Iran Updates, June 2025

Iran Strike Update, June 30, 2025

US officials told Western media that Iranian officials said in intercepted communications that the US strikes on Iran’s nuclear program were “less devastating” than anticipated, which is inconsistent with previous open-source reporting and the nature of the strikes.[i] Four unspecified US officials familiar with US intelligence said that the intercepted communication included Iranian officials speculating as to why the US airstrikes were not as destructive and extensive as they anticipated.[ii] The Western media report did not clarify what the Iranian officials ”anticipated,” which makes it challenging to understand the relative degree of damage Iran sustained due to the relative nature of the statement. It is also unclear when the US intelligence community collected this intelligence, but separate Israeli intelligence suggested that Iranian military officials have been giving false situation reports and downplaying the extent of damage to Iran’s political leadership, however.[iii] Signals intelligence collected within a day or two of the strike would presumably be less reliable than intelligence collected a week or more after the strike. It is unlikely that any Iranian officials could have executed a complete battle damage assessment within 48 hours because doing so would require seeing the inside of the facility, and all the known access points had collapsed. The Institute for Science and International Security also previously assessed that twelve 30,000lb bombs penetrated Fordow and generated a blast wave that would have destroyed the centrifuges enriching uranium at Fordow.[iv] Even small vibrations can destroy centrifuges.

Key Takeaways

• A top Iranian official cast doubt on the likelihood of US-Iran talks soon. The official, who was previously involved in negotiations, said Iran “insist[s]” on enriching uranium.
• US officials told Western media that Iranian officials said in intercepted communications that the US strikes on Iran’s nuclear program were “less devastating” than anticipated, which is inconsistent with previous open-source reporting and the nature of the strikes. It is also unclear what the Iranian officials ”anticipated,” which makes it challenging to understand the relative degree of damage Iran sustained due to the relative nature of the statement.
• A prominent Iranian cleric issued a religious ruling that states individuals who threaten Iranian leadership and religious authority are punishable by death. This cleric previously met with a reformist former Iranian president, who attempted to sideline the supreme leader at least temporarily, and the ruling may be intended to demonstrate loyalty to the supreme leader.

Iran Strike Update, June 29, 2025

Key Takeaways

• Iran has likely begun to assess damage and conduct repair operations at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP). Commercially available satellite imagery captured on June 28 and 29 shows Iranian heavy equipment near two clusters of three impact points on ventilation shafts at Fordow that were caused by US GBU-57 bunker-buster bombs. A US weapons expert assessed that Iran may be filling the craters and conducting engineering damage assessments and radiological sampling.
• International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi said on June 27 that Iran could resume uranium enrichment within “a matter of months.” Grossi stated that Iran could have at most “a few cascades of centrifuges spinning and producing enriched uranium” within months. US and Israeli strikes targeted centrifuge production facilities and active centrifuges, damaging and destroying thousands of centrifuges. The destruction of so many centrifuges will likely hamper Iran’s ability to enrich uranium in the near future.
• Former moderate Iranian President Hassan Rouhani argued that Iran must restore deterrence and rebuild public trust with the Iranian people as part of a revitalized national strategy. Rouhani’s call for restoring trust with the Iranian people follows a similar call by Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Shamkhani on June 28. Rouhani’s statement is also notable given recent reports that Rouhani may be attempting to use Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s absence to try to play a larger and more meaningful role in regime decision-making.
• Iranian Armed Forces General Staff-affiliated outlet Defa Press published an article on June 29 expressing support for the purchase of Chinese fighter jets. Defa Press argued that the Iranian Artesh Air Force “needs to employ up-to-date fighter jets" so that the Artesh Air Force can defend Iranian airspace and confront Iran's adversaries "more effectively." The Israeli Air Force established air superiority over large parts of Iran during the Iran-Israel War, as CTP-ISW previously noted. Defa Press argued that Chinese fighter jets, particularly the Chengdu J-10, can play an” important role” in helping Iran defend its airspace and confront foreign adversaries.

Iran Strike Update, June 28, 2025

Key Takeaways

• US and Israeli airstrikes on the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) between June 12 and 24 reportedly destroyed components of Iran’s nuclear program that would be necessary for weaponization. The strikes destroyed the Uranium Metal Conversion Plant at the ENTC, which Iran could have used to transform uranium gas into dense metal in a process called metallization. This process is one of the last steps required to form the explosive core of an atomic bomb.
• Iran may have begun repair operations at the Natanz Enrichment Complex. Commercially available satellite imagery captured on June 27 shows that Iran has filled in a crater that was formed by US GBU-57 bunker-buster bombs. The imagery shows what appears to be two tents and a truck present at the impact site.
• Israeli strikes targeted senior Iranian military and security officials across multiple branches, likely in an effort to degrade Iran’s command and control structure. Iranian media confirmed on June 28 that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) killed 56 Artesh members, including at least three Artesh generals and 16 conscript soldiers. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media reported on June 28 that Israeli strikes killed Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Intelligence Organization Deputy Director Brigadier General Mehdi Nemati. Nemati reportedly fought alongside former IRGC Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani in Iraq and Syria for several years.
• Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Shamkhani called on regime officials to resolve “disputes” with the Iranian population through “mutual understanding” in an interview on June 28. Shamkhani claimed that nuclear negotiations with the United States are a “deceptive plan” that seeks to “provoke unrest” and “prepare the atmosphere inside Iran” for protests. Shamkhani’s statements come as the Iranian regime has taken steps to securitize the country since the Iran-Israel ceasefire went into effect on June 24.

Iran Strike Update, June 27, 2025

US and Israeli strikes severely set back Iran’s enrichment capabilities, but Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile poses a long-term threat. The United States dropped twelve 30,000lb GBU-57 bunker buster bombs on Fordow directly targeted points above the centrifuge cascade hall and likely destroyed all six IR-1 and seven IR-6 cascades that produced nearly 90 percent of Iran’s 60 percent enriched uranium as of the last IAEA reporting period.[i] IAEA Director Rafael Grossi confirmed on June 26 that the Fordow centrifuges are “no longer working” and emphasized that small vibrations can destroy them.[ii]  The Institute for Science and International Security assessed that the twelve 30,000lb GBU-57s—over 180 tons of bombs—detonated inside the facility after traveling through the Fordow ventilation shafts.[iii] These bombs would have generated a blast wave far more significant than small vibrations.

Iranian enriched uranium stockpiles could pose a threat if Iran attempts to rebuild its nuclear program over the following years. Iranian officials have maintained Iran’s stated right to enrich uranium on Iranian soil despite the US and Israeli air campaign. Two unspecified officials told the Financial Times on June 26 that Iran’s highly enriched uranium stockpile “remains largely intact” following the US and Israeli airstrikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, citing “preliminary intelligence assessments provided to European governments.”[iv] The Institute for Science and International Security also noted that Iran still retains stockpiles of 3 to 5 percent, 20 percent, and 60 percent enriched uranium, which Iran would need to enrich further to weapons-grade (90% enrichment).[v]  Uranium enrichment is logarithmic, meaning that ”the higher [the concentration of Uranium], the easier it gets” to enrich to higher levels.[vi] The destruction of so many centrifuges between June 12 and June 24 will still make enriching from 60 percent to 90 percent much slower. US and Israeli airstrikes on Fordow and other enrichment facilities could have buried enriched uranium underground, which would limit access to the material, but could not have destroyed the material. Conventional explosives cannot destroy enriched uranium. Iran may have moved some enriched uranium from its nuclear facilities to other locations ahead of Israeli strikes, according to some reports.[vii] The White House has rejected reports that suggest Iran relocated enriched material ahead of US airstrikes on June 21.[viii]

The degradation of Iran’s uranium enrichment capabilities will temporarily prevent Iran from enriching to 90 percent weapons-grade uranium, though Iran could enrich to weapons-grade if it can install surviving centrifuges at a new facility.[ix] Iran could attempt to build a simple gun-type nuclear bomb, which is similar to the US atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. A gun-type weapon would need at least 25kg of 90 percent enriched uranium. Iran would only be able to deliver such a weapon using an aircraft or other, more rudimentary delivery weapon, however. Iran would also still require the know-how and facilities to build such a weapon. It is unclear if Iran retains the know-how or facilities needed to build a weapon after Israel’s decapitation campaign targeting nuclear scientists and the US-Israeli strikes on nuclear facilities.[x] A US weapons expert noted that US and Israeli strikes have “significantly” increased the time required for Iran to even build a non-missile deliverable weapon,” such as a nuclear bomb.[xi]

IRGC-affiliated media confirmed on June 27 that the IDF killed another Iranian nuclear scientist, Soleiman Soleimani, in a recent targeted attack.[xii] Soleimani was a chemical engineering graduate from the Iranian University of Science and Technology (IUST).[xiii] The IUST is a Tehran-based technical university closely linked to Iran’s nuclear and missile programs.[xiv] IUST has conducted research relevant to unmanned aerial vehicles, missile propulsion, and satellite technology, and has collaborated with the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran’s Nuclear Science and Technology Research Institute (NSTRI) on continuous mixer technologies with potential missile propellant applications.[xv] Israel’s targeted strikes on Iranian nuclear scientists degrade Iran’s nuclear program by limiting the institutional knowledge available to rebuild the nuclear program following US and Israeli airstrikes.

Key Takeaways

• US and Israeli airstrikes severely set back Iran’s enrichment capabilities, but Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile poses a long-term threat if Iran chooses to rebuild its nuclear program. The degradation of Iran’s uranium enrichment capabilities will temporarily prevent Iran from enriching to 90 percent weapons-grade uranium, though it could do so if it can install surviving centrifuges at a new facility or retains surviving centrifuges at another facility. It is unclear if Iran retains the know-how or facilities needed to build a weapon after Israel’s decapitation campaign targeting nuclear scientists and the US-Israeli strikes on nuclear facilities.
• A top Israeli official said Israel is preparing to resume operations against Iran if necessary. Israel seeks to retain its air superiority over Iranian airspace, prevent reconstruction of Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs, and inhibit Iranian support to members of the Axis of Resistance. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi threatened to conduct retaliatory attacks against a potential Israeli strike.
• The Iranian regime continues to take counterintelligence steps that likely reflect the regime’s paranoia about Israeli infiltration. First Deputy of the Iranian Judiciary Hamzeh Khalili stated on June 27 that the judiciary will pursue Israeli “spies” and called on Iranians to inform the authorities of any dangerous or suspicious activities.

Iran Strike Update, June 26, 2025

Key Takeaways

• The United States and Iran will reportedly resume nuclear negotiations in the near future. Iran will likely reject any US nuclear proposal that requires Iran to halt uranium enrichment on Iranian soil given that Iran has maintained its position on uranium enrichment from before the Israel-Iran War.
• Moderate elements within the Iranian regime may be using Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s isolation during the Israel-Iran War to try to exert greater political influence in the regime. Four unspecified senior Iranian officials told the New York Times that senior Iranian officials, including President Masoud Pezeshkian, Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei, and Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi, are part of a faction that supports a pragmatic and diplomatic approach to the conflict with the United States and Israel. The New York Times report about pragmatic and hardline factions vying for decision-making authority follows earlier indications of internal fissures in the regime.
• International Atomic Energy Agency Director Rafael Grossi stated on June 26 that centrifuges at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) are "no longer working" due to the US and Israeli strikes on the site. Grossi stated that centrifuges are very "delicate" and that "even small vibrations can destroy them.
• Israeli airstrikes killed several IRGC Aerospace Force commanders, including commanders who would have coordinated Iran’s retaliation against Israel. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) attacked a group of IRGC Aerospace Force commanders on June 12 who were meeting to discuss Iran’s retaliation against Israel’s initial airstrikes. The strike killed IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajji Zadeh and at least seven other commanders.

Iran Strike Update, June 25, 2025

Key Takeaways

• A leaked, low-confidence US intelligence assessment found that the US and Israeli strikes caused “moderate to severe” damage to Iran’s nuclear facilities, but that they did not “collapse” the facility. The destruction of the centrifuges and equipment inside does not necessarily require the collapse of the facility itself. A conclusive battle damage assessment of nuclear facilities will take time, given the buried nature of Iran’s nuclear sites and limited on-site access.
• Senior Iranian leadership suggested that Iran may not be willing to cooperate with various international organizations and treaties in the future, despite Iran’s historic and current non-adherence to such agreements.
• The Iranian regime is prioritizing regime security in the wake of the Iran-Israel War. The regime has arrested hundreds of Iranians, and it has focused its efforts on Kurdish areas.

Iran Strike Update, June 24, 2025, Evening Edition 

Israel conducted a two-week air campaign with the objective of degrading, destroying and removing the threat of Iran’s nuclear program.[i] Israel also pursued two supporting objectives to limit Iranian retaliation and provide itself with an offramp. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that “Operation Rising Lion” achieved all of Israel’s war aims “and much more.”[ii] Israel described Iran’s nuclear program as an existential threat to Israel and stated that it would not allow Iran to weaponize its program.[iii] Israel achieved its objectives vis-a-vis the nuclear program by destroying nuclear facilities and enrichment capacity with US support and killing key nuclear scientists who were key in the development and weaponization of the program. The Israeli campaign, supported by US strikes, "effectively destroyed” Iran’s enrichment capacity, though stockpiles of various amounts of enriched uranium remain.[iv] Iran’s ability to enrich these to weapons grade uranium is complicated by the destruction of most of Iran’s centrifuges and the loss of many nuclear scientists.[v] There is more information about the status of the nuclear program below.

Israel supported this main line of effort by conducting a campaign designed to prevent Iran from conducting effective retaliatory strikes on Israel by degrading its ballistic missile capabilities.[vi] Iran originally planned to launch 1,000 ballistic missiles in response to Israeli strikes on Iran, but Israeli strikes forced it to fire much fewer (more on the status of the missile forces below).[vii] Iranian ballistic missile strikes would have targeted Israeli military, intelligence, and political institutions that enabled Israeli operations. These strikes could have also caused major Israeli casualties, which would have been unacceptable for many Israelis. Israeli airstrikes on Iran’s ballistic missile program destroyed Iranian capabilities and forced Iran to launch fewer and smaller attacks on Israel, most of which were intercepted by the IDF.[viii]

Israel pursued a second supporting effort to compel Iran to accept a ceasefire on Israeli terms by creating the perception of a credible existential threat to the Iranian regime. Netanyahu and Israeli Defense Minister Katz directed the IDF on June 20 to “intensify” strikes on Iranian institutions that support regime stability.[ix] The Iranian regime has maintained social control by violently cracking down on protests and other expressions of popular anti-regime sentiment through internal security organizations. Israeli officials suggested that these airstrikes could create conditions which the Iranian population could exploit to overthrow the regime.[x] A series of strikes designed to demonstrate a credible threat to the regime’s stability could be expanded or contracted depending on how the regime responded and Israel’s desire for a ceasefire. Israel could have calculated that the Iranian regime’s overwhelming interest in ensuring regime survival could compel it to agree to a ceasefire.

The limited nature of strikes against internal security institutions suggests that the IDF sought to demonstrate a credible threat to regime stability rather than topple or meaningfully destabilize the regime. A focused, well-designed regime destabilization campaign would have systematically destroyed IRGC provincial and district-level headquarters while simultaneously destroying the Iranian Law Enforcement Command’s infrastructure and assets across the country. Israel struck these targets, but it only did so in Tehran and did not do so systematically even in Tehran.[xi] Israel, given its air superiority over Iran, could have presumably destroyed these targets if needed, which indicates that the IDF made a deliberate choice not to systematically target Iranian internal security assets. The IDF did systematically target missile and nuclear facilities, in contrast.

Israeli strikes against Iran’s energy infrastructure appeared to be related to an effort to influence regime decision-making. Previous energy shortages in Iran have led to protests against the regime. Demonstrations over the rising gas prices in 2017 and 2018 escalated into broader challenges for the regime’s stability, for example.[xii] Israel's attacks on gas production and oil infrastructure, which would exacerbate the root causes of previous demonstrations, suggested that part of Israel’s campaign aimed to influence Iranian regime decision-making by building the perception of a possible credible threat to regime stability. The IDF struck a natural gas processing facility and gas refinery in Bushehr Province on June 14.[xiii] The ensuing fire forced Iranian authorities to partially suspend gas production at South Pars Gas Field, which is one of the largest gas fields in the world and is central to Iran’s domestic energy supply.[xiv] The IDF also struck Iranian oil infrastructure in Tehran on June 14, including an oil depot and an oil refinery in Tehran.[xv]  Both the strikes on internal security institutions and energy infrastructure were relatively limited compared to IDF strikes targeting the nuclear program or retaliatory capabilities.

 The Institute for Science and International Security assessed that US and Israeli strikes on Iran have “effectively destroyed” Iran’s enrichment program.[xvi] The Institute said it will take a “long time” for Iran to restore its enrichment capabilities to pre-strike levels. This assessment is based on the destruction Iran suffered at Natanz nuclear facility, Fordow nuclear facility, Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center and the elimination of many nuclear scientists.[xvii] The six entry point craters for the US bunker-buster bombs at Fordow were above two weak points, and the bombs would have detonated within the facility.[xviii] The Institute for Science and International Security assesses that the bomb blast would have been channeled by the centrifuge cascade hall’s side walls, which would have destroyed all of the installed centrifuges there.[xix] International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) battle damage assessments indicate that Israeli strikes also likely damaged or destroyed several thousand centrifuges at Natanz.[xx] Israel and the United States conducted airstrikes targeting the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant above ground and Fuel Enrichment Plant underground at Natanz, respectively.[xxi]  The IAEA added that it was possible that uranium isotopes may have been dispersed within the facility (though not outside), which would make it difficult to access.[xxii]  This means it may be some time before even the Iranians can determine the true extent of the damage.

The Institute for Science and International Security stated that Iran still retains stockpiles of 3 to 5 percent, 20 percent, and 60 percent enriched uranium, however.[xxiii] Weapons-grade uranium (WGU) is uranium enriched up to 90 percent. The destruction of so many centrifuges will make enriching from 60 percent to 90 percent much slower. A US weapons expert stated that US and Israeli strikes have also made it significantly more difficult and time-consuming for Iran to turn WGU into a usable nuclear weapon.[xxiv] He said the strikes have “significantly” increased the time required for Iran to “even build a non-missile deliverable weapon,“ such as a nuclear bomb. There are significant challenges associated with miniaturizing a nuclear weapon to install it on a ballistic missile warhead.

