Iran Update, November 25, 2025

Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Unspecified Iranian officials told The Telegraph on November 25 that the Houthis and some unspecified Iranian-backed Iraqi groups have become less responsive to Tehran.[i] The Iranian officials mischaracterized Iran’s relationship with the Houthis and Iraqi militias by misrepresenting how the Axis of Resistance functions, however. The Telegraph, citing unspecified Iranian officials, reported on November 25 that Iran has lost control over the Houthis and struggles to maintain cohesion among groups within its Axis of Resistance.[ii] The officials claimed that the Houthis have rejected Iranian directives and have “gone rogue for a while and are now really rebels.”[iii] These officials‘ claims misrepresent the fundamental nature of the Iran-Houthi relationship. The Houthis view themselves as a coequal partner to Iran rather than as an Iranian proxy.[iv] Iran and the Houthis share strategic alignment over key objectives, but the Houthis have historically pursued objectives for their own benefit as well as Iran’s.[v] Both Iran and the Houthis aim to decrease US influence in the region to impose their own vision of a regional order.[vi] Iran has long viewed the Houthis as a partner that can help implement this vision, even though the Houthis sometimes have divergent aims. This relationship is consistent with Iran‘s relationship with many other Axis of Resistance organizations. The Axis of Resistance ”makes decisions and coordinates through [informal] channels, making the alliance appear amorphous and opaque to external observers.” The informal and amorphous nature of the alliance is by design, and it enables Iranian officials to disavow its partners when politically convenient to do so.[vii]

The Iranian officials also mischaracterized Iran’s relationship with some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. An unspecified senior Iranian official told the Telegraph on November 25 that “it’s not just the Houthis,” noting that some Iranian-backed groups in Iraq are also behaving as though Iran has “never had any contact with them.”[viii] The source added that some Iraqi militias have repeatedly ignored Iranian directives to pause training until “tensions subside.”[ix] The source’s statements obscure the reality that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias demonstrate varying degrees of responsiveness to Iran rather than total independence. Iraqi groups operate on a spectrum of alignment with Iranian objectives and directives. Kataib Hezbollah is Iran’s most tightly controlled Iraqi militia and the closest Iraqi group to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force.[x] The Badr Organization is often described as Iran’s “oldest proxy in Iraq” and is a powerful paramilitary actor.[xi] The Badr Organization is also a major Iraqi political party whose leader, Hadi al Ameri, plays a central role in Iraq’s political system, giving the organization more overt Iraqi political interests and constraints than Kataib Hezbollah.[xii] Asaib Ahl al Haq identifies as part of Iran’s Axis of Resistance yet “stubbornly maintains a degree of independence” and has openly disobeyed Iranian instructions.[xiii]

These Iranian officials probably cast the Houthis as an “independent” actor to encourage Saudi-mediated negotiations with the United States to move forward. Iranian officials have repeatedly stated that Iran will only negotiate on the nuclear issue and will not expand the talks to its missile program or Axis of Resistance.[xiv] Iran, by claiming its relationship with the Houthis no longer exists, would be able to assuage some Saudi concerns about the threat that the Iranian-supported Houthis pose to Saudi Arabia. Unspecified Western sources told Lebanese Hezbollah-affiliated media on November 25 that US President Donald Trump gave Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman a “mandate” to mediate a US-Iran agreement.[xv] The sources stated that Saudi Arabia and Iran agreed to convene a high-level meeting in Paris in the coming days.[xvi] The report stated that bin Salman previously asked Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani about Iran’s position on Saudi mediation. Larijani reportedly responded positively but emphasized that Iran cannot offer unspecified concessions.[xvii] Unspecified sources added that Saudi officials also discussed with US officials the need to reach an understanding with Iran to facilitate Yemeni reconciliation.[xviii] Saudi Arabia seeks an end to the Yemen conflict that would weaken the Houthis, which Riyadh views as a threat. Iranian officials could calculate that by casting the Houthis as unassociated with Iran, they would secure Saudi Arabia as a mediator and the resumption of negotiations without needing to make concessions on the Yemeni civil war.

Syrian authorities dismantled an Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)-affiliated cell in Latakia Province, indicating that ISIS-affiliated groups may seek to conduct clandestine activities or attacks in coastal Syria. The Syrian General Security Service (GSS) raided an ISIS-affiliated cell’s safehouse in al Badrousiya, Latakia Province, on November 24.[xix] The Syrian Ministry of Interior (MoI) reported on November 24 that the GSS killed two fighters and arrested the rest of the cell.[xx] The cell injured one GSS member during the raid.[xxi] The GSS also seized “medium and light weapons” from the cell’s safehouse, according to Syrian media.[xxii] The GSS Latakia Province commander said on November 24 that the cell “was planning to carry out terrorist operations on the Syrian coast.”[xxiii]

The MoI’s characterization of the cell in Latakia Province indicates that the cell was part of Salafi-jihadi group Saraya Ansar al Sunnah rather than ISIS. The MoI said the cell in Latakia Province espoused “the ideology of the ISIS terrorist organization” but did not directly attribute the cell to ISIS, which the MoI has done previously.[xxiv] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah is a Salafi-jihadi group ideologically aligned with ISIS that seeks to establish an Islamic State in Syria that excludes Alawites, Druze, Christians, Kurds, and Shia.[xxv] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah conducted several sectarian-based attacks targeting Alawites in coastal Syria between April and June 2025.[xxvi] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah also claimed responsibility for the suicide attack on the Mar Elias Church in Damascus that killed 25 people in June 2025.[xxvii] The MoI also referred to the attacker and the cell that planned the attack on Mar Elias Church as “ISIS-affiliated.”[xxviii]   Saraya Ansar al Sunnah has not claimed individual attacks in Syria since July 2025 but continues to threaten violence against Syrian minorities.[xxix] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah threatened to attack Alawites and Christians in Hama, Homs, Latakia, and Tartous provinces in a video on October 15.[xxx]

