Iran Updates, August 2025

Iran Update, August 29, 2025

Iranian parliamentarians introduced a three-part bill on August 28 to withdraw Iran from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), likely to pressure the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) to not reimpose UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran.[i] The bill would require Iran to leave the NPT and the Additional Protocol, end all negotiations with the United States and the E3, and terminate cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).[ii] The Iranian parliament recently passed a law on June 25 that suspended Iranian cooperation with the IAEA, which makes the last clause largely performative.[iii] The E3 triggered the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism on August 28.[iv] The JCPOA snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UNSC sanctions on Iran in the event of Iran’s “significant non-compliance" of JCPOA commitments.[v] The process to reimpose UNSC sanctions on Iran lasts 30 days, and Iran likely seeks for the E3 to reverse its decision to reimpose these sanctions during the 30-day period.

The introduction of this bill may reflect differences between various regime institutions about how the regime should respond to the E3 decision to trigger the snapback mechanism. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi wrote a letter to the European Union on August 29 in which he stated that Iran “remains committed” to diplomacy and is willing to resume negotiations to reach a “fair and balanced” agreement.[vi] This statement contrasts with the three-part bill, which would suspend all negotiations between Iran and the United States and the E3. The difference between parliament and the executive branch’s views comes after hardline parliamentarians recently criticized the Iranian government for allowing IAEA inspectors to return to Iran. Parliamentarians claimed that the decision violated the law that parliament passed on June 25.[vii] IAEA inspectors returned to Iran on August 27 to supervise a fuel replacement at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. IAEA inspectors do not have access to other Iranian nuclear facilities, such as Natanz or Fordow.

Iran called on the UNSC to approve a Russian-Chinese draft resolution that would extend Resolution 2231 and the JCPOA until at least April 18, 2026.[viii] The snapback mechanism is currently set to expire on October 18, 2025. Iran’s Mission to the UN said on August 28 that UNSC members face a “decisive” choice between backing the Russian–Chinese resolution and preserving diplomacy or reimposing UNSC sanctions, which it claimed would cause “grave consequences.”[ix] Iran previously rejected an E3 proposal to extend the snapback deadline by six months, arguing that extending the snapback deadline gives the E3 more time to reimpose UNSC sanctions on Iran.[x] The E3 offered to extend the snapback deadline in return for Iran resuming full cooperation with the IAEA, resuming negotiations with the United States, and accounting for its 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile.[xi] The Russian-Chinese resolution does not appear to include these conditions and simply urges all parties to resume negotiations, which makes this resolution much more favorable for Iran than the E3 proposal.[xii] The Russian-Chinese resolution also reportedly bans the E3 from reimposing UNSC sanctions on Iran during the six-month extension period.

Key Takeaways

• Iranian response to the E3’s decision to trigger the snapback mechanism: Iranian parliamentarians introduced a three-part bill on August 28 to withdraw Iran from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), likely to pressure the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) to not reimpose UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran.
• Iranian cooperation with Russia and China to avoid snapback sanctions: Iran called on the UNSC to approve a Russian-Chinese draft resolution that would extend Resolution 2231 and the JCPOA until April 18, 2026. Iranian officials previously rejected an E3 proposal to extend the October 2025 snapback deadline by six months.

Iran Update, August 28, 2025

The E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) initiated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback process on August 28.[i] The JCPOA snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance” of JCPOA commitments.[ii] The JCPOA gives the UNSC 10 days to initiate a resolution to continue providing sanction relief to Iran after an E3 member notifies the UNSC of Iran’s ”significant non-performance.”[iii] All prior UN sanctions would return 30 days after the initial referral to the UNSC if the resolution does not pass or a permanent member vetoes it.[iv] The snapback mechanism is currently set to expire on October 18, 2025. The triggering of snapback sanctions comes after Iran failed to meet the E3’s conditions for extending the mechanism’s deadline by the end of August.[v] The E3 previously set an August 31 deadline for Iran to show real progress toward a nuclear deal by renewing cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and restarting negotiations with the United States.[vi] Iranian negotiators met with the E3 in Geneva on August 26 but failed to "put tangible, detailed deliverables on the table,” which prompted the E3 to move forward with the snapback process before the snapback mechanism‘s expiration.[vii] The snapback mechanism would reimpose six UNSC resolutions on Iran, which would impose restrictions on Iran’s conventional arms trade, missile program, uranium enrichment activities, and development of nuclear-capable missiles.[viii]

Iran has demolished buildings at the Mojdeh site (Lavisan-2) at Shahid Rajaei University in Lavisan, Tehran Province, which Israel damaged during the 12-day Israel-Iran War. The Institute for Science and International Security assessed on August 27 that Iran is likely trying to conceal undeclared nuclear weapons research and development activities at this site.[ix] Israel damaged at least four buildings at the Mojdeh site between June 14 and 20 during the war.[x] Satellite imagery from August 20 shows that Iran has demolished two of the damaged buildings, including a building affiliated with the Iranian Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research‘s (SPND) Shahid Karimi Group that is involved in explosives research.[xi] The Mojdeh site previously housed the SPND headquarters, which played a leading role in the Iranian nuclear weapons research program before 2003.[xii] Shahid Rajaei University is affiliated with Iran’s nuclear program, and some US officials believe that the university has been involved in nuclear warhead design research.[xiii]

The IAEA reported on August 27 that there is no evidence Iran has moved its stockpile of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) stored underground at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) since the US strikes on June 21, using satellite imagery.[xiv] IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated on August 27 that “there is nothing to contradict the notion that the material is where it [previously] was.“[xv] Grossi confirmed on June 23 that US and Israeli airstrikes damaged tunnel entrances used for storing enriched material at the ENTC. The Institute for Science and International Security similarly reported, citing satellite imagery, that Iran ”backfilled” these entrances ahead of US strikes likely to try to contain an explosion or prevent the dispersion of hazardous material.[xvi] Iran cannot currently access the ENTC and, therefore, likely cannot conduct a conclusive damage assessment or extract materials. Senior Israeli intelligence officials said that any Iranian attempts to recover the material would "almost certainly" be detected.[xvii] The US strikes also destroyed components of Iran’s nuclear program that would be necessary for further enrichment and weaponization to create a deliverable nuclear weapon.[xviii]

Hezbollah is reportedly attempting to compel Lebanese politicians to support the group’s efforts to delay or reverse the government’s plan to disarm it.  Hezbollah officials have recently held several meetings with political leaders and the group’s allies to acquire support for Hezbollah retaining its weapons.[xix] Hezbollah reportedly sent letters to several independent parliamentarians promising financial and political support in return for neutrality on the government’s decision to disarm Hezbollah.[xx] Hezbollah allegedly told these parliamentarians to not ”bet on the Arab and American positions” as Hezbollah would disrupt the ”situation” with Iranian support.[xxi] Lebanese media reported that the parliamentarians responded negatively to Hezbollah’s efforts.[xxii] Hezbollah has historically used its military capabilities and political influence within other state institutions to sway the Lebanese government’s decision-making.[xxiii]

Hezbollah also appears to be exploiting Lebanese government concerns regarding the potential for internal conflict in Lebanon and Israeli compliance with the US proposal to disarm Hezbollah as a part of the group’s efforts to avoid disarmament. A “well-informed” Lebanese source told Saudi media on August 28 that the Lebanese Council of Ministers’ upcoming session to review the Lebanese Armed Force (LAF)’s plan to disarm Hezbollah is still on ”for now.”[xxiv] The source noted that the session, which is scheduled for September 2, could be postponed if ”internal matters” become complicated.[xxv] Saudi media reported on August 24 that Hezbollah has resorted to inflaming sectarian tensions by portraying the Lebanese government’s decision as an attempt to disarm the Lebanese Shia community.[xxvi] Lebanese officials have previously raised concerns that the government’s decision to disarm Hezbollah could spark communal tensions in Lebanon.[xxvii] Parliament Speaker and Hezbollah ally Nabih Berri told Saudi media on August 27 that the United States gave Lebanon “the opposite” of what it promised.[xxviii] Lebanese politicians have reportedly perceived this statement as representing Berri’s doubts about the US proposal.[xxix] The US proposal includes an Israeli withdrawal from its five permanent positions in southern Lebanon within 90 days and Hezbollah’s complete disarmament by the end of 2025.[xxx] Lebanese ministerial sources previously told Saudi media on August 26 that Lebanese authorities were concerned after Israeli officials said in recent days that Israel would not withdraw until Hezbollah is fully disarmed.[xxxi] The sources said that these Israeli statements are a ”negative sign” and have thwarted US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack’s mission to disarm Hezbollah.[xxxii]

Key Takeaways

• Snapback Sanctions: The E3 initiated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback process on August 28. The JCPOA snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance” of JCPOA commitments.
• Iranian Damage Assessments: Iran has demolished buildings at the Mojdeh site (Lavisan-2) at Shahid Rajaei University in Lavisan, Tehran Province, that Israel damaged during the 12-day Israel-Iran War. The Institute for Science and International Security assessed on August 27 that Iran is likely trying to conceal undeclared nuclear weapons research and development activities at this site.
• Iranian Highly Enriched Uranium: The IAEA reported on August 27 that there is no evidence Iran has moved its stockpile of highly enriched uranium (HEU) stored underground at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) since the US strikes on June 21, citing satellite imagery. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated on August 27 that “there is nothing to contradict the notion that the material is where it [previously] was.“
• Hezbollah Political Coercion: Hezbollah is reportedly attempting to compel Lebanese politicians to support the group’s efforts to delay or reverse the government’s plan to disarm it. Hezbollah also appears to be exploiting Lebanese government concerns regarding the potential for internal conflict in Lebanon and Israeli compliance with the US proposal to disarm Hezbollah as a part of the group’s efforts to avoid disarmament.

Iran Update, August 27, 2025

The E3 (the United Kingdom, Germany, and France) will reportedly initiate the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback process as soon as August 28, according to three European diplomats and one Western diplomat.[i] The JCPOA snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance” of JCPOA commitments.[ii] The snapback mechanism is currently set to expire on October 18, 2025. The E3 imposed a deadline of August 31 on Iran to make meaningful progress toward a nuclear deal, such as by renewing cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and resuming negotiations with the United States.[iii] The E3 offered to postpone the expiration of the snapback mechanism to allow Iran more time to negotiate with the United States.[iv] Iran reportedly failed to make “sufficiently tangible commitments” during the most recent Iran-E3 meeting in Geneva on August 26.[v] Another source stated that Iran offered “very little to work with” to secure an extension.[vi]

It is unclear if the E3 will initiate the dispute resolution process outlined in the JCPOA or directly refer Iran's non-compliance to the UNSC. The dispute resolution process can take up to 35 days and involves a series of steps that aim to resolve non-compliance issues.[vii] The E3 can choose to engage in the dispute resolution process and then refer the issue to the UNSC if it believes that Iran continues to show "significant non-performance." The E3 can conversely bypass the dispute resolution process and directly refer the non-compliance issue to the UNSC. The E3 would be required to include a description of "the good-faith efforts the [E3] made to exhaust the dispute resolution process" when they refer Iran’s non-compliance to the UNSC.[viii]  The JCPOA gives the UNSC 30 days to pass a resolution to extend sanctions relief for Iran, but UNSC permanent members (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, and Russia) can veto such a resolution. The E3 is reportedly hopeful that Iran will make unspecified commitments regarding its nuclear program within 30 days that will allow the E3 to avoid reimposing UNSC sanctions on Iran.[ix] The snapback mechanism would reimpose six UNSC resolutions on Iran, including bans on the transfer of conventional arms to and from Iran, international support for Iran's missile program, enrichment-related activities, and the testing and development of nuclear-capable missiles.[x]

Hardline Iranian parliamentarians criticized the return of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors to Iran and argued that their return undermines a recent law that parliament passed to restrict cooperation with the agency.[xi] These criticisms arose after IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi announced on August 26 that IAEA inspectors would soon resume inspections in Iran.[xii] Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Spokesperson Behrouz Kamalvandi stated on August 27 that IAEA inspectors will supervise the fuel replacement at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) to ensure that electricity is produced in a timely manner.[xiii] The Iranian parliament passed a bill on June 25 to suspend all cooperation with the IAEA.[xiv]  

The Iranian Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Commission warned on August 26 that the AEOI and Foreign Affairs Ministry must fully comply with the law suspending cooperation with the IAEA.[xv] Hardline parliamentarians separately accused the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) on August 27 of concealing decisions from parliament and the public.[xvi] Hardliners warned that continued government cooperation with the IAEA would justify legal action against senior SNSC officials for undermining parliament’s authority.[xvii] Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi stated on August 20 that Iran cannot completely end all cooperation with the IAEA since the upcoming fuel replacement at the BNPP requires inspectors to be present. Araghchi emphasized that the return of IAEA inspectors to Iran would take place within the framework of the law that parliament passed on July 25.[xviii] The IAEA inspectors currently in Iran are reportedly only permitted to oversee the fuel replacement at the BNPP and cannot access or inspect damaged nuclear sites such as Natanz and Fordow.[xix] These sites remain largely inaccessible to any party.

Iran may have allowed IAEA inspectors to return to Iran to show limited cooperation and ease international pressure from the E3. The E3 offered on July 25 to extend the snapback mechanism’s deadline if Iran fully cooperated with the IAEA, resumed nuclear talks with the United States, and accounted for its 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile.[xx] Grossi stated on August 26 that the 12-day war damaged some Iranian nuclear facilities and that he and Iranian officials have discussed steps to restart the agency’s work in Iran.[xxi] The location of Iran’s 408 kilograms of 60 percent enriched uranium is unknown, and it is unclear if Iran can access this material.[xxii]

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani withdrew the Popular Mobilization Authority bill from parliament on August 27, reportedly due to US threats to sanction Iraq if he did not withdraw the bill.[xxiii] The Popular Mobilization Authority bill would likely increase Iran’s influence in the Iraqi political and security spheres by formalizing key structures of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[xxiv] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service comprised of many militias, some of which report to Iran instead of the Iraqi Prime Minister.[xxv]  The Council of Ministers, which Sudani leads, approved the Popular Mobilization Authority bill and submitted it to parliament in February 2025.[xxvi] The Iraqi parliament completed its first and second readings of the draft bill but had not yet voted on it.[xxvii] The Council of Ministers can reintroduce the bill to parliament at a later date, despite Sudani’s withdrawal of the bill at this time.[xxviii]

Kurdish media reported that Sudani withdrew the bill after he reportedly told Shia Coordination Framework members during a recent meeting that the United States would impose “severe” sanctions on Iraq and that “Iraq will be destroyed” if the Popular Mobilization Authority bill was not withdrawn from parliament.[xxix] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. The US State Department spokesperson confirmed on August 12 that the United States opposes the Popular Mobilization Authority law.[xxx] The United States has repeatedly pressured the Iraqi federal government to dissolve the PMF and reportedly threatened to sanction PMF leaders.[xxxi]

NOTE: A version of the following text also appears in CTP-ISW’s August 27 Adversary Entente Task Force Update:

Iran and Belarus have continued to deepen ties, especially regarding military and military industrial matters.[xxxii]  Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian met with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko in Minsk, Belarus, on August 20 to discuss expanding bilateral cooperation and sanctions mitigation efforts.[xxxiii] Iranian and Belarusian officials signed 12 memorandums of understanding intended to strengthen bilateral trade, military technical cooperation, and mutual investment during Pezeshkian’s visit.[xxxiv] Belarusian state media reported that Pezeshkian and Lukashenko agreed to work toward codifying a strategic partnership treaty.[xxxv]

Lukashenko said during the meeting that Belarus is ready to expand “military technical collaboration” with Iran, though Lukashenko did not specify what this cooperation could entail.[xxxvi] Ukraine's Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) warned on August 22 that Iran seeks Belarusian help to restore Iranian air defense systems and electronic warfare (EW) equipment that Israel damaged during the June 2025 war.[xxxvii] The SZRU did not specify how Belarus could help Iran restore damaged assets, and Belarus likely lacks the domestic capabilities to do so. Russia effectively controls Belarus' air defense assets within an integrated air defense system, and Russia's delays in providing S-400 systems to Iran have been a source of friction between Russia and Iran.[xxxviii] Iran may seek to increase defense industrial cooperation with Belarus given that Israeli strikes also targeted Iranian domestic production capabilities for air defense components.[xxxix] Belarus reportedly produces missile components for Russian air defense systems, including S-300 and S-400 systems, and Iran may hope to secure similar components from Belarus.[xl] Such an arrangement would mirror the way that Russia currently uses Belarus’ industrial base to source munitions and other dual-use components to augment Russian military output and sustain its war effort in Ukraine.[xli] Iran and Belarus may additionally further collaborate on drone production--Lukashenko announced in March 2025 that Russia would open a drone production facility in Belarus.[xlii] Iranian engineers previously traveled to Belarus in May 2023 to reportedly examine modifying local factories to produce Iranian drones, like Shahed-type models, for Russia.[xliii]

Iran’s deepening cooperation with Belarus ultimately benefits Russia and helps sustain the Russian war effort against Ukraine given Minsk’s role as Moscow’s key sanctions evasion partner. The SZRU noted that looser restrictions on Belarus’ military sector may make Belarus a more compelling partner for Iran compared to Russia.[xliv] Iranian officials have more publicly voiced discontent with Russian military support for Iran since Russia’s non-response to the Israel-Iran war.[xlv] Iran’s expansion of ties with Belarus will not sideline Russia as Iran’s primary military partner, however, and will simply allow Iran to diversify the manner in which it interacts with Moscow. ISW has long assessed that Russia has de-facto annexed Belarus, and Iran may seek to benefit from this de-facto annexation without having to circumvent the same suite of sanctions that are currently levied against Russia.[xlvi]

The United States and its European partners should view Belarus’ cooperation with Iran as an extension of Russo-Iranian engagement, with similar impacts and potential consequences. Russian efforts to de-facto annex Belarus ensure that Russia reaps any benefits brought to Belarus from cooperation with Iran.[xlvii] Expanding military technical or defense industrial cooperation between Iran and Belarus will likely directly support Russia’s war effort against Ukraine given how the Kremlin has subsumed elements of Belarus' defense industrial base.[xlviii] Iranian economic cooperation that reinforces the Belarusian economy bolsters Russia’s ability to leverage Belarus as a key sanctions evasion partner.[xlix] Iranian-Belarusian economic cooperation furthermore takes place within and reinforces Russian-led initiatives, including the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union and efforts to develop the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC).[l] Russia similarly uses Belarus’ relations with other Russian partners, such as the PRC, as a way to circumvent international sanctions and use engagement with these partners to support its war effort.[li] The United States and European partners should endeavor to levy the same suite of sanctions on Belarus as they do against Russia in order for sanctions on Russia to bear weight.  

Key Takeaways

• Snapback Sanctions: The E3 (the United Kingdom, Germany, and France) will reportedly initiate the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback process as soon as August 28, according to three European diplomats and one Western diplomat. The snapback mechanism would reimpose six UNSC resolutions on Iran, including bans on the transfer of conventional arms to and from Iran, international support for Iran's missile program, enrichment-related activities, and the testing and development of nuclear-capable missiles.
• Nuclear Inspections in Iran: Hardline Iranian parliamentarians criticized the return of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors to Iran and argued that their return undermines a recent law that parliament passed to restrict cooperation with the agency. Iran may have allowed IAEA inspectors to return to Iran to show limited cooperation and ease international pressure from the E3.
• Iranian Influence in Iraq: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani withdrew the Popular Mobilization Authority bill from parliament on August 27, reportedly due to US threats to sanction Iraq if he did not withdraw the bill. The Popular Mobilization Authority bill would likely increase Iran’s influence in the Iraqi political and security spheres by formalizing key structures of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).

