the regime has not conceded on its previous stance against zero uranium enrichment. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s Foreign Affairs Adviser, Kamal Kharrazi, stated that Iran would be open to nuclear negotiations based on “mutual respect” with the United States in an interview with CNN on November 19. Kharrazi said that Iran would maintain its right to enrich uranium domestically for peaceful purposes, however.[xii] Kharrazi stated that potential negotiations with the United States would focus on the “degree of enrichment” that Iran is allowed. Senior Iranian officials have continuously emphasized both before and after the Israel-Iran War that Iran will not negotiate its right to enrich uranium.[xiii]  Kharrazi said that Iran has experienced difficulty in convincing the United States and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) that Iran is not pursuing a nuclear weapon.[xiv] The United States has maintained that Iran must accept zero enrichment.[xv] Kharrazi stated that the United States must “make the first move” if Iran is to return to the negotiating table.[xvi] Kharrazi added that Iran’s nuclear program cannot be eliminated with “force.”[xvii] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi also told Iranian media on November 19 that Iran will not accept zero enrichment because enrichment has become “a matter of national pride.”[xviii]

Iran is continuing to prohibit the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from inspecting damaged and other Iranian nuclear facilities. An unspecified European Union (EU) source told UK-based outlet Oil Price on November 17 that Iran continues to block the IAEA from inspecting nuclear sites, including sites that the United States and Israel struck in June 2025 as well as the Mount Kolang Gaz La facility near Natanz.[xix] Kharrazi claimed that Iran cannot yet assess the damage at nuclear facilities such as Natanz and Fordow in his November 19 CNN interview.[xx] IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stressed the urgent need for Iran to allow IAEA inspectors to inspect nuclear facilities on the sidelines of the IAEA Board of Governors meeting on November 19. Grossi stated that Iran has not yet submitted a report on its damaged nuclear sites and highly enriched uranium stockpile to the IAEA.[xxi]  The E3 also submitted a resolution to the IAEA Board of Governors on November 18 that demands that Iran allow IAEA inspectors to access nuclear sites.[xxii] The IAEA Board of Governors will vote on the resolution in the coming days.[xxiii]

Infighting and paranoia among Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and other Iranian regime officials have reportedly increased since the Israel-Iran War, which could hamper the regime’s ability to make cohesive decisions. Unspecified Iranian regime officials told the Telegraph on November 19 that there is “turmoil” within the regime after the Israel-Iran War.[xxiv] Regime officials are reportedly engaged in infighting due to paranoia over widespread Israeli infiltration.[xxv] The regime has arrested hundreds of individuals on espionage charges since the Israel-Iran War and has executed several Iranians for allegedly spying for Israel.[xxvi] The Iranian officials added that there is growing concern among regime officials and security services that officials who collaborate with Israel may falsely accuse loyal regime officials of treason.[xxvii] These heightened concerns have prompted Iranian officials, particularly within the IRGC, to actively demonstrate their loyalty to the regime, according to an unspecified senior Iranian official.[xxviii] Israeli infiltration enabled the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to kill numerous senior Iranian military commanders and prominent nuclear scientists during the war.[xxix] Iranian officials’ concerns about Israeli infiltration are not new, but the Israel-Iran War exacerbated these concerns. The current environment of suspicion within the regime and lack of trust between officials could hinder the regime from being able to make cohesive decisions because trust and cooperation are critical for effective decision-making.[xxx]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck five Hezbollah rocket storage facilities and killed one Hezbollah fighter in southern Lebanon on November 19 amid the Lebanese Armed Forces’ (LAF) failure to act on Israeli information provided to the ceasefire monitoring committee about Hezbollah sites in southern Lebanon.[xxxi] The IDF issued evacuation orders to residents near targets in Deir Kifa, Chohour, and Tayr Falsay in Tyre District and in Ainatha, Bint Jbeil District, in southern Lebanon.[xxxii] The IDF struck the targets shortly thereafter.[xxxiii] The IDF targeted five Hezbollah rocket storage facilities.[xxxiv] The IDF also killed a Hezbollah fighter who the IDF said was attempting to re-establish Hezbollah’s presence in Tiri, Bint Jbeil District.[xxxv] The IDF Military Intelligence Directorate also identified dozens of locations in the neighboring village of Beit Lif where Hezbollah is rebuilding infrastructure, including a headquarters and weapons depots.[xxxvi] The IDF said on November 19 that it had referred some of the Hezbollah infrastructure in Beit Lif to the ceasefire monitoring committee but that the LAF had not acted on this information.[xxxvii] Israeli media reported on November 8 that Israel warned the LAF through the United States that the LAF is not acting “sufficiently” against Hezbollah because it is not entering rural areas or private property to confiscate Hezbollah weapons.[xxxviii] Israel stated in a message that it will continue and increase attacks across Lebanon if the LAF does not make “significant” improvements.[xxxix] The LAF is bound by the November 2024 ceasefire agreement to disarm Hezbollah south of the Litani River.[xl]

Hezbollah is likely smuggling weapons from Syria to southern Lebanon that the group could use to defend against a possible Israeli ground operation in Lebanon or to attack Israel. The IDF strikes on Hezbollah rocket storage facilities in southern Lebanon occurred as Hezbollah is attempting to replenish its weapons stockpiles.[xli] Syrian and Lebanese authorities have thwarted numerous weapons smuggling attempts along the Lebanon-Syria border since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, which indicates that Hezbollah and/or Hezbollah-aligned actors are continuing to smuggle weapons from Syria into Lebanon.[xlii] Syrian forces seized anti-personnel fragmentation mines, anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM), rocket-propelled grenade warheads, mortar rounds, and Grad rockets in three distinct seizures near al Qusayr, Homs Province, Syria, in September.[xliii] Hezbollah has historically used these types of munitions to target Israeli ground forces in Lebanon and to fire into Israeli territory. Hezbollah fired thousands of Grad rockets into northern Israel between October 2023 and November 2024, for example.[xliv] Hezbollah also launched ATGMs and mortars targeting the IDF and Israeli positions in Lebanon in late fall 2024.[xlv] Recent IDF strikes targeting Hezbollah fighters smuggling munitions into southern Lebanon on November 8 and 10 suggest that at least some smuggling routes between southern Lebanon and other parts of the country and Syria are active.[xlvi]

Syrian President Ahmed al Shara met on November 19 with a prominent Arab tribal sheikh and militia leader from Hasakah Province who supports the Syrian Democratic Forces’ (SDF) position on decentralization.[xlvii] The leader of the SDF-allied Shammar tribe, Sheikh Maneh Hamidi Daham al Jarba, and Shara discussed the role of Arab tribes in Syria and affirmed the Shammar tribe’s support for the government and SDF’s March 10 integration framework agreement.[xlviii] Jarba’s son commands the Sanadid Forces, which is a militia within the SDF that consists of approximately 3,000 Arab tribal fighters.[xlix] A source from the Shammar tribe told Syrian media that the SDF and Sanadid Forces coordinated Jarba’s visit to Damascus.[l] Jarba, while generally supportive of the government, has tempered his support by dismissing the government’s claims that the SDF seeks to secede from Syria.[li] He has also called for a new constitution on the grounds that the current constitution does not include all Syrians, which is also the SDF’s position.[lii]

Debate over centralization or decentralization is the core political issue that faces Syria at present. Syria’s centralized system of government, which was put in place in 1971, contributed to the political grievances that culminated in the 2011 uprising.[liii] Jarba’s meeting with Shara comes amid recent efforts to accelerate the SDF’s civil and military integration into the Syrian state, but the SDF and Syrian government have still not addressed their fundamental disagreement about the definitions of centralization and decentralization.  The SDF interprets decentralization as a mechanism to ensure local government autonomy for regional issues and views the government’s efforts to centralize control in Damascus as an effort to establish an autocratic government.[liv] The Syrian government views centralization as necessary to unite the country and interprets decentralization as a path toward the partition of Syria, however.[lv] Disagreement on this issue has significantly impeded the SDF’s integration since March 2025. The Syrian government and SDF’s continued disagreement risks renewed internal conflict if the framing of the debate over centralization does not change from two zero-sum positions.

Iran Update, November 18, 2025 

The Shia Coordination Framework announced on November 17 that it formed the “largest parliamentary bloc” with 157 seats.[i] This bloc includes Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development Coalition.[ii] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. The Iraqi president will select the largest coalition in parliament to try to form a government.[iii] The framework also announced the formation of a committee to interview candidates for prime minister, even though Sudani has repeatedly stated his intention to serve a second term as prime minister.[iv] This announcement comes after a member of Sudani’s coalition suggested on November 13 that Sudani may attempt to ally with Sunni and Kurdish political parties to try to form the largest bloc because some framework parties refuse to allow Sudani to serve a second term.[v] Several prominent framework parties, including the Iranian-backed Badr Organization, Sadiqoun Movement, Hoquq Movement, Services Alliance, and former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki’s State of Law Coalition, are opposed to Sudani serving a second term due to “disagreements about key issues.”[vi]  

It is unclear whether Sudani would remain in the framework if the framework does not agree to him serving a second term as prime minister. Sudani could attempt to ally with Sunni, Kurdish, and smaller parties to form the largest parliamentary bloc. He could also stay in the framework and try to delay government formation by preventing parliament from meeting the two-thirds quorum required to elect the president.[vii] The president is responsible for nominating a prime minister-designate from the largest bloc.[viii] Shia Coordination Framework parties used this strategy to delay government formation in 2022.[ix] Both of these options require Sudani to ensure that Reconstruction and Development Coalition members do not defect and thereby weaken Sudani’s leverage in parliament.

