Iran Update, November 3, 2025

Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Venezuela recently requested military equipment, including drones, from Iran amid heightened tensions between Venezuela and the United States, according to internal US government documents obtained by the Washington Post.[i] It is unclear if Iran is willing and able to export drones and other military equipment to Venezuela after the Israel-Iran War, however. Venezuelan Transport Minister Ramon Celestino Velasquez reportedly “coordinated a shipment of military equipment and drones from Iran” and informed Iran that it requires “passive detection equipment,” GPS jamming devices, and drones with a range of 1,000 kilometers (approximately 600 miles).[ii] The Washington Post stated that it is unclear how Iran responded to this request.[iii] Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei stated on November 3 that Venezuela can defend itself, but that Iran will “certainly” continue to cooperate with Venezuela.[iv] Velasquez previously visited Tehran in September 2024 and met with Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh.[v] Nasir Zadeh is responsible for Iranian military equipment sales and purchases. Nasir Zadeh and Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro also signed a memorandum of understanding to increase “trade and mobility” between Iran and Venezuela in Caracas, Venezuela, in November 2024.[vi] Iran has outsourced some of its drone production to Venezuela over the past decade, including the production of Mohajer-6 drones, which have a range of 200 kilometers (approximately 124 miles).[vii] It is unclear whether Iran would be willing to supply Venezuela with military equipment--despite Iran’s historical military cooperation with Venezuela--given that Iran is trying to rebuild its weapons stockpiles following the Israel-Iran War. Iran launched at least 1,000 drones at Israel during the Israel-Iran War, and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) destroyed at least 950 Iranian drones during the war.[viii]

Internal political tensions between senior Iranian officials appear to be growing as these officials seek to gain more influence in the regime. An outlet affiliated with Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani characterized Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf in an op-ed on November 1 as a political opportunist who regularly changes his positions on various issues, including engagement with the West, provincial authorities, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to increase his decision-making power in the regime.[ix] Ghalibaf has played a prominent role in Iranian decision-making both during and after the Israel-Iran War. Ghalibaf reportedly took the unprecedented step of assuming a senior military command position during the war.[x] Ghalibaf also played an important role in the establishment of the Defense Council after the war to address key vulnerabilities that Israel exploited during the war.[xi] This op-ed comes amid a flurry of political infighting among various Iranian factions in recent weeks. Various Iranian officials, including Ghalibaf, have harshly criticized former Iranian moderate President Hassan Rouhani for allegedly criticizing the Iranian regime’s close cooperation with Russia. The political infighting comes amid recent reports that senior Iranian officials have sidelined Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and could represent an effort by various Iranian actors to increase their influence in the regime in the face of Khamenei’s reported marginalization. An X account attributed to Mossad claimed on October 30 that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Political and Security Affairs, Ali Asghar Hejazi, and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Mohammad Pakpour have sidelined Khamenei and are “making decisions independently.”[xii] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify this claim.

Key Takeaways

• Venezuelan Request for Iranian Military Equipment: Venezuela recently requested military equipment, including drones, from Iran amid heightened tensions between Venezuela and the United States, according to internal US government documents obtained by the Washington Post. It is unclear if Iran is willing and able to export drones and other military equipment to Venezuela after the Israel-Iran War, however.
• Iranian Domestic Politics: Internal political tensions between senior Iranian officials appear to be growing as these officials seek to gain more influence in the regime. An outlet affiliated with Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani characterized Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf on November 1 as a political opportunist who regularly changes his positions on engaging with the West, increasing provincial authorities, and withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to obtain more decision-making power in the regime.
• Likely ISIS Attack in Deir ez Zor, Syria: ISIS likely conducted a complex grenade and improvised explosive device attack targeting a Syrian Ministry of Defense headquarters in Albu Kamal, Deir ez Zor Province, on November 2. The attack’s target, as well as the weapons used, mirror ISIS’s previous attacks on government forces in Deir ez Zor Province.
• Potential Increase in Israeli Operations in Lebanon: Senior Israeli officials have warned that Israel may increase its rate of operations in Lebanon due to the Lebanese Armed Forces’ limited progress in disarming Hezbollah and reports about Hezbollah’s reconstitution. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz stated on November 2 that the IDF will continue to operate in Lebanon to “defend” Israel until the Lebanese government disarms Hezbollah.

