Iran Updates, October 2025

Iran Update, October 29, 2025 

The Israel-Lebanon ceasefire monitoring committee has agreed to meet more frequently, likely to encourage greater dialogue between Israel and Lebanon. The US-led, five-member committee was established as part of the November 2024 Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire agreement and is responsible for monitoring Israel and Lebanon’s compliance with the agreement.[i] US, French, Lebanese, Israeli, and United Nations officials comprise the committee.[ii] The committee members agreed on October 29 to increase the frequency of committee meetings and scheduled three meetings, which will occur by the end of 2025, to ensure that all members are “aligned and informed.”[iii] Lebanon and Israel previously attempted to hold preliminary discussions to formally renew indirect negotiations, but the discussions reached a “dead end.”[iv] The committee is currently the only way through which Israel and Lebanon can raise concerns and engage with each other in indirect dialogue.[v] Regular and more frequent meetings between the committee members would require Israeli and Lebanese officials to engage with each other more frequently, thus increasing dialogue between the two parties.

The ceasefire monitoring committee may seek to increase dialogue between Israel and Lebanon to resolve ongoing disagreements between the two countries over the US and Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) plans to disarm Hezbollah. US and Lebanese officials have consistently called for the committee to serve as a mediator between Israel and Lebanon.[vi] Israel and Lebanon continue to disagree on the timelines of the US and LAF plans to disarm Hezbollah. Lebanese officials have consistently stated that indirect negotiations and the implementation of the LAF and US disarmament plans are contingent upon Israel ceasing its operations in Lebanon and fully withdrawing from Lebanese territory.[vii] Israel has maintained that it will continue to operate in Lebanon until Hezbollah has been disarmed.[viii] Israel previously refused to discuss the US proposal to disarm Hezbollah in August 2025 and has continued to reject any proposals that require an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and cessation of operations in Lebanon.[ix] Israeli officials have also criticized the speed at which the LAF is implementing its disarmament plan.[x] LAF and Lebanese officials have consistently rejected these criticisms, stating that the LAF’s limited capabilities and continued Israeli operations in Lebanon are hindering the LAF’s progress.[xi]

Hezbollah is continuing to try to smuggle weapons from Syria into Lebanon amid international discussions about Hezbollah’s disarmament. Senior Israeli officials told Israeli media on October 27 that Hezbollah has managed to smuggle “hundreds” of rockets from Syria into Lebanon in recent months.[xii] US Deputy Special Envoy to the Middle East Morgan Ortagus told Saudi media on October 28 that Israeli officials alerted the United States to Hezbollah’s recent cross-border smuggling.[xiii] Iran has historically supplied Hezbollah with weapons and funding using ground lines of communication that cross Syria.[xiv] The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) has increased patrols along the Lebanon-Syria border since June 2025 as part of an effort to prevent Iran and its partners from transferring arms and resources to Hezbollah to support the organization's reconstitution.[xv] The Syrian transitional government has also seized numerous weapons shipments likely bound for Hezbollah and sought to expel Iranian-backed militias and Iranian influence from Syria.[xvi] Senior Syrian and Lebanese officials have held a series of meetings throughout October to discuss border security issues.[xvii] Syrian and Lebanese officials most recently met in Beirut on October 29 to discuss efforts to combat terrorism and drug trafficking.

Key Takeaways

• Hezbollah Disarmament: The Israel-Lebanon ceasefire monitoring committee has agreed to meet more frequently, likely to encourage greater dialogue between Israel and Lebanon. The ceasefire monitoring committee may seek to increase dialogue between Israel and Lebanon to resolve ongoing disagreements between the two countries over the US and Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) plans to disarm Hezbollah.
• Hezbollah Disarmament: Hezbollah is continuing to try to smuggle weapons from Syria into Lebanon amid international discussions about Hezbollah’s disarmament. Senior Israeli officials told Israeli media on October 27 that Hezbollah has managed to smuggle “hundreds” of rockets from Syria into Lebanon in recent months.
• Iraqi Elections: Popular Mobilization Forces units, including the Asaib Ahl al Haq-affiliated 50th Brigade, are reportedly attempting to deter Sunnis in Sunni-majority areas of Ninewa Province from voting in the Iraqi parliamentary elections on November 11, 2025. CTP-ISW has also observed four instances of political violence since October 14.

Iran Update, October 28, 2025 

Former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Mohammad Ali Jafari argued that Iran’s missile program is its main form of deterrence and that Iran deliberately prioritized developing its missile and drone capabilities over its air and ground forces to counter the superior capabilities of the United States and Israel.[i] Jafari gave an interview to the Iranian podcast “Story of the War” on October 25, which features various senior Iranian officials’ perspectives on the Israel–Iran War.[ii] Jafari provided a long summary about the development of Iranian defense strategy. Jafari stated that after a strategic review directed by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei after the Iran-Iraq War, Iran concluded that future conflicts would differ from the war with Iraq and that Iran needed to prioritize other capabilities beyond its ground forces.[iii] Jafari added that Khamenei made the Artesh—Iran’s conventional military—responsible for air defenses and conventional air force technologies like fighter aircraft, and made the IRGC responsible for missiles and drones.[iv] Iran chose this approach to compensate for its limited conventional capabilities and to ensure that it could deter stronger adversaries through inexpensive weapons, such as missiles and drones. Jafari also stated that Iran anticipated future conflict with Israel and the United States after the Iran–Iraq War, which led it to adopt an approach focused on missiles and drones to offset the technological gap between Iranian and US airpower and information systems.[v]

Jafari also claimed that Iran has learned from its successful missile strikes to improve accuracy, starting with the 2017 strike on the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Syria, which was reportedly the first real battlefield test of Iranian missile precision.[vi] Jafari also highlighted that Iran learned from its later strikes on anti-regime targets in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region in October 2022, which demonstrated further improvements to its missile precision.[vii] Jafari’s remarks indicate how Iran has tried to develop its missile capabilities through real combat experience rather than military exercises. Some senior Iranian commanders have previously stated that Iran applied lessons learned from each round of Iran’s missile strikes on Israel, but acknowledged that the True Promise I and II operations in April and October 2024 were part of the learning process.[viii] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran’s inability to accurately strike military or energy infrastructure in Israel highlights the limited accuracy of its ballistic missiles, which likely led Iran to adjust tactics and warhead types to compensate for these shortcomings.[ix] Deputy Vice President for Strategic Affairs Ali Abdullah Khani urged on October 13 that Iran improve its missile guidance systems and adopt maneuverable reentry vehicles to enhance accuracy, which indicates that Iran has continued to emphasize the importance of missile accuracy after the war.[x] Khani added that Iran must reduce its missiles’ circular error probable (CEP), which is “the radius of a circle, centered at the intended target, within which 50 percent of the missiles would be expected to impact.”[xi]

Senior Iranian officials continue to threaten the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, likely aiming to deter adversaries and raise the cost of further action. Jafari stated that Iran kept some options in reserve and did not need to use them during the Israel-Iran War in response to a question about why Iran did not employ naval forces in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz.[xii] Jafari stated that Iran would likely close the Strait of Hormuz if Israel or the United States struck Iran's infrastructure, like water, electricity, or gas, to pressure civilians.[xiii] Jafari added that Iran will also employ these capabilities if a future conflict proves harder.

Iran may be able to use ballistic or cruise missiles to strike moving ships in the Straits of Hormuz and Persian Gulf in future rounds of conflict. Jafari claimed that Iran has the capabilities to strike moving ships. The Houthis, who use Iranian technology and have received Iranian training, have managed to hit multiple moving ships. Iranian state media outlet Mehr News previously reported on October 7 that Iran has developed new anti-ship cruise missiles equipped with fully automated guidance systems.[xiv]

Key Takeaways

• Iran Defense Strategy: Former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Mohammad Ali Jafari argued that Iran’s missile program is its main form of deterrence and that Iran deliberately prioritized developing its missile and drone capabilities over its air and ground forces to counter the superior capabilities of the United States and Israel.
• Lebanese-Israeli Relations: The United States has continued its diplomatic efforts aimed at preventing renewed fighting between Israel and Hezbollah. The resumption of Lebanese-Israeli negotiations could help to defuse tensions between Lebanon and regional and international partners, who have expressed frustration with the Lebanese government’s cautious disarmament process.
• Hezbollah Disarmament: The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) has reportedly continued to seize Hezbollah weapons caches and military infrastructure in southern Lebanon. The LAF has reportedly depleted its explosives stockpile used to destroy Hezbollah weapons caches.

Iran Update, October 27, 2025 

The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)’s apparent hesitancy to disarm Hezbollah has increased international frustration and concern about a potential resumption of fighting between Israel and Hezbollah. Deputy US Special Envoy Morgan Ortagus arrived in Beirut on October 27 to meet with senior Lebanese officials in hopes of preventing renewed fighting between Israel and Hezbollah.[i] Ortagus is expected to attend a ceasefire supervision committee meeting and meet with Lebanese President Joseph Aoun during her visit.[ii] CTP-ISW assessed on October 23 that Hezbollah may have deterred the LAF from disarming the group.[iii] The LAF has conducted basic seizures of Hezbollah weapons caches, but CTP-ISW has not observed any instances of Hezbollah fighters turning weapons over to the state. LAF leadership and members of Lebanon’s security forces were divided over their willingness to act against Hezbollah in August 2025, according to unspecified sources speaking to Lebanese and Emirati media.[iv] The Lebanese government has claimed that Israeli airstrikes have prevented the LAF from more forcefully or efficiently disarming Hezbollah.[v] Lebanese officials and the LAF have failed to concretely explain how the Israelis limit LAF activity and why the LAF cannot implement its plan to disarm Hezbollah with its existing capabilities. Regional and international partners have expressed frustration with the Lebanese government’s cautious disarmament process.[vi]  The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) launched a five-day division-level exercise along the Israel-Lebanon border on November 19 amid these international frustrations. The IDF said that the exercise sought to maintain readiness along Israel’s northern border and prepare for unspecified “different scenarios.”[vii] US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack warned the Lebanese government on November 20 that there may be a “major confrontation” between Israel and Hezbollah if the Lebanese government does not take steps to disarm Hezbollah.[viii]

The IDF has continued its airstrike campaign across Lebanon to prevent Hezbollah reconstitution efforts. The IDF has killed approximately seven Hezbollah fighters and one Hezbollah-affiliated weapons smuggler since CTP-ISW’s last data cutoff on October 24.[ix] The IDF reported that it killed two Hezbollah Radwan Force fighters and two Radwan commanders who supported Hezbollah reconstitution efforts in southern Lebanon.[x] The Radwan Force is Hezbollah’s special operations forces unit created to conduct offensive operations into Israeli territory, and these commanders would presumably be involved in reconstitution efforts due to their role as commanders.[xi] The IDF also killed a Hezbollah-affiliated weapons smuggler in the Bekaa Valley on October 26.[xii] The IDF additionally killed a Hezbollah fighter on October 26 who operated as a liaison between Hezbollah and a southern Lebanese village to support economic reconstruction and rebuild Hezbollah infrastructure.[xiii] An Israeli analyst reported that the IDF has killed one Hezbollah fighter per day on average since the November 2024 Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement.[xiv] Hezbollah fighters targeted by the IDF since October 24 served in positions in which the fighters would aid Hezbollah efforts to reestablish military infrastructure in southern Lebanon, increase local popular support, and procure additional weaponry. The IDF’s targeting of these fighters comes after the IDF increased its rate of airstrikes targeting Hezbollah military infrastructure over the past week. The IDF launched at least 18 airstrikes targeting Hezbollah military infrastructure, including a Hezbollah missile manufacturing site and training camp, on October 23 and October 24, compared to 15 airstrikes between October 1 and 22.[xv]

Key Takeaways

• Hezbollah Disarmament: The Lebanese Armed Forces’ apparent hesitancy to disarm Hezbollah has increased international frustration and concern about a potential resumption of fighting between Israel and Hezbollah. Deputy US Special Envoy Morgan Ortagus arrived in Beirut on October 27 to meet with senior Lebanese officials in hopes of preventing renewed fighting between Israel and Hezbollah.
• Israeli Strikes in Lebanon: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued its airstrike campaign across Lebanon to prevent Hezbollah reconstitution efforts. The IDF has killed approximately seven Hezbollah fighters and one Hezbollah-affiliated weapons smuggler since CTP-ISW’s last data cutoff on October 24.
• Iranian Political Faction Infighting: Iranian officials are concerned that divisions among Iranian political factions around foreign policy will destabilize the Iranian regime and present opportunities for exploitation by Iran’s adversaries. Pragmatic hardliner and Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf called on all Iranian political factions to demonstrate national unity in a parliament session on October 26.
• Iraqi Shia Political Party Divisions: Unspecified Shia Coordination Framework parties are reportedly attempting to receive political support from the United States ahead of the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections, which reflects continued divisions within the coalition. Iraqi media reported on October 27 that unspecified Shia Coordination Framework parties are in a “political rush” to receive US support before the elections on November 11, 2025.