Political parties tied to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias performed better in the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections than they did in the 2021 elections, likely due to several reasons, including Iraqi Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr’s boycott of the elections and the reinstatement of the pre-2021 electoral system.[x] The political blocs of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that won 17 seats under the Fatah Alliance coalition in 2021 won 45 seats in the 2025 elections.[xi] Asaib Ahl al Haq’s Sadiqoun Movement won 27 seats, the Badr Organization won 18 seats, and the Kataib al Imam Ali-affiliated Services Alliance won five seats.[xii] Kataib Hezbollah’s Hoquq Movement, which did not run under the Fatah Alliance in 2021, won five seats in 2025, compared to one seat in 2021.[xiii] Sadr's decision to boycott the election and his efforts to urge his followers, who are primarily Shia, not to vote may partially explain these differences.[xiv] CTP-ISW assessed in June 2025 that Shia Coordination Framework parties may have sought to win votes from Iraqis who would have voted for Sadr in the elections, including by organizing voter registration drives in Sadrist strongholds.[xv] Shia Coordination Framework parties may have successfully convinced a portion of Sadrist voters to vote for Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, although this scenario is less likely due to Sadr’s ideological opposition to the militias.[xvi] Changes to the electoral system may have also contributed to the success of the militias. Framework parties successfully pushed for a reversal of the Iraqi election law in 2023 and re-established Iraq’s proportional representation system, which allows surplus votes for a candidate to be transferred to other candidates on the same party list.[xvii] This electoral system reduces the cost of running multiple candidates in the same district, which benefits often-fractious Iranian-backed political factions.

Some elements of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) are reportedly pressuring Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to accelerate the reconstruction of Iran’s nuclear program and withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).[xviii] An unspecified senior “energy source” who works closely with Iran’s Oil Ministry told UK-based outlet Oil Price on November 17 that the IRGC is pressuring Khamenei to expedite the reconstruction of nuclear facilities that were damaged during the Israel-Iran War.[xix] The source added that some elements of the IRGC are pressuring Khamenei to withdraw from the NPT.[xx] Iran must implement a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as an NPT member.[xxi] Safeguards agreements are “designed to enable the IAEA to detect the diversion of nuclear material from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons uses, as well as to detect undeclared nuclear activities and material.”[xxii] CTP-ISW cannot verify the Oil Price report. Unspecified IRGC officials previously urged Khamenei before the Israel-Iran War to approve the development of a nuclear weapon to confront “existential threats” from the West.[xxiii] An unspecified European Union (EU) source also told Oil Price that unanswered questions about recent Iranian activities at the Mount Kolang Gaz La facility in Esfahan Province have set Iran and the West “on a collision course.”[xxiv] Recent Iranian construction at the facility has fueled concerns that the site could serve not only as a centrifuge assembly plant, as Iran announced in 2020, but also as a covert enrichment facility or secure storage facility for highly enriched uranium.[xxv]

Iran also reportedly intends to allocate a large portion of its military budget to the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and multi-warhead delivery systems, according to the EU source.[xxvi] The source stated that Iran will increase its military budget by over 200 percent in the coming year and accelerate the development of ICBMs with multi-warhead delivery systems and ranges of up to 10,000 kilometers. CTP-ISW cannot verify these claims. Multi-warhead delivery systems likely refer to multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs).[xxvii] Iran used ballistic missiles with cluster munition warheads, which disperse unguided submunitions over a wide area, during the Israel-Iran War. Iran does not currently possess MIRV technology, however. Ballistic missiles with MIRVs are more difficult to defend against than regular ballistic missiles, so Iran may seek to develop MIRV technology to bypass enemy air defenses more effectively.[xxviii]

Iran Update, November 17, 2025 

Iraq’s electoral commission, the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC), released the final results and associated seat allocations from the November 11 Iraqi parliamentary elections on November 17.[i] The Iraqi Federal Supreme Court must ratify the results before the government formation process can formally begin.[ii] Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development Coalition won a plurality of 46 seats.[iii] Shia Coordination Framework parties won a total of 111 seats.[iv] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. Political parties, coalitions, and candidates have three days to submit complaints about the final election results and appeal IHEC’s previous decisions to the Electoral Judicial Panel (EJP).[v] The EJP must adjudicate all appeals before IHEC certifies the election results and sends them to the Federal Supreme Court for ratification.[vi] The Federal Supreme Court did not ratify the October 2021 parliamentary election results until late December 2021 due, in part, to a court case filed by Iranian-backed Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri.[vii]

The Shia Coordination Framework is debating whether to include Sudani in the next Iraqi government, amid reports that Sudani may ally with Sunni and Kurdish political parties. The framework nominated Sudani as prime minister for a first term in 2022.[viii] The framework is expected to discuss government formation with Sudani in the coming days.[ix] A framework source told Iraqi media on November 16 that Sudani has a “good chance” of serving a second term, but that the framework has prepared multiple unspecified “scenarios” if Sudani joins alliances outside of the framework.[x] Iranian-backed Iraqi actors employed a variety of political and violent tactics to hinder Iraqi Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr from allying with Sunni parties and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and excluding Iranian-backed parties after the 2021 parliamentary elections.[xi] A framework source told Arab media on November 17 that prominent framework leaders, such as Maliki, support excluding Sudani from government formation.[xii] A State of Law member similarly told Iraqi media on November 17 that “most” framework parties do not support a second term for Sudani due to “disagreements about key issues.”[xiii]

These statements come after a member of Sudani’s coalition suggested on November 13 that Sudani may attempt to ally with Sunni and Kurdish political parties.[xiv] Sudani is expected to meet with Kurdish political parties, presumably the KDP and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), in Iraqi Kurdistan on November 17 and 18.[xv] The KDP and PUK won 26 and 15 seats in the 2025 elections, respectively.[xvi] The Iraqi president will select the largest coalition in the Iraqi Parliament to attempt to form a government.[xvii] Given that neither the Shia Coordination Framework nor Sudani’s coalition has the 165 seats required to form the government, both blocs will try to ally with smaller parties in the coming weeks. A member of the Services Alliance, which is affiliated with the Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Imam al Ali, confirmed that the framework has created a committee to negotiate with Sunni and Kurdish parties.[xviii] Framework parties could attempt to form a coalition with Sunni and Kurdish parties by offering these parties ministry appointments or other political spoils.

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media claimed on November 15 that the IRGC Navy seized the Marshall Islands-flagged Talara tanker because it was attempting to illegally export Iranian cargo. This claim likely seeks to obfuscate the real reason why the IRGC Navy seized the vessel and may be part of an Iranian effort to prevent any retaliation for the seizure. Three IRGC Navy vessels intercepted the Talara on November 14 and diverted it to Iranian territorial waters.[xix]  IRGC-affiliated Fars News claimed that the Talara was carrying 30,000 tons of Iranian petrochemical products and that the IRGC Navy seized the vessel to “return [Iran’s] property.”[xx] The outlet, citing an unspecified source, stated that an Iranian individual or company intended to illegally export the materials.[xxi] The IRGC Navy stated on November 15 that it seized the Talara to protect Iran’s “national interests and resources” and claimed that the vessel was carrying “unauthorized cargo.” CTP-ISW has not observed any evidence that the vessel was carrying Iranian cargo or that its owner or operator had any links to Iran. The IRGC suggested following the seizure on November 14 that the IRGC Navy had seized the vessel in retaliation for a previous incident, not because the vessel was illicitly transporting Iranian cargo. The Fars News report suggests that Iran may be trying to avoid any retaliation for seizing the tanker by attributing the seizure to a domestic issue rather than foreign tensions. Iran depends on stability in the Strait of Hormuz to export oil, which is the main source of revenue for the regime. Any naval retaliation could impact the stability of the Strait of Hormuz and Iranian oil exports.  