Iran

Likely Jaish al Adl fighters have continued to target Iranian security forces in southeastern Iran. Jaish al Adl is a Baloch, Salafi-jihadi militant group that frequently attacks Iranian security forces in southeastern Iran. Likely Jaish al Adl fighters killed an IRGC Ground Forces officer along the Bampur-Delgan road in Sistan and Baluchistan Province on November 1.[xiii] Likely Jaish al Adl fighters separately killed two Basij members along the Khash-Zahedan road in Sistan and Baluchistan Province on November 1.[xiv] These attacks follow a series of other attacks in Sistan and Baluchistan Province over the past two weeks, including the recent attempted assassination of a tribal leader by possible Jaish al Adl fighters in Khash on October 31.[xv]  

Iranian military commanders have conducted a series of inspections of Artesh and IRGC units across Iran in recent days to assess and evaluate the combat capabilities and readiness of these units.

Armed Forces General Staff Deputy Chief Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi has inspected the following sites since October 31:

• Artesh Air Force 6th Tactical Airbase: Vahidi inspected the Artesh Air Force 6th Tactical Airbase in Bushehr Province on October 31.[xvi] The IDF struck this airbase during the Israel–Iran War.[xvii] Israeli Army Radio reported that Iran was storing ballistic missiles at the airbase.
• IRGC Navy 2nd Nouh-e Nabi Region: Vahidi inspected the IRGC Navy 2nd Nouh-e Nabi Region in Bushehr Province on November 1.[xviii]

IRGC Commander Major General Mohammad Pakpour has inspected the following sites since November 1:

• IRGC Ground Forces Ashoura Operational Base: Pakpour inspected the IRGC Ground Forces Ashoura Operational in northwestern Iran on November 1. The Operational Base oversees IRGC Ground Forces units in Zanjan, Ardabil, and East Azerbaijan provinces.
• IRGC Ground Forces Provincial Units: Pakpour met with Ashoura Provincial Unit personnel in East Azerbaijan Province on November 1. The Ashoura Unit is located near the Southwest Tabriz Missile Base.[xix] Israeli airstrikes during the war destroyed a missile launch control center, one storage tunnel, an air defense battery, and two stationary launchers at the site.[xx] Pakpour also visited the IRGC Ground Forces Karbala and Quds provincial units, which are based in Mazandaran Province and Gilan Province, respectively.[xxi]
• Imam Zaman Mechanized Brigade: Pakpour inspected the IRGC Ground Forces Imam Zaman Mechanized Brigade in Shabestar, East Azerbaijan Province, on November 1.[xxii] The brigade operates along Iran’s northwestern border and conducts armored and mechanized operations.[xxiii] The brigade previously deployed fighters to Syria to defend the Assad regime.[xxiv]
• IRGC Ground Forces Sejjil Drone Units: Pakpour inspected the IRGC Ground Forces Sejjil Drone Units during a drone exercise in an unspecified location in northwestern Iran on November 2.[xxv]

IRGC Navy Commander Brigadier General Alireza Tangsiri inspected the following sites:

• Abu Musa and Siri islands: Tangsiri inspected IRGC naval forces stationed on Abu Musa and Siri islands in the Persian Gulf on November 2.[xxvi] Siri and Abu Musa are two of the four Nazeat Islands, along with Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb, which serve as key positions for controlling maritime access to the Persian Gulf.[xxvii] Iranian military commanders have recently increased their inspections of naval units in the Persian Gulf since September 2025.[xxviii]

