Iran Update, November 7, 2025

The Critical Threats Project (CTP)  at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

The Shia Coordination Framework is reportedly considering integrating Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Iraqi state to meet US demands to disarm the militias while preserving the militias’ political influence.[i] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. A Shia Coordination Framework official told a Kurdish journalist on November 7 that the United States demanded that the Iraqi federal government disarm six Iranian-backed Iraqi militias: Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, Asaib Ahl al Haq, Harakat Ansar Allah al Awfiya, and Kataib al Imam Ali.[ii] All six militias are members of the Islamic Resistance of Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed militias that consistently attacked US forces in Iraq and Syria between October 2023 and January 2024.[iii] All six militias are also US-designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, and four of them have political wings in the Shia Coordination Framework.[iv] The Shia Coordination Framework is reportedly considering complying with the US demand by publicly disarming the six militias and integrating them into the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[v]  The PMF is an Iraqi state security service primarily comprised of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, many of which report to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[vi] These six militias control some PMF brigades but also operate outside of the PMF.[vii]

The United States notably did not demand that the Iraqi federal government disarm the Iranian-backed Badr Organization, possibly because the Badr Organization is not part of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq. The Badr Organization has expressed support for integrating militias into the PMF.[viii] The Badr Organization already controls many PMF brigades and is more heavily integrated in Iraqi state institutions than the six militias that the United States seeks to disarm.[ix]

All of the militias except Kataib Hezbollah reportedly agreed to the Shia Coordination Framework’s plan, likely, in part, to preserve their existing networks and political influence.[x] The Iraqi federal government could reflag militias as units in the PMF, which would enable the militias to maintain their structures and networks. Integrating Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the PMF could also further facilitate Iran’s state capture over the Iraqi state by granting the militias access to state resources and political institutions.  Several of the militias that the United States demanded the Iraqi government disarm currently control Iraqi ministries. Asaib Ahl al Haq controls the Industry and Mines Ministry and Education Ministry, for example.[xi]  The United States has reportedly threatened to withhold official recognition of the next Iraqi government if Iranian-backed Iraqi actors gain control of key Iraqi ministries.[xii] UK-based Amwaj Media reported on November 3 that some unspecified Iraqi militias view further integration into the Iraqi state as a threat to their identity as “resistance organizations.”[xiii] Kataib Hezbollah, which has not agreed to the proposal, has historically rejected demands to disarm because it remains ideologically committed to armed resistance.[xiv]  

The Shia Coordination Framework’s reported strategy to integrate Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the PMF bears similarity to Iran’s reported efforts to push its partner militias in Iraq to shift their focus from armed resistance to political engagement.[xv] Amwaj Media reported on November 3 that Iran would consider supporting smaller Iraqi militias that are not affiliated with the PMF while pushing its larger partner militias in Iraq to focus on politics.[xvi] CTP-ISW assessed on November 4 that Iran may decide to build a loyal cadre of ideological militias, over which Iran has strong control, that would supplement pro-Iranian political parties in the Iraqi federal government while avoiding sanctions on Iraq.[xvii]

Key Takeaways

• Iranian Entrenchment in Iraq: The Shia Coordination Framework is reportedly considering integrating six Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Iraqi state to meet US demands to disarm the militias while preserving the militias’ political influence. Five of the six militias reportedly agreed to the Shia Coordination Framework’s plan, likely, in part, to preserve their existing networks and political influence. Integrating Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the PMF could further facilitate Iran’s state capture over the Iraqi state by granting the militias access to state resources and political institutions.
• PRC-Syria Relations: The PRC abstained from a UN Security Council vote on November 6 to lift sanctions on Syrian President Ahmed al Shara and Interior Minister Anas Khattab, likely due to PRC concerns over Uyghur fighters operating in Syria. The PRC’s UN Ambassador, Fu Cong, called on the Syrian transitional government to take further steps to combat “terrorism.” PRC officials have repeatedly voiced concern over the Syrian transitional government’s appointment of Uyghurs associated with the Turkistan Islamic Party to high ranks within the Syrian army.
• Hezbollah Disarmament: Israeli defense sources claimed on November 7 that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) has occasionally been aware of or “cooperated with” Hezbollah in its efforts to reconstitute. This report comes amid international concern, particularly from Israel, the United States, and Saudi Arabia, over the LAF’s limited progress in disarming Hezbollah.

