Iran Update, November 6, 2025

Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The  Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

The United States reportedly plans to establish a military presence at an unspecified airbase in Damascus to enable a security agreement between Israel and Syria.[i] Six unidentified sources, including two Western officials and a Syrian defense official, told Reuters on November 5 that the United States will use its military presence to monitor a potential Israeli-Syrian security agreement.[ii] The unspecified airbase is located in an area of southern Syria that is expected to make up a demilitarized zone as part of the Israeli-Syrian agreement, according to Reuters.[iii] Two Syrian military sources stated that US forces would potentially use the base for logistics, surveillance, refueling, and humanitarian operations, while Syria would retain full sovereignty over the facility.[iv] The Syrian Foreign Ministry denied these claims on November 6, however.[v] The United States has mediated a potential Israel-Syria security agreement since July 2025, but progress has been limited, and previous talks have collapsed.[vi] The Reuters report partially supports earlier claims that an unspecified Israeli official made to Saudi Arabia on October 29.[vii] The Israeli official said that a future agreement between Israel and Syria would include the establishment of joint US-Israeli-Syrian outposts along the border.[viii] The new base would not be on the border, unless the United States plans to develop a new airfield. The Israeli official claimed that the proposed agreement would resemble the 1974 Disengagement Agreement but would establish an additional joint US-Israeli-Syrian committee to monitor developments on the Syrian border.[ix] The 1974 Disengagement Agreement between Syria and Israel created a United Nations-patrolled buffer zone and enforced a ceasefire along the Israel-Syria border.[x] The United States’ reported plans also follow indications from US and Syrian officials that Syria will join the US-led international coalition against ISIS.[xi]

Iran’s annual oil revenues have significantly decreased, which will likely worsen Iran’s ongoing economic issues amid international sanctions and provide the government with less revenue to carry out its initiatives. The Deputy Chairman of the Iranian Parliament's Budget and Planning Commission, Hadi Ghavami, stated on November 6 that Iran’s oil revenue has dropped significantly, only meeting about 16 percent of the expected annual revenue in 2025.[xii] Reuters reported last month that Iran is offering an eight-to-ten-dollar discount per barrel to incentivize Chinese buyers to buy its oil.[xiii] The discounts in oil revenue will cause profits to fall even if Iran increases its oil exports compared to before sanctions came into effect. Oil is the regime’s largest source of revenue, and its failure to inject oil revenues into the economy could make it significantly difficult to mitigate the impact of international sanctions.

Lower oil revenues may cause Iran to reallocate its oil revenues to military expenditures to replace defense systems that Israel destroyed in June 2025, thus decreasing Iran’s ability to invest in other domestic projects. Iranian officials continue to believe that renewed war with Israel is likely in the short term, which indicates that they will prioritize military expenditure over domestic projects at this time. Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Commission spokesperson Ebrahim Rezaei announced in September 2025 that the commission approved a bill that requires the Iranian Planning and Budget Organization and the Oil Ministry to meet 100 percent of the current year's budget to strengthen Iranian defense capabilities.^[xiv] The bill also allows the Planning and Budget Organization and the Oil Ministry to transfer 1.5 billion dollars under the banner of “oil allocation” to the Armed Forces General Staff. The Iranian Planning and Budget Organization and the Oil Ministry may face challenges in allocating all of the funds outlined in the current budget due to the decrease in oil revenue, but any allocation to the military will decrease the revenue available for domestic projects. Iranian prioritization of military investment over domestic projects could change if the economy continues to weaken under sanctions and popular discontent increases.

Key Takeaways

• US Military Presence in Syria: The United States reportedly plans to establish a military presence at an unspecified airbase in Damascus to enable a security agreement between Israel and Syria. The Syrian Foreign Ministry denied these claims on November 6, however.
• Iranian Oil Exports: Iran’s annual oil revenues have significantly decreased, which will likely worsen Iran’s ongoing economic issues amid international sanctions and provide the government with less revenue to carry out its initiatives. Lower oil revenues may cause Iran to reallocate its oil revenues to military expenditures to replace defense systems that Israel destroyed in June 2025, thus decreasing Iran’s ability to invest in other domestic projects.
• Iraqi Elections: Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah Secretary General Abu Hussein al Hamidawi claimed on November 6 that the Shia Coordination Framework will form the next Iraqi government after the parliamentary elections on November 11, despite ongoing divisions between the coalition’s parties.
• Hezbollah Disarmament: Hezbollah called negotiations with Israel the result of “aggressive blackmail” in a November 6 letter to Lebanese officials. Hezbollah’s letter may be in response to a reported Israeli effort to pressure the Lebanese government to disarm the group.

