Iran Update, October 30, 2025

Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Iran has reportedly received increasingly large sodium perchlorate shipments from China amid Iranian efforts to rebuild its ballistic missile program in the wake of Israel-Iran war. European intelligence sources told CNN on October 29 that Iran received 2000 tons of sodium perchlorate in several shipments that arrived in Bandar Abbas, Iran, from China.[i] Sodium perchlorate is a chemical precursor for solid missile propellant. The Associated Press assessed on September 24 that Iran does not have the necessary planetary mixers to produce solid missile fuel due to Israeli strikes on Iranian military sites in October 2024 and June 2025, however.[ii] Iran has reportedly received larger quantities of sodium perchlorate in recent shipments compared to the quantities of sodium perchlorate that Iran previously received from China in February and May 2025.[iii] These shipments notably arrived in Iran on September 29, two days after the UN Security Council reimposed sanctions on Iran that included sanctions related to the Iranian missile program.[iv] China has recently assisted Iran in developing its ballistic missile program through shipments of sodium perchlorate in addition to other dual-use technologies.[v] Iran reportedly received about 1000 tons of sodium perchlorate from China in February and May 2025.[vi] The larger recent shipments to Iran come as Iran tries to rebuild its missile program following the Israel-Iran War in June 2025. Former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Mohammad Ali Jafari argued on October 25 that Iran’s missile program is its main form of deterrence and that Iran deliberately prioritized developing its missile and drone capabilities over its air and ground forces to counter the superior capabilities of the United States and Israel.[vii]

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani may attempt to ally with Sunni and Kurdish political parties after the upcoming parliamentary elections in order to increase his own power by sidelining powerful Iranian-backed Shia factions and other prominent Shia parties. Iraqi media reported on October 30 that unspecified Iraqi political figures are working to form a Sudani-led post-election alliance that will include Sunni and Kurdish political figures and potentially exclude unspecified Iran-aligned figures and parties.[viii] It is unclear which Iran-aligned political parties would be excluded from the alliance. Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development Coalition includes Popular Mobilization Commission (PMC) Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh and former Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Spokesperson Ahmed al Asadi, which suggests that certain Iranian-backed and -influenced groups will remain in Sudani’s post-election alliance.[ix] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service primarily comprised of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, many of which report to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[x]

Sudani may be attempting to build a coalition with Sunni, Kurdish, and key Shia partners that can sideline these prominent Shia Coordination Framework leaders and ultimately form a government that Sudani leads. Sudani‘s reported efforts to sideline prominent Iranian-backed actors also comes after US Special Envoy to Iraq Mark Savaya reportedly met with leaders of political blocs in Baghdad.[xi] The United States has repeatedly pressured the Iraqi government to limit Iranian influence within Iraqi government institutions and has voiced concerns about powerful Iran-aligned parties running in the upcoming parliamentary elections.[xii]

Iranian-backed and –influenced parties in Iraq may be opposing Sudani’s participation in the upcoming elections out of fear that Sudani, a popular prime minister, could win a large amount of seats and bar them from government. Some Shia Coordination Framework parties--the most influential of which are backed by Iran or have long abetted Iran's activities in Iraq--are opposed to Sudani’s participation in the upcoming elections.[xiii] Some unidentified Shia Coordination Framework parties have reportedly considered choosing one of the Shia Coordination Framework “sheikhs” as the next prime minister due to Sudani’s participation in the upcoming elections.[xiv] The term “sheikhs” in this context likely refers to the most prominent Shia Coordination Framework leaders, such as State of Law Coalition head and former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki, Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri, and Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq head Qais al Khazali. These leaders collectively hold many seats in the current parliament, which makes them influential in the current Sudani government. Sudani, if he manages to prevent them from joining the new government by forming a ruling coalition without them, would be able to increase his own power at their expense.

