Ukraine Invasion Updates

         This page collects the Critical Threats Project (CTP) and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) updates on the invasion of Ukraine. In late February 2022, CTP and ISW began publishing daily synthetic products covering key events related to renewed Russian aggression against Ukraine. These Ukraine Conflict Updates replaced the “Indicators and Thresholds for Russian Military Operations in Ukraine and/or Belarus,” which we maintained from November 12, 2021, through February 17, 2022.

This list also includes prominent warning alerts that CTP and ISW launched outside the crisis update structure. These products addressed critical inflection points as they occurred.

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• Maps on Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes
• Recent Updates
• February 2022 - July 2023 Updates
• Related Reads

Maps on Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes

This interactive map complements the static daily control-of-terrain maps that CTP and ISW produce with high-fidelity and, where possible, street level assessments of the war in Ukraine.

Click here to access the archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that produced daily by showing a dynamic frontline.

The Critical Threats Project and the Institute for the Study of War are publishing a summary of the methodology of our map for those who would like to learn more about the tradecraft for mapping conventional military operations from the open source.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 

Previous versions of these static maps are available in our past publications. 

Recent Updates

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 8, 2025

Kremlin officials and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on June 8 that Russian forces reached the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border and are conducting offensive operations into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast — an oblast that Russia has not illegally declared as annexed. The Russian MoD claimed on June 8 that elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) reached the western border of Donetsk Oblast and are continuing to develop an offensive in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[i] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on June 8 that Russian forces “began an offensive” in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and threatened that those who do not acknowledge current "realities of war" on the battlefield during negotiations will "receive new realities on the ground."[ii] Kremlin officials have repeatedly claimed that any negotiations to end the war must consider the "realities on the ground" (a reference to the current frontline in Ukraine) to demand that Ukraine concede to Russia's demands under threat of further Russian demands.[iii] A Russian milblogger claimed on June 8 that Russian forces reached the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border northwest of Horikhove (southeast of Novopavlivka) and advanced southeast of Muravka (northeast of Novopavlivka), west of Kotlyarivka (east of Novopavlivka), and west and southwest of Bohdanivka (southeast of Novopavlivka).[iv] ISW has not observed geolocated evidence of these claimed advances near the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border as of this writing. ISW forecasted in November 2024 that the Russian military command could advance to the southeasternmost part of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and to envelop these Ukrainian positions in support of Russia's wider campaign to seize all of Donetsk Oblast.[v]       

Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated on June 8 that fighting continued in the Novopavlivka direction but only in Donetsk Oblast.[vi] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the area stated that Russian forces did not cross the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border.[vii] Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported that Ukrainian General Staff Representative Andriy Kovalev stated that claims that Russian forces crossed the border are "Russian disinformation" and not true. NASA Fire Information for Resource Management (FIRMS) data shows satellite-detected heat and infrared anomalies along the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border, and satellite imagery collected on June 7 and 8 shows the appearance of new artillery craters near the border in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. FIRMS data and artillery craters near the border indicate artillery missions in the area and are not inconsistent with official Ukrainian statements about continued fighting in Donetsk Oblast east of the border. ISW assesses that current Russian tactical activity in the vicinity of southeastern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast is a continuation of ongoing Russian offensive efforts in southwestern Donetsk Oblast — not the beginning of a new major offensive operation to seize operationally significant territory in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. ISW will continue to assess the situation in southeastern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and update its assessment.

Russian officials have repeatedly signaled that the Kremlin has wider territorial ambitions in Ukraine, including in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Artem Zhoga, the former commander of the 80th ”Sparta” Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) and current presidential representative to the Ural Federal Okrug, claimed on June 8 that the 90th Tank Division is "closing the strategic gates to the Dnipro [River]."[viii] Zhoga's reference to the Dnipro River is consistent with other Russian officials' calls for Russia to seize territory near the river in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Russian officials have called for Russia to control the areas of the Dnipro River that pass through Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and routinely invoke the Kremlin's concept of "Novorossiya," which Russian officials have defined as all of eastern and southern Ukraine.[ix] ISW observed reported in May 2025 that Russia was setting conditions to establish permanent control over the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), suggesting that Russia may plan to occupy and annex Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[x] Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Colonel Pavlo Palisa also stated on June 5 Russia intends to occupy the entirety of Ukraine on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River, including eastern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, by the end of 2026.[xi]