Iran Update, October 24, 2025 

The Israeli Air Force (IAF) conducted at least 18 airstrikes targeting Hezbollah sites and fighters across Lebanon on October 23 and 24, compared to 15 airstrikes between October 1 and 22. The airstrikes are part of Israel’s effort to prevent Hezbollah’s reconstitution.[i] Five IAF fighter jets struck 16 Hezbollah sites, including a training camp and a missile manufacturing site, in the Bekaa Valley and northern Lebanon on October 23.[ii] The Bekaa Valley has historically served as a Hezbollah stronghold and a key center for Hezbollah military activities.[iii] The IAF struck other Hezbollah sites and fighters in southern Lebanon on October 23 and 24.[iv] The IAF killed Hezbollah’s southern Lebanon Logistics Unit Chief, Abbas Hassan Karaki, on October 24.[v] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) stated that Karaki was responsible for leading Hezbollah’s efforts to rebuild its capabilities and infrastructure in southern Lebanon.[vi] Israel has consistently stated that the Lebanese government is not doing enough to disarm Hezbollah and prevent the group’s reconstitution.[vii]

The Israeli airstrikes come amid concerns about an imminent Israeli escalation in Lebanon. Lebanese media reported on October 23 that Hezbollah is expecting an imminent Israeli escalation.[viii] Hezbollah Parliamentarian Hassan Ezzedine similarly stated on October 24 that Hezbollah cannot discount the possibility that Israel is preparing for a large-scale escalation and noted that Hezbollah is ready to confront all possibilities.[ix] US and European officials warned on October 20 and 24, respectively, about the possibility of a large-scale Israeli operation targeting Hezbollah.[x] Unspecified Israeli military officials stated on October 24 that Israel is not prepared to enter a multi-front war due to budget constraints that limit its ability to rebuild its forces and weapons stockpiles, however.[xi] The IDF reportedly cancelled upcoming reserve call-ups and will release some reserve soldiers soon.[xii] The IDF ended its five-day, division-level military exercise along the Israel-Lebanon border on October 24.[xiii]

Some Iranian officials have emphasized the need to decentralize authority to provincial governors following the Israel-Iran War, likely, in part, to ensure continuity of governance during periods of crisis. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian announced in July that he had delegated “all of the president’s powers” to provincial governors, although it is unclear which specific powers Pezeshkian was referring to.[xiv] Pezeshkian stated that transferring authority to governors was necessary to ensure that local governments can continue to operate even if senior Iranian officials are killed.[xv] Iranian media previously claimed that Israel targeted a Supreme National Security Council meeting in Tehran that Pezeshkian was attending during the Israel-Iran War.[xvi] Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf stated on October 24 that he supports the government’s efforts to delegate authority to provincial governors but emphasized that these efforts must comply with the Iranian Constitution.[xvii] The Iranian Constitution allows the president to appoint special representatives whose decisions hold the same authority as the president’s in “special circumstances.”[xviii] Ghalibaf’s remarks about decentralization come after other senior Iranian officials have similarly expressed support for decentralization in recent weeks. Deputy Vice President for Strategic Affairs Ali Abdullah Khani recently emphasized the need for Iran to decentralize its supply chains, defense systems, and command-and-control structures, for example.[xix] These statements reflect a growing acknowledgement among Iranian officials that Israel exploited Iran’s centralized leadership structure during the Israel-Iran War.

Iran also appears to be empowering provinces to establish economic relations with other countries, likely as part of Iran’s effort to mitigate the impact of international sanctions. Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi stated during a “provincial diplomacy” conference in Khorasan Razavi Province on October 23 that Iran’s borders with neighboring countries have become “vital breathing channels” for Iran's economy.[xx] Araghchi described provincial diplomacy as a “paradigm shift” in how Iran conducts foreign relations.[xxi] Iran may calculate that it can ease the pressure of international sanctions by developing strong economic relationships between Iranian provinces and regional and extra-regional countries. The regime’s push for provincial diplomacy is one of numerous mechanisms that Iran has pursued to try to reduce the impact of sanctions.

Key Takeaways

• Israeli Airstrikes in Lebanon: The Israeli Air Force (IAF) conducted at least 18 airstrikes targeting Hezbollah sites and fighters across Lebanon on October 23 and 24, compared to 15 airstrikes between October 1 and 22. The Israeli airstrikes come amid concerns about an imminent Israeli escalation in Lebanon. Unspecified Israeli military officials stated on October 24 that Israel is not prepared to enter a multi-front war due to budget constraints, however.
• Iranian Reflections on the Israel-Iran War: Some Iranian officials have emphasized the need to decentralize authority to provincial governors following the Israel-Iran War, likely, in part, to ensure continuity of governance during periods of crisis. Iran also appears to be empowering provinces to establish economic relations with other countries, likely as part of Iran’s effort to mitigate the impact of international sanctions.

Iran Update, October 23, 2025 

Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf--a retired military officer but still currently a senior civilian--reportedly took the unprecedented step of assuming an unspecified but very senior military command during the Israel-Iran War in June 2025 after the deaths of many top commanders. Ghalibaf’s assumption of command as a civilian due to command losses demonstrates that Israel caused significant disruption to Iranian command and control. Iranian Tourism and Cultural Heritage Minister Reza Salehi Amiri stated on October 22 that Ghalibaf assumed command of the Iranian armed forces as an emergency response to the deaths of prominent Iranian commanders during the Israel-Iran War.[i] Ghalibaf was once IRGC Air Force commander—the predecessor to the IRGC Aerospace Force—but his assumption of command is nonetheless unprecedented because he currently holds a senior civilian political office.[ii] Multiple IRGC Aerospace Force commanders were killed in the opening days of the conflict, and Ghalibaf could have stepped in on an interim basis to ensure continuity of command. An Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated outlet confirmed the veracity of Amiri’s statements, stating that his speech constituted an informational security breach and accusing him of spying for Israel.[iii] The outlet added that Ghalibaf’s role during the war was kept secret from the public and that his revelation now makes Ghalibaf a prime target for an Israeli assassination.[iv] Ghalibaf stated in an interview on September 24 that he was in ”daily contact” with IRGC Commander Major General Mohammad Pakpour over the course of the war.[v] IRGC Coordination Deputy Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naghdi acknowledged on October 20 that Iran was unable to respond in a timely fashion during the Israel-Iran War due to disruptions in its chain of command after Israel killed several Iranian senior commanders.[vi] Ghalibaf’s assumption of command demonstrates that Iran needed to opt for suboptimal interim measures to ensure continuity of command.

Ghalibaf may have assumed command of the Iranian military or elements of it during the Israel-Iran War without the approval of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Khamenei’s absence during the war suggests that Ghalibaf assumed command without Khamenei’s approval.[vii] The New York Times reported on June 21 that Khamenei isolated himself in a bunker during the war to avoid being assassinated by Israel and that various factions were forming within the Iranian regime to vie for power in Khamenei’s absence.[viii] Ghalibaf, who is a member of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), could have consulted the council. SNSC cannot make decisions without the supreme leader because he must approve all SNSC decisions, however.[ix]

Ghalibaf’s reported role during and after the Israel-Iran War demonstrates his enormous influence in the Iranian regime. Ghalibaf has vast experience in several of Iran’s most important institutions that serve to achieve the regime’s strategic objectives. He previously served as the IRGC Air Force commander, as noted above, but also as the Iranian Police Force chief and the IRGC Khatam al Anbiya Construction Headquarters commander before transitioning to political leadership.[x] There is no public reporting that indicates other Iranian leaders opposed Ghalibaf‘s decision to assume command of the military or some elements of it during the Israel-Iran War, which indicates that he retains significant influence across the regime security establishment or that other regime officials recognized the dire situation during the war. These explanations are not mutually exclusive. Ghalibaf also played an important role in creating the post-war National Defense Council, which Iran designed to fix key vulnerabilities in its defense, cybersecurity, and intelligence systems that Israel exploited during the war.[xi]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced on October 19 that Israeli forces began to conduct a five-day, division-level military exercise along the Israel-Lebanon border to prepare for “different scenarios.”[xii] US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack previously warned the Lebanese government on October 20 that there may be a “major confrontation“ between Israel and Hezbollah if the government does not take steps to disarm Hezbollah.[xiii] An unspecified security source told Lebanese media on October 23 that Hezbollah decided that it would directly respond to any Israeli ground operations and is expecting an imminent Israeli escalation.[xiv] The source noted that Hezbollah has developed a new military plan incorporating lessons learned from the November 2024 Israel-Hezbollah conflict.[xv]

Hezbollah may have deterred the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) from disarming the group. A figure close to Saudi officials told Lebanese media on October 19 that Saudi Arabia has grown frustrated with the Lebanese government’s ”slowness” in implementing its Hezbollah disarmament plan and threatened to pull funding for the LAF, which suggests that Saudi Arabia has concerns about the government’s willingness to disarm Hezbollah on a reasonable timeline.[xvi] US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack stated on October 20 that the Lebanese government’s principle of monopolizing all weapons to the state remains more of an ”aspiration than [a] reality” due to the Lebanese government’s fear of civil unrest and Hezbollah’s political dominance.[xvii] Hezbollah officials, including Secretary General Naim Qassem, have continuously threatened to instigate armed conflict and anti-government protests since the Lebanese government agreed to disarm Hezbollah in August 2025.[xviii] Hezbollah, for example, informed Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and LAF Commander Brigadier General Rodolphe Haykal in August 2025 that the Lebanese government’s implementation of its plan to disarm Hezbollah would cause confrontation.[xix] LAF and Lebanese officials have consistently raised concerns about conflict breaking out between the Lebanese state and Hezbollah during the disarmament process. Haykal previously told Lebanese Parliament Speaker and Hezbollah ally Nabih Berri that the LAF will not ”clash with a key component of the country,” likely referring to Hezbollah.[xx] LAF leadership and members of Lebanon’s security forces were also reportedly divided over their willingness to act against Hezbollah, according to unspecified sources speaking to Lebanese and Saudi media in August 2025.[xxi] Hezbollah’s threats may have exacerbated Lebanese government officials' and security forces’ concerns about internal conflict, which may have deterred the Lebanese government from disarming Hezbollah.

LAF and Lebanese officials have consistently rejected claims that Hezbollah has successfully deterred its disarmament, stating that the LAF’s limited capabilities and continued Israeli operations in Lebanon are hindering its progress.[xxii] Lebanese officials and the LAF have failed to concretely explain how the Israelis limit LAF activity and why the LAF cannot implement its plan to disarm Hezbollah with its existing capabilities. Lebanese officials have also claimed that the LAF is implementing its disarmament plan despite these stated challenges and is expected to complete its first phase of disarmament in southern Lebanon soon.[xxiii] CTP-ISW has not observed any reports of Hezbollah fighters turning over their weaponry to the LAF or the LAF raiding any active Hezbollah sites with Hezbollah personnel present, however. The Lebanese government has taken steps to implement other components of the US proposal to disarm Hezbollah, however. The Lebanese government has started to work with Cyprus to begin negotiations on Lebanese-Israeli prisoner issues, to acquire funds for reconstruction in Lebanon, and to conduct talks with Syrian officials to demarcate the shared border.[xxiv] The Lebanese government’s progress on several other elements of the US proposal and inaction on disarming Hezbollah suggest that Hezbollah has successfully deterred the LAF from fully disarming it, even in the south.

Key Takeaways

• Iranian Command-and-Control: Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf--a retired military officer but still currently a senior civilian--reportedly took the unprecedented step of assuming an unspecified but very senior military command during the Israel-Iran War in June 2025 after the deaths of many top commanders. Ghalibaf’s assumption of command as a civilian due to command losses demonstrates that Israel caused significant disruption to Iranian command and control.
• Israeli Operations in Lebanon: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced on October 19 that Israeli forces began to conduct a five-day, division-level military exercise along the Israel-Lebanon border to prepare for “different scenarios.” Hezbollah has reportedly decided that it will directly respond to any Israeli ground operations and is expecting an imminent Israeli escalation.
• Hezbollah Disarmament: Hezbollah may have deterred the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) from disarming the group. Hezbollah’s threats may have exacerbated Lebanese government officials' and security forces’ concerns about internal conflict. The Lebanese government has made progress on several other elements of the US proposal, but has undertaken only tepid steps to disarm Hezbollah.

