Iran Update, November 10, 2025

Information Cutoff: 4:30 PM ET 

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Note: CTP-ISW will publish an abbreviated Iran Update on November 11, 2025, due to the Veterans Day holiday. We will resume our normal coverage on November 12, 2025.

Syrian President Ahmed al Shara met with US President Donald Trump at the White House on November 10. Shara’s visit marked the first visit of any Syrian president to the White House. Shara and Foreign Affairs Minister Asaad al Shaibani met with Trump, Vice President JD Vance, and Secretary of State Marco Rubio during a closed-door meeting that Shaibani characterized as “constructive.”[i] The Syrian Foreign Ministry noted that Trump and Shara discussed US support for Syrian reconstruction and the repeal of the Caesar Act.[ii] The Caesar Act sanctions anyone who provides support to the Syrian government, supports the Syrian oil and gas industry, exports aircraft or military equipment to Syria, or provides construction or engineering services to the Syrian government.[iii] The United States originally intended for the Caesar Act to target Bashar al Assad’s regime.[iv] The US State, Commerce, and Treasury departments announced shortly after the meeting that they suspended the Caesar Act for another six months.[v] The suspension does not apply to Syrian transactions involving Russia and Iran.[vi] The United States previously issued a six-month waiver for the Caesar Act in May 2025.[vii] Trump told reporters after the meeting that “we’ll do whatever we can to make Syria successful” and that he has “confidence that [Shara] will be able to do the job.”[viii] An unspecified US official told Western media after Shara and Trump’s meeting that the Syrian Embassy in Washington, DC, will resume operations and continue US-Syrian “counterterrorism, security, and economic” coordination.[ix]

Trump and Shara also discussed Syria’s ongoing, US-mediated negotiations with Israel and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).[x] Syria is currently negotiating with Israel over a potential security agreement that may include a demilitarized zone in southern Syria.[xi] Trump told reporters on November 10 that he is working on Israel “getting along” with Syria.[xii] The US, Syrian, and Turkish foreign ministers also met “at President Trump’s direction” following Shara’s meeting with Trump.[xiii] The three officials discussed the integration of the SDF into the ranks of the new Syrian army and the full implementation of the March 10 agreement between the SDF and the Syrian government, according to the Syrian Foreign Ministry.[xiv]

Syria signed a declaration to join the Global Coalition Against the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) on November 10, two days after government forces conducted a major country-wide operation targeting ISIS leaders and cells.[xv] Syrian Information Minister Hamza al Mustafa stated on November 10 that Syria signed a declaration of “political cooperation” with the counter-ISIS coalition that does not yet include “military components.”[xvi] An unspecified US official told the Wall Street Journal that the “exact terms” of Syria’s role in the coalition are still up for discussion.[xvii] The Syrian transitional government has identified the resurgence of ISIS as one of the most pressing issues facing Syria since the fall of the Assad regime and has conducted counter-ISIS operations in recent months.[xviii] The United States and Syria have conducted at least three joint counter-ISIS operations and have shared intelligence related to ISIS since July 2025.[xix]

The Syrian Ministry of Interior (MoI) began a “preemptive” country-wide counter-ISIS operation on November 8 that targeted ISIS logistics and leadership networks.[xx] MoI spokesperson Noureddine al Baba told Syrian state media on November 8 that the General Security Service (GSS) conducted 61 raids targeting ISIS cells in Aleppo, Idlib, Homs, Rif Dimashq, Damascus, Hama, Raqqa, and Deir ez Zor provinces. GGS forces arrested 71 ISIS members.[xxi] The GSS dismantled a sophisticated roadside improvised explosive device (IED) workshop in Damascus City, arrested ISIS cells in Christian and Druze neighborhoods in Homs and Rif Dimashq provinces, respectively, and arrested an ISIS cell in Safira, Aleppo Province.[xxii] ISIS has recently conducted assassinations in Safira.[xxiii] The GSS killed one ISIS fighter during an unspecified raid, and the GSS sustained one casualty.[xxiv] Baba stated that the MoI launched the counter-ISIS operation after receiving intelligence that ISIS planned to reactivate cells across Syria on the “eve of Syria joining the international coalition.”[xxv] Baba warned that ISIS will exploit Syria’s entry into the international coalition to boost its recruitment of youth and that the MoI expects increased ISIS activity after Syria joins the coalition.[xxvi] Baba added that ISIS had planned to attack government facilities, officials, and Syrian minority groups to undermine Syria’s stability and increase fear among Syrian minorities.[xxvii]  An unspecified senior Syrian security official and a senior Middle Eastern official told Reuters on November 10 that ISIS has attempted to assassinate President Shara twice on separate occasions “over the last few months.”[xxviii]

