Iran Update, November 4, 2025

Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Iran is reportedly attempting to force its large proxy and partner militias in Iraq to move into politics, possibly to discourage US sanctions enforcement that would prevent Iran from using the Iraqi economy to evade sanctions.[i] UK-based Amwaj Media reported on November 3 that Iran has encouraged unspecified Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to shift their focus from armed resistance to political engagement, citing Iraqi political insiders.[ii] A source in the Iraqi Prime Minister’s office told Amwaj that the Iraqi federal government has similarly encouraged Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to prioritize their political activities.[iii] Iran reportedly wants “fresh [Iraqi] faces acceptable to the Iraqi public” to lead this political engagement.[iv] An Iranian-backed Iraqi militia source added that Iran would consider funding and politically supporting smaller Iraqi militias that are not affiliated with the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), which would place these militias fully outside state structures and control.[v] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service primarily comprised of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, many of which report to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[vi] The PMF militias linked or loyal to Iran have frequently targeted US forces and assets, including when a likely Kataib Hezbollah cell killed three US servicemembers in Jordan in a drone attack in January 2024.[vii] The United States has sanctioned the Iraqi government and commercial entities and threatened to sanction unidentified PMF leaders.[viii] The Iraqi economy is a crucial lifeline for Iran as it attempts to mitigate new US sanctions, and attacks by Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that are officially part of the Iraqi government could imperil that.

Iran may decide to build a loyal cadre of ideological militias over which Iran has strong control that will supplement pro-Iranian political parties in parliament while avoiding sanctions on Iraq. Iran has previously established splinter groups or front groups to ensure militia loyalty to Iran or to obfuscate the involvement of larger militias in military activity against the United States.[ix] Front groups acted as fronts for larger militias, while splinters officially split from their previous organization. Iran helped split Kataib Hezbollah and Asaib Ahl al Haq from Moqtada al Sadr’s Jaysh al Mahdi (JaM) after 2006 as JaM became less responsive to Iranian control, for example.[x] Some legacy Iranian-backed groups in Iraq, like Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, have notably struggled to control some elements of their forces that have appeared to conduct unsanctioned attacks against US forces, Israel, and some Iraqi assets.[xi] Overzealous and uncontrollable activity is negative for Iran because the risk for escalation that triggers sanctions or other negative effects on the Iraqi economy would badly weaken Iranian sanction evasion efforts. Prominent Iranian-backed Iraqi militias heavily relied on front groups to conduct attacks from 2020 to 2021, likely in an effort to avoid US strikes in retaliation for militia escalation against US forces after the US strike that killed Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force commander Major General Qassem Soleimani in 2020.[xii] Iran and its partners in Iraq have not used front groups in a systematic way since 2021. Front groups could be much more controllable from Tehran than poorly disciplined forces like Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, and would allow powerful groups like the Badr Organization to support Iranian sanctions evasion efforts without drawing US attention.

Most militias will likely resist Iran’s proposals because their military wings are both their raison d’etre and a tool they can use to enforce their will on other Iraqis. The militia-affiliated Iraqi source told Amwaj that unspecified militias are not supportive of Iran’s suggestions, as further integration into the Iraqi state is viewed as a threat to the militias’ identities as resistance organizations.[xiii] Asaib Ahl al Haq attempted to assassinate then-Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al Kadhimi in Fall 2021 to force the formation of a government including Iranian-backed militias, for example, and Kataib Hezbollah assassinated Iraqi researcher Hashem al Hashimi in July 2020 for his investigations into Kataib Hezbollah’s structure and behavior.[xiv] These militias also see “resistance” against Israel and the United States as their raison d’etre, and some have already been resistant to disarmament.[xv]

A smaller group of militias—possibly including the Badr Organization—may acquiesce to Iranian demands and integrate their militias into the PMF while focusing on politics. This would not indicate that Badr has moderated, but instead that it seeks to position itself as a preeminent pro-Iranian political force in Iraq. This move would also be an expression of Badr’s deep commitment to the Iranian project in Iraq. Badr has already supported militia integration into the PMF and militia disarmament, probably because it controls most of the PMF’s support structures and a large number of its brigades.[xvi] This means that even if the PMF answered more reliably to the prime minister, Badr would still exercise extreme sway within the organization and could manipulate the PMF to accomplish Badr’s objectives in Iraq. Badr also controls and influences the Transport Ministry and many private and public enterprises in Iraq that it could continue to use to help Iran exploit sanctions.[xvii] Iran could also feasibly use Badr’s influence in the PMF and other ministries to sideline and suppress militias that refused Iran’s proposals to integrate into politics.

Key Takeaways

• Iranian Proposals to Iraqi Militias: Iran is reportedly attempting to force its large proxy and partner militias in Iraq to move into politics, possibly to discourage US sanctions enforcement that would prevent Iran from using the Iraqi economy to evade sanctions. Iran may decide to build a loyal cadre of ideological militias over which Iran has strong control that will supplement pro-Iranian political parties in parliament while avoiding sanctions.
• Assessed Iraqi Reaction to Iranian Proposals: Most militias will likely resist Iran’s proposals because their military wings are both their raison d’etre and a tool they can use to enforce their will on other Iraqis. A smaller group of militias—possibly including the Badr Organization—may acquiesce to Iranian demands and integrate their militias into the PMF while focusing on politics. This would not indicate that Badr has moderated, but instead that it seeks to position itself as a preeminent pro-Iranian political force in Iraq.
• US Warning to Iranian-Backed Iraqi Militias: US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth warned Iraqi Defense Minister Thabet al Abbasi that the United States would take action against any Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that interfered with US operations in the region, particularly in Syria. Iraqi media have mischaracterized the US message as a warning of impending regional conflict.

Iran

Nothing significant to report.

Iraq

US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth warned Iraqi Defense Minister Thabet al Abbasi that the United States would take action against any Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that interfered with US operations in the region, particularly in Syria.[xviii] US operations are and have always aimed to defeat the Islamic State, and the United States has only conducted operations against Iran, the former Syrian regime, and Iranian-backed forces when these forces interfered in US operations.[xix] Abbasi characterized the warning, which the US Charge d’Affaires delivered to him from US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, as an informal “notification” rather than a threat.[xx]  Iraqi media has mischaracterized the US message as a warning of impending regional conflict.[xxi]

Syria

Nothing significant to report.

Arabian Peninsula

Nothing significant to report.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

European countries have continued to take steps to provide the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) with military support. UK Minister for the Middle East Hamish Falconer visited Lebanon on November 3 and 4 to assess the impact of the United Kingdom’s support to the LAF.[xxii] Falconer reiterated the UK‘s commitment to the LAF during a meeting with Lebanese President Joseph Aoun, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, and LAF Commander Brigadier General Rodolphe Haykal.[xxiii] Falconer and Lebanese officials inaugurated a UK-funded LAF base in southern Lebanon that aims to support a ”permanent and sustainable” LAF presence in the south.[xxiv] Lebanese Defense Minister Michel Menassa and Dutch Defense Minister Ruben Brekelmans separately signed an agreement on November 4 for the Netherlands to provide 7.5 million USD to the LAF.[xxv] Lebanese officials have repeatedly called on foreign countries to support the LAF as it implements its plan to disarm Hezbollah.[xxvi] The LAF has been poorly resourced in the past, which is one of several issues that have limited its ability and willingness to challenge Hezbollah.[xxvii]