Iran Update, November 12, 2025

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

The voter turnout rate was 56 percent in the November 11 Iraqi parliamentary elections, according to Iraq’s electoral commission.[i] Iraq’s electoral commission, the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC), previously reported an average voter turnout rate of 24 percent on November 11 before the polls closed.[ii] This high turnout rate comes after various Iraqi political figures expressed concern about low voter turnout on election day.[iii] The average voter turnout rate in the 2021 Iraqi parliamentary elections was approximately 42 percent.[iv] High voter turnout usually benefits large blocs like Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development Coalition because lower turnout favors smaller parties with very committed supporters.[v] Sudani's coalition won a plurality of votes in eight Iraqi provinces, including Baghdad Province, which also suggests that Sudani is popular.[vi] A plurality of votes suggests that Sudani performed well, but does not indicate that he will win a large number of seats by default because Iraq’s election system uses proportional representation.[vii] A September 2025 survey noted that Sudani had a 64 percent approval rating, which is among the highest approval ratings for an Iraqi prime minister since 2003.[viii] IHEC started to release the November 2025 election vote counts on November 12, but has not released parliamentary seat allocation results at the time of this writing. CTP-ISW will provide additional analysis about the official election results in future Iran Updates.

Iraqi politicians will likely continue informal government formation negotiations in advance of the Federal Supreme Court’s ratification of election results. The Federal Supreme Court’s ratification of the results is the first official step in government formation, but some early negotiations began prior to the elections and will continue as election results are released.[ix] IHEC announced on November 12 that political parties, coalitions, and candidates have logged 39 election complaints thus far, which IHEC must review before it can announce final electoral results.[x] Political parties, coalitions, and candidates can also appeal the final electoral results and IHEC’s decisions regarding complaints to the Electoral Judicial Panel that the Court of Cassation will nominate.[xi] The Court of Cassation legally reports to the Supreme Judicial Council, which Iranian-backed Judge Faiq Zaidan heads.[xii] IHEC will certify all results and send them to the Federal Supreme Court for ratification following the Electoral Judicial Panel’s adjudication.[xiii] The Federal Supreme Court did not ratify the 2021 election results until December 27, 2021, more than two months after the elections, due, in part, to a court case that Iranian-backed Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri filed to annul the preliminary results.[xiv] Iranian-backed parties underperformed in 2021 due to Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr’s participation and the type of electoral system used in the 2021 elections.[xv] The Iraqi President must call for a Parliament session within 15 days of the Federal Supreme Court’s ratification of the results before a President, a speaker, and their deputies, and a prime minister designate are chosen, respectively.[xvi]

The election results themselves and any changes to the results due to disputes will impact government formation negotiations, but Iraqi politicians will likely conduct these negotiations throughout the dispute adjudication phase. These negotiations are about “competition for power and resources” rather than discrete policy matters.[xvii] The performance of coalitions, such as Sudani’s, will impact their ability to form a 165-seat coalition required to form a government. Iranian-backed Iraqi actors deployed a variety of political and violent strategies to hinder the government formation process in 2021 when Sadr attempted to form a government without Iranian-backed political parties.[xviii] Sadr was able to exclude these parties because his large share of seats would have enabled him to form an alliance with large Kurdish and Sunni parties, but without his Shia competitors.

Sudani’s performance is particularly notable given that Iraqi media reported in October 2025 that unspecified Iraqi political figures were working to form a Sudani-led post-election alliance that would include Sunni and Kurdish political figures and potentially exclude some unspecified Iran-aligned figures and parties.[xix] Ameri denied on October 11 that Sudani had requested a second term, likely alluding to ongoing divides that have emerged between Sudani and some Shia Coordination Framework parties this year.[xx] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. The Shia Coordination Framework released a statement the night before the elections, reaffirming that it will re-form its alliance after the elections, but it remains far from clear if the reunification will occur.[xxi]

CTP-ISW observed three instances of political violence on election day. Iraqi media reported on November 11 that Iraqi authorities arrested a man who, as part of a group, exchanged fire with Iraqi security forces at a school used as a polling center near Muzaybilah, Basra Province.[xxii] One unspecified person was reportedly injured in the incident. Supporters of two unspecified rival candidates also clashed near a polling station in al Abbasiya district, Najaf Province, which injured three supporters of one candidate.[xxiii] A medical source separately told Iraqi media that unspecified actors shot and injured four Iraqi soldiers near a school in Tuz Khurmatu district, Salah al Din Province.[xxiv] Iraqi security forces deployed throughout the country on election day to provide extra security for voters.[xxv] These instances of political violence follow other incidents that occurred prior to the elections, including the assassination of Sunni Sovereignty Alliance candidate and Baghdad Provincial Council member Safaa al Mashhadani on October 14.[xxvi] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias killed Mashhadani.[xxvii]

Key Takeaways

• Iraqi Parliamentary Elections: The voter turnout rate was 56 percent in the November 11 Iraqi parliamentary elections, according to Iraq’s electoral commission. Iraqi politicians will likely continue informal government formation negotiations in advance of the Federal Supreme Court’s ratification of election results. CTP-ISW observed three instances of political violence on election day.
• Insurgent Activity in Syria: An Alawite insurgent leader called for Alawites to establish an “independent region” along the coast on November 12. The Men of Light do not appear to have the capabilities or support to successfully force the Syrian government to withdraw from the coast at this time.
• Iranian Defense Strategy: Iranian officials continue to inspect naval units in the Persian Gulf to secure Iran's control over the Gulf, likely as part of Iran’s effort to prepare for any potential conflict with the United States or Israel. These inspections suggest that Iranian officials continue to believe renewed war with the United States or Israel is imminent.