US President Donald Trump reiterated the US demand for Iran to maintain zero uranium enrichment capabilities.[xxv] Trump stated on June 24 that Iran is “not going to have enrichment and [Iran is] not going to have a nuclear weapon.”[xxvi] He emphasized that “Iran will never rebuild their nuclear facilities.”[xxvii] A senior US official reportedly said the Israel-Iran ceasefire was based on discussions with Iranian officials that indicated Iran is willing to resume nuclear negotiations as long as Israel stop its air campaign.[xxviii] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian stated on June 24 that Iran is “ready for talks.”[xxix] Iran repeatedly rejected the US demand for zero uranium enrichment during the US-Iran nuclear negotiations from April to early June 2025.[xxx] It is unclear if Iran is currently willing to accept the US demand for zero uranium enrichment.

Israel has killed at least 14 Iranian nuclear scientists since June 12 as part of its campaign to delay Iran’s ability to weaponize its nuclear capabilities.[xxxi] The IDF killed Sayyed Asghar Hashemi Tabar in Tehran Province on June 20.[xxxii] Hashemi Tabar was a weapons expert at the Shahid Chamran Group, which is a subsidiary of the Iranian Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND), and specialized in pulse power research.[xxxiii] Pulsed power is a technology that stores and releases energy in intense bursts to simulate nuclear detonation effects for research, but pulsed power does not trigger actual nuclear explosions.[xxxiv] The United States sanctioned the Shahid Chamran Group and Hashemi Tabar in 2019 for research related to Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation.[xxxv]  The IDF also killed Iranian nuclear scientist Mostafa Sadati Ermaki in Tehran Province.[xxxvi]

The IDF announced it thwarted a possible Iranian ceasefire violation on June 24 at 4:20 PM ET. The IDF intercepted two drones that it said “apparently" originated from Iran before they entered Israeli airspace.[xxxvii] This attack marks the first time that Iran may have launched drones targeting Israel since the ceasefire went into effect at 12:00 AM ET.[xxxviii] Senior Israeli military and political officials have not commented on the drone attack or threatened a response at the time of this writing.

Key Takeaways

• Israel pursued a campaign to destroy Iran’s nuclear program and with US support was largely successful in doing so. Israel also pursued two supporting lines of effort to limit Iran’s retaliation and create an off-ramp by creating conditions that would pressure Iran into terminating the conflict. Israel pressured Iran by creating a credible threat of regime destabilization.
• The limited nature of strikes against internal security institutions suggests that the IDF sought to demonstrate a credible threat to regime stability rather than topple or meaningfully destabilize the regime. A focused, well-designed regime destabilization campaign would have systematically destroyed regime institutions, which did not happen.
• Iran’s enrichment capabilities have been “effectively destroyed,” according to the Institute for Science and International Security. Iran still retains stockpiles of enriched uranium, but its ability to enrich these stockpiles further will be complicated by the loss of so many centrifuges and facilities.
• Iran’s inability to accurately strike military or energy infrastructure highlights the limited accuracy of its ballistic missiles. The high Israeli intercept rate made it even more difficult for Iran to accurately target key Israeli infrastructure. Israel nonetheless faced sustained missile attacks against key population centers that was unprecedented in the October 7 War.

Iran Strike Update, June 24, 2025, Morning Edition 

Key Takeaways:

• The ceasefire between Iran and Israel appears to be holding despite both Israeli and Iranian claims of violations. Israel has responded to perceived Iranian violations of the ceasefire but has not resumed its campaign at this time.
• Iran has conducted at least seven ballistic missile attacks targeting Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff at 5:00 PM ET on June 23. Iran launched five of the attacks before the ceasefire went into effect at 12:00 AM ET, one attack at 12:06 AM ET, and one attack around 3:25 AM ET. Israel conducted several waves of airstrikes in Tehran on June 23 and 24 before and after the ceasefire went into effect.
• An unspecified senior US military official told the Associated Press on June 24 that the United States intercepted drones that targeted Ain al Asad Airbase and another unspecified base near Baghdad Airport overnight on June 23 and 24.

Iran Strike Update, June 23, 2025, Evening Edition 

Key Takeaways

• US President Donald Trump announced that Israel and Iran agreed to a ceasefire, beginning the evening of June 23. A senior Iranian official confirmed to Reuters that the ceasefire would occur following Qatari mediation.
• Iran conducted a missile attack targeting the US al Udeid Airbase in Qatar in retaliation for the US strikes on the Iranian nuclear program. The attack was largely symbolic and inflicted no casualties or damage, however.
• Iranian elite, including some moderate leaders, have reportedly tried to pressure Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to accept a ceasefire or sideline him entirely. It is unclear what role these individuals played in the US-announced ceasefire.
• Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Policy Majid Takht Ravanchi announced that Iran will remain a member of the NPT. Iranian officials have previously threatened to withdraw from the NPT in response to US and Israeli strikes.
• IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi confirmed that the United States likely inflicted “very significant damage” in its strikes on the Fordow nuclear site. Iran may have moved some of its nuclear material to undisclosed locations beforehand, however.

Iran Strike Update, June 23, 2025, Morning Edition 

Key Takeaways

• The Israeli Air Force (IAF) conducted airstrikes on June 23 targeting roads leading to the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) in order to “disrupt” access to the site. Israeli strikes on access roads to Fordow may prevent Iran from being able to assess damage at Fordow or move materials from the site to another location.
• The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has continued to target Iranian internal security and social control institutions in Tehran. The IDF targeted the Basij headquarters in Tehran. The IDF also struck Evin Prison, which is Iran’s primary facility for holding regime dissidents. An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that the IDF struck the prison’s entrances to facilitate the escape of regime dissidents.

Iran Strike Update, June 22, 2025, Evening Edition 

Key Takeaways

• Iranian leaders uncharacteristically gave no explicit vow of retaliation against the United States. The closest was an IRGC statement warning of “regrettable responses.” This absence of coordinated threats may reflect the extent to which Iranian leaders are struggling to communicate with one another, as they isolate themselves to evade Israeli strikes.
• Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi will travel to Moscow and meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin on June 23. The Kremlin condemned the US strikes and issued veiled threats that are likely meant to stoke panic among Western audiences, including key decision makers.
• Israel continued its strike campaign against Iran, targeting missile, drone, and air defense capabilities. One of the strikes targeted equipment that Iran uses to produce solid fuel for ballistic missiles, which will likely disrupt further the Iranian ability to reconstitute its degraded missile forces.

Iran Strike Update, June 22, 2025, Morning Edition 

Key Takeaways

• The United States conducted strikes targeting three nuclear facilities with bunker-buster bombs and Tomahawk cruise missiles. The US chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said all three sites sustained “extreme damage.” Israeli officials echoed that statement, though they added the Fordow nuclear facility was “not destroyed.”
• Iran began taking steps to retaliate against the United States, including by threatening shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran likely interfered with GPS signals in the Strait on June 22.
• Israel continued its air campaign against Iran.

Iran Strike Update, June 21, 2025, Evening Edition 

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has begun implementing emergency succession measures in response to escalating Israeli strikes and the potential for US military involvement.[i] Unspecified Iranian sources told the New York Times on June 21 that Khamenei has relocated to a secure bunker, suspended digital communications, and now communicates with senior commanders only through a trusted aide.[ii] Sources added that Khamenei named three senior clerics as candidates to replace him if he is killed.[iii] Khamanei also reportedly named replacements for top military commanders and ordered senior officials to work from offices and avoid using cellphones.[iv] These steps mark the first reported instance of Khamenei directly selecting potential successors outside the formal process of the Assembly of Experts. Khamenei likely took these steps amid heightened assassination as some Israeli officials, including Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz, have openly threatened Khamenei’s life.[v] Two unspecified US officials told Reuters on June 15 that the US President Donald Trump vetoed an Israeli plan to kill Khamenei, however.[vi] Trump separately stated on June 17 that the United States knows “exactly where the so-called ‘Supreme Leader’ is hiding” but would not “take him out, at least not for now.”[vii]

Khamenei’s previous actions indicate that the three possible replacements are almost certainly equally as ideological as he is. Khamenei previously met with the Assembly of Experts members in November 2024 and emphasized that the next Supreme Leader must “embody the revolution” and implement Islam in Iranian society.[viii] Khamenei did not name a successor at the meeting, however. Esfahan interim Friday Prayer Leader and Assembly of Experts member Abdolhasan Mahdavi confirmed a week after Khamenei’s meeting in November 2024 that the assembly had confidentially identified and prioritized three candidates for succession and framed it as “a routine responsibility.”[ix] The Assembly of Experts is an 88-member elected clerical body tasked with appointing, supervising, and—at least in theory—removing the Supreme Leader, though in practice it has never challenged the position and plays a limited role in day-to-day politics.[x] The only previous leadership transition in Iran occurred in 1989 under different political conditions. The current assembly was elected in March 2024 and will serve until 2032.[xi]

It remains unclear who Khamenei selected as his potential successor. Unspecified sources added that Mojtaba Khamenei, Khamenei’s son and frequently rumored successor, is not among the designated candidates, however.[xii] Former President Ebrahim Raisi, another widely speculated figure, died in a helicopter crash in May 2024 and is no longer in consideration.[xiii] Khamenei’s decision reflects his concerns about external threats and potential instability after his death, as the regime expects opposition groups and anti-regime actors to exploit any leadership vacuum.[xiv] Opposition groups and anti-regime actors are more likely to try to exploit such a vacuum during a war.

Israeli officials assess that airstrikes on Iranian ballistic missile capabilities since June 12 have degraded Iran’s ability to launch ballistic missile attacks on Israel, which is consistent with the launch rates that CTP-ISW has observed.[xv] Israeli Hatzerim Airbase Commander Brigadier General ”Ayin” said that the IAF has conducted over 1,000 sorties with fighter jets dropping ”hundreds” of munitions on Iranian ballistic missile and storage sites in the past eight days.[xvi] IDF Spokesperson Effie Defrin said that Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities “have been heavily degraded.”[xvii] Brigadier General ”Ayin” stated that these airstrikes have also disrupted Iran’s ability to launch retaliatory attacks from western Iran and have forced Iranian forces to relocate eastward and southward.[xviii] This southward movement of Iranian forces may account for the intensifying Israeli airstrikes in southern Iran that CTP-ISW observed on June 20. The IDF stated on June 17 that Iran had attempted to launch a missile targeting Israel from Esfahan, central Iran, after withdrawing forces from western Iran.[xix] Iran would not be able to use three medium-range ballistic missiles that it has previously used to attack Israel if it fires them from Esfahan. Haj Qassem (1,400-kilometer range), Fattah (1,400-kilometer range), and Kheibar Shekan (1,450-kilometer range) ballistic missiles cannot reach Israel from Esfahan due to their shorter ranges.[xx] Iran would almost certainly need to rely on Emad, Ghadr, and Sejjil-1 ballistic missiles because these missiles are capable of reaching Israel from Esfahan.[xxi] Iran could hypothetically modify the shorter-range missiles to carry smaller payloads (thus extending the range), but doing so rapidly would be difficult. Emad and Ghadr liquid-fuel ballistic missiles are extremely volatile and challenging to transport, however.[xxii] Iran did not launch any ballistic missile attacks on Israel on June 21. The IDF intercepted approximately 40 Iranian drones targeting Israel overnight on June 20 and 21.[xxiii] This is a slight increase in the number of drones that Iran has launched compared to 16 drones on June 20 and 4 drones on June 19.[xxiv]

Key Takeaways

• The Iranian supreme leader named three unspecified senior clerics as possible successors in an effort to secure the future of the Islamic Republic in the event of his death. The limited open-source reporting about possible successors and the supreme leader’s view of his possible successors suggests that the three unspecified clerics are almost certainly equally as ideological as the current supreme leader.
• Israeli officials continue to assess that their air campaign has degraded Iranian ballistic missile capabilities, which is consistent with CTP-ISW's observations.
• The Iranian foreign affairs minister again rejected US demands for zero uranium enrichment during a June 20 meeting with European diplomats.
• The United States continued to deploy military assets to the Middle East.
• Israel has continued to conduct strikes targeting Iranian internal security and social control institutions, which could destabilize the regime over time.

Iran Strike Update, June 21, 2025, Morning Edition 

Key Takeaways

• Israel continued its strike campaign targeting Iranian air defenses, missiles forces, and nuclear sites. These sites include one in Esfahan that produced centrifuges.
• Israel struck and killed senior officers in the IRGC Aerospace Force and Quds Force, which may impose a temporary disruption upon Iranian command-and-control.
• An Iranian drone struck a populated area in Israel for the first time during this war. This is not indicative of a systematic breakdown in Israeli air defenses. Integrated air defense systems are not perfect, and some projectiles will impact their targets.
• Iran conducted another ballistic missile attack targeting Israel. It consisted of five missiles, all of which the IDF intercepted.

Iran Strike Update, June 20, 2025, Evening Edition 

Iran is attempting to impose a dilemma on the United States and the international community between accepting Iranian terms in nuclear negotiations or risking a long and challenging hunt for hidden Iranian nuclear material. This dilemma is likely designed to harden Iran’s nuclear program against destruction either by securing an agreement on Iranian terms (which would presumably allow Iran to continue enrichment) or protecting Iranian nuclear material by hiding the material, thus making a US or Israeli effort to destroy the material more difficult. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Major General Mohsen Rezaei stated during an interview on June 20 that Iran has relocated its enriched material to a secure location to prevent it from being destroyed.[i] This statement is presumably intended to suggest to a Western audience that destroying all of Iran’s nuclear material would require a long, challenging, and possibly futile hunt for hidden material and that therefore the West should negotiate with Iran. Iranian officials have expressed their interest in negotiating a nuclear deal with the United States but have not moderated their negotiating position from before the conflict.[ii] Iran remains committed to preserving its stated ”right“ to enrich uranium.[iii] These Iranian demands over enrichment have been a non-starter for the United States and Israel in the ongoing negotiations, suggesting Rezaei’s statement is designed to increase the pressure on the United States and Israel to relax their positions. The United States and Israel have rejected Iranian demands and have maintained that Iran will not be permitted to enrich uranium on Iranian soil.[iv] Israel launched its air campaign on June 12 to “degrade, destroy, and remove [the] threat” of Iranian weaponization of its nuclear program, and a senior Israeli official said that enrichment remains a red line.[v] US President Donald Trump has threatened to support an air campaign targeting Iranian nuclear infrastructure if Iran fails to meet US demands for zero enrichment.[vi]

European partners, alongside the United States, have demanded that Iran accept zero uranium enrichment levels, restrict its ballistic missile program, and end its support for its proxy forces.[vii] French, German, British, and European Union representatives met with Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi in Switzerland on June 20 to urge Iran to return to nuclear negotiations with the United States.[viii] Araghchi rejected European calls to resume negotiations and reiterated that Iran will not negotiate until Israel ends its air campaign.[ix] US Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt stated on June 19 that Trump will decide whether or not to strike Iran “within the next two weeks.”[x] An anonymous European diplomat speaking to the Washington Post stated that the delegation hoped to reconvene before the end of Trump’s two-week deadline.[xi]

 

An unspecified US official speaking to Fox News reported that the USS Nimitz carrier strike group is expected to arrive in the CENTCOM area of responsibility by June 22.[xii]  A US official told Western media on June 16 that the USS Nimitz carrier strike group is en route to the Middle East from the South China Sea and that it is ahead of schedule.[xiii] The USS Nimitz carrier strike group, which includes the Nimitz and its air wing, multiple destroyers,  and other assets, can support both offensive and defensive contingencies.[xiv]  The United States has also deployed additional assets to support potential operations in the Middle East. There are five guided missile destroyers in the eastern Mediterranean as of June 20, according to US defense officials.[xv] The destroyers can provide much-needed ballistic missile defense support for Israel. A large number of US aircraft have similarly traveled into the Middle East.[xvi] Six US Air Force air-to-air refuelers also moved westward from bases in California and Oklahoma to Honolulu, Hawaii, and Travis Air Force Base, California, respectively, since June 19.[xvii]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are attempting to deter US participation in the Israel-Iran War by threatening to expand the conflict. These militias are very likely observing and reacting to ongoing discussions in Western media about the risks of a protracted war in the Middle East and seek to exploit these concerns by threatening to expand the conflict.[xviii] The militias have repeatedly threatened to target the US and its regional interests if the US enters the war but have not conducted any such attacks at the time of this writing.[xix] Kataib Hezbollah Spokesperson Abu Ali al Askari threatened on June 19 that US participation in the war would trigger attacks on US bases in the region, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al Mandab, and the closure of ports in the Red Sea.[xx] Askari added that US participation would cause the United States to lose trillions of dollars from the region, which could imply that Kataib Hezbollah and other Iranian-backed Iraqi militias could attack US-aligned Gulf states. This implication likely aims to pressure the Gulf States to discourage US involvement.[xxi] Attacks on major US bases outside of Iraq and Syria would by default target US-aligned Arab states, including the Gulf states.

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are also likely conditioning their entry into the war on US participation to avoid dragging Iraq into the war and the negative political repercussions of that decisions ahead of the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections. Iraqi Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr stated that Iraq does not “need new wars” in his condemnation of Israel’s attacks on Iran.[xxii] Iranian-backed political parties, which include those of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias such as Kataib Hezbollah, Asaib Ahl al Haq, and the Badr Organization, lost a significant number of seats in southern Iraq in the 2021 elections to the Sadrist Movement.[xxiii] Sadr publicly announced in March 2025 that he is not running in the elections but could change his mind.[xxiv] Sadr’s warning against Iraqi involvement in the Israel-Iran War suggests he could position himself in opposition to the Iranian-backed Iraqi groups if he decided to run. Sadr could also use potential militia participation to deter Sadrist voters from Iranian-backed parties if he does not run. CTP-ISW assessed on June 3 that Iranian-backed parties may seek to win votes from Iraqis who would have voted for Sadr in the elections, which underscores the potential risks associated with militia involvement in the conflict.[xxv]

International Atomic Energy Agency Director Rafael Grossi warned of a dangerous degradation of nuclear security at Iranian nuclear sites due to Israeli strikes.[xxvi] Grossi addressed the United Nations Security Council on June 20 to present the IAEA’s findings on nuclear security concerns amid the Israeli air campaign. He noted that further damage to Iranian nuclear facilities could result in radiological leaks that could endanger surrounding populations. Grossi noted that Israeli airstrikes targeting the Natanz enrichment site on June 13 destroyed electricity infrastructure and seriously damaged underground nuclear cascade facility. He noted that there was no observed radioactivity outside the facility following the strikes but suggested that there could be contamination within the facility. Grossi stated that Israeli airstrikes on June 13 also damaged the central chemical laboratory, a uranium conversion plant, the Tehran reactor-fuel manufacturing plant, and the enriched uranium metal processing facility at the Esfahan nuclear site. Grossi confirmed that the Khondab Heavy Water Research Reactor in Arak, Markazi Province, was not operational at the time of Israel’s June 19 airstrike. Grossi issued a strong warning that any damage to the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant could result in a ”very high” release of radioactivity into the environment. Grossi stated that a strike which destabilized power to the facility could cause the reactor’s core to melt and release radioactivity into the environment. He explained that damage to the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant would require relocating the nearby population several hundred kilometers away from the facility and providing iodine tablets to prevent radiation poisoning.