Iran Update, October 21, 2025 

Different factions within the Iranian regime are fighting for influence in Iran to determine future Iranian policy after the Israel-Iran War and several scares over the health and availability of the supreme leader. This competition for influence comes after elements within the Iranian regime used Khamenei‘s absence during the Israel-Iran War to attempt to exert more influence over regime policy.[i] Khamenei gave a speech on October 20 after a month of absence, when he did not attend three events that he usually attends.[ii] An unspecified senior regime diplomat said in September 2025 that some Iranian officials are concerned for his health after communication from his office slowed after the Israel-Iran War.[iii] Khamenei, who is 86 years old, also had a major health scare in September 2022.[iv] Regime insiders, who possibly aim to limit any effort by moderate and former President Hassan Rouhani to reclaim political relevance, have reacted negatively to Rouhani’s post-war public criticism of the regime.  Rouhani has attempted to publicly reemerge as a prominent political actor since the start of the war in June 2025 and has positioned himself as a leading advocate for reform. Rouhani met with senior clerics in Qom during the war to urge them to persuade Khamenei to adjust the regime’s policy regarding the war.[v] Rouhani separately called on the regime to make concessions to the Iranian people, strengthen societal resilience, and reduce tensions with the West on August 13.[vi]  An Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) outlet accused Rouhani on October 20 of fueling division and serving as a cautionary example for political conduct amid Iran’s current conditions.[vii]

The resurgence of long-standing tensions between Rouhani and Khamenei’s representative to the Defense Council Ali Shamkhani may also be a reaction to Rouhani’s post-war criticism of the regime and Rouhani’s attempts to reassert himself. Shamkhani stated on October 12 that Rouhani knew ”from the first day” that Iran’s air defense shot down Ukraine Airlines Flight PS752 in January 2020 despite Rouhani’s public denial.[viii] The Iranian government initially denied any responsibility for the downing of the civilian plane.  The comments on Flight PS752 coincided with public backlash regarding Shamkhani’s daughter’s wedding, which critics viewed as evidence of elite privilege amid economic hardship. Some Iranian social media users and outlets speculated that Rouhani’s faction initiated the leak of footage from Shamkhani’s daughter’s wedding in response to Shamkhani’s statements about Rouhani and Flight PS752.[ix]

Long-standing tensions exist between Shamkhani and Rouhani. The Iranian Parliament passed the ”Strategic Action Law” in 2020 with Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) support when Shamkhani was SNSC Secretary.[x] The law mandated faster enrichment and reduced the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring, likely to influence the West regarding the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).[xi] Shamkhani later accused Rouhani’s government of blocking the implementation of the law, which prompted Rouhani to say that he regretted appointing Shamkhani as the SNSC Secretary and that he blamed Shamkhani for obstructing the JCPOA’s revival.[xii]

Some factions may seek to sideline Rouhani’s renewed activism to prevent him from shaping the succession narrative or rallying support among disaffected elites. These factions could see this effort as particularly important now due to the increasing concerns among senior Iranian officials about Khamenei’s health following reduced communication from his office since the beginning of the Israel-Iran War.[xiii] UK-based outlet “IranWire” previously reported on September 12 that an unspecified senior Iranian official stated that SNSC Secretary Ali Larijani and former First Vice President Mohammad Mokhber maintain the closest contact with Khamenei and are maneuvering to expand their influence ahead of a possible succession.[xiv]

The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) reported on October 20 that Iran is building unidentified structures at the former Taleghan 2 nuclear research site at Parchin Military Complex in southeastern Tehran Province.[xv] ISIS assessed that Iran has ”bunkered [two of the structures] over with earth,” likely to “improve their survivability” in the event of future Israeli strikes.[xvi] Covering these structures with dirt is unlikely to stop a concerted effort to destroy the facility, depending on the munitions used. Israel struck Taleghan 2 in October 2024 and destroyed equipment needed to design and test nuclear devices.[xvii] Iran previously used the Taleghan 2 facility for this purpose prior to stopping its nuclear weapons program in 2003.[xviii] This is part of Iran’s effort to reconstitute its nuclear and missile programs in the wake of the Israel-Iran War.

Iran Update, October 20, 2025 

A senior Iranian official suggested in an interview with Nour News on October 13 that the Iranian regime is unable to develop a long-term strategy because it continues to suffer from shock and paralysis after the Israel-Iran War.[i] Nour News interviewed Iranian Deputy Vice President for Strategic Affairs Ali Abdullah Khani on October 13 as part of its "Pathway" series, which aims to present perspectives on how Iran can navigate post-war challenges. Nour News is affiliated with Ali Shamkhani, who is one of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s advisers to the Defense Council. Khani stated that the regime is in a “permanent state of crisis” in which Iranian officials are only focused on the possibility of renewed conflict with Israel and the United States.  Khani argued that this mindset has paralyzed Iranian officials and made them unable to devise long-term defense, economic, and political strategies.[ii] The Iranian regime has adopted stop-gap interim solutions, such as purchasing MiG-29s from Russia, which would be useless against F-35s, and conducting mass arrests of Iranians in the hope of solving Iran’s counter-intelligence failures.[iii] Khani suggested that these reactive approaches do not solve more fundamental strategic issues that Iran faces in its competition with Israel and the United States.[iv] Khani asserted that the regime’s reactive decision-making drains decisionmaker bandwidth and prevents senior leaders from confronting major post-war problems, including reconstruction, economic growth, and, presumably, the failure of Iran’s strategic theories of deterrence and defense.

Khani presented alternative policies that focus on societal resilience and deterrence at the strategic level.[v] Khani stated that Iran must accept that war is always a possibility but emphasized that the Iranian regime cannot allocate all of its resources and capabilities to preparing for war. Khani proposed that Iran should adopt a “more balanced and hybrid” and “people-based” security strategy, while still prioritizing its development of military capabilities. Khani also warned that Iran could fall behind in the international order if the Iranian regime does not fundamentally change its economic and defense strategy.

Khani also made a series of operational- and tactical-level proposals focused on command decentralization and technical improvements for certain weapon systems in light of the setbacks that Iran faced during the war.[vi] Khani proposed expanding former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari‘s 2005 “mosaic doctrine,” which decentralized the IRGC by establishing 32 IRGC provincial units across Iran.[vii] Khani argued that Iran should decentralize supply chains, defense systems, and command and control authority to lower levels to make wartime decision-making more efficient and effective.[viii] Khani probably believes that decentralizing Iranian decision-making would help Iranian leaders overcome the command and control challenges they faced when Israel killed senior Iranian commanders during the war. Israeli strikes against senior IRGC commanders inhibited Iran’s ability to immediately retaliate against Israel.[ix]

Khani also called on the regime to improve its missile guidance systems and implied that the regime should employ maneuverable reentry vehicles as part of an effort to advance its missile program.[x] Khani stated that Iran must improve its missiles’ circular error probable (CEP), which is “the radius of a circle, centered at the intended target, within which 50 percent of the missiles would be expected to impact.”[xi] A maneuverable reentry vehicle can be used to evade anti-ballistic missile systems or improve the accuracy of ballistic missiles by altering their trajectory during the terminal stage of flight. These proposals demonstrate that some Iranian officials acknowledge the relatively low accuracy rate of Iranian missiles.  The IRGC Aerospace Force announced on October 18 that it added an anti-electronic warfare system to the Ghadr ballistic missile and a precision-guided warhead to the Emad ballistic missile, which further highlights how the Iranian regime is trying to develop its ballistic missiles to perform more effectively in the event of a future conflict with Israel.[xii] Iran used the Emad and Ghadr missiles in its April and October 2024 attacks on Israel, as well as during the Israel-Iran War.[xiii]  

IRGC-affiliated outlet Tasnim News Agency separately called on the Iranian regime to develop long-term solutions to mitigate the impact of sanctions. This article illustrates that at least some Iranian regime elements are beginning to focus more on long-term solutions instead of short-term stop-gap measures.[xiv] Tasnim’s emphasis on long-term solutions is consistent with Khani’s call for a long-term strategic rethink. Tasnim stated that the Iranian economy cannot rely on “informal mechanisms” to mitigate the impact of international sanctions, which may be a reference to barter agreements and other mechanisms that Iran uses to evade sanctions.[xv] Tasnim called for using regional and multilateral platforms to promote trade that does not rely on the Western financial system.[xvi] Iranian officials frequently emphasize the importance of cooperation with BRICS and Shanghai Cooperation Organization member states to "de-dollarize” trade.[xvii] Iranian media reported on October 19 that two Russian banks agreed to accept letters of credit issued by Iranian banks to facilitate Russian agricultural exports to Iran and allow Iran to circumvent the SWIFT international banking and finance system.[xviii] Tasnim also highlighted the importance of the private sector and called for reducing Iran’s reliance on oil exports.[xix]   Tasnim also called on the Iranian regime to downsize the government, eliminate monopolies in the economy, and promote private sector competition.[xx]

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani said on October 20 that 250 to 350 US “military advisers and support personnel” will remain at Ain al Asad Airbase in Anbar Province, Iraq, to support US operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Syria.[xxi] The advisers will reportedly work with personnel at al Tanf Garrison in southern Syria to support “counter-ISIS surveillance and coordination.”[xxii] Sudani told Iraqi media that recent “developments in Syria,” almost certainly referring to the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, require the presence of US advisers at Ain al Asad.[xxiii] The Iraqi federal government has considered postponing the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq after the fall of Assad due to concerns that ISIS could exploit the situation in Syria to threaten Iraq.[xxiv] The United States and Iraq agreed in September 2024 that hundreds of US forces would withdraw from Iraq by September 2025 and that the remaining forces would withdraw by the end of 2026.[xxv] Sudani said that this agreement required all US forces to withdraw from Ain al Asad Airbase by September 2025, but it is unclear whether this included non-combat US military advisers and support personnel.[xxvi] Sudani’s statements come after the US Department of Defense announced on September 30 that the United States has reduced its military presence in Iraq.[xxvii] A US official told Reuters on September 30 that the United States will reduce its military personnel from 2,500 to less than 2,000 and redeploy most of the remaining personnel to the Iraqi Kurdistan Region from federal Iraq.[xxviii] The official also said that the United States is in the process of transferring control of Ain al Asad Airbase to the Iraqi federal government.[xxix]

Lebanese and Israeli officials are very unlikely to begin negotiations in the coming weeks because preliminary diplomatic efforts aimed at renewing negotiations have reportedly stalled. Lebanese and Israeli officials were reportedly expected to begin indirect negotiations after the new US Ambassador to Lebanon, Michel Issa, assumes his position in the coming days.[xxx] Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam told Saudi media on October 19 that preliminary discussions between Israel and Lebanon to formally renew indirect negotiations reached a “dead end,” however.[xxxi] Lebanese President Joseph Aoun recently called for renewed talks with Israel to discuss issues in the US proposal to disarm Hezbollah, including an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, border demarcation, Israeli operations in Lebanon, and the issue of disputed territories.[xxxii] Salam claimed that the preliminary discussions stalled due to Israel’s refusal to cease its operations in southern Lebanon.[xxxiii] Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri told Saudi media on October 20 that US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack told the Lebanese government that Israel had rejected a US-proposed negotiations framework.[xxxiv] The US-proposed framework reportedly called for a two-month cessation of Israeli operations in Lebanon, an Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon, and negotiations on other outstanding issues.[xxxv] Berri stated that Lebanon has abandoned “any negotiating process” with Israel outside of the November 2024 Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire monitoring committee.[xxxvi]

Neither Israel nor Lebanon has changed its position on key outstanding issues, including the timeline for disarming Hezbollah, which could further delay the full implementation of the US and Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) disarmament plans. Lebanese President Joseph Aoun reiterated on October 17 that Lebanese officials will not participate in indirect negotiations with Israel until Israel ceases its operations and fully withdraws from southern Lebanon.[xxxvii] Unspecified Lebanese sources told Saudi media on October 19 that Aoun believes that negotiations with Israel should occur simultaneously with the implementation of the Lebanese government’s plan to disarm Hezbollah.[xxxviii] Lebanese officials and the LAF have repeatedly claimed that continued Israeli operations limit the LAF’s ability to fully deploy its forces to southern Lebanon and disarm Hezbollah.[xxxix] Israel has maintained that it will continue to operate in Lebanon until Hezbollah has been disarmed and previously refused to discuss the US proposal to disarm Hezbollah.[xl]

Hezbollah would likely attempt to use any delay in Israeli-Lebanese negotiations to reconstitute its forces, increase its weapons stockpile, and bolster its domestic support base, which would likely increase Hezbollah’s relative strength vis-a-vis the Lebanese government and thus make it more challenging for the government to disarm Hezbollah. Israeli media reported on October 18 that Hezbollah has restored its chain of command after the IDF killed a significant number of its top commanders during the Israel-Hezbollah conflict in late 2024.[xli] Israeli media also reported on October 18 that Hezbollah is rapidly rebuilding its military capabilities.[xlii] Hezbollah has reportedly adopted a new weapons strategy that requires fewer personnel, less money, and limited infrastructure, which could include prioritizing low-cost weapons such as drones.[xliii] Hezbollah reportedly began prioritizing domestic drone production in June 2025 to reduce its reliance on Iranian weapons.[xliv] Iran may focus on rebuilding its armed forces and nuclear and missile programs after the Israel-Iran War, which may further constrain Iranian financial support for Hezbollah.[xlv] The IDF destroyed approximately 70 percent of the drones belonging to Hezbollah’s primary aerial unit, Unit 127, during the Israel-Hezbollah conflict.[xlvi] Israeli media also claimed that Hezbollah has continued to provide compensation to its supporters whose homes were destroyed in the conflict.[xlvii] Hezbollah has historically used financial benefits, including pensions for the families of deceased fighters and compensation for individuals who lost their homes or property, to retain its support base among Lebanese Shia.[xlviii] Hezbollah parliamentarian Hassan Fadlallah claimed on October 20 that Hezbollah has completed around 80 percent of the first phase of its reconstruction plan, which stipulates that Hezbollah will allocate $1 billion to reconstruct Beirut’s southern suburbs and the surrounding villages.[xlix] These actions highlight how Hezbollah is actively trying to maintain its domestic support base and reconstitute as a military organization. Any delay in the implementation of the US proposal would give Hezbollah more time to try to achieve these objectives.