CTP-ISW outlined on November 14 three hypotheses for why Iran may have seized the Talara:

• Iran may have sought to retaliate for the potential attack on the LPG tanker MV Falcon, which caught on fire after an unspecified explosion near Aden, Yemen, on October 18.[xxii]
• Iran may have sought to demonstrate its willingness to close the Strait of Hormuz as a preemptive measure amid Iranian concerns about future US actions.[xxiii]
• Iran may have sought to demonstrate its power to actors, such as Azerbaijan and Saudi Arabia, that have recently taken steps to increase cooperation with Iran’s adversaries.[xxiv]

A Russian and Turkish military delegation toured former Russian military sites near United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) positions located along the Syrian border with the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights on November 17.[xxv] The Russian and Turkish delegation’s tour may be related to previous discussions between Syria and Russia about establishing a Russian military presence in southern Syria.[xxvi] The Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on November 17 that a Russian military delegation toured “a number of military points and sites in southern Syria” to review on-the-ground conditions “within the framework of the ongoing cooperation.”[xxvii] Local sources reported that Syrian security forces escorted a large Russian military convoy to several military sites in Quneitra and Daraa provinces on November 17.[xxviii] The Russian delegation was accompanied by unspecified Turkish military personnel.[xxix] The Russian and Turkish delegation visited a former Russian barracks in Quneitra Province as well as several other Russian military sites.[xxx] The Russian military previously manned approximately 12 observation positions in Syria along the border with the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights before the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. [xxxi] The delegation’s tour comes amid recent Russo-Syrian military and diplomatic engagement and Turkey’s efforts to use the Russian military in Syria to act as a counterbalance against Israel in Syria. Turkey has previously encouraged Syria to strengthen ties with Russia to counterbalance and undermine US and Israeli objectives in Syria.[xxxii] Turkish sources told   in August 2025 that the Turkish government had advised Syrian President Ahmed al Shara to strengthen relations with Russia so that Russia, Turkey, and Syria can counterbalance US, European, Israeli, and Saudi interests in Syria.[xxxiii] An unspecified Syrian source told Reuters that Shara may have discussed the redeployment of Russian military police to southern Syria as a ”guarantor” against Israeli advances in the south during Shara’s visit to Moscow on October 15.[xxxiv] Syrian Defense Minister Major General Marhaf Abu Qasra traveled to Russia on October 31, where he met with Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov.[xxxv] Qasra met with Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-bek Yevkurov and a delegation of reportedly 190 Russian military officials in Damascus on November 16 to discuss military cooperation between the two countries.[xxxvi] The Syrian government has previously stated that it will work with multiple partners to ensure its security interests in southern Syria.   

Key Takeaways

• Iraqi Parliamentary Elections: Iraq’s electoral commission, the Independent High Electoral Commission, released the final results and associated seat allocations from the November 11 Iraqi parliamentary elections on November 17. The Iraqi Federal Supreme Court must ratify the results before the government formation process can formally begin.
• Iraqi Parliamentary Elections: The Shia Coordination Framework is debating whether to include Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani in the next Iraqi government, amid reports that Sudani may ally with Sunni and Kurdish political parties.
• Tanker Seizure in the Strait of Hormuz: Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media claimed on November 15 that the IRGC Navy seized the Marshall Islands-flagged Talara tanker because it was attempting to illegally export Iranian cargo. This claim likely seeks to obfuscate the real reason why the IRGC Navy seized the vessel and may be part of an Iranian effort to prevent any retaliation for the seizure.
• Syrian-Russian Relations: A Russian and Turkish military delegation toured former Russian military sites near United Nations Disengagement Observer Force positions located along the Syrian border with the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights on November 17. The Russian and Turkish delegation’s tour may be related to previous discussions between Syria and Russia about establishing a Russian military presence in southern Syria.

Iran Update, November 14, 2025 

Three small Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) vessels intercepted a Marshall Islands-flagged oil products tanker, Talara, and moved it into Iranian waters in the Strait of Hormuz on November 14.[i] The vessel is operated by Cyprus-based, German- and British-owned Columbia Ship Management. The vessel is owned by Pasha Finance, which allegedly has familial ties to Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev.[ii] The vessel was headed to Singapore from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and was carrying a cargo of high-sulfur gasoil.[iii] Iranian naval forces intercepted the vessel on early Friday morning and diverted it into Iranian territorial waters.[iv] Columbia Ship Management stated that it lost contact with the vessel around 0822 local time near the coast of Khor Fakkan, United Arab Emirates. The IRGC issued a statement on X on November 14, quoting a Quranic verse: “So whoever has assaulted you, then assault him in the same way that he has assaulted you,” suggesting that Iran is retaliating for a previous incident.[v]

Iran has conducted several inspections of naval units in the Persian Gulf since the June 2025 Israel-Iran War due to concerns that the United States and its allies could seize Iranian vessels. Senior Iranian IRGC and Artesh commanders inspected naval facilities at least seven times between June and November 2025—most recently on November 11—to evaluate combat readiness.[vi] Iranian officials have warned in October 2025 that Iran will close the Strait of Hormuz if the international community blocks Iranian oil exports, Iran's most profitable export.[vii] Several senior Iranian officials have touted Iranian naval capabilities and their destructive and deterrent effect towards Iran‘s adversaries in recent statements.[viii]

ISW-CTP is considering the following three hypotheses about Iran’s objectives in seizing the vessel:

• Iran may be seeking retaliation for the potential attack on the LPG tanker MV Falcon, which caught on fire after an unspecified explosion near Aden, Yemen, on October 18.[ix] The non-profit United Against Nuclear Iran reported that the Falcon was an Iranian shadow fleet vessel that transports illicit Iranian oil.[x] The IRGC quoted a Quranic verse on X on November 14 that implied that the IRGC was attempting to retaliate for an earlier incident. Iran may have viewed the Falcon incident as an intentional attack and is attempting to deter any actors responsible for it.
• Iran may be showing its willingness to close off the Strait of Hormuz as a preemptive measure amid Iranian concerns about future US actions. Iranian officials have warned that Iran is willing to close the Strait of Hormuz if the international community blocks Iranian oil exports and have inspected naval facilities along the coast to confirm force capabilities and readiness.[xi]
• Iran may be demonstrating its power to actors, such as Azerbaijan and Saudi Arabia. Both countries have recently taken steps to increase cooperation with Iranian adversaries. Israel and Azerbaijan have held several meetings in 2025 to discuss bilateral cooperation and Azerbaijan’s inclusion in the Abraham Accords.[xii] Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman reportedly plans to discuss a defense agreement with the United States during his visit to Washington next week.[xiii] The Saudi-US defense agreement would be similar to the recently signed Qatar-US agreement that pledged the United States to treat any armed attack on Qatari soil as an attack on the United States. Iran may be showing its ability to disrupt movements across the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz if it perceives any future threats from its adversaries.

Top Iranian-backed politician Hadi al Ameri likely began efforts to bolster the Shia Coordination Framework’s unity after Iraqi parliamentary elections on November 11. The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. Iran-backed Badr Organization head Hadi al Amiri met with National State Forces Coalition leader Ammar al Hakim and Iran-backed militia Asaib Ahl al Haq leader Qais al Khazali on November 13 to discuss government formation.[xiv] Khazali also met with First Deputy Parliament Speaker and Iraqi Foundation Coalition leader Mohsen al Mandalawi on November 14.[xv] The framework may exclude current Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani from the framework, but it remains unclear if all framework parties will support his exclusion. The framework is reportedly split into two groups over Sudani pursuing a second term as prime minister, which will necessitate an effort by Ameri and other framework leaders to retain framework unity.[xvi] Top Iranian-backed parties like Ameri’s Badr Organization and Qais al Khazali’s Sadiqoun may fail to form the large coalition necessary to form a government if the framework collapses.

Khaled Walid, a member of Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development Coalition, suggested on November 13 that Sudani may attempt to ally with Sunni and Kurdish political parties.[xvii] This strategy mirrors Shia National Movement leader Moqtada al Sadr’s ultimately unsuccessful attempt to ally with Sunni and Kurdish leaders to form a “national majority government” that excluded Iran-backed Iraqi parties after the November 2021 parliamentary elections.[xviii] Iraqi media previously reported on October 30 that unspecified Iraqi political figures are working to form a Sudani-led post-election alliance that will include Sunni and Kurdish political figures and potentially exclude unspecified Iran-aligned figures and parties.[xix] Sudani may have already had some success allying with Sunni parties. Sunni Azm Alliance member Walid Fahdawi also claimed on November 14 that the Azm Alliance will likely ally with Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development Coalition.[xx] Khaled Walid implied that Sudani may attempt to ally with Sunni and Kurdish political parties because some Shia Coordination Framework parties refuse to allow Sudani to serve a second term.[xxi]

The other Shia Coordination Framework parties, including the Badr Organization and Nouri al Maliki’s State of Law Coalition, likely seek to exclude Sudani from government. The Iran-backed Badr Organization and Nouri al Maliki’s State of Law Coalition, both of which are Shia Coordination Framework members, have separately expressed opposition to Sudani serving a second term.[xxii] Badr Organization member Mukhtar al Moussawi told Iraqi media on November 13 that Shia Coordination Framework parties received enough votes to form the government without Sudani’s coalition, though he did not support this claim with evidence.[xxiii] Badr Organization member Mahmoud al Hayani denied reports on November 13 that the Framework may form a parliamentary bloc that excludes Sudani’s coalition, but Hayani is probably lying, given Moussawi’s comments, Badr and Maliki’s opposition to a second term, and the comments by Khaled Walid suggesting that the framework sought to exclude Sudani from the premiership.[xxiv] Sudani’s relationship with the Shia Coordination Framework has become increasingly frayed because he has acted contrary to the parties’ interests in recent months.[xxv]

Some Shia Coordination Framework members have also accused Sudani of corruption and having Baathist ties to detract voter support for Sudani’s coalition before the November 2025 elections.[xxvi] Sudani has also reportedly not attended Shia Coordination Framework meetings over the past few weeks after unspecified Framework members accused him of wanting to normalize relations with Israel.[xxvii]

These discussions have continued even though the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) has not finalized the election results or released the preliminary election results yet.[xxviii] IHEC must first review all election complaints that political parties, coalitions, and candidates submitted before publishing the parliamentary election results.[xxix] IHEC reported on November 13 that parties, coalitions, and candidates have so far submitted 101 election complaints.[xxx] Political parties, coalitions, and candidates can then appeal both IHEC’s decisions on complaints and the final electoral results to the Electoral Judicial Panel.[xxxi] IHEC will then certify all election results and send them to the Federal Supreme Court for ratification, following any additional adjudication by the Electoral Judicial Panel.[xxxii] The Federal Supreme Court’s ratification of the results is the first step in government formation.[xxxiii]  CTP-ISW will provide additional analysis about Iraq’s official election results in future Iran Updates.

