3 hours ago

Iran Update, November 20, 2025

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

 

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

 

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

 

Iran has reportedly signaled its willingness to resume negotiations with the United States if its “rights”which refers to its right to enrich uranium on Iranian soilare guaranteed.[i] Iran’s demand violates the stated US red line that Iran must halt all domestic uranium enrichment to resume negotiations.[ii] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian asked Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman in a letter to convey Iran’s openness to negotiations with the United States, “provided its rights are guaranteed,” on his recent visit to Washington, DC, according to two regional sources with knowledge of the matter who spoke to Reuters on November 20.[iii] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi said on November 20 that Iran will not negotiate its right to enrich uranium in an interview with The Economist.[iv]  

Key Takeaways

  • Iranian-US Nuclear Negotiations: Iran has reportedly signaled its willingness to resume negotiations with the United States if its “rights”—which refers to its right to enrich uranium on Iranian soil—are guaranteed. Iran’s demand violates the stated US red line that Iran must halt all domestic uranium enrichment to resume negotiations.
  • Iranian Compliance with the IAEA: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors passed a resolution on November 20 that mandates Iran to immediately inform the IAEA about the status of its enriched uranium and damaged nuclear facilities. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated that Iran has not yet submitted a report on its highly enriched uranium stockpile and nuclear sites.
  • Iranian-backed Iraqi Electoral Performance: Several US-sanctioned Iranian-backed Iraqi political actors won seats in the November 2025 parliamentary elections. A Badr Organization-affiliated militia leader, Waad Qado, won the Shabak quota seat in Ninewa Province after previously winning the seat in 2021.
  • Syrian Army-SDF Fighting in Raqqa Province: The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) attacked Syrian government forces near Madan, southern Raqqa Province, on November 20 and accused the Syrian government of collaborating with the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)-affiliated fighters. The SDF published no evidence to corroborate its claims, which come as the United States and Syria are discussing Syria’s entry into the Global Coalition against ISIS.

Iran

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors passed a resolution on November 20 that mandates Iran to immediately inform the IAEA about the status of its enriched uranium and damaged nuclear facilities.[v] IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated that Iran has not yet submitted a report on its highly enriched uranium stockpile and nuclear sites. Israel and the United States struck nuclear sites that reportedly held the stockpile in June 2025. Iran continues to block IAEA access to these facilities.[vi]

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian continues to emphasize the urgency of Tehran’s water shortage crisis, likely to create broader support for the evacuation of the city. Pezeshkian stated on November 19 that evacuation from Tehran is necessary due to the city’s inability to support the population’s water consumption.[vii] The successful evacuation of a city as large as Tehran would require large-scale public support to ensure an orderly evacuation, reduce friction, and ultimately, prevent widespread protest against the measure. Some Iranian climatologists and a former official have called Pezeshkian‘s calls to ration Tehran‘s water supply and move the capital infeasible.[viii] An unconfirmed report from an Iranian water expert stated on November 14 that the areas of Tehran that consume the most dam water would be evacuated first.[ix] The first, second, and third districts in northern Tehran, which are generally considered wealthier areas, reportedly account for 50 percent of the city's water consumption, according to Tehran Provincial Water Company data.[x] CTP-ISW has not observed any indications that Iran has begun taking steps for evacuation at the time of writing.

 

Iraq

Several US-sanctioned Iranian-backed Iraqi political actors won seats in the November 2025 parliamentary elections.[xi] The Badr Organization-affiliated 30th Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Brigade’s former leader Waad Qado won the Shabak quota seat in Ninewa Province after previously winning the seat in 2021.[xii] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service primarily comprised of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xiii] Qado is a part of the Badr Organization’s parliamentary bloc.[xiv] The US Treasury Department sanctioned Qado in 2019 under the Magnitsky Act for committing human rights abuses.[xv] The political wings of three US-designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations also won a total of 37 seats.[xvi] Asaib Ahl al Haq’s Sadiqoun Movement won 27 seats, the Kataib al Imam Ali-affiliated Services Alliance won five seats, and Kataib Hezbollah’s Hoquq Movement won five seats. Hussein Moanes, a Hoquq Movement member, also won a parliamentary seat in Baghdad Province.[xvii] Moanes was first elected to Parliament in 2021. The US Treasury sanctioned Moanes as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist in 2024.[xviii] CTP-ISW assessed on November 18 that political parties tied to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias likely performed better in the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections than they did in the 2021 elections due to several reasons, including Iraqi Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr’s boycott of the elections and the reinstatement of the pre-2021 electoral system.[xix]