Russia continued to baselessly accuse Ukraine of failing to repatriate the bodies of killed in action (KIA) soldiers on June 8 — part of the Kremlin's efforts to undermine mutually agreed upon confidence-building measures with Ukraine. Russian First Deputy Chief of Information of the General Staff's Main Directorate (GRU) Lieutenant General Alexander Zorin claimed on June 8 that Russia delivered the bodies of 1,212 KIA Ukrainians to an exchange point in accordance with purported agreements made during the June 2 Ukrainian-Russian talks in Istanbul.[xii] Zorin baselessly claimed that no exchange took place on June 7 because Ukraine did not respond to Russia’s messages about the exchange, that Russia continues to wait for confirmation from Ukrainian officials, and that Ukraine is postponing the exchange.[xiii] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov stated on June 8 that authorities in Ukraine and Russia received notice on June 3 — the day following the most recent bilateral talks in Istanbul — that the prisoner of war (POW) and KIA exchanges that Ukraine and Russia agreed upon in Istanbul would occur during at a future date during the week of June 9 to 16.[xiv] GUR Spokesperson Andriy Yusov stated on June 7 that Ukraine and Russia have not yet established the exact date of the KIA exchange and that Ukraine is still preparing for the repatriation exchange.[xv] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin's unwillingness to engage in good faith in lower-level confidence-building measures designed to facilitate larger peace negotiations further demonstrates Russia's disinterest in peace negotiations.[xvi]

The Kremlin appears to have orchestrated a concerted media campaign that aimed to use the purportedly agreed-upon KIA exchange in order to discredit Ukraine and promote Russia's justifications for its war to both domestic and international audiences. Zorin made his claims during a press conference for domestic Russian and foreign journalists in front of refrigerated transport trucks reportedly holding the bodies of Ukrainian KIA servicemembers.[xvii] Yusov stated that Russian officials filmed the videos of the refrigerated trucks and held the press conference for journalists on Russian territory far from the agreed upon exchange location, however.[xviii] Journalists from Russian and international media outlets, including Russian Ministry of Defense-run TV network Zvezda, Russian state media TV channel Channel One (Perviy Kanal), Kremlin-affiliated outlet Izvestia, Hezbollah-affiliated Al Mayadeen TV outlet, and Qatari-owned Al Araby al Jadeed TV outlet, attended the press conference.[xix] Kremlin newswire TASS amplified footage of an Al Mayadeen journalist claiming that Ukraine's alleged refusal to accept the KIA bodies shows the "Nazi nature" of the Ukrainian authorities and footage of an Al Araby journalist claiming that Russia continues to fulfill the commitments it made in Istanbul.[xx] Russian officials likely invited foreign and domestic news outlets to the press conference in order to promote to both foreign and domestic audiences the Russian narratives that Ukraine is spoiling confidence-building measures and peace negotiations and to posture the international community, particularly the Middle East, as supporting Russia's justifications for its full-scale invasion and demands of regime change in Kyiv.[xxi]

Russian officials appear to be setting conditions to withdraw from international arms control treaties, likely as part of preparation for a potential future war with NATO. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov claimed in an interview with Kremlin newswire TASS published on June 7 that Russia’s “unilateral moratorium” on the deployment of land-based missiles prohibited under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty is nearing its “logical conclusion," suggesting that Russia may openly deploy such missiles in the future.[xxii] Ryabkov also claimed that the United States and its Western allies did not appreciate or reciprocate Russia’s "restraint" following the United States' withdrawal from the INF Treaty in 2019. Ryabkov's claim that Russia has continued to abide by the INF Treaty since the US withdrawal are false. The United States suspended its participation in the INF Treaty on February 1, 2019 and withdrew from the treaty in August 2019 due to Russia's development, testing, and deployment of intermediate-range 9M729 (SSC-8) missiles in violation of the treaty.[xxiii] Russia suspended its participation in the INF Treaty in response to the US suspension on February 2, 2019. Ryabkov’s allegations of Russia's continued adherence to the treaty are likely part of the Kremlin’s ongoing efforts to falsely portray itself as a genuine participant in de-escalation efforts and to portray the West and NATO as threats to Russia's security. The Kremlin may leverage the war in Ukraine to renounce its participation in other international arms control treaties as it prepares for a larger confrontation with the West.

Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a chemical plant in Tula Oblast on June 8. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, who often reports on successful Ukrainian drone strikes against Russia, implied on June 8 that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against the Azot chemical plant in Novomoskovsk, Tula Oblast.[xxiv] Kovalenko stated that the plant produces explosives for artillery shells, bombs, and missiles. Russian opposition outlet Astra published footage on June 8 reportedly showing fires at the plant after reported drone strikes.[xxv] Tula Oblast Governor Dmitry Milyaev claimed on June 8 that a Ukrainian drone crashed on the territory of the Azot plant, causing a fire.[xxvi] Ukrainian forces previously conducted a drone strike against the Azot plant on May 24.[xxvii]

Key Takeaways:

• Kremlin officials and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on June 8 that Russian forces reached the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border and are conducting offensive operations into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast — an oblast that Russia has not illegally declared as annexed.
• Russian officials have repeatedly signaled that the Kremlin has wider territorial ambitions in Ukraine, including in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.
• Russia continued to baselessly accuse Ukraine of failing to repatriate the bodies of killed in action (KIA) soldiers on June 8 — part of the Kremlin's efforts to undermine mutually agreed upon confidence-building measures with Ukraine.
• The Kremlin appears to have orchestrated a concerted media campaign that aimed to use the purportedly agreed-upon KIA exchange in order to discredit Ukraine and promote Russia's justifications for its war to both domestic and international audiences.
• Russian officials appear to be setting conditions to withdraw from international arms control treaties, likely as part of preparation for a potential future war with NATO.
• Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a chemical plant in Tula Oblast on June 8.
• Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 7, 2025

Russia baselessly accused Ukraine of failing to conduct a prisoner of war (POW) exchange and to repatriate the bodies of killed in action (KIA) soldiers on June 6 — part of Kremlin efforts to undermine mutually agreed upon confidence building measures with Ukraine. Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky, Russian First Deputy Chief of Information of the General Staff's Main Directorate (GRU) Alexander Zorin, and Russian Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Fomin claimed on June 7 that Russia was prepared to exchange severely wounded and sick POWs, POWs under the age of 25, and 6,000 bodies of KIA soldiers on June 6 as Russia and Ukraine agreed to during the most recent bilateral talks in Istanbul on June 2.[1] Zorin further claimed that Russian representatives waited for Ukrainian representatives on the border of Belarus to work out the technicalities involved in exchanging the bodies, but that Ukrainian representatives never arrived, and Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova and Deputy Chairperson of the Federation Council Committee on International Affairs Andrei Klimov claimed that Ukraine refused to repatriate the KIA bodies. The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of POWs refuted Russian officials' claims and clarified that Ukraine and Russia have not yet agreed upon a date for the repatriation of the bodies and that the two parties are still finalizing lists for the POW exchange.[2] The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of POWs reiterated that Ukraine remains fully committed to engaging constructively to ensure the successful implementation of the KIA repatriation and POW exchange. The Kremlin remains committed to promoting narratives that vilify Ukraine, likely to socialize its domestic audience ahead of Russia's possible rejection of any peace agreement in the future and to discredit Ukraine on the international stage. The Kremlin's unwillingness to engage in good faith in lower-level confidence building measures designed to facilitate larger peace negotiations further demonstrates Russia's disinterest in peace negotiations.

Russian officials continue efforts to deflect blame away from Russia and onto Western states for the lack of progress toward a peace settlement. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov accused European states of becoming the main obstacle to negotiating peace in Ukraine, as European states seek to disrupt negotiations on June 6.[3] Ryabkov also claimed that German Chancellor Friedrich Merz opposes peace in Ukraine and is trying to convince US President Donald Trump to return the United States to "the path of escalation" in the war.[4] Ryabkov claimed that the United States is aware that Russia will not stray — even in the face of threats of more sanctions —  from its position on the need to eliminate the alleged "root causes" of the war (a phrase which Kremlin officials have repeatedly used to call for regime change in Ukraine and changes to NATO's open-door policy and other unilateral American concessions which the Trump administration described as being “too much“).[5] ISW continues to assess that Russia is uninterested in meaningful negotiations with Ukraine and is very likely setting information conditions to protract or possibly expand the war.[6]