Iran Update, November 13, 2025 

A Shia Coordination Framework member suggested on November 13 that the framework could exclude Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s coalition from government formation, even though Sudani’s coalition likely won a plurality of seats in the November 11 Iraqi parliamentary elections.[i] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. Iraq’s electoral commission, the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC), has not released official seat allocations for Iraqi parties based on the results at the time of this writing, but Sudani received the most votes nationally by a margin of over 200,000 votes.[ii] The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) received the second-most votes nationally.[iii] Shia Coordination Framework parties discussed government formation and the selection of the next prime minister in Baghdad on November 12, following IHEC’s announcement of preliminary election results.[iv]  Sudani, who the framework selected as prime minister in 2022, was not present at the meeting. A member of the Iranian-backed Badr Organization told Iraqi media on November 13 that Shia Coordination Framework parties received enough votes for the framework to form the largest bloc—and thus the government—without Sudani’s coalition.[v] Unconfirmed reports that describe the total number of seats the Shia Coordination Framework parties will be allocated suggest that the framework parties will have to include other blocs to arrange the 165-seat coalition required for government formation, however.[vi] The number of seats that Sudani’s coalition ultimately receives will impact how easily the Shia Coordination Framework can exclude him in government formation. CTP-ISW will provide additional analysis about Iraq’s official election results in future Iran Updates.

The Shia Coordination Framework’s ability to form a 165-seat coalition ultimately depends on its ability to stay united. An unidentified political source told Iraqi media on November 13 that leaders of “main lists” within the Shia Coordination Framework do not “have the right to separate” from the coalition during government formation, likely referring to ongoing divisions within the Shia Coordination Framework.[vii] Shia Coordination Framework parties‘ discussions about government formation prior to the elections indicated that the framework consists of two camps that hold diverging preferences on the next Iraqi prime minister. Iraqi media reported in September 2025 that one camp is comprised of Shia Coordination Framework “sheikhs,” which likely refers to prominent figures like State of Law Coalition head and former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki, Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri, and Asaib Ahl al Haq head Qais al Khazali.[viii] The rest of the coalition comprises the second camp.[ix]  

The Badr Organization member’s comments about possibly excluding Sudani from government formation reflect Sudani’s ongoing rivalry with certain Shia Coordination Framework parties that appear to be part of the first camp. Sudani has behaved contrary to the interests of Iranian-backed Iraqi actors in recent months, including by dismissing two Iranian-backed militia commanders and withdrawing a bill from Parliament that would have formally institutionalized parts of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[x] Sudani’s actions that have targeted the interests of Iranian-backed Iraqi actors may be encouraging certain Shia Coordination Framework parties to exclude him from government formation. A Shia Coordination Framework source told Iraqi media on November 13 that the coalition may allow a second Sudani term unless “influential forces move against it.”[xi] Sudani and Maliki have also increasingly come into conflict within the Shia Coordination Framework throughout 2025, and Maliki could reject the second term for Sudani.[xii] An unidentified political source also implied to Iraqi media on November 13 that the Shia Coordination Framework may not necessarily choose the candidate of the party with the most seats as prime minister designate.[xiii] The Iraqi political establishment has historically sought prime ministers who are perceived as malleable.[xiv] Sudani, as the current prime minister and winner of the national popular vote, is unlikely to be perceived as an easily influenceable candidate. Sudani’s possible exclusion is particularly notable given an October 2025 report that Sudani himself may ally with the KDP and Sunni parties to exclude some unspecified Iranian-backed figures and parties from the ruling coalition.[xv] Sudani announced on November 13 that his coalition is willing to discuss government formation with all parties.[xvi]

The Shia Coordination Framework appears to be considering how to involve Iraqi Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr in government formation, likely to reduce opportunities for Sadr to destabilize the government formation process and the next Iraqi government. An adviser to Sudani told BBC Arabic on November 12 that some unidentified Shia Coordination Framework leaders have suggested that the Sadrist Movement be a “key partner” in the formation of the next government, even though the movement lacks parliamentary representation.[xvii] Sadr’s Shia nationalist movement did not participate in the elections, and Sadr repeatedly called on his primarily Shia followers to boycott the vote.[xviii] A Shia Coordination Framework source similarly told Iraqi media that the framework discussed on November 12 the possibility of reaching an “understanding”  with Sadr on his movement’s “role” in the “next stage” and “knowing their position on the second term,” possibly referring to Sadr‘s position on a potential second term for Sudani.[xix]  Shia Coordination Framework actors are likely concerned that Sadr will attempt to destabilize the upcoming government formation process or destabilize a future government in which he is not participating, as he has attempted to do before. Sadr has periodically mobilized his predominantly Shia Iraqi base, including during the government formation process following the 2021 elections.[xx] Government formation is considered to be a “competition for power and resources” that takes place after parliamentary elections, in which parties negotiate ministry appointments, including the prime minister position.[xxi] Shia Coordination Framework parties may possibly attempt to acquire Sadr’s tacit cooperation in government formation by offering his movement positions and/or resources in the next government.

The Islamic State is attempting to exploit the Syrian transitional government’s decision to join the US-led Global Coalition Against the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) to discredit the government among Sunni hardliners and drive recruitment. Syrian Transitional President Ahmed al Shara’s ruling coalition consists of a wide variety of Sunni Arab groups that were opposed to the Assad regime, some of which are hardline Salafi-jihadists.[xxii] These Salafi-jihadists remained allied with Shara as he disavowed the Islamic State in 2013 and then al Qaeda in 2016.[xxiii] Other hardliners broke with Shara both times, remaining with the Islamic State in 2013 and al Qaeda in 2016.[xxiv] The Islamic State encouraged Sunni fighters loyal to Syrian President Ahmed al Shara to join its cells in Syria “before it is too late” on November 13.[xxv] The Islamic State previously attempted to drive recruitment from dissatisfied members of the Syrian transitional government in May 2025 by criticizing Shara for cooperating with the United States after his meeting with US President Donald Trump.[xxvi] The Islamic State’s propaganda is likely aimed at hardline and foreign Salafi-jihadist elements within the MoD that may oppose Shara’s partnership with the coalition and remain susceptible to recruitment. MoI spokesperson Noureddine al Baba warned on November 8 that ISIS will exploit Syria’s entry into the international coalition to boost its recruitment and that the MoI expects increased ISIS activity after Syria joins the coalition.[xxvii]  The Islamic State also condemned the Syrian Ministry of Interior’s (MoI) large counter-ISIS operation on November 8, in which government forces conducted operations against 61 ISIS cells and arrested 71 ISIS fighters across Syrian territory.[xxviii] 

The Islamic State condemned Syria’s November 10 entry into the coalition in a November 13 publication and called it the “public formalization of a step started in secret,” in reference to the Syrian government’s prior cooperation with coalition forces.[xxix] Anonymous Syrian and Western officials told The New York Times on November 12 that the Syrian transitional government and its predecessor organization Hayat Tahrir al Sham have coordinated counter-ISIS operations with the International Coalition since 2016.[xxx] The Islamic State has vehemently opposed Shara since he came to power in December 2024, due in part to his cooperation with the West and relatively moderate stances.[xxxi] Islamic State propaganda has continually portrayed the Syrian transitional government as a proxy for the West that has betrayed hardline Sunnis.[xxxii] Reuters reported on November 10 that ISIS has attempted and failed to assassinate Shara twice “over the last few months,” citing two senior officials. [xxxiii]

Iran Update, November 12, 2025 

The voter turnout rate was 56 percent in the November 11 Iraqi parliamentary elections, according to Iraq’s electoral commission.[i] Iraq’s electoral commission, the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC), previously reported an average voter turnout rate of 24 percent on November 11 before the polls closed.[ii] This high turnout rate comes after various Iraqi political figures expressed concern about low voter turnout on election day.[iii] The average voter turnout rate in the 2021 Iraqi parliamentary elections was approximately 42 percent.[iv] High voter turnout usually benefits large blocs like Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development Coalition because lower turnout favors smaller parties with very committed supporters.[v] Sudani's coalition won a plurality of votes in eight Iraqi provinces, including Baghdad Province, which also suggests that Sudani is popular.[vi] A plurality of votes suggests that Sudani performed well, but does not indicate that he will win a large number of seats by default because Iraq’s election system uses proportional representation.[vii] A September 2025 survey noted that Sudani had a 64 percent approval rating, which is among the highest approval ratings for an Iraqi prime minister since 2003.[viii] IHEC started to release the November 2025 election vote counts on November 12, but has not released parliamentary seat allocation results at the time of this writing. CTP-ISW will provide additional analysis about the official election results in future Iran Updates.