Sudani’s reported strategy mirrors Shia National Movement leader Moqtada al Sadr’s ultimately unsuccessful attempt to ally with Sunni and Kurdish leaders to form a “national majority government” that excluded Iran-backed Iraqi parties after the November 2021 parliamentary elections.[xv] Sadr attempted to exclude Iranian-backed Iraqi parties from the government formation process by allying with the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and Sunni Sovereignty alliance after Sadr's Sairoon bloc won 73 of the 329 parliamentary seats after the November 2021 elections.[xvi] Sadr’s efforts to sideline Iranian-backed Iraqi actors ultimately failed when these groups employed both political and violent tactics to hinder the government formation process.[xvii] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conducted rocket attacks on Kurdish oil and gas fields between March and June 2022 to pressure Kurdish parties to withdraw their support for Sadr, for example.[xviii] The Iraqi Federal Supreme Court, which Iranian-backed Iraqi actors have coopted, also issued a ruling in February 2022 that made it impossible for Sadr to form a government without the inclusion of Iranian-backed Iraqi parties.[xix] Sadr ultimately ordered his party to withdraw from Parliament, thus clearing the way for Iranian-backed Shia parties to form their own government without Sadr. 

Key Takeaways

• Chinese Support for the Iranian Missile Program: Iran has reportedly received increasingly large sodium perchlorate shipments from China amid Iranian efforts to rebuild its ballistic missile program in the wake of Israel-Iran war. Sodium perchlorate is a chemical precursor for solid missile propellant. Iran reportedly does not have the necessary planetary mixers to produce solid missile fuel due to Israeli strikes on Iranian military sites in October 2024 and June 2025, however.
• Iranian Parliamentary Elections: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani may attempt to ally with Sunni and Kurdish political parties after the upcoming parliamentary elections in order to increase his own power by sidelining powerful Iranian-backed Shia factions and other prominent Shia parties. Some Shia Coordination Framework parties--the most influential of which are backed by Iran or have long abetted Iran's activities in Iraq--are opposed to Sudani’s participation in the upcoming elections. Sudani, if he is able to prevent these actors from joining the new government by forming a ruling coalition without them, would be able to increase his own power at their expense.
• Hezbollah’s Disarmament: Lebanese President Joseph Aoun requested that the Lebanese army “confront” Israeli forces in response to a recent Israeli raid in southern Lebanon, probably to limit Hezbollah’s ability to justify its continued existence as a militia under the guise of resistance to Israel. Hezbollah has recently employed this narrative and continued Israeli operations in Lebanon to reject the Lebanese government’s plan to disarm Hezbollah. Aoun’s statements are almost certainly designed to push back against Hezbollah attempts to prevent its disarmament by the government by claiming that the Lebanese army cannot resist Israel.
• Russia in Syria: Russia has reportedly resumed military flights to Russian bases in Syria, possibly to transfer equipment amid recent growing Russo-Syrian diplomatic engagement. Bloomberg, citing flight tracking data, reported that Russian military cargo aircraft resumed flights to Syria for the first time in six months. CTP-ISW cannot confirm that the Russian military has redeployed any equipment to Hmeimim Airbase at the time of this writing.

Iran

Nothing significant to report.

Iraq

See topline section.

Syria

Russia has reportedly resumed military flights to Russian bases in Syria, possibly to transfer equipment amid recent growing Russo-Syrian diplomatic engagement. Bloomberg, citing flight tracking data, reported on October 30 that Russia has resumed military flights to Syria for the first time in six months.[xx] A Russian Air Force Ilyushin Il-62M transport plane reportedly flew from Libya to Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia Province, Syria, and onto Moscow on October 26.[xxi] Russia has long used Hmeimim Airbase as a logistics site for Russian flights to Africa.[xxii] It is unclear if the Russian aircraft transported or evacuated any equipment to or from the base, but Russia has previously transported equipment between Syria and Libya via Hmeimim. US and Libyan officials told The Wall Street Journal in mid-December 2024 that Russia flew equipment, including air defense radars, from Hmeimim Airbase to Russian air bases in eastern Libya.[xxiii] Bloomberg also reported that a Russian Antonov An-124 Ruslan heavy-lift cargo aircraft landed at Hmeimim Airbase three times between October 24 and October 29.[xxiv] The Antonov An-124 Ruslan has a 150-ton cargo capacity that allows it to transport heavy military equipment and cargo on behalf of the Russian military.[xxv] CTP-ISW cannot confirm that the Russian military has redeployed any equipment to Hmeimim Airbase at the time of this writing. These flights resumed shortly after Syrian President Ahmed al Shara met with Russian President Vladimir Putin on October 15 in Moscow and declared that he sought to ”redefine” the Syria-Russia relationship.[xxvi] It is not clear if Syrian and Russian officials have reached a concrete agreement on the future of Russian basing in Syria, despite a series of Syrian-Russian meetings in September and October 2025 to discuss military coordination.[xxvii] Syrian Defense Minister Major General Marhaf Abu Qasra most recently met with Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov in Moscow on October 28 to discuss military topics.[xxviii]

