Iran Update, November 11, 2025

Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The  Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Note: CTP-ISW will publish an abbreviated Iran Update on November 11 and will resume full coverage on November 12.

Key Takeaways

• Iraqi Parliamentary Elections: Iraq held parliamentary elections on November 11. Iraq’s electoral commission, the Independent High Electoral Commission, announced on November 11 that it will release preliminary election results at 10 AM EST on November 12.
• US and Lebanese Government Efforts to Disarm Hezbollah: The United States reportedly gave the Lebanese government a list of economic and security demands aimed at further degrading Hezbollah during a recent US Treasury Department delegation’s visit to Beirut on November 9. The United States reportedly gave Lebanon a 60-day deadline to fulfill at least some of these demands. Hezbollah would likely use any delay in the Lebanese government’s implementation of the US demands to reconstitute some of its capabilities.
• Iranian Reflections on the Israel-Iran War: Iranian Passive Defense Organization head Brigadier General Gholam Reza Jalali sought to shift blame for Iran’s defensive failures during the Israel-Iran War onto government institutions in an interview on November 8. Jalali stated that Iran has prioritized rapid development over security considerations in recent years, which has exacerbated Iran’s security vulnerabilities.

Iraq held parliamentary elections on November 11. Iraq’s electoral commission, the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC), announced on November 11 that it will release preliminary election results at 10 AM EST on November 12.[i] The polls closed at 10 AM EST on November 11.[ii] IHEC reported that the average voter turnout rate was approximately 24 percent as of mid-day on November 11.[iii] The average voter turnout rate was approximately 42 percent in the 2021 parliamentary elections.[iv] IHEC has not released a final voter turnout rate for the elections at the time of this writing. Various Iraqi actors expressed concern about low voter turnout ahead of the elections.[v] Iraqi Security Media Cell head Lieutenant General Saad Maan stated that the elections proceeded without any “significant violations.” Iraqi media outlets reported several instances of voter intimidation and electoral violence, however.[vi] CTP-ISW will provide analysis about the elections, their results, and the subsequent government formation process in upcoming Iran Updates.

The United States reportedly gave the Lebanese government a list of economic and security demands aimed at further degrading Hezbollah during a recent US Treasury Department delegation’s visit to Beirut on November 9.[vii] A US delegation met with Lebanese officials in Beirut on November 9 to discuss measures to disrupt funding to Hezbollah as part of a broader US effort to weaken Hezbollah.[viii] The US delegation presented the following demands to the Lebanese government:[ix]

• Disarm Hezbollah
• Prevent Hezbollah from reconstituting and expanding its military, security, and institutional capabilities
• Shut down all branches of Hezbollah’s main financial institution, al Qard al Hassan
• Tighten control over all legal points of entry into Lebanon, including Beirut Rafic Hariri International Airport and the Port of Beirut, and shut down illegal border crossings
• Strictly monitor Lebanese currency exchange offices, money transfer companies, and foreign financial transfers
• Shut down and ban several US-sanctioned money transfer companies
• Transition away from a cash-based economy
• Prevent Hezbollah from benefiting from public institutions
• Increase oversight to prevent Hezbollah from exploiting its influence and alliances within the Lebanese government to acquire funds

The United States reportedly gave Lebanon a 60-day deadline to fulfill at least some of these demands. The Deputy Assistant to US President Donald Trump and head of the US delegation, Sebastian Gorka, told Lebanese officials on November 9 that the Lebanese government must disarm Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, demonstrate its ability to disarm the group north of the Litani River, and prove that it will implement subsequent phases of its disarmament plan within a 60-day period.[x] Saudi media reported on November 11 that the United States wants the Lebanese government to take “fundamental and effective steps” to meet the list of US demands during this time period.[xi] Lebanese media reported on November 11 that the US delegation clarified that the 60-day deadline should not be “taken literally” but stressed that the Lebanese government must act immediately.[xii] The US delegation warned Lebanese officials that the United States would disengage and no longer play a mediating role in Lebanese affairs if the Lebanese government failed to make progress.[xiii] The Lebanese government has previously taken steps aligned with the reported US demands, such as prohibiting Lebanese banks from engaging with al Qard al Hassan and reforming Lebanon’s financial laws.[xiv] The results of these previous steps are unclear, however.