Iraqi politicians will likely continue informal government formation negotiations in advance of the Federal Supreme Court’s ratification of election results. The Federal Supreme Court’s ratification of the results is the first official step in government formation, but some early negotiations began prior to the elections and will continue as election results are released.[ix] IHEC announced on November 12 that political parties, coalitions, and candidates have logged 39 election complaints thus far, which IHEC must review before it can announce final electoral results.[x] Political parties, coalitions, and candidates can also appeal the final electoral results and IHEC’s decisions regarding complaints to the Electoral Judicial Panel that the Court of Cassation will nominate.[xi] The Court of Cassation legally reports to the Supreme Judicial Council, which Iranian-backed Judge Faiq Zaidan heads.[xii] IHEC will certify all results and send them to the Federal Supreme Court for ratification following the Electoral Judicial Panel’s adjudication.[xiii] The Federal Supreme Court did not ratify the 2021 election results until December 27, 2021, more than two months after the elections, due, in part, to a court case that Iranian-backed Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri filed to annul the preliminary results.[xiv] Iranian-backed parties underperformed in 2021 due to Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr’s participation and the type of electoral system used in the 2021 elections.[xv] The Iraqi President must call for a Parliament session within 15 days of the Federal Supreme Court’s ratification of the results before a President, a speaker, and their deputies, and a prime minister designate are chosen, respectively.[xvi]

The election results themselves and any changes to the results due to disputes will impact government formation negotiations, but Iraqi politicians will likely conduct these negotiations throughout the dispute adjudication phase. These negotiations are about “competition for power and resources” rather than discrete policy matters.[xvii] The performance of coalitions, such as Sudani’s, will impact their ability to form a 165-seat coalition required to form a government. Iranian-backed Iraqi actors deployed a variety of political and violent strategies to hinder the government formation process in 2021 when Sadr attempted to form a government without Iranian-backed political parties.[xviii] Sadr was able to exclude these parties because his large share of seats would have enabled him to form an alliance with large Kurdish and Sunni parties, but without his Shia competitors.

Sudani’s performance is particularly notable given that Iraqi media reported in October 2025 that unspecified Iraqi political figures were working to form a Sudani-led post-election alliance that would include Sunni and Kurdish political figures and potentially exclude some unspecified Iran-aligned figures and parties.[xix] Ameri denied on October 11 that Sudani had requested a second term, likely alluding to ongoing divides that have emerged between Sudani and some Shia Coordination Framework parties this year.[xx] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. The Shia Coordination Framework released a statement the night before the elections, reaffirming that it will re-form its alliance after the elections, but it remains far from clear if the reunification will occur.[xxi]

CTP-ISW observed three instances of political violence on election day. Iraqi media reported on November 11 that Iraqi authorities arrested a man who, as part of a group, exchanged fire with Iraqi security forces at a school used as a polling center near Muzaybilah, Basra Province.[xxii] One unspecified person was reportedly injured in the incident. Supporters of two unspecified rival candidates also clashed near a polling station in al Abbasiya district, Najaf Province, which injured three supporters of one candidate.[xxiii] A medical source separately told Iraqi media that unspecified actors shot and injured four Iraqi soldiers near a school in Tuz Khurmatu district, Salah al Din Province.[xxiv] Iraqi security forces deployed throughout the country on election day to provide extra security for voters.[xxv] These instances of political violence follow other incidents that occurred prior to the elections, including the assassination of Sunni Sovereignty Alliance candidate and Baghdad Provincial Council member Safaa al Mashhadani on October 14.[xxvi] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias killed Mashhadani.[xxvii]

Iran Update, November 11, 2025 

Key Takeaways

• Iraqi Parliamentary Elections: Iraq held parliamentary elections on November 11. Iraq’s electoral commission, the Independent High Electoral Commission, announced on November 11 that it will release preliminary election results at 10 AM EST on November 12.
• US and Lebanese Government Efforts to Disarm Hezbollah: The United States reportedly gave the Lebanese government a list of economic and security demands aimed at further degrading Hezbollah during a recent US Treasury Department delegation’s visit to Beirut on November 9. The United States reportedly gave Lebanon a 60-day deadline to fulfill at least some of these demands. Hezbollah would likely use any delay in the Lebanese government’s implementation of the US demands to reconstitute some of its capabilities.
• Iranian Reflections on the Israel-Iran War: Iranian Passive Defense Organization head Brigadier General Gholam Reza Jalali sought to shift blame for Iran’s defensive failures during the Israel-Iran War onto government institutions in an interview on November 8. Jalali stated that Iran has prioritized rapid development over security considerations in recent years, which has exacerbated Iran’s security vulnerabilities.

Iran Update, November 10, 2025 

Syrian President Ahmed al Shara met with US President Donald Trump at the White House on November 10. Shara’s visit marked the first visit of any Syrian president to the White House. Shara and Foreign Affairs Minister Asaad al Shaibani met with Trump, Vice President JD Vance, and Secretary of State Marco Rubio during a closed-door meeting that Shaibani characterized as “constructive.”[i] The Syrian Foreign Ministry noted that Trump and Shara discussed US support for Syrian reconstruction and the repeal of the Caesar Act.[ii] The Caesar Act sanctions anyone who provides support to the Syrian government, supports the Syrian oil and gas industry, exports aircraft or military equipment to Syria, or provides construction or engineering services to the Syrian government.[iii] The United States originally intended for the Caesar Act to target Bashar al Assad’s regime.[iv] The US State, Commerce, and Treasury departments announced shortly after the meeting that they suspended the Caesar Act for another six months.[v] The suspension does not apply to Syrian transactions involving Russia and Iran.[vi] The United States previously issued a six-month waiver for the Caesar Act in May 2025.[vii] Trump told reporters after the meeting that “we’ll do whatever we can to make Syria successful” and that he has “confidence that [Shara] will be able to do the job.”[viii] An unspecified US official told Western media after Shara and Trump’s meeting that the Syrian Embassy in Washington, DC, will resume operations and continue US-Syrian “counterterrorism, security, and economic” coordination.[ix]

Trump and Shara also discussed Syria’s ongoing, US-mediated negotiations with Israel and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).[x] Syria is currently negotiating with Israel over a potential security agreement that may include a demilitarized zone in southern Syria.[xi] Trump told reporters on November 10 that he is working on Israel “getting along” with Syria.[xii] The US, Syrian, and Turkish foreign ministers also met “at President Trump’s direction” following Shara’s meeting with Trump.[xiii] The three officials discussed the integration of the SDF into the ranks of the new Syrian army and the full implementation of the March 10 agreement between the SDF and the Syrian government, according to the Syrian Foreign Ministry.[xiv]

Syria signed a declaration to join the Global Coalition Against the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) on November 10, two days after government forces conducted a major country-wide operation targeting ISIS leaders and cells.[xv] Syrian Information Minister Hamza al Mustafa stated on November 10 that Syria signed a declaration of “political cooperation” with the counter-ISIS coalition that does not yet include “military components.”[xvi] An unspecified US official told the Wall Street Journal that the “exact terms” of Syria’s role in the coalition are still up for discussion.[xvii] The Syrian transitional government has identified the resurgence of ISIS as one of the most pressing issues facing Syria since the fall of the Assad regime and has conducted counter-ISIS operations in recent months.[xviii] The United States and Syria have conducted at least three joint counter-ISIS operations and have shared intelligence related to ISIS since July 2025.[xix]

The Syrian Ministry of Interior (MoI) began a “preemptive” country-wide counter-ISIS operation on November 8 that targeted ISIS logistics and leadership networks.[xx] MoI spokesperson Noureddine al Baba told Syrian state media on November 8 that the General Security Service (GSS) conducted 61 raids targeting ISIS cells in Aleppo, Idlib, Homs, Rif Dimashq, Damascus, Hama, Raqqa, and Deir ez Zor provinces. GGS forces arrested 71 ISIS members.[xxi] The GSS dismantled a sophisticated roadside improvised explosive device (IED) workshop in Damascus City, arrested ISIS cells in Christian and Druze neighborhoods in Homs and Rif Dimashq provinces, respectively, and arrested an ISIS cell in Safira, Aleppo Province.[xxii] ISIS has recently conducted assassinations in Safira.[xxiii] The GSS killed one ISIS fighter during an unspecified raid, and the GSS sustained one casualty.[xxiv] Baba stated that the MoI launched the counter-ISIS operation after receiving intelligence that ISIS planned to reactivate cells across Syria on the “eve of Syria joining the international coalition.”[xxv] Baba warned that ISIS will exploit Syria’s entry into the international coalition to boost its recruitment of youth and that the MoI expects increased ISIS activity after Syria joins the coalition.[xxvi] Baba added that ISIS had planned to attack government facilities, officials, and Syrian minority groups to undermine Syria’s stability and increase fear among Syrian minorities.[xxvii]  An unspecified senior Syrian security official and a senior Middle Eastern official told Reuters on November 10 that ISIS has attempted to assassinate President Shara twice on separate occasions “over the last few months.”[xxviii]