Iran

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors travelled to Iran on November 12 to inspect the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC), according to a confidential IAEA report obtained by the Associated Press.[xxviii] It is unclear the extent of access that the IAEA or Iran has to the facility, given that Israeli airstrikes severely damaged the facility during the Israel-Iran War in June 2025, however.[xxix] The IAEA has not been able to verify the status of Iran’s weapons-grade uranium stockpile since the war.  The IAEA report stated that Iran notified the IAEA of a new enrichment facility at the ENTC on June 12, and the IAEA immediately requested access to the facility. Iran agreed to the IAEA’s request, but the IAEA cancelled the visitation due to the onset of the war.[xxx] The IAEA does not currently know the precise location of the new facility or the status of its enriched uranium, which the report described as seriously concerning.[xxxi] A previous IAEA report claimed that Iran possessed 440.9 kilograms of 60 percent enriched uranium before the war, which is enough for Iran to produce at least 10 nuclear weapons if enriched to 90 percent.[xxxii] The recent IAEA report, which was shared with all member states of the IAEA Board of Governors, precedes the upcoming IAEA Board of Governors meeting in Vienna from November 19 to 21, during which members will discuss Iran’s nuclear program.[xxxiii]

Iran is developing regional trade routes with neighboring countries, likely as part of a broader Iranian effort to mitigate the impact of international sanctions on the Iranian economy. Iran’s Railway Organization’s Deputy Commerce Director stated on November 8 that Iran intends to become a regional trade “hub” after the first Russian freight train arrived at Aprin Dry Cargo Terminal, which is located about 20 kilometers southwest of Tehran City, via Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.[xxxiv] Iran’s Railway Organization opened Aprin Dry Port in June 2025, and 30 trains from unspecified locations have stopped there so far, according to the organization’s Deputy Commerce Director.[xxxv] The train previously transited a border checkpoint at Incheh Borun economic free zone in northeastern Iran on November 8.[xxxvi] More than 60 companies have reportedly invested in the 4,000-hectare Incheh Borun economic free zone between Iran and Turkmenistan to cut trade and transportation costs, according to Iran’s Golestan Province Governor in October 2025.[xxxvii]

Iran is developing trade routes with all its neighbors. Iran reportedly transported some of the cargo from the Russian freight train, which included paper pulp, onwards to Iraq.[xxxviii] Iran and Iraq have been cooperating to revive the Shalamcheh-Basra railway between southwestern Iran and Basra Port, Iraq, since 2023 after years of planning, but have made little progress.[xxxix] Iran has also held several meetings with officials in neighboring countries since August 2025 to propose trade facilitation projects, including two railways with Turkmenistan near the Sarakhs Border Point in Razavi Khorsan Province, a port-sea consortium with Russia in the Caspian Sea, an economic free zone in Chabahar Port, southeastern Iran, with Pakistan, railways with Tajikistan, and the Rasht-Astara Railway project with Azerbaijan.[xl] Most of these projects are part of the International North-South Transport Corridor, which Iran, Russia, and India established in 2002.[xli] The corridor connects India, Iran, Russia, and Central Asia via road, rail, and sea to reduce transit time and costs between South Asia and Europe.[xlii]

Iranian officials continue to inspect naval units in the Persian Gulf to secure Iran's control over the Gulf, likely as part of Iran’s effort to prepare for any potential conflict with the United States or Israel. These inspections suggest that Iranian officials continue to believe renewed war with the United States or Israel is imminent. Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Commander Major General Ali Abdollahi inspected Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) naval units deployed on the Nazeat Islands on November 11.[xliii] The Nazeat Islands, including Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, Abu Musa, and Siri Island, are key positions for Iran’s ability to control maritime access to the Persian Gulf.[xliv] Abdollahi stated that the IRGC Navy has recently increased its capabilities.[xlv] Abdollahi’s inspection comes amid other key Iranian military commanders, including IRGC Commander Major General Mohammad Pakpour, IRGC Navy Commander Brigadier General Alireza Tangsiri, Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General (AFGS) Abdol Rahim Mousavi, and Artesh Navy Commander Rear Admiral Shahram Irani, inspections of southern Iranian naval units in recent weeks.[xlvi]