US President Donald Trump signaled on June 6 that he could be willing to increase sanctions against Russia. Russia's economic struggles, however, have been and will continue to be driven by Russian military losses on the battlefield. Maximum US economic pressure against Russia is not possible without continued military sales to Ukraine.  Trump stated to reporters on June 6 that he would be willing to "use [The Sanctioning Russia Act of 2025, a bill in the US Senate] if it's necessary" and impose additional sanctions on Russia if Russia demonstrates that it will not "make a deal" or stop fighting.[7] The Sanctioning Russia Act of 2025 has wide bipartisan support in the US Senate and has 82 cosponsors as of June 7.[8]

Any increased economic pressure against Russia — while a positive policy development — by itself is insufficient to force Russian President Vladimir Putin to the negotiating table or change Putin’s theory of victory. The continuation of Western military aid to Ukraine remains pivotal to the execution of a pressure campaign against Russia that could force Putin to recalculate his theory of victory.[9] Putin's theory of victory rests on the assumption that the Russian military can sustain creeping, incremental advances on the battlefield longer than Ukrainian forces can defend and longer than the West is willing to support Ukraine. Putin's strategy will very likely continue to guide his decision to refuse to engage substantively with the United States and Ukraine in peace negotiations. Achieving a peace in Ukraine that is acceptable for US interests necessitates sustained Russian battlefield losses or a significant Russian battlefield setback. The United States must continue equipping Ukrainian soldiers as Russia’s battlefield losses remain the key driver of Russia's current materiel, manpower, and economic problems. Western aid, particularly of weapons systems that only the United States can provide at scale and quickly, would allow Ukrainian forces to better defend their positions, slow Russian advances, and inflict even more serious losses on the Russian military. Higher and even more unsustainable Russian casualty rates on the battlefield, particularly when they are disproportionate to the territorial gains they generate, would risk Putin's efforts to balance "butter and guns" and maintain domestic support.

Key Takeaways:

• Russia baselessly accused Ukraine of failing to conduct a prisoner of war (POW) exchange and to repatriate the bodies of killed in action (KIA) soldiers on June 6 – part of Kremlin efforts to undermine mutually agreed upon confidence building measures with Ukraine.
• Russian officials continue efforts to deflect blame away from Russia and onto Western states for the lack of progress toward a peace settlement.
• US President Donald Trump signaled on June 6 that he could be willing to increase sanctions against Russia. Russia's economic struggles, however, have been and will continue to be driven by Russian military losses on the battlefield. Maximum US economic pressure against Russia is not possible without continued military sales to Ukraine.
• Any increased economic pressure against Russia – while a positive policy development – by itself is insufficient to force Russian President Vladimir Putin to the negotiating table or change Putin’s theory of victory.
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Toretsk. Russian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Kupyansk, Novopavlivka, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 6, 2025

A senior Ukrainian official reported that the Russian military intends to seize half of Ukraine by the end of 2026. Russian forces are highly unlikely to be able to make such large advances in such a narrow time frame, given Russia’s current offensive capabilities and assuming that the flow of Western aid to Ukraine continues. Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Colonel Pavlo Palisa told reporters on June 5 that Russia likely seeks to seize the full extent of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts by September 1, 2025, and create a buffer zone along the northern Ukrainian-Russian border by the end of 2025.[1] Palisa also stated that Russia intends to occupy the entirety of Ukraine on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River and seize Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts by the end of 2026, depriving Ukraine of access to the Black Sea. Western sources published a map on June 4 and 6 that Palisa reportedly presented to US officials and journalists.[2] The map suggests that Russia intends to seize roughly 222,700 additional square kilometers of Ukrainian territory and hold a total of 336,300 square kilometers by the end of 2026 – almost double the roughly 162,000 total square kilometers that Russia held as of the first month of Russia's initial full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The total area of Ukraine is roughly 603,500 square kilometers.