Sadr reportedly refuses to cooperate with the Shia Coordination Framework on government formation due to the framework’s opposition to the stated Sadrist principles.[xx] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which are the political blocs of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xxi] Sadr’s agenda includes limiting the use of weapons to the Iraqi state, which the Iranian-backed Iraqi militias inherently oppose.[xxii] Sadr has his own militia within the PMF.  A Sadrist source told Iraqi media on November 20 that Sadr also rejects external pressure on the government formation process, likely referring to influence by the United States and Iran.[xxiii] The framework appointed an unspecified liaison to inform Sadr about the government formation process and discuss his demands before reports broke about Sadr's refusal to cooperate.[xxiv] CTP-ISW assessed on November 17 that the framework will likely attempt to involve Sadr in the government formation process to reduce the opportunities for Sadr to destabilize the process and the next Iraqi government.[xxv] Sadr has periodically mobilized his predominantly Shia Iraqi base, including during the government formation process following the 2021 parliamentary elections.[xxvi]

Syria

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) attacked Syrian government forces near Madan, southern Raqqa Province, on November 20 and accused the Syrian government of collaborating with the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)-affiliated fighters. The SDF published no evidence to corroborate its claims, which come as the United States and Syria are discussing Syria’s entry into the Global Coalition against ISIS. The Syrian Defense Ministry told state-run Syrian media that SDF fighters attacked a Syrian army position near Madan with “various types of weapons.”[xxvii] The SDF briefly took control of several army positions before the Syrian army regained control of the area.[xxviii] Two Syrian fighters from the 66th Division died in the fighting.[xxix] The 66th Division contains elements of Hayat Tahrir al Sham’s former Zubair bin al Awam Brigade and the US-sanctioned faction Ahrar al Sharqiya.[xxx] The SDF implied in a statement on November 19 that the SDF launched the attack due to the presence of ISIS-affiliated foreign fighters within government positions along the government-SDF frontlines.[xxxi] The SDF published recovered footage from a government reconnaissance drone that shows a fighter in military fatigues wearing a patch of the shahada in white text on a black background.[xxxii] The Islamic State has long used this image on its flag, but these emblems do not necessarily verify that fighters were ISIS members or directly related to the Islamic State. Other Salafi-jihadi fighters in Syria have also used the flag.[xxxiii] The 66th Division has been deployed in Madan since at least June 2025.[xxxiv] Syrian forces and the SDF have traded fire along the Madan-Ghanem al Ali frontlines over the past week in violation of the ceasefire agreed to by both sides on October 7, 2025.[xxxv]

Arabian Peninsula

Nothing significant to report.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) arrested prominent drug smuggler and Hezbollah supporter Nouh Zaiter on November 20, probably as part of an effort to limit Hezbollah’s access to revenue from drug smuggling.[xxxvi] The LAF arrested Zaiter between Knaiseh and Baalbek, Baalbek District, in the Bekaa Valley.[xxxvii] The US Treasury sanctioned Zaiter in 2023 for smuggling Captagon from Syria to Lebanon for Hezbollah.[xxxviii] Hezbollah has historically used Captagon smuggling to fund its operations.[xxxix] Syrian authorities have seized millions of Captagon pills entering Syria from Lebanon over the last six months, which indicates that Captagon manufacturing may have shifted to Lebanon since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024.[xl] The US Treasury Department reported in November 2025 that Iran has smuggled at least $1 billion to Hezbollah since January 2025, but Hezbollah has struggled to meet its financial obligations to its supporters over the past year.[xli]

 


[i] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/edgy-iran-seeks-saudi-leverage-revive-stalled-nuclear-talks-with-us-2025-11-20/

[ii] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/edgy-iran-seeks-saudi-leverage-revive-stalled-nuclear-talks-with-us-2025-11-20/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZxoiBF-hPrI; https://www.armscontrol.org/issue-briefs/2025-06/zero-enrichment-unnecessary-unrealistic-objective-prevent-iranian-bomb

[iii] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/edgy-iran-seeks-saudi-leverage-revive-stalled-nuclear-talks-with-us-2025-11-20/

[iv] https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2025/11/20/an-interview-with-irans-foreign-minister; https://www.cnn.com/2025/11/19/middleeast/iran-us-nuclear-talks-intw-intl ; https://www.cnn.com/2025/11/16/middleeast/iran-nuclear-program-intact-us-strikes-intl; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jun/26/ayatollah-ali-khamenei-threat-america-israel ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/04/04/3342486