Iran Update, August 26, 2025

The Lebanese government will reportedly attempt to persuade rather than coerce Hezbollah to disarm. Hezbollah is unlikely to disarm on its own accord and has historically evaded previous disarmament efforts. US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack said that the Lebanese government will focus on persuasion to encourage Hezbollah disarmament after his meeting with Lebanese President Joseph Aoun on August 26.[i] Barrack announced that Lebanon will present a plan on August 31 that aims to encourage Hezbollah to surrender its weapons to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF).[ii] Hezbollah’s threats to encourage violence if efforts to disarm it persist suggest that the group is attempting to test the government’s willingness to disarm it. A plan based on persuasion is therefore unlikely to disarm Hezbollah successfully, because the group will face few negative consequences if it declines to disarm. Barrack is attempting to build an ”economic zone” in southern Lebanon to court Hezbollah’s supporters, which is an incentive for the rank-and-file of Hezbollah fighters, but would probably not court ideologically motivated Hezbollah fighters and leadership.[iii] Hezbollah has used financial incentives, including jobs, salaries, pensions, and benefits, to retain its support base among Lebanese Shia civilians and to recruit young fighters.[iv]

Hezbollah will likely respond to an explicitly “persuasive” approach by continuing to threaten military action if the government continues to pressure the group politically to disarm. Purely persuasive actions enable Hezbollah to threaten escalation as it needs, while rejecting government overtures because the government’s resort to persuasive actions indicates to Hezbollah that it has deterred the government. Hezbollah’s ability to threaten military action while the government condemns itself to a publicly political approach cedes the initiative to Hezbollah and indicates to Hezbollah that the government lacks sufficient will to disarm Hezbollah.

Hezbollah continues to view its weapons as the group’s core and has previously referred to its weapons as its ”soul,” which further demonstrates its commitment to arms.[v] Hezbollah has consistently initiated wars against Israel while using the excuse that Lebanon needs Hezbollah to “defend” against Israel to refuse disarmament. Hezbollah refused to disarm after Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 2000, arguing that its weapons remained a critical element of national defense against any future Israeli operations.[vi] Hezbollah later attacked Israel in July 2006, kidnapping three Israeli soldiers and triggering a major Israeli ground operation. Hezbollah subsequently similarly used national defense as justification to retain its arms after the 2006 war despite the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire, which called for the disarmament of all armed factions in Lebanon under UNSC Resolution 1701.[vii] Hezbollah also entered the war against Israel on October 8, 2023, by conducting offensive indirect and direct fire against northern Israeli towns. Hezbollah officials, including Secretary General Naim Qassem, have also stated that Hezbollah would ”confront” whoever attempts to disarm the group.[viii] Hezbollah has consistently rejected calls for disarmament, stating that Hezbollah will not surrender its weapons until Israel halts operations and withdraws from southern Lebanon.[ix] Hezbollah has called for negotiations on a national defense strategy once Israel withdraws, which Qassem previously suggested would entail Hezbollah retaining its weapons and acting alongside Lebanese security forces.[x]

Hezbollah’s fiery rhetoric against the government likely aims to deter the government from coercing Hezbollah into disarming while avoiding military escalation. Hezbollah has previously launched mass protests in response to much less significant Lebanese government efforts to counter the group. Hezbollah and its ally, the Amal Movement, incited a protest in Beirut in October 2021 in response to the Lebanese government’s investigation into the potential role of Hezbollah officials in the Beirut port explosion.[xi] This investigation was much less significant to Hezbollah’s long-term survival than government efforts in 2025 to disarm Hezbollah that are supported by the prime minister. The 2021 protests rapidly descended into sectarian clashes between pro-Hezbollah protestors and anti-Hezbollah Lebanese Forces members, which killed at least six individuals.[xii] Hezbollah has largely refrained from officially inciting protests in response to the Lebanese government’s recent decision to disarm the group, however. Hezbollah and the Amal Movement only called on supporters to protest once on August 25, but later postponed the protests to allow for dialogue.[xiii] Hezbollah’s dialogue suggests that the group fears escalation because its weaker position and the inherent unpredictability of protests or military escalation could rapidly spiral out of Hezbollah’s control.

Iran is very unlikely to meet the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) conditions to extend the snapback mechanism deadline before the E3’s end-of-August deadline. The E3 set a deadline for Iran to reach a “substantial deal” by the end of August before the E3 triggers the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism to re-impose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran.[xiv] The snapback mechanism is set to expire on October 18, marking the end of the ten-year period outlined in UN Security Council Resolution 2231, but the E3 would need to initiate the snapback process at the end of August in order to meet the October 18 deadline.[xv] An Iranian delegation led by Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi and Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi met with E3 officials in Geneva, Switzerland, on August 26 to discuss potential snapback sanctions and a snapback mechanism deadline extension.[xvi] An unspecified source told an Axios reporter on August 26 that the Iranians “have [not] put tangible, detailed deliverables on the table.”[xvii] Another source added that Iran offered “very little to work with” to secure an extension.[xviii] The E3 previously proposed on July 25 to extend the snapback mechanism’s deadline in exchange for full cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a resumption of nuclear talks with the United States, and accounting for its 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile.[xix] Iran has repeatedly rejected this proposal.[xx] Iran has reiterated its right to enrich uranium domestically, continued to deny the IAEA access to Iranian nuclear facilities struck in the 12-day Israel-Iran War, and set maximalist preconditions for resuming nuclear talks with the United States.[xxi]

[xxii]

Key Takeaways

• Hezbollah Disarmament: The Lebanese government will reportedly attempt to persuade rather than coerce Hezbollah to disarm. Hezbollah is unlikely to disarm on its own accord and has historically evaded previous disarmament efforts. Hezbollah’s fiery rhetoric against the government likely aims to deter the government from coercing Hezbollah into disarming while avoiding military escalation.
• Iran: Iran is very unlikely to meet the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) conditions to extend the snapback mechanism deadline before the E3’s end-of-August deadline. The E3 set a deadline for Iran to reach a “substantial deal” by the end of August before the E3 triggers the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action snapback mechanism to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran.

Iran Update, August 25, 2025

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei rejected recent calls by Iranian reformist officials to reform Iran’s domestic and foreign policies.[i] Khamenei delivered a speech on August 24 in which he claimed that “Iran’s enemies” failed to defeat Iran during the Israel-Iran War and are now trying to do so by “creating discord in the country.”[ii] Khamenei claimed that agents of the United States and Israel, along with “heedless speakers and writers,” are creating division.[iii] Khamenei may have used the term “heedless speakers and writers” to refer to reformist officials who have recently called on the regime to reform its domestic and foreign policies. Former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani called on August 13 for the regime to make concessions to the Iranian people, strengthen societal resilience, and reduce tensions with the West.[iv] The Iranian Reformist Front separately issued a statement on August 17 that called for political reforms and foreign policy shifts, including suspending uranium enrichment under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) oversight.[v] Khamenei rejected this and similar calls to engage with the United States in his speech on August 24, stating that the conflict between Iran and the United States is “unsolvable.” Khamenei additionally rejected direct talks with the United States but did not explicitly rule out the possibility of indirect negotiations.

The Iranian regime is facing increasing pressure to resume nuclear negotiations with the United States ahead of the E3’s (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) August 31 deadline for Iran to make progress toward a diplomatic solution to the nuclear issue. An Iranian delegation led by Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi will meet with E3 officials in Geneva, Switzerland, on August 26 to continue talks over potential snapback sanctions.[vi] British Foreign Secretary David Lammy stated on August 22 that the E3 will activate the snapback mechanism to reimpose United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran unless Iran agrees to a “verifiable, durable deal.”[vii] A senior French diplomat told Saudi media on August 25 that the meeting in Geneva would be the “last window open to the Iranian side.”[viii]  The E3 imposed a deadline of August 31 on Iran to make meaningful progress toward a nuclear deal, such as by renewing cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and resuming negotiations with the United States.[ix] The E3 offered to postpone the expiration of the snapback mechanism to allow Iran more time to negotiate with the United States.[x] The snapback mechanism is currently set to expire in October 2025. Iranian officials have rejected postponing the deadline because extending the deadline would provide the E3 with more time to trigger the snapback mechanism. The E3 would need to initiate the snapback process by September 3 in order to complete the process by the current October deadline.[xi] The snapback mechanism would reimpose six UNSC resolutions on Iran, including bans on the transfer of conventional arms to and from Iran, international support for Iran's missile program, enrichment-related activities, and the testing and development of nuclear-capable missiles.[xii]

Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani is reportedly trying to convince the Iranian regime to reduce Iran’s level of uranium enrichment from 60 percent to 20 percent to avoid snapback sanctions and further US and Israeli strikes, according to a senior Iranian official speaking to The Telegraph on August 24.[xiii] The senior official stated that Larijani is concerned that another war with the United States or Israel could present a major challenge to the regime.[xiv]  Larijani reportedly faces the most opposition from Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) members.[xv] The official also stated that Iranian leaders appear “willing to comply” with Larijani's call to reduce enrichment levels and re-engage with Western countries.[xvi] The Washington Post similarly reported on July 13 that there is a “consensus” among Iran’s political class that Iran needs to resume nuclear negotiations with the United States, citing political observers inside and outside of Iran.[xvii] These reports suggest that Iranian moderates who support nuclear negotiations with the United States are continuing to prevail over Iranian hardliners who reject negotiations. Larijani replaced Ali Akbar Ahmadian as SNSC secretary on August 5 as part of a broader restructuring of Iranian defense and security institutions after the Israel-Iran War. Larijani is a moderate politician who supported the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

Russia reportedly introduced a draft resolution to extend the snapback mechanism deadline, according to unspecified informed sources speaking to UK-based Amwaj Media on August 25.[xviii] The informed sources stated that China will reportedly co-sponsor the draft resolution.[xix] The draft resolution would extend the snapback deadline by six months until April 2026 and reportedly prevent the E3 from being able to trigger the snapback mechanism during the six-month extension period.[xx] Iran previously rejected an offer by the E3 to extend the snapback deadline, so it is unclear whether Iran will support the Russian draft proposal.[xxi] This report comes after Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi held separate phone calls with their Russian counterparts, President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Lavrov, respectively, to discuss, among other issues, potential snapback sanctions.[xxii] Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi called Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu on August 24 to discuss a diplomatic resolution to the nuclear issue.[xxiii]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq leader Qais al Khazali used popular fears about an Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) resurgence to try to justify the existence of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). Recent US political and economic pressure on the Iraqi federal government to curb Iranian influence in Iraq has sparked a debate in the Iraqi political space about the future and possible dissolution of the PMF.[xxiv] The PMF was established in 2014 by “institutionalizing” pre-existing and predominantly Shia militias, including various Iranian-backed Iraqi militias like Asaib Ahl al Haq, that were engaged in the fight against ISIS.[xxv] Khazali argued on August 23 that unspecified current events are “more dangerous” than the situation before ISIS’s emergence in 2014.[xxvi] He added that “takfiri” fighters are operating on Iraq’s borders. Khazali was likely referring to ISIS fighters who continue to operate in northeastern Syria. Khazali may seek to amplify the threat that ISIS poses to Iraq to prevent the PMF’s dissolution. The spokesperson for Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani asserted on August 23 that ISIS no longer poses a threat to Iraq.[xxvii]

It is possible that Khazali was also referring to Syrian government forces, which control territory immediately along the Iraqi border at the Albu Kamal-al Qaim border crossing.[xxviii] Iranian-backed Iraqi actors have remained intensely distrustful of the Syrian transitional government under President Ahmed al Shara due to Shara’s historic ties to al Qaeda in Iraq, which was the predecessor to ISIS.[xxix] Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's Adviser to Iraq, Mojtaba Hosseini, similarly claimed on August 23 that the United States wants Iraq to “suffer the same fate as Syria.”[xxx]  Iran viewed the overthrow of the Assad regime in December 2024 as part of a US effort to replace a pro-Iranian government with one led by “terrorists” under Syrian President Ahmed al Shara.[xxxi] The Iranian regime has historically accused the United States of creating and supporting terrorist actors like ISIS to undermine Iran and its Axis of Resistance.[xxxii]

Khazali and Hosseini’s comments come amid continued US efforts to dissolve the PMF. Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al Mashhadani stated on August 24 that the United States warned several Iraqi officials, including Iraqi President Abdul Latif al Rashid, that the United States will take a “different position” if the Iraqi Parliament passes laws that oppose US laws, in reference to the Popular Mobilization Authority Law.[xxxiii] The Popular Mobilization Authority Law, which the Iraqi Parliament has not yet voted on, includes provisions to make the PMF chairmanship a ministerial position and professionalize the PMF as a fighting force.[xxxiv]  An “informed source” told Iraqi media on August 23 that a senior US delegation will visit Baghdad in the coming days to discuss the US military withdrawal from Iraq as well as unspecified energy and economic issues.[xxxv] The United States is expected to complete the first phase of its withdrawal from Iraq to the Iraqi Kurdistan Region by the end of September 2025.[xxxvi] The recent US pressure on the Iraqi federal government to curb Iranian influence in Iraq has included demands for the Iraqi government to curb Iranian oil smuggling, which could be discussed by the US delegation visiting Iraq.

Druze leader Hikmat al Hijri’s unification of around 40 Druze militias into the “National Guard” to defend Suwayda Province on August 23 undermines the Syrian transitional government’s efforts to establish a centralized Syrian state.[xxxvii] Hijri formed an autonomous government in Suwayda Province on August 6.[xxxviii] The militias that have merged to form the “National Guard” include prominent Druze militias, such as the Unification Shield, which includes 23 battalions, the Men of Dignity, Liwa al Jibal, the Unified Popular Resistance, the Southern Shield Forces, the Mountain Shield Forces, the Sheikh al Karama Forces, and the 164th Brigade. The Men of Dignity militia was previously open to cooperation with the Syrian transitional government but rejected government control over Suwayda Province after government forces committed atrocities against Druze civilians in July.[xxxix] Hijri commended the creation of the “National Guard” and the “Supreme Legal Committee” and claimed that these institutions serve as the security, military, political, and legal apparatuses of Suwayda Province.[xl]

The newly-formed “National Guard” and “Supreme Legal Committee” include several former Assad-era officers.[xli] The Suwayda “National Guard” includes Brigadier General Jihad Ghoutani, who previously served as an artillery commander under Assad after his promotion in 2019.[xlii] Ghoutani fought for the Assad regime in battles across Syria, including artillery campaigns in Rif Dimashq, Idlib, and Homs provinces.[xliii] Suwayda’s “Supreme Legal Committee” appointed former Assad intelligence officer Brigadier General Shakib Ajoud Nasr, who oversaw political security in Tartous, as head of internal security on August 6.[xliv] The “Supreme Legal Committee" later replaced Nasr with a Suwaydawi judge on August 12.[xlv] 

Key Takeaways

• Baghdad, Iraq: Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq leader Qais al Khazali used popular fears about an Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) resurgence to try to justify the existence of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). Recent US political and economic pressure on the Iraqi federal government to curb Iranian influence in Iraq has sparked a debate in the Iraqi political space about the future and possible dissolution of the PMF.
• Tehran, Iran: The Iranian regime is facing increasing pressure to resume nuclear negotiations with the United States ahead of the E3’s (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) August 31 deadline for Iran to make progress toward a diplomatic solution to the nuclear issue. Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani is reportedly trying to convince the Iranian regime to reduce Iran’s level of uranium enrichment from 60 percent to 20 percent to avoid snapback sanctions and further US and Israeli strikes.
• Suwayda, Syria: Druze leader Hikmat al Hijri’s unification of around 40 Druze militias into the “National Guard” to defend Suwayda Province on August 23 undermines the Syrian transitional government’s efforts to establish a centralized Syrian state. The newly-formed “National Guard” and “Supreme Legal Committee” include several former Assad-era officers.

Iran Update, August 22, 2025

Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani gave an interview on Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s website on August 22 in which he discussed Iran’s post-war defense and considerations for future conflicts.[i] Larijani warned that adversaries may seek new opportunities to attack Iran and that Iran must correct its defensive flaws and rebuild deterrence.[ii] Israel’s strikes during the 12 Day War severely damaged Iranian nuclear and military facilities and killed nuclear scientists and senior commanders.[iii] The Israeli campaign and US strikes demonstrated Iran’s defensive gaps and inability to deter its adversaries. Larijani stated that the Defense Council works as a subsidiary body tasked exclusively with military readiness and fixing deficiencies in the armed forces.[iv] The SNSC established the Defense Council on August 3 to address systemic operational failures during the Israel-Iran War and to take “rapid, balanced, and coordinated” steps against future threats.”[v] Larijani stated that Iran is focusing on improving air defense and radar systems and strengthening its missile force. Larijani added that Iran relies mainly on domestic production but also buys some military equipment from abroad.[vi] Iran previously sought to strengthen defense cooperation with China following the war, including by showing interest in acquiring PRC systems such as the J-10 fighter jet and AWACS to compensate for wartime losses and upgrade air defense capabilities.[vii] Larijani also highlighted that Iran must recognize the war has not ended but has only paused.[viii]

Larijani reaffirmed Iran’s commitment to support the Axis of Resistance and framed resistance groups as natural responses to “foreign aggression.”[ix] Larijani stressed that Iran considers the Axis of Resistance a genuine and strategic asset.[x] Iran previously used the Axis as a key deterrent against the United States and Israel, but the Axis of Resistance has been badly degraded over the past two years of fighting with Israel.  Larijani compared Iran’s support for regional allies to US support for Israel and warned that abandoning them would be “political insanity.”[xi] Larijani rejected the idea that Hezbollah or other groups burden Iran and insisted that they both assist Iran and rely on Iranian support.[xii] Larijani characterized the relationship with Hezbollah and other partner groups as ”brothers” rather than ”subordinates.” This is consistent with CTP-ISW’s longstanding assessment that the Axis of Resistance is an unconventional alliance that Iran leads. Some groups in the Axis are proxies, while Iran exerts more limited influence over other groups.[xiii] Larijani’s inaugural visits to Lebanon and Iraq attempted to demonstrate that Iran has not abandoned its partners in the Axis, but Larijani offered very little visible, tangible support during those visits.[xiv]

Larijani criticized international pressure on Iran from Western countries and accused the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of "partisanship” against Iran during the 12 Day War. Larijani accused IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi of giving a “blank check” to the United States and Israel during the 12 Day War.[xv] Larijani claimed that Grossi “completely gave up and surrendered” and called the agency’s silence after Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities “truly disgraceful.”[xvi] Larijani questioned the value of continued cooperation with the IAEA but stopped short of calling for withdrawal from the NPT, saying instead that the treaty has had “no value” for Iran. Iranian officials repeatedly threatened to withdraw from the NPT if the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggers the snapback sanction mechanism at the end of August.[xvii] The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance” of JCPOA commitments.[xviii] The snapback mechanism expires on October 18, 2025, but the E3 would need to initiate the snapback process at the end of August in order to meet the October 18 deadline.[xix] Iran and the E3 previously discussed extending the snapback deadline during a July 25 Istanbul meeting.[xx] An extension would require a new UNSC resolution with at least nine votes in favor of the resolution and no vetoes from permanent UNSC members. Larijani rejected European proposals to extend the UN Security Council snapback deadline, however. He said that the JCPOA fixed a ten-year limit to the snapback sanctions that cannot be altered. He added that any extensions are a form of “cheating.”[xxi] Larijani added that Iran will never abandon diplomacy but stressed that negotiations must be “real” and not a pretext for pressure. He also warned that Iran will not accept “submission.”[xxii] Iranian officials previously demanded preconditions, including assurances of no further strikes, to continue nuclear talks with the West.[xxiii]

Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi echoed Larijani’s position during a phone call with the foreign ministers of the E3 and European Union Foreign Policy Chief Kaja Kallas on August 22.[xxiv] Araghchi insisted that only the UN Security Council can decide on an extension.[xxv] Araghchi stated that Iran will consult Russia and China on the implications of snapback sanctions.[xxvi] Both sides agreed that Iran and the E3 will continue discussions at the deputy foreign minister level on August 26.[xxvii] CTP-ISW assessed that Iran is very unlikely to accept any arrangement that restricts enrichment, even if the E3 extends the deadline.[xxviii]