Key Takeaways

• Iran’s Relationship to Iranian-backed Militias: Unspecified Iranian officials told The Telegraph on November 25 that the Houthis and some unspecified Iranian-backed Iraqi groups have become less responsive to Tehran. The Iranian officials mischaracterized Iran’s relationship with the Houthis and Iraqi militias by misrepresenting how the Axis of Resistance functions. These Iranian officials probably cast the Houthis as an “independent” actor to encourage Saudi-mediated negotiations with the United States to move forward.
• ISIS-affiliates in Syria: Syrian authorities dismantled an Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)-affiliated cell in Latakia Province, indicating that ISIS-affiliated groups may seek to conduct clandestine activities or attacks in coastal Syria. The Syrian Ministry of Interior’s characterization of the cell in Latakia Province indicates that the cell was part of Salafi-jihadi group Saraya Ansar al Sunnah rather than ISIS.
• Weapons Smuggling in Iran: Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Ground Forces interdicted a shipment of explosive devices, weapons, and ammunition reportedly smuggled by Kurdistan Workers’ Party-linked fighters into northwestern Iran on November 25.

Iran

IRGC Ground Forces interdicted a shipment of explosive devices, weapons, and ammunition reportedly smuggled by Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)-linked fighters into northwestern Iran on November 25.[xxxi] The PKK-linked fighters attempted to smuggle the weapons into Iran via the Kurdish-populated Tergever border near Urmia, West Azerbaijan Province. The PKK is a Kurdish militia group based in the Kurdish-majority areas of Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. The PKK announced in May 2025 that it would dissolve itself and “end its armed struggle.”[xxxii] The Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), which is the Iranian branch of the PKK, announced in May 2025 that it would not adhere to the PKK’s decision to dissolve, however.[xxxiii] Iran and Turkey recently signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on October 30 to strengthen border security cooperation amid concerns about Kurdish fighters operating along their shared border.[xxxiv] Iran has previously accused Kurdish opposition groups of inciting protests in western Iran and cooperating with Israel to facilitate attacks in Iran.[xxxv]

The Iranian regime increased gasoline prices through a multi-tiered pricing system. Similar gas price increases sparked large protests in 2019. The Iranian government will increase the price of gasoline for Iranians who purchase over 100 liters per month beginning in December 2025.[xxxvi] Gasoline prices will remain priced at $0.010 per liter for up to 60 liters (roughly 15 gallons) per month and at $0.027 per liter for up to 100 liters (roughly 26 gallons) per month.  Iranians will pay $0.044 per liter for any monthly consumption above 100 liters.[xxxvii] Iranian parliamentarians sent a letter to Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian on November 10 that urged him to address the worsening gasoline crisis that has been caused by Iranian domestic gasoline production falling short of demand by 20 million liters daily.[xxxviii] Parliamentarians have objected to the Iranian regime importing gasoline to meet demand.[xxxix] Some parliamentarians also warned against raising gasoline prices because it could ”create social consequences like in 2019.”[xl] Pezeshkian previously stated that the gasoline shortages would not necessarily mean an increase in prices.[xli] An increase in gas prices previously sparked protests in Iran in 2019.[xlii]

Iraq

Iraq’s Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) disqualified Iranian-backed Badr Organization Baghdad candidate Muhannad al Khazraji for electoral fraud on November 25.[xliii] Iraqi media reported on November 25 that Khazraji formed a fake Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) brigade and promised around 1,500 young men a position within the brigade in exchange for bringing him 10 voter cards each.[xliv] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that contains Badr Organization militias.[xlv] IHEC‘s decision comes after “dozens” of individuals filed complaints with IHEC’s Board of Commissioners against Khazraji over his fake brigade scheme on November 19.[xlvi] Khazraji’s disqualification will not affect the total number of parliamentary seats that the Badr Organization won in Baghdad Province, however. The total number of votes that the Badr Organization won in Baghdad Province will decrease to 106,606 without Khazraji’s votes, which would still allow the organization to retain its four parliamentary seats.[xlvii]

Khazraji will likely appeal IHEC’s decision. Khazraji denied the fraud allegations on November 25 and threatened to take legal action against “anyone who spreads lies.”[xlviii] Political parties, coalitions, and candidates can appeal IHEC’s decisions on complaints to the Electoral Judicial Panel.[xlix] IHEC will then certify all election results and send them to the Federal Supreme Court for ratification, following any additional adjudication by the Electoral Judicial Panel.[l]

Unspecified actors launched a drone targeting the Emirati-operated Khor Mor gas field in Chamchamal District, Sulaymaniyah Province, Iraq, on November 23.[li] Kurdish security forces shot down the drone, according to a Kurdish media report on November 24.[lii] Two Emirati companies, Dana Gas and Crescent Petroleum, operate the gas field.[liii]

Syria

See the topline section.

Arabian Peninsula

Nothing significant to report.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.