The United States is attempting to disrupt Iran’s financial support to Hezbollah as part of an effort to pressure the group to disarm. Senior Lebanese officials, including Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, met with a US Treasury Department delegation on November 9 to discuss anti-money laundering, counter-smuggling, and counter-terrorism financing efforts.[xxix] The US delegation reportedly called on Lebanese authorities to combat money laundering, transition away from a cash-based economy, and shut down Hezbollah’s main financial institution, al Qard al Hassan.[xxx]  US Treasury Department Undersecretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence John Hurley said on November 9 that the United States seeks to take advantage of Iran’s “current weakened state” to cut off its funding to Hezbollah.[xxxi] Iran’s efforts to rebuild its armed forces and missile and nuclear programs after the Israel-Iran War may constrain Iranian financial support for Hezbollah.[xxxii] The US Treasury Department reported in November 2025 that Iran has smuggled at least $1 billion to Hezbollah in 2025, mostly through Lebanese money exchange companies, however.[xxxiii] Iran reportedly provided over $700 million to Hezbollah annually before the October 7 War.[xxxiv] Hezbollah continues to struggle to maintain its financial commitments after the war, which suggests that the funds that Iran has transferred to Hezbollah have not been enough to meet Hezbollah’s reconstitution needs.[xxxv] Hurley noted that the United States believes that cutting off Iran’s financial support to Hezbollah is the key to disarming the group.[xxxvi] The United States recently sanctioned three officials who coordinated financial transfers from the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) to Hezbollah as part of its effort to disrupt Iranian financial support for Hezbollah.[xxxvii]

Israel’s recent military operations in Lebanon align with the United States’ effort to curb Iranian support for Hezbollah. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has recently struck several Hezbollah sites and killed Hezbollah fighters linked to the group’s smuggling network. The IDF killed three Hezbollah fighters who smuggled combat equipment for the group in southern Lebanon on November 8 and 10.[xxxviii] The IDF struck the largest Hezbollah camp in the Bekaa Valley on November 10, which housed an underground drone and missile factory as well as Hezbollah’s main tunnel between Syria and Lebanon.[xxxix] Senior Israeli officials recently noted that Hezbollah has managed to smuggle “hundreds” of rockets from Syria into Lebanon in recent months despite improved interdiction efforts on both sides of the border.[xl] Iran has historically supplied Hezbollah with weapons and funding using ground lines of communication across Syria.[xli] Israel’s efforts to curb Iranian materiel support for Hezbollah and Hezbollah smuggling come amid Israel's ongoing frustration with the Lebanese Armed Forces’ (LAF) slow progress in disarming Hezbollah.[xlii] Israeli media reported on November 8 that Israel conveyed a message to the LAF via the United States that the LAF is not acting “sufficiently” against Hezbollah because it is not entering rural areas or private property to confiscate Hezbollah weapons.[xliii] Israel’s message noted that Israel will continue to conduct attacks across Lebanon if the LAF does not make “significant” improvements.[xliv]

The LAF has refuted Israel’s critiques about its lack of progress in disarming Hezbollah. LAF Commander Brigadier General Rodolphe Haykal said that Israel’s claims that the LAF is only conducting “superficial and symbolic” raids are “lies.”[xlv] Haykal claimed that the LAF has assumed control over “almost all” of southern Lebanon in a Lebanese cabinet meeting on November 6, during which Haykal presented the LAF’s second progress report on the implementation of its plan to disarm Hezbollah.[xlvi] The LAF report claimed that the LAF has conducted 4,190 operations, seized roughly 150 Hezbollah tunnels and weapons caches, confiscated 53 Hezbollah rocket launchers, and arrested 346 individuals since September 5.[xlvii] The LAF report did not disclose the affiliations of the arrested individuals. CTP-ISW has not observed any reports of the LAF seizing Hezbollah weapons or raiding active Hezbollah sites, however. Unspecified military officials emphasized to Lebanese media on November 8 that the LAF is proceeding “cautiously” given southern Lebanon’s terrain and the LAF’s limited human and logistical resources.[xlviii] The LAF also stated that the LAF’s disarmament plan never included searching private property for Hezbollah weapons in response to Israel’s criticism that the LAF is not entering rural areas or searching private property.[xlix] Israel reportedly requested that the LAF conduct house-to-house searches during an October 2025 ceasefire monitoring committee meeting.[l] The LAF rejected this demand.[li] Israel reportedly conducted airstrikes across Lebanon after the October 2025 meeting.[lii] Lebanese security sources said that the strikes were a warning that the LAF’s failure to conduct more thorough searches and operations could prompt a new “full-blown” Israeli military campaign.[liii]