Larijani called on the regime to prioritize solving people’s basic problems to preserve resilience in future conflicts. Larijani said citizens must have a minimum standard of living even in wartime so they can endure and remain steadfast, stressing that the state must meet essential needs in both war and peacetime. Larijani warned that energy shortages in electricity and gas, and factory closures, are unacceptable because they erode national wealth and weaken resilience. The regime may fear that if citizens grow dissatisfied, they will be less likely to support the regime in the next conflict. A recent energy shortage has forced Iran to shut schools, universities, and government offices across most provinces as authorities cut electricity and water amid extreme heat and war damage to infrastructure.[xxix] Larijani's remarks follow a large protest in Shiraz, Fars Province, on August 21, where residents gathered outside the provincial governor’s office to denounce repeated water and power outages and chanted “Not Gaza, not Lebanon - my life is for Iran.”[xxx] These chants are a criticism of the regime’s decision to funnel resources to its regional partners while neglecting basic services for Iranians.[xxxi] Energy shortages have triggered repeated unrest in recent months, including the May strike by iron market traders in Tehran and a large July demonstration in Gilan Province over water and electricity outages.[xxxii]

The United States reportedly asked Israel on August 21 to significantly reduce “non-urgent” military operations and withdraw from one of its five permanent positions in Lebanon, according to two unspecified sources speaking to Axios.[xxxiii] The sources said that US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack and Israeli officials recently discussed steps that the Israeli government could take while the Lebanese government disarms Hezbollah.[xxxiv] Barrack proposed a temporary pause of Israel‘s “non-urgent“ airstrikes for a ”few weeks” and a phased plan for Israel to withdraw from its five permanent positions.[xxxv] The sources noted that this temporary pause could be extended if the Lebanese government takes further action to prevent Hezbollah reconstitution in southern Lebanon.[xxxvi] The sources stated that the United States also envisions implementing an “economic zone” in southern Lebanon.[xxxvii] This economic zone would address Israeli concerns of Hezbollah reconstitution on its northern border by reportedly making it difficult for Hezbollah to reconstitute in southern Lebanon.[xxxviii] The sources did not provide any further information on the details of this economic zone. Qatar and Saudi Arabia have reportedly agreed to invest in the reconstruction of southern Lebanon once Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon is complete.[xxxix]

Israel and the United States have reportedly made progress on the US proposal to disarm Hezbollah, according to the same Axios sources.[xl] The sources did not provide any further details on Israel and the United States’ talks on the US proposal. The source noted that Israel did not reject the US proposal and ”is willing to give it a chance.”[xli] One of the sources noted that Israel has not yet made a final decision on the US proposal, however.[xlii] Senior Lebanese officials previously called on the United States to pressure Israel to agree to the US disarmament proposal during Barrack’s visit to Beirut on August 18.[xliii] Lebanese officials have also stated that the Lebanese government would not implement the US proposal until Israel agrees to the US proposal.[xliv]

Hezbollah officials have continued to warn the Lebanese government about potential confrontation if the Lebanese government attempts to disarm Hezbollah, which is likely an effort to leverage the government’s concerns about internal conflict in Lebanon to delay or reverse the government’s plan to disarm Hezbollah. Hezbollah Executive Council Head Ali Damoush said on August 22 that Hezbollah has acted calmly so far but that this approach will “not last long.”[xlv] Lebanese media recently reported on August 20 that Hezbollah vowed not to resort to protests and to keep things calm at least until the end of August.[xlvi] Damoush added that Hezbollah may resort to escalation if the Lebanese government insists on implementing its decision to disarm Hezbollah.[xlvii] Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem also made an earlier threat on August 15 to ”confront” the government and incite protests against it.[xlviii] Prime Minister Nawaf Salam criticized Qassem’s speech on August 15 for containing “a veiled threat of civil war,“ which he stated no one in Lebanon wants.[xlix]

Other elements of the Lebanese government have not replied with as much confidence as Salam, which suggests that Hezbollah’s efforts to prevent its disarmament by threatening the government may be experiencing some success. A pro-Hezbollah media outlet reported on August 22 that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) had rhetorically responded to this pressure, however, by telling senior Lebanese officials and Hezbollah that it will not take any action that could undermine internal stability.[l] LAF Commander Brigadier General Rodolphe Haykal previously told Lebanese Parliament Speaker and Hezbollah ally Nabih Berri that the LAF will not “clash with a key component of the country.“[li] The LAF’s recent statements underscore the Lebanese government’s ongoing concerns about internal conflict arising between the Lebanese state and Hezbollah.[lii] Lebanese officials have raised concerns that the government’s decision to disarm Hezbollah could spark communal tensions in Lebanon.[liii] A delay or reversal of the Lebanese government’s decision to disarm Hezbollah would provide Hezbollah with the time needed to reconstitute its forces and re-establish itself domestically.[liv] Hezbollah is very unlikely to disarm on its own accord because it believes that its arms are central to its ability to challenge and ultimately destroy the Israeli state.[lv]

Key Takeaways

• Iran: Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani gave an interview on Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s website on August 22 in which he discussed Iran’s post-war defense and considerations for future conflicts.
• Iran: Larijani criticized international pressure on Iran from Western countries and accused the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of "partisanship” against Iran during the 12 Day War.
• Lebanon: The United States reportedly asked Israel on August 21 to significantly reduce “non-urgent” military operations and withdraw from one of its five permanent positions in Lebanon, according to two unspecified sources speaking to Axios.
• Lebanon: Hezbollah officials have continued to warn the Lebanese government about potential confrontation if the Lebanese government attempts to disarm Hezbollah, which is likely an effort to leverage the government’s concerns about internal conflict in Lebanon to delay or reverse the government’s plan to disarm Hezbollah.

Iran Update, August 21, 2025

Iraqi Popular Mobilization Committee (PMC) Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh defended the Popular Mobilization Authority Law against domestic critics during an interview with Iraqi media on August 20.[1] This law, which Parliament has yet to vote on, would likely increase Iran’s influence in the Iraqi political and security spheres by formalizing key structures of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) within the Iraqi security apparatus.[2] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service comprised of many militias, some of which report to Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani instead of Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani.[3] Fayyadh denied Iranian-backed Iraqi militia involvement in the law’s creation and added that the law has been in development for years with Iraqi Ministry of Defense support.[4] CTP-ISW is unable to verify Fayyadh’s claims about the militia's role in the law’s creation. The Council of Ministers, which is headed by Sudani and includes the Minister of Defense, approved the law and submitted it to Parliament in February 2025, which implies Ministry of Defense involvement, however.[5]  Fayyadh also claimed that the political debate over the Popular Mobilization Authority Law does not relate to the law’s “substance” but rather to his leadership.[6] This law would elevate Fayyadh’s role as head of the PMC to a cabinet-level position within the newly-created Popular Mobilization Authority, which surely, in part, explains Fayyadh’s support for the law.[7]

 Fayyadh’s interview comes as US political and economic pressure on the Iraqi government to curb Iranian influence in Iraq has sparked debate on the future and potential dissolution of the PMF.[8]  The US State Department spokesperson confirmed on August 12 that the United States opposes the Popular Mobilization Authority law.[9]  The law also faces domestic opposition from Sunni and Kurdish parliamentarians, who walked out of a July 16 parliamentary session to protest the reading of the law.[10] A Shia Coordination Framework parliamentarian told Iraqi media on August 18 that over 100 parliamentarians have signed a petition to vote on the law in the next Parliament session, but added that no Sunni or Kurdish parliamentarians have signed the petition.[11] The votes of these parliamentarians and the support of the Iraqi voters they represent are critical to passing the law.

Fayyadh attempted to portray the PMF as a responsible actor to defend it from critics. He noted that the Popular Mobilization Authority law would strengthen the separation between the PMC and unspecified armed groups, in reference to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that operate outside of the PMF.[12]   The PMC is formally responsible for ensuring that militias in the PMF answer to the Iraqi federal government, but has failed to enforce this requirement. Fayyadh added that the PMF maintains a “high level of discipline,” which is false.[13] Some PMF groups have conducted attacks without orders from any government chain of command.[14] Militias within the PMF have explicitly rejected Iraqi government oversight.[15]

Fayyadh also said that the PMF has no ”hostility towards any party,” which ignores attacks that militias within the PMF have conducted targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria and the attempted assassination of former Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al Kadhimi by elements of a militia that is part of the PMF.[16] Fayyadh said that the PMF provides security to Iraqis, but he ignored the PMF’s efforts to commit sectarian cleansing in Sunni areas.[17] The PMF has prevented the return of residents who fled from al Awja, Salah al Din Province, in 2014 during the anti-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) fight, which is an act of sectarian cleansing.[18] Fayyadh claimed that the PMF is in the process of resolving the al Awja issue.[19]

Fayyadh also attempted to obfuscate the relationship between the IRGC and the PMF. He described the PMF as an “Iraqi force” with “no connection” to the IRGC, which is false.[20] Militias that comprise PMF brigades conducted hundreds of attacks that targeted US forces in Iraq and Syria between October 2023 to January 2024.[21] Those militias immediately stopped that campaign following direct intervention by IRGC Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani.[22] Fayyadh himself has also advanced Iranian objectives in Iraq. Fayyadh was part of a PMF ”crisis cell” formed in late 2019 to suppress mass Iraqi protests with the IRGC’s support.[23] Then-IRGC Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani supported this crisis cell.

Fayyadh tried to justify the PMF’s continued role as a security force by asserting that the PMF would adhere to orders to dissolve by the Shia religious authority, despite having previously rejected such orders.[24] Ayatollah Ali al Sistani, Iraq’s highest religious figure, said in November 2024 that arms should be confined to the Iraqi state.[25] Some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, denied that Sistani’s call was directed at the militias.[26]

The continued survival of Assad-era Captagon smuggling networks, which helped Assad’s economy, demonstrates the economic interests that continue to animate internal conflict in Syria. These networks have the potential to destabilize Syria, as demonstrated in violent flare-ups throughout 2025.[27] Captagon and other smuggling networks long helped sustain the Assad regime during the war. The regime profited 3 to 5 billion USD annually from the Captagon trade.[28] Many of these networks continue to survive in Syria because, while Assad’s collapse destroyed the regime, it did not destroy many of the disparate networks that helped the regime survive for as long as it did. The transitional government began a counter-narcotics campaign in January 2024 that has naturally spurred a violent reaction from many of these networks.[29] This campaign has reduced Captagon production by approximately 80%, according to the Financial Times on August 21.[30]

The Captagon trade and other Assad-era criminal enterprises are almost certainly driving some—but not all—of the violence in Syria. Some of the violence along the Syria-Lebanon border and in western Syria in early 2025 appeared to be part of efforts by smuggling networks to defend their ratlines.[31] Not all of these criminal enterprises were allied with Assad, of course. Local reporting suggests that three key groups—the Bedouin Sunni tribes, Druze militias, and networks loyal to the Assad regime—have competed for control of the smuggling networks in southwestern Syria.[32] The divisions between the three groups are not purely identity-based, but competition over economic interests can rapidly take on an intercommunal bent as Bedouin Sunni fighters kill Druze or vice versa.  Many Assad-era Captagon smuggling networks persist, however, in areas that have little to no transitional government control, including within Suwayda Province, the Kurdish-controlled northeast, the Syrian coast, and the Syria-Lebanon border.[33] The Financial Times reported that Assad-linked criminal networks and Bedouin tribes sustain the drug trade in Suwayda Province by exploiting local poverty and the continued employment of Assad-era border guards on the Jordanian border.[34]

Key Takeaways

• Captagon Networks in Syria: The continued survival of Assad-era Captagon smuggling networks, which helped Assad’s economy, demonstrates the economic interests that continue to animate internal conflicts in Syria. These networks have the potential to destabilize Syria, as demonstrated in violent flare-ups throughout 2025.
• Justifications for the PMF: Iraqi Popular Mobilization Commission head Faleh al Fayyadh defended the Popular Mobilization Authority Law against domestic critics during an interview with Iraqi media on August 20. This law, which Parliament has yet to vote on, would likely increase Iran’s influence in the Iraqi political and security spheres by formalizing key structures of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) within the Iraqi security apparatus.
• IAEA Inspections in Iran: Iran continues to block International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) access to its damaged nuclear facilities and highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile after the 12-day war. Iran’s 409 kg HEU stockpile remains in one or several unspecified locations, and Iran’s access to the stockpile is unclear.

Iran Update, August 20, 2025

Former Prime Minister and State of Law Coalition leader Nouri al Maliki may be using the Accountability and Justice Commission (AJC) to sideline political opponents ahead of the November 2025 elections. Iraqi media reported on August 20 that the AJC has so far barred 33 candidates affiliated with Shia Coordination Framework parties for alleged Baath party ties.[i] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. The AJC reportedly barred eight members of Asaib Ahl al Haq’s Sadiqoun Movement, seven Badr Organization candidates, five members of Kataib Hezbollah’s Hoquq Movement, six members of the Imam Ali Brigade’s Services Alliance,  the head of Kataib Sayyid al Suhahda in Kirkuk, one member of Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development bloc, and three candidates from Labor Minister Ahmed al Asadi’s Jund al Samaa bloc.[ii] Asadi is aligned with Sudani.[iii] Shia political parties, but particularly Maliki, previously used the AJC ahead of elections in 2010 to bar candidates opposed to him, and could be weaponizing the commission again.[iv] It is highly unlikely that seven Badr Organization members, for example, have real Baathist ties due to Badr’s history. Badr Organization is the rebranded Badr Corps. The Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) founded the Badr Corps as an Iraqi Shia formation to fight Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi Army during the Iran-Iraq War.[v] The AJC only excluded three candidates aligned with Maliki for suspected Baath party ties, according to leaked documents published by Iraqi media on August 13.[vi] Candidates from political parties and coalitions that are competing with Maliki’s State of Law Coalition, meanwhile, constitute a disproportionate number of those barred due to alleged Ba'ath party links. This report comes after Maliki’s Dawa Party released a statement on August 13 affirming its support for the Commission’s measures.[vii] Maliki also emphasized on August 8 the need for the AJC to take action against Baathists.[viii] Former Prime Minister Haider al Abadi, once a member of Maliki’s former Dawa Party, criticized on August 20 the weaponization of the AJC for political purposes.[ix] Shia political parties, particularly Maliki, have long manipulated the Accountability and Justice Commission to target political opponents.[x]

The Accountability and Justice Commission’s investigation and exclusion of candidates tied to Shia Coordination Framework parties reflects ongoing tensions among Shia parties within the Framework. Iraqi media reported on August 19 that Shia Coordination Framework members are divided over US pressure to dissolve the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[xi] Political sources close to the Shia Coordination Framework told Iraqi media on August 6 that some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are “almost at odds” with some elements of the Shia Coordination Framework.[xii] Division among the Shia Coordination Framework is notable ahead of the elections because factional infighting between Iranian-backed groups before the 2021 Iraqi parliamentary elections ultimately advantaged other Iraqi parties over Iranian-backed parties in the elections.[xiii]

Key Takeaways

• Iraqi Parliamentary Elections: Former Prime Minister and State of Law Coalition leader Nouri al Maliki may be using the Accountability and Justice Commission (AJC) to sideline political opponents ahead of the November 2025 elections. Iraqi media reported that the AJC has so far barred 33 candidates affiliated with the Shia Coordination Framework parties for alleged Baath party ties.
• Damage at Fordow: The New York Times reported on August 20 that conclusive damage assessments of US strikes on Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant require more time, which is consistent with previous reporting. Several technical experts told the New York Times that a precise damage assessment requires advanced computer simulations, exact details of the bombs, and extensive knowledge of the geology of Fordow.
• US Counter-ISIS Operations: The United States conducted an operation reportedly targeting senior Iraqi ISIS leader Salah Noman in Atmeh, Idlib Province, on August 20. The US ground operation in Atmeh occurs amid ongoing counter-ISIS efforts in northern Syria near the Turkish border, including a recent ground operation in al Bab in July 2025.

Iran Update, August 19, 2025

The Shia Coordination Framework is reportedly divided over US efforts to dissolve the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. A source close to the Shia Coordination Framework told Iraqi media on August 19 that Shia Coordination Framework members are divided into two “camps,” with the first in support of challenging US objections to the PMF and the latter concerned about the threat of US sanctions and strikes targeting Iraq.[i] The United States has repeatedly pressured the Iraqi federal government to dissolve the PMF and reportedly threatened to sanction PMF leaders.[ii] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[iii] This report of Shia Coordination Framework divisions comes amid a broader debate within Iraq about limiting the transfer of arms to the Iraqi state and efforts by Iranian-backed Iraqi political actors to pass the Popular Mobilization Authority Law.[iv] CTP-ISW assessed on August 6 that this law, which the Iraqi Parliament has yet to vote on, would likely increase Iran’s influence in the Iraqi political and security spheres by formalizing key PMF structures, like the al Muhandis General Company, as part of the Iraqi government.[v] This company is controlled by Iranian-backed factions and acquired land along the Iraq-Saudi Arabia border that Iraqi groups used to launch drones targeting Saudi Arabia.[vi] The law nominally subordinates the PMF to the defense minister via the head of the future Popular Mobilization Authority, but the PMF has officially answered to the prime minister since 2016 without answering to the prime minister in reality.[vii] The US State Department spokesperson confirmed on August 12 that the United States opposes the law.[viii]

The Shia Coordination Framework source did not specify which Shia Coordination Framework parties support challenging US pressure to dissolve the PMF, but many Shia Coordination Framework parties with affiliated armed groups likely support passing the Popular Mobilization Authority Law.[ix] Iranian-backed Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri and Asaib Ahl al Haq’s Sadiqoun bloc have expressed willingness to wear the PMF uniform during the next Parliament session to induce a vote on the PMF law.[x] CTP-ISW assessed on July 16 that some Iraqi parliamentarians, including Shia Coordination Framework-aligned Deputy Parliament Speaker Mohsen al Mandalawi, have previously threatened to remove Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al Mashhadani, likely in an effort to force Mashhadani to put the law on the Parliamentary agenda.[xi] Mashhadani has so far not placed the law on the agenda for a vote.   Over 120 parliamentarians submitted a petition on August 5 to amend the agenda for the August 5 parliament session to include a vote on the law.[xii] Mandalawi, the deputy speaker, chaired the session, which ended early due to a lack of quorum.[xiii] Mashhadani accused Mandalawi of violating the Parliamentary bylaws by chairing the session and called the session invalid.[xiv] Parliament reportedly did not discuss the law during the session.[xv]

There is domestic opposition to the law among Kurdish and Sunni parties. Parliament read the law for a second time on July 16, but Kurdish and Sunni parliamentarians left parliament to protest the law because it was raised without prior ”political consensus” or discussion in committee.[xvi] A Shia Coordination Framework parliamentarian told Iraqi media on August 18 that over 100 parliamentarians have signed a petition to vote on the law in the next Parliament session, but added that no Sunni or Kurdish parliamentarians have signed the petition.[xvii]

Iraqi media similarly did not specify which Shia Coordination Framework parties are concerned about the threat of US sanctions or military action in response to US pressure to dissolve the PMF.[xviii] Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein stated in a recent interview that he objected to the “timing” of the Iraqi Parliament’s efforts to pass the law.[xix] Hussein emphasized the importance of convincing Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to disarm rather than forcing them to do so, however. Iranian-backed militias in Iraq, some of which refuse to disarm before the return of the ”mahdi,” are very unlikely to be ”convinced” to disarm.[xx] A State of Law Coalition parliamentarian and member of the Shia Coordination Framework separately told Iraqi media on August 7 that unspecified actors submitted a proposal to Mashhadani to postpone the approval of the law until after the elections to allow time for discussion with the United States about the law’s ”controversial provisions.”[xxi] Division among the Shia Coordination Framework is notable ahead of the elections due to the way that factional infighting between Iranian-backed groups advantaged other Iraqi parties over Iranian-backed parties in the 2021 Iraqi parliamentary elections.[xxii]

