Iran Updates, February 2025

Iran Update, February 25, 2025

The British ambassador to Israel stated on February 25 that the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) has given Iran until the end of June 2025 to conclude a new nuclear deal and prevent the imposition of snapback sanctions. It is very unlikely that Iran will conclude a deal with the E3 and the United States by June 2025, given that such a deal would require Iran to completely change its current policy on negotiations.[i] The JCPOA snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.” The snapback mechanism expires in October 2025. The JCPOA itself will also effectively expire in October 2025, which means that Iran and the E3 would essentially have to draft a new agreement from scratch. It is very unlikely that Iran, the E3, and the United States would be able to draft such an agreement by June 2025 given that the negotiations that resulted in the JCPOA lasted for years. A new deal would also require Iran to completely change its stance on negotiations. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei categorically rejected nuclear negotiations with the United States in a speech on February 7.[ii] Iranian officials who previously supported and were involved in negotiations with the United States have since then echoed Khamenei’s rejection of negotiations.[iii] The conclusion of a nuclear deal by June 2025 would require Khamenei to reverse his policy on negotiations, which he is unlikely to do.

 

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) previously passed a censure resolution proposed by the E3 in November 2024 that requires the IAEA to produce a ”comprehensive report” on Iranian nuclear activities by spring 2025.[iv] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the IAEA report would almost certainly confirm Iranian noncompliance with the JCPOA and lay the foundation for the E3 to reimpose snapback sanctions in early March 2025[v] IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated on February 14 that the IAEA Board of Governors will not discuss the ”comprehensive report” in its March 2025 meeting, however.[vi]

 

Iran is preparing for a potential Israeli strike on Iran, according to two unspecified senior Iranian officials speaking to The Telegraph on February 25.[vii] The officials said that Iran is bolstering its air defenses, but that Iran’s current systems would likely not be able to defend against an Israeli strike. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) rendered Iran’s Russian-made S-300 air defense systems, which were the most advanced air defense systems that Iran operated, in its October 2024 strikes on Iran.[viii] The Telegraph reported that the damage to Iran’s S-300 systems has ”prompted Iran to pressure Russia”  to accelerate the delivery of the S-400 missile system to Iran.[ix]

 

A senior Iranian military commander threatened on February 24 that Iran could attack US and allied interests in the Middle East in response to a potential Israeli attack on Iran. Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Commander Major General Gholam Ali Rashid warned that Iran could attack facilities and bases that "assist” an Israeli attack on Iran.[x] Rashid was likely referring to US bases in Gulf and Iraq as well as other sites in the Gulf countries. The Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters is the highest Iranian operational headquarters and is responsible for joint and wartime operations.[xi] Iran has previously attacked US bases in response to Israeli attacks because Iranian officials believe that the United States can prevent Israel from conducting airstrikes targeting Iranian assets. Iranian-backed militants targeted al Tanf Garrison with drones and rockets in October 2021 after the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck Iranian military targets in central Syria, for example.[xii] 

 

Iran retains a large number of short-range ballistic missiles that it could use to strike US bases in the Middle East. The October 2024 IDF strikes on Iran severely degraded Iran’s long-range missile production capabilities and Iranian strikes targeting Israel depleted Iran’s stockpile of long-range ballistic missiles, but Iran still retains very large stockpiles of short-range ballistic missiles.[xiii] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajji Zadeh recently similarly warned that Iran could attack US bases with short-range missiles in response to an Israeli attack, stating that Iran does not need to increase the range of its missiles because its missiles can already reach all US bases in the region.[xiv]

 

The Iranian Artesh and IRGC conducted a joint exercise in the Persian Gulf, Sea of Oman, and the Indian Ocean between February 22 and February 25 that was likely part of Iran’s efforts to project power ahead of a potential Israeli strike on Iran. The Artesh and IRGC concluded the “Zolfaghar 1403” military exercise on February 25.[xv] The Artesh Navy and IRGC Aerospace Force conducted their first joint missile operation in which cruise and ballistic missiles ”fully sank” a simulated target in the northern Indian Ocean.[xvi] This joint effort could help Iran improve its coordination in the event it needs to conduct real-world military operations as part of a retaliation for an Israeli strike. The Artesh reportedly tested the long-range Iranian-made ”Arash” drone, which Iranian officials claim has a range of 1,200 kilometers.[xvii] The Artesh Navy also displayed its surface and submarine fleet, including destroyers, missile-launching vessels, troop carriers, and Fateh- and Ghadir-class submarines.[xviii] The focus on missile strikes in this exercise suggests that Iran may have sought to use the exercise to signal that it might respond forcefully to an attack on Iran.

 

The attendees of the two-day Syrian National Dialogue Conference issued a statement consistent with the interim government’s stated goals at the end of the conference on February 25.[xix] The statement concluded two days of discussion among hundreds of Syrians who gathered in Damascus and joined the conference virtually to discuss their visions for Syria’s future. Syrian officials have promoted the National Dialogue Conference, and its final statement in particular, as the first step toward drafting a new Syrian constitution.[xx] The conference has been viewed as a litmus test for how the HTS-led interim government will respond to minority groups’ demands and represent Syrians in the future government. Syrian media reported that 550 Syrians participated in the conference’s second day.[xxi] Syrian state media added that 6,000 Syrian expatriates participated in the conference virtually.[xxii] The final statement said that the Syrian Preparatory Committee will issue a “detailed report” that presents the attendees‘ opinions and discussions.[xxiii] This report should provide more information about whether and how the large number of conference attendees reached serious proposals or concepts. The attendees’ reaction to the report may also indicate how accurately the Preparatory Committee renders the opinions and discussions of the attendees.

 

The conference’s final statement is not significantly different from the interim government's previous rhetoric and stated goals. The final statement outlined 18 non-binding recommendations for the Syrian government.[xxiv] All of the recommendations are consistent with the goals and values that the Syrian interim government has outlined since coming to power in December 2024. Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara highlighted many of the goals that are included in the list of recommendations during his opening speech on the second day of the conference.[xxv] The non-binding recommendations include:[xxvi]

• Syrian unity and sovereignty over all territory and armed factions. The conference attendees rejected any “division” of “part[s] of the homeland” from the interim government’s control. The attendees also emphasized support for a new national army and the dissolution of all armed groups. The conference notably did not include Kurdish officials affiliated with the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) or its political wing, the Democratic Union Party (PYD).[xxvii]
• Acceleration of the government formation process. The attendees called on the interim government to accelerate the formation of a constitutional committee and an interim legislative council. The constitutional committee will draft a new Syrian constitution that ensures a balance of power and enshrines justice, freedom, and equality as Syrian values. The interim legislative council will assume temporary legislative duties until Syria holds elections for a permanent legislature. Shara previously implied that the interim government would establish these two bodies soon after the National Dialogue Conference.[xxviii]
• Preservation of and respect for human rights and the rights of minorities. The attendees called on the interim government to respect human rights, including women’s rights, and to reject discrimination on the basis of race, religion, or sect. The statement called for “peaceful coexistence” among Syria’s diverse communities and rejected all forms of sectarian or ethnically motivated violence.
• An immediate Israeli withdrawal from southern Syria. The attendees condemned the Israel Defense Force’s (IDF) incursion into Syrian territory as a violation of Syrian sovereignty and called for an immediate IDF withdrawal. The attendees also called on the international community to pressure Israel to stop its “violations.”

 

The National Dialogue Conference, and the conference’s final statement, do not appear to impact who will comprise the future constitutional committee. The interim government likely designed the conference and statement to legitimize the constitutional committee and its decisions. The conference’s recommendations have not been designed to be legally binding in any way but are designed to legitimize the political process by allowing the interim government to note that it consulted a broad swath of Syrians. Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara has previously stated that these recommendations will “pave the way” for the “constitutional declaration,” a document that will presumably serve as the legal basis for the transitional period.[xxix] National Dialogue Conference spokesperson Hassan al Daghim recently stated that Shara expects the recommendations presented during the National Dialogue Conference to inform the drafting of this ”constitution declaration.”[xxx]  The committee is not required to consider the recommendations given that the recommendations are non-binding, however. The Syrian government is expected to appoint a constitutional committee in the near future. It is unclear if this committee will be more representative of Syrian society than the National Dialogue Conference Preparatory Committee, which is mostly comprised of pro-HTS individuals who are loyal to Shara.[xxxi] The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), which is the de-facto governing authority of northeastern Syria, criticized the National Dialogue Conference on February 25 for not fairly representing all components of Syrian society. The AANES stated that it will not contribute to the “implementation of [conference’s] outcomes,” presumably referring to the principles outlined in the conference’s final statement.[xxxii]

 

Protests have broken out across Syria in response to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's recent demand to demilitarize southern Syria. Hundreds of Syrians gathered in villages across Daraa and Suwayda provinces on February 25 to protest Netanyahu’s demand.[xxxiii] Smaller-scale protests took place in other provinces, including Rif Dimashq, Latakia, Tartous, and Aleppo provinces, and outside the UN headquarters in Mezzeh, Damascus.[xxxiv] Several Syrian protestors carried signs that affirmed their support for interim government control over the south and the interim government’s right to ”defend the homeland” against external forces.[xxxv]

 

These protests may expand because the interim government has few means to satisfy the protesters’ concerns. The expansion of the protests would risk destabilizing the interim government during a very difficult transition. Shara lacks the capacity to seriously counter Israeli operations militarily and risks destabilizing the transition even if he could respond militarily to Israeli operations. Shara recognizes the constraints he operates under and has noted that the interim government does not seek a fight with Israel.[xxxvi] These constraints are temporary, to be sure, and do not rule out a military response from forces loyal to Shara in the future, former Assad regime elements he does not control, or other independent actors. The temporary constraints also do not rule out future attacks from Syria against Israel itself. A group of 50 prominent individuals from Quneitra Province and the Golan Heights criticized Shara’s ”disregard” for the IDF’s actions in southern Syria and called on Shara to apply diplomatic and political pressure on Israel to end the IDF presence in Syria.[xxxvii] Shara also lacks the diplomatic leverage to pressure the IDF to withdraw, however. Shara’s inability to respond to the Israeli military action means that protests may expand as Damascus fails to accede to the protesters’ demands and Israeli operations continue.  

 

CTP-ISW is monitoring reports that Israel conducted several airstrikes in southern Syria after CTP-ISW’s data cutoff on February 25.[xxxviii] CTP-ISW will cover these strikes in the February 26 Iran Update.

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Nuclear Program: The British ambassador to Israel stated on February 25 that the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) has given Iran until the end of June 2025 to conclude a new nuclear deal and prevent the imposition of snapback sanctions. It is very unlikely that Iran will conclude a deal with the E3 and the United States by June 2025, given that such a deal would require Iran to completely change its current policy on negotiations. Iran has continued to prepare for an Israeli strike on Iran.
• Iranian Threats Against the United States: A senior Iranian military commander threatened on February 24 that Iran could attack US and allied interests in the Middle East in response to a potential Israeli attack on Iran. Iran retains a large number of short-range ballistic missiles that it could use to strike US bases in the Middle East. The October 2024 IDF strikes on Iran severely degraded Iran’s long-range missile production capabilities and Iranian strikes targeting Israel depleted Iran’s stockpile of long-range ballistic missiles, but Iran still retains very large stockpiles of short-range ballistic missiles.
• Syrian Constitution: The attendees of the two-day Syrian National Dialogue Conference issued a statement consistent with the interim government’s stated goals at the end of the conference on February 25. The National Dialogue Conference, and the conference’s final statement, do not appear to impact who will comprise the future constitutional committee. The interim government likely designed the conference and statement to legitimize the constitutional committee and its decisions.
• Israel in Syria: Protests have broken out across Syria in response to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's recent demand to demilitarize southern Syria. These protests may expand because the interim government has few means to satisfy the protesters’ concerns. The expansion of the protests would risk destabilizing the interim government during a very difficult transition.

Iran Update, February 24, 2025

The Syrian interim government began a two-day National Dialogue Conference on February 24 on 24-hour notice.[i] The Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-affiliated Preparatory Committee started sending invitations to over one thousand Syrians nationwide and internationally on February 23 calling for attendees to report the next day to Damascus.[ii] The Preparatory Committee spokesperson Hassan al Daghim said that over 600 invitees arrived in Damascus on February 24.[iii] The short notice prevented the attendance of invitees from outside of Syria and likely decreased participation from remote provinces like Hasakah and Raqqa, given the travel and planning requirements inherent for international travel and travel through lines of control within Syria.[iv] The conference will hold simultaneous 4.5-hour sessions touching on transitional justice, constitutional structure, institutional reform, personal freedoms, civil society, and economic principles on February 25.[v] Syrian interim president Ahmed al Shara will also speak to the conference attendees.[vi]

The conference has not yet met the expectations that the HTS-led interim government initially set due to the 24-hour notice given to participants, which will constrain the ability of many Syrians to attend the conference. The interim government, the Preparatory Committee, and Shara had framed the conference as a chance for Syrians to meaningfully impact the direction of post-Assad Syria and as a gesture of good will to minority groups that HTS would not assume authoritarian power over the state.[vii] The failure to give proper advance notice for the conference is unlikely to achieve these lofty expectations, however.The lack of advance notice means that many Syrians--both inside and outside Syria—will not be able to attend owing to logistical constraints. The conference’s short time frame will similarly not allow for any meaningful discussion on plans for Syria’s future. This may result in a conference that makes few decisions and does not represent large swathes of Syrians.

Some minority leaders in Syria are already expressing their concerns over the short notice, limited scope, and short duration of the talks. A Druze leader, the Syrian Kurdish National Council (KNC) and other Kurdish minority party representatives expressed frustrations with the conference.[viii] The KNC condemned the haste, scope, and choice of representatives.[ix] Damascus excluded the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces and the Democratic Union Party (PYD), which is heavily influential within the SDF.[x] None of these groups or leaders are representative of the entirety of their minority groups. Their frustrations and concerns do underscore the significant shortcomings inherent in the rapid execution of the conference, however.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu demanded on February 23 that Syria fully demilitarize southern Syria.[xi] Netanyahu said that Israel will not allow any Syrian government forces to deploy south of Damascus and demanded “full demilitarization” of Daraa, Suwayda, and Quneitra provinces.[xii] Daraa, Suwayda, and Quneitra make up 11,241 square kilometers. Netanyahu added that Israel will “not tolerate any threat “to the Syrian Druze community.[xiii] Syrians demonstrated against Netanyahu’s statement in several locations across Daraa Province.[xiv] The Syrian interim government has not publicly responded to Netanyahu‘s statement at the time of this writing.