These reports may be overstating the degree to which Hezbollah has reconstituted its capabilities and maintained its support base. Hezbollah has reportedly struggled to appoint new leaders to key political and military roles, according to a Saudi media report in September 2025.[l] Hezbollah units reconstituted from the Hezbollah cadres that survived the war will be less effective than their predecessor units given that Israel killed a significant number of Hezbollah’s experienced commanders and left Hezbollah with a much less experienced command cadre. Hezbollah’s new reported weapons strategy may allow the group to reconstitute some of its weapon capabilities, but the group still faces numerous setbacks to replenish its weapons arsenal.[li] The fall of the Assad regime in Syria and the crackdown by the Lebanese government on weapons and money smuggling through Lebanese airports and border crossings make Iranian efforts to resupply Hezbollah relatively slow and inefficient.[lii] Hezbollah has also largely struggled to maintain its financial commitments to its fighters and Shia support base following the conflict. Hezbollah’s main financial institution, al Qard al Hassan, temporarily froze compensation payments to fighters in February 2025 and later indefinitely suspended payments to fighters in June 2025.[liii] Al Qard al Hassan has not resumed these payments as of September 2025.[liv] Hezbollah’s financial struggles have reportedly caused unprecedented discontent among its Shia support base, which could grow over time if Hezbollah is unable to fulfill these commitments.[lv]

Key Takeaways

• Iranian Reflections on the Israel-Iran War: A senior Iranian official suggested in an interview with Nour News on October 13 that the Iranian regime is unable to develop a long-term strategy because it continues to suffer from shock and paralysis after the Israel-Iran War. Khani presented alternative policies that focus on societal resilience and deterrence at the strategic level.
• US Withdrawal from Iraq: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani said on October 20 that 250 to 350 US “military advisers and support personnel” will remain at Ain al Asad Airbase in Anbar Province, Iraq, to support US operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Syria.
• Lebanese Hezbollah Disarmament: Lebanese and Israeli officials are very unlikely to begin negotiations in the coming weeks because preliminary diplomatic efforts aimed at renewing negotiations have reportedly stalled. Hezbollah would likely attempt to use any delay in Israeli-Lebanese negotiations to try to reconstitute its forces, bolster its domestic support base, and increase its weapons stockpile.

Iran Update, October 17, 2025 

The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) reported on October 16 that Iranian activity around Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC)’s underground facilities indicates that Iran is not attempting to retrieve centrifuges or uranium stocks. ISIS assessed that Iran may be trying to establish secure access to ENTC tunnels and reinforce tunnel entrances against future strikes.[i] ISIS reported that satellite imagery of the tunnel entrances to the ENTC’s underground facilities showed that Iran cleared out all debris in front of the northern tunnel entrance and most of the debris in front of the middle tunnel entrance in late July and late September, respectively.[ii] ISIS reported that imagery from September 30 showed a backhoe piling rocks in front of the northern tunnel entrance, which ISIS said could be a sign that Iran is trying to reinforce the northern tunnel against possible future strikes.[iii] The ISIS report added that Iran is likely prioritizing ”slow and safe access” to the ENTC underground facilities because it may be dangerous to enter after the strikes.[iv] The United States struck the ENTC on June 22.[v] ISIS stated that the extent of damage to the three tunnels could not be assessed at this time.[vi]

Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani met with Russian President Vladimir Putin on October 16, likely primarily to discuss sanctions evasion and mitigation efforts.[vii] This is Larijani’s first visit to Russia since the UN Security Council reimposed snapback sanctions on Iran on September 27.[viii] Iran relies heavily upon Russia as a key partner to mitigate the impact of international sanctions. The reimposition of UN sanctions restored an arms embargo and broad UN restrictions upon Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile programs.[ix] Larijani likely discussed ways that Russia can assist Iran in evading and mitigating the impact of sanctions. Iran and Russia have historically collaborated through networks of foreign-based front companies and shadow fleets transporting sanctioned goods, such as energy exports and arms sales.[x] Russian Permanent Representative to the United Nations Vasily Nebenzya stated on October 1 that Russia does not recognize the “snapback as coming into force,” suggesting that Russia will continue to assist Iran evade sanctions as it did before the imposition of snapback sanctions.[xi] Larijani and Putin also likely discussed Russian military assistance that Russia could provide to Iran. Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Lavrov separately stated on October 13 that Russia would “develop military-technical cooperation with Iran” with “no restrictions.”[xii]  Larijani could also have discussed military support for Iran from Russia in addition to sanctions evasion and mitigation. Iran seeks to buy Russian military equipment, though procuring it has been difficult given Russia’s prioritization of the war in Ukraine. Russian assets like the S-300 have also proven incapable of stopping Israeli or US air attack, and Russian aircraft like the MiG-29 and Su-35 are unlikely to seriously challenge the US-made F-35.

Iranian media also reported that Larijani conveyed an unspecified message from Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to Putin.[xiii] Kremlin newswire TASS previously reported on October 9 that Putin claimed that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told Russia that Israel is committed to a settlement and “is not interested in confrontation with Iran.”[xiv] Putin’s claim likely reflects Russia’s ongoing interest in serving as a political intermediary between Iran, the United States, and Israel. Russia has consistently attempted to position itself as a mediator between Iran and the United States during nuclear negotiations in early 2025.[xv][xvi]

Turkey is attempting to secure an agreement with the Syrian government that would allow Turkish forces to target Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) fighters deep inside Syria and possibly set conditions for future military operations targeting the SDF. Unspecified Turkish officials told Bloomberg on October 17 that Turkey and Syria have discussed expanding the 1998 Adana Agreement so that it allows Turkey to target Kurdish fighters up to 30 kilometers in Syrian territory.[xvii] The 1998 Adana Agreement, which the Turkish government signed with the Assad regime, currently allows Turkey the right to target Kurdish fighters it deems a threat up to five kilometers into Syrian territory.[xviii] Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan used this agreement to justify Turkey’s right to launch a military offensive targeting the SDF in 2019, citing the Assad regime’s lack of “measures” taken to rein in Kurdish fighters near the border.[xix] Turkey has recently threatened to take military action against the SDF—which it views as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party—by the end of 2025 if the SDF does not integrate into the Syrian state by that date.[xx] Turkey's ability to target the SDF deeper in Syrian territory would allow Turkey to set conditions for possible future military operations targeting the SDF, including by targeting key SDF tactical and operational commanders within the 30-kilometer operational zone. Turkey has previously struck SDF forces deep into Syria—much deeper than 30 kilometers—but an amendment to the 1998 Adana Agreement would enable ground pursuit and help alleviate any possible friction with the new Syrian government.

It is unclear if the Syrian government will permit an expansion of the Adana Agreement under these terms, given that doing so may risk ending recent Kurdish cooperation with the government. The Syrian government has negotiated with the SDF over its integration into the Syrian state while it has simultaneously attempted to prevent Turkey from conducting another destabilizing military offensive in northern Syria.[xxi] The Syrian government and SDF recently reached a limited breakthrough in negotiations and agreed to integrate the SDF into the Syrian army in three divisions and several independent brigades after months of stalled negotiations. Many of the mechanisms of the SDF’s integration into the Syrian army still need to be finalized, according to SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi on October 16.[xxiii] Abdi said that the recent SDF-government progress gives Turkey “no excuse” to act in Syrian territory, however.[xxiv]

Turkey may leverage planned weapons shipments in order to secure this agreement with the Syrian government. Turkish officials told Bloomberg that Turkey plans to supply the Syrian Defense Ministry with armored vehicles, drones, artillery, missiles, and air defense systems in the coming weeks.[xxv] These shipments are likely part of the military training and ”consultation” agreement that Syrian officials signed with Turkey on August 13.[xxvi] This agreement and the weapons transfers that it entails could give Turkey additional leverage over the Syrian government because the Syrian Defense Ministry does not currently own many of these systems.[xxvii] Turkish officials said that this equipment will be deployed in northern Syria.[xxviii]

Iran Update, October 16, 2025 

Iranian-backed Iraqi fighters likely assassinated Iraqi Sunni Sovereignty Alliance candidate and Baghdad Provincial Council member Safaa al Mashhadani on October 14 with an explosive device in al Dhubat neighborhood, Tarmiyah district, Iraq.[i] The perpetrators remotely detonated an explosive device on Mashhadani’s car, killing Mashhadani and injuring four others.[ii] Both the Iraqi parliament speaker and the prime minister announced investigations into the assassination.[iii] Iraqi Security Media Cell head Lieutenant General Saad Maan said on October 15 that unspecified actors had previously tried to assassinate Safaa al Mashhadani.[iv] No group has claimed responsibility for either incident at the time of this writing, which suggests the involvement of Iranian-backed actors.

Iran Update, October 15, 2025 

Syrian Transitional President Ahmed al Shara’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on October 15 indicates that the Syrian government will likely pursue a pragmatic and multi-faceted relationship with Russia.[i] This meeting was the first between the two leaders since Shara came to power in December 2024.  Shara told Putin that he is attempting to “redefine” the Syrian-Russian relationship and that Russia will play a “significant role” in helping Syria advance its political goals.[ii] Putin stated that he is ”prepared to do everything possible” to implement new initiatives between the two countries in reference to discussions about Russian participation in the reconstruction of Syria’s energy sector. [iii] Syrian Defense Minister Major General Marhaf Abu Qasra, Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani, head of intelligence Hussein al Salama, and Maher al Shara, who is Shara’s brother and a Russian citizen, also attended the meeting.[iv]

The current Russia-Syria relationship consists of mutually beneficial arrangements and understandings that have developed since the fall of the regime. Russia, once a key Assad ally, has maintained a military presence at three military bases in Syria since the fall of the Assad regime, including an airbase and a naval base in coastal Syria that are critical for Russia’s power projection in the Mediterranean Sea.[v] Russia has attempted to use economic incentives to secure its basing rights in Syria under Shara’s government. The continued Russian presence in Syria suggests that this effort has been somewhat successful.[vi] The Syrian government has proven to be increasingly willing to engage directly with Russia since Spring 2025 on economic, military, and political issues that are advantageous to Syria.[vii]

CTP-ISW assesses that the Syrian government likely aims to achieve the following domestic political, economic, and military objectives from a “redefined” relationship with Russia: 