The United States is attempting to disrupt Iran’s financial support to Hezbollah as part of an effort to pressure the group to disarm. Senior Lebanese officials, including Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, met with a US Treasury Department delegation on November 9 to discuss anti-money laundering, counter-smuggling, and counter-terrorism financing efforts.[xxix] The US delegation reportedly called on Lebanese authorities to combat money laundering, transition away from a cash-based economy, and shut down Hezbollah’s main financial institution, al Qard al Hassan.[xxx]  US Treasury Department Undersecretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence John Hurley said on November 9 that the United States seeks to take advantage of Iran’s “current weakened state” to cut off its funding to Hezbollah.[xxxi] Iran’s efforts to rebuild its armed forces and missile and nuclear programs after the Israel-Iran War may constrain Iranian financial support for Hezbollah.[xxxii] The US Treasury Department reported in November 2025 that Iran has smuggled at least $1 billion to Hezbollah in 2025, mostly through Lebanese money exchange companies, however.[xxxiii] Iran reportedly provided over $700 million to Hezbollah annually before the October 7 War.[xxxiv] Hezbollah continues to struggle to maintain its financial commitments after the war, which suggests that the funds that Iran has transferred to Hezbollah have not been enough to meet Hezbollah’s reconstitution needs.[xxxv] Hurley noted that the United States believes that cutting off Iran’s financial support to Hezbollah is the key to disarming the group.[xxxvi] The United States recently sanctioned three officials who coordinated financial transfers from the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) to Hezbollah as part of its effort to disrupt Iranian financial support for Hezbollah.[xxxvii]

Israel’s recent military operations in Lebanon align with the United States’ effort to curb Iranian support for Hezbollah. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has recently struck several Hezbollah sites and killed Hezbollah fighters linked to the group’s smuggling network. The IDF killed three Hezbollah fighters who smuggled combat equipment for the group in southern Lebanon on November 8 and 10.[xxxviii] The IDF struck the largest Hezbollah camp in the Bekaa Valley on November 10, which housed an underground drone and missile factory as well as Hezbollah’s main tunnel between Syria and Lebanon.[xxxix] Senior Israeli officials recently noted that Hezbollah has managed to smuggle “hundreds” of rockets from Syria into Lebanon in recent months despite improved interdiction efforts on both sides of the border.[xl] Iran has historically supplied Hezbollah with weapons and funding using ground lines of communication across Syria.[xli] Israel’s efforts to curb Iranian materiel support for Hezbollah and Hezbollah smuggling come amid Israel's ongoing frustration with the Lebanese Armed Forces’ (LAF) slow progress in disarming Hezbollah.[xlii] Israeli media reported on November 8 that Israel conveyed a message to the LAF via the United States that the LAF is not acting “sufficiently” against Hezbollah because it is not entering rural areas or private property to confiscate Hezbollah weapons.[xliii] Israel’s message noted that Israel will continue to conduct attacks across Lebanon if the LAF does not make “significant” improvements.[xliv]

The LAF has refuted Israel’s critiques about its lack of progress in disarming Hezbollah. LAF Commander Brigadier General Rodolphe Haykal said that Israel’s claims that the LAF is only conducting “superficial and symbolic” raids are “lies.”[xlv] Haykal claimed that the LAF has assumed control over “almost all” of southern Lebanon in a Lebanese cabinet meeting on November 6, during which Haykal presented the LAF’s second progress report on the implementation of its plan to disarm Hezbollah.[xlvi] The LAF report claimed that the LAF has conducted 4,190 operations, seized roughly 150 Hezbollah tunnels and weapons caches, confiscated 53 Hezbollah rocket launchers, and arrested 346 individuals since September 5.[xlvii] The LAF report did not disclose the affiliations of the arrested individuals. CTP-ISW has not observed any reports of the LAF seizing Hezbollah weapons or raiding active Hezbollah sites, however. Unspecified military officials emphasized to Lebanese media on November 8 that the LAF is proceeding “cautiously” given southern Lebanon’s terrain and the LAF’s limited human and logistical resources.[xlviii] The LAF also stated that the LAF’s disarmament plan never included searching private property for Hezbollah weapons in response to Israel’s criticism that the LAF is not entering rural areas or searching private property.[xlix] Israel reportedly requested that the LAF conduct house-to-house searches during an October 2025 ceasefire monitoring committee meeting.[l] The LAF rejected this demand.[li] Israel reportedly conducted airstrikes across Lebanon after the October 2025 meeting.[lii] Lebanese security sources said that the strikes were a warning that the LAF’s failure to conduct more thorough searches and operations could prompt a new “full-blown” Israeli military campaign.[liii]

An unidentified Iraqi official told a Kurdish journalist on November 10 that all Iranian-backed Iraqi militias with political wings in the Shia Coordination Framework are “demanding” that US forces remain in Iraq.[liv] It is unclear why Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would support US forces retaining a presence in Iraq, given that the removal of US forces from the Middle East is a long-standing objective shared by Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. CTP-ISW cannot independently verify this report and has not observed indications that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have shifted their position on the US military presence in Iraq. The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. The Shia Coordination Framework includes the political wings of multiple militias.[lv]  The United States and Iraq agreed in September 2024 that hundreds of US forces would withdraw from Iraq by September 2025 and that the remaining forces would withdraw by the end of 2026.[lvi]  A US official told Reuters on September 30 that the United States will reduce its military personnel from 2,500 to less than 2,000 and redeploy most of the remaining personnel to the Iraqi Kurdistan Region from federal Iraq.[lvii]  Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani announced on October 20 that 250 to 350 US “military advisors and support personnel” will remain at Ain al Asad Airbase in Anbar Province, Iraq, to support US operations against ISIS in Syria.[lviii]

Key Takeaways

• Syria-US Relations: Syrian President Ahmed al Shara met with US President Donald Trump at the White House on November 10. Shara’s visit marked the first visit of any Syrian president to the White House.
• US Efforts to Disarm Hezbollah: The United States is attempting to disrupt Iran’s financial support to Hezbollah as part of an effort to pressure the group to disarm. Israel’s recent military operations in Lebanon align with the United States’ effort to curb Iranian support for Hezbollah.
• Iranian-backed Iraqi Militia Posture: An unidentified Iraqi official told a Kurdish journalist on November 10 that all Iranian-backed Iraqi militias with political wings in the Shia Coordination Framework are “demanding” that US forces remain in Iraq. It is unclear why Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would support US forces retaining a presence in Iraq, given that the removal of US forces from the Middle East is a long-standing objective shared by Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.

Iran Update, November 7, 2025 

The Shia Coordination Framework is reportedly considering integrating Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Iraqi state to meet US demands to disarm the militias while preserving the militias’ political influence.[i] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. A Shia Coordination Framework official told a Kurdish journalist on November 7 that the United States demanded that the Iraqi federal government disarm six Iranian-backed Iraqi militias: Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, Asaib Ahl al Haq, Harakat Ansar Allah al Awfiya, and Kataib al Imam Ali.[ii] All six militias are members of the Islamic Resistance of Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed militias that consistently attacked US forces in Iraq and Syria between October 2023 and January 2024.[iii] All six militias are also US-designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, and four of them have political wings in the Shia Coordination Framework.[iv] The Shia Coordination Framework is reportedly considering complying with the US demand by publicly disarming the six militias and integrating them into the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[v]  The PMF is an Iraqi state security service primarily comprised of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, many of which report to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[vi] These six militias control some PMF brigades but also operate outside of the PMF.[vii]

The United States notably did not demand that the Iraqi federal government disarm the Iranian-backed Badr Organization, possibly because the Badr Organization is not part of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq. The Badr Organization has expressed support for integrating militias into the PMF.[viii] The Badr Organization already controls many PMF brigades and is more heavily integrated in Iraqi state institutions than the six militias that the United States seeks to disarm.[ix]

All of the militias except Kataib Hezbollah reportedly agreed to the Shia Coordination Framework’s plan, likely, in part, to preserve their existing networks and political influence.[x] The Iraqi federal government could reflag militias as units in the PMF, which would enable the militias to maintain their structures and networks. Integrating Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the PMF could also further facilitate Iran’s state capture over the Iraqi state by granting the militias access to state resources and political institutions.  Several of the militias that the United States demanded the Iraqi government disarm currently control Iraqi ministries. Asaib Ahl al Haq controls the Industry and Mines Ministry and Education Ministry, for example.[xi]  The United States has reportedly threatened to withhold official recognition of the next Iraqi government if Iranian-backed Iraqi actors gain control of key Iraqi ministries.[xii] UK-based Amwaj Media reported on November 3 that some unspecified Iraqi militias view further integration into the Iraqi state as a threat to their identity as “resistance organizations.”[xiii] Kataib Hezbollah, which has not agreed to the proposal, has historically rejected demands to disarm because it remains ideologically committed to armed resistance.[xiv]  