Key Takeaways

• Iran is using negotiations and its efforts to hide nuclear material to impose a dilemma on the United States and force Washington to decide between accepting Iranian terms in nuclear negotiations or risking a long and challenging hunt for hidden Iranian nuclear material. This dilemma is designed to protect the nuclear program by securing an agreement with allowances for enrichment or protecting enriched material by hiding it. Iranian officials have not relaxed their negotiating position, which US and Israeli officials are not willing to accept.
• The Nimitz carrier strike group will arrive in the CENTCOM AOR by June 22.
• Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are attempting to deter US participation in the war by threatening to attack US forces if the US attacks Iran. These threats are probably informed by ongoing discussions in the West about a protracted war with Iran.
• The International Atomic Energy Association director warned of a dangerous degradation of nuclear security at Iranian nuclear sites due to Israeli strikes.
• Israel continued to conduct strikes targeting the Iranian internal security and social control apparatus, which could destabilize the regime. CTP-ISW has not observed any indications that the regime is near collapse or that its control is significantly weakened at this time.

Iran Strike Update, June 20, 2025, Morning Edition 

Six US Air Force air-to-air refuelers moved westwards from bases in California and Oklahoma to Honolulu, Hawaii, and Travis Air Force Base, California, respectively, on June 19. Open-source flight trackers showed six US Air Force KC-46A Pegasus aircraft redeploying westwards to Travis Air Force Base, California, and Honolulu, Hawaii, on June 19.[i] The KC-46A Pegasus is an aerial refueling aircraft that supports combat operations by enabling aircraft to project power over an extended area.[ii]

Key Takeaways

• The US Air Force deployed six air-to-air refueling aircraft to California and Hawaii. The aircraft support combat operations by enhancing the ability of aircraft to project force.
• Israel has continued to strike Iranian air defense and missile forces. These strikes have helped Israel achieve air superiority over parts of Iran and preempt Iranian missile attacks.
• Israel has continued to strike the Iranian internal security apparatus, which could degrade the ability of the regime to repress its people.
• Iran has continued firing small waves of one-way attack drones at Israel but with no real success. The attacks appear poorly coordinated if they are meant to overwhelm Israeli defenses.

Iran Strike Update, June 19, 2025, Evening Edition 

Key Takeaways

• Iranian officials have expressed interest in negotiating an end to the Israel-Iran conflict but have not moderated their negotiating positions from before the conflict. Iranian proposals that do not fulfill US demands, such as the US demand for zero Iranian uranium enrichment, will likely preclude Iran from reaching a new nuclear deal with the United States and a ceasefire in the Israel-Iran War.
• The IDF has continued to strike Iranian nuclear, military, and energy infrastructure. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said on June 19 that "preventing [Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s] existence” is one of the Israeli air campaign’s objectives.
• Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed Brigadier General Mohammad Karami as the IRGC Ground Forces commander on June 19. Khamenei’s appointment of Karami may reflect regime concerns about potential domestic unrest, given that Karami has previously been involved in suppressing internal dissent.
• Iran has continued its ballistic missile campaign despite the IDF’s claims that it has destroyed between one-half and two-thirds of Iran’s missile launchers. Iran has launched more advanced missiles targeting Israel since June 18.
• Iranian-backed Iraqi militias continue to threaten retaliation if the United States joins the Israel-Iran War. The Kataib Hezbollah spokesperson warned on June 19, for example, that US participation in the war would trigger attacks on US bases in the region, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al Mandab, and the closure of ports in the Red Sea.

Iran Strike Update, June 19, 2025, Morning Edition 

Key Takeaways

• The IDF struck several nuclear facilities, including the Arak Heavy Water Reactor in Markazi Province. Iran could use this reactor to support the production of plutonium-based nuclear weapons. The IDF also struck a storage facility linked to the Iranian nuclear program in Natanz, Esfahan Province.
• The IDF has struck at least six Iranian Ghadir radars since June 12, according to commercially available satellite imagery. Ghadir radars reportedly have the ability to detect aircraft from 1,100 kilometers away.
• An Iranian ballistic missile struck the Soroka Medical Center in Beersheba. Iranian ballistic missile attacks on Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff have injured over 200 individuals. The Israeli defense minister warned that Israel will intensify its attacks on Iran following the strike on the Soroka Medical Center.

Iran Strike Update, June 18, 2025, Evening Edition 

Key Takeaways

• Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei rejected the call from US President Donald Trump for Iran’s “unconditional surrender.” Khamenei also threatened US forces if the United States joins the war against Iran.
• The so-called “Axis of Resistance” has continued to threaten retaliation if the United States joins the war against Iran. These threats have come from Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.
• Israeli strikes have driven Iranian forces to begin firing missiles from central Iran rather than western Iran. Iranian forces will need to use longer-range missiles to reach Israel from the launch sites in central Iran.
• Iran is struggling to coordinate large-scale missile strikes targeting Israel due to pressure from Israeli strikes. This is reflected in the volume of recent Iranian missile fire, which has decreased significantly throughout the war.
• Iranian leaders appear concerned about the potential for social unrest. They have taken precautions to protect their regime, while Israel has struck sites connected to the Iranian internal security apparatus.

Iran Strike Update, June 18, 2025, Morning Edition 

Key Takeaways

• Israeli strikes have focused on targeting the Iranian missile program in recent hours. Israel has struck several sites tied to missile production, including a site that Iran has expanded significantly in recent years to build weapons for Russia and the so-called “Axis of Resistance.”
• Israeli strikes have targeted two centrifuge production sites around Tehran. Israel also struck the IRGC Imam Hossein University, which is controlled by the IRGC and Iranian nuclear weapons research.
• Iran downed an Israeli drone around Esfahan. This marks the first confirmed Israeli aircraft that Iran has downed since the Israeli strikes began.
• Iran conducted two ballistic missile attacks targeting Israel. The attacks reportedly included around 20 and 30 missiles.

Iran Strike Update, June 17, 2025, Evening Edition 

Key Takeaways

• The IAEA confirmed that Israeli strikes have impacted underground infrastructure at the Natanz nuclear site. This came after the IAEA reported that Israeli strikes have likely damaged or destroyed thousands of centrifuges at Natanz.
• Israel has continued striking Iranian military targets, which has likely degraded Iranian missile forces significantly. This degradation is reflected in the decreasing volume of Iranian missile fire at Israel. 
• Israel has continued striking energy infrastructure and regime sites connected to domestic surveillance and repression. These strikes could reduce the ability of the regime to control the population and, in turn, destabilize it.
• US President Donald Trump called for Iran’s “unconditional surrender.” This came as the United States sent additional forces to the Middle East and could reportedly meet with senior Iranian officials in the coming days to discuss a resolution to the war.
• Iran has prepared to fire missiles at US forces if the United States strikes Iran, according to the New York Times. The outlet reported that Iran would first attack US positions in Iraq and then in other unspecified Arab countries, presumably those around the Persian Gulf.
• Iranian-backed militias have agreed to attack US forces in Iraq if the United States strikes Iran. These militias are the same ones that conducted around 200 attacks targeting US positions in Iraq and Syria from October 2023 to November 2024.
• A senior Houthi official said that the Houthis “will intervene to support Iran against Israel.” The Houthis could support Iran by firing projectiles at US and Israeli targets or resuming attacks targeting international shipping.

CTP-ISW has recorded 197 reported or confirmed Israeli airstrikes on Iran since the start of the Israeli air campaign on June 12.

CTP-ISW has recorded 39 reported or confirmed Iranian ballistic missile or interceptor impacts on Israel since the start of the Israeli air campaign on June 12.

Iran Strike Update, June 17, 2025, Morning Edition 

We will produce two updates per day while conditions in the Middle East warrant it. This first update will focus on reports about the strike campaign and identify the areas struck between 6:00 PM ET on June 16 and 6:00 AM ET on June 17. The second update will cover all events over the previous 24 hours and refine our earlier reports about the strike campaign.

Key Takeaways

• Israel has continued striking Iranian military targets, especially sites tied to the Iranian missile program. Israel has also struck a target with ties to the Iranian chemical weapons program.
• Israel conducted a strike killing the newly appointed commander of the Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters, which is responsible for joint and wartime operations.
• Iran has conducted five additional missile attacks targeting Israel. All five attacks had a relatively small volume of fire, possibly demonstrating how degraded Iranian missile forces are.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has targeted military infrastructure across Iran since June 16. The IDF destroyed dozens of ballistic missile and drone storage and launch sites in western Iran overnight between June 16 and 17.[i] An Israeli analyst posted satellite imagery on June 16 that showed damage from an Israeli strike at an Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) base in Ghazanchi, Kermanshah Province.[ii] The base was reportedly a ballistic missile launch site.[iii] Israeli airstrikes also reportedly targeted an unspecified IRGC base in Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province, and an IRGC ammunition depot in Dezful, Khuzestan Province.[iv]

The IDF targeted infrastructure reportedly linked to the Iranian chemical weapons program. Satellite imagery from June 16 shows damage to two buildings at the Shahid Meisami Group in Karaj, Alborz Province.[v] The Shahid Meisami Group is an Iranian chemical engineering and research group that is involved in Iran’s chemical weapons program.[vi] The group is subordinate to the Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND), which played a leading role in the Iranian nuclear weapons research program before 2003.[vii] The IDF targeted the SPND headquarters in Tehran on June 14.[viii]

CTP-ISW is tracking several unverified reports of additional airstrikes at the Natanz Enrichment Complex in Esfahan Province.[ix] CTP-ISW will provide battle damage assessments and further analysis on the status of the Iranian nuclear program in its June 17 evening update.

The IDF announced on June 17 that it killed newly appointed Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Commander Major General Ali Shadmani in an airstrike in central Tehran.[x] Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed Shadmani to command the headquarters after the IDF killed former Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Commander Major General Gholam Ali Rashid on June 13.[xi]

Iran has conducted five ballistic missile attacks targeting Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on June 16. Iran reportedly launched two ballistic missiles targeting central Israel in the first barrage on June 16, according to an OSINT social media account.[xii] CTP-ISW reported this attack in its June 16 evening update but did not have details about the number of missiles that Iran launched at Israel at the time. Iran reportedly launched three ballistic missiles in the second barrage two hours later.[xiii] It is unclear how many missiles Iran launched in the third barrage.[xiv] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that Iran fired less than 10 ballistic missiles in the first three barrages with no reported impacts or casualties.[xv] Iran launched approximately 20 missiles in the fourth barrage. At least one missile struck a parking lot in central Israel, reportedly injuring five people.[xvi] Iran reportedly launched approximately 10 ballistic missiles in the fifth barrage.[xvii]

Iran struck the Israeli Military Intelligence School in Camp Moshe Dayan in Tel Aviv on June 17.[xviii] The strike damaged a warehouse in the compound.[xix]

The IDF has intercepted several drones that crossed into Israeli airspace since June 16.[xx] The Israeli Air Force (IAF) intercepted approximately 30 drones that were launched at Israel overnight on June 16 and 17.[xxi]

Iran Strike Update, June 16, 2025, Evening Edition 

Iran has maintained its negotiating position on its nuclear program during the Israeli campaign, meaning that Iran does not appear willing to negotiate an end to the Iran-Israel War yet. Western media reported on June 16 that Iran is seeking to “de-escalate tensions” and quoted Arab officials who said that Iranian officials said that Tehran is open to returning to negotiations if the United States does not join the strike.[i] Arab “intermediaries” said that Iran is “not ready to make concessions in nuclear talks,” however.[ii] Public statements from Iranian leaders support this claim by Arab intermediaries. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian continued to threaten “severe” responses if the United States failed to restrain Israel and separately defended Iran’s “right” to peaceful nuclear energy and research.[iii] The Iranian parliament also began to build a proposal to leave the Non-Proliferation Treaty.[iv] These responses are presumably non-starters for the United States and Israel. An unspecified Israeli official said prior to the strikes that Iran must end its uranium enrichment at a minimum, which is a position that the Trump administration has also maintained during the negotiations.[v]

 

Other reports appear to dispute the assertions by these Arab officials. An unspecified regional source and “an official briefed on” Iran-Gulf Arab communications claimed that Iran would return to nuclear talks if a ceasefire were reached and if Iran is allowed to "finish its response" to Israeli strikes.[vi] An unspecified Iranian official also said Iran is “willing to be flexible“ in negotiations.[vii] These demands in practice ask Israel to stand down and defend against a final Iranian attack without Iran facing the threat of an Israeli response. It is not clear why or if Israel would agree to such an arrangement.

 

An unspecified Iranian diplomat shared a personal, unofficial message with an Iranian diaspora publication that claimed Iranian leaders are willing to “give up uranium enrichment to preserve the regime.”[viii] These statements do not reflect official Iranian government positions. The diplomat claimed that the Artesh and IRGC will “lose control of the situation” and that the regime is “ready to negotiate” if it can achieve “face-saving solutions.” He said that he was not speaking as a representative of the Iranian government.

 

Iran likely calculates that it can impose costs on Israel for Israel’s campaign against Iran, but Iran’s attacks have been mostly ineffective and do not appear to be influencing Israeli decision making. Iranian officials have continued to threaten a “severe response” to Israeli strikes. Iranian officials appear to design these statements to deter Israel by suggesting Iran can impose costs on Israel, but the lack of Iranian success in actually doing so will presumably diminish the deterrent effect of the statements over time. Iranian missile and drone attacks on Israel have not achieved strategic effects that would influence Israeli decision making. The lack of Iranian success in imposing costs on Israel will presumably further diminish the deterrent effect of the statements over time.

 

Iran’s calculations about continuing the war may change in the coming weeks as Israeli strikes expand and threaten the regime. An Israeli outlet reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin told the Iranian supreme leader that the survival of the Iranian regime is under threat.[ix] Putin made the call after a conversation with US President Donald Trump about Russian mediation between Iran and Israel. Israeli strikes have recently expanded to target Iranian internal security and social control institutions, which could threaten regime stability. The current Israeli strikes are probably the most serious threat to regime survival that the Iranian regime has faced since 1979. The supreme leader and his allies could conclude that offering concessions and ending uranium enrichment is necessary if it saves the regime.

 

The United States is deploying new forces to the Middle East as part of a buildup to be closer to the Middle East and “provide options to defend US assets and interests.”[x] A US official told Western media on June 16 that the USS Nimitz carrier strike group is en route to the Middle East from the South China Sea, and it is ahead of schedule.[xi] The US Air Force is also moving “a large number” of refueling tanker aircraft to Europe to be closer to the Middle East, according to a US official.[xii] Flight tracking data from June 15 confirmed that at least 21 tankers have left the United States and started to move towards Europe.[xiii]

 

Key Takeaways

• Iran has reportedly maintained its uncompromising position regarding nuclear talks, meaning that it is not yet ready to negotiate an end to the war with Israel. Other reports have indicated that Iran may grant concessions if it is allowed to fully retaliate against Israel.
• The United States is deploying additional forces to the Middle East to “provide options to defend US assets and interests.” These forces include a carrier strike group and a high number of refueling tanker aircraft.
• The IAEA indicated that Israeli strikes have likely damaged or destroyed thousands of centrifuges at the Natanz nuclear site. The Fordow site remains largely unscathed, however, according to the IAEA.
• The Iranian capacity to conduct missile operations is likely degraded. The IDF has likely destroyed around a third of the Iranian missile launchers. Iran has also used between a third and half of its missiles that can reach Israel.
• The IDF struck the IRIB headquarters in Iran likely to degrade the Iranian capacity to produce propaganda and shape the information environment. This came after the IDF began striking other regime institutions and energy infrastructure.

Iran Strike Update, June 16, 2025, Morning Edition 

Key Takeaways

• Israel struck military and military-industrial sites around Tehran as part of its ongoing campaign into Iran. There are also unverified reports of an Israeli strike around the Fordow nuclear site.
• Iran conducted another ballistic missile attack against Israel. Iran reportedly fired around 40 missiles, with at least two missiles appearing to strike an energy site in Haifa.

The IDF has targeted several military sites across Iran since June 15. The IDF confirmed on June 16 that the Israeli Air Force struck the IRGC Quds Force headquarters in Tehran.[i] IRGC Quds Force operatives used this facility to plan attacks against Israel.[ii] The IDF reportedly struck an IRGC barracks in Zanjan, Zanjan Province, and a munitions bunker in Qom City, Qom Province.[iii] The IDF also struck Parchin military complex east of Tehran, which Iran has used to develop and manufacture explosive materials and advanced munitions, including ballistic missiles.[iv] Israel targeted missile production sites at Parchin in its October 2024 attack. The Parchin complex also reportedly played a key role in the Iranian nuclear weapons program.

An airstrike reportedly targeted Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant in Safarabad, Qom Province.[v] CTP-ISW will provide a bomb damage assessment and further reflections on the status of the Iranian nuclear program in the upcoming evening update. 

Iran has conducted a single ballistic missile attack targeting Israel since June 15.[vi] An Israeli military correspondent reported that Iran launched approximately 40 missiles.[vii] Two Iranian missiles reportedly struck the Haifa Power Plant, according to open-source watchers on social media.[viii] Impacts in the Haifa area killed three.[ix] Geolocated footage shows damage to the US Embassy in Tel Aviv.[x] US Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee stated that the embassy sustained minor damage but that there were no injuries.[xi]

The IDF intercepted several drones that crossed into Israeli territory on June 15 and 16.[xii] It is unclear what group launched these drones.   

