Iran Update, November 13, 2025

Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

A Shia Coordination Framework member suggested on November 13 that the framework could exclude Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s coalition from government formation, even though Sudani’s coalition likely won a plurality of seats in the November 11 Iraqi parliamentary elections.[i] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. Iraq’s electoral commission, the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC), has not released official seat allocations for Iraqi parties based on the results at the time of this writing, but Sudani received the most votes nationally by a margin of over 200,000 votes.[ii] The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) received the second-most votes nationally.[iii] Shia Coordination Framework parties discussed government formation and the selection of the next prime minister in Baghdad on November 12, following IHEC’s announcement of preliminary election results.[iv]  Sudani, who the framework selected as prime minister in 2022, was not present at the meeting. A member of the Iranian-backed Badr Organization told Iraqi media on November 13 that Shia Coordination Framework parties received enough votes for the framework to form the largest bloc—and thus the government—without Sudani’s coalition.[v] Unconfirmed reports that describe the total number of seats the Shia Coordination Framework parties will be allocated suggest that the framework parties will have to include other blocs to arrange the 165-seat coalition required for government formation, however.[vi] The number of seats that Sudani’s coalition ultimately receives will impact how easily the Shia Coordination Framework can exclude him in government formation. CTP-ISW will provide additional analysis about Iraq’s official election results in future Iran Updates.

The Shia Coordination Framework’s ability to form a 165-seat coalition ultimately depends on its ability to stay united. An unidentified political source told Iraqi media on November 13 that leaders of “main lists” within the Shia Coordination Framework do not “have the right to separate” from the coalition during government formation, likely referring to ongoing divisions within the Shia Coordination Framework.[vii] Shia Coordination Framework parties‘ discussions about government formation prior to the elections indicated that the framework consists of two camps that hold diverging preferences on the next Iraqi prime minister. Iraqi media reported in September 2025 that one camp is comprised of Shia Coordination Framework “sheikhs,” which likely refers to prominent figures like State of Law Coalition head and former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki, Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri, and Asaib Ahl al Haq head Qais al Khazali.[viii] The rest of the coalition comprises the second camp.[ix]  

The Badr Organization member’s comments about possibly excluding Sudani from government formation reflect Sudani’s ongoing rivalry with certain Shia Coordination Framework parties that appear to be part of the first camp. Sudani has behaved contrary to the interests of Iranian-backed Iraqi actors in recent months, including by dismissing two Iranian-backed militia commanders and withdrawing a bill from Parliament that would have formally institutionalized parts of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[x] Sudani’s actions that have targeted the interests of Iranian-backed Iraqi actors may be encouraging certain Shia Coordination Framework parties to exclude him from government formation. A Shia Coordination Framework source told Iraqi media on November 13 that the coalition may allow a second Sudani term unless “influential forces move against it.”[xi] Sudani and Maliki have also increasingly come into conflict within the Shia Coordination Framework throughout 2025, and Maliki could reject the second term for Sudani.[xii] An unidentified political source also implied to Iraqi media on November 13 that the Shia Coordination Framework may not necessarily choose the candidate of the party with the most seats as prime minister designate.[xiii] The Iraqi political establishment has historically sought prime ministers who are perceived as malleable.[xiv] Sudani, as the current prime minister and winner of the national popular vote, is unlikely to be perceived as an easily influenceable candidate. Sudani’s possible exclusion is particularly notable given an October 2025 report that Sudani himself may ally with the KDP and Sunni parties to exclude some unspecified Iranian-backed figures and parties from the ruling coalition.[xv] Sudani announced on November 13 that his coalition is willing to discuss government formation with all parties.[xvi]

