Iran Update, November 18, 2025

The  Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

The Shia Coordination Framework announced on November 17 that it formed the “largest parliamentary bloc” with 157 seats.[i] This bloc includes Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development Coalition.[ii] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. The Iraqi president will select the largest coalition in parliament to try to form a government.[iii] The framework also announced the formation of a committee to interview candidates for prime minister, even though Sudani has repeatedly stated his intention to serve a second term as prime minister.[iv] This announcement comes after a member of Sudani’s coalition suggested on November 13 that Sudani may attempt to ally with Sunni and Kurdish political parties to try to form the largest bloc because some framework parties refuse to allow Sudani to serve a second term.[v] Several prominent framework parties, including the Iranian-backed Badr Organization, Sadiqoun Movement, Hoquq Movement, Services Alliance, and former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki’s State of Law Coalition, are opposed to Sudani serving a second term due to “disagreements about key issues.”[vi]  

It is unclear whether Sudani would remain in the framework if the framework does not agree to him serving a second term as prime minister. Sudani could attempt to ally with Sunni, Kurdish, and smaller parties to form the largest parliamentary bloc. He could also stay in the framework and try to delay government formation by preventing parliament from meeting the two-thirds quorum required to elect the president.[vii] The president is responsible for nominating a prime minister-designate from the largest bloc.[viii] Shia Coordination Framework parties used this strategy to delay government formation in 2022.[ix] Both of these options require Sudani to ensure that Reconstruction and Development Coalition members do not defect and thereby weaken Sudani’s leverage in parliament.

Political parties tied to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias performed better in the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections than they did in the 2021 elections, likely due to several reasons, including Iraqi Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr’s boycott of the elections and the reinstatement of the pre-2021 electoral system.[x] The political blocs of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that won 17 seats under the Fatah Alliance coalition in 2021 won 45 seats in the 2025 elections.[xi] Asaib Ahl al Haq’s Sadiqoun Movement won 27 seats, the Badr Organization won 18 seats, and the Kataib al Imam Ali-affiliated Services Alliance won five seats.[xii] Kataib Hezbollah’s Hoquq Movement, which did not run under the Fatah Alliance in 2021, won five seats in 2025, compared to one seat in 2021.[xiii] Sadr's decision to boycott the election and his efforts to urge his followers, who are primarily Shia, not to vote may partially explain these differences.[xiv] CTP-ISW assessed in June 2025 that Shia Coordination Framework parties may have sought to win votes from Iraqis who would have voted for Sadr in the elections, including by organizing voter registration drives in Sadrist strongholds.[xv] Shia Coordination Framework parties may have successfully convinced a portion of Sadrist voters to vote for Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, although this scenario is less likely due to Sadr’s ideological opposition to the militias.[xvi] Changes to the electoral system may have also contributed to the success of the militias. Framework parties successfully pushed for a reversal of the Iraqi election law in 2023 and re-established Iraq’s proportional representation system, which allows surplus votes for a candidate to be transferred to other candidates on the same party list.[xvii] This electoral system reduces the cost of running multiple candidates in the same district, which benefits often-fractious Iranian-backed political factions.

Some elements of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) are reportedly pressuring Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to accelerate the reconstruction of Iran’s nuclear program and withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).[xviii] An unspecified senior “energy source” who works closely with Iran’s Oil Ministry told UK-based outlet Oil Price on November 17 that the IRGC is pressuring Khamenei to expedite the reconstruction of nuclear facilities that were damaged during the Israel-Iran War.[xix] The source added that some elements of the IRGC are pressuring Khamenei to withdraw from the NPT.[xx] Iran must implement a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as an NPT member.[xxi] Safeguards agreements are “designed to enable the IAEA to detect the diversion of nuclear material from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons uses, as well as to detect undeclared nuclear activities and material.”[xxii] CTP-ISW cannot verify the Oil Price report. Unspecified IRGC officials previously urged Khamenei before the Israel-Iran War to approve the development of a nuclear weapon to confront “existential threats” from the West.[xxiii] An unspecified European Union (EU) source also told Oil Price that unanswered questions about recent Iranian activities at the Mount Kolang Gaz La facility in Esfahan Province have set Iran and the West “on a collision course.”[xxiv] Recent Iranian construction at the facility has fueled concerns that the site could serve not only as a centrifuge assembly plant, as Iran announced in 2020, but also as a covert enrichment facility or secure storage facility for highly enriched uranium.[xxv]

Iran also reportedly intends to allocate a large portion of its military budget to the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and multi-warhead delivery systems, according to the EU source.[xxvi] The source stated that Iran will increase its military budget by over 200 percent in the coming year and accelerate the development of ICBMs with multi-warhead delivery systems and ranges of up to 10,000 kilometers. CTP-ISW cannot verify these claims. Multi-warhead delivery systems likely refer to multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs).[xxvii] Iran used ballistic missiles with cluster munition warheads, which disperse unguided submunitions over a wide area, during the Israel-Iran War. Iran does not currently possess MIRV technology, however. Ballistic missiles with MIRVs are more difficult to defend against than regular ballistic missiles, so Iran may seek to develop MIRV technology to bypass enemy air defenses more effectively.[xxviii]

Key Takeaways

• Iraqi Elections: The Shia Coordination Framework announced on November 17 that it formed the “largest parliamentary bloc” with 157 seats. This bloc includes Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development Coalition. It is unclear whether Sudani would remain in the framework if the framework does not agree to him serving a second term as prime minister.
• Iranian-backed Iraqi Militia Performance in Iraqi Elections: Political parties tied to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias performed better in the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections than they did in the 2021 elections, likely due to several reasons, including Iraqi Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr’s boycott of the elections and the reinstatement of the pre-2021 electoral system.
• Iranian Nuclear and Missile Program: Some elements of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps are reportedly pressuring Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to accelerate the reconstruction of Iran’s nuclear program and withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Iran also reportedly intends to allocate a large portion of its military budget to the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles and multi-warhead delivery systems, according to an EU source.