The US-trained Syrian Free Army has left the Syrian army and joined the Syrian Ministry of Interior (MoI)’s Badia Security Directorate. The MoI integrated the Syrian Free Army (formerly known as Maghawir al Thawra) into the Badia Security Directorate and appointed a replacement commander for the unit on October 29.[xxix] The unit will presumably continue to operate in the Syrian Central Desert (also known as the Badia), which is a hotspot for ISIS activity. The Syrian Free Army had previously integrated into the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) Rif Dimashq-based 70th division in May 2025.[xxx] The Syrian Free Army confirmed that it will continue to operate out of the US base in al Tanf and that the unit’s transfer to the MoI “does not affect [the Syrian Free Army’s] cooperation with International Coalition forces.”[xxxi] US forces have trained and operated alongside Syrian Free Army forces against ISIS since 2015.[xxxii] The unit has about 600 fighters.[xxxiii] International Coalition forces and the Syrian Free Army conducted a raid on a suspected ISIS leader in Dumayr, Rif Dimashq Province, on October 17.[xxxiv] The Syrian Free Army also conducted several counter-narcotic and counter-weapon smuggling operations before the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024.[xxxv]

Arabian Peninsula

Nothing significant to report.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Israeli ground forces raided a building in southern Lebanon on October 29 as part of Israeli efforts to destroy Hezbollah infrastructure and prevent Hezbollah’s reconstitution.[xxxvi] The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) claimed that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) advanced into the town of Blida in southern Lebanon and raided the town’s local municipality building.[xxxvii] The LAF reported that the IDF killed a municipal employee during the raid.[xxxviii] Blida is located along the Israel-Lebanon border, adjacent to the Israeli town of Yiftah.[xxxix]  The IDF said that Hezbollah had recently used the Blida building for unspecified “terrorist activities” and that the IDF fired upon a suspect in the building that forces deemed a direct threat.[xl] LAF forces deployed to Blida after Israeli forces withdrew and have since established positions around the town.[xli]

Lebanese President Joseph Aoun requested that the LAF “confront” Israeli forces in response to the Israeli raid, probably to limit Hezbollah’s ability to justify its continued existence as a militia under the guise of resistance to Israel. Aoun requested that the LAF “confront any Israeli [ground] incursions” into “liberated” areas of southern Lebanon to defend Lebanese territory and its citizens during a meeting with LAF Commander Brigadier Rudolphe Haykal on October 30.[xlii] Aoun consistently issues statements that condemn Israeli operations in Lebanon but has not previously called upon Lebanese security services to take direct action against Israel in response to an Israeli operation.[xliii] It is doubtful that the LAF will act upon this request given that the LAF has historically not participated in any conflicts with Israel and has not directly confronted the IDF in recent months.[xliv]

Aoun’s request comes amid calls from Hezbollah and Hezbollah-aligned Lebanese officials upon the Lebanese government to take further action in response to the Israeli raid. Lebanese Parliament Speaker and Hezbollah ally Nabih Berri condemned the raid, stating that the raid constituted an aggression against Lebanon that ”cannot be reined in with condemnations.”[xlv] Hezbollah similarly condemned the raid and called on the Lebanese government to do more to halt Israeli operations in Lebanon.[xlvi] Hezbollah has long framed itself as the ”defender” of Lebanon and used the Lebanese security forces’ historic inaction against Israel to justify its existence.[xlvii] Hezbollah has recently employed this narrative and continued Israeli operations in Lebanon to reject the Lebanese government’s plan to disarm Hezbollah.[xlviii] Aoun’s statements are almost certainly designed to push back against Hezbollah attempts to prevent its disarmament by the government by claiming that the LAF cannot resist Israel. Aoun and the Lebanese government are currently attempting to disarm Hezbollah but have made only very limited progress.