Israel has also offered other opportunities to small numbers of Syrian Druze and reportedly conducted a census of Quneitra Province. The Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT)—a department within the Israeli Defense Ministry)—will launch a pilot program to provide job opportunities to members of the Syrian Druze community to work in Israeli-controlled Golan Heights.[xv] Local Syrian media claimed on February 22 that Israel conducted a census in Quneitra Province as a part of this program.[xvi] Residents of Quneitra reportedly rejected Israeli job opportunities, labeling any acceptance of the opportunities as ”normalization with Israel.” Local Syrian media quoted unspecified Quneitra residents who suggested that these moves demonstrated Israel’s “intention to remain [in Syria] for a long time.”[xvii]

The continued Israeli presence in southwestern Syrian will provide opportunities for anti-Israeli Syrian groups to attack the IDF. Interim Syrian President Ahmed al Shara said on January23 that Damascus does not seek a fight with Israel, but Shara has only limited control over southwestern Syria as of February 2025.[xviii] A pro-Assad Syrian militia claimed an attack targeting Israeli forces in Quneitra in early 2025.[xix] These regime remnants currently have very limited capabilities, but a continued Israeli presence could engender increased hostility in southern Israel and enable other anti-Israeli groups to recruit more fighters.

Hezbollah officials said that they will “support” the Lebanese army’s efforts to expel Israel from Lebanon, which reflects the group’s severe degradation and prioritization of reconstitution. Hezbollah officials spoke at former Hassan Nasrallah’s funeral in southern Beirut on February 23 and avoided direct threats against Israeli forces in Lebanon.[xx] The officials instead highlighted the group’s commitment to supporting the Lebanese state’s efforts to expel Israel. Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem said that Hezbollah had entered a “new phase” in which Hezbollah will support Lebanon’s diplomatic efforts to expel Israel from Lebanese territory.[xxi] Qassem said that Hezbollah could exercise the right to “resist” if its assessment of the situation changed.[xxii] A prominent Hezbollah member of parliament also said the Lebanese state needed to “liberate” the remaining Israeli-controlled territory in Lebanon.[xxiii] These statements indicate that Hezbollah is unwilling to attack Israeli forces in the short term, likely due to Israeli operations that severely degraded the group.

Hezbollah’s activities on the ground also indicate that Hezbollah is willing to shift more security responsibilities to the Lebanese army, even in Hezbollah-dominated southern Lebanon. An unspecified source close to Hezbollah told the Wall Street Journal on February 23 that Hezbollah circulated an internal memo to combat units ordering fighters who are not from southern Lebanon to vacate positions and allow the Lebanese Armed Forces to take control of the area.[xxiv] Hezbollah has historically enjoyed de-facto security control over southern Lebanon and has viewed itself the primary node in Lebanon committed to resistance against Israel. Ceding these tasks to the Lebanese state suggests that Hezbollah has indeed entered a ”new phase” that is characterized by its temporary loss of influence in the south in order to prioritize long-term reconstitution and rehabilitation.

Iran emphasized its continued support for Hezbollah and Lebanon in the wake of the October 7 War. Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, Ahl al Bayt World Assembly Secretary-General Mohammad Hassan Aktari, Supreme Leader’s Representative in Iraq and Syria Seyyed Mojtaba Hosseini, the Supreme Leader’s Office’s Communications and International Affairs Deputy Mohsen Qomi, and Presidential Coordination Council member Seyyed Reza Taghavi attended Nasrallah’s funeral in Beirut on February 23.[xxv] Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei also declared five days of national mourning following Nasrallah’s funeral.[xxvi]Khamenei also claimed that the resistance Nasrallah built would grow stronger. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps reiterated the IRGC’s commitment to ”liberating” Palestinian lands and warned Israeli leaders of their “inevitable fate” in a condolence message for Nasrallah.[xxvii]

Ghalibaf, Araghchi and Iranian Ambassador to Beirut Mojtaba Amani separately met with Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Lebanese Foreign Minister Youssef Raji on February 23.[xxviii] Ghalibaf also met separately with Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and then Lebanese Parliament Speaker and Shia Amal Movement leader Nabih Berri about Iranian support for Lebanon.[xxix]  Ghalibaf told Berri that Iran considers Hezbollah as ”part of Lebanon’s national security and strength.”[xxx] Ghalibaf added in a press conference that Iran is ready to strengthen bilateral cooperation to achieve “development and security in Lebanon.”[xxxi]

Other Axis of Resistance members also attended Nasrallah’s funeral. Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) officials attended the funeral, including the Chairman Faleh Fayyadh, Chief of Staff Abu Fadak al Muhammadawi, and Finance Director Qassim al Zubaidi.[xxxii] An Abu Dhabi-based outlet also claimed that the PMF officials traveled with four million dollars that they gave to Hezbollah.[xxxiii] Asaib Ahl al Haq Deputy Secretary General Muhammad Tabatabai and senior Asaib Ahl al Haq official Jawad al Talibawi were also in Beirut.[xxxiv] Several Houthi officials also attended the ceremony in Beirut, including Houthi Military Negotiating Committee Head Major General Yahya Abdullah al Razami.[xxxv]

Iran reportedly threatened to strike Iraqi Kurdistan with unspecified systems if Iraq fails to implement the March 2023 Iran-Iraq security agreement. Unspecified “informed sources” speaking to Iraqi media claimed that Iran threatened to conduct strikes against unspecified Kurdish opposition groups after Iran observed the groups participating in a military parade in Iraqi Kurdistan.[xxxvi] Iran and Iraq signed a security agreement in March 2023 requiring Iraqi authorities to disarm and relocate members of the Kurdish opposition groups away from the border.[xxxvii] The agreement followed a series of Iranian strikes against Kurdish opposition groups in Iraqi Kurdistan from September to November 2022 after Iranian leaders accused these groups of stoking civil unrest against the Iranian regime and described their presence in Iraqi Kurdistan as a national security threat.[xxxviii] Iranian leaders have previously threatened to resume such attacks if Iraqi authorities do not completely fulfill the security agreement.[xxxix]

A flurry of meetings between the Kurdistan Regional Government, federal Iraqi government, and Iranian government to discuss border security suggests that Iran may be increasingly concerned about its border security along the border with Iraqi Kurdistan. CTP-ISW cannot verify the reports of an Iranian threat to strike, however. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and Iraqi federal government joint committee met at the KRG's Interior Ministry on February 22 to discuss continued cooperation between the Iraqi federal government, the KRG, and Iran on border security issues.[xl]  KRG Interior Minister Rebar Ahmed and Iraqi National Security Adviser Qassem al Araji attended the meeting. Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) President Masoud Barzani separately met with Araji on February 22 to discuss Iran-Iraq relations and review the March 2023 security agreement.[xli] An Iranian Interior Ministry delegation also travelled to Baghdad on February 22 to meet with Iraqi officials.[xlii] Iranian Interior Minister Iskander Momeni met with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani to discuss bilateral relations and border security as part of the delegation that traveled to Baghdad.[xliii]

Key Takeaways:

• Syrian Constitution: The Syrian interim government began a two-day National Dialogue Conference on February 24 on 24-hour notice. The conference has not yet met the expectations that the HTS-led interim government initially set due to the 24-hour notice given to participants, which will constrain the ability of many Syrians to attend the conference. This may result in a conference that makes few decisions and does not represent large swathes of Syrians.
• Israel in Syria: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu demanded on February 23 that Syria fully demilitarize southern Syria. Israel has simultaneously offered other opportunities to small numbers of Syrian Druze and reportedly conducted a census of Quneitra Province. The continued Israeli presence in southwestern Syrian will provide opportunities for anti-Israeli Syrian groups to attack the IDF.
• Hezbollah in Lebanon: Hezbollah officials said that they will “support” the Lebanese army’s efforts to expel Israel from Lebanon, which reflects the group’s severe degradation and prioritization of reconstitution. Hezbollah’s activities on the ground also indicate that Hezbollah is willing to shift more security responsibilities to the Lebanese army, even in Hezbollah-dominated southern Lebanon.
• Iran and Iraqi Kurdistan: Iran reportedly threatened to strike Iraqi Kurdistan with unspecified systems if Iraq fails to implement the March 2023 Iran-Iraq security agreement. A flurry of meetings between the Kurdistan Regional Government, federal Iraqi government, and Iranian government to discuss border security suggests that Iran may be increasingly concerned about its border security along the border with Iraqi Kurdistan. CTP-ISW cannot verify the reports of an Iranian threat to strike, however.

Iran Update, February 20, 2025

Senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commanders have resurfaced threats to conduct a direct attack on Israel, likely to try to shape Israeli decision making and deter a potential Israeli strike on Iran. Several senior IRGC commanders, including IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami, IRGC Deputy Commander Brigadier General Ali Fadavi, and IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajji Zadeh, have warned in recent days that Iran will conduct a third “True Promise” attack against Israel.[i] Iran named its previous two direct attacks on Israel in April and October 2024 “True Promise I” and “True Promise II,” respectively.[ii] Iranian military officials initially threatened to conduct a third direct attack on Israel after the IDF conducted strikes in Iran in late October 2024.[iii] These threats gradually subsided in the weeks following the IDF strikes, however. IRGC commanders have likely resurfaced these threats in recent days to try to deter an Israeli attack on Iran and to reassure the Iranian population that the IRGC would respond to any Israeli attack on Iranian territory.

Hajji Zadeh highlighted Iran’s vulnerability to an external attack in an interview on February 18. Hajji Zadeh stated that Iran’s “anti-ballistic [missile] defense” systems suffered damage during “recent incidents.”[iv] Hajji Zadeh was likely referring to the S-300 air defense systems that the IDF struck in October 2024. The October 2024 IDF strikes rendered Iran's S-300 air defense systems inoperable, likely by destroying the radars that the systems rely on.[v] Hajji Zadeh added that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s “first follow-up" during meetings with Hajji Zadeh, Salami, and Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri is about the issue of “anti-ballistic [missile] defense” systems.[vi] Khamenei’s prioritization of this issue highlights his concern about a potential external attack on Iran. Hajji Zadeh claimed that Iran will install “anti-ballistic [missile] defense systems” in Tehran and other major Iranian cities in the next Persian calendar year, which begins in late March 2025.[vii]

The Syrian Preparatory Committee held “dialogue sessions” for Raqqa and Hasakah provinces in Damascus on February 20 in which some participants expressed anti-Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) views. The Preparatory Committee’s “dialogue sessions,” which have thus far taken place in provincial capitals rather than in the national capital, are meant to help the interim government "develop an integrated action plan” for the National Dialogue Conference.[viii] This conference will reportedly facilitate the drafting of a new Syrian constitution.[ix]  Preparatory Committee member and Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-affiliated Muhammad Mastat stated that the Raqqa dialogue session took place in Damascus due to SDF “threats, repression and silence against the people of [Raqqa] province.”[x] Syrian state media quoted an anonymous participant from the SDF stronghold of Qamishli who demanded that the new Syrian state correct injustices that the Assad regime committed against Kurds, but did not otherwise discuss protections for the Kurdish population.[xi] SANA reported that attendees at the Raqqa dialogue session discussed SDF “crimes and violations” against locals, including wrongful imprisonment.[xii]  Preparatory Committee spokesperson Hassan al Daghim emphasized that Hasakah, Deir ez Zor, and Raqqa must rejoin the Syrian state under “one army” and called for the dissolution of all military formations outside of the Syrian Defense Ministry.[xiii] The interim government has repeatedly called on the SDF to dissolve in recent weeks.[xiv]

The composition of the Raqqa and Hasakah dialogue sessions was likely influenced by the fact that it took place in Damascus and that the HTS-affiliated Preparatory Committee refused to invite the SDF. A minority Kurdish party, the Kurdish National Council (KNC), criticized the decision to hold the dialogue sessions outside areas controlled by the SDF and the composition of the session participants.[xv] The KNC is dominated by the Syrian wing of the Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). KDP President Masoud Barzani has called on the interim government to respect Kurdish rights and the SDF to cooperate with the KNC in negotiations with Damascus.[xvi] Preparatory Committee members have repeatedly stated that the SDF and its political party, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), will not be invited to the National Dialogue Conference.[xvii] A Kurdish activist posted a video on February 20 of the Syrian interim government purportedly ejecting a ”representative of the SDF (AANES) from the National Dialogue Committee Session.”[xviii] CTP-ISW cannot verify the authenticity of this video. The Deir ez Zor Province dialogue session is scheduled to take place in Deir ez Zor City on February 21.[xix] It remains unclear if representatives from the SDF-controlled eastern bank of the Euphrates River, which constitutes about half of Deir ez Zor Province, will be allowed to attend the session. The potential exclusion of Kurdish groups from dialogue sessions would likely impact the trajectory of the National Dialogue Conference and subsequent drafting of the constitution.