Iran

Iran seeks to deepen its economic cooperation with Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) member countries to mitigate the effects of international sanctions. The SCO, which Iran joined in 2023, is a multilateral forum that was established by Eurasian countries, including the People’s Republic of China and Russia, to coordinate on political, military, and economic issues.[xxix] Iran views multilateral institutions such as the SCO as necessary to counter and undermine the US-led international order. SCO officials signed a cooperation document on November 17 at the SCO’s 24th Heads of Government summit in Moscow covering a wide range of economic issues, including the use of national currencies for trade, investments in green energy technology and transportation, and increased economic diplomacy.[xxx] Iranian First Vice President Mohmmad Reza Aref met with Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin on November 17 on the sidelines of the summit to discuss expanding economic ties, including the development of joint railway projects.[xxxi] Aref separately met with Belarusian Prime Minister Alexander Turchin on November 18 and emphasized the importance of bilateral investment and production initiatives to “meet mutual needs.”[xxxii]  Aref and other participating officials signed a joint statement condemning “coercive” economic sanctions, stating that they hinder international cooperation.[xxxiii] Iran, Russia, and Belarus, among other SCO member states, are heavily sanctioned by the United States and its allies.[xxxiv]

Iraq

See topline section.  

Syria

The Syrian government is reportedly reviewing a Russian proposal to redeploy Russian military police to former positions along the Syrian border with the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights to act as a buffer between Israel and Syria. An unspecified Syrian government source told Israeli media on November 18 that the Russian-Turkish military delegation’s tour of former Russian positions in Syria on November 17 was part of a Russian proposal to return Russian military police to southern Syria to “act as a buffer between Israeli and Syrian forces.”[xxxv] The source added that Russia presented the proposal to the Syrian government “in recent months” and that the government is still considering it.[xxxvi] A separate Syrian source stated that a renewed Russian military presence in southern Syria as part of an Israeli-Syrian security arrangement is “not impossible.”[xxxvii] Russian and Israeli media reported that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu discussed ways to establish stability in Syria with Russian President Vladimir Putin on November 15.[xxxviii] Israel reportedly previously did not oppose the presence of Russian military police in southern Syria during the Assad regime.[xxxix] Russian forces previously manned approximately 12 observation positions in Syria along the border with the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights before the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024.[xl]

The Syrian government began the first public trials for perpetrators responsible for Alawite massacres on the Syrian coast in March 2025. These and subsequent trials will test the Syrian government’s ability and willingness to pursue transitional justice and rebuild minority trust. Syrian media reported that a judge and two advisers held preliminary sessions in Aleppo City for 14 individuals, including seven Assadists and seven government-affiliated perpetrators, who are accused of committing violations on the Syrian coast.[xli] The Assadist perpetrators are accused of sedition, inciting sectarian war, and attacking government and military forces, while the government-affiliated perpetrators are accused of deliberately killing civilians and looting.[xlii] Syrian media reported that the Aleppo City court will conduct trials for the 14 individuals until December 25 and announce a verdict following deliberations.[xliii] The Syrian National Inquiry Commission spokesperson told Syrian state media on November 17 that the Commission had referred 563 suspects to the judiciary.[xliv] Prosecuting government forces that committed sectarian atrocities in March would demonstrate the transitional government’s commitment to impartial justice and could help rebuild minority, particularly Alawite, trust.

Arabian Peninsula

Nothing significant to report.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Lebanese Deputy Parliament Speaker and Hezbollah ally Ali Hassan Khalil met with senior Iranian officials in Tehran on November 16, possibly to seek additional Iranian financial and military support.[xlv] Khalil is the political deputy of Lebanese Parliament Speaker and Hezbollah ally Nabih Berri and the second-in-command of the Hezbollah-allied Amal Movement.[xlvi] The US Treasury Department sanctioned Khalil in 2020 for exploiting his former position as Lebanese Finance Minister to provide funding and resources to Hezbollah-owned companies.[xlvii] Khalil met with Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani, and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf to discuss Iran’s support for Hezbollah.[xlviii] Khalil stated during his meeting with Ghalibaf that Lebanon hopes that “Iran will stand by us more than ever to face the challenges ahead.”[xlix] Khalil’s statement suggests that he may have sought increased financial and military support from the Iranian regime during his visit to Tehran. The US Treasury Department reported in November 2025 that Iran has smuggled at least $1 billion to Hezbollah in 2025.[l] Hezbollah has struggled to uphold its financial commitments to its fighters and supporters since February 2025, which has created frustration among Hezbollah’s Shia support base.[li] Disruptions to Hezbollah’s ability to provide its support base with promised benefits may not have an immediate effect on the population’s support for Hezbollah but could diminish support for Hezbollah over time.