Iran Update, November 14, 2025

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Three small Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) vessels intercepted a Marshall Islands-flagged oil products tanker, Talara, and moved it into Iranian waters in the Strait of Hormuz on November 14.[i] The vessel is operated by Cyprus-based, German- and British-owned Columbia Ship Management. The vessel is owned by Pasha Finance, which allegedly has familial ties to Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev.[ii] The vessel was headed to Singapore from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and was carrying a cargo of high-sulfur gasoil.[iii] Iranian naval forces intercepted the vessel on early Friday morning and diverted it into Iranian territorial waters.[iv] Columbia Ship Management stated that it lost contact with the vessel around 0822 local time near the coast of Khor Fakkan, United Arab Emirates. The IRGC issued a statement on X on November 14, quoting a Quranic verse: “So whoever has assaulted you, then assault him in the same way that he has assaulted you,” suggesting that Iran is retaliating for a previous incident.[v]

Iran has conducted several inspections of naval units in the Persian Gulf since the June 2025 Israel-Iran War due to concerns that the United States and its allies could seize Iranian vessels. Senior Iranian IRGC and Artesh commanders inspected naval facilities at least seven times between June and November 2025—most recently on November 11—to evaluate combat readiness.[vi] Iranian officials have warned in October 2025 that Iran will close the Strait of Hormuz if the international community blocks Iranian oil exports, Iran's most profitable export.[vii] Several senior Iranian officials have touted Iranian naval capabilities and their destructive and deterrent effect towards Iran‘s adversaries in recent statements.[viii]

ISW-CTP is considering the following three hypotheses about Iran’s objectives in seizing the vessel:

• Iran may be seeking retaliation for the potential attack on the LPG tanker MV Falcon, which caught on fire after an unspecified explosion near Aden, Yemen, on October 18.[ix] The non-profit United Against Nuclear Iran reported that the Falcon was an Iranian shadow fleet vessel that transports illicit Iranian oil.[x] The IRGC quoted a Quranic verse on X on November 14 that implied that the IRGC was attempting to retaliate for an earlier incident. Iran may have viewed the Falcon incident as an intentional attack and is attempting to deter any actors responsible for it.
• Iran may be showing its willingness to close off the Strait of Hormuz as a preemptive measure amid Iranian concerns about future US actions. Iranian officials have warned that Iran is willing to close the Strait of Hormuz if the international community blocks Iranian oil exports and have inspected naval facilities along the coast to confirm force capabilities and readiness.[xi]
• Iran may be demonstrating its power to actors, such as Azerbaijan and Saudi Arabia. Both countries have recently taken steps to increase cooperation with Iranian adversaries. Israel and Azerbaijan have held several meetings in 2025 to discuss bilateral cooperation and Azerbaijan’s inclusion in the Abraham Accords.[xii] Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman reportedly plans to discuss a defense agreement with the United States during his visit to Washington next week.[xiii] The Saudi-US defense agreement would be similar to the recently signed Qatar-US agreement that pledged the United States to treat any armed attack on Qatari soil as an attack on the United States. Iran may be showing its ability to disrupt movements across the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz if it perceives any future threats from its adversaries.

Top Iranian-backed politician Hadi al Ameri likely began efforts to bolster the Shia Coordination Framework’s unity after Iraqi parliamentary elections on November 11. The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. Iran-backed Badr Organization head Hadi al Amiri met with National State Forces Coalition leader Ammar al Hakim and Iran-backed militia Asaib Ahl al Haq leader Qais al Khazali on November 13 to discuss government formation.[xiv] Khazali also met with First Deputy Parliament Speaker and Iraqi Foundation Coalition leader Mohsen al Mandalawi on November 14.[xv] The framework may exclude current Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani from the framework, but it remains unclear if all framework parties will support his exclusion. The framework is reportedly split into two groups over Sudani pursuing a second term as prime minister, which will necessitate an effort by Ameri and other framework leaders to retain framework unity.[xvi] Top Iranian-backed parties like Ameri’s Badr Organization and Qais al Khazali’s Sadiqoun may fail to form the large coalition necessary to form a government if the framework collapses.