These dialogue sessions are taking place about a week before the March 1, 2025, internal deadline that HTS set for itself to form a transitional government. Interim Foreign Affairs Minister Asaad al Shaibani said on February 12 that Syria will “be launched [on] March 1” and “represent the Syrian people as much as possible.”[xx] The HTS ”Victory Conference” in late January 2025 resulted in the appointment of HTS leader Ahmed al Shara as interim president. Shara is responsible for establishing a transitional legislature.[xxi]

Interim government Internal Security Forces seized a possible Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) in Azaz, northwestern Aleppo Province, on February 20.[xxii] Azaz is located near the Syria-Turkey border. Security forces dismantled the VBIED.[xxiii] This is the eleventh car bomb or VBIED that has detonated or been dismantled in Syrian interim government and SNA-controlled territory in Aleppo Province since late December 2024, most recently on February 3.[xxiv] No actor or group has claimed responsibility for the recent car bomb and VBIED attacks, and it is unclear if the same actor has conducted every attack. Turkish and anti-SDF Syrian media frequently claimed that the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the People’s Protection Units (YPG), and the SDF conduct these attacks, which the SDF has consistently denied.[xxv]

The PKK may have conducted some of these attacks, including the attempted car bomb attack in Azaz. Several of the attacks involved relatively advanced VBIEDs that caused high civilian casualties.[xxvi] A relatively organized cell is required to manufacture and transport such VBIEDs prior to their detonation. The PKK has historically operated in northwestern Syria, particularly in northern Aleppo Province, and some of its cells almost certainly remain in the area.[xxvii] ISIS also has some presence in northern Aleppo Province, but it has deprioritized this area in recent years and it very likely lacks the sort of well-developed safe zones required to build and deploy VBIEDs.

It is highly unlikely that SDF commander Mazloum Abdi has command and control over PKK elements operating in Azaz and other areas behind the frontline. Abdi has denied that the SDF is involved in the recent attacks and has significant incentives to avoid undermining ongoing negotiations with the Damascus government.[xxviii] Abdi, who is a relative moderate within the SDF, has also verbally agreed to eject foreign PKK fighters from Syria.[xxix] The expulsion of PKK fighters from Syria—many of whom answer to the PKK’s headquarters, not Abdi—which would both increase Abdi’s own power and help him secure a deal with Damascus.[xxx] A deliberate decision by Abdi to permit these attacks on civilians in northern Syria risks scuttling talks with Damascus and destroying the SDF project that Abdi has built since 2015.

Key Iraqi political parties, including the main Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia political parties, are attempting to solidify their control of the Iraqi state by amending the Iraqi electoral law ahead of the October 2025 parliamentary elections. Some Shia Coordination Framework members are concerned that the return of Iraqi nationalist Shia cleric Muqtada al Sadr to Iraqi politics could threaten the seat shares of their individual parties in parliament and allow Sadr to control parliament.[xxxi] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose collection of Shia parties, some of which are backed by Iran. Sadr won the most seats in the October 2021 parliamentary elections and his movement nearly formed a government with Kurdish and Sunni backing before Sadr withdrew from politics in 2022.[xxxii] His withdrawal from politics enabled the Shia Coordination Framework to gain the majority of seats in parliament. An unspecified Sadrist source said on February 20 that Sadr will not participate in the upcoming elections regardless of whether Iraq uses an “electoral district or Saint Lague system.”[xxxiii] The Iraqi parliament has previously frequently modified the Iraqi electoral law before parliamentary elections.[xxxiv] The French Saint Lague system that Iraq used during elections between 2014 and 2020 allocated seats proportionally to Iraqi political parties in a way that often disadvantaged smaller parties.[xxxv] Iraq adopted a majoritarian system in 2020 that enabled smaller parties to win more seats in parliament.[xxxvi] Sadr’s movement won the largest number of seats in the October 2021 elections, largely due to internal competition within the Shia Coordination Framework.[xxxvii]

Parliament passed an amendment to the electoral law in 2023 to return Iraq to the Saint Lague system, likely to favor larger Shia Coordination Framework parties in the October 2025 elections.[xxxviii]  State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki recently called on parliament to approve an amendment that would decrease the number of electoral districts in each province, which would further return Iraq to its pre-2020 electoral system.[xxxix] 

Maliki reportedly seeks to amend the electoral law because he is concerned that Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani will prioritize winning a second term as prime minister over ensuring that the Shia Coordination Framework retains its majority in parliament.[xl] Unidentified Shia sources told Saudi media in September 2024 that Sudani has allied politically with 50 unspecified Shia Coordination Framework members, around 60 parliamentarians, and multiple provincial governors. Maliki may be concerned that Sudani’s political aspirations could lead him to further divide the Shia Coordination Framework’s support among Shia voters, which would weaken the Shia Coordination Framework against Sadr’s movement in the upcoming elections.

Some Iraqi Shia politicians and notable Shia religious figures are concerned that Sadr’s potential non-involvement in the upcoming elections could destabilize Iraq. Iraqi media reported on February 20 that the Shia Coordination Framework is publicly supporting Sadr’s involvement in the parliamentary elections because Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani called for the participation of all Shia political parties in the political process.[xli] Some Shia Coordination Framework members may be concerned that Sadr could call for protests if his political party does not participate in the upcoming elections, which would risk destabilizing the country. Sadr has periodically called for protests, including after the 2021 elections.[xlii] Sadr’s supporters and Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) fighters clashed following Sadr’s withdrawal from politics in June 2022.[xliii] Sadr’s Saraya al Salam militia also initially supported the October 2019 protests and continued to support the protesters until well after the protest movement caused the collapse of the Adel Abdul Mahdi government.[xliv] Many of the pro-Iran factions that are part of the Shia Coordination Framework supported the Mahdi government. The fall of Mahdi‘s government led to the premiership of Mustafa al Kadhimi, whose government threatened some of the Shia Coordination Framework factions. Shia Coordination Framework members may seek to include Sadr in the upcoming elections to head off the risk of protests while simultaneously changing the electoral law to disadvantage Sadr and other small parties. This move would protect Iraq’s stability by avoiding protests while also ensuring that elements of the Shia Coordination Framework could control the government.

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Rhetoric: Senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commanders have resurfaced threats to conduct a direct attack on Israel, likely to try to shape Israeli decision making and deter a potential Israeli strike on Iran. Hajji Zadeh also highlighted Iran’s vulnerability to an external attack in an interview on February 18. Hajji Zadeh stated that Iran’s “anti-ballistic [missile] defense” systems suffered damage during “recent incidents.”
• Syrian Constitution: The composition of the Raqqa and Hasakah dialogue sessions was likely influenced by the fact that it took place in Damascus and that the HTS-affiliated Preparatory Committee refused to invite the SDF. The Kurdish National Council (KNC), criticized the decision to hold the dialogue sessions outside areas controlled by the SDF and the composition of the session participants. This is notable given the KNC’s long-standing opposition to the SDF.
• Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Syria: Interim government Internal Security Forces seized a possible PKK vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) in Azaz, northwestern Aleppo Province, on February 20. It is highly unlikely that SDF commander Mazloum Abdi has command and control over PKK elements operating in Azaz and other areas behind the frontline. Abdi has denied that the SDF is involved in the recent attacks and has significant incentives to avoid undermining ongoing negotiations with the Damascus government.
• Iraqi Elections: Key Iraqi political parties, including the main Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia political parties, are attempting to solidify their control of the Iraqi state by amending the Iraqi electoral law ahead of the October 2025 parliamentary elections.
• Iraqi Politics: Some Iraqi Shia politicians and notable Shia religious figures are concerned that Sadr’s potential non-involvement in the upcoming elections could destabilize Iraq. Shia Coordination Framework members may seek to include Sadr in the upcoming elections to head off the risk of protests while simultaneously changing the electoral law to disadvantage Sadr and other small parties. This move would protect Iraq’s stability by avoiding protests while also ensuring that elements of the Shia Coordination Framework could control the government.

Iran Update, February 19, 2025

The Syrian Preparatory Committee does not plan to include the Kurdish-majority Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) or its political wing, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), in the National Dialogue Conference.[i] This conference will reportedly facilitate the drafting of a new Syrian constitution, and therefore, the composition of its attendees will influence the trajectory of the post-Assad Syrian state. Preparatory Committee spokesperson Hassan al Daghim told Turkish state media on February 19 that the Syrian interim government expects armed groups to disarm and integrate into the new Syrian army and for the political wings of these armed groups to dissolve.[ii] Daghim called out the SDF and PYD specifically, arguing that the PYD ”must be dissolved“ because the SDF “operates outside the authority of the Damascus government.”[iii] The PYD controls the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), which governs SDF-controlled areas in northeastern Syria.[iv] Daghim’s call for the PYD to ”dissolve” differs from recent reports that Turkey wants to encourage Kurdish political parties, including the PYD, to participate in the political system in Damascus.[v] Daghim confirmed that the Preparatory Committee “has not and will not communicate with the Syrian Democratic Forces or any other military group” but that the interim government is continuing to negotiate disarmament terms with the SDF.[vi] There appear to be several outstanding issues in the negotiations between the interim government and the SDF. An SDF commander stated that the SDF and AANES agreed to merge their forces into the Syrian Defense Ministry on February 17, suggesting that figures formerly associated with the SDF could participate in the conference if the SDF dissolves before the conference.[vii]

The committee’s statements reflect the historic animosity between the SDF and Sunni Arab opposition factions. The SDF fought Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)’s predecessor organizations and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) throughout the 2010s in Syria and had several political disagreements.[viii] The PYD, for example, did not join Syrian opposition organizations.[ix] Sunni Arab opposition groups have accused the SDF of cooperating with the Assad regime and have historically viewed the group with suspicion.[x] The Preparatory Committee is mostly comprised of pro-HTS figures who are loyal to Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara. Daghim previously headed the SNA Moral Guidance Department and has previously criticized the SDF.[xi] Daghim stated on January 31 that the SDF is “one of the Syrian components and cannot be distinguished from other [components].”[xii] Daghim nonetheless appears to be distinguishing the PYD, a dominant component of the SDF, from other Syrian components by calling for its dissolution. The SDF’s leaders, many of whom are Kurdish, are likely reluctant to integrate into an organization that includes groups that have repeatedly committed human rights abuses against Kurds. SDF leaders almost certainly recognize that ongoing Turkish and Turkish-backed attacks in northern Syria pose a possibly existential threat to the SDF and Kurds.[xiii] The SDF is therefore unlikely to willingly give up its ability to defend Kurdish areas against active attacks.

Iraqi nationalist Shia cleric Muqtada al Sadr reportedly plans to return to Iraqi politics, which could deepen fissures between the Shia Coordination Framework parties ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections in October 2025. The Shia Coordination Framework is a relatively loose alliance of several small and major Iraqi parties, some of whom could attempt to ally with Sadr prior to or after elections to improve their political positions. Iraqi media reported on February 18 that Sadr’s Shia National Movement registered to participate in the parliamentary elections.[xiv] Sadr called on his supporters to update their voter registration on February 19.[xv] Sadr’s movement withdrew from Parliament in 2022 amid political deadlock following the October 2021 parliamentary elections.[xvi] The movement’s withdrawal from politics enabled the Shia Coordination Framework to form the largest bloc in parliament. Sadr maintains significant support in the Iraqi Shia community. His return to politics could therefore threaten the Shia Coordination Framework’s majority in parliament, especially if he manages to co-opt smaller parties.

Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia political parties are competing for the chairmanship of the Popular Mobilization Commission (PMC), which is currently held by Faleh al Fayyadh. The PMC is responsible for ensuring that militias in the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) answer to the Iraqi federal government.[xvii] The Iraqi parliament is scheduled to vote on the PMF Law in its next session.[xviii] The PMF Law would force some PMF commanders and leaders, including Fayyadh, to retire due to their age. Some Iranian-backed Shia Coordination Framework members agreed on February 17 to add an amendment to the law that enables the Iraqi prime minister to extend the retirement age for PMF commanders and officials.[xix] This amendment would enable Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani to postpone Fayyadh‘s retirement. Former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki’s State of Law Coalition and Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq’s Sadiqoun Bloc reportedly seek to quickly pass the PMF Law, even if the passage of this law causes Fayyadh’s removal.[xx] Parliamentary sources told Iraqi media on February 19 that parliamentarians from the Badr Organization and Sudani oppose Fayyadh’s removal because they are concerned that a “hardline alternative” could replace Fayyadh.[xxi] It is not clear who the Badr Organization would consider a ”hardliner,” though it may be a reference to more extreme Iranian-backed groups like Kataib Hezbollah. The Shia Coordination Framework members who oppose Fayyadh also reportedly believe that the retirement of veteran PMF leaders could weaken the organization.

Fayyadh met with Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi and Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian in Tehran on February 18, which may indicate that Fayyadh sought Iranian support to retain his position.[xxii] Araghchi reaffirmed Iran’s support for Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, likely including those that operate within the PMF, during his meeting with Fayyadh.[xxiii] Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei similarly stated during a meeting with Sudani in Tehran in early January 2025 that the PMF must be “further strengthened and preserved.”[xxiv]

Some elements of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba appear to be increasingly frustrated over Iranian-backed Iraqi militias’ lack of “resistance” against the United States and Israel. A group calling itself the al Burhan Special Combat Force and claiming to be a part of Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq announced its formation on February 14.[xxv] The group said that it would defend Iraqi territory and citizens from “occupation inside and outside of Iraq,” presumably a reference to the United States and Israel. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force commander ordered Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to cease attacks against US forces in January 2024. The Quds Force commander’s order caused some apparent frustration among more extreme Iranian-backed Iraqi militias like Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, which did not ”initially agree” to the directive.[xxvi] Some Nujaba fighters may be frustrated by the failure of Iranian-backed groups to respond to reports that the Iraqi federal government may reconsider the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq by the end of 2026.[xxvii]

Iranian-backed Iraqi groups similarly stopped attacks targeting Israel in November 2024 due to threats that Israel may strike Iraqi-backed groups in the country, and some fighters may be increasingly frustrated about the lack of attacks targeting Israel. The Islamic Resistance of Iraq—of which Nujaba is a member—frequently said that its attacks targeted “our occupiers” in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, a clear reference to Israel.[xxviii]  Iran and its partners and proxies have claimed that Israeli intelligence organizations also operate in Iraqi Kurdistan.[xxix] The al Burhan Special Combat Force’s reference to ”occupation” inside Iraq could refer to these organizations.

