Iran Update, November 19, 2025

Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

An Iranian Defense Ministry-affiliated delegation covertly traveled to Russia in November 2024, possibly to seek “laser technology and expertise that could help [Iran] validate a nuclear weapon design without conducting a nuclear explosive test,” according to a former CIA analyst speaking to the Financial Times.[i] This report corroborates CTP-ISW's assessment from November 2024 that Iran had restarted its nuclear weapons research program. CTP-ISW cannot independently assess the status of this program following the Israel-Iran War. The Financial Times reported on November 19 that the Iranian Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND) used a front company, DamavandTec, to organize a trip for Iranian laser specialists to go to St. Petersburg, Russia, in November 2024.[ii] The SPND played a leading role in Iran’s nuclear weapons research program before 2003.[iii] The United States sanctioned DamavandTec in October 2025 for procuring “items applicable to the development of nuclear explosive devices from foreign suppliers.”[iv] The Iranian laser specialists visited the US-sanctioned Russian military technology company Laser Systems. Iran has previously sought assistance from Russia to develop its nuclear program.[v] The Financial Times previously reported that four Iranian nuclear scientists and an Iranian counterintelligence officer traveled to Moscow in August 2024 to visit Russian research institutes that specialize in dual-use technologies that could be used for nuclear weapons development.[vi] Iranian nuclear scientists’ visits to Russia in August and November 2024 came amid other indications, such as reports that Iran had begun running computer models and conducting metallurgical research that could support the development of nuclear weapons, that Iran had resumed its nuclear weapons research program.[vii] CTP-ISW cannot independently assess the status of this program following the Israel-Iran War.

Iran is continuing to develop parts of its nuclear program that could potentially support the development of a nuclear weapon. CTP-ISW has not observed any evidence that the Iranian regime seeks to develop a nuclear weapon, however. The Institute for Science and International Security reported on November 18 that Iran is constructing a possible high-explosive containment vessel at the former Taleghan 2 nuclear research site at the Parchin Military Complex in southeastern Tehran Province.[viii] The Institute noted that high-explosive containment vessels are necessary for the development of nuclear weapons but that they can also be used for “many other conventional weapons development processes.”[ix]  The Iranian regime previously used the Taleghan 2 facility to test explosives that are needed to detonate a nuclear device before the regime suspended its nuclear weapons program in 2003.[x] International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director Rafael Grossi stated on November 19 that there is nothing that currently necessitates an IAEA inspection at Taleghan 2 when asked about the construction of a possible high-explosive containment vessel at the site.[xi]

Iranian officials continue to express openness to resuming nuclear negotiations with the United States, but the regime has not conceded on its previous stance against zero uranium enrichment. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s Foreign Affairs Adviser, Kamal Kharrazi, stated that Iran would be open to nuclear negotiations based on “mutual respect” with the United States in an interview with CNN on November 19. Kharrazi said that Iran would maintain its right to enrich uranium domestically for peaceful purposes, however.[xii] Kharrazi stated that potential negotiations with the United States would focus on the “degree of enrichment” that Iran is allowed. Senior Iranian officials have continuously emphasized both before and after the Israel-Iran War that Iran will not negotiate its right to enrich uranium.[xiii]  Kharrazi said that Iran has experienced difficulty in convincing the United States and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) that Iran is not pursuing a nuclear weapon.[xiv] The United States has maintained that Iran must accept zero enrichment.[xv] Kharrazi stated that the United States must “make the first move” if Iran is to return to the negotiating table.[xvi] Kharrazi added that Iran’s nuclear program cannot be eliminated with “force.”[xvii] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi also told Iranian media on November 19 that Iran will not accept zero enrichment because enrichment has become “a matter of national pride.”[xviii]

Iran is continuing to prohibit the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from inspecting damaged and other Iranian nuclear facilities. An unspecified European Union (EU) source told UK-based outlet Oil Price on November 17 that Iran continues to block the IAEA from inspecting nuclear sites, including sites that the United States and Israel struck in June 2025 as well as the Mount Kolang Gaz La facility near Natanz.[xix] Kharrazi claimed that Iran cannot yet assess the damage at nuclear facilities such as Natanz and Fordow in his November 19 CNN interview.[xx] IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stressed the urgent need for Iran to allow IAEA inspectors to inspect nuclear facilities on the sidelines of the IAEA Board of Governors meeting on November 19. Grossi stated that Iran has not yet submitted a report on its damaged nuclear sites and highly enriched uranium stockpile to the IAEA.[xxi]  The E3 also submitted a resolution to the IAEA Board of Governors on November 18 that demands that Iran allow IAEA inspectors to access nuclear sites.[xxii] The IAEA Board of Governors will vote on the resolution in the coming days.[xxiii]