Hardline media and officials are negatively responding to recent reformist calls for change within the Iranian regime, which highlights how the post-war environment has deepened existing fissures between reformists and hardliners over how to govern Iran and engage the West. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s official website said in an August 18 article that recent remarks by reformists were similar to a “quiet multimedia influence campaign” conducted by the United States and Israel, and alleged that the reformists seek to promote division within Iran over issues such as nuclear policy and uranium enrichment specifically.[xxiii] The article indicates that the Supreme Leader continues to reject any zero uranium enrichment demands.[xxiv] This statement from the Supreme Leader’s office comes after reformists have called for political reform and foreign policy shifts. The Reformist Front published a statement on August 18 outlining eleven demands, including lifting restrictions on reformist leaders, allowing free elections, reforming women’s rights laws, lifting censorship, and suspending uranium enrichment in exchange for sanctions relief.[xxv] Former President Hassan Rouhani advocated on August 13 for reducing tensions with the West and expanding relations with European and neighboring countries.[xxvi] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Tasnim News Agency claimed on August 19 that reformists are conceding to Western pressure, and Tasnim warned that “trusting the enemy“ could threaten regime stability.[xxvii] Another IRGC-affiliated outlet dismissed the Reformist Front’s statement as a “blueprint” for selling Iran’s independence and accused reformists of spreading American and Israeli propaganda.[xxviii] Assembly of Experts Secretary Abbas Kaabi similarly said that the statement repeated “the enemy’s narrative” and focused too narrowly on internal problems rather than external threats.[xxix]

The Lebanese government and the World Bank will reportedly sign a 250 million USD loan agreement early next week that seeks to support Lebanon’s reconstruction.[xxx] This loan agreement is likely part of the Lebanese government’s efforts to use reconstruction fronts to decrease support for Hezbollah. Lebanese Finance Minister Yassin Jaber announced on August 13 that the Lebanese cabinet authorized him to sign the agreement, which the World Bank previously approved in June 2025.[xxxi] The loan agreement is dedicated to rebuilding infrastructure and clearing the remaining rubble in Lebanon from Israeli operations since September 2024.[xxxii] Lebanon has reportedly received an initial installment of 75 million euros from France and 20 million USD from Iraq, which the Lebanese Finance Ministry has started to allocate to reconstruction efforts in Beirut’s southern suburbs and southern Lebanon, which were heavily damaged during the Israeli campaign in Lebanon.[xxxiii] The 250 million USD loan will serve as the initial funding for a 1 billion USD financing program that aims to launch reconstruction and recovery efforts in Lebanon.[xxxiv] International organizations and entities will reportedly provide the remaining 750 million dollars in grants.[xxxv] The Lebanese Parliament will vote on the loan in early September 2025.[xxxvi]

The Lebanese government has taken early steps to begin reconstruction in Lebanon following the Israel-Hezbollah conflict in November 2024. The Lebanese government has secured several foreign donations, appointed individuals to focus on reconstruction efforts, started clearing debris, and taken steps to reform government policies to address corruption and economic issues that may deter foreign investors.[xxxvii] Hezbollah previously led such reconstruction efforts and provided a social safety net for the Lebanese population after the 2006 war, but Hezbollah has recently struggled to reconstruct damaged infrastructure following the conflict in late 2024.[xxxviii] Hezbollah has similarly struggled to maintain its financial commitments to fighters, which has contributed to growing frustration among Hezbollah supporters.[xxxix] Frustrated Hezbollah supporters have demanded answers from Hezbollah about when they will receive reconstruction funds to rebuild businesses and homes destroyed in the war.[xl] Hezbollah has historically used financial benefits, including pensions for the families of deceased fighters and compensation to those who lost their homes or property, to retain its support base among Lebanese Shia.[xli] The Lebanese government’s recent reconstruction efforts amid growing frustration among Hezbollah’s Shia support base could weaken Hezbollah’s ability to maintain its domestic support base. These efforts will need to be sustained to be successful, however.

Key Takeaways

• Iraqi Domestic Politics: The Shia Coordination Framework is reportedly divided over US efforts to dissolve the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). Division among the Shia Coordination Framework is notable ahead of the elections due to the way that factional infighting between Iranian-backed groups advantaged other Iraqi parties over Iranian-backed parties in the 2021 Iraqi parliamentary elections.
• Iranian Internal Fissures: Hardline media and officials are negatively responding to recent reformist calls for change within the Iranian regime, which highlights how the post-war environment has deepened existing fissures between reformists and hardliners over how to govern Iran and engage the West.
• Lebanon’s Reconstruction: The Lebanese government and the World Bank will reportedly sign a 250 million USD loan agreement early next week that seeks to support Lebanon’s reconstruction. This loan agreement is likely part of the Lebanese government’s efforts to use reconstruction fronts to weaken Hezbollah’s ability to maintain its domestic support base.

Iran Update, August 18, 2025

Syrian security forces told Emirati media on August 16 that the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is preparing a three-pronged offensive to seize Raqqa and Deir ez Zor provinces. This report and others are likely part of an effort by Turkey and some elements of the Syrian transitional government to coerce the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to surrender to the transitional government.[i] The Syrian security sources told Emirati media that the MoD has assembled 50,000 troops near the city of Palmyra, Homs Province, to capture Deir ez Zor and Raqqa provinces with support from local Arab tribes if the SDF refuses to hand over these provinces to the transitional government by October 2025.[ii] A separate Syrian source said that the MoD is preparing staging grounds for the offensive in Rusafa, Raqqa Province, and Sukhnah, Homs Province, which are 70 kilometers northeast and 166 kilometers northeast from Palmyra, respectively.[iii]

It is unlikely that the Syrian transitional government is preparing for a major offensive at this time. Local Syrians would almost certainly observe and publicize the movements of 50,000 personnel. The much smaller mobilizations towards the Syrian coast in March 2025 and southwestern Syria in July 2025 garnered significant media attention both within Syria and in the West. Satellite imagery shows no prepared staging areas in any of the locations mentioned by the sources. Some of the locations make little military sense as staging areas, moreover. Sukhnah is a less optimal staging area for a major offensive against the SDF compared to other areas closer to the Euphrates River. Deir ez Zor City and its surroundings have a significant amount of military infrastructure left over from the Assad regime, including Deir ez Zor Airport, that would be far more suitable than the remote desert town of Sukhnah.[iv] Sukhnah is also 135km by road from Deir ez Zor City, and any force staged in Sukhnah would need to travel 135km to reach its point of departure. Palmyra is even further to the west. Forces travelling from the staging grounds to the point of departure would also have to travel to areas frequently attacked by small ISIS cells. These cells could not stop a large Syrian force, but they could disrupt the movement and make an already challenging operation even more complex.

Rusafa presents a more viable staging ground for the MoD than Sukhnah. MoD forces in Rusafa would be positioned at the rear of SDF forces based in Deir Hafer and could try to cut off the ground line of communication between Deir Hafer and SDF-controlled Raqqa Province. Rusafa is located 26 kilometers south of two hydroelectric dams controlled by the SDF. The MoD would have to capture these towns in order to stage an assault to capture Raqqa City. An unspecified source told Emirati media that newly-integrated Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) units would advance on SDF positions near Tishreen Dam, which is located northeast of Deir Hafer.[v] This force would be canalized by the Tishreen Dam crossing, the eastern side of which is surely guarded by SDF units. Tishreen Dam is the only intact Euphrates River crossing between Lake Assad and the Turkish border.

This report comes amid similar reports in Turkish media that Turkey and the Syrian transitional government are preparing for an offensive against the SDF. Turkish media recently claimed on August 14 that a joint offensive by Turkey and the Syrian government against the SDF is imminent.[vi] These reports likely seek to pressure the SDF to integrate into the Syrian state and surrender its territory by threatening a military operation against it. 

An adviser to Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani announced on August 17 that US forces will withdraw from Ain al Asad Airbase and Baghdad International Airport in September 2025.[vii] A spokesperson for the US Embassy in Baghdad separately told Iraqi media on August 18 that the US-led international coalition’s mission in Iraq will transition to a “more traditional bilateral security partnership.”[viii] The United States and Iraq agreed in September 2024 that hundreds of US-led international coalition forces would withdraw from Iraq by September 2025 and that remaining forces would withdraw by the end of 2026.[ix] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have repeatedly threatened to attack US forces if the United States postpones its military withdrawal from Iraq.[x] 

Senior Lebanese officials called on the United States to pressure Israel and Syria to agree to the US proposal to disarm Hezbollah during US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack’s visit to Beirut on August 18.[xi] Lebanese President Joseph Aoun told Barrack that Israel and Syria must commit to the contents of the US proposal, which the Lebanese government approved on August 7.[xii] Aoun told Saudi media on August 17 that the US proposal will not become effective until all relevant parties approve it.[xiii] Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam separately told Barrack that the United States must fulfill its responsibilities by pressuring Israel to cease hostilities, withdraw from its five permanent positions in southern Lebanon, and release Lebanese prisoners held in Israel.[xiv] Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri similarly called on Israel to commit to the proposal during his meeting with Barrack.[xv] Barrack told Lebanese reporters following his meeting with Aoun that the United States has discussed the potential for a long-term ceasefire with Israel but has not shared the Hezbollah disarmament proposal with Israel.[xvi] Barrack suggested that Israel would take unspecified steps in the coming weeks.[xvii]

Barrack also reportedly told Aoun that Syria has not responded to the US proposal to disarm Hezbollah.[xviii] The US proposal includes provisions to increase joint Lebanese-Syrian border operations and demarcate unspecified areas of the Lebanon-Syria border.[xix] Lebanese and Syrian officials signed an agreement in March 2025 to demarcate the border and increase border security coordination.[xx] Lebanese officials have recently expressed willingness to discuss issues with Syrian officials that have complicated relations between the two countries, including the issue of imprisoned and displaced Syrians in Lebanon.[xxi] The Syrian government has consistently called on the Lebanese government to release Syrian prisoners and allow them to serve their sentence in Syria, but Lebanese judicial officials have denied these requests.[xxii]

Israel has maintained that it will continue to operate in Lebanon until Hezbollah has been disarmed.[xxiii] Israel previously rejected Berri’s July 2025 demand that Israel halt all airstrikes in Lebanon prior to the Lebanese government’s disarmament of Hezbollah.[xxiv] An unspecified Israeli official told Saudi media on August 18 that Israel will “play its part” in the US proposal when Lebanon takes unspecified “concrete steps.”[xxv] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) recently shifted to a “forward defense” posture on August 1 to maintain Israel’s “strategic superiority” in southern Lebanon and prevent Hezbollah from reconstituting capabilities that could pose a threat to northern Israeli towns.[xxvi] Recent IDF operations, including ground raids, airstrikes, and drone strikes, demonstrate this posture shift.[xxvii] The IDF had a similar objective in its campaign against Hezbollah in late 2024 due to Israel’s concern about a potential Hezbollah ground incursion into northern Israel.[xxviii] The Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire agreement in November 2024 included an addendum that ensures the Israeli right to self-defense against any future threat that Hezbollah may pose.[xxix] The IDF has acted on this addendum and has continued to operate against Hezbollah since November 2024, including via airstrikes and raids targeting Hezbollah infrastructure.[xxx]

Hezbollah would likely use any delay in the implementation of the US disarmament plan to reconstitute its forces, increase its weapons stockpiles, and bolster its domestic support base, which would increase Hezbollah’s relative strength vis-a-vis the Lebanese government and thus make it more challenging for the government to disarm Hezbollah. Iranian officials and Axis-affiliated media recently reported that Hezbollah began appointing new commanders to reconstitute its command structure.[xxxi] Hezbollah reportedly began prioritizing domestic drone production in June 2025 to reduce its reliance on Iranian weapons.[xxxii] The IDF destroyed approximately 70 percent of the drones of Hezbollah’s primary aerial unit, Unit 127, during the Israel-Hezbollah conflict in late 2024.[xxxiii] Hezbollah is also restructuring its financial system to confront challenges to its ability to pay salaries and provide services to Lebanese civilians.[xxxiv] Hezbollah has historically used financial benefits, including pensions for the families of deceased fighters and compensation for individuals who lost their homes or property, to retain its support base among Lebanese Shia.[xxxv] These actions highlight how Hezbollah is actively trying to reconstitute as a military organization and maintain its domestic support base. Any delay in the implementation of the US proposal would give Hezbollah more time to try to achieve these objectives.

Key Takeaways

• Turkish Pressure Campaign: Syrian security sources told Emirati media on August 16 that the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is preparing a three-pronged offensive to seize Raqqa and Deir ez Zor provinces. This report and others appear to be an effort by Turkey and some elements of the Syrian transitional government to coerce the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to surrender.
• US Withdrawal from Iraq: An adviser to Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani announced on August 17 that US forces will withdraw from Ain al Asad Airbase and Baghdad International Airport in September 2025. A spokesperson for the US Embassy in Baghdad separately told Iraqi media on August 18 that the US-led international coalition’s mission in Iraq will transition to a “more traditional bilateral security partnership.”
• Hezbollah Disarmament: Senior Lebanese officials called on the United States to pressure Israel and Syria to agree to the US proposal to disarm Hezbollah during US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack’s visit to Beirut on August 18. Israel has maintained that it will continue to operate in Lebanon until Hezbollah is disarmed.

Iran Update, August 15, 2025

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah Secretary General Abu Hussein al Hamidawi published a statement on August 15 in which he called for strengthening Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, likely in response to recent US efforts to weaken the Axis of Resistance.[i] Hamidawi underlined the necessity of “supporting” Iranian-backed Iraqi militias with advanced weapons, enhanced technical capabilities, and improved “defensive and destructive capacities.”[ii] Hamidawi’s statement comes as the United States pursues various lines of effort to weaken Iran and its Axis of Resistance.[iii] The Lebanese government agreed on August 7 to a US proposal to disarm Hezbollah.[iv] The United States has also pressured the Iraqi government to dissolve the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), which is an Iraqi state security service that includes a large number of Iranian-backed militias.[v]  State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki emphasized the importance of the PMF’s existence in the face of US and Israeli efforts to disarm Hezbollah in a phone call with Iranian Supreme Leader International Affairs Adviser Ali Akbar Velayati on August 8.[vi] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba separately warned the United States on August 14 against “taking steps against Iraq,” referring to US pressure to dissolve the PMF.[vii] 

Hamidawi was presumably asking both Iran and the Iraqi federal government to provide Kataib Hezbollah with advanced weapons and technical capabilities. Iran has historically provided Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including Kataib Hezbollah, with weapons and training.[viii] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani reportedly told PMF leaders to pressure the Iraqi government for funding to modernize their weapons systems during his July 28 visit to Baghdad.[ix]

Iranian Supreme Leader International Affairs Adviser Ali Akbar Velayati emphasized Iranian support for the Houthis during a meeting with the Houthi representative to Iran on August 14. Velayati denied that the Axis of Resistance has weakened and underlined the Houthis' pivotal role in the Axis of Resistance’s war against Israel in a meeting with Houthi Representative to Iran Ibrahim al Dailami.[x] The Houthis are the only Axis of Resistance member that still regularly conducts attacks targeting Israel. The Houthis also continue to threaten international shipping.[xi] Velayati separately criticized US pressure to disarm Lebanese Hezbollah and the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq.[xii] This meeting comes after Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani reaffirmed Iranian support for the Axis of Resistance during his visits to Iraq and Lebanon between August 11 and 14.[xiii]

Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem threatened to incite anti-government protests in Lebanon if the Lebanese government attempts to disarm Hezbollah during a speech on August 15.[xiv] Qassem claimed that the Lebanese government is carrying out an “American-Israeli order” to disarm Hezbollah “even if it leads to civil war and internal strife.”[xv] The Lebanese government agreed on August 7 to the objectives of US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack’s proposal to disarm Hezbollah.[xvi]  Hezbollah mobilized some protestors on August 8 after the Lebanese government approved the US proposal.[xvii] These protests did not gain traction or expand beyond Hezbollah support zones, however.[xviii] Qassem stated that Hezbollah is prepared for confrontation and will incite protests if “confrontation is imposed on Hezbollah.“[xix]

The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Hezbollah-affiliated officials have recently taken steps to try to prevent clashes between the LAF and Hezbollah during the disarmament process.[xx] The disarmament proposal tasks the LAF with disarming Hezbollah.[xxi] LAF Commander Brigadier General Rodolphe Haykal and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri have discussed ways to prevent any confrontation between the LAF and Hezbollah during the disarmament process.[xxii] Berri is Hezbollah’s highest-ranking ally in the Lebanese government and is currently mediating between the Lebanese government and Hezbollah to resolve outstanding issues.[xxiii]

Qassem also reiterated that Hezbollah will not surrender its weapons until Israel halts its operations and withdraws from southern Lebanon.[xxiv]  Qassem called on the Lebanese government to hold a meeting to plan to “confront” Israel and added that Hezbollah will confront "the Israeli-American project no matter the cost.”.[xxv]  Hezbollah has long used continued Israeli operations and the 1989 Taif Agreement, which called for the disarmament of all Lebanese militias except Hezbollah, to justify retaining its weapons.[xxvi] Hezbollah will likely continue to use Israeli operations in Lebanon and the Taif Agreement to reject the government’s decision to disarm the group.[xxvii] Hezbollah’s refusal to disarm will likely complicate the Lebanese government and the LAF’s ability to implement the disarmament plan.

Several Lebanese officials rejected Qassem’s statements on August 15. Prime Minister Nawaf Salam criticized Qassem’s speech for containing “a veiled threat of civil war.”[xxviii] Salam rejected Qassem’s claims that the Lebanese government is implementing an “American-Israeli project,” stating that the government’s decision to disarm Hezbollah was “purely Lebanese.”[xxix] Anti-Hezbollah Lebanese Justice Minister Adel Nassar similarly stated that the Lebanese government had been working on a plan to disarm Hezbollah prior to US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack’s presentation of the US proposal to the Lebanese government in June 2025.[xxx] Nassar added that the issue of the state’s monopoly on arms is “not open to debate.”[xxxi]

Key Takeaways

• PMF Dissolution: Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah Secretary General Abu Hussein al Hamidawi published a statement on August 15 in which he called for strengthening Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, likely in response to recent US efforts to weaken the Axis of Resistance. Hamidawi underlined the necessity of “supporting” Iranian-backed Iraqi militias with advanced weapons, enhanced technical capabilities, and improved “defensive and destructive capacities.”
• Iran-Houthi Relations: Iranian Supreme Leader International Affairs Adviser Ali Akbar Velayati emphasized Iranian support for the Houthis during a meeting with the Houthi representative to Iran on August 14. Velayati denied that the Axis of Resistance has weakened and underlined the Houthis' pivotal role in the Axis of Resistance’s war against Israel in a meeting with Houthi Representative to Iran Ibrahim al Dailami.
• Hezbollah Disarmament: Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem threatened to incite anti-government protests in Lebanon if the Lebanese government attempts to disarm Hezbollah during a speech on August 15. Qassem reiterated that Hezbollah will not surrender its weapons until Israel halts its operations and withdraws from southern Lebanon.