The Shia Coordination Framework’s reported strategy to integrate Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the PMF bears similarity to Iran’s reported efforts to push its partner militias in Iraq to shift their focus from armed resistance to political engagement.[xv] Amwaj Media reported on November 3 that Iran would consider supporting smaller Iraqi militias that are not affiliated with the PMF while pushing its larger partner militias in Iraq to focus on politics.[xvi] CTP-ISW assessed on November 4 that Iran may decide to build a loyal cadre of ideological militias, over which Iran has strong control, that would supplement pro-Iranian political parties in the Iraqi federal government while avoiding sanctions on Iraq.[xvii]

Key Takeaways

• Iranian Entrenchment in Iraq: The Shia Coordination Framework is reportedly considering integrating six Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Iraqi state to meet US demands to disarm the militias while preserving the militias’ political influence. Five of the six militias reportedly agreed to the Shia Coordination Framework’s plan, likely, in part, to preserve their existing networks and political influence. Integrating Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the PMF could further facilitate Iran’s state capture over the Iraqi state by granting the militias access to state resources and political institutions.
• PRC-Syria Relations: The PRC abstained from a UN Security Council vote on November 6 to lift sanctions on Syrian President Ahmed al Shara and Interior Minister Anas Khattab, likely due to PRC concerns over Uyghur fighters operating in Syria. The PRC’s UN Ambassador, Fu Cong, called on the Syrian transitional government to take further steps to combat “terrorism.” PRC officials have repeatedly voiced concern over the Syrian transitional government’s appointment of Uyghurs associated with the Turkistan Islamic Party to high ranks within the Syrian army.
• Hezbollah Disarmament: Israeli defense sources claimed on November 7 that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) has occasionally been aware of or “cooperated with” Hezbollah in its efforts to reconstitute. This report comes amid international concern, particularly from Israel, the United States, and Saudi Arabia, over the LAF’s limited progress in disarming Hezbollah.

Iran Update, November 6, 2025 

The United States reportedly plans to establish a military presence at an unspecified airbase in Damascus to enable a security agreement between Israel and Syria.[i] Six unidentified sources, including two Western officials and a Syrian defense official, told Reuters on November 5 that the United States will use its military presence to monitor a potential Israeli-Syrian security agreement.[ii] The unspecified airbase is located in an area of southern Syria that is expected to make up a demilitarized zone as part of the Israeli-Syrian agreement, according to Reuters.[iii] Two Syrian military sources stated that US forces would potentially use the base for logistics, surveillance, refueling, and humanitarian operations, while Syria would retain full sovereignty over the facility.[iv] The Syrian Foreign Ministry denied these claims on November 6, however.[v] The United States has mediated a potential Israel-Syria security agreement since July 2025, but progress has been limited, and previous talks have collapsed.[vi] The Reuters report partially supports earlier claims that an unspecified Israeli official made to Saudi Arabia on October 29.[vii] The Israeli official said that a future agreement between Israel and Syria would include the establishment of joint US-Israeli-Syrian outposts along the border.[viii] The new base would not be on the border, unless the United States plans to develop a new airfield. The Israeli official claimed that the proposed agreement would resemble the 1974 Disengagement Agreement but would establish an additional joint US-Israeli-Syrian committee to monitor developments on the Syrian border.[ix] The 1974 Disengagement Agreement between Syria and Israel created a United Nations-patrolled buffer zone and enforced a ceasefire along the Israel-Syria border.[x] The United States’ reported plans also follow indications from US and Syrian officials that Syria will join the US-led international coalition against ISIS.[xi]

Iran’s annual oil revenues have significantly decreased, which will likely worsen Iran’s ongoing economic issues amid international sanctions and provide the government with less revenue to carry out its initiatives. The Deputy Chairman of the Iranian Parliament's Budget and Planning Commission, Hadi Ghavami, stated on November 6 that Iran’s oil revenue has dropped significantly, only meeting about 16 percent of the expected annual revenue in 2025.[xii] Reuters reported last month that Iran is offering an eight-to-ten-dollar discount per barrel to incentivize Chinese buyers to buy its oil.[xiii] The discounts in oil revenue will cause profits to fall even if Iran increases its oil exports compared to before sanctions came into effect. Oil is the regime’s largest source of revenue, and its failure to inject oil revenues into the economy could make it significantly difficult to mitigate the impact of international sanctions.

Lower oil revenues may cause Iran to reallocate its oil revenues to military expenditures to replace defense systems that Israel destroyed in June 2025, thus decreasing Iran’s ability to invest in other domestic projects. Iranian officials continue to believe that renewed war with Israel is likely in the short term, which indicates that they will prioritize military expenditure over domestic projects at this time. Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Commission spokesperson Ebrahim Rezaei announced in September 2025 that the commission approved a bill that requires the Iranian Planning and Budget Organization and the Oil Ministry to meet 100 percent of the current year's budget to strengthen Iranian defense capabilities.^[xiv] The bill also allows the Planning and Budget Organization and the Oil Ministry to transfer 1.5 billion dollars under the banner of “oil allocation” to the Armed Forces General Staff. The Iranian Planning and Budget Organization and the Oil Ministry may face challenges in allocating all of the funds outlined in the current budget due to the decrease in oil revenue, but any allocation to the military will decrease the revenue available for domestic projects. Iranian prioritization of military investment over domestic projects could change if the economy continues to weaken under sanctions and popular discontent increases.

Iran Update, November 4, 2025 

Iran is reportedly attempting to force its large proxy and partner militias in Iraq to move into politics, possibly to discourage US sanctions enforcement that would prevent Iran from using the Iraqi economy to evade sanctions.[i] UK-based Amwaj Media reported on November 3 that Iran has encouraged unspecified Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to shift their focus from armed resistance to political engagement, citing Iraqi political insiders.[ii] A source in the Iraqi Prime Minister’s office told Amwaj that the Iraqi federal government has similarly encouraged Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to prioritize their political activities.[iii] Iran reportedly wants “fresh [Iraqi] faces acceptable to the Iraqi public” to lead this political engagement.[iv] An Iranian-backed Iraqi militia source added that Iran would consider funding and politically supporting smaller Iraqi militias that are not affiliated with the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), which would place these militias fully outside state structures and control.[v] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service primarily comprised of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, many of which report to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[vi] The PMF militias linked or loyal to Iran have frequently targeted US forces and assets, including when a likely Kataib Hezbollah cell killed three US servicemembers in Jordan in a drone attack in January 2024.[vii] The United States has sanctioned the Iraqi government and commercial entities and threatened to sanction unidentified PMF leaders.[viii] The Iraqi economy is a crucial lifeline for Iran as it attempts to mitigate new US sanctions, and attacks by Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that are officially part of the Iraqi government could imperil that.

Iran may decide to build a loyal cadre of ideological militias over which Iran has strong control that will supplement pro-Iranian political parties in parliament while avoiding sanctions on Iraq. Iran has previously established splinter groups or front groups to ensure militia loyalty to Iran or to obfuscate the involvement of larger militias in military activity against the United States.[ix] Front groups acted as fronts for larger militias, while splinters officially split from their previous organization. Iran helped split Kataib Hezbollah and Asaib Ahl al Haq from Moqtada al Sadr’s Jaysh al Mahdi (JaM) after 2006 as JaM became less responsive to Iranian control, for example.[x] Some legacy Iranian-backed groups in Iraq, like Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, have notably struggled to control some elements of their forces that have appeared to conduct unsanctioned attacks against US forces, Israel, and some Iraqi assets.[xi] Overzealous and uncontrollable activity is negative for Iran because the risk for escalation that triggers sanctions or other negative effects on the Iraqi economy would badly weaken Iranian sanction evasion efforts. Prominent Iranian-backed Iraqi militias heavily relied on front groups to conduct attacks from 2020 to 2021, likely in an effort to avoid US strikes in retaliation for militia escalation against US forces after the US strike that killed Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force commander Major General Qassem Soleimani in 2020.[xii] Iran and its partners in Iraq have not used front groups in a systematic way since 2021. Front groups could be much more controllable from Tehran than poorly disciplined forces like Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, and would allow powerful groups like the Badr Organization to support Iranian sanctions evasion efforts without drawing US attention.

Most militias will likely resist Iran’s proposals because their military wings are both their raison d’etre and a tool they can use to enforce their will on other Iraqis. The militia-affiliated Iraqi source told Amwaj that unspecified militias are not supportive of Iran’s suggestions, as further integration into the Iraqi state is viewed as a threat to the militias’ identities as resistance organizations.[xiii] Asaib Ahl al Haq attempted to assassinate then-Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al Kadhimi in Fall 2021 to force the formation of a government including Iranian-backed militias, for example, and Kataib Hezbollah assassinated Iraqi researcher Hashem al Hashimi in July 2020 for his investigations into Kataib Hezbollah’s structure and behavior.[xiv] These militias also see “resistance” against Israel and the United States as their raison d’etre, and some have already been resistant to disarmament.[xv]

A smaller group of militias—possibly including the Badr Organization—may acquiesce to Iranian demands and integrate their militias into the PMF while focusing on politics. This would not indicate that Badr has moderated, but instead that it seeks to position itself as a preeminent pro-Iranian political force in Iraq. This move would also be an expression of Badr’s deep commitment to the Iranian project in Iraq. Badr has already supported militia integration into the PMF and militia disarmament, probably because it controls most of the PMF’s support structures and a large number of its brigades.[xvi] This means that even if the PMF answered more reliably to the prime minister, Badr would still exercise extreme sway within the organization and could manipulate the PMF to accomplish Badr’s objectives in Iraq. Badr also controls and influences the Transport Ministry and many private and public enterprises in Iraq that it could continue to use to help Iran exploit sanctions.[xvii] Iran could also feasibly use Badr’s influence in the PMF and other ministries to sideline and suppress militias that refused Iran’s proposals to integrate into politics.