Iran likely attempted to sell as much oil to China as it could before US President Donald Trump reinstated his “maximum pressure” policy on Iran.[xxx] Bloomberg reported on February 18 that Iranian oil exports to China increased by 82 percent between January 1 and February 1, citing data from intelligence firm Kpler.[xxxi] Iranian oil exports to China previously peaked just before US President Donald Trump imposed “maximum pressure“ sanctions on Iran for the first time in 2018.[xxxii] Unspecified traders in the oil market told Bloomberg that Iran and China have increasingly used “ship-to-ship transfers” and “alternative receiving terminals” to confront logistical issues caused by US sanctions.[xxxiii] US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent stated on February 14 that the United States aims to reduce Iranian oil exports by more than 90 percent.[xxxiv]

Iran seeks to increase economic cooperation with Russia to mitigate the impact of US sanctions on the Iranian economy, but it is unclear whether this cooperation will meaningfully improve Iranian economic conditions. Iranian Central Bank Governor Mohammad Reza Farzin met with Russian Central Bank Governor Elvira Nabiullina in Yekaterinburg, Russia, on February 18 to discuss monetary and banking cooperation.[xxxv] The officials will discuss exchange rates and the implementation of the second and third phases of the Mir-Shetab banking system.[xxxvi] Iran and Russia implemented the first phase of the Mir-Shetab system in November 2024 to circumvent the SWIFT system, which is based on the US dollar.[xxxvii] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian separately met with Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk in Tehran on February 18 to discuss the implementation of the Russo-Iranian comprehensive strategic agreement.[xxxviii] Iranian Roads and Urban Development Minister Farzaneh Sadegh and Russian Transport Minister Roman Vladimirovich Starovoyt also signed the 2025 Roadmap for Transport and Transit Cooperation in Tehran on February 18.[xxxix] The agreement includes the completion of the Rasht-Astara Railway, which is part of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC).[xl] Iran and Russia have discussed the construction of the Rasht-Astara Railway for several years, and it is unclear whether this agreement will accelerate the construction of the railway.[xli]

The Syrian interim government asked Russian officials to pressure Iran to stop trying to destabilize Syria, according to unspecified Syrian diplomatic sources speaking to Syrian media on February 19.[xlii] The sources denied Iraqi media reports that the Syrian interim government asked Iran to resume relations. CTP-ISW has previously assessed that Iran is trying to stoke sectarian tension in Syria and exploit such tension to rebuild the Axis of Resistance in Syria.[xliii]

Key Takeaways:

• Syrian Constitution: The Syrian Preparatory Committee does not plan to include the Kurdish-majority Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) or its political wing, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), in the National Dialogue Conference. The committee’s statements reflect the historic animosity between the SDF and Sunni Arab opposition factions.
• Shia Iraqi Politics: Iraqi nationalist Shia cleric Muqtada al Sadr reportedly plans to return to Iraqi politics, which could deepen fissures between the Shia Coordination Framework parties ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections in October 2025.
• Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces: Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia political parties are competing for the chairmanship of the Popular Mobilization Commission (PMC), which is currently held by Faleh al Fayyadh.
• Iraqi Militia Friction: Some elements of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba appear to be increasingly frustrated over Iranian-backed Iraqi militias’ lack of “resistance” against the United States and Israel.
• Iranian Oil Exports: Iran likely attempted to sell as much oil to China as it could before US President Donald Trump reinstated his “maximum pressure” policy on Iran.
• Syrian Stabilization: The Syrian interim government asked Russian officials to pressure Iran to stop trying to destabilize Syria, according to unspecified Syrian diplomatic sources speaking to Syrian media on February 19. CTP-ISW has previously assessed that Iran is trying to stoke sectarian tension in Syria and exploit such tension to rebuild the Axis of Resistance in Syria.

Iran Update, February 18, 2025

NOTE: CTP-ISW is adjusting its Middle Eastern coverage to focus more closely on Iran and the Axis of Resistance in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. CTP-ISW is also reducing its coverage of the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and Lebanon. This refocusing is in response to the continued expansion of the Iranian nuclear program and the risk of an escalation in the coming months, as well as the Israeli defeats of Hamas and Hezbollah. We will cover and assess Axis of Resistance activities in the Palestinian territories and Lebanon at a less granular level moving forward. We will continue to publish analysis on other key US interests in the region, such as the defeat of ISIS and Syrian stability. We will also continue to adjust our Middle Eastern coverage and make those adjustments clear in response to regional dynamics and priorities, just as we did immediately after Hamas' October 7 attack on Israel and the fall of the Assad Regime.   

A Syrian Defense Forces (SDF) commander stated that the SDF and the governing body in northeast Syria agreed to merge their forces into the Syrian Defense Ministry on February 17.[i] A commander within the Northern Democratic Brigade—a faction of the SDF—said that the SDF, the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), and the Syrian Democratic Council (SDF) agreed to merge SDF and AANES-affiliated security forces into the Syrian army after discussion on February 17 about negotiations with Damascus.[ii] The SDF reportedly agreed to several conditions, including to remove non-Syrian fighters from the SDF’s ranks.[iii] SDF commander Mazloum Abdi said in a February 18 interview with Kurdish media that the Syrian government also requested that the SDF transfer certain security issues to the Syrian state, including control over ISIS prisons.[iv] Abdi said that the SDF was ”open to cooperation” in these fields but did not explicitly specify whether the SDF had agreed to the conditions.[v] Non-Syrian fighters within the SDF likely primarily refer to foreign Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) fighters operating within northern Syria. Abdi recently confirmed that these fighters had come to Syria to support the SDF’s fight against ISIS and reportedly agreed to expel non-Syrian Kurds from Syria if the SDF, Turkey, and Turkish-backed forces reached a ceasefire in northern Syria.[vi] Turkey, which has worked with the Syrian government to pressure the SDF to disarm, has long demanded that the SDF expel PKK members from its ranks, although it has often conflated the two and has also, in effect called for the SDF’s destruction.[vii]

There still appear to be several outstanding issues in negotiations between the SDF and the Syrian interim government, but both parties appear to be engaging with one another constructively. Abdi said that there are still disagreements between Damascus and the SDF, though the two parties have continued to prepare suitable preconditions for negotiations.[viii] Abdi or the Syrian government have not yet publicly agreed on the specific mechanisms of the SDF’s integration into the Defense Ministry. Abdi’s demand that the SDF integrate as a ”bloc” was one of the main sticking points of negotiations in the past two months, and it is unclear if either side has relaxed their views on this issue.[ix]  Abdi’s public congratulations to Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara on assuming the presidency and invitation for Shara to visit northeastern Syria suggests that the SDF continues to be willing to engage positively with the Syrian government.[x]

SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi is under tremendous pressure from internal SDF rivals, external Kurdish rivals, longtime enemies, and his allies to integrate with the Damascus government. This pressure appears to be pushing the SDF to gradually moderate its demands. The reported SDF decision to merge itself into the Syrian army comes after weeks of SDF insistence that it would only integrate as a “bloc,” indicating that either Damascus, Abdi, or both parties moderated their demands.[xi] Senior Syrian officials have maintained that the state was considering the use of military action against the SDF if it continued to refuse to disarm.[xii] Turkey, which has continued to cultivate a significant strategic relationship with Damascus since the fall of Assad, has combined military threats with political persuasion through the Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) to compel Abdi to moderate his demands.[xiii] The KDP could calculate that cooperation with Abdi would provide an opportunity to re-establish the position of its Syrian wing, which has long had little influence due to the supremacy of the SDF and the Democratic Union Party (PYD), of which Abdi is a member. The United States—the SDF’s key supporter—also supports negotiations between the SDF and Damascus.[xiv]

Abdi probably sees an opportunity to avoid a major conflict with Damascus and solidify his own position, though he presumably recognizes that integration with the Syrian army is fraught with risk given the outstanding issues outlined above. Abdi’s rivals in the SDF, who include hardliners like Alder Khalil, oppose a deal with Damascus.[xv] Abdi could believe that by allying his wing of the SDF with other Kurdish elements and Damascus, he may be able to sideline the hardliners and force them from Syria. Alder Khalil, who is reportedly the leader of the PYD, would likely be one of the PKK members expelled from Syria under a deal.[xvi] It is unclear how Damascus or the SDF would actually expel the PKK, however, and whether the PKK would fight the decision without a call from PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan to disarm.

The Iraqi Central Bank reportedly banned five local banks from US dollar transactions to combat money laundering and smuggling.[xvii] The Iraqi Central Bank may have banned these banks under US pressure. Unidentified sources told Reuters on February 16 that the bans followed a recent meeting between Central Bank officials and US Treasury and Federal Reserve officials, suggesting the Iraqi officials may be reacting to US pressure. The Iraqi Central Bank denied on February 16 that any Iraqi banks are subject to ”international sanctions.”[xviii] Iraqi banks have historically facilitated money transfers that support Axis of Resistance operations, including attacks on US forces and allies.[xix]

Key Takeaways:

• Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)-Damascus Negotiations: A Syrian Defense Forces (SDF) commander stated that the SDF and the governing body in northeast Syria agreed to merge their forces into the Syrian Defense Ministry on February 17. There still appear to be several outstanding issues in negotiations between the SDF and the Syrian interim government, but both parties appear to be engaging with one another constructively.
• SDF Negotiating Position: SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi is under tremendous pressure from internal SDF rivals, external Kurdish rivals, longtime enemies, and his allies to integrate with the Damascus government. This pressure appears to be pushing the SDF to gradually moderate its demands. Abdi probably sees an opportunity to avoid a major conflict with Damascus and solidify his own position, though he presumably recognizes that integration with the Syrian army is fraught with risk given the outstanding issues regarding integration.
• Iraqi Financial System and Iranian-backed Militias: The Iraqi Central Bank reportedly banned five local banks from US dollar transactions to combat money laundering and smuggling. The Iraqi Central Bank may have banned these banks under US pressure.

Iran Update, February 17, 2025

Unspecified sources told Bloomberg that Russia appears to be nearing a deal with the Syrian interim government to maintain a “reduced” military presence in Syria.[i]  The sources said that Russia is “close” to a deal that would keep at least some staff and equipment in Syria.[ii] One of the sources said that Russia hopes to keep the same air and naval bases that it used prior to the fall of Bashar al Assad, likely referring to Hmeimim airbase and the naval base at Tartus.[iii] Russia also previously held several other airbases within central and northern Syria, including a helicopter base in Qamishli, though it is unclear whether the agreement will cover these sites. Russian forces have fully evacuated all their former positions in Syria except for Hmeimim airbase and the port of Tartus.[iv] Other forces, such as the Syrian interim government or US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), have taken many of these bases following Russian forces’ evacuation.[v]

The tone of engagement between Russia and the Syrian interim government has notably become more cooperative in recent weeks, which supports the sources’ claims that Russia may be nearing an agreement with Syria. Shara emphasized Syria’s “strong strategic relationship“ with Russia during a recent phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin.[vi] Interim Syrian Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra recently suggested that Syria could allow Russia to retain air and naval bases in Syria if there are “benefits” for Syria.[vii] It is not clear what “benefits“ Russia may be offering Syria in current negotiations. Russia delivered local Syrian currency to the Syrian central bank on February 12 in a gesture that likely sought to foster goodwill with the Syrian government.[viii] This gesture followed Syrian officials’ demands that Russia pay its debts to the Syrian state and Putin’s offer to Shara to assist with Syria’s economy.[ix]

Unspecified sources also told Bloomberg that Russia could help with the Syrian government’s counter-ISIS efforts.[x] It is unclear based on this comment whether the Syrian interim government has discussed Russian forces re-deploying to Syria to fight against ISIS. The Syrian interim government is likely eager to obtain manpower to assist in counter-ISIS operations as the government contends with the political and material realities of forming and training the new Syrian army. Russian participation in the Assad regime campaign against ISIS failed to effectively degrade ISIS in Syria, however. Russian aircraft proved to be far more capable in targeting Syrian opposition groups on behalf of the regime than it was targeting ISIS.[xi] The scale of a future Russian deployment to Syria would impact the success of any Russian counter-ISIS operations, and it is unclear if a ”reduced” military presence would be any more effective against ISIS than Russian forces were at the height of Russian deployments to Syria. US CENTCOM recently announced in July 2024 that ISIS is attempting to reconstitute in Syria following several years of decreased capability.[xii] Russia would by no means provide a suitable replacement for the United States or SDF in counter-ISIS operations in the face of ISIS reconstitution efforts.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) confirmed that it will remain indefinitely in five strategically significant positions in southern Lebanon after withdrawing from all other positions on February 18.[xiii] Israeli Army Radio reported on February 17 that the IDF has built sites at these five positions and will remain there even as the IDF leaves most other areas of southern Lebanon in accordance with the ceasefire with Lebanon.[xiv] The United States approved Israel to hold these positions, which are:[xv]

1. Sulam Ridge, south of Labbouneh, Lebanon. Sulam Ridge overlooks the Israeli town of Shlomi.[xvi]
2. Jabal Blat, northwest of Ramyeh, Lebanon. Jabal Blat overlooks Shtula and Zarit.[xvii]
3. Shaked Ridge, south of Aitaroun, Lebanon. Shaked Ridge is north of Avivim and Malkia.[xviii]
4. Tzivoni Ridge, between Houla and Markaba, Lebanon. Tzivoni Ridge is west of Margaliot.[xix]
5. Tal al Hamamis, south of Khiam, Lebanon. Tal al Hamamis overlooks Khiam, Kfar Kila, and Metula.[xx]

Holding these positions would distribute the IDF across the border from east to west and enable the IDF to monitor territory that it previously cleared. This would in turn help prevent Lebanese Hezbollah fighters from approaching the border and reduces the threat of Hezbollah ground or short-range attacks into Israel.

The IDF stated that it is “preparing for a long stay” at these positions until Hezbollah is no longer south of the Litani River.[xxi] The IDF has repeatedly criticized the failure of the Lebanese Armed Forces to destroy Hezbollah infrastructure and weapons south of the Litani River and has emphasized that the IDF will continue to act against threats from Hezbollah.[xxii]  The IDF told Israeli Army Radio that Hezbollah infrastructure has been “completely destroyed” in areas about five to eight kilometers from the border where the IDF has operated.[xxiii] The area is also clear of a “high percentage” of weapons, according to the IDF.[xxiv]

The IDF is separately building defensive positions in front of border towns in northern Israel.[xxv] The IDF will triple the pre-war number of troops deployed along the border.[xxvi]

Hezbollah appears unwilling to confront the IDF militarily in the short-term, as Hezbollah prioritizes reconstituting. Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem declared that the IDF must withdraw from Lebanon fully by the ceasefire expiration on February 18 and that the IDF had "no pretext" to maintain a military presence in southern Lebanon.[xxvii] Qassem demanded that the Lebanese state take a “firm and decisive” position against the Israeli presence in Lebanon but notably did not threaten to resume attacks.[xxviii] Qassem likely aims to avoid engaging Israeli forces or attacking Israel for the moment, as Hezbollah helps rebuild and reconstitute its forces. Qassem would very likely become more willing to attack the IDF, as Hezbollah regains strength.