Iran Update, August 14, 2025

Some senior Lebanese officials are attempting to propose a Hezbollah disarmament plan that would seek to “buy time” for Lebanon, thereby increasing the risk that Hezbollah could reconstitute itself in the interim and make it more difficult to disarm Hezbollah. Lebanese ministers and high-level officials have reportedly proposed various plans to disarm Hezbollah but remain split on a decision. Two unspecified Lebanese sources told Reuters on August 5 that Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, President Joseph Aoun, and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam have been working to agree on a cabinet decision that would appease the United States and “buy Lebanon more time.”[i] It is unclear what length of time this decision seeks. Berri’s proposed wording would commit Lebanon to forming a national defense strategy and maintaining a ceasefire with Israel, but would avoid an explicit pledge to disarm Hezbollah across Lebanon.[ii]

Hezbollah would likely agree to Berri’s proposal because Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem has repeatedly called for the Lebanese government and Hezbollah to coordinate on a national defense strategy.[iii] Berri’s proposal comes amid Lebanese media reporting that Aoun and Berri both aim to “prevent any domestic political clash that would torpedo” future cabinet sessions.[iv] Lebanese officials have also raised concerns that a decision explicitly calling for Hezbollah to disarm could spark communal tensions in Lebanon.[v]

Some Lebanese ministers appear to have rejected Berri’s proposal, however. Anti-Hezbollah Lebanese Forces Party-affiliated Minister Kamal Shehadi told Reuters that other Lebanese ministers plan to propose a formulation that commits Lebanon to a deadline to disarm Hezbollah.[vi]

Hezbollah would benefit significantly from Berri’s proposal as it would give the group time to reconstitute and reestablish itself domestically. Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem emphasized on August 5 that Hezbollah would not agree to any timetable to hand over its weapons, which is likely an attempt to delay talks further and secure more time for reconstitution.[vii]  The lack of a disarmament deadline would hinder the Lebanese government's ability to disarm Hezbollah because it would give the group time to entrench itself domestically and increase the risk of a military confrontation that the government is unlikely to accept. Israeli operations remain focused on efforts to maintain Hezbollah’s degradation, however.

Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem threatened Israel directly for the first time in months during his televised speech on August 5.[viii] Qassem threatened to launch missiles targeting Israel if Israel engages in a “large-scale aggression“ against Lebanon.”[ix] It is unlikely that Hezbollah possesses the capabilities to launch any large-scale attacks against Israel, given that it was severely degraded during the Israel-Lebanon conflict in late 2024.[x]

Qassem acknowledged that Hezbollah suffered a 45% casualty rate during the Israeli campaign in Lebanon, which almost certainly rendered Hezbollah combat ineffective. Hezbollah suffered 12.5% killed in action from its total force during the war. Qassem noted that Israel killed 5,000 Hezbollah fighters and wounded 13,000 others, which marks the first time that Hezbollah has provided an official death toll.[xi] Hezbollah had 40,000 total fighters before the war, according to US intelligence, which means that 32.5% of its total force was wounded and 12.5% of its total force was killed.[xii] Qassem said that Hezbollah still has fighters who are ready to make ”the harshest sacrifices” if needed.[xiii]  The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has killed nearly all of the top Hezbollah commanders, degraded the Radwan Force, destroyed kilometers of offensive tunnels, and demonstrated the Israeli ability to rapidly inflict massive casualties upon Hezbollah at relatively little cost.[xiv]

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian appointed Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Larijani as Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) secretary.[xv] Larijani's appointment comes as moderate and pragmatic hardline elements in the Iranian regime have sought to play a more influential role in Iran's security policy following the Israel-Iran War. Larijani is replacing Ali Akbar Ahmadian, who had served as SNSC secretary since May 2023.[xvi] Ahmadian will reportedly assume a new, unspecified deputy position within the government.[xvii]  Some Iranian media outlets and social media users have speculated in recent weeks that the regime would soon appoint Larijani as SNSC secretary and have praised Larijani as an effective, trusted, and moderate leader.[xviii] These characterizations of Larijani as a “moderate” official are consistent with reports that Larijani tried to contact Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei during the Israel-Iran War to advocate for a ceasefire.[xix] Larijani previously served as SNSC secretary from 2005 to 2007 before he resigned due to disagreements with hardliner former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.[xx] Larijani was the speaker of the parliament from 2008 and 2020 and oversaw the passage of the 2015 nuclear deal, also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).[xxi] Larijani repeatedly expressed his support for the deal and defended it against hardliners in parliament.[xxii] Media affiliated with former SNSC Secretary Ali Shamkhani stated on August 5 that Larijani’s appointment will impact Iran’s engagement with the West.[xxiii]

Larijani has played an important role in developing Iran's relations with Russia, China, and the Axis of Resistance in addition to engaging in diplomacy with the West. Western media reported in January 2025 that Larijani had made secret trips to Russia to gain Russian assistance on Iran’s nuclear program.[xxiv] Larijani also discussed the Iranian nuclear program with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on July 20.[xxv] Larijani has also held a long-standing role overseeing the Iranian strategic partnership with China, including the 25-year cooperation agreement signed in 2021.[xxvi] Larijani met with senior Lebanese officials in Beirut following the Israel-Hezbollah conflict to reinforce Iran’s regional stance.[xxvii] Some Iranian media have characterized Larijani as an effective communicator and diplomat.[xxviii]

Larijani's appointment comes amid a broader effort to restructure and reshape Iran's decision-making apparatus, likely in order to prepare for potential future conflicts. This restructuring effort appears to be led by moderate and pragmatic hardline elements within the regime. The SNSC established a "Defense Council" on August 3 to streamline decision-making during wartime.[xxix] An outlet affiliated with pragmatic hardliner Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf suggested that moderate Iranian President Pezeshkian will appoint Ghalibaf as the Defense Council secretary.[xxx] A political analyst close to the regime similarly suggested that Ghalibaf had a significant role in establishing the Defense Council.[xxxi] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the establishment of this body, which will operate under the SNSC, likely reflects Iranian leaders’ recognition of systemic organizational and operational failures during the Israel-Iran War.[xxxii] Other Iranian media outlets have recently called on the Iranian regime to alter its internal and external strategy following the war.[xxxiii] Media affiliated with former SNSC Secretary Ali Shamkhani published an op-ed on July 29 that urged Iran to "rearrange the country's decision-making system" to adapt to evolving threats.[xxxiv]

Iran has sought Russian support for its nuclear weapons program.[xxxv] The Financial Times reported on August 4 that four Iranian nuclear scientists and an Iranian counterintelligence officer traveled to Moscow in August 2024 to visit Russian research institutes specializing in dual-use technologies that can be used in nuclear weapons development.[xxxvi] These nuclear scientists were affiliated with the Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry (MODAFL)’s Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND), which played a leading role in the Iranian nuclear weapons research program before 2003.[xxxvii] MODAFL reportedly requested one of the scientists to use his technology consulting firm, likely as a guise, to lead an Iranian delegation to Moscow.[xxxviii] One of the other scientists runs a US-sanctioned company that procures dual-use technology for nuclear weapons development for SPND.[xxxix] The other two scientists specialize in radiation testing and neutron generators that trigger nuclear explosions.[xl]

The delegation visited two research facilities run by a Russian scientist with nuclear weapons testing expertise, specifically in vacuum technology for implosion mechanisms.[xli] Such visits would reportedly require Russian intelligence approval.[xlii] The United States sanctioned an SPND-affiliated company, Ideal Vacuum, in May for trying to ”procure from foreign suppliers and indigenously fabricate equipment that could be applicable in nuclear weapons research and development.”[xliii] One of the nuclear scientists tried to purchase three nuclear isotopes, including tritium, which increases the yield of nuclear warheads, from a Russian nuclear isotope supplier in May 2024.[xliv] The Financial Times was unable to confirm if the scientist completed the sale of these isotopes. Iran has historically pursued nuclear cooperation with Russia through various diplomatic channels, likely including the Russo-Iranian Strategic Comprehensive Agreement signed in January.[xlv] Newly-appointed SNSC Secretary and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei senior advisor Ali Larijani attempted to muster up support for the Iranian nuclear program in several covert meetings with Russian officials in 2025.[xlvi]

Recent Islamic State (IS) propaganda has attempted to exploit recent fighting between Druze and Sunni Bedouin fighters to recruit new fighters from hardline elements of Shara’s coalition. The effort may also seek to recruit local Sunni Bedouin in Suwayda Province. IS released an editorial on July 31 that criticized the Syrian government and Shara’s actions during the intercommunal violence in Suwayda Province in mid to late July.[xlvii] IS accused Shara of dragging Sunni Bedouin fighters into “his political game and then leaving them alone” to face “siege, betrayal, and displacement” during the Suwayda violence.[xlviii] IS said that Shara “suddenly played the role of the deliverer of the Druze.”[xlix] IS’s hardline ideology maintains that the Druze are apostates who should be killed.[l]  IS similarly criticized Syrian government forces for assisting the United States in a raid targeting an ISIS cell in al Bab, Aleppo Province, on July 25.[li] IS called on “confused jihadists” who do not believe that Shara’s cooperation with the United States is “clear apostasy and support for the ‘Zio-Crusader’.”[lii] These arguments very likely seek to generate recruits among the hardline Salafi-jihadists in Shara’s orbit who similarly believe that the Druze are apostates. 

IS likely aims to exploit hardliners’ anger over these recent events and stoke further disillusionment among IS sympathizers. A BBC Salafi-jihadi analyst reported on August 4 that Islamist hardliners are dissatisfied with Shara’s failure to take a strong stand against the Druze” and support Sunni Bedouin tribes in Suwayda.[liii] IS has frequently referenced ISIS’s 2018 violence against the Druze in Suwayda to appeal to hardliners and portray itself as the only force willing to act decisively against the Druze.[liv] Several ISIS-linked social media accounts also claimed that ISIS supporters were active in Suwayda Province and participated in the conflict “discreetly and independently” alongside Sunni Bedouin tribes.[lv] There has been no definitive proof that ISIS took part in attacks on the Druze in any organized manner, which suggests that these posts are likely an attempt to create the illusion that ISIS fighters support the Bedouin tribes and that Shara does not. The BBC analyst also reported that IS is exploiting Islamist and jihadist anger over the Syrian government forces cooperating with the US on the al Bab raid.[lvi] Prominent hardline clerics began engaging in theological debates regarding whether Shara and his forces had committed an act of disbelief or apostasy by ”cooperating” with the ”enemies of Islam.”[lvii] IS has reportedly recently shown renewed optimism about the group’s appeal and recruitment potential in Syria.[lviii]

The IS propaganda effort will also likely contribute to increased distrust in southwestern Syria, especially if ISIS conducts any attacks targeting the Druze. The ISIS claims that it participated in the recent fighting will give more credence to Druze militia claims that the Sunni Bedouin sought to exterminate Druze communities, regardless of whether that was the actual intent.[lix] ISIS has long sought to wipe out groups it deems apostates, and the IS propaganda will enable some Druze leaders to mobilize their communities with greater ease.[lx] Increased Druze mobilization could lead to further fighting and further Sunni Bedouin communal mobilization, especially if ISIS does become more involved. A course of action that results in more Sunni Bedouin and Druze mobilization and fighting would create significant recruitment opportunities for ISIS. IS and its affiliates, including ISIS, have long sought to create intercommunal strife in target areas in order to exploit the ensuing chaos.[lxi]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah offered on August 4 to cede control of unspecified areas within the Baghdad Belts to the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[lxii]  The Baghdad Belts are residential, industrial, and agricultural areas that encircle Baghdad.[lxiii] Kataib Hezbollah Spokesperson Abu Ali al Askari did not explicitly identify the areas that Kataib Hezbollah was willing to cede but referred to al Latifiya, al Buaitha, al Madain, and al Tajiat as areas with a Kataib Hezbollah presence.[lxiv]  It is similarly unclear which PMF unit Askari is offering control of these areas to. The specific PMF units that the Iraqi government gave control of the areas to would matter because Kataib Hezbollah commands the 45th and 46th PMF brigades. A hypothetical decision that gave control of these areas to these PMF brigades would represent no change, for example.[lxv]

Askari said that Kataib Hezbollah spreads ”security, justice, and peaceful coexistence among sects” in areas under its control, which is false.[lxvi] Kataib Hezbollah and other militias committed acts of sectarian cleansing in Jurf al Sakhr, south of Baghdad, during the anti-ISIS fight. Kataib Hezbollah has used areas under its control for assassinations, rocket attacks, weapons storage, and extortion of local businesses.[lxvii]   Askari’s statement comes after several Kataib Hezbollah members engaged Iraqi Federal Police officers in Dora, Baghdad, on July 27 and killed one civilian and a Federal Police officer.[lxviii] Kataib Hezbollah and other Iranian-backed Iraqi actors have tried to distance themselves from this incident, which occurred amid policy discussions over restricting arms to the Iraqi state and dissolving the PMF. Askari’s statement probably aims to present Kataib Hezbollah as a responsible actor that is a net positive in order to undermine efforts to disarm the militias.

Askari also called Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani an ineffective leader on August 4.[lxix] He described Sudani as a ”manager” instead of a leader. He called on the Shia Coordination Framework to assume their “historical responsibilities,” likely in reference to the removal of US forces from Iraq and other policy concerns that Askari raised in his statement.[lxx] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. Kataib Hezbollah’s Haquq Movement is a member of the Shia Coordination Framework. Askari’s comments regarding Sudani could reflect increasing disillusionment among elements of the Shia Coordination Framework with Sudani ahead of the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections.

Key Takeaways

• Lebanese Hezbollah Disarmament: Some senior Lebanese officials are attempting to propose a Hezbollah disarmament plan that would seek to “buy time” for Lebanon, which would increase the risk that Hezbollah could reconstitute itself in the interim and make it more difficult to disarm Hezbollah.
• Israel-Hezbollah: Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem threatened Israel directly for the first time in months during his televised speech on August 5. Qassem acknowledged that Hezbollah suffered a 45% casualty rate during the Israeli campaign in Lebanon, which almost certainly rendered Hezbollah combat ineffective. Hezbollah suffered 12.5% killed in action from its total force during the war.
• Iranian Defense Apparatus: Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian appointed Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Larijani to Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) secretary. Larijani's appointment comes as moderate and pragmatic hardline elements in the Iranian regime have sought to play a more influential role in Iran's security policy following the Israel-Iran War.
• Iranian Nuclear Program: Iran has sought Russian support for its nuclear weapons program. The Financial Times reported on August 4 that four Iranian nuclear scientists and an Iranian counterintelligence officer traveled to Moscow in August 2024 to visit Russian research institutes specializing in dual-use technologies that can be used in nuclear weapons development.
• Iraq: Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah offered on August 4 to cede control of unspecified areas within the Baghdad Belts to the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). It is unclear which PMF unit Kataib Hezbollah is offering control of these areas to. Kataib Hezbollah commands the 45th and 46th PMF brigades. Kataib Hezbollah also called Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani an ineffective leader, which could reflect increasing disillusionment among elements of the Shia Coordination Framework with Sudani ahead of the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections.
• ISIS in Syria: Recent Islamic State (IS) propaganda has attempted to exploit recent fighting between Druze and Sunni Bedouin fighters to recruit new fighters from hardline elements of Shara’s coalition. IS released an editorial on July 31 that criticized the Syrian government and Shara’s actions during the intercommunal violence in Suwayda Province in mid to late July. IS likely aims to exploit hardliners’ anger over these recent events and stoke further disillusionment among sympathizers.

Iran Update, August 13, 2025

Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani’s visit to Beirut likely reflects Iranian efforts to recover Iranian influence in Lebanon and in the Levant after Hezbollah’s degradation and the collapse of the Assad regime. Larijani met with Lebanese President Joseph Aoun, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri on August 13.[i] Aoun and Salam are currently leading the state’s efforts to disarm Hezbollah, and Berri is Hezbollah’s highest-ranking ally in the Lebanese government. An Iranian analyst close to the regime stated on August 13 that Larijani’s visit aimed to “prevent a complete shift in Lebanon’s internal power balance to the detriment of Hezbollah.”[ii] Larijani likely seeks to meet with anti-Hezbollah Lebanese politicians as part of a broader strategy to halt the implementation of a Hezbollah disarmament plan. The Lebanese government tasked the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) with creating a plan to establish a state monopoly on arms on August 5 and agreed to the objectives of the US proposal to disarm Hezbollah on August 7.[iii] The United States and Israel also decided on August 13 to renew the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)’s contract and expand UNIFIL‘s authority to stage raids, arrest individuals, and erect checkpoints.[iv] UNIFIL has previously rarely taken steps to challenge Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, but expanded activities may allow UNIFIL to challenge Hezbollah in some way.[v]

Larijani also reaffirmed Iranian support for Hezbollah during his visit, likely in an attempt to bolster Iran’s declining credibility as a reliable partner. Larijani reaffirmed Iran’s support for Hezbollah and called on Lebanese civilians to “preserve the resistance” during a press conference following his meeting with Berri.[vi] Hezbollah is also referred to as the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon by pro-Iran actors.[vii] Larijani stated that Iran will stand by Lebanon in the case of ”any Israeli escalation.”[viii] Larijani is likely attempting to reaffirm Iran’s support for Hezbollah after Iran failed to support Hezbollah during the Israeli campaign in Lebanon and after the damage Iran suffered in the Israel-Iran War.[ix] Iran also failed to act quickly enough to defend its Syrian ally, the Bashar al Assad regime, from an HTS-led offensive that led to the regime’s collapse.[x] Iran likely needs to take efforts to bolster its credibility with Hezbollah and regionally. Iranian support for its proxies and partners in the Levant has long served as a form of Iranian deterrence against Israel.

Larijani’s statements vowing support for Hezbollah are largely performative, given that Iran’s current constraints will likely severely limit any Iranian effort to meaningfully support Hezbollah. The fall of the Assad regime in Syria and the Lebanese state’s crackdown on Iranian smuggling through Lebanese airports and border crossings have rendered any Iranian effort to resupply Hezbollah relatively slow and inefficient.[xi] Iran’s inability to smuggle weapons and money to Hezbollah forces has forced Iran to rely on sending Hezbollah cash transfers rather than large shipments of weapons.[xii] Lebanon has been able to interdict some of these cash transfers.[xiii] Iran’s need to rebuild and re-focus its domestic strategy after the Israel-Iran War will likely further constrain available Iranian financial support for Hezbollah.[xiv] Iran may seek to retain its influence in Lebanon, but could struggle to provide real support. Larijani notably made no explicit comments about exact types of support Lebanon or Hezbollah could expect beyond reaffirming Iran's solidarity with Hezbollah and rejecting calls for the group to disarm.[xv]

Turkey is likely encouraging the Syrian government to increase military and political pressure on the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to integrate into Syria. Turkey has become increasingly disillusioned with integration negotiations between the SDF and the Syrian transitional government. Turkey pressured Syria to withdraw from the US- and French-brokered integration negotiations in Paris with the SDF, which undermines US policy objectives in Syria.[xvi] Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan also likely discussed the SDF and integration efforts with Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani during their meeting on August 13.[xvii] Fidan said that Turkey is observing behavior from the SDF in Syria that ”we find hard to tolerate.“[xviii] Fidan and Shaibani probably did not discuss military planning, but it is nonetheless notable that a pro-government Turkish columnist said on August 13 that the Syrian government is preparing a military operation against the SDF.[xix] The Syrian transitional government aims to bring all of Syria under its control and has its own motives to integrate the SDF—militarily or diplomatically—regardless of Turkish encouragement. Such an operation would, however, likely require Turkish approval due to the degree of Turkish influence in Syria and its government. Another Turkish journalist who has previously written for government outlets claimed that Turkish sources said that US officials told the SDF that the United States may not be able to support the SDF against the Syrian army or Turkey.[xx] Turkish armed forces would reportedly provide indirect support for a ”limited operation” against the SDF by the transitional government.[xxi] Turkey is motivated to fully dismantle the SDF because its sees the continued existence of the SDF as a threat to its regional ambitions and domestic stability.