CTP-ISW is tracking reports that an unspecified actor detonated car bombs or vehicle borne explosive devices in Tehran.  CTP-ISW is unable to verify these reports currently due to the contradictory and unclear information space.

Iran Strike Update, June 15, 2025, Evening Edition 

Key Takeaways

• The IDF expanded its air campaign into Iran by beginning to strike regime institutions, including some related to internal security and social control. This comes the day after the IDF began striking energy infrastructure. The degradation of the Iranian coercive apparatus coupled with energy shortages could destabilize the regime.
• The IDF conducted its furthest strike eastward as part of its efforts to establish air superiority over Iran. The IDF specifically struck an Artesh airbase around Mashhad in northeastern Khorasan Razavi Province. Most of the Israeli strikes targeting air defenses have been around western and central Iran thus far.
• Iran has continued its missile campaign targeting Israel, having launched 10 total barrages at the time of this writing. Two of these barrages occurred in recent hours. The IDF has intercepted around 92 percent of the missiles that Iran has fired at Israel thus far, according to an Israeli official speaking to Reuters.

Iran Strike Update, June 14, 2025, Evening Edition 

The Israeli air campaign is driving generational turnover in Iranian military leadership.[i] Israeli strikes have killed numerous senior military officers so far. These individuals, such as Mohammad Bagheri and Amir Ali Hajji Zadeh, had occupied some of the highest positions in the Iranian armed forces for years and, in some cases, decades.[ii] Many of these officers had close personal bonds to one another, having forged brotherly ties in their youth during the Iran-Iraq War and maintained those relationships as they rose together through military ranks in the following decades. These relationships created an informal influence network at the highest echelons of the Iranian military establishment. These officers were extremely influential in shaping Iranian strategy due to their positions at the top of the military hierarchy and their immediate access to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. These officers intervened in Iranian domestic affairs on several occasions to assert their shared political preferences and see the regime through internal crises. CTP-ISW identified this network in a 2013 report, labeling it the IRGC Command Network.[iii] That Israel has killed so many members within and in the orbit of the Command Network in recent days means that Israel has not only removed a key leadership cadre—it has also degraded one of the most stable and influential factions in the Islamic Republic. The Command Network has been an enduring presence in Iranian decision-making circles for decades—one of the few factions to remain so dominant other than Khamenei himself. It is too soon to assess what implications the dismantlement of the Command Network will have on Iranian behavior and strategy.

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed Major General Amir Hatami as the overall Artesh commander.[iv] Hatami replaces Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi, whom Khamenei earlier appointed as Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) chief. The selection of Hatami is notable for several reasons. Khamenei overlooked Artesh Deputy Commander Brigadier General Mohammad Hossein Dadras, who has been the Artesh second-in-command since 2017, and instead favored Hatami for the top post. Hatami is a career Artesh officer but has little experience in senior Artesh command positions compared to Dadras. Hatami spent much of his career working in the AFGS before becoming the defense and armed forces logistics minister under the second Hassan Rouhani administration (2017-2021). Hatami was the first Artesh officer to become the Iranian defense minister in decades, highlighting the great trust that Khamenei had in him. Khamenei appointed Hatami to become his personal adviser for Artesh affairs at the end of Rouhani’s term, further demonstrating support for Hatami, despite the deteriorating relationship between Khamenei and Rouhani.

Hatami is notably a vocal proponent of Iran’s “active deterrence” doctrine, which has underpinned the offensive strategy that Iran has had since 2014-16.[v] Active deterrence is a preventive warfare doctrine that emphasizes interventions abroad to expand Iranian influence and strategic depth and strengthen the Axis of Resistance.[vi] It does not follow, of course, that Hatami’s promotion will presage additional Iranian interventions abroad. But it does at least reflect the influential role that Hatami appears to have played in shaping Iranian strategy and Khamenei’s decision-making in recent years.

Key Takeaways

• The Israeli air campaign is driving generational turnover in Iranian military leadership. Israeli strikes have killed numerous senior military officers so far. Many of these officers had close personal bonds to one another, having forged brotherly ties in their youth during the Iran-Iraq War and maintained those relationships as they rose together through military ranks in the proceeding decades.
• Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed Major General Amir Hatami as the overall Artesh commander. Hatami is notably a vocal proponent of Iran’s “active deterrence” doctrine, which has underpinned the offensive strategy that Iran has had since 2014-16.
• The IDF has continued to target Iranian military targets across Iran, likely to degrade Iran’s retaliatory capabilities.
• This update contains early bomb damage assessments (BDA) of several Iranian facilities, including Natanz, Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center, and several military bases.
• Two US officials said Israeli strikes at Natanz were “extremely effective,” but a senior Israeli official added that the damage is not yet “fatal.”
• Israel struck the Artesh Air Force 2nd Tactical Airbase (TAB) in Tabriz on the night of June 12 to 13, as CTP-ISW previously reported. The strikes destroyed several buildings north of Artesh Air Force aircraft hangars and cratered the approaches from the hangars to the runway.
• Israel may have destroyed a likely aircraft hangar and a radar at Hamedan Air Force Base (43km north of Hamedan) on the night of June 12 to 13.
• Israel struck several buildings at the Amand Missile Base that likely stored ballistic missiles.
• Israel struck the Bakhtaran (Panj Pelleh) underground missile base in Kermanshah on June 13.
• Israel expanded its ongoing strike campaign against Iran on June 14 by targeting critical energy infrastructure. This expansion marks new Israeli efforts to degrade Iran’s capacity to sustain its military and nuclear program.
• CTP-ISW is monitoring reports that the IDF struck the Shahran oil depot on the northwestern outskirts of Tehran on June 14.
• Iran may respond to the Israeli escalation by threatening international maritime security.
• Iranian officials said that Iran will not return to US-Iran nuclear negotiations until Israel halts its attacks on Iran and Iran has finished its retaliatory attacks on Israel.
• Some of Iran’s partners and proxies in the Axis of Resistance have so far failed to meaningfully intervene and impose costs on Israel for targeting Iran so far.
• Iran has launched seven waves of ballistic missile attacks targeting Israel from Iranian territory since initial Israeli strikes on June 12.

Iran Strike Update, June 13, 2025, Evening Edition 

CTP-ISW will resume our coverage of the Israeli Strikes on Iran tomorrow, June 14, 2025. We will produce two updates. The first will cover events between 2:00 PM ET on June 13 and 6:00 AM ET on June 14. The second update will cover events between 6:01 AM ET and 6:00 PM ET on June 14. We will continue to produce two updates per day while conditions warrant it.

Key Takeaways

• Israel launched an air campaign targeting the Iranian nuclear program and regime leadership on June 12 to “degrade, destroy, and remove [the] threat” of Iranian weaponization of its nuclear program. The June 12 to 13 strikes are the opening volley in a weekslong air campaign, according to multiple Israeli officials. It will be difficult to assess the success or failure of the Israeli air campaign based on these objectives in this early stage.
• Israel's strikes intended to impose discrete military effects on Iran that made it difficult for Iran to respond quickly. These effects included the suppression of Iranian air defenses, the degradation of Iran’s ability to retaliate against Israel, and the disruption of Iranian command and control. Israel’s ability to generate at least some of these effects have contributed to Israel’s immediate success and set conditions for Israel to continue and expand the campaign as needed.
• Israel has targeted Iranian nuclear infrastructure on June 12 and 13 in an effort to cripple Iran’s uranium enrichment capabilities. Israel struck enrichment capabilities at Natanz, nuclear facilities in Esfahan. There are unverified reports of strikes at or near Fordow, possibly targeting air defense systems.
• The IDF also targeted multiple Iranian military targets, including a major missile base in Kermanshah Province.
• The IDF targeted prominent members of the Iranian nuclear research network. Israel killed five senior Iranian nuclear scientists from Shahid Beheshti University on June 12 and 13.
• Unspecified Iranian sources told a New York Times journalist that Israeli strikes killed IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani.
• Iran has replaced its slain commanders with other high-ranking officers with long records of service to the regime.
• Iran conducted a two-wave ballistic missile attack targeting Israel from Iranian territory about 18 hours after the initial Israeli strikes. This retaliation seems to have had limited to no effect at this time.
• Iran’s partners and proxies in the Axis of Resistance—excluding the Houthis—released generic statements condemning the Israeli strikes and have not yet changed their behavior toward Israel. The parties gave no indication that they would intervene on behalf of Iran, reflecting how weakened they are after years of fighting Israel. The Houthis are the only Axis partner that has targeted Israel after the strikes.
• US President Donald Trump warned that "even more brutal” attacks on Iran will follow if Iran does not commit to a nuclear deal with the United States. Iran subsequently announced that it has withdrawn from the US-Iran nuclear talks.
• The US Navy deployed the USS Thomas Hudner to the eastern Mediterranean, presumably to assist Israeli ballistic missile defenses.

Iran Strike Update, June 13, 2025, Morning Edition 

This update is the second of at least three CTP-ISW Iran Updates over the next 24 hours that will cover the Iran-Israel war. The recent Israeli strikes are a rapidly evolving situation, and no single individual or organization will have complete information at this time, including the states involved. Some of the information that is available in the open-source will be contradictory or inaccurate. CTP-ISW will continually refine our assessments over the coming days and weeks, as we work to understand the situation. CTP-ISW will issue corrections and clearly articulate when we refine an earlier understanding of events.  

Many sources will misinterpret information in the coming hours. Social media users posted footage that showed dozens of bright streaks in the sky during the October 2024 Iranian ballistic missile attack on Israel and claimed that all of the streaks were ballistic missiles, for example. It later emerged that some of the streaks were ballistic missile interceptors, not missiles.

CTP-ISW will only publish high-confidence information. Our maps and the update below include information including “anti-aircraft fire,” reported and confirmed explosions, and reported and confirmed airstrikes. Some users online may misinterpret anti-aircraft fire as evidence of an airstrike. Some air defense systems have long ranges that make it difficult to assess if the air defense fire’s point of origin is the actual target or if the air defense systems are protecting a more distant site. Likewise, the sounds of explosions may not denote an airstrike because some sources may misinterpret the sounds of missile launches or other kinetic activity.

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei published a brief and generic statement following the Israeli strikes, condemning the attacks and vowing to retaliate.
• Israel conducted covert operations targeting Iranian ballistic missile launchers, which likely hampered Iran’s ability to retaliate with ballistic missiles in the immediate aftermath of the strikes. Israel reportedly built a secret one-way attack drone base in Iran, which it used to strike Iranian ballistic missile launchers near Tehran on June 12.
• In addition to striking nuclear and military infrastructure, Israel has conducted a decapitation campaign targeting Iranian military leadership.

Iran Update, June 12, 2025

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) will be publishing multiple updates over the next 24 hours from June 12-13, 2025, to provide insights into the ongoing strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities, military infrastructure, and key military and nuclear program leadership. We will continue to produce Iran Update special editions until the strikes conclude. We will prioritize covering Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities in response to the attacks that threaten US forces and interests.

This update is the first of at least three CTP-ISW Iran Updates over the next 24 hours that will cover the Iran-Israel war. The recent Israeli strikes are a rapidly evolving situation, and no single individual or organization will have complete information at this time, including the states involved. Some of the information that is available in the open-source will be contradictory or inaccurate. CTP-ISW will continually refine our assessments over the coming days and weeks, as we work to understand the situation. CTP-ISW will issue corrections and clearly articulate when we refine an earlier understanding of events.  

Many sources will misinterpret information in the coming hours. Social media users posted footage that showed dozens of bright streaks in the sky during the October 2024 Iranian ballistic missile attack on Israel and claimed that all of the streaks were ballistic missiles, for example. It later emerged that some of the streaks were ballistic missile interceptors, not missiles.

CTP-ISW will only publish high-confidence information. Our maps and the update below include information including “anti-aircraft fire,” reported and confirmed explosions, and reported and confirmed airstrikes. Some users online may misinterpret anti-aircraft fire as evidence of an airstrike. Some air defense systems have long ranges that make it difficult to assess if the air defense fire’s point of origin is the actual target or if the air defense systems are protecting a more distant site. Likewise, the sounds of explosions may not denote an airstrike because some sources may misinterpret the sounds of missile launches or other kinetic activity.

Key Takeaways:

• Israel conducted the first strikes of its air campaign targeting the Iranian nuclear program and regime leadership on June 12.
• These strikes killed a number of senior Iranian leaders.
• Iran has not yet responded to Israel’s strikes despite claims on June 11 that it had finalized plans for an “immediate counterstrike” against Israel. It is unclear at this time why Iran has yet to respond.
• Iran may opt for “strategic patience” in the aftermath of a strike on its nuclear facilities or other key assets.
• It is also possible that Israel somehow disrupted Iran’s response by targeting Iran’s ballistic missile launch sites and stockpiles.

Israel conducted the first strikes of its air campaign targeting the Iranian nuclear program and regime leadership on June 12. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced on June 12 that Israel has launched a military operation against Iran that will continue “for as many days as it takes to remove the [Iranian] threat.”[i] He stated that Israel has targeted Iran’s nuclear enrichment, nuclear weaponization, and ballistic missile programs as well as Iranian nuclear scientists.

Israeli airstrikes were reported at the following locations:

• Natanz Enrichment Complex in Esfahan Province.[ii] Netanyahu confirmed that Israel hit Natanz.[iii]
• Nobonyad Street in Tehran Province.[iv]
• Lavizan district in Tehran Province.[v]
• Jahan Koudak Tower in Tehran Province.[vi]
• Farahzad neighborhood in Tehran Province.[vii]
• Amir Abad neighborhood in Tehran Province.[viii]
• Andarzgou neighborhood in Tehran Province.[ix]
• Langari Street in Tehran Province.[x]
• Patrice Lumumba Street in Tehran Province.[xi]
• Asatid-e Sarv Complex in Tehran Province.[xii] [xiii]

Israel also targeted Iran’s leadership and nuclear scientists. Iranian media has confirmed that Israeli airstrikes killed Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri, Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Commander Major General Hossein Salami, Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Commander Gholam Ali Rasid, Iranian nuclear scientist and former head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Fereydoon Abbasi, and Iranian physicist and President of the Islamic Azad University Mohammad Mehdi Tehranchi.[xiv] Unverified images circulating on social media show specific buildings impacted by the airstrikes, suggesting that Israel conducted targeted killings in Tehran.[xv] Israeli Army Radio also reported that Israel targeted Ali Shamkhani, a top adviser to the supreme leader.[xvi] Iranian media reported that Shamkhani is in critical condition.[xvii]

Unverified reports also indicate that explosions were heard in the following provinces: Qom, Markazi, Kermanshah, and Hamadan.[xviii] The maps below include key Iranian sites in these provinces. Please note that we are not confirming at this time that any, some, or all of these facilities have been targeted.  

Iran has not yet responded to Israel’s strikes despite claims on June 11 that it had finalized plans for an “immediate counterstrike” against Israel.[xix] It is unclear at this time why Iran has yet to respond. Iran may opt for “strategic patience” in the aftermath of a strike on its nuclear facilities or other key assets. Iran responded four days after the US airstrike that killed Qassem Soleimani on January 3, 2020. Iran similarly waited two weeks to respond to the Israeli airstrike that killed senior IRGC officer Mohammad Reza Zahedi. Iran could choose to delay a counterattack to better assess the damage that Israel inflicted and then calculate a suitable response to the initial attack or campaign. CTP-ISW will continue to monitor Iran’s response whenever it comes. 

It is also possible that Israel somehow disrupted Iran’s response by targeting Iran’s ballistic missile launch sites and stockpiles. Netanyahu said that the strike simultaneously targeted the nuclear program and the missile program, but CTP-ISW has not yet observed reports of Israeli strikes against multiple missile sites.[xx]

CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.   

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Iran Update, June 11, 2025

The United States authorized the voluntary departure of US military dependents and began preparations for a partial US Embassy Baghdad evacuation amid new pessimism about US-Iran nuclear talks.  US President Donald Trump reportedly acknowledged that Iran has delayed US-Iran nuclear talks in a phone call with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on June 9, though he reiterated that the United States still opposes military action against Iran and believes a nuclear deal with Iran is possible.[i] Trump expressed similar qualified pessimism in a New York Post interview on June 10, when he said that he is “less confident” now than before about Iran agreeing to end uranium enrichment.[ii] Multiple US officials have said publicly that Iran will not be able to enrich uranium under a nuclear agreement.[iii] Trump also added that Iran will not possess a nuclear weapon "regardless of whether a deal is reached."[iv] The United States began instituting a series of force protection measures on June 11 following the increase in pessimism. Axios reported on June 11 that US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth authorized the voluntary departure of military dependents from locations across the US Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility, citing an unspecified US defense official.[v] An unspecified US official separately told Reuters on June 11 that the US military plans to authorize the temporary departure of service members' families from Bahrain due to "heightened tensions in the region".[vi] Unspecified US and Iraqi sources separately told Reuters on June 11 that the United States is also preparing a partial evacuation of the US Embassy in Baghdad due to unspecified “tensions in the Middle East.“[vii] An unspecified Iraqi official added that the decision was due to “potential security concerns related to possible regional tensions.”[viii]

 

Some reports suggest that Iran is opposed to several provisions of a recent US nuclear negotiations proposal. The time and date of the sixth round of nuclear talks have not yet been announced. The United States hopes the sixth round of negotiations will occur on June 12, while Iran insists on June 14.[ix] An Iranian expert close to the Iranian regime claimed on June 11 that several provisions of the US nuclear proposal were so "maximalist, excessive, and even humiliating" that they compelled Iran to issue a firm and proportional response. The "proportional response" may refer to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s categorical rejection of the recent US nuclear proposal, which would require Iran to eventually halt all uranium enrichment on its own soil.[x] This Iranian response may have influenced Trump's remarks about the decreasing likelihood of a deal.[xi] Trump separately told Fox News on June 11 that Iran has become “much more aggressive” in the negotiations.[xii] Unspecified senior US officials told Fox News that Iran appears to be delaying the process while it advances its nuclear program.