Key Takeaways:

• Syria: Bloomberg reported that Russia appears to be nearing a deal with the Syrian interim government to retain a reduce military presence in Syria.
• Lebanon: The IDF announced plans to remain indefinitely at five locations in southern Lebanon, as the IDF withdraws from most other positions.

Iran Update, February 13, 2025

The newly-appointed Syrian Preparatory Committee provided some details about how it plans to select representatives to attend the National Dialogue Conference.  This conference will reportedly facilitate the drafting of a new Syrian constitution, and therefore, the composition of its attendees will influence the trajectory of the post-Assad Syrian state.[i] The Preparatory Committee is mostly comprised of pro-Hayat Tahrir al Sham figures who are loyal to Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara.[ii] Preparatory Committee member and spokesperson Hassan al Daghim said on February 13 that armed groups will not be allowed to participate in the conference.[iii] This condition most notably bars the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) from participating in the conference but also bars southern Syrian armed groups, including the Southern Operations Room (SOR) and the Druze Men of Dignity militia, from participating. The Men of Dignity and SOR have not disarmed but have reportedly made progress toward doing so during negotiations with the interim government.[iv] The SDF is also negotiating with the interim Defense Ministry, but CTP-ISW assesses that the SDF is unlikely to give up its ability to defend Kurdish areas against active Turkish-backed attacks by disarming.[v] The SDF’s likely refusal to disarm does not preclude other Kurdish groups from participating in the conference, such as the Kurdish National Council (KNC), which is dominated by the Syrian wing of the Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP).[vi]

It remains unclear how the Preparatory Committee will ensure the diversity of conference attendees. The committee is comprised of five males and two females and does not appear to include representatives of the Alawite, Druze, Kurdish, and Shia communities.[vii] The committee announced that “citizens” in each province will choose “national figures capable of representing the interests” of their province to participate in the National Dialogue Conference.[viii] This selection method could underrepresent minority groups in provinces with significant minority populations, including Aleppo, Homs, and Hama if the “citizens” who select “national figures” do not sufficiently represent minority ethnic and religious groups. The committee reiterated Shara’s opposition to quota systems that would ensure minority representation but promised that it would take “diversity into account.”[ix] The committee has not set a date for the National Dialogue Conference and noted that the interim government has delayed the conference several times.[x]  

Iran likely pressured members of the Iraqi Shia Coordination Framework to support the General Amnesty Law in order to prevent conflict between Shia and Sunni parties in Iraq. The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Iranian-backed political parties. Parliament passed the General Amnesty Law on January 21, after which some parliamentarians, including members of the Shia Coordination Framework, submitted lawsuits to the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court to challenge the constitutionality of the January 21 parliament session.[xi] The Federal Supreme Court rejected the lawsuits on February 11. The General Amnesty Law would grant amnesty to many Iraqis, including many Sunnis, who were arrested under Article 4 of the Anti-Terrorism Law.[xii] Iran reportedly warned unspecified Iraqi officials not to “anger partners” in the country, possibly referring to Sunni parties.[xiii]  Most members of the Shia Coordination Framework agreed to support the approval of the General Amnesty Law to “unify ranks” and avoid “provoking the Sunnis” after the overthrow of the Assad regime in Syria, according to unspecified political sources speaking to Iraqi media on February 13.[xiv] Iraqi media previously reported that some Iraqi Shia political parties are concerned about potential Sunni discord in Iraq following the overthrow of Assad by primarily Sunni groups in Syria in December 2024.[xv]

Iranian-backed Iraqi State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki has continued to try to prevent the implementation of the General Amnesty Law despite Iranian pressure and the rest of the Shia Coordination Framework's consensus to implement the law. Maliki described the January 21 parliament session as “incorrect” and warned on February 10 that previous unspecified violations of the Iraqi constitution caused “deterioration and bloodshed” in Iraq.[xvi] Maliki recently made anti-Sunni sectarian statements on February 1. Maliki emphasized that “we will not allow terrorists to leave prisons,” in reference to the individuals who would be released from prison under the General Amnesty Law.[xvii] A Shia Coordination Framework parliamentarian submitted a new lawsuit against the General Amnesty Law to the Federal Supreme Court on February 11.[xviii] Another Shia Coordination Framework-aligned parliamentarian said on February 11 that Federal Supreme Court President Jassem Mohammad Abboud disagreed with the majority decision to reject the recent lawsuits against the General Amnesty Law.[xix] Abboud is affiliated with the Iranian-backed Badr Organization and Maliki.[xx] Abboud’s reported support for the lawsuits could suggest that Abboud is closer to Maliki than the Badr Organization, although it is unclear to what extent the Badr Organization has complied with Iranian requests to support the General Amnesty Law. The Higher Judicial Council in Iraq also ignored the Federal Supreme Court’s decision to place a pause on the law as it reviewed the law’s constitutionality, which suggests that Higher Judicial Council chief Faiq Zaidan remains beholden to pro-Iranian militias rather than Maliki.[xxi]

Israel and Hamas reportedly reached an agreement on February 13 to continue the implementation of the first phase of the ceasefire agreement.  Egyptian and Qatari mediators said on February 12 that they succeeded in preventing a breakdown of the ceasefire agreement.[xxii] Hamas agreed to release three Israeli hostages on February 15 after mediators confirmed that Israel would allow the entry of tents and engineering equipment into the Gaza Strip.[xxiii] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that the ceasefire agreement requires Israel to permit the entry of these materials to enable the construction of makeshift housing for Gazans and the removal of rubble.[xxiv] Several trailers and trucks loaded with heavy machinery gathered near the Rafah border crossing on February 13.[xxv] Hamas announced on February 10 that it would postpone the release of Israeli hostages, citing alleged Israeli violations of the ceasefire agreement.[xxvi] Israel responded by threatening to resume military operations in the Gaza Strip.[xxvii]

Iran Update, February 12, 2025

Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara formed a preparatory committee on February 12 that is mostly comprised of pro-HTS individuals who are loyal to Shara.[i] The composition of this committee suggests that it will likely make decisions that align with Shara’s views and objectives. Shara announced on January 30 that he would form a preparatory committee to facilitate “deliberations” and “consultations” about the National Dialogue Conference.[ii] The National Dialogue Conference will reportedly represent all segments of Syrian society and facilitate the drafting of a new Syrian constitution.[iii] It is unclear what role the preparatory committee will play in organizing and overseeing the conference. Shara also stated on January 30 that the Syrian interim government would unveil a “Constitutional Declaration” after the formation of a preparatory committee.[iv] The preparatory committee is comprised of five males and two females and does not appear to include representatives of the Alawite, Druze, Kurdish, and Shia communities. The committee includes the following individuals:

• Yousef al Hajer: Hajer is from al Shuhail, Deir ez Zor Province, which was a Jabhat al Nusra stronghold until ISIS declared the formation of a caliphate in June 2014.[v] Hajar was injured in an April 2024 attack that targeted Abu Maria al Qahtani, one of the founders of Jabhat al Nusra.[vi] Hajer previously served as the head of the HTS Political Bureau and as a member of the HTS-controlled Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) Shura Council in northwestern Syria.[vii]
• Hassan al Daghim: Daghim is Sunni and previously headed the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army’s (SNA) Moral Guidance Department.[viii] Daghim and other SNA members met with Shara in late December 2024 to discuss the integration of armed groups into the new Syrian Defense Ministry.[ix] Daghim stated on January 31 that the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) is “one of the Syrian components and cannot be distinguished from other [components].”[x] Daghim was previously a strong critic of Shara but reconciled with Shara in 2024.[xi]
• Hind Qabawat: Qabawat is a Christian who has spent years promoting interfaith tolerance, women’s rights, and conflict resolution in Syria.[xii] Qabawat serves as the director of interfaith peacebuilding at George Mason University’s Center for World Religions, Diplomacy, and Conflict Resolution. Qabawat is also a member of the High Negotiations Committee for Syria in Geneva. Qabawat founded the Syrian Center for Dialogue, Peace, and Reconciliation in Toronto.
• Maher Alloush: Alloush is Sunni and close to Ahrar al Sham, which is an Islamist opposition group that has been close to HTS and its predecessor organizations since the mid-2010s.[xiii] Alloush previously mediated an internal dispute in Ahrar al Sham that resulted in the appointment of Abu Obeida as leader of Ahram al Sham in January 2019.[xiv] Alloush met with Shara in December 2024.[xv]
• Mustafa Musa: Musa is a member of HTS and served as the head of the SSG Shura Council from April 2020 until the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024.[xvi] Musa, who is a trained pharmacist, also previously headed the SSG Shura Council health committee.[xvii]
• Mohammad Mastat: Mastat previously served as the director of primary healthcare in the SSG Health Ministry.[xviii] Mastat is affiliated with Faylaq al Sham, which is a Muslim Brotherhood-influenced Islamist militia that has been a longtime HTS partner.[xix]
• Huda al Attasi: Attasi is a Turkish citizen and is the co-founder and director of International Humanitarian Relief.[xx] Attasi has spent years helping Syrian women, orphans, and displaced individuals. Attasi is a founding member of the Syrian Association for Citizens’ Dignity, which advocates for the rights of displaced Syrians.[xxi]

The Syrian interim government has continued to attempt to consolidate its control over groups in southern Syria that have not yet joined the Defense Ministry. Syrian Interim Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra met with southern military commanders Naseem Abu Ara and Ali Bash in Damascus on February 12.[xxii] Ali Bash is the deputy of Ahmed al Awda, the current Southern Operations Room commander who previously led the Eighth Brigade, a group comprised of former opposition fighters who reconciled with the Assad regime and reorganized themselves as the ”Eighth Brigade.”[xxiii] Abu Ara is an Eighth Brigade commander.[xxiv] An unspecified source told southern Syria-based media that Abu Ara and Bash agreed to hold future meetings with Damascus to ”follow up” on steps to integrate Southern Operations Room fighters into the Syrian Defense Ministry. Qasra recently told the Wall Street Journal that Awda had resisted attempts to bring his units under the Defense Ministry.[xxv] Abu Ara denied Qasra’s allegations in a video statement on February 10 and argued that the people of the south were among the first to call for the Defense Ministry’s establishment.[xxvi] Qasra’s meeting with Abu Ara and Ali Bash suggests that southern leaders, such as Awda, will continue to discuss their integration into the Defense Ministry, although it does not appear that Awda or his subordinates have made any explicit commitments.

The HTS-led Department of Military Operations also deployed to western Suwayda Province for the first time on February 12.[xxvii] The government forces deployed to “contain tensions” following the murder of a Syrian man in al Thaala.[xxviii] This is the Syrian government’s first official deployment in Suwayda Province.[xxix] The Wall Street Journal reported that the Men of Dignity Movement--a prominent Druze militia based in Suwayda--has thus far prevented the entry of HTS-led forces into Suwayda Province.[xxx] The head of the Men of Dignity Movement, Sheikh Abu Hassan Yahya al Hajjar, announced that the movement will cooperate with the Interior Ministry’s new police and security forces.[xxxi] It is unclear if Damascus and the Men of Dignity or another group coordinated the deployment of the Military Operations Department. The Syrian interim government likely seeks to cultivate goodwill among Suwayda residents by showing its abilities to ensure security in the region, however.

Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara held his first official call with Russian President Vladimir Putin on February 12, suggesting that Syria seeks to maintain a future relationship with Russia even as Russia withdraws its military assets from Syria. The Kremlin reported that Putin and Shara discussed recent negotiations over Russian basing rights in Syria between the Syrian government and the Russian delegation that visited Damascus on January 28.[xxxii] This delegation failed to reach an agreement with the Syrian government.[xxxiii] It does not appear that Shara’s call with Putin led to any agreement on Russia's continued military presence at Hmeimim Air Base and the Port of Tartus. The direct communication between Shara and Putin, however, suggests that the Syrian interim government will continue to attempt to maintain a relationship with the Russian government and that negotiations over Russia’s presence in Syria have not concluded. Senior Syrian officials have adopted a more positive position towards Russia in recent days, even as Russian forces have continued to withdraw from Syrian territory.[xxxiv] Shara stressed Syria’s “strong strategic relationship“ with Russia during the phone call with Putin, according to an official Syrian government report, and Interim Syrian Defense Minister Marhaf Abu recently suggested that Syria is open to Russian air and naval bases in Syria if there are “benefits” for Syria.[xxxv]  Syrian officials’ public posture towards Russia suggests that Syria will continue to engage with Russia, particularly as Syrian officials hope Western countries will lift sanctions imposed upon the Assad regime. Putin stressed the need to lift economic sanctions on Syria during the call, echoing a recent call from Russian Deputy Foreign Minister and Special Presidential Representative for the Middle East and North Africa Mikhail Bogdanov on several unspecified countries to lift all unilateral sanctions imposed on Syria.[xxxvi] Syria could use its continued engagement with Russia as leverage with the West as Syria attempts to secure sanctions relief from the West.