Khaled Walid, a member of Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development Coalition, suggested on November 13 that Sudani may attempt to ally with Sunni and Kurdish political parties.[xvii] This strategy mirrors Shia National Movement leader Moqtada al Sadr’s ultimately unsuccessful attempt to ally with Sunni and Kurdish leaders to form a “national majority government” that excluded Iran-backed Iraqi parties after the November 2021 parliamentary elections.[xviii] Iraqi media previously reported on October 30 that unspecified Iraqi political figures are working to form a Sudani-led post-election alliance that will include Sunni and Kurdish political figures and potentially exclude unspecified Iran-aligned figures and parties.[xix] Sudani may have already had some success allying with Sunni parties. Sunni Azm Alliance member Walid Fahdawi also claimed on November 14 that the Azm Alliance will likely ally with Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development Coalition.[xx] Khaled Walid implied that Sudani may attempt to ally with Sunni and Kurdish political parties because some Shia Coordination Framework parties refuse to allow Sudani to serve a second term.[xxi]

The other Shia Coordination Framework parties, including the Badr Organization and Nouri al Maliki’s State of Law Coalition, likely seek to exclude Sudani from government. The Iran-backed Badr Organization and Nouri al Maliki’s State of Law Coalition, both of which are Shia Coordination Framework members, have separately expressed opposition to Sudani serving a second term.[xxii] Badr Organization member Mukhtar al Moussawi told Iraqi media on November 13 that Shia Coordination Framework parties received enough votes to form the government without Sudani’s coalition, though he did not support this claim with evidence.[xxiii] Badr Organization member Mahmoud al Hayani denied reports on November 13 that the Framework may form a parliamentary bloc that excludes Sudani’s coalition, but Hayani is probably lying, given Moussawi’s comments, Badr and Maliki’s opposition to a second term, and the comments by Khaled Walid suggesting that the framework sought to exclude Sudani from the premiership.[xxiv] Sudani’s relationship with the Shia Coordination Framework has become increasingly frayed because he has acted contrary to the parties’ interests in recent months.[xxv]

Some Shia Coordination Framework members have also accused Sudani of corruption and having Baathist ties to detract voter support for Sudani’s coalition before the November 2025 elections.[xxvi] Sudani has also reportedly not attended Shia Coordination Framework meetings over the past few weeks after unspecified Framework members accused him of wanting to normalize relations with Israel.[xxvii]

These discussions have continued even though the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) has not finalized the election results or released the preliminary election results yet.[xxviii] IHEC must first review all election complaints that political parties, coalitions, and candidates submitted before publishing the parliamentary election results.[xxix] IHEC reported on November 13 that parties, coalitions, and candidates have so far submitted 101 election complaints.[xxx] Political parties, coalitions, and candidates can then appeal both IHEC’s decisions on complaints and the final electoral results to the Electoral Judicial Panel.[xxxi] IHEC will then certify all election results and send them to the Federal Supreme Court for ratification, following any additional adjudication by the Electoral Judicial Panel.[xxxii] The Federal Supreme Court’s ratification of the results is the first step in government formation.[xxxiii]  CTP-ISW will provide additional analysis about Iraq’s official election results in future Iran Updates.

Key Takeaways

• Iraqi Parliamentary Elections: Top Iranian-backed politician Hadi al Ameri likely began efforts to bolster the Shia Coordination Framework’s unity after Iraqi parliamentary elections on November 11. The framework may fail to form the large coalition necessary to form a government due to divisions over whether to support Mohammad Shia al Sudani for a second term as Prime Minister.
• Iraqi Parliamentary Elections: Khaled Walid, a member of Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development Coalition, suggested on November 13 that Sudani may attempt to ally with Sunni and Kurdish political parties. The other Shia Coordination Framework parties, including the Badr Organization and Nouri al Maliki’s State of Law Coalition, likely seek to exclude Sudani from government.
• Tanker Seizure in the Strait of Hormuz: Three small Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) vessels intercepted a Marshall Islands-flagged oil products tanker, Talara, and moved it into Iranian waters in the Strait of Hormuz on November 14. Iranian officials have warned that Iran would close the Strait of Hormuz if the international community blocked Iranian oil exports and have touted Iranian naval capabilities and their destructive and deterrent effect towards Iran‘s adversaries.