 

The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO), which monitors maritime security issues, also reacted on June 11 to increased tensions in the region. UKMTO published an advisory on June 11 that warned mariners about a rise in military activity in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman due “to heightened tensions in the region.”[xiii] UKMTO advised vessels transiting the Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, and Strait of Hormuz to exercise caution and report any incidents or suspicious activity.[xiv] The advisory comes amid previous alert reports and Iranian threats to international commercial shipping since May 2025. UKMTO previously reported on May 18 that several vessels experienced Global Positioning System (GPS) interference in the Strait of Hormuz for several hours.[xv] Iran has historically conducted GPS jamming to create conditions to seize ships that inadvertently enter its territorial waters.[xvi] Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri threatened on May 12 that Iran would respond to any attack by disrupting international commercial shipping.[xvii] IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami also inspected IRGC naval units in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf islands on June 11 to evaluate units’ readiness.[xviii] Salami stated that the IRGC Navy is “fully equipped and operationally ready” to respond to any threat and that it has prepared specific responses for all scenarios. Any Iranian response to any military action taken against Iran would likely include operations in the Persian Gulf.

 

Iran continues to threaten to target US and Israeli assets in the region, likely to deter potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran. Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh stated on June 11 that “Iran has access” to all US bases in the region and would target them "without hesitation if provoked."[xix] Nasir Zadeh added that the United States will "certainly suffer more casualties" than Iran in the event of an "enemy mistake and any aggression" against Iran.[xx] Nasir Zadeh is not responsible for the planning or conduct of operations, but his statements echo threats from other senior Iranian officials and military entities. Senior Iranian officials have repeatedly threatened in recent months to attack US bases and forces in the Gulf countries in response to any attack on Iran.[xxi] IRGC-affiliated media claimed on June 10 that Israeli secret nuclear facilities are "within range" of the Iranian armed forces and that Iran could destroy them with “hundreds of ballistic missiles” with a single order.[xxii] The Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) similarly threatened on June 9 to target Israeli secret nuclear facilities and claimed that Iran has obtained sensitive intelligence that it could use to strike those sites if Israel attacked Iranian nuclear facilities.[xxiii]

 

The United States and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) submitted a non-compliance resolution that declares Iran in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors meeting on June 11.[xxiv] The IAEA Board of Governors has not yet voted on the resolution and will resume its meeting on June 12.[xxv] The non-compliance resolution will reportedly give Iran an unspecified period to address its “less than satisfactory” cooperation with the IAEA’s probe into three undeclared Iranian nuclear sites.[xxvi] The IAEA Board of Governors previously passed a similar non-compliance resolution against Iran in September 2005.[xxvii] The Board of Governors later referred Iran's non-compliance to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in February 2006, which led to the imposition of UN sanctions on Iran.[xxviii] The Board of Governors could similarly refer the new non-compliance resolution to the UNSC, assuming the Board of Governors passes the resolution. Such an action could lead to the imposition of further UN sanctions on Iran. The E3 could separately use the non-compliance resolution in future efforts to impose snapback sanctions on Iran. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[xxix]

 

Iran has threatened to expand its nuclear program if the IAEA passes a non-compliance resolution against Iran. A UK-based outlet reported on June 11 that it has "learned" that Iran will "likely" open a new uranium enrichment facility in response to a non-compliance resolution.[xxx] This report is consistent with statements from Iranian officials threatening to take "technical" counter-measures in response to an IAEA non-compliance resolution.[xxxi] Iran has previously announced it would take steps to expand its nuclear program in retaliation for IAEA resolutions.[xxxii] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran could calculate that taking steps to further expand its nuclear program at this time would increase the risk of snapback sanctions or potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran.[xxxiii]

 

Russia offered to accept Iran's "excess" enriched uranium stockpile as part of a potential US-Iran nuclear agreement.[xxxiv] Russian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Ryabkov stated on June 11 that Russia is "ready to provide assistance" to the United States and Iran regarding the US-Iran nuclear negotiations.[xxxv] Ryabkov added that Russia could remove Iran's "excess nuclear material" and downblend it.[xxxvi] Downblending is the process of converting highly enriched uranium into low-enriched uranium. Iran previously sent 25,000 pounds of its 20 percent enriched uranium to Russia in December 2015 as part of the 2015 US-Iran nuclear deal.[xxxvii]  Russia’s offer comes amid recent Russian efforts to acquire a more influential role within US-Iran negotiations, including repeated offers to mediate the talks.[xxxviii] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Russia's involvement in the US-Iran nuclear talks would be very unlikely to secure US interests due to Russia's alignment with Iran.[xxxix] Russia has opposed the stated US demands in the negotiations by supporting Iran's right to enrich uranium and has tried to interfere with US-E3 attempts to declare Iran non-compliant with IAEA standards.[xl] A Wall Street Journal journalist reported on June 11 that Russian Permanent Representative to the UN in Vienna Mikhail Ulyanov delivered an "extremely long statement" at the IAEA Board of Governors meeting on June 11, likely to delay a vote on the non-compliance resolution against Iran.[xli] It is notable that Russia is simultaneously offering to support the US-Iran nuclear negotiations while trying to help Iran delay the vote on a non-compliance resolution and avoid further sanctions.

 

US Envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack told al Monitor on June 10 that the US holds several “expectations” for Syrian President Ahmed al Shara to act upon following the US decision to lift sanctions on Syria.[xlii] The shift to ”expectations” from ”conditions” to lift sanctions reflects the US decision to lift sanctions before all the previous conditions to lift sanctions were met. ”Expectations” imply the US anticipates these previous conditions will be met in the future. Barrack stated that the United States expects transparency from Shara as he acts on the priorities that US President Donald Trump outlined to Shara during their meeting in Riyadh on May 14.[xliii] Barrack noted that the United States expects Shara to curb Palestinian militant activity in Syria, prevent an ISIS resurgence, and take steps towards an eventual entry into the Abraham Accords.[xliv] The US previously gave the Syrian government a list of “confidence-building“ conditions in mid-March 2025 that Damascus needed to address before the United States would consider removing sanctions.[xlv] The similarities between the former confidence-building measures and the expectations described by Barrack suggest that US priorities in Syria not changed significantly, however. The March conditions reportedly included US-Syria counterterrorism cooperation, barring foreign fighters from senior political or military positions, the destruction of remaining chemical weapons stockpiles, and ending Palestinian political and militia activity in Syria.[xlvi] The Syrian government has taken steps to address these conditions in recent months. The Syrian transitional government has taken steps to eject Palestinian militant organizations from Syria, engaged Israel in deconfliction talks, and has continued to dismantle Iranian-linked networks in Syrian territory, but it has not removed foreign fighters from senior military positions.[xlvii] The United States and the Syrian transitional government recently agreed to integrate foreign fighters into the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to prevent foreign fighters from joining Salafi-jihadi groups in Syria.[xlviii]

 

Key Takeaways:

• Tensions in the Middle East: The United States authorized the voluntary departure of US military dependents and began preparations for a partial US Embassy Baghdad evacuation amid new pessimism about US-Iran nuclear talks. Some reports suggest that Iran is opposed to several provisions of a recent US nuclear negotiations proposal.
• Iranian Threats Towards the United States: Iran continues to threaten to target US and Israeli assets in the region, likely to deter potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran.
• IAEA Board of Governors Meeting: The United States and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) submitted a non-compliance resolution that declares Iran in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors meeting on June 11. Iran has threatened to expand its nuclear program if the IAEA passes a non-compliance resolution against Iran.
• Iran-Russia Cooperation: Russia offered to accept Iran's "excess" enriched uranium stockpile as part of a potential US-Iran nuclear agreement.
• Syria Sanctions: US Envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack told al Monitor on June 10 that the US holds several “expectations” for Syrian President Ahmed al Shara to act upon following the US decision to lift sanctions on Syria.

Iran Update, June 10, 2025

The Syrian transitional government has quickly responded to several false reports of insurgent activity in coastal Syria over the last week. The government’s rapid response demonstrates that the government remains concerned about violence in coastal Syria despite low levels of Alawite insurgency activity there. Multiple factors, including a lack of Alawite support for insurgent groups, government pressure, and poorly executed insurgent operations, have probably contributed to the decrease in insurgent activity in coastal areas. The transitional government deployed several General Security Services (GSS) and Defense Ministry units to Daliyah, Latakia Province, on June 4 following false reports about an Assadist insurgent attack in the town.[i] The “attack” was reportedly a personal verbal dispute between two people that local officials overstated.[ii] Alawite militia “Coastal Shield Brigade” denied that any insurgent attack targeted Daliyah on June 4.[iii] The local transitional government officials likely responded to the rumored attack with force and urgency, given that neighboring areas participated in the March attacks against the GSS.[iv] Government forces imposed a curfew on Daliyah and arrested alleged “outlaws.“[v] Some of the defense ministry units that deployed to Daliyah committed atrocities targeting Alawite communities on June 4 and 5.[vi] 50th Division soldiers reportedly killed three men and burned cars and homes in neighboring villages of Daliyah.[vii] The transitional government arrested the soldiers on June 9, however.[viii] This incident underscores the threat posed by the government’s continued discipline issues within certain MoD units. Poorly disciplined units that are deployed to areas in times of crisis could increase the risk of minor incidents devolving into widespread sectarian violence, like that seen in coastal Syria in March 2025. 

 

The transitional government does not appear to be similarly concerned about small-scale insurgent activity in other areas of Syria.[ix] Likely ISIS fighters detonated improvised explosive devices (IED) targeting GSS positions in Deir ez Zor province, and unspecified militants detonated IEDs targeting other GSS positions in Daraa from June 4 to June 10, but Damascus had a minimal response.[x] Part of the transitional government’s reaction to incidents in coastal Syria may be linked to continued threats from organized groups and former militia leaders in coastal Syria.[xi] Syrian businessman and the maternal cousin of Bashar al Assad Rami Makhlouf claimed in late May 2025 that June 2025 will mark the “beginning” of anti-government activity and that this activity will accelerate in July 2025.[xii]

Iran is preparing a counter-proposal for the United States that includes terms for an interim deal. Iran may calculate that reaching an interim deal with the United States will delay or prevent snapback sanctions or potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran. Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi told Iranian state media on June 10 that Iran is still preparing its response to the recent US nuclear proposal but described the counter-proposal as offering a "framework for an agreement.”[xiii] Ravanchi stated that Iran is not currently interested in presenting a "very long...comprehensive" proposal. Ravanchi added that Iran and the United States can engage in "more detailed negotiations" after they agree on a framework agreement.  A senior US official told Axios on June 10 that the United States has received indications that Iran will reject the recent US proposal while signaling interest in continuing the US-Iran nuclear negotiations.[xiv] Iran likely wants to continue negotiations in order to delay snapback sanctions or strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action snapback mechanism expires in October 2025, which may give Iran an incentive to prolong negotiations. Iran's push for a framework agreement and continued negotiations also comes ahead of US President Donald Trump's 60-day deadline, which expires on June 12, for Iran to agree to a new nuclear deal.[xv] The United States and Iran will reportedly hold a sixth round of the US-Iran nuclear negotiations this week. Axios reported on June 10 that the United States and Iran will hold the sixth round of nuclear talks in Oslo on June 13 or in Muscat on June 15.[xvi]

 

Hezbollah is reportedly prioritizing domestic drone production in order to reduce its reliance on procuring Iranian weapons.[xvii] Israeli media reported on June 9 that Hezbollah has shifted its rehabilitation budget to focus on domestic production of explosive-laden and attack drones over missiles and rocket procurement.[xviii] These drones are reportedly simpler, faster, and cheaper to produce because they use readily available civilian parts.[xix] The Houthis similarly produce some drones domestically and rely upon readily available civilian parts.[xx] These Houthi drones were used to sustain a year-long campaign against Saudi Arabia that targeted southern Saudi provinces just over the Yemeni border.[xxi] Israeli media reported that these drones are harder for Israeli air defense systems to immediately detect and classify.[xxii] Some of Hezbollah’s most lethal attacks against Israel have used these drones, including the October 2024 drone attack targeting an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) training camp in Binyamina that injured at least 67 Israelis.[xxiii]

 

Hezbollah likely seeks to prioritize domestic drone production after recent setbacks that have complicated its ability to procure and smuggle Iranian weapons into Lebanon.[xxiv] The Israeli Air Force officer responsible for overseeing efforts against Hezbollah’s covert aerial unit stated Hezbollah wants to achieve “greater self-sufficiency and less reliance on Iran.”[xxv] Hezbollah has historically relied on land, air, and maritime smuggling routes to procure weapons from Iran into Lebanon.[xxvi] The new Syrian government has affirmed that it will not allow Iran to re-establish its activities and influence in Syria, which it previously used to provide financial support and military equipment to Hezbollah.[xxvii] The Syrian transitional government has also continued to dismantle smuggling networks between Iraq and Syria that previously served as a key node in the ground line of communication between Iran and Hezbollah during the Assad regime.[xxviii] Lebanese authorities also tightened security and control at Beirut’s International Airport in May 2025 to curb Hezbollah-linked smuggling.[xxix] Iran has used civilian flights traveling to Beirut airport to traffic weapons to Hezbollah since at least 2018.[xxx] The IDF has also continued to target Hezbollah weapons production and storage facilities in recent months.[xxxi] The IDF Air Force struck Hezbollah drone production and storage facilities in Beirut’s southern suburbs on June 5.[xxxii]

 

Hezbollah may be able to smuggle some small shipments of arms through Syria into Lebanon, but Hezbollah will find it far more challenging to smuggle in missile or missile production components. Hezbollah previously used Syria as a rear area where it could produce very sophisticated solid-fuel ballistic missile systems, for example.[xxxiii] It will not be possible for Hezbollah to rebuild similar production capabilities. Many missile components, such as engines, are also much larger and difficult to transport compared to small arms or dual-use drone components.

 

Key Takeaways:

• Syrian Insurgencies: The Syrian transitional government has quickly responded to several false reports of insurgent activity in coastal Syria over the last week. The government’s rapid response demonstrates that the government remains concerned about violence in coastal Syria despite low levels of Alawite insurgency activity there. The transitional government does not appear to be similarly concerned about small-scale insurgent activity in other areas of Syria.
• Iran Nuclear Negotiations: Iran is preparing a counter-proposal for the United States that includes terms for an interim deal. Iran may calculate that reaching an interim deal with the United States will delay or prevent snapback sanctions or potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran.
• Hezbollah Reconstitution: Hezbollah is reportedly prioritizing domestic drone production in order to reduce its reliance on procuring Iranian weapons. Hezbollah likely seeks to prioritize domestic drone production after recent setbacks that have complicated its ability to procure and smuggle Iranian weapons into Lebano Hezbollah may be able to smuggle some small shipments of arms through Syria into Lebanon, but Hezbollah will find it far more challenging to smuggle in missile or missile production components.

Iran Update, June 9, 2025

Iran continues to signal that it will reject the recent US nuclear proposal. The United States recently sent a proposal to Iran that would require Iran to halt all uranium enrichment on Iranian soil after the establishment of a regional nuclear consortium.[i] Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei criticized the US proposal on June 9 and stated that Iran will soon present a counter-proposal via Oman.[ii] Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf stated on June 8 that "no rational mind would accept" the US proposal.[iii] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran's continued rejection of the US demand for zero uranium enrichment could cause the US-Iran negotiations to collapse.[iv] US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu held a phone call on June 9 amid growing indications from Iranian officials that Iran is planning to reject the US proposal. [v] Trump stated after the phone call that Iran and the United States will meet on June 12, which corresponds with the reported US deadline for Iran to agree to a new nuclear deal.[vi] Netanyahu reportedly convened a security cabinet meeting to discuss Iran following the phone call.[vii]

The Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) released a statement following Trump and Netanyahu’s phone call on June 9 in which it threatened to attack Israel's "covert nuclear facilities" in response to a potential Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities.[viii] The SNSC claimed that Iran would attack Israeli nuclear facilities using a "treasure trove” of sensitive information about Israeli nuclear facilities that Iran reportedly recently obtained and exfiltrated to Iran.[ix] Iranian officials announced Iran’s alleged acquisition of this sensitive information on June 7.[x] Iran's claim that it obtained intelligence about Israeli nuclear facilities is likely an information operation that seeks to advance several objectives. A US journalist reported on June 4 that Iran may include a demand for a nuclear weapons-free Middle East in its counter-proposal to the United States, citing two experts in contact with Iranian negotiators.[xi] Iran may calculate that it can use its alleged acquisition of "sensitive information” about Israeli nuclear facilities to bolster its argument for a nuclear weapons-free Middle East. Iran may also use this information operation to reinforce its threat to attack Israeli nuclear facilities in retaliation for a potential Israeli strike on Iran in order to try to deter such a strike.[xii]

Iran threatened to expand its nuclear program if the International Atomic Energy Agency passes a non-compliance resolution against Iran. The IAEA Board of Governors is meeting between June 9 and 13, during which the United States and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) intend to submit a non-compliance resolution against Iran.[xiii] The United States and E3 drafted a non-compliance resolution in response to the May 31 IAEA comprehensive report that unscored Iran’s “less than satisfactory” cooperation with the IAEA. Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Spokesperson Behrouz Kamalvandi stated on June 8 that Iran has prepared "a list of countermeasures," including “technical" countermeasures, if the IAEA passes the non-compliance resolution.[xiv] Iran announced that it would install over 6,000 centrifuges at its enrichment facilities in retaliation for the IAEA Board of Governors' November 2024 censure resolution that condemned Iran for its failure to cooperate fully with the IAEA.[xv] It is unclear if Iran would decide to take a similar course of action in response to a non-compliance resolution. CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran could calculate that taking steps to further expand its nuclear program would increase the risk of snapback sanctions or potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran.[xvi]

Iran is conducting an information operation to undermine the recent IAEA comprehensive report, likely to deter diplomatic and military action against Iran. The IAEA's recent comprehensive report confirmed that Iran conducted undeclared nuclear activities at four locations—Turquzabad, Marivan, Varamin, and Lavizan-Shian—until the early 2000s.[xvii] The Institute for Science and International Security published an analysis of the IAEA's comprehensive report on June 6 and highlighted that Iran conducted several implosion tests essential to building a nuclear weapon at Marivan in 2003.[xviii] The IAEA stated that Iran conducted these tests as part of its broader plan to conduct a cold test, which is typically the final test of a nuclear weapon implosion development program. The release of the IAEA’s comprehensive report follows reports that a "secret team" of Iranian weapons engineers and scientists is "exploring" a faster approach to build a nuclear weapon in a "matter of months.”[xix] Iran responded to the comprehensive report by claiming on June 7 that Israel sabotaged and contaminated its nuclear facilities at these four sites.[xx] Iran likely accused Israel of sabotage to obfuscate Iran's non-compliance with the IAEA and to try to deter a non-compliance resolution, potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran, and snapback sanctions.

