Iran Update, November 17, 2025

The Critic al Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Iraq’s electoral commission, the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC), released the final results and associated seat allocations from the November 11 Iraqi parliamentary elections on November 17.[i] The Iraqi Federal Supreme Court must ratify the results before the government formation process can formally begin.[ii] Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development Coalition won a plurality of 46 seats.[iii] Shia Coordination Framework parties won a total of 111 seats.[iv] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. Political parties, coalitions, and candidates have three days to submit complaints about the final election results and appeal IHEC’s previous decisions to the Electoral Judicial Panel (EJP).[v] The EJP must adjudicate all appeals before IHEC certifies the election results and sends them to the Federal Supreme Court for ratification.[vi] The Federal Supreme Court did not ratify the October 2021 parliamentary election results until late December 2021 due, in part, to a court case filed by Iranian-backed Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri.[vii]

The final results of the November 2025 elections are as follows:

The Shia Coordination Framework is debating whether to include Sudani in the next Iraqi government, amid reports that Sudani may ally with Sunni and Kurdish political parties. The framework nominated Sudani as prime minister for a first term in 2022.[viii] The framework is expected to discuss government formation with Sudani in the coming days.[ix] A framework source told Iraqi media on November 16 that Sudani has a “good chance” of serving a second term, but that the framework has prepared multiple unspecified “scenarios” if Sudani joins alliances outside of the framework.[x] Iranian-backed Iraqi actors employed a variety of political and violent tactics to hinder Iraqi Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr from allying with Sunni parties and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and excluding Iranian-backed parties after the 2021 parliamentary elections.[xi] A framework source told Arab media on November 17 that prominent framework leaders, such as Maliki, support excluding Sudani from government formation.[xii] A State of Law member similarly told Iraqi media on November 17 that “most” framework parties do not support a second term for Sudani due to “disagreements about key issues.”[xiii]

These statements come after a member of Sudani’s coalition suggested on November 13 that Sudani may attempt to ally with Sunni and Kurdish political parties.[xiv] Sudani is expected to meet with Kurdish political parties, presumably the KDP and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), in Iraqi Kurdistan on November 17 and 18.[xv] The KDP and PUK won 26 and 15 seats in the 2025 elections, respectively.[xvi] The Iraqi president will select the largest coalition in the Iraqi Parliament to attempt to form a government.[xvii] Given that neither the Shia Coordination Framework nor Sudani’s coalition has the 165 seats required to form the government, both blocs will try to ally with smaller parties in the coming weeks. A member of the Services Alliance, which is affiliated with the Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Imam al Ali, confirmed that the framework has created a committee to negotiate with Sunni and Kurdish parties.[xviii] Framework parties could attempt to form a coalition with Sunni and Kurdish parties by offering these parties ministry appointments or other political spoils.

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media claimed on November 15 that the IRGC Navy seized the Marshall Islands-flagged Talara tanker because it was attempting to illegally export Iranian cargo. This claim likely seeks to obfuscate the real reason why the IRGC Navy seized the vessel and may be part of an Iranian effort to prevent any retaliation for the seizure. Three IRGC Navy vessels intercepted the Talara on November 14 and diverted it to Iranian territorial waters.[xix]  IRGC-affiliated Fars News claimed that the Talara was carrying 30,000 tons of Iranian petrochemical products and that the IRGC Navy seized the vessel to “return [Iran’s] property.”[xx] The outlet, citing an unspecified source, stated that an Iranian individual or company intended to illegally export the materials.[xxi] The IRGC Navy stated on November 15 that it seized the Talara to protect Iran’s “national interests and resources” and claimed that the vessel was carrying “unauthorized cargo.” CTP-ISW has not observed any evidence that the vessel was carrying Iranian cargo or that its owner or operator had any links to Iran. The IRGC suggested following the seizure on November 14 that the IRGC Navy had seized the vessel in retaliation for a previous incident, not because the vessel was illicitly transporting Iranian cargo. The Fars News report suggests that Iran may be trying to avoid any retaliation for seizing the tanker by attributing the seizure to a domestic issue rather than foreign tensions. Iran depends on stability in the Strait of Hormuz to export oil, which is the main source of revenue for the regime. Any naval retaliation could impact the stability of the Strait of Hormuz and Iranian oil exports.  