• Military Cooperation: Syria likely aims to gain military and technical lessons from the Russian military as the Syrian Defense Ministry builds and professionalizes the new Syrian army. Senior Syrian and Russian defense officials have continued to discuss possible defense cooperation in meetings since September 2025, including discussing the development of the Syrian army’s training, artillery, and armor capabilities and readiness.[viii] Russia is unlikely to provide Syria with Russian arms imports or direct Russian training given Russia's current need to prioritize materiel shortages in its war against Ukraine.[ix]
• Economic Aid: Syria likely seeks to continue to procure economic aid from Russia in order to address Syria’s critical resource shortages, particularly in the energy sector.[x] Russia has delivered crude and refined oil to Syria via sanctioned tankers since March 2025, when few states were willing to do so given remaining US and international sanctions on Syria.[xi] Shara told Putin during their meeting that Syria depends on Russia to operate its power plants and for food supplies.[xii] Russia has delivered wheat grown in Russian-occupied Ukraine to Syria since April 2025.[xiii] Shara and Putin discussed Russia’s future involvement in “oil projects” and in the restoration of energy and rail infrastructure damaged during the civil war, according to Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak.[xiv]
• Support for Assadists: Syrian officials likely intend to secure the Kremlin’s commitment to end its support for members of the Assad regime in order bolster the Syrian government’s domestic and international legitimacy. Russia is currently providing asylum to former Syrian President Bashar al Assad and his family.[xv] Shara declared in a recent interview that Syria will use ”all legal means possible” to demand that Assad be brought to justice and stand trial in Syria.[xvi] Russia also hosts several other former regime officials, some of whom were reportedly involved in instigating the pro-Assad coastal insurgency in March 2025.[xvii] An unspecified Syrian source told Reuters that Syrian officials sought guarantees from Putin that Russia will not help any regime remnants “rearm.”[xviii]
• Balancing Israel in Syria. Syria may seek to engage Russia and retain Russian forces in Syria in order to build a military and political counterweight to Israel. Israel maintains a presence in southern Syria and Israeli officials say that they want to institute a demilitarized zone in southern Syria. An unspecified Syrian source told Reuters that Shara may discuss the redeployment of Russian military police to southern Syria as a ”guarantor” against Israeli advances in the south.[xix] Russian forces formerly manned about 12 observation points along the Syria-Israel border prior to the fall of the regime.[xx] Turkey reportedly backs the effort to use Russia to ”balance” against Israel.[xxi]

Key Takeaways

• Russo-Syrian Cooperation: Syrian Transitional President Ahmed al Shara’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on October 15 indicates that the Syrian government will likely pursue a pragmatic and multi-faceted relationship with Russia.
• Iranian Sanctions Subversion: The People’s Republic of China (PRC) continues to receive Iranian oil exports at PRC port terminals despite five rounds of US sanctions that have targeted PRC port terminals and oil refineries for receiving illicit Iranian crude oil.
• US Sanctions in Iraq: Iraq's state-owned Rafidain Bank closed its office within the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) directorate on October 15, likely in reaction to recent US sanctions.

Shara and his government are poised to strengthen relations with Russia in order to achieve the above objectives in the absence of international pressure to cut ties with Russia.  European Union parliamentarians called for Syria to end its ties with Russia in March 2025, but the effort has lost political momentum in more recent months.[xxii] Shara and his government may believe that Syria can forge a mutually beneficial relationship with Russia at this time and face few barriers to doing so.

Iran Update, October 14, 2025 

Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Commander Mazloum Abdi said on October 11 that he and the Syrian transitional government reached a “preliminary agreement” last week to integrate the SDF and Kurdish internal security forces into the state’s defense and interior ministries, respectively.[i] Abdi met with Syrian President Ahmed al Shara, Defense Minister Major General Marhaf Abu Qasra, and US officials in Damascus on October 7 to agree to a ceasefire following an outbreak of violence between government forces and the SDF in Aleppo City.[ii] Abdi previously agreed to integrate all forces in northeastern Syria into state security forces in a framework agreement that he reached with Shara in March, but neither side has implemented most of the terms of the agreement.[iii] Abdi referred to the new agreement as a “preliminary agreement” and “oral agreement,” which suggests that the new agreement may represent a renewed commitment by the SDF to integrate its forces into the state and will probably necessitate further negotiations on specific implementation mechanisms.[iv] A prominent People’s Protection Units (YPG) commander led a delegation of SDF and Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) officials to discuss “joint military and security cooperation” with Abu Qasra and Syrian Interior Minister Anas Khattab in Damascus on October 13.[v] The Kurdish and Syrian government officials presumably discussed mechanisms to implement the new agreement.[vi]

Shara and Abdi appear to have reached at least a partial agreement about certain elements of the SDF’s integration into the new Syrian army. Abdi told AFP that the SDF will be “restructured through its integration” into the Defense Ministry but did not provide further details.[vii] Shara and Abdi have disagreed thus far over how the SDF would join the military. The SDF has consistently demanded that it integrate into the Syrian army as a “bloc” and retain its attributes, including its female units and commanders.[viii] It is unclear if Shara and Abdi have fully addressed this issue. An unspecified "informed” source told Syria TV on October 13 that Shara and Abdi agreed to establish three divisions and several brigades “from the SDF” as army units in Hasakah, Raqqa, and Deir ez Zor provinces.[ix] CTP-ISW cannot confirm this claim, but such an agreement would be consistent with the SDF’s demand to remain deployed in northeastern Syria.[x] Abdi may also have been referring to a recent US proposal to form a joint SDF-government force to fight the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS).[xi] Abdi said that the SDF accepted this proposal.[xii]

The Syrian transitional government and the SDF have not yet agreed on a model for decentralized governance in Syria, however. Such disagreements may continue to delay or prevent the SDF's integration into the Syrian state. Abdi said that he and the Syrian government share an “understanding on the principle of decentralization" but that the SDF and government “have not agreed on it” and are “still discussing finding a common formula acceptable to all.”[xiii] The Syrian transitional government has consistently rejected decentralization and federalism and has accused the SDF of promoting "separatism.”[xiv] The two parties’ disagreement over decentralization has been one of the principal disagreements that has delayed the SDF’s integration into the Syrian state.

Senior Syrian officials likely discussed the status of talks with the SDF and Turkish support for the Syrian army with Turkish officials in Ankara on October 12.[xv] Syrian Defense Minister Major General Marhaf Abu Qasra, intelligence head Hussein al Salama, and Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani discussed counterterrorism, border control, and joint training with their Turkish counterparts in Ankara.[xvi] The officials very likely discussed the progress of talks with the SDF given Turkey’s role in pressuring the Syrian government to increase political and military pressure on the SDF to integrate into the Syrian state in recent months. Abdi told AFP on October 11 that successful negotiations with the Syrian government would depend on whether Turkey plays a “supportive and contributing role.”[xvii] Turkish Defense Minister Yaser Guler called on the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and “all affiliated groups...especially in Syria” to “surrender weapons immediately” in a statement on October 11 prior to the Syrian delegation’s visit.[xviii] Turkey often conflates the SDF with the PKK and uses “PKK” to refer to the entire SDF. Abu Qasra separately thanked Guler on October 12 for Turkey's “concrete efforts” to build the Syrian army.[xix] Turkey and Syria signed a defense agreement in August 2025 that commits Turkey to assisting Syria with military training and equipment procurement.[xx]

Key Takeaways

• SDF Integration: Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Commander Mazloum Abdi said on October 11 that he and the Syrian transitional government reached a “preliminary agreement” last week to integrate the SDF and Kurdish internal security forces into the state’s defense and interior ministries, respectively. The Syrian transitional government and the SDF have not yet agreed on a model for decentralized governance in Syria, however. Such disagreements may continue to delay or prevent the SDF's integration into the Syrian state.
• Iranian Oil Tanker Activity: Iran reportedly turned on the automatic identification systems (AIS) of most of its oil tankers on October 13, according to Tanker Trackers. This incident marks the first time that Iranian tankers have turned on their AIS signals since 2018.
• US Sanctions on Iranian-backed Iraqi militias: Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah criticized recent US sanctions targeting Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)-owned commercial entities, Iraqi bank executives, and Kataib Hezbollah officials. Kataib Hezbollah Spokesperson Abu Ali al Askari called the US sanctions “ridiculous” and denied any connection between Kataib Hezbollah and the sanctioned individuals.

Iran Update, October 13, 2025 

Hamas and Israel have continued to implement the October 9 ceasefire agreement. Hamas and Israel agreed to a ceasefire and hostage-prisoner exchange on October 9, and the Israeli government approved the agreement on October 10.[i] The agreement called for Hamas to release all remaining hostages and Israel to release Palestinian prisoners held in Israel.[ii] Hamas released all 20 living hostages and the bodies of four deceased hostages on October 13.[iii] It is unclear when Hamas will release the remaining 24 deceased hostages.[iv] Israel previously stated that an unspecified international organization would help locate the remaining deceased hostages if Hamas did not release them by October 13.[v] Israel released at least 1,700 Palestinian prisoners on October 13.[vi] The ceasefire agreement also calls for humanitarian aid to be delivered to the Gaza Strip.[vii] Egypt sent approximately 400 aid trucks to the Gaza Strip on October 12.[viii] The aid will be distributed after Israel inspects the trucks.[ix] Humanitarian organizations are expected to deliver approximately 600 trucks of aid per day to the Gaza Strip.[x]

US President Donald Trump traveled to Israel and Egypt to discuss the ceasefire with regional leaders. Trump addressed the Israeli Knesset on October 13 and told reporters that "the war is over.”[xi]  Trump departed Israel to attend a summit in Sharm al Sheikh, Egypt, on October 13 to discuss outstanding aspects of the US plan with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al Sisi and other Arab and regional leaders, including Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas.[xii]  Trump, Sisi, Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad al Thani, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan signed a ceasefire plan during the summit.[xiii]  Trump said that the document, which the White House referred to as the “Gaza Peace Plan,” will “spell out rules and regulations” for the ceasefire.[xiv] The US plan calls for representatives from the United States, Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey to coordinate the implementation of the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas.[xv] Two hundred US military personnel will deploy to Israel to assist with the implementation of the ceasefire alongside forces from Egypt, Qatar, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates.[xvi] The ceasefire agreement does not address key outstanding issues between Hamas and Israel, such as Hamas’ disarmament, a full Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, and future governance in the Gaza Strip.[xvii] Hamas and Israel concluded talks on Trump’s peace plan after both parties agreed to the first phase of the plan and will not resume negotiations on outstanding issues until the first phase is implemented.[xviii]

Senior Iranian officials have continued to threaten to close the Strait of Hormuz, likely to try to deter the United States and its allies from enforcing UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1929 and sanctions on Iranian oil exports.[xix] UNSC Resolution 1929 calls on UN member states to “inspect any [Iranian] vessel on their territory suspected of carrying prohibited cargo, including banned conventional arms or sensitive nuclear or missile items.”[xx] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi warned on October 10 that Iran would respond “in a reciprocal and appropriate manner” if UN member states use UNSC Resolution 1929 to seize Iranian vessels.[xxi] Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser to the Defense Council Ali Shamkhani similarly warned Iranian adversaries on October 10 that Iran has not decided to close the Strait of Hormuz, but that Iran’s response to unspecified escalation in the strait would not be “limited.”[xxii] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Navy Commander Rear Admiral Ali Reza Tangsiri separately stated on October 11 that Iran’s decision to close the Strait of Hormuz would depend on “the pressure on Iranian exports,” most likely referring to Iranian oil exports.[xxiii]  The United States recently sanctioned over 90 individuals, entities, and vessels on October 9 for facilitating the illicit trade of Iranian oil and gas.[xxiv] The sanctions are part of Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign, which seeks to drive Iranian oil exports to zero.[xxv] The United States previously seized Iranian oil tankers and weapons shipments between May 2018 and January 2021 as part of the first Trump administration’s maximum pressure campaign.[xxvi] Iran responded to the maximum pressure campaign in 2019 by threatening international shipping, including by seizing a British oil tanker, harassing vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz, and conducting an attack targeting Saudi oil facilities.[xxvii] Iranian officials’ concern about Iran’s ability to continue exporting Iranian oil comes after Reuters reported in March 2025 that the United States was considering a plan in which the United States and its allies would halt and inspect Iranian oil tankers at sea.[xxviii] Oil exports are Iran’s economic lifeline and are critical to keeping the Iranian economy afloat, particularly amid increased Western economic pressure on Iran in recent weeks. Iranian military commanders have recently increased inspections of naval units in the Persian Gulf, including naval units stationed at Kharg Island, which is home to Iran’s main oil export terminal.[xxix]

Key Takeaways:

• Hamas-Israel Ceasefire: Hamas and Israel have continued to implement the October 9 ceasefire agreement. Hamas released all 20 living hostages and the bodies of four deceased hostages, and Israel released at least 1,700 Palestinian prisoners on October 13. The ceasefire agreement does not address key outstanding issues between Hamas and Israel, such as Hamas’ disarmament, a full Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, and future governance in the strip.
• Iranian Threats to Close the Strait of Hormuz: Senior Iranian officials have continued to threaten to close the Strait of Hormuz, likely to try to deter the United States and its allies from enforcing UNSC Resolution 1929 and sanctions on Iranian oil exports. UNSC Resolution 1929 calls on UN member states to “inspect any [Iranian] vessel on their territory suspected of carrying prohibited cargo, including banned conventional arms or sensitive nuclear or missile items.”