Hezbollah would likely use any delay in the Lebanese government’s implementation of the US demands to reconstitute some of its capabilities. The Lebanese government has previously been hesitant to take aggressive or direct action against Hezbollah, which has delayed the implementation of the Lebanese Armed Forces’ (LAF) disarmament plan.[xv] The Lebanese government’s unwillingness to take decisive action against Hezbollah could limit the government’s ability to meet the US demands. Any delay in the government’s implementation of the US demands would give Hezbollah time to try to strengthen its financial system. Hezbollah began restructuring its financial system in August 2025 to resist economic pressure and improve its ability to fulfill its financial commitments.[xvi] Hezbollah announced in October 2025 that the group had made significant progress on its reconstruction plan and has continued to compensate fighters whose homes were destroyed in the Israel-Hezbollah conflict in late 2024.[xvii] Hezbollah has historically used financial benefits, including pensions for the families of deceased fighters and compensation for individuals who lost their homes or property, to retain its support base among Lebanese Shia.[xviii]

Any delay in the Lebanese government’s implementation of economic reforms could also disrupt the Lebanese government's ability to acquire and retain international aid, which is crucial to the government’s reconstruction efforts after the Israel-Lebanon conflict. The recent US demands mirror the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) requirements for the Lebanese government to access the IMF’s loan and financial assistance program for reconstruction.[xix] The IMF has demanded since March 2025 that the Lebanese government restructure its financial sector, implement governance reforms, establish credible monetary policies, and enhance its counter-terrorist financing measures.[xx] Other international organizations have also made financial assistance to the Lebanese state contingent on its progress in implementing reforms. The World Bank will reportedly stop funding projects in Lebanon if the Lebanese government does not accelerate its implementation of economic reforms.[xxi] These projects could potentially include the World Bank’s $250 million project that aims to support Lebanon’s urgent repair and reconstruction needs.[xxii] The World Bank estimated in March 2025 that Lebanon would need approximately $11 billion for its reconstruction and recovery needs following the Israel-Hezbollah conflict in late 2024.[xxiii]

Iranian Passive Defense Organization (PDO) head Brigadier General Gholam Reza Jalali sought to shift blame for Iran’s defensive failures during the Israel-Iran War onto government institutions in an interview on November 8. Jalali gave an interview to the Iranian podcast “Story of the War,” which features various senior Iranian officials’ reflections on the Israel–Iran War.[xxiv] Jalali noted that Iran is vulnerable to infiltration and that Iran’s adversaries can track Iranian officials using traffic cameras and communication networks, among other means. Jalali claimed that government agencies have failed to address these security weaknesses despite years of PDO warnings.[xxv] Israel killed numerous senior Iranian military commanders and nuclear scientists during the war, highlighting the degree of Israeli infiltration in Iran. Jalali stated that Iran has prioritized rapid development over security considerations in recent years, which has exacerbated security vulnerabilities.[xxvi] The PDO operates under the Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) and is responsible for developing and coordinating policies to defend Iranian civilian, military, and nuclear infrastructure from attacks.[xxvii] Jalali emphasized that the PDO is not responsible for the implementation of passive defense policies, however.[xxviii]

Jalali also discussed Iran’s preparations for a potential attack on its nuclear facilities before the war. Jalali stated that the PDO prepared a plan after Iran’s missile strike on Israel in October 2024 to prepare for a potential attack on its nuclear sites and potential radioactive or chemical contamination.[xxix] Jalali stated that former AFGS Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri approved the plan, but that President Masoud Pezeshkian's administration resisted its implementation because it did not believe that war was imminent and did not want to “worry” the Iranian public.[xxx] Jalali stated that Iran preemptively emptied large ammonia and chlorine tanks in Esfahan Province to prevent chemical leaks and civilian harm if Iran’s nuclear facilities were attacked.[xxxi] Jalali added that the nuclear sector significantly reduced its activity and “relocated equipment” before the war. It is unclear what “equipment” Jalali was referring to.