An unidentified Iraqi official told a Kurdish journalist on November 10 that all Iranian-backed Iraqi militias with political wings in the Shia Coordination Framework are “demanding” that US forces remain in Iraq.[liv] It is unclear why Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would support US forces retaining a presence in Iraq, given that the removal of US forces from the Middle East is a long-standing objective shared by Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. CTP-ISW cannot independently verify this report and has not observed indications that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have shifted their position on the US military presence in Iraq. The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. The Shia Coordination Framework includes the political wings of multiple militias.[lv]  The United States and Iraq agreed in September 2024 that hundreds of US forces would withdraw from Iraq by September 2025 and that the remaining forces would withdraw by the end of 2026.[lvi]  A US official told Reuters on September 30 that the United States will reduce its military personnel from 2,500 to less than 2,000 and redeploy most of the remaining personnel to the Iraqi Kurdistan Region from federal Iraq.[lvii]  Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani announced on October 20 that 250 to 350 US “military advisors and support personnel” will remain at Ain al Asad Airbase in Anbar Province, Iraq, to support US operations against ISIS in Syria.[lviii]

Key Takeaways

• Syria-US Relations: Syrian President Ahmed al Shara met with US President Donald Trump at the White House on November 10. Shara’s visit marked the first visit of any Syrian president to the White House.
• US Efforts to Disarm Hezbollah: The United States is attempting to disrupt Iran’s financial support to Hezbollah as part of an effort to pressure the group to disarm. Israel’s recent military operations in Lebanon align with the United States’ effort to curb Iranian support for Hezbollah.
• Iranian-backed Iraqi Militia Posture: An unidentified Iraqi official told a Kurdish journalist on November 10 that all Iranian-backed Iraqi militias with political wings in the Shia Coordination Framework are “demanding” that US forces remain in Iraq. It is unclear why Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would support US forces retaining a presence in Iraq, given that the removal of US forces from the Middle East is a long-standing objective shared by Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.

Iran

Iranian oil revenue has decreased despite a recent increase in oil exports, possibly because Iran offers discounted oil prices to the People’s Republic of China (PRC).[lix] Iranian oil exports increased to an average of 2.3 million barrels per day (bpd) between the second week of October 2025 and the first week of November, according to Tanker Trackers.[lx] Iran exported around 2.1 million bpd in late September 2025, by comparison.[lxi] Iran’s recent oil export volumes nearly approach Iran’s level of oil exports in 2018, the year that US President Donald Trump withdrew from the nuclear deal and began his “maximum pressure” campaign against Iranian energy exports.[lxii] An Iranian parliamentarian involved in Iran’s budget drafting process told Iranian media on November 6 that Iran’s oil revenue has dropped significantly, only meeting about 16 percent of its expected annual revenue in 2025.[lxiii] Unidentified trade sources told Reuters on October 29 that buyers, mostly from the PRC, pushed Iran to sell crude oil at nearly $10 below standard Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) Brent Crude Oil prices.[lxiv] Iran reportedly sold its crude oil at only $6 under ICE Brent in September 2025 and $3 under ICE Brent in March 2025.^lxii Iranian oil has devalued throughout 2025 due to concerns about US, United Nations, and European Union sanctions on Iranian energy exports.[lxv]

Iran is facing water and gas shortages that could lead to internal instability. The Tehran area is facing an unprecedented water shortage crisis due to prolonged drought, overconsumption, and government mismanagement.[lxvi] The Iranian Energy Ministry-owned Water Research Institute stated on November 7 that Tehran must prepare for a crisis after the city received no rainfall in both October and November, despite normally receiving 50–60 millimeters during these months.[lxvii] This drought has caused Tehran’s reservoir volume to drop to about 250 million cubic meters, compared to around 490 million cubic meters in the last Persian calendar year.[lxviii] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian warned on November 7 that Tehran may ration water in December if rain does not fall and that individuals may have to evacuate Tehran if the water shortage persists.[lxix] Iranian Energy Minister Abbas Aliabadi announced on November 9 that water suppliers may cut water in some areas of Tehran if the water shortage continues and advised Iranians to install home water storage systems in preparation.[lxx] An Iranian water industry official stated on November 9 that water pressure would be lowered during the night to allow cities to refill their reservoirs.[lxxi] The water shortage crisis demonstrates the Iranian regime’s inability to address the needs of its citizens and could potentially trigger unrest.