Iran

Iran seeks to expand economic ties with its partners and regional countries, likely as part of an effort to mitigate the effects of international sanctions. Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf met with his Pakistani counterpart, Sardar Ayaz Sadegh and members of the Pakistani Chamber of Commerce in Islamabad on November 6 to discuss expanding bilateral trade, banking, and technological relations.[xv] Ghalibaf argued for expanding the total trade volume between the two countries from $3 billion to $10 billion over an unspecified period of time.[xvi] Ghalibaf’s trip comes after Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi recently emphasized on October 23 that provinces will need to take a greater role in cross-border economic exchange with neighboring countries in the future.[xvii] Araghchi described these engagements as ”vital breathing channels” for the Iranian economy and ”a paradigm shift” in how Iran would conduct its foreign policy in the future.[xviii]

Iran also seeks to expand trade relations with Russia, which is a key Iranian partner. Iranian Port and Maritime Organization CEO Saeed Rasouli and Russian officials agreed on November 5 to form a port-sea consortium between the two countries to increase trade in the Caspian Sea.[xix] The agreement comes after a member of the Iran-Russia Joint Chamber of Commerce‘s Board of Directors stated on October 20 that Iran must "make maximum use of the new regional space" and trade with countries bordering the Caspian Sea to counter the effects of international sanctions.[xx]

Iraq

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah Secretary General Abu Hussein al Hamidawi claimed on November 6 that the Shia Coordination Framework will form the next Iraqi government after the parliamentary elections on November 11, despite ongoing divisions between the coalition’s parties.[xxi] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia parties, some of which Iran backs. Several framework parties, which include Kataib Hezbollah’s Haquq Movement, are running separately in the elections, but have stated that the coalition will re-form ahead of post-election negotiations.[xxii] It is far from clear if the parties that currently comprise the framework will remain in it after the elections due to the ongoing divisions among the parties on topics ranging from the appointment of the next prime minister to reform of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[xxiii] Many of these groups also have long-running differences dating back to before the fall of Saddam Hussein. Hamidawi also urged Iraqis to vote in the upcoming elections amid concerns by a variety of Iraqi politicians about the potential for low-voter turnout.[xxiv]

The US-led International Coalition in Iraq verified on November 4 that the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) can conduct airstrikes targeting the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) without US support.[xxv] The US-led International Coalition has supported the ISF’s operations targeting ISIS since 2014, including via specialized training on directing airstrikes in recent years.[xxvi] An International Coalition official said that the ISF’s achievement demonstrates its ability to independently combat ISIS in Iraq.[xxvii] ISIS only conducted three attacks in Iraq in September 2025.[xxviii] The spokesperson for Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani asserted in late August 2025 that ISIS no longer poses a threat to Iraq.[xxix] The International Coalition's announcement comes amid changes to the US footprint in Iraq. The United States and Iraq agreed in September 2024 that hundreds of US forces would withdraw from Iraq by September 2025 and that the remaining forces would withdraw by the end of 2026.[xxx]  A US official also told Reuters on September 30 that the United States will reduce its military personnel from 2,500 to less than 2,000 and redeploy most of the remaining personnel to the Iraqi Kurdistan Region from federal Iraq.[xxxi]  Sudani announced on October 20 that 250 to 350 US “military advisors and support personnel” will remain at Ain al Asad Airbase in Anbar Province, Iraq, to support US operations against ISIS in Syria.[xxxii]

Syria

See topline section.