CTP-ISW outlined on November 14 three hypotheses for why Iran may have seized the Talara:

• Iran may have sought to retaliate for the potential attack on the LPG tanker MV Falcon, which caught on fire after an unspecified explosion near Aden, Yemen, on October 18.[xxii]
• Iran may have sought to demonstrate its willingness to close the Strait of Hormuz as a preemptive measure amid Iranian concerns about future US actions.[xxiii]
• Iran may have sought to demonstrate its power to actors, such as Azerbaijan and Saudi Arabia, that have recently taken steps to increase cooperation with Iran’s adversaries.[xxiv]

A Russian and Turkish military delegation toured former Russian military sites near United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) positions located along the Syrian border with the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights on November 17.[xxv] The Russian and Turkish delegation’s tour may be related to previous discussions between Syria and Russia about establishing a Russian military presence in southern Syria.[xxvi] The Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on November 17 that a Russian military delegation toured “a number of military points and sites in southern Syria” to review on-the-ground conditions “within the framework of the ongoing cooperation.”[xxvii] Local sources reported that Syrian security forces escorted a large Russian military convoy to several military sites in Quneitra and Daraa provinces on November 17.[xxviii] The Russian delegation was accompanied by unspecified Turkish military personnel.[xxix] The Russian and Turkish delegation visited a former Russian barracks in Quneitra Province as well as several other Russian military sites.[xxx] The Russian military previously manned approximately 12 observation positions in Syria along the border with the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights before the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. [xxxi] The delegation’s tour comes amid recent Russo-Syrian military and diplomatic engagement and Turkey’s efforts to use the Russian military in Syria to act as a counterbalance against Israel in Syria. Turkey has previously encouraged Syria to strengthen ties with Russia to counterbalance and undermine US and Israeli objectives in Syria.[xxxii] Turkish sources told   in August 2025 that the Turkish government had advised Syrian President Ahmed al Shara to strengthen relations with Russia so that Russia, Turkey, and Syria can counterbalance US, European, Israeli, and Saudi interests in Syria.[xxxiii] An unspecified Syrian source told Reuters that Shara may have discussed the redeployment of Russian military police to southern Syria as a ”guarantor” against Israeli advances in the south during Shara’s visit to Moscow on October 15.[xxxiv] Syrian Defense Minister Major General Marhaf Abu Qasra traveled to Russia on October 31, where he met with Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov.[xxxv] Qasra met with Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-bek Yevkurov and a delegation of reportedly 190 Russian military officials in Damascus on November 16 to discuss military cooperation between the two countries.[xxxvi] The Syrian government has previously stated that it will work with multiple partners to ensure its security interests in southern Syria.   

Key Takeaways

• Iraqi Parliamentary Elections: Iraq’s electoral commission, the Independent High Electoral Commission, released the final results and associated seat allocations from the November 11 Iraqi parliamentary elections on November 17. The Iraqi Federal Supreme Court must ratify the results before the government formation process can formally begin.
• Iraqi Parliamentary Elections: The Shia Coordination Framework is debating whether to include Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani in the next Iraqi government, amid reports that Sudani may ally with Sunni and Kurdish political parties.
• Tanker Seizure in the Strait of Hormuz: Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media claimed on November 15 that the IRGC Navy seized the Marshall Islands-flagged Talara tanker because it was attempting to illegally export Iranian cargo. This claim likely seeks to obfuscate the real reason why the IRGC Navy seized the vessel and may be part of an Iranian effort to prevent any retaliation for the seizure.
• Syrian-Russian Relations: A Russian and Turkish military delegation toured former Russian military sites near United Nations Disengagement Observer Force positions located along the Syrian border with the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights on November 17. The Russian and Turkish delegation’s tour may be related to previous discussions between Syria and Russia about establishing a Russian military presence in southern Syria.

Iran

Senior Iranian military officials have continued to emphasize the importance of Iran’s missile program for its national security, which suggests that Iran will continue to invest in the development of its missile program. IRGC Spokesperson Brigadier General Ali Mohammad Naeini stated in an interview on November 16 that Iran’s missile program both deters and defeats Iranian adversaries.[xxxvii] Naeini’s statement echoes other Iranian officials’ comments about Iran’s missile program since the Israel-Iran War in June 2025.[xxxviii] Former IRGC Commander Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari argued on October 25 that Iran’s missile program is Iran’s main form of deterrence and that Iran deliberately prioritized developing its missile and drone capabilities over its air and ground forces to counter Israel and the United States’ superior capabilities.[xxxix] Iranian Deputy Vice President for Strategic Affairs Ali Abdullah Khani similarly stated on October 20 that Iran must improve its missile capabilities and adopt an approach to confront “hybrid warfare.”[xl] Naeini also identified “hybrid warfare” as a strategy used by Israel and the United States in his interview on November 16.[xli] The Iranian regime defines “hybrid warfare” as the use of all domains of power, including information, electronic, cultural, social, and military operations, by hostile actors to destabilize Iran.[xlii]