Egyptian state media reported on February 12 that mediators from Egypt and Qatar are “intensifying” diplomatic efforts to prevent the breakdown of Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement.[xxxvii] Unspecified Egyptian sources told Reuters that Qatar and Egypt discussed efforts to prevent the collapse of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire on February 12.[xxxviii] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu threatened on February 11 to resume military operations in the Gaza Strip after Hamas said it would postpone the planned release of Israeli hostages on February 15, which would violate the ceasefire.[xxxix] A third IDF division entered the buffer zone along the Israel-Gaza Strip boundary on February 11, and the IDF recalled reservists as part of preparations for resumed operations in the Gaza Strip.[xl] Israeli officials have indicated that Israel will continue to meet its obligations under the first phase of the ceasefire if Hamas releases Israeli hostages on February 15, however.[xli]

Jordanian King Abdullah II agreed to accept 2,000 sick Gazan children but refused to host additional Palestinian refugees during a meeting with US President Donald Trump in Washington, DC, on January 11.[xlii] King Abdullah II stated that "everyone“ should prioritize rebuilding the Gaza Strip.[xliii] Egypt and Jordan are developing a plan to rebuild the Gaza Strip without relocating Gazans.[xliv]

Key Takeaways:

• Syrian Transition: Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara formed a preparatory committee on February 12 that is mostly comprised of pro-HTS individuals who are loyal to Shara. The composition of this committee suggests that it will likely make decisions that align with Shara’s views and objectives.
• Syrian Defense Ministry: The Syrian interim government has continued to attempt to consolidate its control over groups in southern Syria that have not yet joined the Defense Ministry. The HTS-led Department of Military Operations also deployed to western Suwayda Province for the first time on February 12.
• Syria-Russia Relations: Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara held his first official call with Russian President Vladimir Putin on February 12, suggesting that Syria seeks to maintain a future relationship with Russia even as Russia withdraws its military assets from Syria.
• Gaza Strip: Egyptian state media reported on February 12 that mediators from Egypt and Qatar are “intensifying” diplomatic efforts to prevent the breakdown of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement.

Iran Update, February 11, 2025

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu threatened to resume military operations in the Gaza Strip if Hamas fails to release Israeli hostages on February 15.[i] Netanyahu made this announcement after he convened a security cabinet meeting on February 11 to discuss the second phase of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement.[ii] Hamas stated on February 10 that it would postpone the release of Israeli hostages, which would be a violation of the ceasefire agreement.[iii] Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz instructed the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) on February 10 to prepare for any “possible scenario” in the Gaza Strip.[iv] The IDF deployed its 252nd Division to the buffer zone along the Israel-Gaza Strip boundary on February 11, bringing the total number of divisions there to three.[v] Hamas could use the remaining hostages to pressure Netanyahu to negotiate again if the IDF resumed operations in the Gaza Strip.

Hamas is trying to set informational conditions to be able to blame Israel for a potential breakdown of the ceasefire. Senior Hamas official Osama Hamdan said on February 10 that Hamas’ decision to postpone the release of hostages is a “warning” to Israel.[vi] Hamdan claimed that Hamas will comply with its ceasefire obligations so long as Israel fulfills its obligations. This statement seeks to preemptively blame any breakdown in the ceasefire on an alleged Israeli failure to fulfill its ceasefire obligations. Hamas has, however, itself violated the ceasefire agreement by postponing the release of Israeli hostages.

The Iraqi Federal Supreme Court rejected on February 11 recent lawsuits that sought to suspend the implementation of the General Amnesty Law.[vii] The Iraqi Federal Supreme Court temporarily suspended the implementation of the General Amnesty Law, the Personal Status Law, and the Property Restitution Law on February 4 after several parliamentarians, including members of the Iranian-backed State of Law Coalition, submitted lawsuits to the Federal Supreme Court.[viii] The General Amnesty Law grants amnesty to many Iraqis, including many Sunnis who were arrested under Article 4 of the Anti-Terrorism Law.[ix] The Federal Supreme Court’s rejection of the lawsuits is notable given that the court has historically delivered rulings in favor of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and politicians.[x]

Iranian-backed Shia political parties will very likely continue to try to prevent the implementation of the General Amnesty Law, despite the court ruling. State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki stated on February 1 that “we will not allow terrorists to leave prisons,” in reference to the individuals who would be released from prison under the General Amnesty Law.[xi] Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri has also previously expressed strong opposition to the General Amnesty Law.[xii] These Iranian-backed militia leaders’ statements about the General Amnesty Law suggest that they will strongly challenge the Federal Supreme Court ruling.

The recent Federal Supreme Court ruling highlights existing fissures between the various judicial institutions in Iraq. The Supreme Judicial Council, which is constitutionally responsible for managing Iraqi courts, supervising judges, and forming policies to govern judicial operations, rejected on February 5 the Federal Supreme Court’s decision to temporarily suspend the implementation of the General Amnesty, Personal Status, and Property Restitution laws.[xiii] The Court of Cassation, which legally reports to the Supreme Judicial Council, reportedly overturned the Federal Supreme Court’s February 4 decision on February 10.[xiv] The Supreme Judicial Council is led by Iranian-backed Judge Faiq Zayden.[xv] Federal Supreme Court head Judge Jasem Mohammad Abbood is tied to the Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Badr Organization and Maliki.[xvi]

Some Iraqi Sunni political actors are attempting to reduce the influence of Iranian-backed Shia parties in Ninewa Province, northern Iraq. Iraqi media reported on February 8 that the United Ninewa Bloc attempted to remove Ninewa Provincial Council Chairman Ahmed al Hasoud.[xvii] The United Ninewa Bloc is an alliance of Sunni parties that includes the Azm Alliance (led by Muthanna al Samarrai), Sovereignty Alliance (led by Khamis al Khanjar), and Progress Party (led by Mohammad al Halbousi).[xviii] Hasoud is a member of the National Contract Bloc, which is led by Popular Mobilization Committee Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh.[xix] The Ninewa Future Bloc, which is affiliated with the Iranian-backed Shia Coordination Framework, opposed the efforts to remove Hasoud.[xx] Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish groups have long vied for control in Ninewa Province. Sunni and Kurdish residents have long been resentful of Shia groups’ presence and influence in areas of the province. The Popular Mobilization Forces control some positions along the border between Syria and Ninewa Province.[xxi]

Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister Masrour Barzani met with Sovereignty Alliance head Khamis al Khanjar to discuss developments in Iraq and KRG-Iraqi federal government relations on February 8.[xxii]

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu threatened to resume military operations in the Gaza Strip if Hamas fails to release Israeli hostages on February 15. Hamas is trying to set informational conditions to be able to blame Israel for a potential breakdown of the ceasefire.
• Iraq: The Iraqi Federal Supreme Court rejected on February 11 recent lawsuits that sought to suspend the implementation of the General Amnesty Law. Iranian-backed Shia political parties will very likely continue to try to prevent the implementation of the General Amnesty Law, despite the court ruling.
• Iraq: Some Iraqi Sunni political actors are attempting to reduce the influence of Iranian-backed Shia parties in Ninewa Province, northern Iraq.

Iran Update, February 10, 2025

Hamas said on February 10 that it would postpone the release of Israeli hostages on February 15, which would be a violation of the ceasefire agreement.[i] Hamas likely aims to retain its hostages as leverage in negotiations. Hamas’ military wing spokesperson claimed that Israel violated the ceasefire agreement by delaying the return of Gazans to the northern Gaza Strip, targeting them with gunfire, and restricting the flow of aid into the Gaza Strip.[ii] These claims are misleading. Israel delayed the movement of Gazans to the northern strip in January 2025 because Hamas did not release a female civilian hostage before releasing female soldier hostages, as required under the ceasefire agreement.[iii] Israeli forces have fired warning shots at Palestinians, but warning shots are a normal part of most escalation-of-force procedures in professional militaries.[iv] Israel has also provided at least an average of 555 aid trucks per day to Gazans, which is an increase from 70 trucks per day in early January 2025, before the ceasefire.[v] Israel has responded to Hamas’ threat to violate the ceasefire agreement. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz instructed the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to prepare for any “possible scenario” in the Gaza Strip in response to Hamas’ ceasefire violations.[vi]

Hamas likely seeks to retain leverage in part because it believes that retaining the hostages will be key to pressure Israel and the United States to move forward with the second phase of negotiations.  Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu previously indicated that Israel is willing to resume military operations in the Gaza Strip and added that Israel will “continue the war until Hamas no longer holds sway in Gaza.”[vii] Hamas may calculate that by retaining the hostages, it can increase domestic Israeli pressure on the Israeli government to continue negotiations and reach a permanent ceasefire. Hamas would be able to use these remaining hostages to pressure Netanyahu to negotiate again in the future.

This negotiating strategy seeks to save Hamas as an organization rather than defend Palestinians or Gaza. Hamas has repeatedly presented itself as the defender of the Palestinian people and as the government of Gaza. Hamas, were it negotiating as a government or as a defender of its people, would seek to exchange the hostages in return for a stop to the fighting and the release of humanitarian aid in order to help Palestinians. Hamas is using the hostages as leverage to secure its own survival, however. The UN reported that Israel has allowed “over” 10,000 aid trucks into the strip since January 19.[viii] This means that Israel provided an average of more than 555 aid trucks to enter the strip daily between January 19 and February 6, according to the United Nations.[ix] The ceasefire requires Israel to allow 600 trucks into the Strip a day, which would require Israel to send 10,800 trucks into the Strip between January 19 and February 6.[x] The daily average of 555 aid trucks is 55 trucks more than Israel allowed to enter the strip prior to October 7, 2023, and an increase of nearly 500 trucks daily compared to November 2024, however.[xi]

US President Donald Trump said on February 10 that the United States will “build a permanent place” for Gazans outside the Gaza Strip.[xii] Trump added that he will negotiate with Jordan and Egypt to accept Gazan refugees even though both countries have rejected the proposal.[xiii] The Egyptian Foreign Ministry announced on February 9 that Egypt will host an emergency Arab League summit on February 27 in Cairo to discuss “new and dangerous developments” following Trump’s statement on Gaza.[xiv] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi also called for an emergency Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) meeting in separate phone calls with OIC Secretary General Hussein Ibrahim Taha, and the Tunisian, Egyptian, and Malaysian foreign ministers on February 9 and 10.[xv]

Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas issued a decree on February 10 that restructured legislation that provided payments to Palestinian fighters in the West Bank who were arrested by Israeli forces or died while conducting an attack.[xvi] The restructured legislation will provide social welfare funding to Palestinians based on socio-economic status rather than allowances based on “prisoner or martyr” status.[xvii] This legislation formerly provided payment to Palestinian fighters arrested by Israeli security forces based on the length of their prison sentence.[xviii] Various Israeli and American administrations referred to this system as “pay-to-slay.“[xix] A Palestinian official told Axios that the decree transfers the cash assistance program, database, and allocations from the PA Ministry of Social Development to the Palestinian National Foundation for Economic Empowerment, an ”independent institution” focused on reducing poverty and addressing unemployment.[xx] Abbas founded the organization in 2019.

Iranian officials who had previously supported nuclear negotiations with the United States explicitly supported Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's decision to reject nuclear negotiations with the United States on February 10.[xxi] These officials included Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, who worked on nuclear negotiations with the West under the Rouhani administration and remained a key supporter of negotiations.[xxii] President Masoud Pezeshkian, who similarly signaled his openness to negotiations with the West, also indicated his alignment with Khamenei‘s stance.[xxiii]  Senior political officials and Artesh and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commanders also condemned US President Donald Trump‘s “maximum pressure“ policy towards Iran and dismissed any potential US and Israeli ”threats” to Iran.[xxiv] The coalescence of top regime officials on the nuclear issue, including those previously supportive of negotiations, follows The Telegraph’s report on February 8, which stated that senior Iranian military leaders have been urging Khamenei in recent months to approve the construction of a nuclear weapon.[xxv]

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip Ceasefire: Hamas said that it will postpone the release of Israeli hostages on February 10, which would be a violation of the ceasefire agreement. Hamas likely seeks to retain leverage in part because it believes that retaining the hostages will be key to pressure Israel and the United States to move forward with the second phase of negotiations. This negotiating strategy seeks to save Hamas as an organization rather than defend Palestinians or Gaza.
• West Bank: Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas issued a decree on February 10 that restructured legislation that provided payments to Palestinian fighters in the West Bank who were arrested by Israeli forces or died while conducting an attack.
• Iran: Iranian officials who had previously supported nuclear negotiations with the United States explicitly supported Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's decision to reject nuclear negotiations with the United States on February 10. These officials included Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, who worked on nuclear negotiations with the West under the Rouhani administration and remained a key supporter of negotiations.

Iran Update, February 9, 2025

Senior Iranian military leaders have urged Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in recent months to approve the construction of a nuclear weapon, according to an unspecified Iranian official speaking to the Telegraph.[i] The article reported that the military leaders have previously supported Khamenei’s policy against nuclear weapons but now feel that they are faced with an “existential threat” since US President Donald Trump entered office. The unspecified Iranian official said that “we have never been this vulnerable, and it may be our last change to obtain [a nuclear weapon] before its too late.” The official added that the Khamenei’s decisions to forbid nuclear weapons and negotiations with the United States is “driving the regime toward collapse.”[ii] The official claimed that Iran has been “just a few button presses away from building a nuclear weapon for some time now.”[iii] This article follows the New York Times reporting that Iranian scientists are exploring how to build a crude nuclear weapon quickly.[iv] These reports are consistent with CTP-ISW assessment that Iran has restarted its nuclear weapons research but has not yet made a deliberate effort to build a weapon.

Khamenei's Foreign Affairs Advisor Kamal Kharrazi previously told the Financial Times in July 2024 that Iran was open to pursuing nuclear weaponization if faced with ”an existential threat.”[v] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Aragchi alluded to the ”heated debate” on whether to build a nuclear weapon on January 28, when Araghchi threatened pursuing one if the E3 triggered snapback sanctions before October 2025.[vi]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) completed its withdrawal from the Netzarim Corridor in the Gaza Strip on February 9 as part of its obligations under the ceasefire agreement with Hamas.[vii] An Israeli military correspondent reported that the IDF withdrew from the eastern sector of the Netzarim Corridor to the buffer zone along the Israel-Gaza Strip border.[viii] The IDF began withdrawing from the corridor on January 27 to allow Gazans to return via established routes to the northern Gaza Strip.[ix] Hamas released three Israeli hostages on February 8 as part of its own ceasefire obligations.[x] 

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Senior Iranian military leaders have urged Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in recent months to approve the construction of a nuclear weapon, according to an unspecified Iranian official.
• Gaza Strip: The IDF completed its withdrawal from the Netzarim Corridor in the Gaza Strip as part of its obligations under the ceasefire agreement with Hamas.
• Syria: An SNA commander claimed that his forces captured Tishreen Dam but withdrew in response to commands from higher headquarters.