Iran Update, October 9, 2025 

Hamas and Israel agreed on October 8 to the first phase of US President Donald Trump’s plan for peace in the Gaza Strip.[i] The first phase will not be implemented until the Israeli cabinet approves it.[ii] The first phase stipulates that Israeli forces will immediately cease military operations in the Gaza Strip and withdraw to an agreed-upon line within 24 hours after the cabinet approves the plan.[iii] Israeli forces will retain control of approximately 53 percent of the Gaza Strip during the first phase.[iv] Hamas will release all 20 living hostages within 72 hours after Israel completes its withdrawal.[v] Hamas will also release all deceased hostages and Israel will release 2,000 Palestinian prisoners within an unspecified timeframe.  At least 400 truckloads of humanitarian aid will enter the Gaza Strip each day during the first phase.[vi] Both Israel and Hamas have reportedly begun initial preparations to implement the ceasefire agreement. Israeli Army Radio reported that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has halted offensive operations in the Gaza Strip and begun preparing to withdraw its forces.[vii] Hamas has reportedly started to transfer hostages to locations where medical care is available in preparation for their release.[viii] The Israeli government has convened to vote on the agreement but has not made an official decision at the time of this writing. Israeli media reported that the Israeli cabinet is expected to approve the deal.[ix]

The Hamas-Israel ceasefire in the Gaza Strip is a framework ceasefire agreement and not a comprehensive agreement to end the war. Hamas and Israel ended negotiations on Trump’s plan after both parties agreed to the first phase, and will not resume negotiations on outstanding issues until the first phase is implemented.[x] Hamas and Israeli officials have not discussed key outstanding aspects of the US plan, including governance over the Gaza Strip and Hamas’ disarmament.[xi] Western and Arab officials met in Paris on October 9 to discuss these issues.[xii] Hamas and Israeli officials did not participate in the talks in Paris.

It remains unclear if the Hamas-Israel ceasefire will impact how Hamas’ partners in the Axis of Resistance engage with Israel. The Houthis have justified their missile and drone campaign against Israel and international shipping as a response to Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip.[xiii] Houthi Political Bureau member Mohammad al Bukhaiti stated on October 6 that international mediators should not focus on disarming Hamas “because our weapon is Hamas' weapon, and our theater of operations is Hamas' theater of operations,” which suggests that the Houthis will continue to support Hamas even if Hamas is disarmed.[xiv] The Houthis have continued to attack Israel since Hamas agreed to the ceasefire on October 3.[xv] It is unclear if the Houthis would halt such attacks if the Hamas-Israel ceasefire holds. The Houthis would retain the ability to resume attacks against Israel or international shipping at any time and for any reason in the future even if they suspended attacks due to a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.

Key Takeaways

• Hamas-Israel Ceasefire: Hamas and Israel agreed on October 8 to the first phase of US President Donald Trump’s plan for peace in the Gaza Strip. The Hamas-Israel ceasefire in the Gaza Strip is a framework ceasefire agreement and not a comprehensive agreement to end the war. Hamas and Israeli officials have not yet discussed key outstanding aspects of the US plan, including governance over the Gaza Strip and Hamas’ disarmament. It remains unclear if the Hamas-Israel ceasefire will impact how Hamas’ partners in the Axis of Resistance engage with Israel.

Iran Update, October 8, 2025 

Iranian officials have threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz, likely to try to discourage the United States from enforcing sanctions that target Iranian oil exports. An Iranian parliamentarian warned on October 4 that Iran would close the Strait of Hormuz if the United States or its allies prevent Iranian oil exports.[i] The head of the Iranian Armed Forces Judicial Organization similarly warned on October 5 that Iran would not allow a US presence in the Persian Gulf to threaten Iran’s economic or military security.[ii] US President Donald Trump reinstated his maximum pressure campaign against Iran in February 2025 to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon and curb its influence abroad.[iii] Trump’s maximum pressure campaign seeks to drive Iranian oil exports “to zero.”[iv] The United States previously seized Iranian oil tankers and weapons shipments between May 2018 and January 2021 as part of the first Trump administration’s maximum pressure campaign.[v]  Reuters reported in March 2025 that the United States was considering a plan for the United States and its allies to halt and inspect Iranian oil tankers at sea.[vi] Iran previously attempted to close the strait in 2019 in response to the US maximum pressure campaign by sabotaging Emirati tankers, seizing British ships, and launching cruise missiles at Saudi oil facilities.[vii] Iranian officials’ threats to close the Strait of Hormuz come as Iranian military commanders have recently increased inspections of naval units in the Persian Gulf, including naval units deployed at the Nazeat Islands.[viii] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) deployed naval mines, ballistic and anti-ship cruise missiles, and fast attack craft to these islands in May 2025.[ix] Iranian state-controlled outlet Mehr News detailed Iran’s anti-ship missile capabilities on October 7 and highlighted Iran’s development of new cruise missiles that reportedly have fully automated guidance systems.[x] These capabilities could support a potential Iranian effort to close the Strait of Hormuz.

The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) arrested several unidentified individuals in Anbar and Dhi Qar Provinces on October 2 and 8 for suspected Baath Party ties in what appear to be instances of sectarian targeting.[xi] The PMF Intelligence and Information Department launched a campaign on October 2 to pursue Baath Party remnants.[xii] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes several Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, some of which report to Iran instead of the Iraqi Prime Minister.[xiii] The 27th PMF Brigade, which the Iranian-backed Badr Organization controls, arrested a man in Karma District, Anbar Province, on October 2 for promoting Baath Party ideology.[xiv] PMF intelligence units separately arrested several alleged “senior” Baath Party members in Nasiriyah, Dhi Qar Province, on October 8.[xv] Prominent Iraqi Shia politicians have commonly conflated Sunnism with membership in the Sunni-dominated Baathist government under Saddam Hussein and have abused de-Baathification measures to target Sunnis.[xvi]

It is unclear if these arrests are related to the upcoming November 2025 parliamentary elections, but the arrests come as multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi actors have sought to disqualify alleged Baath Party remnants ahead of the elections.[xvii] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iraqi Shia politicians are likely attempting to sideline Sunni political opposition ahead of the November 2025 elections by accusing their opponents of having Baathist ties.[xviii] Iraqi law prohibits Baath Party members from participating in political activities, including competing in elections.[xix] Iraqi Shia political parties have weaponized this law and other de-Baathification mechanisms to target Sunnis, particularly Sunni political opposition.[xx]

Key Takeaways

• Iranian Threats to Close the Strait of Hormuz: Iranian officials have threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz, likely to try to discourage the United States from enforcing sanctions that target Iranian oil exports. Iranian officials have recently increased inspections of naval units in the Persian Gulf.
• Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces Arrest Campaign: The Popular Mobilization Forces arrested several unidentified individuals in Anbar and Dhi Qar Provinces on October 2 and 8 for suspected Baath Party ties in what appear to be instances of sectarian targeting. It is unclear if these arrests are related to the upcoming November 2025 parliamentary elections, but the arrests come as multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi actors have sought to disqualify alleged Baath Party remnants ahead of the elections.

Iran Update, October 7, 2025 

Iran is pursuing alternative mechanisms, which may include barter systems, to mitigate the impact of snapback sanctions. Iranian Government Spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani stated on October 7 that the Iranian government aims to counter snapback sanctions by deepening ties with neighboring countries and international blocs such as the Eurasian Economic Union, BRICS, and Shanghai Cooperation Organization.[i] Mohajerani added that the Iranian government will also use barter mechanisms to sustain trade.[ii] An Iranian trade official similarly stated on October 7 that the Iranian government is preparing alternative ”mechanisms“ to reduce the impact of snapback sanctions on Iran’s trade agreements.[iii] The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) reimposed snapback sanctions on Iran on September 27, and the European Union (EU) reimposed sanctions on Iran on September 29.[iv]

These alternative mechanisms may include barter systems that bypass sanctions. US media previously reported on October 5 that Iran and China have used barter systems that bypass dollar transactions to evade US sanctions since at least 2018, including via the exchange of Iranian oil and metals for Chinese goods and infrastructure projects.[v] Unspecified officials told the Wall Street Journal on October 5 that China funded infrastructure projects in Iran in 2024 in exchange for 8.4 billion US dollars of Iranian oil.[vi]

Iran’s moves to mitigate sanctions are probably driven by concerns that sanctions on the Iranian economy will trigger an economic downturn. The World Bank forecasted in its October report that Iran will face an economic downturn over the next two years.[vii] The World Bank stated that the Iranian economy will shrink by 1.7 percent in 2025 and 2.8 percent in 2026, which is a change from the World Bank’s April 2025 forecast of 0.7 percent growth in 2026.[viii] The World Bank attributed this decline to reduced oil exports and non-oil economic activity due to the reimposition of UNSC sanctions and economic disruptions that followed the Israel-Iran War. The World Bank’s assessment comes amid the reimposition of sanctions on Iran and after several countries, including Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and Turkey, stated that they would abide by UNSC measures.[ix]

The Hamas-Israel ceasefire in the Gaza Strip is a framework ceasefire agreement and not a comprehensive agreement to end the war. Hamas and Israel continued to hold indirect negotiations on US President Donald Trump’s ceasefire plan in Egypt on October 7, which demonstrates that both sides view the plan as a starting point or framework for further negotiations rather than a comprehensive agreement to end the war.[x] Hamas leaders agreed on October 3 to release all living and deceased Israeli hostages during the ceasefire and expressed openness to negotiate on other elements of the US plan.[xi]  Hamas and Israeli officials first held talks on October 6 to discuss the roadmap for future negotiations and ceasefire mechanisms.[xii] The officials discussed an Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and a timetable for a hostage exchange during talks on October 7.[xiii] Hamas and Israeli officials have not discussed other key aspects of the US plan for peace in the Gaza Strip, such as governance over the Gaza Strip and Hamas’ disarmament.[xiv] Israeli and Hamas officials are expected to continue negotiations for several days, with US officials joining the talks on October 8.[xv]

The United States facilitated a ceasefire between the Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) on October 7 after fighting broke out between Syrian government and Kurdish forces in two Kurdish-dominated neighborhoods of Aleppo City.[xvi] Lingering tensions between the SDF and Syrian government over the partial integration of the into the Syrian state likely led to the outbreak of fighting. Ashrafiyeh and Sheikh Maqsoud are two historically Kurdish neighborhoods in Aleppo City that the SDF agreed to integrate into the .[xvii] The SDF’s Internal Security Forces, also known as the Asayish, do not appear to have integrated into local police forces under the Interior Ministry, as expected under the agreement.[xviii] Both the Syrian government and Kurdish forces have accused the other of exacerbating conflict in these neighborhoods in the months since the agreement went into effect.[xix] The most recent episode of fighting began shortly after the Syrian General Security Service (GSS) located an alleged SDF tunnel that extended from Kurdish areas into a nearby government-controlled neighborhood on October 6 and closed off all entrances or exits to Ashrafiyeh and Sheikh Maqsoud.[xx] Kurdish residents protested the closure of routes in and out of the neighborhoods, while Syrian government and Asayish forces exchanged fire for several hours.[xxi] Syrian state media reported that SDF mortar shells landed in nearby neighborhoods of Aleppo City.[xxii] The Syrian government accused the SDF of targeting GSS security checkpoints in Sheikh Maqsoud, which the SDF later denied.[xxiii] This round of fighting was the largest-scale conflict between Syrian government forces and Kurdish forces in Aleppo City since the SDF agreed to integrate into the Syrian state on March 10.

SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi and two other Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) officials travelled to Damascus to meet with Syrian Transitional President Ahmed al Shara and Defense Minister Major General Marhaf Abu Qasra on October 7.[xxiv] Abu Qasra later announced that he and Abdi agreed to an immediate “comprehensive ceasefire on all fronts” in northern and northeastern Syria, likely referring to the fighting both in Aleppo City and recent exchanges of fire near Deir Hafer, eastern Aleppo Province.[xxv] US Special Envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack—who was also present for the meeting along with US Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander Admiral Brad Cooper—told Saudi media on October 7 that Shara and Abdi discussed both sides’ “recommitment” to the March 10 Agreement and that both sides were “heading in the right direction.”[xxvi]

US mediation temporarily halted the brief fighting in Aleppo City, but similar incidents will almost certainly erupt absent further progress from either side towards the SDF's integration into the Syrian state. Both the Syrian government and Turkey have maintained that the SDF must integrate by the end of the year.[xxvii] The continued lack of effort from both the government and the SDF to address minor issues—such as the Asayish’s integration into local police, for example—can contribute to further small-scale bouts of fighting as the deadline for the SDF’s integration approaches.