Arabian Peninsula

Nothing significant to report.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Lebanese, US, and Israeli officials said that they are prepared to hold negotiations between Israel and Lebanon. Informed sources told Lebanese media on November 5 that the United States seeks political negotiations between Israel and Lebanon, and has noted that US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack would be willing to oversee the negotiations in any city that Lebanon chooses.[xxxiii] The sources added that the United States and Israel have appointed unspecified officials to participate in these negotiations.[xxxiv] It is unclear whether these officials have agreed or been approved to participate. Lebanese President Joseph Aoun has reiterated his openness to negotiate with Israel to ”end tensions.”[xxxv] Neither Lebanon nor Israel has changed its position on key outstanding issues, however. Unspecified military sources told Saudi media on November 6 that the second phase of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)’s disarmament plan, which focuses on areas north of the Litani River, is linked to ”political developments and the Israeli position on negotiations.”[xxxvi]  Aoun previously noted that Lebanese officials would not participate in negotiations with Israel until Israel ceases its operations and fully withdraws from southern Lebanon.[xxxvii] Israel has maintained that it will continue to operate in Lebanon until Hezbollah has been disarmed.[xxxviii]

Hezbollah called negotiations with Israel the result of “aggressive blackmail” in a November 6 letter to Lebanese officials.[xxxix] Hezbollah’s letter may be in response to a reported Israeli effort to pressure the Lebanese government to disarm the group. Hezbollah urged Lebanese President Joseph Aoun, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri to reject negotiations with Israel that occur under “aggressive blackmail.”[xl] Hezbollah’s letter comes amid Israeli media reports claiming that recent Israeli operations aim to pressure the Lebanese state to take more aggressive steps to disarm Hezbollah. An Israeli journalist assessed on November 5 that Israel is “escalating its threats” in order to pressure the Lebanese government to disarm Hezbollah.[xli] Israeli media reported on November 6 that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is preparing for a ”military move” with the aim of weakening Hezbollah, and bringing the group and the Lebanese government to sign a ”stable agreement” with Israel.[xlii] Senior Israeli officials noted that Israel and the United States coordinated this new ”military move” to convey a clear message to Lebanon: reach an agreement and disarm Hezbollah.[xliii]

The IDF struck six Hezbollah weapons and construction facilities in southern Lebanon on November 6.[xliv] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson asked residents of Tayr Debba and Taybeh in Tyre District and Aita al Jabal, Zawtar al Charkiyeh, and Kfardounine in Nabatieh District in southern Lebanon to evacuate.[xlv] The IDF struck the targets shortly thereafter.[xlvi] The IDF reported that it targeted multiple Radwan Force weapons depots and a Hezbollah construction facility used to produce equipment to rebuild Hezbollah infrastructure.[xlvii] The IDF and Israeli media recently warned that Hezbollah is rebuilding its military infrastructure, particularly in southern Lebanon, and restoring its weapon capabilities through domestic production and smuggling from Syria.[xlviii]

The US Treasury Department sanctioned three individuals on November 6 for coordinating financial transfers from the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force to Hezbollah.[xlix] The sanctioned individuals have funneled millions of US dollars and supported crude oil and other export smuggling from Iran to Hezbollah.[l] The US Treasury Department sanctioned the following individuals:[li]

• Osama Jaber: Jaber is a Hezbollah member who supported Iranian money transfers to Hezbollah through licensed and unlicensed Lebanese money exchanges between September 2024 and February 2025.[lii]
• Jafar Mohammad Qasir: Qasir is a Hezbollah member who leads Hezbollah’s finance team and “revenue-generating economic portfolio.”[liii]
• Samer Kasbar: Kasbar is Qasir’s deputy, who facilitates business deals with Hezbollah’s finance team, including exporting Iranian metal and chemical goods in mid-2025.[liv]

The US Treasury Department stated that the IRGC Quds Force has transferred over $1 billion to Hezbollah since January 2025 through money exchange companies.[lv] Unspecified sources told Saudi media on September 4 that the United States identified “millions of dollars” worth of Iranian financial payments to Hezbollah that Iran facilitated through traditional money transfer systems and overland smuggling.[lvi] The United States previously sanctioned four individuals who facilitated Iranian financial transfers to Hezbollah on May 15.[lvii]