Iranian-backed Shia Coordination Framework parties are committing electoral fraud ahead of the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections, according to leaked audio recordings. The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. Kurdish media reported on June 8 that an unspecified leader of Iranian-backed militia Asaib Ahl al Haq (AAH) threatened to fire AAH members who don’t update their voter registration and vote for candidates of AAH’s Sadiqoun political bloc.[xxi] The AAH leader also pressured the families of AAH members to vote for Sadiqoun candidates.[xxii] A professor at the Baghdad-based al Farahidi University, which is owned by Deputy Parliament Speaker Mohsen al Mandalawi, was recorded telling students and their families to vote for Mandalawi in exchange for academic degrees and financial benefits.[xxiii] Iranian-backed Iraqi political parties have bought votes and threatened voters in previous elections.[xxiv]

National Wisdom Movement head Ammar al Hakim condemned corruption and electoral fraud on June 7.[xxv] Hakim’s condemnation came after various Shia Coordination Framework members opposed to Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani and his coalition, including AAH head Qais al Khazali, accused Sudani and his coalition of corruption.[xxvi] Hakim’s National Wisdom Movement will compete against Sudani and AAH in the upcoming November 2025 elections. It is unclear if Hakim is coordinating with Shia Coordination Framework parties to damage Sudani’s electoral prospects, although Hakim could benefit from a decline in support for Sudani’s coalition.[xxvii]

Key Takeaways:

• US-Iran Nuclear Negotiations: US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu held a phone call on June 9 amid growing indications from Iranian officials that Iran is planning to reject the recent US nuclear proposal. Trump stated after the phone call that Iran and the United States will meet on June 12, which corresponds with the reported US deadline for Iran to agree to a new nuclear deal. Netanyahu reportedly convened a security cabinet meeting to discuss Iran following the phone call. The Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) released a statement following Trump and Netanyahu’s phone call on June 9 in which it threatened to attack Israel's "covert nuclear facilities" in response to a potential Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. The SNSC claimed that Iran would attack Israeli nuclear facilities using a "treasure trove” of sensitive information about Israeli nuclear facilities that Iran reportedly recently obtained and exfiltrated to Iran. Iran's claim that it obtained intelligence about Israeli nuclear facilities is likely an information operation that seeks to advance several objectives. Iran likely accused Israel of sabotage to obfuscate Iran's non-compliance with the IAEA and to try to deter a non-compliance resolution, potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran, and snapback sanctions.
• Iraqi Parliamentary Elections: Iranian-backed Shia Coordination Framework parties are committing electoral fraud ahead of the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections, according to leaked audio recordings. Kurdish media reported on June 8 that an unspecified leader of Iranian-backed militia Asaib Ahl al Haq (AAH) threatened to fire AAH members who don’t update their voter registration and vote for candidates of AAH’s Sadiqoun political bloc. A professor at the Baghdad-based al Farahidi University, which is owned by Deputy Parliament Speaker Mohsen al Mandalawi, was separately recorded telling students and their families to vote for Mandalawi in exchange for academic degrees and financial benefits. National Wisdom Movement head Ammar al Hakim condemned corruption and electoral fraud on June 7.

Iran Update, June 6, 2025

Iran is continuing to cooperate with China to replenish its solid-fuel ballistic missile stockpile after Israel destroyed Iranian solid-fuel production sites in October 2024.[i] Israeli strikes in October 2024 damaged three major long-range missile production sites in Iran, including the Shahroud Military Site in Semnan Province and the Khojir and Parchin complexes in Tehran Province.[ii] Unspecified sources told the Wall Street Journal on June 5 that Iran has ordered thousands of tons of ammonium perchlorate from China in recent months.[iii] Ammonium perchlorate comprises around 70 percent of the propellant of solid-fuel missiles.[iv] The sources stated that an Iranian firm, Pishgaman Tejarat Rafi Novin Company, ordered the material from a Hong Kong-based company. This report follows several sodium perchlorate transfers from China to Iran in recent months.[v] Sodium perchlorate can be converted into ammonium perchlorate. Two US-sanctioned Iranian cargo vessels, Golbon and Jairan, delivered over 1,100 tons of sodium perchlorate from China to Bandar Abbas, Iran, in early 2025.[vi] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organization (SSJO), which oversees part of Iran’s missile research and development, took delivery of the cargo.[vii] Iran also previously engaged in secret negotiations with China and Russia in April 2023 to acquire ammonium perchlorate from China.[viii]

The sources speaking to the Wall Street Journal stated that the new ammonium perchlorate shipments could support the production of up to 800 ballistic missiles. Western sources previously estimated that 1,000 tons of ammonium perchlorate can fuel up to 260 medium-range ballistic missiles.[ix] If the 800 ballistic missiles that the Wall Street Journal referred to are medium-range missiles, this would suggest that Iran purchased around 3,000 tons of ammonium perchlorate from China.[x] Iran may have purchased this amount of ammonium perchlorate to compensate for the loss of some sodium perchlorate that China recently shipped to Iran. An unspecified source told the Wall Street Journal that the explosion at Shahid Rajaei Port in Bandar Abbas on April 26 destroyed some of the sodium perchlorate that China shipped to Iran in early 2025.[xi]

Iran could provide its proxies and partners, including the Houthis and Russia, with new ballistic missiles that it produces or materials that are needed to build ballistic missiles. An unspecified source told the Wall Street Journal that Iran plans to send part of the ammonium perchlorate to Iranian-backed militias, including the Houthis in Yemen.[xii] Iran has previously exported ammonium perchlorate to members of the Axis of Resistance. The US Navy intercepted a vessel in the Gulf of Oman that was carrying around 70 tons of ammonium perchlorate from Iran to Yemen in November 2024, for example.[xiii] The recent shipments may also improve Iran’s ability to provide ballistic missiles to Russia for its war with Ukraine. Iran began sending Fateh-360 ballistic missiles, which are solid-fuel missiles, to Russia in September 2023.[xiv]

The United States and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) are planning to submit a non-compliance resolution against Iran at the upcoming International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors meeting on June 9. The resolution will reportedly give Iran time to address its “less than satisfactory” cooperation with the IAEA’s probe into three undeclared nuclear sites.[xv] The IAEA's recent quarterly and comprehensive reports both confirmed Iran’s non-compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Safeguards Agreement.[xvi]  An unspecified senior Western diplomat told the Associated Press on June 5 that the goal of the planned non-compliance resolution is to “resolve the [Iranian nuclear] issue.”[xvii] The diplomat stated that the Board of Governors will not immediately refer the non-compliance resolution to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and that Iran will have an unspecified amount of time to fulfill its safeguards obligations. The Board of Governors will reportedly hold an extraordinary meeting in the summer to pass a resolution to refer Iran’s non-compliance to the UNSC if Iran fails to cooperate with the IAEA by that time. The IAEA Board of Governors previously passed a similar resolution that declared Iran in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations in September 2005.[xviii] The Board of Governors later referred Iran's non-compliance to the UNSC in February 2006, which led to the imposition of UN sanctions on Iran.[xix]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi warned on X on June 6 that Iran would respond “forcefully” to any IAEA Board of Governors resolution.[xx] Iran announced that it would install over 6,000 centrifuges at its enrichment facilities in retaliation for the IAEA Board of Governors' November 2024 censure resolution that condemned Iran for its failure to cooperate fully with the IAEA.[xxi] It is unclear if Iran would decide to take a similar course of action in response to a non-compliance resolution. Iran could calculate that taking steps to further expand its nuclear program would increase the risk of snapback sanctions or potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran. The non-compliance resolution would lay the foundation for the E3 to trigger snapback sanctions.

Israeli officials informed the United States that Israel will not strike Iran unless US President Donald Trump signals that the US-Iran nuclear negotiations have failed, according to two unspecified Israeli sources.[xxii] An unspecified Israeli source told Axios on June 5 that Israeli officials said that Israel will not "surprise" the United States with a military strike on Iran. A separate Israeli source added that Israeli officials said that there is ”no logic” in attacking Iran if a "good diplomatic solution” is reached. Trump warned Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu against taking any action that could potentially jeopardize the US-Iran nuclear talks in a phone call on May 22.[xxiii] US officials told Axios that the next round of the US-Iran nuclear negotiations is not expected to take place this weekend.[xxiv]

Key Takeaways:

• Chinese Support for the Iranian Ballistic Missile Program: Iran is continuing to cooperate with China to replenish its solid-fuel ballistic missile stockpile after Israel destroyed Iranian solid-fuel production sites in October 2024. Unspecified sources told the Wall Street Journal on June 5 that Iran has ordered thousands of tons of ammonium perchlorate from China in recent months. Ammonium perchlorate comprises around 70 percent of the propellant of solid-fuel missiles. This report follows several sodium perchlorate transfers from China to Iran in recent months. Sodium perchlorate can be converted into ammonium perchlorate. The sources speaking to the Wall Street Journal stated that the new ammonium perchlorate shipments could support the production of up to 800 ballistic missiles. Iran could provide its proxies and partners, including the Houthis and Russia, with new ballistic missiles that it produces or materials that are needed to build ballistic missiles.
• US-Iran Nuclear Negotiations: The United States and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) are planning to submit a non-compliance resolution against Iran at the upcoming International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors meeting on June 9. The resolution will reportedly give Iran time to address its “less than satisfactory” cooperation with the IAEA’s probe into three undeclared nuclear sites. An unspecified senior Western diplomat stated that the Board of Governors will not immediately refer the non-compliance resolution to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and that Iran will have an unspecified amount of time to fulfill its safeguards obligations. The Board of Governors will reportedly hold an extraordinary meeting in the summer to pass a resolution to refer Iran’s non-compliance to the UNSC if Iran fails to cooperate with the IAEA by that time. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi warned on X on June 6 that Iran would respond “forcefully” to any IAEA Board of Governors resolution.

Iran Update, June 5, 2025

Russia continues to position itself as a mediator in the US-Iran nuclear negotiations. Russia’s mediation of the US-Iran talks would be very unlikely to secure US interests given Russia’s alignment with Iran. US President Donald Trump stated on June 4 that Russian President Vladimir Putin offered to "participate" in the US-Iran nuclear negotiations.[i] Russia’s offer to mediate the negotiations comes after Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei explicitly rejected a recent US nuclear proposal to Iran because the proposal would require Iran to eventually halt all uranium enrichment on Iranian soil.[ii] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran’s continued rejection of the US demand for zero uranium enrichment could cause the US-Iran nuclear negotiations to collapse.[iii] Iran and Russia have held several meetings since March 2025 to discuss the dispute between Iran and the United States over Iran’s nuclear program.[iv] Russia has opposed stated US objectives in the nuclear negotiations and the recent US proposal by supporting Iran’s right to enrich uranium.[v] Russian Permanent Representative to the UN in Vienna Mikhail Ulyanov claimed in early March 2025 that Iran’s production of 60 percent enriched uranium has “no weapons risk."[vi] Iran currently has enough 60 percent enriched uranium, if enriched further, to produce nearly 10 nuclear weapons.[vii] Russia’s support for Iran’s domestic uranium enrichment is inconsistent with the stated US position against uranium enrichment on Iranian soil. US President Donald Trump confirmed on June 3 that the United States maintains its position that Iran cannot enrich uranium.[viii]

Iran and Russia have deepened political and military cooperation in recent years, particularly since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Iran has supported Russia’s invasion of Ukraine by providing Russia with Fateh-360 ballistic missiles and launchers and Shahed drones.[ix] Iran reportedly purchased Russian Su-35 fighter jets in January 2025, though Russia has not yet delivered the Su-35s to Iran.[x] Russia has also supported and cooperated with Iran’s Axis of Resistance in recent years. This cooperation has included working with Iran and Iranian-backed militias to attack US forces in the Middle East.[xi] Russia also supported the Axis of Resistance against Israel during the October 7 War, including by providing targeting intelligence to the Houthis to support attacks on international shipping and US vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.[xii] Iran and Russia signed a strategic cooperation agreement in January 2025, which further illustrates their close collaboration and alignment in working to erode US global influence.[xiii]

Iran is leveraging its membership in multilateral organizations such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to try to mitigate the effects of international sanctions. Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf attended the 11th BRICS Parliamentary Forum in Brazil on June 4 and 5.[xiv] Ghalibaf called for a joint legislative charter among BRICS members to counter sanctions.[xv] Ghalibaf urged BRICS members to use alternative financial tools, such as BRICS Pay, and conduct commercial transactions using national currencies instead of the US dollar. Ghalibaf met with Brazilian officials on the sidelines of the forum to promote the expansion of bilateral ties through the Iran-Brazil Joint Economic Commission.[xvi]

Iranian Central Bank Governor Mohammad Reza Farzin separately attended a meeting for central bank governors of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) member states in Beijing on June 2.[xvii] Farzin proposed the creation of a joint bank for SCO member states in order to facilitate financial transactions among members and reduce reliance on institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Iran’s emphasis on cooperation with BRICS and SCO members is part of a broader Iranian effort to build a parallel international order that challenges “Western dominance” and US “unilateralism.“[xviii]

Senior Iranian military commanders continue to prepare for potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran. Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard inspected Iran's Northern Air Defense Zone at Mehrabad Airport in Tehran Province on June 5 to evaluate military units and defense capabilities at the site.[xix] Sabahi Fard also inspected air defense positions near former Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini’s mausoleum in southern Tehran. Sabahi Fard may have inspected the Hazrat-e Amir Brigade Air Defense Site. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck the Hazrat-e Amir Brigade Air Defense Site in October 2024.[xx] The brigade is located roughly 8 miles from Khomeini’s mausoleum and about 7 miles from the Northern Air Defense Zone at Mehrabad Airport. Sabahi Fard has inspected at least 12 Iranian air defense sites across Iran since April 2025.[xxi]

Key Takeaways:

• Russo-Iranian Cooperation: Russia continues to position itself as a mediator in the US-Iran nuclear negotiations. Russia’s mediation of the US-Iran talks is unlikely to secure US interests given Russia’s alignment with Iran. Russia has opposed stated US objectives in the nuclear negotiations and the recent US proposal by supporting Iran’s right to enrich uranium. Russian Permanent Representative to the UN in Vienna Mikhail Ulyanov claimed in early March 2025 that Iran’s production of 60 percent enriched uranium has “no weapons risk." Iran currently has enough 60 percent enriched uranium, if enriched further, to produce nearly 10 nuclear weapons.
• Iranian Efforts to Undermine Sanctions: Iran is leveraging its membership in multilateral organizations such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to try to mitigate the effects of international sanctions. Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf attended the 11th BRICS Parliamentary Forum in Brazil on June 4 and 5. Ghalibaf called for a joint legislative charter among BRICS members to counter sanctions. Iranian Central Bank Governor Mohammad Reza Farzin separately attended a meeting for central bank governors of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) member states in Beijing on June 2. Farzin proposed the creation of a joint bank for SCO member states in order to facilitate financial transactions among members and reduce reliance on institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
• Iranian Preparations for a Potential Strike: Senior Iranian military commanders continue to prepare for potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran. Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard inspected Iran's Northern Air Defense Zone at Mehrabad Airport in Tehran Province on June 5 to evaluate military units and defense capabilities at the site. Sabahi Fard also inspected air defense positions near former Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini’s mausoleum in southern Tehran. Sabahi Fard may have inspected the Hazrat-e Amir Brigade Air Defense Site.

Iran Update, June 4, 2025

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei categorically rejected the recent US nuclear proposal because the proposal would require Iran to eventually halt all uranium enrichment on Iranian soil.[i] Iran’s continued rejection of the US demand for zero uranium enrichment could cause the US-Iran nuclear negotiations to collapse. Axios reported on June 2 that the US proposal would allow Iran to enrich uranium at three percent on Iranian soil during the establishment of a regional nuclear consortium.[ii] The United States reportedly seeks to establish the consortium outside of Iran. Iran would be required to halt all enrichment after the establishment of the consortium. Khamenei delivered a speech on June 4 in which he stated that enrichment in Iran "is a red line."[iii] Khamenei claimed that a nuclear industry without enrichment is “practically worthless" and emphasized that Iran would not become “dependent” on foreign countries for uranium.[iv] Under the US proposal, Iran would receive uranium for civilian nuclear purposes as part of the regional consortium but would not be allowed to independently enrich uranium on Iranian soil after the consortium is formed.   

 

Iran may accept the establishment of a regional nuclear consortium if it operates on Iranian soil. An unspecified senior Iranian official told Axios on June 3 that Iran is open to the consortium model, but only if the consortium’s enrichment facility is located in Iran.[v] Two unspecified Iranian officials separately told the New York Times on June 4 that Iran is planning to “bargain” for the regional consortium to be based on Kish or Gheshm islands in the Persian Gulf to maintain its right to enrichment on Iranian soil.[vi] An unspecified Arab diplomatic source told Israeli media on June 3 that the United States may propose placing the consortium on one of the disputed islands—Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, or Lesser Tunb.[vii] Iran seeks for the regional consortium to be based on Kish or Gheshm islands, rather than the disputed islands, given that the former are internationally recognized as Iranian territory while the latter are claimed by both Iran and the United Arab Emirates.

 

The Iranian officials speaking to the New York Times added that Iran is open to the consortium idea because Iran “does not want talks to fail."[viii] It is in Iran's interest to prolong the nuclear talks, given that it likely calculates that prolonging the talks will delay or prevent snapback sanctions and a potential US or Israeli strike on its nuclear facilities. US President Donald Trump accused Iran of “slow-walking [its] decision” after Khamenei rejected the US proposal on June 4. Iran has not yet submitted a formal response to the US proposal, which could reflect internal debates in Iran about how to reject the US zero enrichment demand in the proposal while also ensuring that the negotiations do not collapse.