Iran Update, November 3, 2025 

Venezuela recently requested military equipment, including drones, from Iran amid heightened tensions between Venezuela and the United States, according to internal US government documents obtained by the Washington Post.[i] It is unclear if Iran is willing and able to export drones and other military equipment to Venezuela after the Israel-Iran War, however. Venezuelan Transport Minister Ramon Celestino Velasquez reportedly “coordinated a shipment of military equipment and drones from Iran” and informed Iran that it requires “passive detection equipment,” GPS jamming devices, and drones with a range of 1,000 kilometers (approximately 600 miles).[ii] The Washington Post stated that it is unclear how Iran responded to this request.[iii] Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei stated on November 3 that Venezuela can defend itself, but that Iran will “certainly” continue to cooperate with Venezuela.[iv] Velasquez previously visited Tehran in September 2024 and met with Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh.[v] Nasir Zadeh is responsible for Iranian military equipment sales and purchases. Nasir Zadeh and Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro also signed a memorandum of understanding to increase “trade and mobility” between Iran and Venezuela in Caracas, Venezuela, in November 2024.[vi] Iran has outsourced some of its drone production to Venezuela over the past decade, including the production of Mohajer-6 drones, which have a range of 200 kilometers (approximately 124 miles).[vii] It is unclear whether Iran would be willing to supply Venezuela with military equipment--despite Iran’s historical military cooperation with Venezuela--given that Iran is trying to rebuild its weapons stockpiles following the Israel-Iran War. Iran launched at least 1,000 drones at Israel during the Israel-Iran War, and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) destroyed at least 950 Iranian drones during the war.[viii]

Iran Update, October 30, 2025 

Iran has reportedly received increasingly large sodium perchlorate shipments from China amid Iranian efforts to rebuild its ballistic missile program in the wake of Israel-Iran war. European intelligence sources told CNN on October 29 that Iran received 2000 tons of sodium perchlorate in several shipments that arrived in Bandar Abbas, Iran, from China.[i] Sodium perchlorate is a chemical precursor for solid missile propellant. The Associated Press assessed on September 24 that Iran does not have the necessary planetary mixers to produce solid missile fuel due to Israeli strikes on Iranian military sites in October 2024 and June 2025, however.[ii] Iran has reportedly received larger quantities of sodium perchlorate in recent shipments compared to the quantities of sodium perchlorate that Iran previously received from China in February and May 2025.[iii] These shipments notably arrived in Iran on September 29, two days after the UN Security Council reimposed sanctions on Iran that included sanctions related to the Iranian missile program.[iv] China has recently assisted Iran in developing its ballistic missile program through shipments of sodium perchlorate in addition to other dual-use technologies.[v] Iran reportedly received about 1000 tons of sodium perchlorate from China in February and May 2025.[vi] The larger recent shipments to Iran come as Iran tries to rebuild its missile program following the Israel-Iran War in June 2025. Former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Mohammad Ali Jafari argued on October 25 that Iran’s missile program is its main form of deterrence and that Iran deliberately prioritized developing its missile and drone capabilities over its air and ground forces to counter the superior capabilities of the United States and Israel.[vii]

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani may attempt to ally with Sunni and Kurdish political parties after the upcoming parliamentary elections in order to increase his own power by sidelining powerful Iranian-backed Shia factions and other prominent Shia parties. Iraqi media reported on October 30 that unspecified Iraqi political figures are working to form a Sudani-led post-election alliance that will include Sunni and Kurdish political figures and potentially exclude unspecified Iran-aligned figures and parties.[viii] It is unclear which Iran-aligned political parties would be excluded from the alliance. Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development Coalition includes Popular Mobilization Commission (PMC) Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh and former Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Spokesperson Ahmed al Asadi, which suggests that certain Iranian-backed and -influenced groups will remain in Sudani’s post-election alliance.[ix] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service primarily comprised of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, many of which report to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[x]

Sudani may be attempting to build a coalition with Sunni, Kurdish, and key Shia partners that can sideline these prominent Shia Coordination Framework leaders and ultimately form a government that Sudani leads. Sudani‘s reported efforts to sideline prominent Iranian-backed actors also comes after US Special Envoy to Iraq Mark Savaya reportedly met with leaders of political blocs in Baghdad.[xi] The United States has repeatedly pressured the Iraqi government to limit Iranian influence within Iraqi government institutions and has voiced concerns about powerful Iran-aligned parties running in the upcoming parliamentary elections.[xii]

Iranian-backed and –influenced parties in Iraq may be opposing Sudani’s participation in the upcoming elections out of fear that Sudani, a popular prime minister, could win a large amount of seats and bar them from government. Some Shia Coordination Framework parties--the most influential of which are backed by Iran or have long abetted Iran's activities in Iraq--are opposed to Sudani’s participation in the upcoming elections.[xiii] Some unidentified Shia Coordination Framework parties have reportedly considered choosing one of the Shia Coordination Framework “sheikhs” as the next prime minister due to Sudani’s participation in the upcoming elections.[xiv] The term “sheikhs” in this context likely refers to the most prominent Shia Coordination Framework leaders, such as State of Law Coalition head and former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki, Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri, and Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq head Qais al Khazali. These leaders collectively hold many seats in the current parliament, which makes them influential in the current Sudani government. Sudani, if he manages to prevent them from joining the new government by forming a ruling coalition without them, would be able to increase his own power at their expense.

Sudani’s reported strategy mirrors Shia National Movement leader Moqtada al Sadr’s ultimately unsuccessful attempt to ally with Sunni and Kurdish leaders to form a “national majority government” that excluded Iran-backed Iraqi parties after the November 2021 parliamentary elections.[xv] Sadr attempted to exclude Iranian-backed Iraqi parties from the government formation process by allying with the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and Sunni Sovereignty alliance after Sadr's Sairoon bloc won 73 of the 329 parliamentary seats after the November 2021 elections.[xvi] Sadr’s efforts to sideline Iranian-backed Iraqi actors ultimately failed when these groups employed both political and violent tactics to hinder the government formation process.[xvii] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conducted rocket attacks on Kurdish oil and gas fields between March and June 2022 to pressure Kurdish parties to withdraw their support for Sadr, for example.[xviii] The Iraqi Federal Supreme Court, which Iranian-backed Iraqi actors have coopted, also issued a ruling in February 2022 that made it impossible for Sadr to form a government without the inclusion of Iranian-backed Iraqi parties.[xix] Sadr ultimately ordered his party to withdraw from Parliament, thus clearing the way for Iranian-backed Shia parties to form their own government without Sadr. 

Key Takeaways

• Chinese Support for the Iranian Missile Program: Iran has reportedly received increasingly large sodium perchlorate shipments from China amid Iranian efforts to rebuild its ballistic missile program in the wake of Israel-Iran war. Sodium perchlorate is a chemical precursor for solid missile propellant. Iran reportedly does not have the necessary planetary mixers to produce solid missile fuel due to Israeli strikes on Iranian military sites in October 2024 and June 2025, however.
• Iranian Parliamentary Elections: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani may attempt to ally with Sunni and Kurdish political parties after the upcoming parliamentary elections in order to increase his own power by sidelining powerful Iranian-backed Shia factions and other prominent Shia parties. Some Shia Coordination Framework parties--the most influential of which are backed by Iran or have long abetted Iran's activities in Iraq--are opposed to Sudani’s participation in the upcoming elections. Sudani, if he is able to prevent these actors from joining the new government by forming a ruling coalition without them, would be able to increase his own power at their expense.
• Hezbollah’s Disarmament: Lebanese President Joseph Aoun requested that the Lebanese army “confront” Israeli forces in response to a recent Israeli raid in southern Lebanon, probably to limit Hezbollah’s ability to justify its continued existence as a militia under the guise of resistance to Israel. Hezbollah has recently employed this narrative and continued Israeli operations in Lebanon to reject the Lebanese government’s plan to disarm Hezbollah. Aoun’s statements are almost certainly designed to push back against Hezbollah attempts to prevent its disarmament by the government by claiming that the Lebanese army cannot resist Israel.
• Russia in Syria: Russia has reportedly resumed military flights to Russian bases in Syria, possibly to transfer equipment amid recent growing Russo-Syrian diplomatic engagement. Bloomberg, citing flight tracking data, reported that Russian military cargo aircraft resumed flights to Syria for the first time in six months. CTP-ISW cannot confirm that the Russian military has redeployed any equipment to Hmeimim Airbase at the time of this writing.

Previous Iran Updates

• October 2025
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• December 2024
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