Iraq

Former Ninewa Province Governor Atheel al Nujaifi claimed on November 3 that the Asaib Ahl al Haq-affiliated 50th Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Brigade was removed from Hamdaniya District, Ninewa Province due to US Special Envoy to Iraq Mark Savaya’s ties to Chaldean Cardinal Louis Sako.[xxix] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service primarily comprised of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, many of which report to Iran instead of the Iraqi Prime Minister.[xxx] US President Donald Trump appointed Savaya, who is a Chaldean Christian, as Special Envoy to Iraq on October 19.[xxxi] Assyrian media reported on October 29 that the PMF and Iraqi army deployed “special forces” to “force” the 50th PMF Brigade out of the Ninewa Plains.[xxxii] Local sources told Assyrian media on October 29 that the Chaldean Church played a “prominent” role in the removal of the 50th PMF Brigade from the Ninewa Plains.[xxxiii] CTP-ISW cannot verify whether a PMF and Iraqi army deployment occurred or if the 50th PMF Brigade remains in the Ninewa Plains. The reported removal of the 50th PMF Brigade from Hamdaniya comes after Popular Mobilization Commission Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh separated the primarily Christian 13th Regiment from the 50th PMF Brigade on October 19 and restored the Ninewa Plains Protection Units as an independent force.[xxxiv] The PMF forced the 13th Regiment to join the 50th PMF Brigade in 2023.[xxxv] The 13th Regiment and the 74th Regiment previously fought the Islamic State in the Ninewa Plains area under the banner of the Ninewa Plains Protection Units.[xxxvi] Chaldean Church officials and the local population have urged the Iraqi federal government to reverse the 13th Regiment’s integration into the 50th PMF Brigade and have called for the 50th PMF Brigade's withdrawal from the Ninewa Plains in recent years.[xxxvii] CTP-ISW assessed on October 31 that Fayyadh may have decided to separate the 13th Regiment from the 50th PMF Brigade to increase goodwill among the Christian population in the Ninewa Plains ahead of the November 2025 parliamentary elections.[xxxviii]

Syria

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) likely conducted a complex grenade and improvised explosive device (IED) attack targeting a Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) headquarters in Albu Kamal, Deir ez Zor Province, on November 2.[xxxix] Unidentified assailants threw a grenade at the 86th Division headquarters in Albu Kamal, which injured one MoD fighter.[xl] MoD fighters left the headquarters to pursue the assailants, at which point the assailants detonated a roadside IED, injuring three MoD fighters.[xli] The attack’s target, as well as the weapons used, mirror ISIS’s previous attacks on government forces in Deir ez Zor Province.[xlii] The likely ISIS fighters’ use of a grenade attack to lure MoD fighters into an IED ambush that inflicted additional casualties and enabled the assailants to escape also demonstrates that the attack was complex and coordinated. NATO defines a complex coordinated attack as “an attack conducted by multiple hostile elements which employ at least two distinct classes of weapon systems.”[xliii] Two ISIS fighters previously attempted to conduct a tactically sophisticated suicide attack on a Syrian government checkpoint in al Mayadin, Deir ez Province, on August 22.[xliv]

Arabian Peninsula

Nothing significant to report.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Senior Israeli officials have warned that Israel may increase its rate of operations in Lebanon due to the Lebanese Armed Forces’ limited progress in disarming Hezbollah and reports about Hezbollah reconstitution.[xlv] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz stated on November 2 that the IDF will continue to operate in Lebanon to “defend” Israel until the Lebanese government disarms Hezbollah.[xlvi] Katz also said that the IDF may intensify its efforts to enforce the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire to protect northern Israeli residents.[xlvii] Israeli media reported on November 2 that Israeli intelligence and the IDF Northern Command identified that Hezbollah has begun to rebuild military infrastructure in several regions in Lebanon, including north of the Litani River, the Jordan Valley, and south of Beirut. Israeli media also reported that Hezbollah is collecting weapons from Hezbollah infrastructure that the IDF previously struck.[xlviii] An Israeli official told Saudi media on November 2 that Israel warned the Lebanese government that it may strike Beirut’s southern suburbs if the Lebanese government does not disarm Hezbollah.[xlix] This message comes amid growing Israeli frustration with the Lebanese state’s slow progress to disarm Hezbollah. CTP-ISW has not observed any reports of the LAF seizing arms from Hezbollah fighters or raiding active Hezbollah sites. US and European officials have recently warned about the possibility of a large-scale Israeli operation targeting Hezbollah if Lebanon continues to make limited progress to disarm Hezbollah.[l]