Iran Update, November 24, 2025

Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) killed Hezbollah’s “de facto chief of staff” and senior commander Haitham Ali Tabatabai in Beirut’s southern suburbs on November 23.[i] Tabatabai’s death will likely disrupt Hezbollah’s reconstitution for a short period because of Tabatabai’s significant experience at many echelons of command in fighting against Israel and engaging with Hezbollah’s Syrian partners. His experience at many echelons of command and in Syria would enable him to intimately understand the assets that Hezbollah needed to replace after the Fall 2024 Israeli campaign in Lebanon to defend southern Lebanon against renewed Israeli operations. His experience in Syria would have also allowed him to build relationships with many cross-border smugglers and other actors that can support Hezbollah’s reconstitution. The IDF stated that it killed Tabatabai in order to prevent Hezbollah’s reconstitution.[ii] Tabatabai was considered one of Hezbollah’s three highest-ranking military officials after the Israel-Hezbollah conflict in Fall 2024, and he has reportedly led Hezbollah‘s efforts to reconstitute after the war.[iii] Tabatabai has held numerous senior positions within Hezbollah’s military command since the group’s founding in 1982.[iv] Tabatabai helped establish Hezbollah’s Radwan Force and reportedly commanded Hezbollah’s Southern Front in Fall 2024 after Israel killed the previous commander.[v] Tabatabai helped train Hezbollah’s partners in Syria and Yemen and commanded Hezbollah special forces in both countries.[vi] Tabatabai would have been able to use his experience planning and leading defensive operations against Israel in southern Lebanon, in addition to his engagement with Syrian partners and knowledge of Lebanon-Syria supply lines, to plan Hezbollah’s reconstitution and any future attacks against Israel.[vii]

Tabatabai’s death may only have a limited impact on Hezbollah’s reconstitution processes, however, because he reportedly shared responsibility for Hezbollah’s military and reconstruction processes with another commander. This commander, Mohammad Haider, is the most likely replacement for Tabatabai due to Haider’s experience handling the reconstitution portfolio. An Israeli military correspondent reported that Haider and Tabatabai shared military and reconstitution roles. It is unclear which Hezbollah commander will replace Tabatabai because Israel killed the majority of Hezbollah’s senior commanders in Fall 2024.[viii] Tabatabai reportedly shared the command over Hezbollah’s military and reconstruction with senior Hezbollah commander Mohammad Haidar.[ix]

CTP-ISW has identified multiple ways in which Hezbollah may respond to Israel’s killing of Tabatabai. The IDF has “significantly” increased the alert status of air defense systems in northern Israel and the readiness of forces following Tabatabai’s killing.[x] The following potential scenarios are laid out from most likely to least likely, with the least likely scenario also being the most dangerous:

1. Hezbollah does not launch an attack on Israel or Israeli forces. CTP-ISW assesses that this is Hezbollah’s most likely course of action. Hezbollah officials have stated that the strike crossed the group’s “red line” but did not explicitly vow to retaliate for the strike.[xi] Any Hezbollah retaliatory attack targeting Israel or Israeli forces would prompt a large Israeli response, as the IDF has promised to respond to any direct threats or plans to attack Israel with force. Such an Israeli response would possibly disrupt Hezbollah’s current efforts to regenerate its forces and replenish its weapons stocks. Hezbollah fighters, weapons stockpiles, and smuggling routes are common Israeli targets in Lebanon. Hezbollah may decide to issue threats to distract from its inaction, such as threatening to halt cooperation with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) or to redeploy forces to southern Lebanon. Hezbollah has repeatedly threatened the LAF and Lebanese government in 2025 to slow LAF disarmament efforts but has not yet escalated militarily.[xii] Hezbollah could pursue a similar tactic with Israel.
2. Hezbollah launches a few projectiles towards open areas of northern Israel in a symbolic attack. Hezbollah has a precedent of conducting small-scale, symbolic attacks that target uninhabited areas of northern Israel so as not to provoke a large Israeli response.[xiii] Hezbollah fired two rockets at an IDF border position in the Israeli-controlled Shebaa Farms in early December 2024 as a “warning” against Israeli ceasefire violations, for example. Israel responded aggressively to the December 2024 ”warnings,” however, and Hezbollah has not conducted any major ”warnings” since.[xiv]
3. Hezbollah fires munitions targeting an Israeli position in Lebanon. Israel currently maintains forces at five outposts in southern Lebanon. These forces are more exposed relative to Israeli units in Israel, and Hezbollah can frame any attack on Israeli forces in Lebanon as “resistance” against an “occupier.” A direct attack on Israeli forces would risk a limited but serious Israeli response, however, which could increase the risks of discontent among Hezbollah supporters in southern Lebanon who are still slowly recovering from the fighting in Fall 2024. Any resumed conflict in Lebanon that could be blamed on the group would likely have major repercussions for the group’s image among Lebanese civilians and its Shia support base.[xv]
4. In a most dangerous course of action, Hezbollah attempts an infiltration attack in northern Israel or an IDF outpost in Lebanon. A Hezbollah infiltration—whether successful or not—could trigger a major Israeli response that would imperil both Hezbollah’s rebuild and continued support from southern Lebanese civilians. Hezbollah could miscalculate and feel pressured into enforcing its “red line” mentioned above by triggering an infiltration. This option risks triggering major Israeli operations in the air over southern Lebanon at minimum, but the IDF has practiced offensive operations in response to major Hezbollah infiltrations in recent weeks as well.[xvi]

An unspecified senior IDF official told Israeli media on November 24 that the IDF must work to degrade Hezbollah to a point where the LAF is militarily stronger than Hezbollah, which would presumably enable the LAF to disarm it with greater ease.[xvii] The IDF has conducted numerous airstrikes in recent days that have targeted Hezbollah reconstitution efforts in southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley.[xviii] The IDF’s priority is to ensure that Hezbollah cannot build infrastructure within five to ten kilometers of Israel’s northern border, according to a senior IDF official on November 24.[xix] Senior Israeli officials have also continued to threaten that Israel will not allow Hezbollah to reconstitute its forces, particularly given the LAF’s slow and tepid progress in disarming the group.[xx] An unspecified senior IDF official said that Israeli military action alone will not achieve Hezbollah’s disarmament and that the IDF must degrade Hezbollah so that the LAF is militarily stronger than Hezbollah.[xxi]

The IDF has continued to threaten that it will launch an expanded operation against Hezbollah in Lebanon if the LAF does not disarm the group.[xxii] IDF officials told Israeli media on November 24 that Israel is on the verge of launching a ”short, preemptive operation” to deter Hezbollah and degrade the group’s capabilities.[xxiii] The IDF has also continued to conduct drills to prepare forces and reservists for various “sudden” events, including a reservist call-up drill on November 23 and a multi-division drill on November 24 to practice responses to ”sudden events on the northern border.”[xxiv] IDF Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir visited the 210th Regional Division during the drill and was updated on preparations along the Israel-Lebanon border and the division’s increased operational alert status.[xxv] The IDF 210th Regional Division is responsible for Israel’s northern border in the Golan Heights and Mount Hermon area adjacent to Syria and Lebanon.[xxvi]

Key Takeaways

• Israel’s Strike on Hezbollah: The IDF killed Hezbollah’s “de facto chief of staff” and senior commander Haitham Ali Tabatabai in Beirut’s southern suburbs on November 23. Tabatabai’s death will likely disrupt Hezbollah’s reconstitution for a short period because of Tabatabai’s significant experience at many echelons of command in fighting against Israel and engaging with Hezbollah’s Syrian partners. CTP-ISW has identified multiple ways in which Hezbollah may respond to Israel’s killing of Tabatabai.
• LAF Disarmament: An unspecified senior IDF official told Israeli media on November 24 that the IDF must work to degrade Hezbollah to a point where the LAF is militarily stronger than Hezbollah, which would presumably enable the LAF to disarm it with greater ease. IDF officials told Israeli media on November 24 that Israel is on the verge of launching a ”short, preemptive operation” to deter Hezbollah and degrade the group’s capabilities.
• Sectarian Violence in Syria: Unknown actors attempted to instigate sectarian conflict between Sunnis and Alawites in Homs City, but the responses of local security forces and residents contained the violence and prevented its spread or intensification.
• Iraqi Government Formation: Iraqi Sunni political parties are continuing intra-ethnic negotiations regarding government formation, including the election of the parliament speaker. Progress Party leader Mohammad al Halbousi is reportedly negotiating alliances with other Arab-majority Sunni political parties and will be elected as parliament speaker.