Turkish influence continues to grow within the Syrian military amid this pressure effort. Turkish and Syrian defense officials signed a military training and “consultation” agreement in Ankara on August 13 after Syria requested Turkish military support to strengthen its counterterrorism capabilities on July 23.[xxii]  The Turkish Defense Ministry will provide training programs and technical support to strengthen the Syrian army and ”reform the security apparatus comprehensively.”[xxiii] This agreement could give Turkey additional leverage over the Syrian government, amid additional Turkish avenues of influence. Turkey has continued to provide salaries for elements of the Syrian army, such as the Syrian National Army (SNA).[xxiv] Turkey also holds economic sway over the Syrian government through recent energy and trade deals.[xxv]

Additional Turkish defense cooperation with the Syrian government may discourage the SDF from integrating into the Syrian army because of the relations between Turkey and the Kurds. Kurds in northeastern Syria have come under threat from Turkish-backed forces that are now affiliated with the government throughout the civil war. Some Turkish-backed militias in the SNA are made up of Turkish ethno-nationalists who have committed atrocities against Kurds in northern Syria.[xxvi] The Kurdish-dominated SDF may feel reticent to enter a command structure trained by these former adversaries, particularly if the SDF is not allowed to maintain a Kurdish force to defend Kurds in northeastern Syria. Kurdish communities have repeatedly called for autonomy and voiced their opposition to centralized rule because they view the transitional government as majoritarian and are skeptical of the government’s ability and willingness to protect their communities.[xxvii] The Syrian transitional government’s repeated failure to protect minority communities has reinforced the perception among minority communities that integration under the current government framework is unsafe. This challenge exemplifies the barriers that the transitional government faces in reaching a comprehensive integration agreement through diplomacy.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told Israeli media on August 12 that Iran still “holds” about 400 kilograms of enriched uranium, though Iran may still be unable to access this stockpile.[xxviii] The size of the stockpile is consistent with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)’s estimate in June 2025 that Iran retained about 408.6 kilograms of 60 percent enriched uranium. The IAEA reported in May that Iran possessed a total enriched uranium stockpile of 9,247.6 kilograms, though this estimate includes uranium enriched to lower levels.[xxix] Netanyahu stated that Israel ”knew in advance” the strikes would not destroy the uranium, which is logical because uranium is an element and therefore cannot be destroyed, only scattered.[xxx] Netanyahu also argued that the stockpile alone is “insufficient to produce a nuclear weapon” without other key elements of Iran’s nuclear program.[xxxi] Netanyahu is likely referring to assets damaged by Israel during the 12-day war, including research and development facilities, explosives manufacturing sites, and knowledge from key nuclear scientists.[xxxii] Netanyahu said the strikes eliminated two “cancerous” threats to Israel’s existence: Iran’s nuclear weapons program and its planned production of 20,000 ballistic missiles.[xxxiii]

It is unclear whether Iran can access its 60 percent enriched uranium because some of the stockpile may be buried under rubble at Fordow or Esfahan.[xxxiv] US and Israeli airstrikes on Fordow and other enrichment facilities may have buried enriched uranium underground, which would limit access to the material.[xxxv] Iran cannot begin further enrichment or weaponization until it regains physical access to it. Western media reports after the initial strikes suggested that Iran may have transferred part of its enriched uranium from nuclear facilities to other sites before the Israeli and US strikes.[xxxvi] Senior Israeli officials have repeatedly warned that Israel would “almost certainly” detect any Iranian attempts to recover the material and conduct renewed strikes to prevent Iran from accessing the material.[xxxvii] Netanyahu stated that Israel continues to monitor Iran’s nuclear weapons program in coordination with the United States and will act with or without US approval.[xxxviii] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian acknowledged on August 10 that Israeli strikes had damaged nuclear capabilities and warned that rebuilding them could prompt further attacks.[xxxix]

Key Takeaways

• Iranian Regional Influence: Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani’s visit to Beirut likely reflects Iranian efforts to recover Iranian influence in Lebanon and in the Levant after Hezbollah’s degradation and the collapse of the Assad regime. Larijani reaffirmed Iranian support for Hezbollah during his visit, likely in an attempt to bolster Iran’s declining credibility as a reliable partner. Larijani’s statements vowing support for Hezbollah are largely performative, given that Iran’s current constraints will likely limit any Iranian effort to meaningfully support Hezbollah.
• Turkey and Syria: Turkey is likely encouraging the Syrian government to increase military and political pressure on the Kurdish-dominated SDF to integrate into Syria. The Syrian transitional government aims to bring all of Syria under its control and has its own motives to integrate the SDF—militarily or diplomatically—regardless of Turkish encouragement.
• Iranian Nuclear Program: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told Israeli media on August 12 that Iran still “holds” about 400 kilograms of enriched uranium, though Iran may still be unable to access this stockpile. Iran cannot begin further enrichment or weaponization until it regains physical access to it.

Iran Update, August 12, 2025

Likely Hezbollah sources threatened to incite protests in Lebanon against US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack’s upcoming visit to Beirut if senior Lebanese officials do not meet with Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani’s visit to Beirut on August 13.[i] Lebanese officials have reportedly attempted to pressure Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and other Lebanese officials not to meet with Larijani. Lebanese media reported on August 12 that Prime Minister Nawaf Salam suggested that Lebanese officials should boycott Larijani’s visit.[ii] Lebanese Foreign Minister Youssef Rajji is reportedly continuing his “domestic and foreign contacts” in an attempt to cancel Larijani’s visit or force Iran to ”offer an apology“ to the Lebanese government for its recent statements in support of Hezbollah.[iii] Lebanese media also reported that anti-Hezbollah Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea is exerting ”major pressure” on Salam to convince Aoun not to receive Larijani.[iv] Aoun has reportedly declined these requests, stating that such a move would ”violate all diplomatic norms.”[v] Several anti-Hezbollah parliamentarians similarly expressed discontent and criticized Larijani’s upcoming visit.[vi] Lebanese Forces Party parliamentarian Ziad Hawat claimed on August 11 that Iran has blatantly interfered in Lebanese politics through arming Hezbollah and inciting “resistance” in Lebanon, stating that “Iran should stay in Iran.”[vii]

Unspecified informed sources told Hezbollah-aligned media on August 12 that any attempt to prevent Larijani from visiting Beirut would be an “explosive step” that could be met with a “broad popular response” against the visits of “other envoys.”[viii] Larijani is expected to visit Beirut on August 13 to reportedly meet with Aoun, Salam, and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, only five days before US Envoy Thomas Barrack is expected to visit Beirut on August 18.[ix] The ”informed sources”--likely Hezbollah officials or close Hezbollah allies, given that they are speaking to a Hezbollah-aligned outlet--are implying that Hezbollah will mobilize protesters against Barrack. Hezbollah previously mobilized protesters on August 8 after the Lebanese government approved a plan to disarm Hezbollah.[x] Hezbollah-aligned media reported that Larijani will also meet with unspecified Hezbollah leaders.[xi] Iranian Ambassador to Lebanon Mojtaba Amani posted on X on August 12 and said that Larijani’s visit seeks to express ”Iran’s perspective and vision.”[xii]

Salam and Rajji’s willingness to entertain an effort to spurn Larijani during his visit demonstrates the degree to which this Lebanese government is willing to challenge inordinate Iranian influence in Lebanon. Previous Lebanese governments would have been unlikely to even entertain such a public challenge to Iran and its ally Hezbollah.

The Lebanese government has recently expressed discontent over Iranian officials’ statements in support of Hezbollah since the Lebanese government took early steps to disarm Hezbollah. The Lebanese government tasked the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) with creating a plan to establish a state monopoly on arms on August 5 and agreed to the objectives of the US proposal to disarm Hezbollah on August 7.[xiii] Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi noted on August 6 that the Lebanese government’s plan to disarm Hezbollah is unrealistic and ”doomed.”[xiv] International Affairs Advisor to the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ali Akbar Velayati, said on August 9 that Iran is “certainly” opposed to disarming Hezbollah.[xv] The Lebanese Foreign Ministry called Velayati’s statement a ”flagrant and unacceptable interference” by Iran.[xvi]

Iranian officials have strongly criticized the US proposal to oversee a transit corridor in the southern Caucasus due to Iranian fears that its adversaries and competitors seek to use the corridor to undermine Iranian security and economic interests. Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a declaration of intent on August 8 on a US-brokered peace deal that grants the United States exclusive development rights to a 27-mile corridor through southern Armenia that connects Azerbaijan to its exclave, the Nakhchivan Autonomous Region.[xvii] The agreed-upon corridor is fundamentally the actualization of the Zangezur Corridor—a Turkish and Azerbaijani-proposed transit route that would connect Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan. Iran has historically opposed the Zangezur Corridor and viewed it as an effort to economically sideline Iran and limit Iranian regional influence.[xviii] A senior adviser to the Supreme Leader emphasized Iran's strong opposition to the proposed transit corridor on August 9 and referred to it as a "political conspiracy" against Iran.[xix] An Iranian analyst close to the regime similarly characterized the proposed transit corridor as an Iranian “containment belt” meant to isolate Iran and threaten Iran’s security.[xx]  The corridor runs along Iran's only shared border with Armenia and would sever Iranian land access to Russia and Europe via Armenia, which could exclude Iran from a new international transit route and hinder Iranian efforts to become a major transit hub. The corridor would enable Azerbaijan to circumvent Iran to access the Nakhchivan Autonomy Republic, which will likely deprive Iran of political leverage and any associated revenue along the transit corridor. Azerbaijan currently accesses its exclave and Turkey through Iran.

This proposed agreement would be an additional victory for Iranian adversaries at a time when Iran’s relative ability to project power in its near abroad has diminished.[xxi] Iranian officials have expressed concern about Turkey's expanding influence as a rival in the Middle East and around Iran’s borders, especially after Turkey replaced Iran as the primary backer of the new Syrian government following Assad's fall in December 2024. Turkey currently uses routes through Iran to trade with Central Asia, but a new route directly from Turkey to Azerbaijan through Armenia means that Turkey may be able to use the corridor to reach the Caspian Sea while circumventing Iran completely. Iran has similarly found itself at odds with Azerbaijan, which has taken steps to strengthen ties with Israel in recent months. Iran has historically accused Israel of using Azerbaijani territory to conduct operations in Iran, including during the Israel-Iran War.[xxii] Israeli government officials have recently called for including Azerbaijan in the Abraham Accords.[xxiii]

Iran has taken some steps in an effort to deter the corridor from being established. Iranian President Masoud Pezeskhian warned Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan during a phone call on August 11 to be wary of foreign attempts to use the agreement as a way to achieve “hegemonic goals,” likely referring to the United States.[xxiv] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi separately held a phone call with Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan on August 12 to discuss the US-brokered peace deal and the proposed transit corridor.[xxv] Pezeshkian is scheduled to visit Armenia on August 18.[xxvi] The Iranian National Security and Foreign Policy Commission held a meeting with defense, military, and foreign policy officials on August 11 to discuss Iranian diplomatic and military efforts to block the passage of the transit corridor.[xxvii] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-affiliated media stated on August 12 that Iran will be forced to adopt a "multi-layered and measured response" to the corridor.[xxviii] Iran has previously threatened to take military action to prevent the development of the Zangezur Corridor.[xxix] Iran has also previously conducted numerous provocative military exercises along the border designed to discourage the development of the corridor.[xxx] 

Turkey pressured Syria to withdraw from the US- and French-brokered integration negotiations in Paris and encouraged Syria to strengthen ties with Russia to counterbalance US and partner influence in Syria, which undermines US policy objectives in Syria.[xxxi] Unspecified Turkish sources told Syria in Transition that Turkey pressured the Syrian transitional government to withdraw from scheduled Paris negotiations with the United States, France,  and the SDF, due to fears that the transitional government would be forced to concede to Kurdish autonomy demands due to its poor handling of security in Suwayda.[xxxii] This demonstrates that Turkey’s primary concern about the Syrian government’s behavior in Suwayda is whether the Syrian government’s behavior will strengthen the SDF, not the behavior itself or the crimes committed by government forces. The SDF’s decision to invite prominent Druze leader Hikmat al Hijri to a political conference in Hasakah City on August 8 likely made it easier for Turkey to successfully pressure Syria to abandon the talks in Paris and demand that the SDF negotiate in Damascus, however.[xxxiii] Hijri's political movement declared an autonomous Suwaydawi government, and fighters close to Hijri have broken multiple ceasefires by attacking government forces and other Druze factions.[xxxiv] Turkey is simultaneously attempting to help Russia retain influence in Syria by encouraging the Syrian transitional government to strengthen diplomatic ties with Russia. Turkish sources said that the Turkish government had advised President Ahmed Shara to strengthen relations with Russia so that Russia, Turkey, and Syria can counterbalance US, European, Israeli, and Saudi interests in the country.[xxxv]

These Turkish efforts undermine key US policy objectives, including maintaining Syrian stability and preventing Russia from re-establishing itself in Syria. The US effort to integrate the SDF into Syria would prevent future rounds of conflict between the Kurdish-dominated SDF and Turkish-backed factions, which could seriously imperil Syrian stability and provide openings for ISIS to resurge. Increased Russian military influence in Syria would be similarly deleterious to Syrian stability. Russian state media reported on August 11 that the Syrian transitional government sought renewed Russian military police patrols in southern Syria to curb Israeli activity, citing a Russian source at an August 1 meeting between Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Shaibani and the Syrian diaspora in Moscow.[xxxvi] The Russian military conducted a patrol in SDF-controlled Qamishli, Hasakah Province, on August 4 shortly after Syrian diplomats returned from Moscow to negotiate Russian basing in Syria.[xxxvii] Russian military operations in Syria, particularly in southern Syria, did not contribute to lasting stability during the civil war and, in some cases, supported Iranian operations in Syria.[xxxviii]

The SDF and the transitional government have nonetheless continued to make progress in negotiations over the integration agreement despite Turkish interference.  Al Jazeera reported on August 11 that an SDF delegation arrived in Damascus to renew integration talks with the transitional government, but no updates have followed.[xxxix] The SDF and the Syrian transitional government likely desire to avoid any major fighting between the government and SDF, given that major military operations would risk significant destabilization of Syria that could imperil the political positions of both sides.

Recent ceasefire violations amid heightened tensions between the SDF and transitional government forces could threaten progress to negotiate the March 10 agreement, however. Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) forces reportedly made “suspicious movements" near Deir Hafer, Aleppo Province, and nearby villages, on August 11.[xl] These movements occurred in relatively open farmland dotted by small villages crisscrossed by dirt roadways and small agricultural canals. The only notable defensive line outside of the small villages is a 30-meter-wide east-west canal that runs south of Tal Maaz, 8 km northwest of Deir Hafer. The MoD engaged SDF forces near Tal Maaz on August 12 after the SDF advanced toward MoD positions there..[xli] The precise MoD-SDF frontlines in Aleppo Province are unclear, but the reports of ”suspicious movements” and the engagement near Tal Maaz suggest that both sides may be executing reconnaissance operations, which seek to ”obtain information about the activities and resources of an enemy or adversary [and] secure data concerning...characteristics of a particular area.”[xlii]

Key Takeaways

• Lebanese Hezbollah: Likely Hezbollah sources threatened to incite protests in Lebanon against US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack’s upcoming visit to Beirut if senior Lebanese officials do not meet with Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani’s visit to Beirut on August 13. Salam and Rajji’s willingness to entertain an effort to spurn Larijani during his visit demonstrates the degree to which this Lebanese government is willing to challenge inordinate Iranian influence in Lebanon.
• Iran in the Caucasus: Iranian officials have strongly criticized the US proposal to oversee a transit corridor in the South Caucasus due to Iranian fears that its adversaries and competitors seek to use the corridor to undermine Iranian security and economic interests. This proposed agreement would be an additional strategic victory for Iranian adversaries at a time when Iran’s relative ability to project power in its near abroad has diminished.
• Turkey in Syria: Turkey pressured Syria to withdraw from the US- and French-brokered integration negotiations in Paris and encouraged Syria to strengthen ties with Russia to counterbalance US and partner influence in Syria, which undermines US policy objectives in Syria. Negotiations have continued despite this interference, but recent ceasefire violations threaten to derail this.

Iran Update, August 11, 2025

Iranian Supreme Leader International Affairs Adviser Ali Akbar Velayati discussed the threats that Iran perceives to its regional influence in an interview on August 9 that underscored Iran’s commitment to its strategic goals despite recent setbacks.[i] Velayati’s statements demonstrate significant continuity between Iran’s pre- and post-war approach to the region and its use of the Axis of Resistance. Velayati reiterated Iran’s support for the Axis of Resistance but notably highlighted the Houthis as a “gem” within the Iranian proxy and partner network.[ii] Velayati said that Iran will oppose US-supported efforts to disarm Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. The Lebanese government, which the United States has pressured to disarm Hezbollah, agreed on August 7 to disarm Hezbollah.[iii] The United States has similarly pressured the Iraqi government to pass legislation that would disarm or reform the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), which has been opposed by Iran’s Iraqi allies.[iv] Velayati held a phone call with the Iraqi State of Law coalition head and Iranian ally in Iraq, Nouri al Maliki, on August 8 in which Maliki emphasized that Iraq will not allow the United States to disarm the PMF, which suggests the pair discussed recent US efforts to undermine the PMF.[v] Velayati also suggested that resistance groups will form in Syria to resist Israel.[vi] Khamenei and other Iranian officials have previously framed the post-Assad Syrian landscape as an opportunity for Iran to shape events in Syria through grassroots mobilization, which is consistent with Iranian hopes prior to the Israel-Iran War.[vii]

It remains unclear how Iran will attempt to oppose any of these US-supported efforts, but Velayati’s interview highlights the increased importance of the Houthi Movement within Iran’s Axis of Resistance. The Houthis remain the most unified and capable member of the Axis of Resistance after two years of war, having suffered relatively little damage compared to Hezbollah or Hamas.

Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani appears to be trying to secure Iranian interests in Iraq and Lebanon during planned visits to each country this week, amid Iranian concern about its regional influence. Larijani’s visits appear to be an effort to actualize the policy priorities outlined by Velayati. Larijani met separately with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani and National Security Advisor Qassim al Araji on August 11.[viii] Iranian anti-regime media reported on August 11 that Larijani will encourage unidentified Shia parties to pass the Popular Mobilization Authority Law during his visit.[ix] CTP-ISW assessed on August 6 that this law, on which the Iraqi Parliament is yet to vote, would likely increase Iran’s influence in the Iraqi political and security spheres by formalizing the PMF’s structures and responsibilities.[x] Larijani will reportedly also discuss coalition formation ahead of the upcoming November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections with unspecified Iraqi officials.[xi] Iran has previously encouraged Iranian-backed Iraqi parties to unite ahead of the elections to improve the likelihood that the parties will maintain control of the Iraqi parliament.[xii] Larijani and Araji also signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to ”develop“ the 2023 Iran-Iraq security agreement that required Iraqi authorities to disarm and relocate members of Kurdish opposition groups from the Iran-Iraq border.[xiii] This is probably an extension of Iran’s focus on internal security because Iran views Iraqi Kurdistan as a rear area from which anti-regime Kurdish groups can operate in Iran, which threatens Iranian regime stability.[xiv] Iran has previously pressured the Iraqi federal government to remove Kurdish opposition groups from the Iran-Iraq border and may be concerned about the threat of Israel using these Kurdish groups to infiltrate Iran and transport materiel.[xv] Larijani will visit Beirut later this week to discuss “regional affairs” with unspecified Lebanese officials.[xvi]  Multiple Iranian officials have expressed their discontent with the Lebanese government’s initial steps to disarm Hezbollah over the last several weeks.[xvii]

Larijani’s diplomatic efforts in Iraq and Lebanon strongly suggest that Larijani will take a more active approach toward implementing Iranian foreign policy in the region as SNSC secretary compared to his predecessor. Larijani’s visits after his appointment as SNSC secretary on August 5  suggest that his approach will be more hands-on compared to his predecessor, Ali Akbar Ahmadian, who served as a coordinator of Iran’s security apparatus rather than an executor.[xviii] Pragmatic hardliner Larijani’s active role further suggests that moderate and pragmatic elements of the Iranian regime may begin to increase their engagement in Iranian foreign policy, particularly with its regional partners and proxies. Larijani has considerable experience engaging in Iranian foreign policy from his previous roles. [xix]

Iran has taken steps to protect its nuclear scientists following the 12-day Israel-Iran War. Israel killed at least 14 nuclear scientists during the war.[xx] The Telegraph reported on August 11 that Iran has sent its remaining nuclear scientists to safe houses in northern Iran, citing a senior Iranian official.[xxi] The official said Iran has replaced all the nuclear scientists teaching at universities with individuals who have no connection to Iran's nuclear program. Iran reportedly assigned each key nuclear scientist at least one deputy in order to try to ensure knowledge continuity.[xxii] Israeli sources are concerned that some of these deputies have replaced the scientists whom Israel killed during the war. Some of the replacement scientists reportedly have expertise in explosives and warhead design. An Israeli intelligence and defense analyst stated that Iran still has scientists who have previously worked on nuclear weapons delivery systems, including efforts to adapt Shahab-3 missiles to hold nuclear warheads.[xxiii] The senior Iranian official also said Iran has assigned multiple agencies to protect nuclear scientists as opposed to the single Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) unit that handled the scientists’ protection previously.[xxiv]

Iran likely assigned multiple agencies to protect its nuclear scientists to address counterintelligence concerns following the war.[xxv] The existence of multiple agencies providing security for the scientists enables each agency to ensure the compliance of the other agencies, but it will contribute to siloed organizations that hinder information sharing. Iranian authorities executed an Iranian nuclear scientist on August 6 for reportedly providing Israel with information about another nuclear scientist whom Israel killed during the war.[xxvi]

Key Takeaways

• Iran: Iranian Supreme Leader International Affairs Adviser Ali Akbar Velayati discussed the threats that Iran perceives to its regional influence in an interview on August 9 that underscored Iran’s commitment to its strategic goals despite recent setbacks.
• Iran: Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani appears to be trying to secure Iranian interests in Iraq and Lebanon during planned visits to each country this week, amid Iranian concern about its regional influence. Larijani’s diplomatic efforts in Iraq and Lebanon strongly indicate that Larijani will take a more active approach toward implementing Iranian foreign policy in the region as SNSC secretary compared to his predecessor.
• Iran: Iran has taken steps to protect its nuclear scientists following the 12-day Israel-Iran War.
• Yemen: The Houthis and Iran are using an extensive smuggling network involving personnel in Iran, Somalia, and Yemen to bypass the UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism in Djibouti, according to smugglers detained by a pro-Yemeni government faction.