The Lebanese government has continued to take steps to disarm and weaken Hezbollah. The Lebanese Council of Ministers held a cabinet session on October 6 to review the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)’s first monthly progress report on the implementation of its plan to disarm Hezbollah south of the Litani River in the next three months.[xxviii] LAF Commander Brigadier General Rodolphe Haykal reported that the LAF has prioritized monopolizing weapons south of the Litani River, containing weapons across Lebanon, and increasing control over Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon.[xxix] The LAF has doubled the number of its missions in southern Lebanon and has made ”serious progress” in implementing its plan in the past month, according to Lebanese minister Kamal Shehadeh.[xxx]

Haykal said that Hezbollah is not cooperating with the LAF.[xxxi] Hezbollah previously threatened in September 2025 to halt its cooperation with the LAF by refusing to hand over its weapons south of the Litani River if the Lebanese government approved and implemented the LAF’s disarmament plan.[xxxii] Haykal noted that continued Israeli operations have created obstacles for the LAF's implementation of the plan.[xxxiii] Israel has maintained that it will continue to operate in Lebanon until Hezbollah is disarmed.[xxxiv]

The Lebanese Council of Ministers also agreed to suspend the license of a Hezbollah propaganda organization during the cabinet session on October 6.[xxxv] The Lebanese Association of Arts, commonly known as Rissalat, is a Hezbollah art and media organization that spreads Hezbollah propaganda.[xxxvi] Lebanese Interior Minister Ahmad al Hajjar requested that the government dissolve Rissalat, and Lebanese Justice Minister Adel Nassar suggested that the government take judicial measures in response to Hezbollah’s Raouche Rock event.[xxxvii] Rissalat disregarded the Lebanese government’s instructions and illuminated the Raouche Rock in Beirut on September 25 during a rally event to commemorate the death of former Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah.[xxxviii] Hezbollah officials previously warned the government against action that would target Rissalat during the cabinet session and threatened to organize all future Hezbollah events under Rissalat’s name.[xxxix] Rissalat stated that it will continue its activities in response to the government’s decision, which will force the government to take further legal or police action to shut down the organization.[xl]

Hezbollah’s inability to delay or veto the council’s decision to suspend Rissalat’s license and activities reflects Hezbollah’s relative loss of political leverage. Hezbollah held enough seats to have de facto veto power on the council between 2008 and 2019.[xli] Hezbollah and its ally, the Amal Movement, currently only hold five seats in the Council of Ministers, which is insufficient to veto a council decision.[xlii] Hezbollah’s weakened political leverage is also exemplified by the increasing confidence of the Lebanese government to take steps to directly weaken Hezbollah in recent months. The Lebanese Central Bank banned all licensed Lebanese banking institutions from working directly or indirectly with Hezbollah’s main financial arm, al Qard al Hassan, in July 2025.[xliii] The Lebanese government tasked the LAF with disarming Hezbollah and approved the US disarmament plan in August 2025.[xliv]

Iran Update, October 6, 2025

Hamas agreed to a ceasefire with Israel on October 3 but called for negotiating other aspects of US President Donald Trump’s plan for peace in the Gaza Strip. Trump proposed a 20-point plan to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on September 29 that laid out a broad vision for the end of the Israel-Hamas War and the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip.[i] Trump warned that Hamas would face “all hell” if it did not agree to his peace plan by October 5.[ii] Hamas leaders agreed on October 3 to release all living and deceased Israeli hostages as part of the ceasefire and expressed openness to engaging in negotiations on other elements of Trump’s plan.[iii] Hamas endorsed one point of Trump’s plan that calls for a Palestinian body of independent technocrats to govern the Gaza Strip, but did not explicitly agree that an international transitional body chaired by Trump should have oversight and supervision over the Palestinian technocratic body.[iv] Hamas’ statement also did not acknowledge that Trump’s plan requires Hamas and other Palestinian factions to disarm.[v] US, Israeli, and Hamas negotiators held indirect negotiations on the ceasefire plan in Egypt on October 6.[vi] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has continued offensive operations and airstrikes in the Gaza Strip, but halted its major offensive into Gaza City due to the ceasefire agreement.[vii] Hamas and other Palestinian factions have continued to target Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip since Hamas agreed to the proposal on October 3.[viii]

Elements of Trump's plan require Hamas to concede on many of its long-held ceasefire demands, which raises questions about the viability of a long-term ceasefire agreement. Hamas and Israel last observed a ceasefire between January and March 2025. The ceasefire ended after Israel accused Hamas of delaying the release of hostages and failing to negotiate on next steps to end the war.[ix] Hamas has consistently demanded a full Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and a “permanent ceasefire,” but Trump’s plan only requires the IDF to fully withdraw after a set of undefined ”standards, milestones, and timeframes linked to demilitarization” are met in the opinion of the IDF, the United States, and additional guarantors.[x] Hamas previously demanded a “permanent” ceasefire in exchange for releasing Israeli hostages due to skepticism that the IDF would resume hostilities once Israel received the hostages.[xi] Hamas has seemingly conceded on this demand by agreeing to release all living and deceased Israeli hostages before receiving a guarantee of a full IDF withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. Hamas has also not yet addressed US and Israeli demands that it disarm and disband under Trump’s plan. Netanyahu remains adamant that Hamas will be disarmed either through diplomatic means with Trump’s plan or through IDF military action if the plan fails.[xii] Hamas would receive some elements of its long-held demands, namely aid, reconstruction, and the release of prisoners held in Israel, under the proposal.[xiii]

It is unclear if an end to the war in the Gaza Strip would impact how Hamas’ partners in the Axis of Resistance engage with Israel. Both Iran and Hezbollah supported Hamas’ agreement to the ceasefire and implicit rejection of the full US plan.[xiv] Iran and Hezbollah’s endorsement of Hamas’ objection to the later stages of Trump’s plan surrounding the political administration of the Gaza Strip suggests that both support Hamas continuing the war. The Houthis have justified their missile and drone campaign against Israel and international shipping as a response to Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip.[xv] It is unclear if the Houthis would halt these campaigns in response to a lasting Israel-Hamas ceasefire. The Houthis have continued to attack Israel since Hamas agreed to the ceasefire with Israel on October 3.[xvi] Houthi Political Bureau member Mohammad al Bukhaiti said on October 6 that international mediators should not focus on disarming Hamas “because our weapon is Hamas' weapon, and our theater of operations is Hamas' theater of operations,” suggesting that the Houthis will continue to support Hamas even if the group is disarmed.[xvii] 

Syria’s October 5 parliamentary elections are a positive step toward the development of a representative government in Syria, but the establishment of political parties will likely be necessary to form any meaningful opposition to Syrian President Ahmed al Shara. At least 6,000 subcommittee members voted within regional electoral districts to elect at least 119 members of the legislature.[xviii] A committee appointed by Shara previously finalized the 6,000 subcommittee members in early September 2025.[xix] Shara will soon appoint the remaining one-third of the legislature, or 70 seats, in the coming days.[xx] The assembly’s members will serve 30-month terms, according to the Syrian transitional constitution.[xxi] The assembly will propose, approve, and repeal legislation, ratify international treaties, and approve the state’s budget, among other responsibilities.[xxii] The assembly will maintain legislative authority until Syria adopts a permanent constitution with new legislative elections.[xxiii]   

The newly elected assembly members appear to at least minimally represent the diversity of Syria’s ethnic, religious, and sectarian communities, including Kurds, Alawites, Turkmen, and Ismailis, among others, according to Syrian and international observers.[xxiv] Many of the assembly members represent their region’s demographics. All three representatives for Afrin, a Kurdish stronghold in northern Aleppo Province, are Kurdish, for example.[xxv] The head of the committee that supervised the elections suggested on October 6 that Shara will use his appointment of 70 assembly members to address “gaps” in representation in the legislature, such as the small proportion of women and Christians.[xxvi] Candidates also appear to represent diverse political beliefs, ranging from moderates with a record of criticizing Shara and his new government to more conservative Islamists connected to the HTS-aligned Islamist coalition Ahrar al Sham.[xxvii] The election of many community representatives, activists, and dignitaries will probably present opportunities for them to engage more closely with Shara and his government, which is critical to build civil discourse and improve communication and trust between Syrian communities and the government. 

The assembly in its current form will likely not be able to meaningfully check the Syrian presidency. Shara has indirectly approved all of the elected candidates, given his oversight over their selection. Shara formed the Supreme Committee for People’s Assembly Elections in June 2025 to select at least 6,000 subcommittee members and approve 1,578 electoral candidates from among the subcommittee members.[xxviii] The newly elected assembly members may hold a diverse spectrum of political beliefs, but there is little transparency into the candidate selection process and whether or not Shara or his advisers had the authority to veto politically unfavorable candidates. The Supreme Committee faced criticism for rejecting numerous candidates on the basis of population demographics, cultural diversity, and “competence” without allowing appeals.[xxix] Syria’s transitional constitution also provides the assembly with very limited abilities to overrule Shara. A two-thirds majority of the assembly can overrule Shara’s veto of any legislation and require him to pass the legislation into law, but this check is somewhat offset by the fact that Shara will soon appoint one-third of the assembly members, which may limit the assembly’s ability to amass enough support to overturn Shara’s decisions.[xxx] The assembly lacks any other meaningful constitutionally provided powers through which it can push back against Shara’s decisions if needed.[xxxi] Diverse representation within the People’s Assembly is only valuable to the Syrian people if assembly members can meaningfully benefit or protect their communities.

The formation of political parties is one way through which assembly members can organize and build coalitions to advance the interests of the regions they represent and counter Shara’s policies. Syria’s transitional constitution protects the right to form political parties, though candidates ran independently in the October 5 election.[xxxii] Newly elected assembly members may organize into parties over time, and Shara’s tolerance for the creation of diverse parties or coalitions that may oppose him or push against his agenda will be an indicator of Shara’s commitment to forming a democratic society.

Neither Syrian Kurds in the northeast nor Druze in southern Syria participated in the October 5 elections. The Syrian government announced in late August 2025 that it would indefinitely suspend elections in Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)-controlled territory and in Suwayda Province.[xxxiii]  The 21 seats allocated to these provinces will remain empty until these territories join the Syrian state, according to the government.[xxxiv] It is unlikely that these territories will integrate in the near term, however. Many Druze factions in Suwayda Province continue to organize under the banner of the “National Guard,” which is a force that is loyal to the newly formed Suwayda Autonomous Government.[xxxv] This parallel government structure is staunchly opposed to Shara’s Damascus-based government.[xxxvi]

Kurdish officials criticized the results of the October 5 elections as unreflective of the Syrian “national will.”[xxxvii] These criticisms come as neither the SDF nor the Syrian government has made meaningful, concessionary steps toward integrating the SDF into the Syrian army since March 2025. The Syrian army and SDF have continued to exchange artillery fire along frontlines near Deir Hafer, Aleppo Province, since October 3.[xxxviii] The Syrian government reportedly conducted multiple drone strikes targeting SDF positions and fortifications in this region on October 5.[xxxix] SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi met with US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack and US Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander Admiral Brad Cooper in Hasakah on October 6.[xl] Abdi stated that they discussed “political integration” and counter-ISIS efforts, but it is unclear if any progress was made.[xli]

Iran and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have used barter systems that avoid monetary transactions on the international market to circumvent US sanctions on Iran since at least 2018, according to two US media reports published on October 5.[xlii] PRC companies began exporting motor vehicles to Iran in exchange for Iranian metals, including copper and zinc, around 2018 after US President Donald Trump launched his “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran, according to individuals with knowledge of the trade speaking to Bloomberg.[xliii] Hong Kong-registered PRC front companies have also recently paid PRC contractors to build infrastructure in Iran in exchange for Iranian crude oil exports to the PRC, according to current and former Western officials speaking to the Wall Street Journal.[xliv] Some of the officials stated that the PRC transmitted $8.4 billion in oil payments via this barter arrangement to finance PRC contracted infrastructure projects in Iran in 2024.[xlv] Iran and the PRC previously conducted negotiations in 2023 over a similar barter agreement in which Iran would provide the PRC with crude oil in exchange for the PRC’s assistance in constructing the Tehran-North freeway, which connects Tehran to the Caspian Sea.[xlvi] It is unclear whether Iran and the PRC signed the agreement in 2023. These transactions do not require Chinese or Iranian companies to trade on the international market using the US dollar and are not subject to US sanctions, according to the Wall Street Journal and Bloomberg reports.[xlvii] The PRC does not acknowledge the United States’ unilateral sanctions and subsequent secondary sanctions on Iran, claiming that PRC-Iran trade complies with international law.[xlviii]