The Shia Coordination Framework appears to be considering how to involve Iraqi Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr in government formation, likely to reduce opportunities for Sadr to destabilize the government formation process and the next Iraqi government. An adviser to Sudani told BBC Arabic on November 12 that some unidentified Shia Coordination Framework leaders have suggested that the Sadrist Movement be a “key partner” in the formation of the next government, even though the movement lacks parliamentary representation.[xvii] Sadr’s Shia nationalist movement did not participate in the elections, and Sadr repeatedly called on his primarily Shia followers to boycott the vote.[xviii] A Shia Coordination Framework source similarly told Iraqi media that the framework discussed on November 12 the possibility of reaching an “understanding”  with Sadr on his movement’s “role” in the “next stage” and “knowing their position on the second term,” possibly referring to Sadr‘s position on a potential second term for Sudani.[xix]  Shia Coordination Framework actors are likely concerned that Sadr will attempt to destabilize the upcoming government formation process or destabilize a future government in which he is not participating, as he has attempted to do before. Sadr has periodically mobilized his predominantly Shia Iraqi base, including during the government formation process following the 2021 elections.[xx] Government formation is considered to be a “competition for power and resources” that takes place after parliamentary elections, in which parties negotiate ministry appointments, including the prime minister position.[xxi] Shia Coordination Framework parties may possibly attempt to acquire Sadr’s tacit cooperation in government formation by offering his movement positions and/or resources in the next government.

The Islamic State is attempting to exploit the Syrian transitional government’s decision to join the US-led Global Coalition Against the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) to discredit the government among Sunni hardliners and drive recruitment. Syrian Transitional President Ahmed al Shara’s ruling coalition consists of a wide variety of Sunni Arab groups that were opposed to the Assad regime, some of which are hardline Salafi-jihadists.[xxii] These Salafi-jihadists remained allied with Shara as he disavowed the Islamic State in 2013 and then al Qaeda in 2016.[xxiii] Other hardliners broke with Shara both times, remaining with the Islamic State in 2013 and al Qaeda in 2016.[xxiv] The Islamic State encouraged Sunni fighters loyal to Syrian President Ahmed al Shara to join its cells in Syria “before it is too late” on November 13.[xxv] The Islamic State previously attempted to drive recruitment from dissatisfied members of the Syrian transitional government in May 2025 by criticizing Shara for cooperating with the United States after his meeting with US President Donald Trump.[xxvi] The Islamic State’s propaganda is likely aimed at hardline and foreign Salafi-jihadist elements within the MoD that may oppose Shara’s partnership with the coalition and remain susceptible to recruitment. MoI spokesperson Noureddine al Baba warned on November 8 that ISIS will exploit Syria’s entry into the international coalition to boost its recruitment and that the MoI expects increased ISIS activity after Syria joins the coalition.[xxvii]  The Islamic State also condemned the Syrian Ministry of Interior’s (MoI) large counter-ISIS operation on November 8, in which government forces conducted operations against 61 ISIS cells and arrested 71 ISIS fighters across Syrian territory.[xxviii] 

The Islamic State condemned Syria’s November 10 entry into the coalition in a November 13 publication and called it the “public formalization of a step started in secret,” in reference to the Syrian government’s prior cooperation with coalition forces.[xxix] Anonymous Syrian and Western officials told The New York Times on November 12 that the Syrian transitional government and its predecessor organization Hayat Tahrir al Sham have coordinated counter-ISIS operations with the International Coalition since 2016.[xxx] The Islamic State has vehemently opposed Shara since he came to power in December 2024, due in part to his cooperation with the West and relatively moderate stances.[xxxi] Islamic State propaganda has continually portrayed the Syrian transitional government as a proxy for the West that has betrayed hardline Sunnis.[xxxii] Reuters reported on November 10 that ISIS has attempted and failed to assassinate Shara twice “over the last few months,” citing two senior officials. [xxxiii]

Key Takeaways

• Iraqi Parliamentary Elections: A Shia Coordination Framework member suggested on November 13 that the framework could exclude Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s coalition from government formation, even though Sudani’s coalition likely won a plurality of seats in the November 11 Iraqi parliamentary elections. The Shia Coordination Framework’s reported interest in excluding Sudani from government formation reflects Sudani’s ongoing rivalry with certain Shia Coordination Framework parties. The number of seats that Sudani’s coalition ultimately receives will impact how easily the Shia Coordination Framework can exclude him in government formation.
• Iraqi Parliamentary Elections: The Shia Coordination Framework appears to be considering how to involve Iraqi Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr in government formation, likely to reduce opportunities for Sadr to destabilize the government formation process and the next Iraqi government. Sadr has periodically mobilized his predominantly Shia Iraqi base, including during the government formation process following the 2021 elections. Shia Coordination Framework parties may possibly attempt to acquire Sadr’s tacit cooperation in government formation by offering his movement positions and/or resources in the next government.
• Syria in the Global Coalition: The Islamic State is attempting to exploit the Syrian transitional government’s decision to join the US-led Global Coalition Against ISIS to discredit the government among Sunni hardliners and drive recruitment. Islamic State propaganda is likely aimed at hardline and foreign Salafi-jihadist elements within the Syrian government that may oppose Shara’s partnership with the coalition and remain susceptible to recruitment.