Former AFGS Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri approved the deployment of additional Iranian military forces to the Nazeat Islands near the Strait of Hormuz in May 2025. These deployments could have enabled Iran to harass shipping in the Strait of Hormuz in the event of war. Bagheri said that Iran would retaliate against US military bases, disrupt international commercial shipping, and attack regional states that host US forces “if the US military makes a mistake.”[xlvii] Iran previously responded to the US “maximum pressure” campaign in 2019 by attacking oil tankers near the Strait of Hormuz, seizing a foreign vessel, and harassing US and British naval ships.[xlviii]

The United States sanctioned 32 individuals and entities on November 12 for operating multiple weapon procurement networks  that support Iran’s ballistic missile and drone production.[xlix] The sanctioned individuals and entities are based in Iran, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Turkey, the People's Republic of China (PRC), Hong Kong, India, Germany, and Ukraine.  The sanctions targeted a multinational network of individuals and companies that coordinated Iran’s procurement of missile propellant ingredients, including sodium chlorate, sodium perchlorate, and sebacic acid, from the PRC . Sodium perchlorate is a chemical precursor for solid missile propellant.[l] European intelligence sources told CNN on October 29 that Iran received several shipments from the PRC that contained a total of 2,000 tons of sodium perchlorate.[li] Iran previously received about 1,000 tons of sodium perchlorate from China in February and May 2025.[lii] Iran‘s recent, larger shipment from the PRC comes amid Iran’s efforts to rebuild its missile program after the Israel-Iran War. Iran sees its ballistic missile program as its main deterrent against future attacks.[liii] The US Treasury Department sanctioned th e following individuals and entities on November 12, among others:

• Marco Klinge (UAE, India, Germany): Klinge is the principal facilitator of the MVM partnership that coordinates the procurement of Chinese sodium chlorate for Iran via his front companies. Klinge’s front companies include MVM Amici Trading LLC (UAE), Farmlane Private Limited (India), and EVA Handelsgesellschaft UG (Germany), which used to source and transfer missile propellant materials to Iran.[liv]
• Vahid Qayumi (Iran, Turkey): Qayumi managed the MVM partnership’s chemical operations in Iran. Qayumi oversaw the procurement of missile propellant ingredients, such as sebacic acid, through his companies, including Zagros Shimi Fars Manufacturing Industries and Furqan Novin Pars. Qayumi also used his company, Vahid Ghayoumy Goods Wholesalers LLC (UAE), to ship materials from China to Iran.
• Majid Dolatkhah (Iran and Turkey): Dolatkhah coordinated the MVM partnership’s procurement channels in Turkey and served as the liaison between Parchin Chemical Industries and Klinge. Dolatkhah also facilitated transfers of sodium chlorate, sodium perchlorate, and sebacic acid to Iran.

The US Treasury also sanctioned other entities for supporting Iran’s drone industry linked  as follows:

• Kimia Part Sivan Company (KIPAS): KIPAS worked with the IRGC Quds Force to improve its drone program. It coordinated with its subsidiary Iranian Baspar Puya Company (PARPO) and front company Pars Navandishan Artificial Intelligence Projects Company (ARIAPA), which produced and repaired drone components and provided technical support to Iran.[lv]
• Oje Parvas Mado Nafar Company (Mado): Mado produces Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 drone engines for the IRGC. Mado is supported by PRC-based entities that facilitate transactions and procure drone components on its behalf. Chinese and Hong Kong-based entities used payments from multiple entities to acquire drone components like aluminum alloy castings and spark plug caps.
• Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company (HESA): HESA is a state-owned subsidiary of Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). It used a procurement network and Ukraine-based front companies to supply aerospace materials, including attitude indicators, magnetometers, engines, and sensors.

Iraq

See topline section.

Syria 

An Alawite insurgent leader called for Alawites to establish an “independent region” along the coast on November 12.  [lvi] The group formed in response to the March 2025 coastal massacres that targeted Alawites, according to the Men of Light’s unnamed leader in an interview on November 12.[lvii] The group’s leader stated that  the militia’s primary objective is to ”confront” Syrian President Ahmed al Shara’s government because Alawites ”cannot co-exist" with forces that have committed massacres targeting the Alawite community.[lviii] The Men of Light‘s leader declared that the Alawite community has the right to establish “an independent region” along the Syrian coast to ensure Alawites’ protection if the Syrian transitional government does not withdraw from the coastal region.[lix]   

The Men of Light do not appear to have the capabilities or support to successfully force the Syrian government to withdraw from the coast at this time. The Men of Light’s attacks targeting the Syrian transitional government have been relatively sporadic thus far and have yet to force any serious change to the way that government forces operate. The group has claimed at least four IED attacks targeting Syrian General Security Service (GSS), police, or other government-affiliated vehicles in the vicinity of Jableh since August 2025.[lx] There have been no reported casualties from any of these attacks, and the Men of Light has not claimed any attacks outside of the Jableh-Baniyas region.[lxi] The group’s limited reach and effectiveness of its attacks also suggest that the Men of Light retains limited support within Syria at this time. The Syrian transitional government maintains a well-established political and security presence throughout the Syrian coastal region and is unlikely to withdraw from any government-controlled territory without an extremely significant threat to government forces or a change in government policy .[lxii]

Arabian Peninsula

Nothing significant to report.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.