Iran

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed a new commander of the Artesh Ground Forces amid the regime’s broader efforts to reshuffle senior military leadership after the Israel-Iran War.  Khamenei appointed Brigadier General Ali Jahanshahi to command the  Artesh Ground Forces on November 22.[xxvii] The Artesh Ground Forces operates around 50 infantry, mechanized infantry, and armored brigades.[xxviii] Jahanshahi previously commanded the 77th Samen Ol Aemeh Division of the Artesh Ground Forces in Mashhad, served as Artesh Ground Forces deputy coordinator, and acted as an ”evaluation” deputy for the Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters.[xxix] Jahanshahi is replacing former Ground Forces Commander Brigadier General Kioumars Heydari, whom Khamenei appointed as Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters deputy commander on November 24.[xxx] Iranian diaspora media, citing Iranian state media, reported that Jahanshahi’s appointment was part of expected leadership rotations and that the new appointment seeks to strengthen the Artesh Ground Forces operational structure.[xxxi] Khamenei’s appointment of Jahanshahi comes amid regime efforts to reshuffle senior military leadership in the wake of the Israel-Iran War. The regime has made several recent changes as part of this effort, including appointing Brigadier General Hojatollah Ghoreishi as the IRGC Deputy Coordinator on October 27 and Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi as the new Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) deputy chief on October 30.[xxxii]

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces Quds Operational Base announced on November 24 that it dismantled an Ansar al Furqan cell during a security operation in Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[xxxiii] Ansar al Furqan is a Salafi-Jihadi insurgent group active in southeastern Iran.[xxxiv] IRGC forces reportedly detained several members of the cell and seized two suicide vests during the ongoing “Martyrs of Security” operational exercise.[xxxv] The IRGC began this operation in October 2024 after Jaish al Adl—a Baloch Salafi-Jihadi group that operates in southeastern Iran—killed ten Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) officers in the province.[xxxvi] Ansar al Furqan claimed responsibility for attacking IRGC personnel near the Iran–Pakistan border in December 2023 and for attacking a LEC station in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province in January 2024.[xxxvii]

Iraq

Iraqi Sunni political parties are continuing intra-ethnic negotiations regarding government formation, including the election of the parliament speaker. Political leaders from the main Sunni parties—Progress Party, Azm Alliance, Sovereignty Alliance, National Hasm Alliance, and National Masses Party—announced on November 23 the formation of a “National Political Council” to unify their political efforts and plans on key issues.[xxxviii] It is unclear if this National Political Council constitutes a parliamentary alliance. This announcement comes after a Sovereignty Alliance member told Iraqi media on November 20 that Progress Party leader Mohammad al Halbousi is reportedly negotiating alliances with other Arab-majority Sunni political parties and will be elected as parliament speaker, a position he held from 2018 to 2023.[xxxix] The Progress Party won 27 seats and was the best-performing Sunni party in the elections.[xl]

It is unclear under the current Iraqi law whether Halbousi can be elected as parliament speaker, however. Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court (FSC) removed Halbousi from his position as parliament speaker in 2023 after former Progress Party member Laith al Dulaimi accused Halbousi of forging Dulaimi’s signature on a resignation letter in 2022.[xli] Iraqi Parliament elected Shia Coordination Framework-aligned Mahmoud al Mashhadani to replace Halbousi as parliament speaker in October 2024.[xlii] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. Iraq‘s Central Anti-Corruption Criminal Court cleared Halbousi of forgery charges in April 2025, but this decision does not overturn the FSC’s earlier ruling.[xliii] FSC decisions are final and cannot be appealed.[xliv] Bad actors, including the Shia Coordination Framework in 2022-25 and Nouri al Maliki in 2010, have purposely sought questionable constitutional interpretations and bent the law to support their own objectives.[xlv] Any Iraqi actor, provided they have the leverage to do so, could similarly reinterpret Iraqi law.