Iran

See topline section.

Iraq

See topline section.

Syria

Unknown actors are attempting to develop a covert pro-Assad insurgent and support networks in coastal Syria. The Syrian General Security Service (GSS) dismantled a large, well-equipped Assadist insurgent cell in Sheikh Bader, Tartous Province, on November 12.[xxxiv] GSS forces raided an Assadist safehouse in Sheikh Bader, where they arrested 13 Assadist insurgents and seized a large quantity of weapons and ammunition, including RPGs, marksman rifles, and machine guns.[xxxv] The Assadist safehouse also contained a small field clinic, communication devices, and an additional weapon cache hidden in a nearby cave.[xxxvi] The Ministry of Interior (MoI) said that the Assadist cell was led by a Shia cleric from Idlib Province who had coordinated with Iran and the IRGC to organize pro-Iran religious events in Aleppo City from 2018-2024.[xxxvii] The MoI claimed that the Assadist cell killed 20 civilians in various attacks and attempted to recruit young men and children into the group.[xxxviii]  Covert activities are activities that a sponsor or group executes to conceal their identity or involvement, but the activities themselves--in this case, killings--are usually visible. The group did not claim these killings or activities.  

This cell’s reported activity and its attempts to recruit suggest that it had at least some local support. The MoI probably did not break up this group for some time after it moved into the area, given that it was able to kill 20 civilians and establish large arms stockpiles and sustainment capabilities. The MoI said that the Assadist cell members were former Assad regime members, and a Syrian source claimed that few, if any, of the cell members were local to the area.[xxxix] Locals in rural areas can usually detect and report the presence of outsiders--particularly military-aged males--and that the MoI took some time to detect the group suggests that locals did not immediately report the cell. 

CTP-ISW is considering the hypothesis that the IRGC may be encouraging or supporting the covert efforts to establish similar Assadist cells. The MoI claimed that the cell leader, Shia Cleric Abdul Ghani Qassab, has worked for the IRGC in Syria for over four decades and that he continues to have unspecified foreign connections.[xl] Anonymous sources told Syrian media on November 13 that Qassab led a cell during the civil war that was involved in “activities linked to IRGC propaganda networks, which work to recruit members for Iranian militias in Syria.”[xli] Local sources claimed Qassab deepened his ties with Iran and Hezbollah after protests erupted in Idlib Province in 2011 and helped suppress civilian demonstrations alongside armed Assad loyalists.[xlii] Qassab fled to Aleppo City at the end of 2011, where he forged closer ties with Iranian militias, the Iranian consulate, and began organizing pro-Iran religious events.[xliii] Sources claim Qassab expanded Iranian influence in Aleppo City and built a large following by distributing aid provided by the Iranian consulate.[xliv] Local sources claim Qassab was not directly affiliated with the IRGC or involved in combat but still received IRGC support and adopted its ideology.[xlv]

Arabian Peninsula

Nothing significant to report.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Saudi Arabia is planning to expand economic relations with Lebanon. A senior Saudi official told Reuters on November 13 that Saudi Arabia plans to “imminently” increase commercial ties with Lebanon since the Lebanese government has “demonstrated efficacy” in countering drug smuggling to Saudi Arabia over the past few months.[xlvi] Saudi Ambassador to Lebanon Walid Bukhari stated on November 14 that Lebanon will see the results of Saudi support in “the coming days.”[xlvii] Drug smuggling networks have historically operated from Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley and along the Lebanon-Syria border, smuggling Captagon and other drugs manufactured in Lebanon and Syria to Saudi Arabia.[xlviii] The Lebanese Armed Forces and Internal Security Forces have seized Captagon factories and large quantities of drugs in the Bekaa Valley in recent months.[xlix] Saudi Arabia has provided intelligence to support Lebanese counter-smuggling efforts, according to Lebanese Interior Minister Ahmad Hajjar on September 2.[l] Senior Lebanese officials, including President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, praised the Saudi decision on November 13 and 14, saying that it would begin a “new phase of prosperity and stability” for Lebanon.[li]