Iran Update, August 8, 2025

Hezbollah supporters held protests in 16 locations across Lebanon on August 7 in response to the Lebanese government’s support for disarming Hezbollah.[i] Public support for Hezbollah presents a significant obstacle to decreasing Hezbollah’s influence in Lebanon in the short term. The Lebanese Council of Ministers agreed on August 7 to the objectives of US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack’s proposal to disarm Hezbollah by December 31, 2025.[ii] Hezbollah supporters protested in several Beirut suburbs, southern Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley, and other Hezbollah strongholds in Lebanon.[iii] The majority of these areas are largely comprised of Lebanese Shia civilians, who have fervently backed Hezbollah since the 1980s.[iv] Hezbollah has long exploited the Lebanese government’s shortcomings to deeply entrench itself in Lebanon.[v] Hezbollah was able to assuage domestic discontent and gain widespread support and influence following the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War despite suffering military losses.[vi] Hezbollah has used financial incentives, including pensions for families of deceased fighters and compensation for individuals who lost their homes or property, and social services to retain its support base among Lebanese Shia civilians.[vii]

The Lebanese government has undertaken steps to inhibit Hezbollah’s ability to provide financial benefits to its supporters, which could decrease support for Hezbollah in the mid- to long-term. The Lebanese government and the United States have taken steps to restrict the flow of money to Hezbollah to prevent its reconstitution since the end of the Israel-Hezbollah conflict in November 2024.[viii] Hezbollah, which quickly rebuilt Lebanon and provided a social safety net for Lebanese civilians after the 2006 war, is struggling to reconstruct damaged infrastructure and reconstitute its forces following the conflict in late 2024.[ix] Hezbollah has also struggled to maintain its financial commitments to fighters. Hezbollah’s primary financial institution, Al Qard al Hassan, claimed that it would continue to provide financial resources to its supporters despite restrictions placed on it by the Lebanese Central Bank. Al Qard al Hassan has not resumed payments to fighters since June 2025.[x] Disruptions to Hezbollah’s ability to provide its support base with promised benefits may not have an immediate effect on the population’s support for Hezbollah, but could diminish support for Hezbollah over time. 

Key Takeaways

1. Hezbollah supporters held protests in 16 locations across Lebanon on August 7 in response to the Lebanese government’s support for disarming Hezbollah. Public support for Hezbollah presents a significant obstacle to decreasing Hezbollah’s influence in Lebanon in the short term.
2. State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki told Iranian Supreme Leader International Affairs Adviser Ali Akbar Velayati during a phone call on August 8 that Iraq will not allow the United States or Israel to disarm the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).

Iran Update, August 7, 2025

The Lebanese Council of Ministers agreed on August 7 to the objectives of US Envoy Thomas Barrack’s proposal to disarm Hezbollah.[i] The proposal’s objectives include a phased plan to completely disarm Hezbollah by December 31, 2025, and to ensure an Israeli withdrawal from its five permanent positions in southern Lebanon.[ii] The objectives also include the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to key border areas, the commencement of indirect Israel-Hezbollah talks to facilitate prisoner exchanges, and the permanent demarcation of Lebanon’s borders with Israel and Syria.[iii] The Lebanese Council of Ministers did not agree on all details included in the proposal, but it did agree to the overall objectives.[iv] The United States submitted the proposal to the Lebanese government on June 19.[v] The United States and the Lebanese government have negotiated the details of this agreement over the past six weeks, but had not previously reached an agreement.[vi] Hezbollah has not released any official statements on the Lebanese government’s agreement on the US proposal. Three unspecified political sources told Reuters on August 7 that Hezbollah and its allies symbolically withdrew from the cabinet session during discussions on the US proposal.[vii]

Iranian officials and Axis-affiliated media recently reported that Hezbollah has begun to reconstitute its command structure, but it is very unlikely that Hezbollah could rebuild its units to the level of proficiency the units had before the war. Hezbollah also faces several significant challenges that will complicate its ability to reconstitute. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said on August 6 that Hezbollah is restructuring itself and appointing new commanders.[viii] Axis-affiliated media echoed this statement. Araghchi added that Iran will continue to support the group.[ix] Araghchi noted that Hezbollah will remain a “dominant force" that Iran will continue to support.[x] Axis-affiliated media claimed that Hezbollah has not exhibited any internal disarray and has continued its political and regional "presence.”[xi] Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem also noted on August 5 that Hezbollah still has fighters who are ready to make “the harshest sacrifices” if needed.[xii]

These statements ignore that Hezbollah units reconstituted from the remaining Hezbollah cadres will be less effective than their predecessor units due to a lack of experienced commanders. The IDF has killed nearly all of the top Hezbollah commanders and inflicted a 45 percent casualty rate on Hezbollah.[xiii] The casualty rates in units in southern Lebanon may be higher because the IDF focused much of its campaign there. A representative of Hezbollah’s Association of the Wounded noted on August 6 that none of the individuals injured in the pager attack against Hezbollah devices have recovered.[xiv] Over 3,000 individuals were injured in the attack, many of whom were presumably Hezbollah officials and fighters.[xv] The extremely high casualty rate, combined with the deaths of top commanders, means that Hezbollah will have a much less experienced command cadre around which it will need to build units composed mostly of green, inexperienced fighters. These units will be far less effective than the experienced, veteran units led by 40-year veterans of Hezbollah prior to the war.

The post-war units will have the added challenge of needing to replenish their weapons arsenal under many more constraints than Hezbollah experienced before the war, as well. Israel destroyed much of its heavy weapons and short-range missile stockpile during and after the war.[xvi] The fall of Syria and the crackdown by the Lebanese government on weapons and money smuggling through Lebanese airports and border crossings will make any Iranian effort to resupply Hezbollah relatively slow and inefficient.[xvii] Hezbollah could attempt smuggling efforts through Lebanese ports, as it has already set conditions to do so. An unspecified Western official told Saudi media in April 2025 that Hezbollah had begun to reassert its control over the port through a network of collaborators, including dock workers and customs agents.[xviii] The official noted that Iran has relied on the maritime route to support Hezbollah after the closure of smuggling routes via Syria.[xix] Lebanese officials denied these claims and stated that Lebanese authorities had implemented ”serious” security measures at the port.[xx] Maritime smuggling through the ports will be relatively more challenging than the land border crossings that were controlled by the pro-Hezbollah Assad regime on the Syrian side before 2024.

Hezbollah’s continued weakness is exemplified by increasingly confident Lebanese authorities and United Nations forces in Lebanon, which have not previously challenged Hezbollah at scale. Lebanese authorities have taken steps to curb Hezbollah smuggling. Lebanese airport authorities fired several Hezbollah-affiliated employees at the Beirut Rafic Hariri International Airport in May 2025 and began to inspect all planes and passengers that arrive at the airport.[xxi] Iran has tried to use the Beirut airport to smuggle funds to Hezbollah since the loss of its weapons smuggling routes through Syria due to the fall of the Assad regime.[xxii] The LAF has shut down several known smuggling routes and increased its presence along the Lebanon-Syria border to curb Hezbollah-linked smuggling in recent months.[xxiii] The LAF and UN are reinforcing the counter-smuggling effort with relatively more significant operations in southern Lebanon as well. The LAF announced in May 2025 that it had dismantled over 500 Hezbollah military positions and weapons depots in southern Lebanon.[xxiv] United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) forces have also taken previously rare steps to degrade Hezbollah infrastructure in southern Lebanon, such as by dismantling a likely Hezbollah tunnel network and several weapons caches in southern Lebanon on August 7.[xxv] These efforts will need to be sustained to be successful, however.

Iranian media outlet Nour News proposed on August 7 that the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) will likely increase its focus on domestic security, while still prioritizing foreign policy.[xxvi] Nour News, which is affiliated with Supreme Leader adviser Ali Shamkhani, concluded that newly appointed SNSC Secretary Ali Larijani would also “speak more to the public,” compared to his predecessor, Ali Akbar Ahmadian.[xxvii] This follows Nour News’ July 29 and August 6 recommendations that the SNSC form a “Strategic Command Center” and adopt a more comprehensive security approach to counter emerging “hybrid threats.”[xxviii] These ”hybrid threats” include misinformation and disinformation campaigns targeting the Iranian public and the ”collapse of public trust.“[xxix] The Nour News proposals align with President Masoud Pezeshkian’s call for Larijani to “prioritize emerging threats” and take a “people-based approach” to national security.[xxx]  The SNSC has subsidiary councils that address internal security.[xxxi] The increased focus of the SNSC on domestic security likely reflects regime concerns about regime destabilization in the wake of the 12-day Israel-Iran War. Pragmatic voices on the SNSC, such as Pezeshkian and Larijani, favor public engagement over tighter security measures to bolster national security. Larijani’s appointment signals the SNSC’s shift toward addressing emerging threats that impact trust between the government and the people through public engagement rather than purely security-focused measures, which represents a rebalancing almost certainly directed by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.  

Khamenei officially replaced Ahmadian with Larijani as his representative on the SNSC on August 6.[xxxii] The SNSC Secretary has historically been one of two Supreme Leader representatives on the SNSC.

Khamenei also appointed Ahmadian and Shamkhani on August 6 as his representatives to the new Defense Council, which the SNSC established on August 3 to address emerging national security threats.[xxxiii] Shamkhani, who is also a pragmatic hardliner, notably called on the regime to resolve ”disputes” with the Iranian people through a ”process of understanding,” during an interview on June 29.[xxxiv]

Nour News attributed Larijani’s appointment to the SNSC as well as the SNSC’s formation of the Defense Council in its August 7 op-ed to the “current security conditions,” including “the possibility of a renewed enemy [Israeli or US] attack” on Iran.[xxxv] Iranian officials have continued to express their concern about the potential for future conflicts with Israel and the United States. Iranian Artesh Commander Major General Amir Hatami warned on August 3, for example, that “[Iran] should not underestimate the enemy and consider its threats over.”[xxxvi]  Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Intelligence chief Brigadier General Majid Khademi also declared on August 7 that “the war has not ended” and that Iran is just “in a state of temporary pause.”[xxxvii] Khademi asserted that the West is continuing to try to stoke internal instability in Iran.[xxxviii]

Nour News suggested in its August 7 op-ed that pragmatic hardliner Larijani may bring the SNSC closer to Iran’s Foreign Affairs Ministry to coordinate on nuclear negotiations with the United States and Europe, which “cannot be ruled out.”[xxxix]  Nour News referenced Larijani’s past engagement in nuclear negotiations with the West during his first term as SNSC secretary between 2005 and 2007.[xl] Larijani separately defended Iran’s agreement to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with the United States against hardliner criticism while serving as parliament speaker in 2015.[xli] More recently, Larijani reportedly tried to contact Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei during the Israel-Iran War to advocate for "opening talks” with the United States.[xlii] Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi separately expressed his optimism about working with Larijani, noting his ”deep and realistic insight into both domestic and foreign policy,” in an interview on August 6.[xliii] Araghchi added that Iran’s diplomats are ”fully prepared to engage in coordinated cooperation” with Larijani.[xliv]  

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah is attempting to use the Shia Coordination Framework as a vehicle to sideline the Sudani administration ahead of the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections. The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. Kataib Hezbollah announced on August 6 that Kataib Hezbollah Secretary General Abu Hussein al Hamidawi urged unidentified Shia Coordination Framework leaders during a meeting on August 2 to “block” Sudani’s decisions ahead of the upcoming elections after recent unspecified decisions by Sudani have “contradicted the fundamental positions,” presumably of the framework.[xlv] "Fundamental positions” may refer to policy issues such as efforts to remove US forces from Iraq, which was a policy issue that Kataib Hezbollah Spokesperson Abu Ali al Askari mentioned in a statement on August 4.[xlvi] Hamidawi also called for the creation of a specialized Shia Coordination Framework committee to investigate events surrounding clashes between Kataib Hezbollah members and Iraqi Federal Police officers in Dora, Baghdad, on July 27 that killed one civilian and a Federal Police officer.[xlvii] Hamidawi’s request to use a Shia Coordination Framework committee appears to undermine Sudani’s previous order for the formation of a high-level committee to investigate the clashes using standard Iraqi judicial mechanisms.[xlviii] Kataib Hezbollah and other Iranian-backed Iraqi actors have tried to distance themselves from the incident in Dora, which occurred amid policy discussions over restricting arms to the Iraqi state and dissolving the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces.[xlix]

The Shia Coordination Framework groups are now in increasing competition with one another ahead of the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections, which will make it more difficult for Kataib Hezbollah to build a political coalition to sideline Sudani. Kataib Hezbollah’s attempts to obstruct Sudani’s influence follow an August 6 Iraqi media report that some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are “almost at odds with the Shia Coordination Framework.”[l] CTP-ISW assessed on August 6 that this report likely refers to the disillusionment of some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias towards elements of the Shia Coordination Framework, such as Sudani.[li] The Shia Coordination Framework currently plans to run across multiple lists in the upcoming elections, which likely reflects divisions amongst the coalition.[lii]

Druze rhetoric and actions that are hostile to the Syrian government demonstrate the deep barriers to reconciliation and lack of trust between the transitional government and the Druze community. A committee formed by prominent Druze Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri announced the formation of a  “temporary” autonomous government for Suwayda Province on August 6.[liii]  Judges on the “Supreme Legal Committee” within the new ”autonomous government” appointed an executive body, security officials, and ministerial heads to govern Suwayda instead of the Damascus-based transitional government.[liv] A member of the Syrian Ministry of Justice said that the judiciary would investigate the committee judges for “engaging in political works” that conflict with Syrian national interests.[lv] Two Assad-era brigadier generals, formerly responsible for coastal Syria and accused of committing war crimes, command the new Suwaydawi government’s internal security forces.[lvi]  A militia spokesperson unaligned with Hijri said on August 6 that the only way to ”make proper amends and regain trust” would be to execute Syrian President Ahmed al Shara and Suwayda General Security Service (GSS) leader Ahmed al Dalati in Suwayda for crimes against the Druze.[lvii] The Liwa al Jabal spokesperson also said that there was “no longer space for dialogue or discussion" with the transitional government.[lviii] Such strong rhetoric from Druze militias that previously collaborated with the transitional government demonstrates the level of distrust that has grown since intercommunal violence erupted in Suwayda Province in mid-July.[lix] This rhetoric makes it unsurprising that the Druze have begun to implement alternative governance structures while refusing to collaborate with the transitional government. This new autonomous government and the strong rhetoric from Druze militias reduce the likelihood that the July 18 ceasefire between the transitional government and Druze militias will progress to its third phase. The third phase calls for activating state-run institutions, gradually deploying government forces to Suwayda Province, and integrating Suwaydawi institutions into the Syrian state.[lx]

 Key Takeaways

• Hezbollah Disarmament: The Lebanese Council of Ministers agreed on August 7 to the objectives of US Envoy Thomas Barrack’s proposal to disarm Hezbollah.
• Hezbollah Reconstitution: Iranian officials and Axis-affiliated media recently reported that Hezbollah has begun to reconstitute its command structure, but it is very unlikely that Hezbollah could rebuild its units to the level of proficiency the units had before the war. Hezbollah also faces several significant challenges that will complicate its ability to reconstitute.
• Iranian National Security Appointments: Iranian media outlet Nour News proposed on August 7 that the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) will likely increase its focus on domestic security, while still prioritizing foreign policy. Nour News also attributed Larijani’s appointment to the SNSC as well as the SNSC’s formation of the Defense Council to the “current security conditions,” including “the possibility of a renewed enemy [Israeli or US] attack” on Iran.
• Iraqi Militia Political Maneuverings: Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah is attempting to use the Shia Coordination Framework as a vehicle to sideline the Sudani administration ahead of the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections. The Shia Coordination Framework groups are now in increasing competition with one another ahead of the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections, which will make it more difficult for Kataib Hezbollah to build a political coalition to sideline Sudani.
• Druze-Syrian Government Relations: Druze rhetoric and actions that are hostile to the Syrian government demonstrate the deep barriers to reconciliation and lack of trust between the transitional government and the Druze community. A committee formed by prominent Druze Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri announced the formation of a “temporary” autonomous government for Suwayda Province on August 6.