Infighting and paranoia among Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and other Iranian regime officials have reportedly increased since the Israel-Iran War, which could hamper the regime’s ability to make cohesive decisions. Unspecified Iranian regime officials told the Telegraph on November 19 that there is “turmoil” within the regime after the Israel-Iran War.[xxiv] Regime officials are reportedly engaged in infighting due to paranoia over widespread Israeli infiltration.[xxv] The regime has arrested hundreds of individuals on espionage charges since the Israel-Iran War and has executed several Iranians for allegedly spying for Israel.[xxvi] The Iranian officials added that there is growing concern among regime officials and security services that officials who collaborate with Israel may falsely accuse loyal regime officials of treason.[xxvii] These heightened concerns have prompted Iranian officials, particularly within the IRGC, to actively demonstrate their loyalty to the regime, according to an unspecified senior Iranian official.[xxviii] Israeli infiltration enabled the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to kill numerous senior Iranian military commanders and prominent nuclear scientists during the war.[xxix] Iranian officials’ concerns about Israeli infiltration are not new, but the Israel-Iran War exacerbated these concerns. The current environment of suspicion within the regime and lack of trust between officials could hinder the regime from being able to make cohesive decisions because trust and cooperation are critical for effective decision-making.[xxx]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck five Hezbollah rocket storage facilities and killed one Hezbollah fighter in southern Lebanon on November 19 amid the Lebanese Armed Forces’ (LAF) failure to act on Israeli information provided to the ceasefire monitoring committee about Hezbollah sites in southern Lebanon.[xxxi] The IDF issued evacuation orders to residents near targets in Deir Kifa, Chohour, and Tayr Falsay in Tyre District and in Ainatha, Bint Jbeil District, in southern Lebanon.[xxxii] The IDF struck the targets shortly thereafter.[xxxiii] The IDF targeted five Hezbollah rocket storage facilities.[xxxiv] The IDF also killed a Hezbollah fighter who the IDF said was attempting to re-establish Hezbollah’s presence in Tiri, Bint Jbeil District.[xxxv] The IDF Military Intelligence Directorate also identified dozens of locations in the neighboring village of Beit Lif where Hezbollah is rebuilding infrastructure, including a headquarters and weapons depots.[xxxvi] The IDF said on November 19 that it had referred some of the Hezbollah infrastructure in Beit Lif to the ceasefire monitoring committee but that the LAF had not acted on this information.[xxxvii] Israeli media reported on November 8 that Israel warned the LAF through the United States that the LAF is not acting “sufficiently” against Hezbollah because it is not entering rural areas or private property to confiscate Hezbollah weapons.[xxxviii] Israel stated in a message that it will continue and increase attacks across Lebanon if the LAF does not make “significant” improvements.[xxxix] The LAF is bound by the November 2024 ceasefire agreement to disarm Hezbollah south of the Litani River.[xl]

Hezbollah is likely smuggling weapons from Syria to southern Lebanon that the group could use to defend against a possible Israeli ground operation in Lebanon or to attack Israel. The IDF strikes on Hezbollah rocket storage facilities in southern Lebanon occurred as Hezbollah is attempting to replenish its weapons stockpiles.[xli] Syrian and Lebanese authorities have thwarted numerous weapons smuggling attempts along the Lebanon-Syria border since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, which indicates that Hezbollah and/or Hezbollah-aligned actors are continuing to smuggle weapons from Syria into Lebanon.[xlii] Syrian forces seized anti-personnel fragmentation mines, anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM), rocket-propelled grenade warheads, mortar rounds, and Grad rockets in three distinct seizures near al Qusayr, Homs Province, Syria, in September.[xliii] Hezbollah has historically used these types of munitions to target Israeli ground forces in Lebanon and to fire into Israeli territory. Hezbollah fired thousands of Grad rockets into northern Israel between October 2023 and November 2024, for example.[xliv] Hezbollah also launched ATGMs and mortars targeting the IDF and Israeli positions in Lebanon in late fall 2024.[xlv] Recent IDF strikes targeting Hezbollah fighters smuggling munitions into southern Lebanon on November 8 and 10 suggest that at least some smuggling routes between southern Lebanon and other parts of the country and Syria are active.[xlvi]

Syrian President Ahmed al Shara met on November 19 with a prominent Arab tribal sheikh and militia leader from Hasakah Province who supports the Syrian Democratic Forces’ (SDF) position on decentralization.[xlvii] The leader of the SDF-allied Shammar tribe, Sheikh Maneh Hamidi Daham al Jarba, and Shara discussed the role of Arab tribes in Syria and affirmed the Shammar tribe’s support for the government and SDF’s March 10 integration framework agreement.[xlviii] Jarba’s son commands the Sanadid Forces, which is a militia within the SDF that consists of approximately 3,000 Arab tribal fighters.[xlix] A source from the Shammar tribe told Syrian media that the SDF and Sanadid Forces coordinated Jarba’s visit to Damascus.[l] Jarba, while generally supportive of the government, has tempered his support by dismissing the government’s claims that the SDF seeks to secede from Syria.[li] He has also called for a new constitution on the grounds that the current constitution does not include all Syrians, which is also the SDF’s position.[lii]