Iran Update, February 6, 2025

Many of the most prominent Iraqi Sunni political parties have emphasized the need for political action to achieve long-standing Sunni political demands ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections in October 2025. A member of the Progress Party, which is led by former Parliament Speaker and key Sunni politician Mohammad al Halbousi, warned on February 5 that the Progress Party could boycott parliament in response to the recent Iraqi Federal Supreme Court decision to temporarily suspend the implementation of the General Amnesty Law.[i] The Federal Supreme Court, which is responsible for interpreting the constitution and determining the constitutionality of laws and regulations, temporarily suspended the implementation of the General Amnesty Law on February 3. This law would grant amnesty to many Iraqis, including many Sunnis who were arrested under Article 4 of the Anti-Terrorism Law. The Progress Party holds 39 seats in parliament, which is far below the number of seats needed to block a quorum.[ii] A Progress Party-affiliated adviser to the Anbar Provincial Council similarly called on Sunni parliamentarians to boycott the political process and start “large” demonstrations in response to the Federal Supreme Court decision.[iii]

These statements come after the Sunni Azm Alliance called on February 5 for a “comprehensive national dialogue” to amend the Iraqi constitution.[iv]  Azm Alliance head Muthanna al Samarrai is a member of the newly-formed United Sunni Leadership Coalition.[v] Halbousi is not a member of this new Sunni political coalition, and the United Sunni Leadership Coalition appears to be an alternative Sunni political party to Halbousi’s Progress Party.  It is therefore notable that both the Progress Party and parts of the United Sunni Leadership Coalition have called for political action to protest the Federal Supreme Court decision. Some Sunni politicians have accused State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki of pushing the Federal Supreme Court to suspend the implementation of the General Amnesty Law.[vi] Maliki previously used the court to target political opposition, particularly Sunnis, during his term as prime minister between May 2006 and September 2014.[vii] Maliki’s rumored involvement in the Federal Supreme Court decision is consistent with recent sectarian, anti-Sunni statements he has made.[viii] Maliki stated on February 1 that “we will not allow terrorists to leave prisons,” about the individuals who would be released from prison under the General Amnesty Law. Iranian-backed actors have claimed that the General Amnesty Law would release ”terrorists” and ”murderers” into society to try to prevent the approval and implementation of this law. [ix]

There are early indications of fissures between Iran-backed Shia political parties and figures ahead of the parliamentary elections in October 2025. Iraqi media reported on February 6 that the Iranian-backed Shia Coordination Framework appears “divided” due to an ongoing dispute between Maliki and National Wisdom Movement head Ammar al Hakim.[x] The dispute is reportedly over Maliki’s outsized influence in the Shia Coordination Framework and the removal of the Dhi Qar governor, who is a member of Hakim’s party. Iraqi media reported on January 30 that Hakim has boycotted several Shia Coordination Framework meetings because Maliki orchestrated the removal of the Dhi Qar governor.[xi] Unidentified sources told Iraqi media on February 6 that Shia Coordination Framework members discussed unifying Shia factions and resolving tensions with Hakim on February 5.[xii] Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani reportedly convinced Hakim to resume his participation in Shia Coordination Framework meetings in return for the appointment of Hakim-backed figures to government positions.

Syrian interim government forces have deployed to areas previously controlled by the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) as armed factions have started to integrate into the new Syrian army and security apparatus. Interim government security forces deployed to Afrin and Jandairis, north of Aleppo, on February 6.[xiii] The SNA has controlled and administered these areas since 2018.[xiv]  Kurdish media claimed that the interim government would take control of SNA territory and dismantle barracks and other military infrastructure in the area.[xv]  Interim government-affiliated Public Security forces deployed to checkpoints near the entrances to Manbij, Aleppo Province, on February 5, demonstrating that the deployment of interim government forces extends across SNA-controlled territory.[xvi]

These interim government deployments will likely continue as former opposition groups integrate into the Syrian Defense Ministry. It is unclear how extensive the integration of armed groups across Syria will be or the pace at which this integration will occur. It is also unclear to what extent groups that integrate into the Defense Ministry will subordinate themselves to largely HTS-dominated command structures. Syrian media circulated reports on February 3 that the Syrian Defense Ministry appointed two SNA leaders as division commanders within the new Syrian armed forces.[xvii]  It is unclear if these commanders will recruit their divisions directly from their militias. The Syrian interim government said that it dissolved all former rebel and armed groups, including factions of the SNA, on January 29, but the fact that SNA groups continue to fight against the SDF along the Euphrates River suggests that the SNA groups have been dissolved in name only.[xviii] The interim government deployments come after Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara discussed Syrian-Turkish defense coordination with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Ankara, Turkey, on February 4.[xix] Turkey closely coordinates with and provides air support to the SNA. Shara and Erdogan may have discussed the integration of SNA factions into the new Syrian armed forces.

Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz instructed the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) on February 6 to prepare a plan for the “voluntary departure” of Palestinians from the Gaza Strip.[xx] Katz said that the plan will include “special arrangements” for Gazans to relocate to “any country willing to receive them" via air, sea, or land. Katz discussed the plan with senior Israeli defense officials, including IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi.[xxi] Katz’s statement comes after US President Donald Trump suggested that Gazans should relocate to Egypt and Jordan.[xxii]

US President Donald Trump said on February 6 that the Gaza Strip should be “turned over” to the United States by Israel after the “conclusion of fighting.”[xxiii] Trump suggested that Gazans could relocate to other areas in the Middle East while the United States rebuilds the Gaza Strip. Trump said that no US troops would participate in this plan.

Key Takeaways:

• Iraqi Politics: Many of the most prominent Iraqi Sunni political parties have emphasized the need for political action to achieve long-standing Sunni political demands ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections in October 2025. Former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki is attempting to block Sunni political action, which has caused some Sunni political parties to threaten additional political moves, including demonstrations.
• Control of Syria: Syrian interim government forces have deployed to areas previously controlled by the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) as armed factions have started to integrate into the new Syrian army and security apparatus. These interim government deployments will likely continue as former opposition groups integrate into the Syrian Defense Ministry.
• Gaza Strip: Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz instructed the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) on February 6 to prepare a plan for the “voluntary departure” of Palestinians from the Gaza Strip. US President Donald Trump said on February 6 that the Gaza Strip should be “turned over” to the United States by Israel after the “conclusion of fighting.”

Iran Update, February 5, 2025

Iran is downplaying the significance of US “maximum pressure” sanctions while signaling some openness to nuclear negotiations with the West. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi said that the maximum pressure policy is a “failed experiment” in response to US President Donald Trump announcing on February 4 his intent to re-enforce extensive sanctions on Iran.[i] Senior Iranian officials separately expressed willingness to engage in nuclear negotiations, emphasizing the Iranian policy against building and using nuclear weapons. Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Director Mohammad Eslami similarly said that Iran has no plans to develop nuclear weapons.[ii] An unspecified senior Iranian official told Reuters on February 5 that Iran is ready to give the United States a chance to resolve disputes.[iii] Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei ultimately will decide whether Iran negotiates with the West or tries to build a nuclear weapon, however. Trump said on February 5 that he would like to pursue a “verified nuclear peace agreement” with Iran “immediately.”[iv]                

Reuters reported on February 5 that Trump ordered his administration to work with allies to "complete the snapback of international sanctions and restrictions on Iran,” likely referring to discussions with the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) to trigger snapback sanctions on Iran.[v] The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism allows signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[vi] The E3 previously stated that it is prepared to impose snapback sanctions on Iran.[vii] The E3 has until October 2025 to do so.[viii]

The US Defense Department is preparing plans for the withdrawal of US service members from Syria.[ix] No order has been given to proceed with the withdrawal at the time of this writing, however. A US withdrawal would severely undermine the counter-ISIS mission in Iraq and Syria and would create a vacuum that ISIS could exploit to reconstitute. SDF spokesperson Farhad Shami said on February 5 that ISIS is waiting for a US withdrawal to reactivate and restore its physical so-called ”caliphate.”[x] Shami confirmed that the SDF had received no warning from the United States about plans to withdraw.[xi]

A US withdrawal from Syria would very likely create opportunities for ISIS to rebuild itself in northeastern Syria in particular. The United States provides critical functions that enable the SDF to secure detention facilities in northeastern Syria that hold 10,000 ISIS fighters, whom US Central Command Commander General Michael Kurilla has called “an ISIS army-in-waiting.”[xii] A US withdrawal from Syria would significantly increase the likelihood that the SDF would be unable to secure these ISIS fighters due to pressure from Turkey and Turkish-backed forces. The distraction and chaos caused by a US withdrawal from northeastern Syria would provide ISIS an opening to launch a major attack against some of these detention facilities. ISIS attacked al Sinaa Prison—a detention facility in southern Hasakah City—in January 2022 and freed up to 300 ISIS fighters.[xiii] Some of these fighters infiltrated back to regime-held areas in the central Syrian desert, which likely spurred an increase in attacks in the central Syrian desert in early 2023.[xiv] 

Iraqi Sunni political parties are increasingly vocalizing long-held political demands ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections in October 2025. Former Parliament Speaker and Progress Party leader Mohamed al Halbousi called for “massive demonstrations” on February 4 to protest the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court’s decision to suspend the implementation of the General Amnesty Law.[xv] The Federal Supreme Court suspended the implementation of the General Amnesty Law and two other laws that the Iraqi Parliament passed on January 21 in order to determine the constitutionality of the laws.[xvi] The General Amnesty Law would grant amnesty to many Iraqis, including some who were arrested under Article 4 of the Anti-Terrorism Law.[xvii] The Anbar, Salah al Din, and Ninewa provincial governors and Kirkuk Provincial Council chairman suspended work in protest of the court decision.[xviii] Multiple independent Iraqi parliamentarians urged Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani to ask Parliament to remove the provincial governors due to their “rebellion.”[xix] The Sunni Azm Alliance party separately called for a “comprehensive national dialogue” to amend the Iraqi constitution on February 5.[xx] The Azm Alliance added that a referendum on unspecified amendments should occur on the same day as the parliamentary elections. The Iraqi constitution stipulates two alternate mechanisms for adding constitutional amendments that both require a vote in Parliament and a public referendum.[xxi] Azm Alliance head Muthanna al Samarrai is a member of the newly formed United Sunni Leadership Coalition that called for the Sudani administration to implement nine longstanding Sunni demands on January 18.[xxii]

Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia officials are continuing to use inflammatory and sectarian rhetoric in response to these Sunni demands. The Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada secretary general, Abu Alaa al Walai, compared the people “attacking” the Federal Supreme Court’s decision to those who “brought down a third of Iraq,” likely referring to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).[xxiii] Walai’s rhetoric mirrors Iranian-backed Iraqi State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki’s anti-Sunni sectarian statements on February 1.[xxiv] Maliki implicitly accused Sunnis of trying to overthrow the Iraqi federal government. The Iranian-backed Shia Coordination Framework has expressed support for the Federal Supreme Court’s decision to suspend the implementation of the General Amnesty Law.[xxv]

US President Donald Trump hosted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Washington, DC on February 4 in order to discuss Iran, Israeli-Saudi normalization, and the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.[xxvi] Trump later said in a joint press conference that the United States would “take over” and “own” the Gaza Strip and rebuild it.[xxvii] Trump added that the United States will clear destroyed infrastructure and remove unexploded ordinance. Trump also suggested that Egypt and Jordan could accept Palestinian refugees, despite the two countries previously rejecting the possibility.[xxviii]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Senior Iranian officials are downplaying the significance of US “maximum pressure” sanctions while signaling some openness to nuclear negotiations with the West.
• Syria: The United States is drafting plans to withdraw its forces from Syria, which ISIS would exploit to resurge in Syria.
• Iraq: Iraqi Sunni political parties are increasingly vocalizing long-held demands ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections in October 2025.
• Gaza Strip: US President Donald Trump hosted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Washington, DC in order to discuss Iran, the Gaza Strip, and Israeli-Saudi normalization.

Iran Update, February 4, 2025

Iran is conducting nuclear research that would enable it to build a nuclear weapon in a period of months. The New York Times reported on February 3 that a "secret team" of Iranian weapons engineers and scientists is "exploring" a faster approach to build a nuclear weapon in a "matter of months.”[i] The engineers and scientists could be from the Organization of Defense Innovation and Research (SPND), which, under a different name, played a leading role in the Iranian nuclear weapons research program before 2003. The new approach would decrease the time Iran needs to turn weapons-grade uranium (uranium enriched to 90 percent) into a nuclear weapon. This approach would significantly reduce the time that the International Atomic Energy Agency would have to detect Iranian weaponization activity. It would also reduce the time that the United States or Israel would have to take military action against Iranian nuclear facilities. Iran currently possesses near weapons-grade uranium (uranium enriched to 60 percent), but Western estimates indicate that Iran could further enrich this material to weapons-grade levels within days. Unspecified US officials said that Iran could build an "older-style nuclear weapon" using the new approach, but that such a weapon would not fit on a ballistic missile and would likely be less reliable than a modern weapon. CTP-ISW does not assess that Iran has decided to build a nuclear weapon at this time.

Iran’s nuclear weapons research comes as Israel has eroded key elements of Iran’s deterrence since October 2024. The IDF has defeated Hamas in the Gaza Strip and degraded Hezbollah.[ii] The IDF also disabled Iranian air defenses and disrupted Iranian missile production capabilities in its airstrikes on Iran in October 2024.[iii] The New York Times reported that Iran is exploring “new options” to deter US or Israeli strikes, citing unspecified intelligence.[iv] Some Iranian hardliners have publicly called for Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon to restore deterrence vis-a-vis Israel.[v] CTP-ISW has previously observed that some Iranian hardliners are trying to pressure the Supreme Leader to revoke his 2003 fatwa that bans the production and use of nuclear weapons.