 

Likely Iranian-aligned militants launched a small-scale rocket attack from southwestern Syria into the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights on June 3.[ix] This attack marks the first time that militants have attacked Israel from Syrian territory since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024.[x] Militants launched two rockets from Tasil, Daraa Province, into the southern Golan Heights.[xi] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) briefly operated in Tasil in April 2025.[xii] Israeli media reported on June 3 that the rockets landed in open areas and did not cause any casualties.[xiii] The IDF launched several retaliatory air and artillery strikes targeting Syrian military sites and towns in southwestern Syria on June 3.[xiv] The targeted military sites included the new Syrian army’s 121st Brigade base near Kanaker, Rif Dimashq Province, and the 175th Brigade base near Izraa, Daraa Province.[xv]

 

Two likely Iranian-aligned groups separately claimed responsibility for the June 3 rocket attack.[xvi] Neither group has previously conducted any attacks targeting Israel. The Martyr Muhammad al Deif Brigades claimed responsibility for the attack and released a video that reportedly showed the rockets landing in the Golan Heights.[xvii] The Martyr Muhammad al Deif Brigades is a Hamas-aligned Palestinian resistance group that announced its formation on June 3.[xviii] The Islamic Resistance Front of Syria-the First of the Brave also claimed responsibility for the attack and published a video of the alleged rockets in their launching positions on June 3.[xix] The Islamic Resistance Front of Syria-the First of the Brave is an anti-Israel militia formed in January 2025 that uses iconography widely associated with or inspired by the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps.[xx] The Islamic Resistance Front of Syria-the First of the Brave Spokesperson Abu al Qasim gave a speech on June 4 in which he stated that the Syrian government has become a “defeatist project demanding normalization” with Israel to gain “some personal and moral privileges.”[xxi] Qasim stated that this attack was a “clear warning” and that the group will conduct additional attacks targeting Israel in the future.[xxii] Qasim also noted that the group will attack “whoever tries to strip Syria of its resistance identity.”[xxiii]

 

This attack may have been an attempt to fuel tension between Israel and Syria in order to undermine recent deconfliction and diplomatic efforts between the two countries. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz posted on X on June 3 that Israel holds Syrian President Ahmed al Shara “directly responsible for every threat” and attack on Israel from Syrian territory.[xxiv] The IDF also stated on June 3 that the Syrian transitional government will continue to bear consequences “as long as hostile activity continues from its territory.”[xxv] The Syrian Foreign Affairs Ministry issued a statement that reaffirmed that Syria “has not and will not” pose a threat to any country in the region.[xxvi] The ministry added that some external actors are seeking to destabilize the region to advance their own interests.[xxvii] Israel has repeatedly expressed concern regarding threats to Israel from Syria since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024.[xxviii] The IDF has conducted ground and air operations in southern Syria since December 2024 with the aim of eliminating these threats, including Iranian-backed networks in Syria.[xxix] The Syrian transitional government has repeatedly called on Israel to withdraw from Syrian territory to the 1974 deconfliction line.[xxx] Israel and Syria have taken steps in recent weeks to ease tensions. Several unspecified sources told Western media on May 27 that Israeli and Syrian officials are holding direct talks on joint security and “broader political understandings” to calm tensions and prevent further conflict.[xxxi] Syrian President Ahmed al Shara also reportedly expressed willingness to normalize relations with Israel during meetings with US officials in April 2025.[xxxii] Renewed tension between Israel and Syria could undermine the countries’ recent efforts to prevent military escalation and reach a political and diplomatic understanding.

The Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) spokesperson announced on June 4 that the LEC arrested an “ISIS-affiliated network” in Tehran.[xxxiii] LEC forces arrested 13 individuals who were part of the network, including the leader, members of support and coordination teams, and suicide operatives. LEC forces seized suicide vests and backpacks, among other equipment. The network reportedly planned to execute attacks at public ceremonies across Iran, likely during the current flurry of commemoration ceremonies for former Iranian Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini. Police departments across Tehran, Esfahan, Qom, and Alborz provinces coordinated to arrest the individuals. Iranian officials have recently articulated a clear commitment to border security amid an uptick in militant activity since December 2023.[xxxiv] Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), which is the Afghan branch of the Islamic State, has conducted several attacks in Iran in recent years. ISKP members detonated suicide vests during a ceremony in Kerman Province in January 2024 commemorating the anniversary of the United States killing former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani.[xxxv] ISKP separately conducted two attacks targeting the Shah Cheragh Shrine in Shiraz, Fars Province, in October 2022 and August 2023.[xxxvi]

 

Shia Coordination Framework members opposed to Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani and his coalition accused Sudani and his coalition of corruption, likely to damage Sudani’s electoral prospects in the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections. The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. An unspecified Shia Coordination Framework member opposed to Sudani claimed on June 4 that Sudani is paying voters to vote for him.[xxxvii] The source also claimed that Sudani is using prominent members of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition to increase support for his coalition. The Shia Coordination Framework member accused Karbala Governor Nassif al Khattabi and Popular Mobilization Committee Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh, who are members of Sudani’s coalition, of using public funds in their electoral campaigns. Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq (AAH) head Qais al Khazali and State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki are running against Sudani in the upcoming November 2025 elections and have recently accused Sudani and members of his coalition of corruption.[xxxviii] It is unclear who made the recent allegations against Sudani, Khattabi, and Fayadh. Sudani has derived a large amount of popular support among the Iraqi population for his anti-corruption policies.[xxxix] Corruption charges against Sudani, real or fabricated, could diminish support for his coalition.

 

The Shia Coordination Framework reportedly rejected a proposal by Sudani for a “political consensus” to prevent conflicts during the formation of the next government after the parliamentary elections.[xl] A Shia Coordination Framework member told Iraqi media on June 4 that Sudani sought to negotiate an agreement with the Coordination Framework to allocate control of the presidency, speakership, and premiership. Sudani reportedly sought to negotiate this agreement to prevent deadlock in parliament following the elections. The Iraqi Parliament failed to elect a president and prime minister for a year following the 2021 elections for multiple reasons, including disputes between Iranian-backed parties and Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr.[xli]

 

Sudani is likely attempting to secure a second premiership. Iraqi public polling throughout the Sudani administration has shown that Sudani is popular among voters and will likely win a significant portion of seats in parliament in the November 2025 elections.[xlii] Unspecified Shia sources told Saudi media in September 2024 that Sudani had formed alliances with 50 unspecified Shia Coordination Framework members, around 60 parliamentarians, and multiple provincial governors.[xliii] A member of the Iranian-backed Badr Organization told Iraqi media on May 25 that the Shia Coordination Framework would not prevent Sudani from serving a second term, indicating that the Shia Coordination Framework has discussed the possibility of Sudani continuing to serve as prime minister.[xliv]

 

Key Takeaways:

• US-Iran Nuclear Negotiations: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei categorically rejected the recent US nuclear proposal because the proposal would require Iran to eventually halt all uranium enrichment on Iranian soil. Iran’s continued rejection of the US demand for zero uranium enrichment could cause the US-Iran nuclear negotiations to collapse. Khamenei claimed that a nuclear industry without enrichment is “practically worthless" and emphasized that Iran would not become “dependent” on foreign countries for uranium. Under the US proposal, Iran would receive uranium for civilian nuclear purposes as part of the regional consortium but would not be allowed to independently enrich uranium on Iranian soil after the consortium is formed.
• Israel-Syria Tensions: Likely Iranian-aligned militants launched a small-scale rocket attack from southwestern Syria into the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights on June 3. This attack marks the first time that militants have attacked Israel from Syrian territory since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. Two likely Iranian-aligned groups separately claimed responsibility for the June 3 rocket attack. Neither group has previously conducted any attacks targeting Israel. This attack may have been an attempt to fuel tension between Israel and Syria in order to undermine recent deconfliction and diplomatic efforts between the two countries.
• Iranian Internal Security: The Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) spokesperson announced on June 4 that the LEC arrested an “ISIS-affiliated network” in Tehran. LEC forces arrested 13 individuals who were part of the network, including the leader, members of support and coordination teams, and suicide operatives. LEC forces seized suicide vests and backpacks, among other equipment. Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), which is the Afghan branch of the Islamic State, has conducted several attacks in Iran in recent years.
• Iraqi Parliamentary Elections: Shia Coordination Framework members opposed to Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani and his coalition accused Sudani and his coalition of corruption, likely to damage Sudani’s electoral prospects in the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections. The Shia Coordination Framework separately rejected a proposal by Sudani for a “political consensus” to prevent conflicts during the formation of the next government after the parliamentary elections.

Iran Update, June 3, 2025

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi likely discussed the Lebanese government’s efforts to prevent Hezbollah’s reconstitution during a visit to Beirut on June 3.[i] Lebanese Foreign Affairs Minister Youssef Rajji stated during a meeting with Araghchi that all reconstruction aid for Lebanon must go through state institutions and rejected any efforts to bypass the Lebanese government to support Hezbollah’s military reconstitution.[ii] Rajji’s comments likely refer to recent Iranian efforts to financially support Hezbollah’s reconstitution as the Lebanese state and Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have simultaneously cracked down on Hezbollah activity across Lebanon. Iran recently attempted to smuggle funds to Hezbollah through Beirut Rafic Hariri International Airport, for example.[iii] Iran will likely seek to establish other means through which to financially and materially support Hezbollah’s reconstitution. Araghchi told Lebanese officials that Iran seeks to open a “new page” in its relationship with Beirut. Araghchi emphasized Iran’s readiness to expand political and economic relations with Lebanon and reaffirmed Iran’s support for Lebanon’s independence and sovereignty during a meeting with Rajji.[iv]

US President Donald Trump confirmed on June 3 that the United States maintains its position that Iran cannot enrich uranium.[v] Trump's statement follows an Axios report on June 2 that the recent US written nuclear proposal to Iran would allow Iran to enrich uranium at three percent on Iranian soil for a negotiated period of time.[vi] Axios reported that the proposal also calls for the establishment of a regional nuclear consortium. Unspecified diplomatic sources told Reuters on June 2 that Iran plans to reject the proposal and considers the proposal a “non-starter” because it does not "soften the United States’ stance on enrichment.”[vii] Iranian media and officials have similarly expressed disapproval of the US proposal, citing "excessive [US] demands” and have reiterated that domestic uranium enrichment is an Iranian "red line.”[viii] Iranian plans to reject the US proposal suggest that the proposal calls on Iran to permanently suspend uranium enrichment after enriching uranium at three percent for a period of time.[ix] The US proposal may allow Iran to enrich uranium at three percent until the regional nuclear consortium is established, after which Iran would not be allowed to enrich any uranium domestically. Iranian officials have previously stated that Iran would agree to reduce its uranium enrichment to 3.67 percent, which is the enrichment limit in the 2025 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)[x] Iran would therefore likely not reject the US proposal if it allowed Iran to permanently enrich uranium at near-JCPOA levels, which further suggests that the US proposal requires Iran to eventually halt all domestic uranium enrichment.

Iran is likely continuing to try to prevent a possible non-compliance resolution and snapback sanctions ahead of the June 9 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors meeting. Unspecified diplomats told Reuters on June 2 that the United States and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) are planning to submit a resolution at the upcoming Board of Governors meeting that formally declares Iran in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations in response to recent IAEA reports.[xi] Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi met with 17 ambassadors from IAEA Board of Governors member states and separately with the E3 ambassadors to the United Nations (UN) on June 3.[xii] Gharibabadi warned them against implementing "any politically motivated action" against Iran.  Gharibabadi likely sought to convince the IAEA Board of Governors member states to vote against a non-compliance resolution at the upcoming meeting. A non-compliance resolution would lay the foundation for the E3 to trigger the JCPOA snapback mechanism. The E3 has recently threatened to trigger snapback sanctions if the United States and Iran do not reach a “substantial deal” by August 2025.[xiii]

Gharibabadi held a separate meeting with the Chinese and Russian ambassadors to the UN on June 3, likely to encourage them to challenge efforts to impose snapback sanctions on Iran.[xiv] Any JCPOA signatory (the United States, the E3, China, and Russia) can initiate the snapback process by referring Iran's non-compliance to the UNSC. The JCPOA gives the UNSC 30 days to pass a resolution to extend sanctions relief for Iran, but the UNSC permanent members (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, and Russia) can veto such a resolution.[xv] China and Russia, therefore, have limited ability to block the reimposition of UNSC sanctions on Iran. China and Russia are also members of the IAEA Board of Governors and could vote against a non-compliance resolution. There are, however, 35 members in the Board of Governors, and an IAEA resolution requires a two-thirds majority to be approved.[xvi]

Artesh Ideological and Political Organization head Abbas Mohammad Hassani threatened on June 3 that Iran would target US ships in the Persian Gulf, Sea of Oman, Atlantic Ocean, and Pacific Ocean in “the event of [US] mischief,” likely referring to potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran.[xvii] Iranian officials have repeatedly threatened to attack US bases and international shipping in response to a potential strike.[xviii] Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri approved the deployment of military assets to the Nazeat Islands in the Strait of Hormuz in early May 2025.[xix] Senior Iranian military officials have also inspected defense and combat capabilities at military bases and air defense sites across southeastern Iran in recent weeks.[xx] This activity is likely part of a broader Iranian effort to simultaneously deter and prepare for a potential strike on Iran. Hassani's threat to attack US ships in the Atlantic and Pacific Ocean is consistent with Iranian aspirations to develop a naval presence beyond the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz.[xxi]

Shia Coordination Framework members are reportedly encouraging Iraqis, including those in Sadrist strongholds, to register to vote in the upcoming November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections even though Sadr announced that he will not compete in the elections.[xxii] The Shia Coordination Framework may seek to win votes from Iraqis who would have voted for Sadr in the elections. The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. Iraqi media reported on June 3 that several current and former Shia parliamentarians have implied that Sadr will participate in the upcoming elections despite the fact that Sadr announced in late March 2025 that his party will not participate in the elections.[xxiii] Iraqi media also reported on June 3 that Shia Coordination Framework parties are concerned about an Iraqi boycott of the elections, particularly in central and southern Iraq.[xxiv] These parties are likely specifically concerned that Shias in central and southern Iraq will boycott the elections given that such a boycott would result in fewer votes for Shia Coordination Framework parties. Iraqi media reported on June 3 that over nine million eligible Iraqi voters are expected to boycott the elections.[xxv]  Shia Coordination Framework members may be suggesting that Sadr will participate in the upcoming elections in order to encourage Iraqi Shias who were planning to boycott the elections to vote. The Shia Coordination Framework may calculate that, if Sadr ultimately does not participate in the elections, individuals who planned to vote for Sadr may instead vote for a Shia Coordination Framework party. Iraqi voters must update their voter registration by June 15 to be able to vote in the elections.  Sadr denounced any attempt by political parties to use his name implicitly or explicitly on May 31, possibly referring to its use as a campaign tactic.[xxvi]

Data from the Iraqi electoral commission, the Independent High Electoral Commission, shows that Iraqi voters have most frequently updated their voter registration in Ninewa Province and Baghdad’s Rusafa District.[xxvii] The Shia Coordination Framework recently announced that it will run in unified alliances in Ninewa, Salah al Din, and Diyala Provinces.[xxviii] CTP-ISW assessed that the Shia Coordination Framework will compete in unified alliances in these provinces to ensure that it does not split the vote and enable more unified Kurdish or Sunni alliances to win more seats.[xxix] Rusafa District is a Sadrist support zone.[xxx] A parliamentarian from Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq’s Sadiqoun bloc told Iraqi media on June 3 that Sadiqoun is conducting a national campaign to encourage Iraqis in poor areas to participate in the upcoming elections.[xxxi] Sadr’s base has historically included poor Shia.[xxxii]

Two unspecified US officials told Fox News on June 2 that the United States has closed or transferred control of three bases in northeastern Syria to the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).[xxxiii] The two officials said that the United States has closed Mission Support Site Green Village and transferred control of Mission Support Site Euphrates to the SDF.[xxxiv] Both sites are located east of the Euphrates River in Deir ez Zor Province and supported SDF counter-ISIS operations. The United States also withdrew from a third unspecified position, according to the US officials.[xxxv] US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack similarly said on June 2 in an interview with Turkish media that the United States will reduce its presence in Syria from "eight bases to five to three” and will “eventually” reduce its presence to one base.

The officials speaking to Fox News added that 500 US troops have withdrawn from Syria in recent weeks.[xxxvi] These withdrawals are consistent with the US Department of Defense’s announcement on April 18 that the United States will reduce the number of US forces deployed in Syria to “less than a thousand” in the coming months.[xxxvii] The United States maintained roughly 900 US personnel in Syria between 2019 and 2024, when the United States increased the number of troops to 2,000 US personnel.[xxxviii]

Barrack said that the United States has encouraged the SDF to resolve its disputes with the transitional government and integrate into the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[xxxix] Middle East Eye also reported on June 3 that the United States has mediated talks between the SDF and Turkey about the US withdrawal from Syria, handover of ISIS prisons and camps, and SDF integration into the MoD.[xl] The Syrian MoD is expected to soon deploy to northeastern Syria to backfill the SDF as part of a recent integration agreement, but Damascus and the SDF do not yet appear to have agreed to the terms of these deployments.[xli]  Outstanding disagreements between the SDF and Damascus could pull resources and attention away from the SDF to conduct counter-ISIS operations in northeastern Syria if the integration process is not smooth or worse, is unsuccessful.