Syria

Unknown actors attempted to instigate sectarian conflict between Sunnis and Alawites in Homs City, but the responses of local security forces and residents contained the violence and prevented its spread or intensification. Unknown actors killed a Sunni Bedouin couple from the Bani Khaled tribe in their home in Zaidal, in the western outskirts of Homs City, on November 23.[xlvi] A Syrian source reported that unknown actors wrote sectarian slogans in the victim’s blood on the walls of the house in an attempt to incite widespread sectarian conflict in Homs City.[xlvii] One of the slogans was “Ya Hussein,” a Shia phrase that Alawites use.[xlviii] Zaidal neighbors several of Homs City’s Alawite-majority neighborhoods. Members of the Bani Khaled tribe vandalized homes in the neighboring majority Alawite Muhajreen neighborhood in response to the murder, according to an independent Syria researcher in Homs City.[xlix] The General Security Service (GSS) cordoned off Muhajareen‘s adjacent neighborhoods of Zahraa and Abbasiyeh to prevent the violence from spreading.[l] Bani Khaled tribesmen later broke through the GSS cordon and attacked Alawite and Sunni homes in the mixed Bedouin-Alawite neighborhood of Abbasiyeh.[li] The independent researcher emphasized that the GSS tried to contain the situation and restore order in western Homs, but struggled due to insufficient resources to cordon off hundreds of streets.[lii] The GSS reestablished control of Abbasiyeh after the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) deployed fighters to the area and erected other barriers to prevent the violence from spreading.[liii] Unaffiliated Bedouin tribesmen also helped the GSS restrain Bani Khaled tribesmen in Abbasiyeh, which shows that the tensions were not strictly Sunni–Alawite.[liv] The GSS imposed a temporary curfew over Homs City.[lv] The combined efforts by the GSS and local Bedouins were critical in preventing the spread of sectarian violence in the area, such as how the deployment of Syrian forces exacerbated violence along the Syrian coast on March 6.[lvi] The GSS isolated the sectarian unrest in Homs through containment measures, cross-communal cooperation, and rapid intervention, which reduced the violence and prevented it from escalating into mutual sectarian reprisals. The Homs Health Directorate reported that 18 people were injured in Homs City on November 23 but did not report any deaths.[lvii]

The perpetrators of the attack are still unclear as of this writing. Unknown actors have recently conducted sectarian attacks that target Alawites in Western Homs City, however. Unknown actors killed four Alawite civilians in sectarian-motivated attacks from October 25 to November 22.[lviii] A Syrian human rights organization reported in May 2025 that unknown masked gunmen have specifically targeted Alawites in Western Homs City in numerous sectarian attacks since the beginning of 2025.[lix]

The GSS conducted a raid targeting Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) cells in northwest Aleppo Province in the GSS’s first counter-ISIS operation since Syria joined the Global Coalition Against ISIS.^i[lx] Syrian media reported that the GSS raided multiple ISIS cell safehouses in Kafr Janneh, Aleppo Province, on November 24.[lxi] An unspecified MoI source told Syrian state media that the GSS targeted ISIS cells in Kafr Janneh that threatened the security and stability of Aleppo Province.[lxii] The GSS has not reported the number of ISIS fighters that it arrested or reported whether the GSS sustained casualties during the operation at the time of this writing. This operation is the first counter-ISIS operation that the GSS has conducted since Syria joined the Global Coalition Against ISIS on November 10.[lxiii] US Central Command (CENTCOM) and the Syrian MoD previously conducted a joint raid on an ISIS safehouse in al Bab, northern Aleppo Province, on July 25 that killed senior ISIS leader, Dhiya Zawba Muslih al Hardani, and his two ISIS-affiliated sons.[lxiv]

Arabian Peninsula

Nothing significant to report.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

See the topline section.