Iran Update, August 6, 2025

The Lebanese Council  of Ministers took an early step on August 5 to attempt to disarm Hezbollah. Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam announced on August 5 that the Lebanese Council of Ministers tasked the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) with creating a plan to establish a state monopoly on arms across Lebanon by the end of 2025.[i] The Lebanese Council of Ministers is Lebanon’s executive body that sets and implements Lebanese government policy.[ii] This plan would require Hezbollah to disarm. The LAF will submit the plan to the Council of Ministers by August 31 for the council to discuss and approve.[iii] It is unclear whether this review period will provide opportunities for Hezbollah and its allies to push back against and postpone the approval of the proposed plan. Lebanese Foreign Minister Youssef Rajai posted on X on August 6 that the Lebanese government’s decision to establish a state monopoly on arms is final and that there will be “no turning back.”[iv]

Hezbollah released a statement on August 6 that condemned the council’s decision and deemed it a “major sin.”[v] Hezbollah asserted that the decision is “a clear violation” of the Lebanese government’s February 2025 ministerial statement, which states that the Lebanese government is committed to the 1989 Taif Agreement and adopting a domestic national defense strategy.[vi] Hezbollah has consistently called for the implementation of the 1989 Taif Agreement, which calls for the disarmament of all Lebanese militias except Hezbollah.[vii] Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem has repeatedly called on the Lebanese government and Hezbollah to coordinate a national defense strategy.[viii] Hezbollah noted in its August 6 statement that it is open to dialogue and is prepared to discuss a strategy with the government but not until Israel concludes its operations in Lebanon.[ix] The Amal Movement, which is a close ally of Hezbollah, released a similar statement on August 5 condemning the council’s decision.[x]

Hezbollah’s inability to delay or veto the council’s decision reflects Hezbollah's relative loss of political leverage within the Lebanese government. Several Hezbollah and allied Amal Movement ministers symbolically walked out of the council session on August 5, but neither group was able to prevent the council from tasking the LAF to establish a state monopoly on arms.[xi] The council was rarely able to pass legislation without Hezbollah’s approval between 2008 and 2019, given that Hezbollah held enough seats to have de facto veto power.[xii] Hezbollah and the Amal Movement currently only hold five seats in the Council of Ministers, which is insufficient to veto a council decision.[xiii] Hezbollah has recently struggled to maintain its support base in the Lebanese government and Lebanese society, which has likely contributed to its waning political leverage. Notable Hezbollah allies have recently shifted their positions and expressed support for the state’s monopoly on arms.[xiv] Lebanese media reported on July 28 that Lebanese Parliament Speaker and long-time Hezbollah ally Nabih Berri is “in agreement” with Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam on the state’s "approach toward the weapons file.”[xv] The Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) and the Marada Movement, which are two Lebanese political parties that have historically supported Hezbollah’s retention of weapons, have also publicly declared their support for the state’s monopoly on arms.[xvi]

 Hezbollah’s recent political losses and declining political leverage are unlikely to prevent Hezbollah from attempting to block efforts by the state to disarm it, however. Hezbollah has long used its military capabilities and political influence within other state institutions to sway the Lebanese government’s decision-making.[xvii] Hezbollah has continued to reject calls to disarm, which suggests that it will oppose and challenge any LAF plan to establish a state monopoly on arms.[xviii]

Iranian media outlet Nour News suggested on August 6 that Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian instructed newly appointed Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani to adopt a comprehensive security approach to counter hybrid threats. Nour News, which is affiliated with former SNSC Secretary and Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Shamkhani, suggested on August 6 that Pezeshkian instructed Larijani to “monitor and prioritize emerging and technological threats” and “redefine security concepts with a people-based approach.” Nour News stated that the “emerging” threats that Iran faces include cyberattacks, the spread of misinformation and disinformation exacerbated by artificial intelligence, international sanctions, climate-induced migration, and the “collapse of social capital and public trust."[xix] These threats are consistent with the regime’s understanding of hybrid warfare, which the regime defines as the use of all domains of power—including information, electronic, cultural, social, and military operations—by hostile actors to destabilize Iran.  Nour News previously proposed on July 29 the creation of a "Strategic Command Center" to accelerate the Iranian regime’s responses to hybrid threats in wartime.[xx]

Pezeshkian’s emphasis on a “people-based” security approach and Nour New’s call for increasing social capital and public trust are consistent with recent calls by moderate and pragmatic regime officials to increase societal resilience and resolve disputes between the regime and the Iranian people.  Shamkhani called on the regime to resolve “disputes” with the Iranian population through a “process of understanding” in an interview on June 28.[xxi] Supreme Leader International Affairs Adviser Ali Akbar Velayati separately stated on July 21 that preserving national cohesion may require “revising social policies” and prioritizing public satisfaction.[xxii] Pezeshkian recently noted during a meeting with reformists on July 22 that the regime must engage in dialogue, not confrontation, to solve its problems.[xxiii]

Some regime officials welcomed Larijani’s appointment as a necessary shift for Iranian national security. Velayati stated on X on August 5 that Larijani’s appointment demonstrates the regime’s “foresight” and described his appointment as an “effective step.”[xxiv] Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi separately expressed his willingness to cooperate with Larijani.[xxv] Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh praised Larijani as a seasoned politician who will prove transformative in his new role.

Ultrahardliners criticized Larijani’s appointment as SNSC secretary, which likely reflects their broader dissatisfaction with the recent resurgence of moderates and pragmatists in the Iranian political sphere. Ultrahardline Paydari Front leader and Supreme Leader Representative to the SNSC Saeed Jalili criticized supporters of negotiations with the United States on August 6.[xxvi] Larijani defended Iran’s agreement to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with the United States against hardliners’ criticism while serving as parliament speaker in 2015.[xxvii] Larijani also reportedly tried to contact Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei during the Israel-Iran War to advocate for "opening talks” with the United States.[xxviii] A Larijani-affiliated outlet characterized Jalili’s criticism as resentment over his "diminished role” in the SNSC, highlighting the factional tensions surrounding Larijani’s appointment.[xxix] Jalili’s adviser, Amir Hossein Sabeti, also expressed pessimism about Larijani’s appointment on August 6, stating that Larijani’s approach to solving problems is "not fundamentally different” from those of moderate President Masoud Pezeshkian and former reformist President Hassan Rouhani.[xxx]  

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian appointed former Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian as the President’s Special Representative and Head of the Headquarters for National and Strategic Projects Development.[xxxi]  Pezeshkian stated that the new headquarters led by Ahmadian will help Iran accomplish its strategic goals and remove obstacles to domestic and foreign investors, including by mobilizing the Iranian public and Iranian intellectuals.[xxxii] Pezeshkian said that Ahmadian’s role as the head of the “Progressive People’s Organization” will enable him to pursue these objectives. Ahmadian reportedly established the Progressive People’s Organization when he led the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Strategic Center between 2007 and 2023.[xxxiii] The organization was established to implement national projects outlined in the Iranian government's seventh five-year development plan.[xxxiv]

Assadist remnants likely attempted to conduct a false flag attack on a church in Tartous Province on August 6 to heighten fears in the local community and incite sectarian tensions in coastal Syria. The Syrian government announced on August 6 that the General Security Service (GSS) thwarted an attempt by two Assadist remnants to detonate a large improvised explosive device (IED) at the Mar Elias Maronite Church in al Khreibat, east of Tartous City.[xxxv] The GSS also seized leaflets with threatening sectarian messages, a black flag commonly affiliated with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and weapons in the attackers’ vehicle.[xxxvi]

The Assadist remnants likely intended to frame an attack on the church as an ISIS attack to incite sectarian strife. It is unlikely that the perpetrators were members of ISIS, despite the presence of an ISIS flag in their vehicle, given that the attackers were reportedly Alawite and ISIS has not historically sustained a presence in coastal Syria.[xxxvii]  Unknown actors recently left threatening leaflets at a church in Tartous on July 6 that claimed to be from ISIS-aligned Salafi-jihadi group Saraya Ansar al Sunnah.[xxxviii] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah denied placing the leaflets at the church, and local priests attributed the leaflets to Assadist remnants.[xxxix]

The Assad regime often conducted false flag operations before it was overthrown in December 2024 to try to portray the Syrian opposition as jihadists.[xl] The two regime remnants may have sought to employ a similar tactic to try to heighten fears in the local community, increase recruitment, and spread anti-government sentiment. Pro-Alawite insurgents, many of whom support the former regime, have participated in a low-level insurgency since the fall of the Assad regime to try to destabilize the Syrian transitional government.[xli]  The attempted attack resembles a recent ISIS-linked suicide bombing in a church in Damascus in June 2025 that instilled considerable fear in the Christian community.[xlii] Many prominent Syrian Christians criticized the transitional government’s response to the attack.[xliii]

Key Takeaways

• Hezbollah Disarmament: The Lebanese Council of Ministers tasked the LAF with creating a plan to establish a state monopoly on arms across Lebanon by the end of 2025, which is an early step to attempt to disarm Hezbollah. Hezbollah’s inability to delay or veto the council’s decision reflects Hezbollah's relative loss of political leverage within the Lebanese government.
• Iranian Defense Apparatus: Iranian media outlet Nour News suggested on August 6 that Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian instructed newly appointed Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani to adopt a comprehensive security approach to counter hybrid threats.
• Security in Syria: Assadist remnants likely intended to frame a planned attack on a church in Tartous Province on ISIS in order to heighten fears in the local community and incite sectarian tensions in coastal Syria. It is unlikely that the perpetrators were members of ISIS, given that the attackers were reportedly Alawite and that the Assad regime has historically used false flag operations to generate sectarian tensions.

Iran Update, August 5, 2025

Iran Update, August 4, 2025

Iran’s highest national security and foreign policy decision-making body, the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), established a “Defense Council” on August 3 to streamline decision-making during wartime.[i] The establishment of this body, which will operate under the SNSC, likely reflects Iranian leaders’ recognition of systemic operational failures during the Israel-Iran War. Iranian media emphasized that this body will be responsible for taking “rapid, balanced, and coordinated” steps to confront threats to Iran.[ii] Iranian media added that the SNSC formed the Defense Council in response to “fragmentation in decision-making" and a “lack of sufficient coordination between different institutions.”[iii] The composition of the Defense Council is notably similar to the composition of the SNSC, but, unlike the SNSC, the Defense Council includes the Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters commander and excludes the Iranian foreign affairs and interior ministers.[iv] The Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters is responsible for joint and wartime operations.[v] The inclusion of the Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters commander in the Defense Council creates a more direct link between this military institution and Iranian leaders. It is unlikely, however, that this council will enable the Iranian regime to respond more quickly and effectively to future threats so long as Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei does not empower the senior military commanders in this council to make and implement decisions without his approval.

The formation of the Defense Council indicates that Iranian leaders are concerned about potential future conflicts and are trying to develop a more proactive and efficient decision-making process to respond to future conflicts. The Defense Council that the SNSC established is notably similar to the “Strategic Command Center” that an Iranian outlet affiliated with former SNSC Secretary Ali Shamkhani proposed on July 29.[vi] The outlet stated that the “Strategic Command Center” would have “cross-sectoral authority” to rapidly respond to evolving threats.[vii] Iranian leaders have frequently warned about the potential for future conflicts since the end of the Israel-Iran War and likely seek to reform Iran’s decision-making structure in preparation for these potential conflicts. Iranian Artesh Commander Major General Amir Hatami warned on August 3, for example, that “[Iran] should not underestimate the enemy and consider its threats over.”[viii]

Moderate and pragmatic elements in the Iranian regime appear to be leading the restructuring of Iran's decision-making apparatus. Moderate President Masoud Pezeshkian, who chairs the SNSC, will head the Defense Council and appoint its secretary.[ix] An outlet affiliated with pragmatic hardliner Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf suggested that Pezeshkian will appoint Ghalibaf as the Defense Council secretary.[x] A political analyst close to the regime similarly suggested that Ghalibaf had a significant role in establishing the Defense Council.[xi]  The establishment of the Defense Council comes as Iranian media outlets have speculated that pragmatic hardliner former SNSC Secretary and Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Larijani could return to his former role as SNSC secretary.[xii] Iranian media has framed Larijani’s potential return to the SNSC as a shift to a more pragmatic approach in the Iranian regime. Some Iranian media outlets have speculated that Larijani could replace ultrahardliner Saeed Jalili as one of Khamenei’s representatives to the SNSC.[xiii]

Ghalibaf’s reported important role in the establishment of the Defense Council comes as the Iranian Parliament has also played a prominent role in influencing Iranian internal and external security policy following the Israel-Iran War. Parliament has supported and approved an anomalous amount of security-related legislation, including legislation that would further suppress internal dissent, since the end of the Israel-Iran War.[xiv]

Unprecedented and growing discontent among Hezbollah’s Shia support base could weaken Hezbollah’s political leverage to resist disarmament. Much of the Lebanese Shia community has fervently backed Hezbollah since the 1980s.[xv] The New York Times reported on August 4 that the Lebanese Shia community is in “shock, despair,” and angry with Hezbollah, however.[xvi] An anonymous Hezbollah supporter told the New York Times that Hezbollah “promised us a victory but instead destroyed our villages, destroyed our homes.”[xvii] Hezbollah, which quickly rebuilt Lebanon and provided a social safety net for Lebanese civilians after the 2006 war, is struggling to reconstruct damaged infrastructure and reconstitute its forces following the Israel-Hezbollah conflict in late 2024.[xviii] Hezbollah has struggled to maintain its financial commitments to fighters following the conflict in late 2024, which has contributed to the Shia community’s growing frustration.[xix] Frustrated Hezbollah supporters have demanded answers from Hezbollah about when they will receive reconstruction funds to rebuild businesses and homes destroyed in the war.[xx] Hezbollah has historically used financial benefits, including pensions for the families of deceased fighters and compensation to those who lost their homes or property, to retain its support base among Lebanese Shia.[xxi]

The Lebanese government reportedly hopes that frustration among southern residents toward Hezbollah will pressure Hezbollah to disarm.[xxii] Frustration among Hezbollah’s Lebanese Shia support base comes amid six weeks of negotiations between the United States and Lebanon about disarming Hezbollah.[xxiii] Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem has persistently rejected calls to disarm while some Hezbollah allies have recently shifted their positions and expressed support for the state’s monopoly on arms.[xxiv] Lebanese media reported on July 28 that Lebanese Parliament Speaker and Hezbollah ally Nabih Berri is “in agreement” with Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam “on the approach toward the weapons file.”[xxv] Both Aoun and Salam have publicly called on Hezbollah to disarm.[xxvi] Lebanese media reported that Hezbollah “is in a state of shock over its allies’ public calls for the monopolization of weapons” by the state.[xxvii] Lebanese media also stated that Aoun’s speech on July 31 in which he called on Hezbollah to disarm has “created a popular and political momentum supportive of the state.”[xxviii] Continued frustration among Hezbollah’s Shia support base and growing momentum for the Lebanese government’s position could weaken Hezbollah's political leverage and ability to maintain support for its retention of weapons.

A brief breakdown in the ceasefire in Suwayda Province, Syria, on August 3 underscores the lack of trust between the Syrian transitional government and the Druze community. This distrust extends to other Syrian minority groups as well. Druze militias launched a preplanned attack on August 3 to capture the strategically important Tell Hadid hill from the Syrian General Security Service (GSS).[xxix] Tell Hadid overlooks Suwayda City and serves as a government-controlled buffer between Druze militias and Sunni Bedouin fighters who are in the process of implementing a three-phase ceasefire agreement after intercommunal violence swept the province in mid-July.[xxx] The Israeli Air Force fired flares over neighboring Daraa Province as Druze militias captured the hill.[xxxi]  The Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Sunni Bedouin fighters recaptured Tell Hadid on August 3 after engaging with Druze militias.[xxxii]  The GSS also recaptured the villages of Walgha and Rimat Hazm on August 3 after Druze militias advanced toward the villages.[xxxiii]  All parties agreed to a ceasefire and Druze fighters returned to their original positions on August 3.[xxxiv] Syrian sources claimed that the new ceasefire calls for the withdrawal of all Syrian government and affiliated forces from Suwayda Province.[xxxv] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify this claim. The Syrian Ministry of Interior (MoI) reopened a key humanitarian corridor into Suwayda Province on August 4 after closing it due to the fighting.[xxxvi] Parties were in the process of implementing the second phase of the previous July 18 ceasefire agreement, which includes the delivery of aid, provision of services, and repair of infrastructure, when fighting broke out on August 3.[xxxvii] It remains unclear how or if the July 18 ceasefire will progress to its third phase, which calls for activating state-run institutions, gradually deploying government forces to Suwayda Province, and integrating Suwaydawi institutions into the Syrian state, after the recent ceasefire violation and new ceasefire agreement.[xxxviii]

A Sheikh al Karama Druze militia member outlined the Druze community’s irreconcilable grievances toward the Syrian transitional government a day before Druze militias attacked Tell Hadid.[xxxix] Sheikh al Karama previously negotiated with the Syrian transitional government about security issues and integration before the outbreak of intercommunal violence in Suwayda in mid-July.[xl] The militia member stated on August 2 that “after the grievous violations committed against the minorities [in Suwayda Province]...it has become impossible to remain under a centralized state that prevents the minorities from participating in it.” The militia member added that an “autonomous administration or separation is the sole solution.”[xli] This sentiment is not unique to the Druze. Kurdish and Alawite communities have repeatedly called for autonomy and voiced their opposition to centralized rule because they view the transitional government as exclusionary and are skeptical of the government’s ability and willingness to protect their communities.[xlii] The Syrian transitional government’s repeated failure to protect minority communities has reinforced the perception among minority communities that integration under the current government framework is unviable. 

Key Takeaways

• Iranian Defense Apparatus: Iran’s highest national security and foreign policy decision-making body, the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), approved the establishment of a “Defense Council” on August 3 to streamline decision-making during wartime. The formation of the Defense Council indicates that Iranian leaders are concerned about potential future conflicts and are trying to develop a more proactive and efficient decision-making process to respond to future conflicts.
• Syria Ceasefire: A brief breakdown in the ceasefire in Suwayda Province, Syria, on August 3 underscores the lack of trust between the Syrian transitional government and the Druze community. This distrust extends to other Syrian minority groups as well. The Syrian government’s repeated failure to protect minority communities has reinforced the perception among minority communities that integration under the current government framework is unviable.
• Hezbollah Disarmament: Unprecedented and growing discontent among Hezbollah’s Shia support base could weaken Hezbollah’s political leverage to resist disarmament. The population's frustration comes amid six weeks of negotiations between the United States and Lebanon about disarming Hezbollah.

Iran Update, August 1, 2025

Former Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif proposed the creation of a regional nuclear body called the Middle East Network for Atomic Research and Advancement (Menara) in an op-ed in the Guardian on July 31.[i] Iran would almost certainly demand to maintain domestic enrichment capabilities under such a proposal.[ii] Zarif stated that Menara would promote “peaceful nuclear cooperation” among member states.[iii] Zarif added that countries would have to reject nuclear weapons and agree to verification mechanisms to be admitted to the regional body.[iv] Zarif stated that Menara member states would “benefit from peaceful nuclear technology” and conduct “joint ventures,” including uranium enrichment, waste management, nuclear fusion, and medicine.[v] Zarif stated that a board of representatives from member states would monitor compliance and suggested that the International Atomic Energy Agency and UN Security Council could support the regional body.[vi]

Zarif suggested that Menara member states would share enrichment facilities.[vii] The United States previously sought before the Israel-Iran War to establish a regional nuclear consortium outside of Iran that would provide Iran with uranium for civilian nuclear purposes but would not allow enrichment on Iranian soil.[viii] Iranian officials stated that Iran was open to the consortium model, but only if the consortium's enrichment facilities were located in Iran.[ix] Iran would similarly likely only support Menara if it allowed Iran to continue enriching uranium on Iranian soil. An Iranian expert close to the regime stated that Menara cannot succeed without support from global powers such as the United States.[x] The United States has repeatedly insisted that Iran must halt domestic uranium enrichment.[xi] The expert also stated that Israel would likely refuse to join this new nuclear body, which he stated would turn the Menara plan into “unilateral disarmament for Iran and Arab states.”[xii]

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Fars News announced on August 1 the formation of a new “Defense Council” in Iran.  The new council will reportedly assume strategic responsibilities for Iran’s national defense policy, and the regime will soon finalize its structure.[xiii] Fars News stated that the Defense Council will be part of Iran’s “new” defense and security structure.[xiv] Fars News also announced that the regime will likely appoint Ali Larijani as the new Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) secretary in the coming days.[xv] Some Iranian media outlets and social media users have speculated in recent weeks that Larijani may soon be appointed as SNSC secretary.[xvi] Fars News reported that current SNSC Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian would take responsibility for “several special and strategic files.”

This announcement follows a Nour News report from July 30 that there will likely be "imminent changes” in high-ranking Iranian security institutions after "necessary...structural reforms have been implemented."[xvii] Nour News has historically been affiliated with the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) broadly, but has recently increasingly aligned itself with former SNSC Secretary Ali Shamkhani. Iran previously established the “Supreme Defense Council” following the 1979 Islamic Revolution to oversee the Iranian armed forces and manage defense-related matters, including coordinating the armed forces and overseeing national security during the Iran-Iraq War.[xviii] This announcement also follows a July 29 Nour News op-ed that called on the regime to restructure its decision-making system and establish a “Strategic Command Center” with "cross-sectoral authority” to coordinate security, economic, and diplomatic responses to threats.[xix]

Key Takeaways

• Iranian Nuclear Program: Former Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif proposed the creation of a regional nuclear body called the Middle East Network for Atomic Research and Advancement (Menara) in an op-ed in the Guardian on July 31. Iran would almost certainly demand to maintain domestic enrichment capabilities under such a proposal. The United States has repeatedly insisted that Iran must halt domestic uranium enrichment.
• Iranian Defense Establishment: Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Fars News announced on August 1 the formation of a new “Defense Council” in Iran. The new council will reportedly assume strategic responsibilities for Iran’s national defense policy, and the regime will soon finalize its structure. Fars News also announced that the regime will likely appoint Ali Larijani as the new Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) secretary in the coming days.