Iran

Iranian media outlets circulated a video on November 13 that purportedly shows Iranian pilots training with Russian fifth-generation Su-57 fighter jets in Russia. This video is not a strong indicator that Russia intends to supply aircraft to Iran at this time.[xxxiv] The pilots in the video compared the fighter jet’s flight to the performance of a US F-4 Phantom II fighter jet, which Iran acquired prior to the 1979 Islamic Revolution.[xxxv] CTP-ISW has not observed indicators that Russia has adjusted its ability or willingness to supply Iran with fighter jets or material of any kind at this time, however. Russia is unlikely to provide Iran with new and high-tech equipment at a time when it is facing a materiel shortage in its war in Ukraine. Russia announced in 2019 that it would aim to procure 76 Su-57s by 2028.[xxxvi] A Ukraine-based open-source intelligence organization reported in August 2025 that the Russian Defense Ministry has struggled to procure Su-57 since 2021.[xxxvii] Russia reportedly had very few Su-57s in service in June 2024 and used the planes that it did have as launch vehicles for Kh-59/69 cruise missiles, according to Ukrainian intelligence.[xxxviii] Russia has yet to supply Iran with 4.5-generation Su-35 fighter jets that Iran reportedly bought in January 2025.[xxxix]

Iraq

The Iraqi Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) reported on November 13 that political parties, coalitions, and candidates have submitted 101 election complaints thus far.[xl] The process of adjudicating election complaints can delay government formation and alter election results. IHEC‘s Board of Commissioners must review all complaints before the commission can announce the final parliamentary electoral results.[xli] IHEC is not the final arbitrator of election-related complaints, as political parties, coalitions, and candidates can appeal both IHEC’s decisions on complaints and the final electoral results to the Electoral Judicial Panel. The Court of Cassation nominates the Electoral Judicial Panel.[xlii] The Court of Cassation legally reports to the Supreme Judicial Council, which Iranian-backed Judge Faiq Zaidan heads.[xliii] IHEC will certify all election results and send them to the Federal Supreme Court for ratification following any additional adjudication by the Electoral Judicial Panel.[xliv] The Federal Supreme Court’s ratification of the election results is the first official step in government formation.[xlv] The Federal Supreme Court did not ratify the October 2021 election results until December 27, 2021, more than two months after the elections.[xlvi] Iranian-backed Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri filed a court case to annul the preliminary results in 2021 that contributed in part to the long delay.[xlvii]

Syria

US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack reportedly told US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Commander Mazloum Abdi to accelerate the SDF’s integration into the Defense Ministry following a meeting between US, Syrian, and Turkish officials in Washington, DC, on November 10.[xlviii] Barrack reportedly told Abdi during a November 11 phone call that the SDF needed to take tangible steps towards implementing the March 10 Agreement before the end of 2025.[xlix]  The SDF is the United States’s longtime and primary local partner in the fight against ISIS in northeastern Syria, and the United States has encouraged the SDF to join the new Syrian state since at least March 2025.[l] Abdi confirmed on his X account after the call that the SDF is committed to “accelerat[ing]” its integration into the Syrian state.[li] Negotiations between the SDF and the transitional government on the integration of the SDF’s military units into Syrian state structures have proceeded slowly since both parties agreed to the framework in March 2025. Both the Syrian government and Turkey have maintained that the SDF must integrate by the end of the year.[lii] Barrack’s conversation with Abdi about accelerating the pace of integration follows meetings between Syrian government officials and senior US officials in Washington, DC, on November 10. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani, and Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan discussed the integration of the SDF into the ranks of the new Syrian army. [liii]Barrack stated that Rubio, Shaibani, and Fidan "mapped the next phase of US-Turkish-Syrian framework,” which includes the SDF’s economic, military, and political integration into the Syrian state and the adoption of a new approach to Syrian-Turkish-Israeli relations.[liv] The SDF and Syrian government are expected to hold a round of negotiations this week in Damascus, according to a Syrian government official and a source close to the SDF on November 11.[lv]

Arabian Peninsula

Nothing significant to report.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.