Key Takeaways:

• Hezbollah Reconstitution: Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi likely discussed the Lebanese government’s efforts to prevent Hezbollah’s reconstitution during a visit to Beirut on June 3. Lebanese Foreign Affairs Minister Youssef Rajji stated during a meeting with Araghchi that all reconstruction aid for Lebanon must go through state institutions and rejected any efforts to bypass the Lebanese government to support Hezbollah’s military reconstitution. Rajji’s comments likely refer to recent Iranian efforts to financially support Hezbollah’s reconstitution as the Lebanese state and Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have simultaneously cracked down on Hezbollah activity across Lebanon.
• US-Iran Nuclear Negotiations: US President Donald Trump confirmed on June 3 that the United States maintains its position that Iran cannot enrich uranium. Trump's statement follows an Axios report on June 2 that the recent US written nuclear proposal to Iran would allow Iran to enrich uranium at three percent on Iranian soil for a negotiated period of time. Axios reported that the proposal also calls for the establishment of a regional nuclear consortium. Unspecified diplomatic sources told Reuters on June 2 that Iran plans to reject the proposal and considers the proposal a “non-starter” because it does not "soften the United States’ stance on enrichment.” Iranian plans to reject the US proposal suggest that the proposal calls on Iran to permanently suspend uranium enrichment after enriching uranium at three percent for a period of time.
• Iranian Threats to Maritime Shipping: Artesh Ideological and Political Organization head Abbas Mohammad Hassani threatened on June 3 that Iran would target US ships in the Persian Gulf, Sea of Oman, Atlantic Ocean, and Pacific Ocean in “the event of [US] mischief,” likely referring to potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran. Iranian officials have repeatedly threatened to attack US bases and international shipping in response to a potential strike.
• Iraqi Parliamentary Elections: Shia Coordination Framework members are reportedly encouraging Iraqis, including those in Sadrist strongholds, to register to vote in the upcoming November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections even though Sadr announced that he will not compete in the elections. The Shia Coordination Framework may seek to win votes from Iraqis who would have voted for Sadr in the elections.
• US Military Withdrawal from Syria: Two unspecified US officials told Fox News on June 2 that the United States has closed or transferred control of three bases in northeastern Syria to the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The two officials said that the United States has closed Mission Support Site Green Village and transferred control of Mission Support Site Euphrates to the SDF. Both sites are located east of the Euphrates River in Deir ez Zor Province and supported SDF counter-ISIS operations. The officials speaking to Fox News added that 500 US troops have withdrawn from Syria in recent weeks.

Iran Update, June 2, 2025

Iran increased its stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium by 133.8 kilograms, or 3.2 significant quantities, since February 2025, according to an unreleased International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report.[i] Iran has enough 60 percent enriched uranium, if enriched further, to produce nearly 10 nuclear weapons. The Associated Press reported on May 31 that Iran possesses 408.6 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent, or 9.8 significant quantities, as of May 17.[ii] A significant quantity is the “approximate amount of nuclear material for which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded.”[iii] Iran had 274.8 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent, or 6.6 significant quantities, in February 2025, by comparison. The IAEA report added that Iran’s total stockpile of enriched uranium is 9,247.6 kilograms, which marks a 953.2-kilogram increase since February 2025.[iv]   The IAEA report does not provide a month-to-month breakdown of Iran's uranium enrichment activity. It is therefore unclear whether Iranian uranium enrichment increased, decreased, or remained the same following the start of the US-Iran nuclear negotiations on April 12. Iran has previously increased its stockpile of enriched uranium to try to gain leverage in negotiations.[v] It is unclear, however, why Iran would pursue rapid enrichment amid the current US-Iran negotiations and potentially increase the risk of snapback sanctions or potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran. The IAEA report comes as Iran has taken other measures to expand its nuclear program in recent months. Iran has installed new cascades of advanced centrifuges at Natanz and Fordow. Iran has also conducted metallurgical testing and computer simulations that could support the production of a nuclear weapon.[vi]

The IAEA separately published a comprehensive report on May 31 that states that Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA has been “less than satisfactory” in “a number of respects.”[vii] The report noted that Iran has failed to cooperate with the IAEA to resolve concerns about undeclared nuclear sites and material in Iran. The IAEA confirmed that Iran conducted undeclared nuclear activities at three locations—Lavisan-Shian, Varamin, and Turquzabad—until the early 2000s.[viii] The IAEA published the comprehensive report on May 31 in response to an IAEA censure resolution in November 2024. The censure resolution was proposed by the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany).[ix] The IAEA's quarterly and comprehensive reports both confirm Iranian non-compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Safeguards Agreement.

The United States and the E3 are planning to submit a resolution that formally declares Iran in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations in response to the recent IAEA reports, according to unspecified diplomats.[x] The United States and the E3 will reportedly submit the resolution at the next IAEA Board of Governors meeting on June 9 and 10. The resolution would lay the foundation for the E3 to trigger snapback sanctions. The JCPOA snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[xi] The IAEA Board of Governors previously passed a similar resolution declaring Iran in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations in September 2005.[xii] The Board of Governors referred Iran's non-compliance to the UN Security Council in February 2006, which led to the imposition of sanctions on Iran.[xiii] An unspecified senior Iranian official told Reuters on May 30 that Iran would respond to a resolution by "expand[ing] nuclear work."[xiv]

Iran is likely trying to prevent a possible non-compliance resolution and snapback sanctions ahead of the June 9 IAEA Board of Governors meeting. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi held a phone call with IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi on June 1, during which Araghchi asked Grossi to explain "Iran's cooperation with the [IAEA]" at the Board of Governors meeting and warned that Iran would respond to "any inappropriate move by the European parties," almost certainly referring to snapback sanctions.[xv] Araghchi separately met with Grossi in Cairo, Egypt, on June 2.[xvi] Araghchi and Grossi’s meeting comes amid rising tensions between Iran and the E3. The E3 has threatened to trigger snapback sanctions on Iran if the United States  and Iran do not reach a “substantial deal” by August 2025. An Iranian hardline outlet described a recent meeting between Iran and the E3 on May 16 as “tense.”[xvii]  The same outlet claimed that the E3 demanded that any future agreement include a JCPOA-style snapback clause—a demand that Iranian officials have condemned as “illegal.”[xviii] Iranian officials have previously threatened a "serious response" if the E3 triggers snapback sanctions.[xix] Iran could increase its near weapons-grade uranium stockpile or further expand its nuclear program in other ways in response to snapback sanctions.

The United States presented a written nuclear proposal to Iran via Oman on May 31.[xx] Unspecified officials told the New York Times on May 31 that the proposal includes the establishment of a regional consortium comprised of Iran, the United States, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab states. Axios similarly reported on May 31 that the proposal includes the establishment of a regional consortium to enrich uranium for civilian purposes. Axios reported that the United States and IAEA would oversee the consortium and that the United States wants the consortium’s enrichment facilities to be located outside of Iran, citing an unspecified source. The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson  emphasized on June 2 that a regional consortium "cannot in any way replace enrichment inside Iran.”

It is unclear if the United States would allow Iran to continue enriching uranium on Iranian soil if it agreed to join a regional consortium. The New York Times reported that the US nuclear proposal calls on Iran to completely cease uranium enrichment. Axios reported on June 2 that the proposal would allow "low-level uranium enrichment on Iranian soil" for an unspecified period of time.[xxi] Axios reported that Iran would reduce uranium enrichment to 3 percent, which is below the 3.67 percent limit in the JCPOA.  The proposal also reportedly bars Iran from building new enrichment facilities conducting centrifuge research and development, and enriching uranium at underground facilities for an unspecified period of time. Under the proposal, Iran would limit enrichment activity at above-ground facilities and "dismantle critical infrastructure for conversion and processing of uranium."

Iran is reportedly planning to reject the US nuclear proposal, which would likely further stall the US-Iran negotiations.[xxii] An unspecified Iranian diplomat close to the Iranian negotiating team told Reuters on June 2 that Iran is drafting a negative response to the proposal and considers the proposal a “non-starter” due to its failure to address Iranian interests or soften the United States’ stance on enrichment.[xxiii] The source added that Iran’s nuclear negotiations committee, which is under the supervision of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, assessed that the US proposal is “completely one-sided” and does not serve Iran’s interests.[xxiv] An Iranian expert close to the regime similarly stated on June 1 that the contents of the US nuclear proposal decrease the chances of Iran and the United States reaching a new deal.[xxv]

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office called on the international community to “act now” against Iran following the release of the IAEA reports on May 31. Netanyahu’s office described the reports as “a clear warning sign” that Iran is "totally determined to complete its nuclear weapons program."[xxvi]  These statements come amid reports that Israel is preparing to strike Iranian nuclear facilities if the US-Iran nuclear negotiations collapse..[xxvii] US President Donald Trump recently called on Netanyahu to avoid taking any action that could potentially jeopardize the US-Iran nuclear negotiations. [xxviii]

The Iranian armed forces are continuing to prepare for potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran.  The Financial Times reported on June 1 that Western intelligence and satellite imagery indicate that Iran has repositioned surface-to-air missile launchers, including S-300 air defense systems, near nuclear sites such as Natanz and Fordow.[xxix] Israeli airstrikes into Iran in April and October 2024 rendered Iran’s four Russian-made S-300 air defense systems inoperable, and it is very unlikely that Russia has supplied Iran with new S-300 systems. The IDF rendered an Iranian S-300 inoperable in April 2024 by striking the S-300's tomb stone engagement radar.[xxx] Iran displayed an S-300 with a “new, Iranian-designed” radar in February 2025.[xxxi] The Artesh Air Defense Force conducted air defense exercises in northern and western Iran in January 2025, including near Fordow and the Arak heavy water reactor.[xxxii]

Iranian commanders also continue to inspect air defense sites ahead of a potential Israeli or US strike on Iran. Artesh Air Force Commander Brigadier General Hamid Vahedi and his deputy, Brigadier General Ali Akbar Talebzadeh, inspected the 10th Tactical Air Base in Chabahar, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on June 2.[xxxiii] Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard recently inspected Iran's Southeastern Air Defense Zone in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, on April 4 and May 30.[xxxiv] Artesh Commander Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi conducted an inspection at the same air defense zone on May 16.[xxxv]

 

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq (AAH) is waging a campaign against Popular Mobilization Committee Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh, likely to damage Fayyadh’s electoral prospects in the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections. An AAH parliamentarian claimed on June 2 that parliament will question Fayyadh over his alleged support for certain Sunni groups.[xxxvi] Asaib Ahl al Haq Secretary General Qais al Khazali claimed on April 1 that Turkey equips the Ninewa Guards and Kirkuk Shield Forces, the former of which integrated into the 59th Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) brigade in 2017.[xxxvii] AAH-controlled media similarly claimed in mid-April 2025 that Turkey and ”Baathists” train and equip these forces.[xxxviii] AAH-controlled media also claimed that Fayyadh took several trips to Turkey to facilitate the integration of these groups into the PMF.[xxxix]  AAH has supported legislation that would require Fayyadh to retire and likely seeks to replace Fayyadh with someone more favorable to AAH.[xl] Fayyadh will compete in the November 2025 parliamentary elections as part of Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development Coalition, while Khazali will reportedly compete on a separate list.[xli] AAH may calculate that it can damage Fayyadh’s electoral prospects in the upcoming elections by highlighting his alleged ties to Turkey and support for the Ninewa Guards and Kirkuk Shield Forces.

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah threatened to resume its attack campaign against US forces in Iraq in a statement commemorating the death of former Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini on June 2.[xlii] Kataib Hezbollah threatened that it would inflict “severe blows” on the United States if the United States ”procrastinat[es]” its withdrawal from Iraq. The United States and Iraq agreed in September 2024 that hundreds of US-led international coalition forces would withdraw from Iraq by September 2025 and that remaining forces would withdraw by the end of 2026.[xliii]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have exploited loopholes within the Iraqi financial system to commit fraud and obtain funds to support operations since 2023.[xliv] The Wall Street Journal reported on May 31 that cross-border transactions increased from $50 million to $1.5 billion between January and April 2023 after the US Treasury and New York Federal Reserve took steps in 2022 to curb Iranian money laundering through Iraqi banks. Under this new method, Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would purchase large quantities of pre-paid Visas and Mastercards in Iraq and transport them into neighboring countries to withdraw the funds. The armed factions would withdraw cash from an ATM and transfer the money back to Iraq through electronic transfers or the hawala system. In Iraq, the militias would exchange the US dollars to Iraqi dinars for up to 21% above the official market rate.   Mastercard blocked over 100,000 Iraqi-issued cards and removed 4,000 merchants in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) suspected of being involved in fraudulent Iraqi transactions. Visa similarly sent alerts warning of fraud for approximately 70,000 Iraqi cards and approximately 5,000 UAE vendors. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and the Iranian regime have exploited lax oversight and loopholes within the Iraqi financial system to circumvent US sanctions on Iran.[xlv] The funds obtained through these loopholes are used to fund various Iranian and militia operations, including attacks on US forces in the region.

 

The United States will allow the Syrian transitional government to integrate foreign fighters into the new Syrian army in order to prevent foreign fighters from joining Salafi-jihadi groups in Syria.[xlvi] US Special Envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack told Reuters on June 2 that the United States reached an “understanding” that the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) will integrate foreign fighters into the ranks of the new Syrian army “with transparency.”[xlvii] Barrack said that the United States prefers to keep foreign fighters under the command of the Syrian state rather than to exclude them.[xlviii] Barrack’s comments constitute a significant departure from the United States’ demand in March 2025 that the Syrian government bar foreign fighters from senior government positions, including military positions.[xlix] Unspecified sources close to the Syrian MoD told Reuters that Syrian President Ahmed al Shara and his advisers argued to Western officials that excluding foreign fighters from the army could push them toward groups like al Qaeda or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).[l] Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) has historically integrated numerous foreign militias into its military structure and many of these groups, such as the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), are extremely loyal to HTS.[li] The Syrian government's integration of these fighters into the new chain of command reduces the risk that these fighters join extremist armed groups, particularly given a recent uptick in activity by Salafi-jihadi groups in Syria in May 2025.[lii]

Three unspecified Syrian defense officials said on June 2 that the MoD is planning to integrate 3,500 foreign fighters, including fighters from TIP, into the newly-formed 84th Division.[liii] TIP is an al Qaeda-affiliated Uyghur jihadist group that has fought alongside HTS and its predecessor organizations since the mid-2010s.[liv] The group is fully subordinate to HTS despite its al Qaeda affiliation and will therefore likely follow the chain of command of the new Syrian army. TIP political official Osama Bughra confirmed to Western media on June 2 that the group now operates “entirely under the MoD’s authority.”[lv] Syrian defense officials said that Syrian fighters will also join the 84th Division, which suggests that the unit will not be completely composed of foreign fighters.[lvi]

It is unclear if the Syrian transitional government’s decision to integrate TIP into the 84th Division will complicate its nascent relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The PRC has long opposed Uyghur militants’ activities in Syria and maintained a strategic partnership with the former Assad regime in order to suppress TIP.[lvii] PRC Representative to the United Nations (UN) Fu Cong recently called on the Syrian government to fight against “foreign terrorist fighters,” including TIP and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), on March 25.[lviii] ISW assessed in late January 2025 that the containment of TIP, ETIM, and other Uyghur groups would likely shape the PRC’s Syria policy.[lix] PRC officials may calculate that TIP’s inclusion in the Syrian government can sufficiently contain the group and prevent it from threatening the PRC. The PRC has pursued a diplomatic relationship with the new transitional government and PRC officials have conducted three official visits to Damascus since February 2025.[lx] Syria has invited Chinese investment for its reconstruction and growth and recently signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with a Chinese firm to invest in free trade zones in Rif Dimashq and Homs provinces.[lxi]

 

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Nuclear Program: Iran increased its stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium by 133.8 kilograms, or 3.2 significant quantities, since February 2025, according to an unreleased International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report. Iran has enough 60 percent enriched uranium, if enriched further, to produce nearly 10 nuclear weapons. It is unclear whether Iranian uranium enrichment increased, decreased, or remained the same following the start of the US-Iran nuclear negotiations on April 12. The IAEA separately published a comprehensive report on May 31 that states that Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA has been “less than satisfactory” in “a number of respects.”
• US-Iran Nuclear Negotiations: The United States presented a written nuclear proposal to Iran via Oman on May 31. Unspecified officials told the New York Times on May 31 that the proposal includes the establishment of a regional consortium comprised of Iran, the United States, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab states. Axios similarly reported on May 31 that the proposal includes the establishment of a regional consortium to enrich uranium for civilian purposes. It is unclear if the United States would allow Iran to continue enriching uranium on Iranian soil if it agreed to join a regional consortium. Iran is reportedly planning to reject the US nuclear proposal, which would likely further stall the US-Iran negotiations.
• Iraqi Parliamentary Elections: Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq (AAH) is waging a campaign against Popular Mobilization Committee Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh, likely to damage Fayyadh’s electoral prospects in the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections. AAH may calculate that it can damage Fayyadh’s electoral prospects in the upcoming elections by highlighting his alleged ties to Turkey and support for the Ninewa Guards and Kirkuk Shield Brigades.
• Threat to US Forces: Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah threatened to resume its attack campaign against US forces in Iraq in a statement commemorating the death of former Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini on June 2. Kataib Hezbollah threatened that it would inflict “severe blows” on the United States if the United States ”procrastinat[es]” its withdrawal from Iraq.
• Iraqi Militia Funding: Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have exploited loopholes within the Iraqi financial system to commit fraud and obtain funds to support operations since 2023. The Wall Street Journal reported on May 31 that cross-border transactions increased from $50 million to $1.5 billion between January and April 2023 after the US Treasury and New York Federal Reserve took steps in 2022 to curb Iranian money laundering through Iraqi banks.
• Iranian Preparations for Potential US or Israeli Strikes:Financial Times reported on June 1 that Western intelligence and satellite imagery indicate that Iran has repositioned surface-to-air missile launchers, including S-300 air defense systems, near nuclear sites such as Natanz and Fordow. Iranian commanders also continue to inspect air defense sites ahead of a potential Israeli or US strike on Iran.
• Syrian Army Formation: The United States will allow the Syrian transitional government to integrate foreign fighters into the new Syrian army in order to prevent foreign fighters from joining Salafi-jihadi groups in Syria. US Special Envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack told Reuters on June 2 that the United States reached an “understanding” that the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) will integrate foreign fighters into the ranks of the new Syrian army “with transparency.” Unspecified sources close to the Syrian MoD told Reuters that Syrian President Ahmed al Shara and his advisers argued to Western officials that excluding foreign fighters from the army could push them toward groups like al Qaeda or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Three unspecified Syrian defense officials said on June 2 that the MoD is planning to integrate 3,500 foreign fighters, including fighters from TIP, into the newly-formed 84th Division.

Previous Iran Updates

• June 2025
• May 2025
• April 2025
• March 2025
• February 2025
• January 2025
• December 2024
• November 2024
• October 2024
• September 2024
• August 2024
• July 2024
• June 2024
• May 2024
• April 2024
• March 2024
• February 2024
• January 2024
• December 2023
• November 2023
• October 2023