Debate over centralization or decentralization is the core political issue that faces Syria at present. Syria’s centralized system of government, which was put in place in 1971, contributed to the political grievances that culminated in the 2011 uprising.[liii] Jarba’s meeting with Shara comes amid recent efforts to accelerate the SDF’s civil and military integration into the Syrian state, but the SDF and Syrian government have still not addressed their fundamental disagreement about the definitions of centralization and decentralization.  The SDF interprets decentralization as a mechanism to ensure local government autonomy for regional issues and views the government’s efforts to centralize control in Damascus as an effort to establish an autocratic government.[liv] The Syrian government views centralization as necessary to unite the country and interprets decentralization as a path toward the partition of Syria, however.[lv] Disagreement on this issue has significantly impeded the SDF’s integration since March 2025. The Syrian government and SDF’s continued disagreement risks renewed internal conflict if the framing of the debate over centralization does not change from two zero-sum positions.

Key Takeaways

• Iranian Nuclear Research: An Iranian Defense Ministry-affiliated delegation covertly traveled to Russia in November 2024, possibly to seek “laser technology and expertise that could help [Iran] validate a nuclear weapon design without conducting a nuclear explosive test,” according to a former CIA analyst speaking to the Financial Times. This report corroborates CTP-ISW's assessment from November 2024 that Iran had restarted its nuclear weapons research program. CTP-ISW cannot independently assess the status of this program following the Israel-Iran War.
• Iranian Nuclear Program: Iran is continuing to develop parts of its nuclear program that could potentially support the development of a nuclear weapon. The Institute for Science and International Security reported on November 18 that Iran is constructing a possible high-explosive containment vessel at the former Taleghan 2 nuclear research site at the Parchin Military Complex in southeastern Tehran Province. CTP-ISW has not observed any evidence that the Iranian regime seeks to develop a nuclear weapon.
• IDF Strikes Against Hezbollah: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck five Hezbollah rocket storage facilities and killed one Hezbollah fighter in southern Lebanon on November 19 amid the Lebanese Armed Forces’ (LAF) failure to act on Israeli information provided to the ceasefire monitoring committee about Hezbollah sites in southern Lebanon.
• Syrian Government-SDF Negotiations: Syrian President Ahmed al Shara met on November 19 with a prominent Arab tribal sheikh and militia leader from Hasakah Province who supports the Syrian Democratic Forces’ (SDF) position on decentralization. Debate over centralization or decentralization is the core political issue that faces Syria at present. The Syrian government and SDF’s continued disagreement risks renewed internal conflict if the framing of the debate over centralization does not change from two zero-sum positions.

Iran

Iran released the Marshall Islands-flagged Talara tanker on November 19 after confiscating its cargo.[lvi] Three IRGC Navy vessels intercepted the Talara on November 14 and diverted it to Iranian territorial waters.[lvii] Iranian Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad claimed on November 19 that the Talara is not an oil tanker and that the vessel was transporting unspecified cargo from the Persian Gulf.[lviii] He added that the IRGC Navy seized the vessel because the owner of the cargo failed to pay the Iranian Industry and Mine Bank for the shipment. IRGC-affiliated Fars News claimed on November 15 that the Talara was carrying 30,000 tons of Iranian petrochemical products and that the IRGC Navy had seized the vessel to “return [Iran’s] property.”[lix] CTP-ISW cannot verify the claims made by Paknejad and Fars News.

Iraq

Nothing significant to report.

Syria

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited IDF positions in southern Syria on November 19 amid reports that Israeli-Syrian negotiations to reach a security agreement have stalled.[lx] Netanyahu, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz, Foreign Minister Gideon Saar, and other Israeli security officials visited IDF positions in Quneitra Province, according to Israeli and Syrian media.[lxi] The Syrian Foreign Affairs Ministry condemned the visit as a violation of Syria’s sovereignty and called for Israel to withdraw from southern Syria in order to reinstate the 1974 Disengagement Agreement.[lxii] Unspecified Israeli sources told Israeli media on November 17 that negotiations between Israel and Syria to reach a security agreement are at an “impasse” after Israeli negotiators rejected Syrian President Ahmed al Shara’s demand that Israel withdraw from its positions in southern Syria.[lxiii] The Israeli sources said that Israel would only withdraw in exchange for a “full peace agreement” and not merely a “security agreement” with Syria.[lxiv] Shara has repeatedly stated that Syria will not sign a peace agreement with Israel or join the Abraham Accords due to repeated Israeli incursions into southern Syria and Israel’s control over the Golan Heights.[lxv]

Arabian Peninsula

Nothing significant to report.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

See topline section.