US President Donald Trump ordered the re-enforcement of “maximum pressure” sanctions on Iran on February 4 to dissuade Iran from pursuing a nuclear weapon. Trump signed an executive order that targets Iranian oil sales to other countries.[vi] Trump previously withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and imposed “maximum pressure” sanctions on Iran during his first term as president. Trump told reporters that he is open to a deal with Iran and would be willing to meet with Iranian officials.

“Maximum pressure” sanctions will likely cause further deterioration of the Iranian economy. The Iranian budget relies heavily on oil export revenues. Iran previously exported around 2.5 million barrels of oil per day in April 2018—one month before Trump withdrew the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.[vii] Iranian oil exports fell dramatically in the following years, but oil exports began to slowly increase beginning in 2020, though Iran still only exported 400,000 barrels per day in 2020.[viii] Iran will likely try to continue to export oil illicitly but will likely not be able to maintain current oil export levels.[ix] Oil exports are also insufficient to resolve the underlying issues that plague the Iranian economy. These issues will remain regardless of the imposition of sanctions. These economic issues include widespread corruption, nepotism, and the outsized role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and parastatal foundations, known as bonyads, in the economy.[x]

Iran is attempting to improve its air defense abilities possibly in preparation for a conventional conflict with the United States or Israel. Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri, with the approval of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, appointed Artesh Air Defense Force Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard as the commander of the Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters on February 4.[xi] Sabahi Fard will continue to serve as the Artesh Air Defense Force commander as well. Sabahi Fard replaced Brigadier General Ghader Rahim Zadeh, who had commanded the Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters since April 2021.[xii] Khamenei appointed Rahim Zadeh as an adviser to Artesh Commander Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi.[xiii] Iran established the Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters in 2008. Khamenei restructured the Iranian air defense structure in 2019, delegating air defense operations to the Artesh Air Defense Force and elevating the Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters to a higher echelon of command. The Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters is responsible for coordinating air defense activity between the Artesh and IRGC. Sabahi Fard previously commanded the Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters from May 2018 to May 2019 before Khamenei restructured it.[xiv]

These military leadership changes come as Iran has conducted several air defense exercises in recent weeks, specifically around Iranian nuclear facilities.[xv] The Artesh Air Defense Force most recently conducted an exercise in southwestern Iran on February 4.[xvi] The Artesh Air Defense Force tested Iranian-made radar systems, an expanded surveillance network, and the ”Majid” and “Joshan” missile systems, which Iranian media claims can intercept a large-scale drone attack.[xvii] These exercises reflect Iran’s efforts to strengthen its air defense capabilities and concerns about a potential conventional conflict with the United States or Israel.

An Israeli delegation will travel to Doha on February 8 and 9 to negotiate the second phase of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire-hostage agreement.[xviii] The Israeli Prime Minister’s Office announced that the delegation would travel to Doha after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met with US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff in Washington, DC on February 4. The ceasefire agreement required Israel and Hamas to begin negotiations for the second phase on February 3.[xix] Reuters reported on January 19 that the second phase of the ceasefire "is to include the release of the remaining Israeli hostages, a complete Israel Defense Forces withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, and a permanent ceasefire.[xx]

Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara discussed Syrian-Turkish defense coordination with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Ankara, Turkey, on February 4.[xxi] Shara announced that Syria is forming a “joint strategy” with Turkey to confront regional security threats and ensure lasting stability in the two countries.[xxii] Neither Shara nor Erdogan provided details about this strategy. Several unspecified officials and security sources told Reuters on February 4 that Shara and Erdogan would likely discuss the creation of a joint defense pact that would allow Turkey to use airbases in the central Syrian desert and take a “lead role” in training the new Syrian army.[xxiii]  Shara and Erdogan did not announce a defense pact during their joint press conference.

A defense pact between Syria and Turkey would be consistent with current Syrian objectives. Syrian leaders have said that they will pursue “strategic relations” with Turkey and have frequently included Turkish-backed factions and commanders in meetings about the establishment of the new Syrian government and military.[xxiv] The presence of Turkish forces at Syrian airbases in the central Syrian desert would in theory enable Turkey to defend Syrian airspace in the event of a future attack, according to several officials, including one Syrian security official.[xxv] The Assad regime previously acquired and used Russian and Iranian air defense systems, such as the Russian Pantsir missile system.[xxvi] Israeli airstrikes before and after the fall of the regime likely destroyed the majority of these systems.[xxvii] The Syrian government is likely eager to obtain temporary Turkish protection from potential threats in the absence of a functional military and active air defense systems. The new Syrian army also needs military equipment and training, both of which Russia and Iran previously provided to Assad’s Syrian Arab Army (SAA).[xxviii] Syrian Interim Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra noted during a recent interview that the Defense Ministry needs critical ”infrastructure” to repair or replace aircraft, tanks, and radars.[xxix] The new Syrian army units, which the interim government is forming from various armed factions, will require training to become organized and disciplined units.

A defense pact between Syria and Turkey would similarly enable Turkey to pursue its strategic objectives in Syria by increasing its influence in Syria. Turkish officials have repeatedly stated that Turkey seeks to “eliminate” the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).[xxx] An unspecified regional intelligence official stated that Turkey seeks to establish airbases at Palmyra military airport and the Tiyas airbase to send a “message” to the People’s Protection Units (YPG) in northern Syria.[xxxi]

Formalized Turkish military involvement in Syria would also likely be part of Turkey and HTS’s efforts to coerce the SDF to integrate into the Syrian Defense Ministry. Shara and Erdogan likely discussed recent developments in HTS’s ongoing negotiations with the SDF. Shara recently told Western media that he is not very optimistic about the possibility of an agreement with the SDF but that negotiations continue.[xxxii] Imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan is expected to make an imminent ”historic call” for the Kurdistan Workers‘ Party (PKK) to disarm. Turkish officials expect that such a call would pressure the SDF into an agreement to disarm and integrate into the HTS-led interim government.[xxxiii] Turkey has repeatedly threatened to conduct a military offensive into northern Syria in order to “eliminate” the SDF but has refrained from doing so while HTS negotiates with the SDF. HTS and Turkey may calculate that a formal Turkey-Syria defense agreement and an increased Turkish military presence in Syria could pressure the SDF to concede to HTS and Turkish demands. The SDF is unlikely to disarm, however, as it actively engages Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army in northern Syria.  

A significant number of Russian vessels that had been at the Port of Tartus in recent weeks may have left Syria for Russia as Russian-Syrian negotiations about Russia's continued access to its bases in Syria reportedly continue. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on February 3 that Russian and Syrian authorities will continue contact on "all issues," including Russia's continued access to the Port of Tartus.[xxxiv] Data from MarineTraffic.com showed that the Russian Sparta and Sparta II cargo ships were off the coast of Tunisia on February 4.[xxxv] OSINT analyst MT Anderson posted satellite imagery from the morning of February 4 showing thе Sparta and Sparta II, as well as potentially the Alexander Otrakovsky Ropucha-class landing ship, the Admiral Golovko Admiral Gorshkov-class frigate, and the Admiral Grigorovich Grigorovich-class frigate off the coast of Tunisia.[xxxvi] Satellite imagery and reports from Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) indicated that all these vessels had been at the Port of Tartus in December 2024 and January 2025.[xxxvii] The departure of a significant number of vessels from the Port of Tartus suggests that the Kremlin is not optimistic about the results of ongoing Russian-Syrian negotiations. The location of the vessels off the coast of Tunisia also suggests that these ships are not bound for Libya, though Russia sent some assets from Syria to Libya by air in December 2024 and January 2025, as the Critical Threats Project's (CTP) Africa File previously reported.[xxxviii] The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense's Resistance Center reported on February 4 that Russian ships began evacuating weapons from the Port of Tartus on January 27, and satellite imagery collected on January 18 and 27 showed that the Russian military had loaded equipment onto the Sparta and Sparta II at Tartus.[xxxix] The Ukrainian Resistance Center noted that the Sparta II turned off its automatic identification system (AIS) after leaving Syria—a common practice among ships in Russia's "shadow fleet.”[xl]

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Nuclear Program: Iran is conducting nuclear research that would enable it to build a nuclear weapon in a period of months. CTP-ISW does not assess that Iran has decided to build a nuclear weapon at this time. Iran’s nuclear weapons research comes as Israel has eroded key elements of Iran’s deterrence since October 2024.
• Maximum Pressure: US President Donald Trump ordered the re-enforcement of “maximum pressure” sanctions on Iran on February 4 to dissuade Iran from pursuing a nuclear weapon. “Maximum pressure” sanctions will likely cause further deterioration of the Iranian economy.
• Iranian Air Defense: Iran is attempting to improve its air defense abilities possibly in preparation for a conventional conflict with the United States or Israel. These military leadership changes come as Iran has conducted several air defense exercises in recent weeks, specifically around Iranian nuclear facilities.
• Gaza Strip Ceasefire: An Israeli delegation will travel to Doha on February 8 and 9 to negotiate the second phase of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire-hostage agreement.
• Syria-Turkey Relations: Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara discussed Syrian-Turkish defense coordination with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Ankara, Turkey, on February 4. A defense pact between Syria and Turkey would be consistent with current Syrian objectives, and it would similarly enable Turkey to pursue its strategic objectives in Syria by increasing its influence in Syria.
• Russia in Syria: A significant number of Russian vessels that had been at the Port of Tartus in recent weeks may have left Syria for Russia as Russian-Syrian negotiations about Russia's continued access to its bases in Syria reportedly continue.

Iran Update, February 3, 2025

An Iraqi Sunni parliamentarian criticized State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki on February 3 for promoting sectarianism.[i] Maliki gave a speech on February 1 in which he made anti-Sunni sectarian statements and implicitly accused Sunnis of trying to overthrow the Iraqi federal government.[ii] Progress Party member Shaalan al Karim described Maliki’s speech as “charged with sectarianism” and criticized the Shia Coordination Framework--a loose coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi parties--for not denouncing Maliki’s statements.[iii] Karim added that the Iraqi parliament approved the General Amnesty Law amendment on January 21 with “broad political agreement.” Karim likely made this statement in response to Maliki’s claim that the amendment will release “murderers and criminals” from prison.[iv] The General Amnesty Law amendment will grant amnesty to many Iraqis, including some who were arrested under Article 4 of the Anti-Terrorism Law.[v] The approval of the amendment was a long-standing Sunni demand and has long been opposed by Iraqi Shia parties. CTP-ISW has observed no other prominent Iraqi Sunni politician respond to Maliki’s speech at the time of this writing.

Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara will visit Ankara, Turkey, on February 4.[vi] The director of media for Turkish President Erdogan said that Shara will discuss the latest developments in Syria and Syrian-Turkish economic and security cooperation during meetings at the Presidential Complex.[vii]

Unknown actors detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) along the M4 highway outside of Manbij and killed at least 19 people on February 3.[viii] Syrian media reported that unknown actors parked the VBIED near the Hassin station, outside of Manbij City, on February 2 and then detonated it the next day. At least 15 of the casualties were agricultural workers in the vehicle next to the VBIED.[ix] Unknown actors have recently detonated at least seven VBIEDS in the Manbij area since December 2024, including an attack on February 1.[x] This most recent attack is the highest casualty incident yet in the series of attacks. The perpetrators and intended target(s) of the attack are unknown at this time. Syrian President Ahmed al Shara’s Office said in a statement that the Syrian state would pursue and impose “severe punishments” on the perpetrators of the attack.[xi]

Turkish and anti-SDF Syrian media accused the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the People’s Protection Units (YPG), and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) of conducting the February 3 VBIED attack.[xii] Previous VBIED attacks have similarly inspired accusations against the SDF. SDF officials condemned the attack and blamed Turkish-backed factions for conducting the attack and inspiring fear among the population.[xiii] The SDF volunteered the help the Syrian interim government find the perpetrators.[xiv]

Key Takeaways:

• Iraq: An Iraqi Sunni parliamentarian criticized Nouri al Maliki for stoking sectarian tensions. This comes after Maliki gave an inflammatory speech accusing Sunnis of trying to overthrow the Iraqi federal government.
• Syria: Interim President Ahmed al Shara will pay an official visit to Ankara to discuss bilateral cooperation and events in Syria.
• Syria: An unknown actor detonated a VBIED near Manbij in northern Syria, marking the seventh VBIED detonation in the area in recent months.

Iran Update, February 2, 2025

The Iraqi parliament voted to approve an amendment to the Iraqi budget law to provide salaries for Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) employees and resume oil exports from the Iraqi Kurdistan Region on February 2.[i] The Iraqi government will pay $16 per barrel to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), an increase from the previous compensation of $6 per barrel. An international consulting firm will determine the actual cost of oil extraction in the Kurdistan Region, according to the amended budget law. An Iraqi parliament’s finance committee member said that the cost of oil extraction is not fixed and may reach $22 per barrel, depending on the consulting firm’s inspection.[ii] The KRG spokesperson confirmed that the Iraqi parliament also resolved the issue of KRG employees' outstanding salaries.[iii] Iraqi and Kurdish officials are discussing sending the salaries in the “coming few days.”

Several Iraqi security and political officials have sought to delay the withdrawal of US-led international coalition forces from Iraq due to the situation in Syria. The Associated Press reported on January 31 that the fall of the Assad regime in Syria informed Iraqi officials’ assessment to delay the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq.[iv] Iraqi security and political officials warned that the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq would create a vacuum for ISIS to reconstitute. A US defense official said that unspecified Iraqi government officials have asked “informally at the highest of levels” to delay the withdrawal of US forces citing the same reason. The United States and Iraq agreed in September 2024 that hundreds of US-led international coalition forces would withdraw from Iraq by September 2025 and that the remaining troops would withdraw by the end of 2026.[v]

Key Takeaways:

• Iraqi Parliament: The Iraqi parliament voted to approve an amendment to the Iraqi budget law to provide salaries for Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) employees and resume oil exports from the Iraqi Kurdistan Region on February 2.
• US Presence in Iraq: Several Iraqi security and political officials have sought to delay the withdrawal of US-led international coalition forces from Iraq due to the situation in Syria.
• Turkey: Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan reiterated Turkish threats against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in a press conference with his Qatari counterpart on February 2.