Iran is also facing a gasoline crisis that could contribute to internal instability. Pezeshkian said on October 23 that gasoline prices may "have to” rise.[lxxii] An Iranian parliamentarian claimed on November 8 that Iran has run out of money in its budget to import gasoline.[lxxiii] Iranian parliamentarians sent a letter to Pezeshkian on November 10 urging him to address the worsening gasoline crisis.[lxxiv] The letter highlighted that Iran’s domestic gasoline production falls short by 20 million liters daily, which forces the Iranian regime to buy costly imports. These imports subsequently strain the Iranian budget and worsen inflation.[lxxv] An increase in gas prices previously sparked protests in Iran in 2019.[lxxvi]

Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Deputy Chief Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi inspected air defense sites at the Shahid Bushehrian Air Defense Zone in Bushehr Province on November 10.^l[lxxvii] Vahidi recently replaced Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Ashtiani as the Armed Forces General Staff Deputy Chief.[lxxviii] Vahidi inspected the Artesh Air Force 6th Tactical Airbase in Bushehr Province on October 31 and the IRGC Navy 2nd Nouh-e Nabi Region in Bushehr Province on November 1.[lxxix] The following map shows important military, nuclear, and energy sites in Bushehr Province, including the three sites that Vahidi recently inspected.

Iraq

Iraq’s electoral commission reported an 82 percent turnout rate during the November 9 early voting period for the parliamentary elections.[lxxx] Iraqi security personnel, internally displaced persons, prisoners, and hospitalized patients were eligible to vote early. These groups comprise about five percent of eligible Iraqi voters.[lxxxi] The 82 percent turnout rate during the early voting period comes amid concerns about low voter turnout on election day on November 11.[lxxxii] An internal Shia Coordination Framework memo leaked in July 2025 warned of a voter turnout rate below 20 percent.[lxxxiii]

Iraqi media reported several instances of voter intimidation during the early voting period on November 9.[lxxxiv] Unidentified Interior Ministry members claimed on November 9 that unspecified officers and security force personnel pressured them to vote for specific candidates and electoral lists.[lxxxv] Unidentified actors also reportedly threatened to expel some Anbar Province Tribal Mobilization forces members from the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) if they did not vote for a PMF-affiliated candidate.[lxxxvi] The Iraqi government formed the Tribal Mobilization forces as part of the PMF in 2014. Sunnis and other minority groups make up the Tribal Mobilization forces, making the body considerably different from the rest of the Shia-dominated PMF.[lxxxvii] These incidents follow multiple reports of voter intimidation, voter fraud, and electoral violence during the November 2025 election season.[lxxxviii]

Syria

See topline section.

Arabian Peninsula

Unspecified Yemeni sources cited by Saudi media on November 9 claimed that Houthi Interior Minister Abdulkarim Amiruddin Hussein al Houthi is dead.[lxxxix]  Abdulkarim has been in a coma since August 2025 when Israeli airstrikes targeted Houthi leadership in Sanaa.[xc] Israel’s August 2025 airstrikes also killed Houthi Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Mohammad Abdulkarim al Ghamari.[xci] Abdulkarim was a top Houthi leader and was close to Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi.[xcii] Abdulkarim designed and maintained the Houthis’ internal security strategy to control territory in Yemen, which included domestic population suppression.[xciii] Abdulkarim also maintained close ties with the IRGC and Hezbollah, according to counterterrorism experts.[xciv] It is unclear who has been functioning as the interim interior minister since August 2025.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on November 9 that the IDF has mobilized 9,000 reservists over the past week.[xcv] The IDF reportedly assigned the reservists to multiple units and roles, including the 96th Division, combat brigade administrative assistance units, Home Front Command battalions, and Air Force defense battalions.[xcvi] The 96th Division has operated along the Israel-Jordan border and the West Bank security barrier over the past year.[xcvii] The IDF stated that the mobilization is intended to improve force readiness and ease the burden on other reservists.[xcviii]