Iran appears to be prioritizing strengthening its air power by purchasing foreign fighter jets to address weaknesses that Israel exploited during the Israel-Iran War. Iran allegedly agreed to buy 48 Su-35 fighter jets from Russia with electronic warfare components and avionic enhancements, according to documents from Russian military conglomerate Rostec that were leaked by the Ukrainian hacker group “Black Mirror.”[xlix] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the authenticity of the leaked documents. Iran would allegedly receive the first shipment of Su-35s as early as 2026, although Iran has previously experienced difficulties acquiring Russian military systems given Russia’s constraints and preoccupation with its war in Ukraine.[l] Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf advocated on September 24 for Iran to enhance its air power through the purchase of fighter jets.[li] The supposed Iran-Russia deal also comes amid reports that Iran may have acquired MiG-29 fighter jets from Russia.[lii]  Iranian Armed Forces General Staff-controlled Defa Press previously expressed support for the purchase of Chinese J-10 fighter jets in June 2025.[liii] Iran has sought advanced fighter jets from its partners because Israel achieved air superiority in Iran within the first few days of the Israel-Iran War, which helped Israel to achieve its objectives of degrading the Iranian nuclear and ballistic missile programs.[liv]

Iraqi Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr is reportedly planning to make an unspecified “move” regarding the upcoming November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections that will not cause “chaos or escalation,” according to a former Sadrist parliamentarian.[lv] The former parliamentarian’s statement that Sadr seeks to avoid “chaos and escalation” suggests that Sadr does not plan to incite protests surrounding the elections. Sadr announced in March 2025 that his Shia National Movement would not participate in the elections and has repeatedly urged his supporters, who are primarily Shia, not to vote.[lvi] Sadr reaffirmed his call for Sadrists to boycott the elections during a meeting with former Sadrist parliamentarians in Najaf on October 3.[lvii] Iran and Iraqi politicians across the political spectrum have expressed support for Sadr’s involvement in the elections, likely due to concerns that Sadr could try to destabilize a future government that doesn’t include his movement.[lviii] Sadr has periodically called for protests, including after the 2021 elections.[lix]

Iraqi politicians remain concerned about the potential of low voter turnout in the upcoming parliamentary elections. Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani, Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq head Qais al Khazali, and State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki all emphasized the importance of voter participation in the elections during speeches on October 4 and 5.[lx] These speeches follow reports that Shia Coordination Framework parties are concerned that voter turnout in the upcoming elections will fall below 20 percent due to the Sadrist boycott.[lxi] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. CTP-ISW assessed in June 2025 that Shia Coordination Framework parties may seek to win votes from Iraqis who would have voted for Sadr in the elections.[lxii]

Key Takeaways

• Gaza Ceasefire Plan: Hamas agreed to a ceasefire with Israel on October 3 but called for negotiating other aspects of US President Donald Trump’s plan for peace in the Gaza Strip. Elements of Trump's plan require Hamas to concede on many of its long-held ceasefire demands, which raises questions about the viability of a long-term ceasefire agreement.
• Syrian Parliamentary Elections: Syria’s October 5 parliamentary elections are a positive step toward the development of a representative government in Syria, but the establishment of political parties will likely be necessary to form any meaningful opposition to Syrian President Ahmed al Shara. Neither Syrian Kurds in the northeast nor Druze in southern Syria participated in the elections.
• Iran-PRC Trade: Iran and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have reportedly used barter systems that avoid monetary transactions on the international market to circumvent US sanctions on Iran since at least 2018, according to two US media reports published on October 5.
• Iranian Air Defense: Iran appears to be prioritizing strengthening its air power by purchasing foreign fighter jets to address weaknesses that Israel exploited during the Israel-Iran War.
• Iraqi Parliamentary Elections: Iraqi Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr is reportedly planning to make an unspecified “move” regarding the upcoming November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections that will not cause “chaos or escalation,” according to a former Sadrist parliamentarian. The former parliamentarian’s statement suggests that Sadr does not plan to incite protests surrounding the elections.

Iran Update, October 2, 2025 

Former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy Commander   emphasized the role that Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities and national unity played in its “success” during the Israel-Iran War in June 2025.[i] Alaei claimed that Iran demonstrated the strength of its ballistic missiles and national unity during the war in an interview with Nour News on October 1.[ii] Alaei claimed that Iran‘s demonstration of these strengths caused the United States and Israel to call for a ceasefire.[iii]  Alaei also claimed that Iranian missiles became more precise throughout the war and that no segment of the Iranian population chose to side with Israel in support of internal division.[iv] Alaei’s reflections almost certainly reflect only some segments of the regime’s national security community, and CTP-ISW cannot determine whether Alaei’s statements are reflective of a broader trend in Iranian strategic thought or if it is isolated to only a small number of thinkers.

Alaei’s statements regarding Iran‘s ballistic missiles and national unity suggest that some elements of the regime’s national security community believe that the regime has enough domestic support to engage in a prolonged conflict with Israel and could inflict more damage through continued missile strikes.[v] These reflections indicate that some Iranian officials believe that at least some elements of its previous efforts to deter and defend against Israeli strikes could be successful in the future, presumably with some modifications. Israel accomplished its campaign objectives—the degradation of Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs—in the Israel-Iran War, but it needed to end the war rapidly and at a moment of its own choosing.[vi] Israel forced Iran to rapidly end the war by creating the perception of a credible existential threat to the Iranian regime.[vii] Israel struck Iranian institutions and other assets used by the Iranian regime to ensure regime stability.[viii] A series of strikes against these institutions and assets that the Israelis design to demonstrate a credible threat to the regime’s stability could be expanded or contracted depending on how the regime responds and Israel’s desire for a ceasefire. Israel calculated that the Iranian regime’s overwhelming interest in ensuring regime survival would compel it to agree to a ceasefire. Alaei appears to be implying that the war illustrated that, in the future, Iranian missiles could be more successful if Israeli interceptor stockpiles are depleted. Alaei also suggests that national unity would have sustained a longer war, but it is unclear if expanded Israeli strikes would change Iranian calculations about regime stability.

Alaei’s assumptions that the ballistic missile attack campaign and national unity were part of Iran’s ”success” appear to disregard the reality that Israeli operations did not intend to collapse the regime or even seriously threaten it. Israel only aimed to demonstrate its military capability to destroy Iran’s ability to control its population. Israel retains that capability, and as noted above, could decide to expand or contract its military campaign against regime targets and threaten regime stability as it deems necessary to accomplish its objectives.

Alaei also emphasized that Iran can strike the United States and Israel due to its geographic position in the Persian Gulf.[ix] Alaei described Iran’s location in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman as the security and military “center of gravity of the region.” Alaei’s statement may be attempting to highlight the potential threat that Iran could pose to US forces and allied partners.[x] The IRGC Navy has historically harassed commercial and military vessels in the Persian Gulf to signal its ability to disrupt maritime traffic and pressure the United States and its partners.[xi]

It is notable that Nour News chose to interview Alaei as the first guest in its new “Pathway” series, given that Alaei has historically criticized the regime and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Nour News is affiliated with the Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser to the Defense Council Ali Shamkhani. Alaei served as the first IRGC Navy Commander from 1985 to 1990 and later as IRGC chief of staff from 1997 to 1999.[xii] Shamkhani similarly served as the IRGC Navy Commander from 1990  to 1997 and then as Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister from 1997 and 2005.[xiii] Shamkhani would have probably coordinated with Alaei in both of these roles. Alaei has repeatedly challenged the regime’s policies, including in his 2009 letter about the regime’s prison abuses, a 2011 editorial that indirectly criticized Khamenei, and his opposition to Iran’s support for former Syrian President Bashar al Assad.[xiv] Alaei also publicly sympathized with anti-regime protesters in 2020 and suggested abolishing Iran’s morality patrol.[xv] Alaei’s criticism of the regime was underscored in his interview with Nour News. Alaei noted that both Iranian reformists and hardliners had managed the nuclear file but emphasized that all negotiations occurred under the Supreme Leader’s supervision, placing ultimate responsibility on Khamenei.[xvi] Alaei dismissed Iran’s foreign policy as no better than “acceptable” on the nuclear issue, which implicitly faulted Khamenei for the failure to achieve a resolution.[xvii]

Iran is attempting to improve and fix vulnerabilities in its air defense systems that Israel exploited during the Israel-Iran War. An Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS)-controlled outlet reported on October 1 that the Iranian army has replaced and strengthened its air defense systems and short-range air defenses to counter drones.[xviii] It is unclear what type of short-range systems the Iranians have strengthened or whether these systems include electronic warfare systems. The outlet also claimed that Iran is attempting to acquire HQ-9 long-range surface-to-air missile (SAMs) batteries to counter Israeli F-35 fighter jets. Iranian Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Commission head Abolfazl Zohrevand previously claimed in September 2025 that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) would supply Iran with HQ-9 SAMs.[xix] CTP-ISW has observed no evidence that the PRC delivered these systems. It is unlikely that an HQ-9 SAM could shoot down an F-35 fighter jet, however.[xx] Israel destroyed the target engagement radars of four Russian S-300s, which bear technical similarities to Chinese HQ-9 SAMs, in Iran in April and October 2024.[xxi] The IRGC Ground Forces also conducted an air defense drill in its eastern air defense zone south of Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi Province, on October 2 to bolster its air defenses.[xxii] Iran conducted a similar exercise in northwestern Iran on September 24.[xxiii]

Senior Syrian and Russian defense officials have continued to discuss possible defense cooperation, signaling a possible shift towards deeper Syrian-Russian defense relations. Syrian Chief of the General Staff Major General Ali al Naasan, Assistant Defense Minister for the Northern Region Brigadier General Fahim Issa, Air Force Commander Brigadier General Assem al Hawari, Navy Commander Brigadier General Mohammad al Saud, 52nd Division Commander Brigadier General Haitham al Ali, and other Syrian officials arrived in Moscow on October 2 to discuss “coordination mechanisms” with Russian defense officials.[xxiv] The inclusion of Fahim Issa, who is responsible for northern Syria, suggests that the two parties discussed the remaining Russian presence in Syria, particularly in Qamishli, Syria, which is surrounded by Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)-controlled territory. Fahim Issa is a Syrian Turkmen ethno-nationalist who is extremely hostile to Kurds and the SDF.[xxv] Issa is also close to Turkish ethno-nationalists aligned with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.[xxvi] Turkey has threatened to attack the SDF if the SDF fails to integrate with the Syrian state before December 31, 2025.[xxvii]

The Syrian Defense Ministry's visit to Russia suggests that Syrian officials may seek to increase military cooperation with Russia in the coming months, possibly through the exchange of military expertise. The Syrian delegation visited the Russian military’s Central National Military Park near Kubinka, Moscow Oblast, and viewed Russian air defense systems, reconnaissance and fixed-wing attack drones, anti-tank guided missiles, and armored vehicles.[xxviii] Russia is currently facing a serious materiel shortage, and its commitment to fighting in Ukraine will take priority over arms exports to Syria, despite previous Syrian interest in procuring Russian equipment.[xxix] Syrian officials may seek to increase cooperation with Russia to learn from the Russian military, however.

The Syrian defense officials’ visit to Moscow comes amid an increased number of high-level meetings between Syrian and Russian defense officials in the past month.[xxx]  The topics discussed and officials present at other recent Syria-Russia meetings also suggest that Syria may be interested in establishing more direct military cooperation with Russia in the coming months. The Syrian Air Force Training Department head, Brigadier General Yahya Bitar, and representatives from the Defense Ministry’s training, artillery, and armor departments met with a Russian military delegation in Syria on October 2.[xxxi] The delegations discussed ways to “develop these specialties,” presumably referring to developing the Syrian army’s training, artillery, and armor capabilities and readiness.[xxxii] Syrian President Ahmed al Shara is expected to travel to Moscow on October 15 for the Arab-Russian summit, during which Syrian and Russian officials may continue to discuss the two countries‘ relations.[xxxiii]

Key Takeaways

• Iranian Strategic Re-Think: Former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy Commander emphasized in an interview with Nour News the role that Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities and national unity played in its “success” during the Israel-Iran War in June 2025. Alaei’s statements suggest the regime believes that it has enough domestic support to engage in a prolonged conflict with Israel and could inflict more damage through continued missile strikes in the future.
• Iranian Air Defense: Iran is attempting to improve and fix vulnerabilities in its air defense systems that Israel exploited during the Israel-Iran War. An Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS)-controlled outlet reported on October 1 that the Iranian army has replaced and strengthened its air defense systems and short-range air defenses to counter drones.
• Syrian-Russian Defense Cooperation: Senior Syrian and Russian defense officials have continued to discuss possible defense cooperation, signaling a possible shift towards deeper Syrian-Russian defense relations. Syrian officials’ visit to Moscow on October 2 suggests that Syria may seek to increase military cooperation with Russia in the coming months, possibly through the exchange of military expertise.

Previous Iran Updates

• September 2025
• August 2025
• July 2025
• June 2025
• May 2025
• April 2025
• March 2025
• February 2025
• January 2025
• December 2024
• November 2024
• October 2024
• September 2024
• August 2024
• July 2024
• June 2024
• May 2024
• April 2024
• March 2024
• February 2024
• January 2024
• December 2023
• November 2023
• October 2023