[v] https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2025-71.pdf; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iaea-board-passes-resolution-demanding-answers-access-iran-2025-11-20/

[vi] https://www.iranintl.com/202511193175 ; https://oilprice.com/Geopolitics/Middle-East/Irans-Hidden-Nuclear-Push-Resumes-Under-Pickaxe-Mountain.html

[vii] https://www.bbc.com/persian/articles/cj9798y08veo ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/08/29/3452532

[viii] https://aftabnews dot ir/fa/news/1022740/ ; https://fararu dot com/fa/news/923220/

[ix] https://www.eghtesadonline dot com/fa/news/2100147

[x] https://www.javanonline dot ir/fa/news/1328520

[xi] https://t.me/IHECOfficail/5412 ; https://experience.arcgis.com/experience/e33475ade87c41a58795bd544c7c1179 ; https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/09/terrorist-designations-of-iran-aligned-militia-groups

[xii] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-hashd-al-shabak-30th-pmf-brigade ; https://t.me/IHECOfficail/5412

[xiii] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/the-leadership-and-purpose-of-iraqs-popular-mobilization-forces/

[xiv] https://t.me/platformB/4163 

[xv] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm735

[xvi] https://experience.arcgis.com/experience/e33475ade87c41a58795bd544c7c1179; https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/09/terrorist-designations-of-iran-aligned-militia-groups

[xvii] https://t.me/IHECOfficail/5400

[xviii] https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/Details.aspx?id=47178

[xix] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-18-2025/

[xx] https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/الصدر-يقطع-الطريق-مام-ال-طار-برفضه-التدخل-في-تشكيل-الحكومة-العراقية-الجديدة

[xxi] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/post-iraqi-election-disunity-among-iranian-backed-parties-could-threaten-their-influence-in-iraq/

[xxii] https://x.com/salih_m_iraqi/status/1944462147226136909

[xxiii] https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/الصدر-يقطع-الطريق-مام-ال-طار-برفضه-التدخل-في-تشكيل-الحكومة-العراقية-الجديدة)

[xxiv] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/ال-طار-يجس-نبض-الصدر-بمبعوث-خاص-يحظى-بـ-ثقة-الجميع

[xxv] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-17-2025/

[xxvi] https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2022/8/30/timeline-what-led-to-al-sadrs-withdrawal-deadly-iraq-clashes ; https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2016/3/29/iraq-muqtada-al-sadrs-green-zone-demonstration

[xxvii] https://sana dot sy/locals/2332787

[xxviii] https://sana dot sy/locals/2332787; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1991425109803126998

[xxix] https://sana dot sy/locals/2332787; https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1991465421220749685

[xxx] https://www.facebook.com/groups/1194456925454998/permalink/1221282359439121?_rdrhttps://www.facebook.com/groups/542169309516530/permalink/2409465062786936/?_rdr; https://akmckeever.substack.com/p/who-is-liwa-al-qadisiyah-al-raqqa. ; https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0292

[xxxi] https://x.com/SDF_Syria/status/1991217079119409359

[xxxii] https://x.com/SDF_Syria/status/1991217079119409359 

[xxxiii] https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Flag_of_Jabhat_al-Nusra.jpg

[xxxiv] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1932403481630966090

[xxxv] https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1963137326437024163; https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1989980062771474644; https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1989223373965066332; https://t.me/sana_gov/142091

[xxxvi] https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/1991513050013397246; https://today.lorientlejour dot com/article/1485681/drug-kingpin-nouh-zaiter-arrested-by-lebanese-army.html

[xxxvii] https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/1991513050013397246; https://today.lorientlejour dot com/article/1485681/drug-kingpin-nouh-zaiter-arrested-by-lebanese-army.html.

[xxxviii] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1369

[xxxix] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-new-syrian-governments-fight-against-the-islamic-state-hezbollah-and-captagon/; https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/03/double-dealers-lebanon-and-the-risks-of-captagon-trafficking?lang=en ; https://newlinesmag.com/spotlight/captagon-how-assads-drug-trade-fueled-his-downfall/

[xl] https://sana dot sy/en/local/2274577/; https://today.lorientlejour dot com/article/1466921/syria-says-seized-3-mn-captagon-pills.html

[xli] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0308; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-august-

View Citations