Iran

Nothing significant to report.

Iraq

Iraqi Armed Forces Spokesperson Major General Sabah al Numan announced on November 7 that the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) have entered a new phase of bilateral cooperation with the United States following high-level meetings between US and Iraqi officials on November 6.[xviii] Numan’s announcement comes after the US-led International Coalition in Iraq announced on November 4 that the ISF can conduct airstrikes targeting the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) without US support.[xix] The United States is reducing its military presence in federal Iraq as part of a reorientation away from the US-led multinational counter-ISIS mission Operation Inherent Resolve and toward a bilateral security relationship with Iraq.[xx]    

Syria

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) abstained from a UN Security Council (UNSC) vote on November 6 to lift sanctions on Syrian President Ahmed al Shara and Interior Minister Anas Khattab, likely due to PRC concerns over Uyghur fighters operating in Syria.[xxi] All UNSC members except the PRC voted in favor of the motion and lifted UN sanctions on the two Syrian leaders.[xxii] The PRC’s UN Ambassador, Fu Cong, called on the Syrian transitional government to take further steps to combat “terrorism” and singled out the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM).[xxiii] Fu was likely referring to the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), which the PRC considers to be an offshoot of ETIM. TIP continues to operate in Syria due to its historical partnership with the Syrian transitional government. TIP was part of the coalition that overthrew Bashar al Assad in December 2024 under the leadership of Hayat Tahrir al Sham.[xxiv] PRC officials have repeatedly voiced concern over the Syrian transitional government’s appointment of Uyghurs associated with TIP to high ranks within the Syrian army.[xxv] The Syrian transitional government has reportedly reflagged TIP as the 84th Division in the new Syrian army.[xxvi] The PRC’s concerns about TIP have not prevented PRC firms from engaging with the new Syrian government, however. A PRC contracting firm signed a memorandum of understanding with the Syrian transitional government in May 2025 to invest in free industrial zones in Damascus and Homs, for example.[xxvii] Syrian Economy Minister Mohammad Nidal al Shaar stated on October 21 that the transitional government is working to secure five or six investment projects with the PRC worth hundreds of millions of dollars.[xxviii]

The United States and the United Kingdom also removed Shara and Khattab from targeted sanctions lists on November 7.[xxix] The US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced that it removed Shara and Khattab from the list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT).[xxx] The US State Department designated Shara and Khattab as SDGTs for their involvement with al Qaeda in Iraq in 2013 and 2012, respectively.[xxxi] The United Kingdom also announced that it removed sanctions on Shara and Khattab.[xxxii] A spokesperson for the European Union (EU) told Reuters on November 7 that the EU will follow suit.[xxxiii]

Arabian Peninsula

Nothing significant to report.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Israeli defense sources claimed on November 7 that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) has occasionally been aware of or “cooperated with” Hezbollah in its efforts to reconstitute.[xxxiv] The unspecified Israeli defense sources told Israeli media outlet Ynet News that the LAF has sometimes known about or cooperated with Hezbollah during Hezbollah training exercises and weapons transfers. The LAF has also reportedly known about Hezbollah’s efforts to rehabilitate its operational and financial systems.[xxxv] The sources did not specify what they meant by LAF “cooperation” with Hezbollah. Ynet’s report comes amid international concern, particularly from Israel, the United States, and Saudi Arabia, over the LAF’s limited progress in disarming Hezbollah.[xxxvi] The LAF has operated in southern Lebanon to seize Hezbollah weaponry and dismantle Hezbollah positions since the November 2024 Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire. US Central Command reported on October 15 that the LAF has seized about 100,000 Hezbollah rockets and 400 missiles since the November 2024 ceasefire.
 CTP-ISW has not observed any reports of the LAF seizing arms from Hezbollah fighters or raiding active Hezbollah sites.