Iraq

The Shia Coordination Framework will likely try to involve Iraqi Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr in the government formation process to reduce opportunities for Sadr to destabilize the process and the next Iraqi government. The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. A Shia Coordination Framework source told Iraqi media on November 16 that the Shia Coordination Framework has agreed to appoint an unidentified representative to inform Sadr about government formation progress and discuss his demands.[xliii] Sadr’s Shia Nationalist Movement did not participate in the parliamentary elections on November 11, and Sadr repeatedly called on his primarily Shia followers to boycott the elections.[xliv] Sadr has periodically mobilized his predominantly Shia Iraqi base, including during the government formation process following the 2021 parliamentary elections.[xlv]  This report comes after an adviser to Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani stated on November 12 that some unidentified Shia Coordination Framework leaders suggested involving the Sadrist movement as a “key partner” in forming the next Iraqi government, despite the movement lacking parliamentary representation.[xlvi]

Popular Mobilization Commission (PMC) Chairman and Ataa Movement head Faleh al Fayyadh may be attempting to secure his political future regardless of Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s position in the future government. Fayyadh met with Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq head Qais al Khazali on November 14.[xlvii] Iraqi media noted that this meeting “reopened” communication between Fayyadh and Khazali, following Khazali’s public support for Fayyadh’s removal as PMC chairman in spring 2025.[xlviii] Fayyadh also met with Iraqi Deputy Parliament Speaker and National Foundation Coalition head Mohsen al Mandalawi on November 15.[xlix] Fayyadh is a member of Sudani’s coalition, while Mandalawi and Khazali are both Shia Coordination Framework members.[l] The framework is currently debating whether to include Sudani in the next Iraqi government. Fayyadh would likely benefit politically if Sudani serves a second term given Fayyadh’s close ties to Sudani, but Fayyadh could be meeting with Shia Coordination Framework actors to ensure that he maintains his political influence regardless of whether Sudani serves a second term.

Syria

See topline section.

Arabian Peninsula

Unverified reports claimed that the IRGC Quds Force sent Abdul Reza Shahlai (aka Yusuf Abu al Karkh, aka Hajji Yusef) to Sanaa to resolve internal disputes between senior Houthi leadership.[li] Yemeni journalists, citing unspecified Sanaa-based sources, claimed on November 15 that Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi ordered his nephew Ali Hussein al Houthi to purge Houthi intelligence agencies of alleged Israeli infiltration.[lii] Senior Houthi leader Abdullah Razami reportedly opposed Abdulmalik’s campaign to purge Houthi intelligence services and refused to allow Ali Hussein al Houthi to purge the Houthi intelligence services.[liii] Razami was reluctant to accept Abdulmalik’s rise to power in 2004 following Houthi founder Hussein al Houthi’s death and was subsequently demoted.[liv] Razami established and personally funded an armed wing named the “Hamedan-Saada Axis,” also known as the “Death Brigades,” outside of the Houthi chain of command between 2007 and 2015, and recruited members with familial ties.[lv] Yemen-based news outlets claimed that Iran helped integrate the Death Brigades into the Houthi forces in 2015, and that the IRGC Quds Force oversees special training for the forces.[lvi] Razami also established an independent judiciary to resolve tribal disputes in Sanaa and established his own media arm.[lvii] A Sanaa-based research center, citing sources close to Houthi leadership, claimed that Abdulmalik feared Razami’s growing power and appointed him to several senior, but powerless, Houthi positions in 2022.[lviii] Razami has reportedly retired, imprisoned, and demoted various Houthi leaders during his tenure.[lix] Razami requested that Iran send Shahlai to resolve the dispute, according to Sanaa-based sources.[lx] The United States Government reported that Shahlai planned and provided material support for multiple operations that killed US forces in Iraq and funded and directed a plot to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to the United States in 2011.[lxi] Iranian diaspora media claimed that Shahlai assumed responsibility for IRGC Quds Force operations in Yemen in 2015.[lxii] Shahlai reportedly survived a US attempt to kill him in 2020 the same day that the United States killed IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al Muhandis in Baghdad.[lxiii] Yemeni journalists reported that Shahlai has returned to Sanaa after spending a year in Iran.[lxiv]

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

The newly-appointed US Ambassador to Lebanon, Michel Issa, met with senior Lebanese officials in Beirut on November 17.[lxv] Issa met with Lebanese President Joseph Aoun, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri to present his diplomatic credentials.[lxvi] Issa told the Lebanese officials that the United States seeks to “strengthen and develop US-Lebanese relations in all fields.”[lxvii] Lebanese media reported in October 2025 that Issa is expected to lead US efforts to mediate potential negotiations between Israel and the Lebanese government on outstanding issues related to the US proposal to disarm Hezbollah.[lxviii]