Palisa’s map of purported Russian operational objectives suggests that Russian forces will attempt to seize and leverage positions in Zaporizhia and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts to support concurrent efforts to seize the remainder of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts prior to September 1, 2025. Palisa’s map suggests that the Russian military command does not intend for Russian forces to seize Zaporizhzhia City by September 1. Palisa’s map suggests that Russian forces seek to leverage these positions to eventually seize Zaporizhzhia City, which is consistent with the Russian government’s formal territorial demands for all Zaporizhia Oblast.[3]

It remains unclear on what basis the Russian military may be able to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast within the next three months or even advance the 50 to 80 kilometers from the current Russian frontline to the administrative boundaries of Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces have spent the last 15 months advancing between 30 and 50 kilometers from the outskirts of Avdiivka to their current positions northeast and southwest of Pokrovsk, a far slower rate of advance than the one necessary to seize all of Donetsk Oblast by September 1. The rate of Russian advance as depicted by the map also appears to assume that Russian forces will be able to fight through the Kostyantynivka-Kramatorsk-Slovyansk fortress belt – a series of fortified cities that form the backbone of Ukraine’s defensive positions in Donetsk Oblast – at a rate never demonstrated by Russian forces at any point during Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russian forces have not fought through a comparable town since Russian forces engaged in a year-long and pyrrhic effort to seize Bakhmut that ended in May 2023.[4]

Palisa’s assessment posits that Russian forces would then sequentially attempt to seize the remainder of Kherson Oblast and create a “buffer zone” along the international border in northern Ukraine by the end of 2025. Palisa’s map suggests that Russian forces would attempt to ford the Dnipro River, retake the remainder of Kherson Oblast, marginally advance further in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and establish a defensible buffer zone along the international border in Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv oblasts by the end of 2025.[5] The Russian military command would likely have to redeploy significant Russian forces from other areas of the frontline to accomplish these objectives, assuming Ukraine’s international partners continue supporting Ukraine.

Russian forces would struggle to seize the remainder of Kherson Oblast, as it would require crossing the Dnipro River, establishing a lodgement on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River, seizing Kherson City, and then advancing further west and north to the oblast's administrative borders. Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces have successfully conducted cross-river operations at scale across the Dnipro River since Russia’s withdrawal to east (left) bank Kherson Oblast in November 2022, and the establishment of significant Ukrainian defenses in west bank Kherson Oblast since liberating this area will only further hamper Russia’s ability to seize the remainder of Kherson Oblast.[6]

A series of intensified, simultaneous Russian offensives into northern Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv oblasts would spread Russia’s manpower and materiel along the entire thousand-kilometer-long frontline and likely exacerbate existing constraints. Russia’s reported operational objectives through the end of 2025 are consistent with long-standing Russian demands that Ukraine concede the illegally annexed Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and Crimea, however.[7]

The Russian military command’s purported objectives for 2026 extend far beyond Russia’s formal territorial demands and aim to seize a significant part of central Ukraine and most of southern and eastern Ukraine. Palisa’s map suggests that Russian forces intend to seize the entirety of Ukraine on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River, which includes the rest of unoccupied Zaporizhia Oblast, and all of Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, and Poltava oblasts; and half of Kyiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. Palisa's map suggests that Russian forces also intend to seize parts of southern Ukraine west of the Dnipro River, including most of Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts. Russian forces will have to seize nine currently unoccupied oblast capitals – Zaporizhzhia, Odesa, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Dnipro, Kharkiv, Sumy, Chernihiv, and Poltava cities – with an estimated pre-war population of over 5.6 million people.[8] Russia has not captured an oblast capital city since March 2022, when Russian forces seized Kherson City and subsequently lost it eight months later. This goal would require Russian forces to advance over 300 kilometers from the furthest point of the international border to Kyiv City within the next 18 months.

Russia’s purported military campaign plans for 2025 and 2026 are consistent with long-standing Russian territorial objectives and recent statements by pro-Kremlin voices in the information space. Kremlin officials have repeatedly demanded that Russia create a “buffer zone” along the international border in northern Ukraine to defend Russian cities in Bryansk, Kursk, and Belgorod oblasts against Ukrainian drone and artillery strikes and ground operations.[9] Kremlin officials also routinely invoke the Kremlin’s concept of “Novorossiya” – which Russian officials have defined as all of eastern and southern Ukraine – to justify ever-expanding Russian territorial ambitions in eastern and southern Ukraine.[10] Russian officials have previously characterized Kharkiv and Odesa cities as “Russian” cities.[11] Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov told Kremlin newswire TASS on May 31 that Ukraine risks losing Zaporizhzhia, Dnipro, Sumy, Kharkiv, Odesa, and Mykolaiv cities if Ukraine refuses a peace settlement in the near future.[12]

Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo stated in April 2025 that the "return" of the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River to Russia is "fundamentally important" and an "absolute priority.”[13] Saldo called for Russia to completely control the areas of the Dnipro River that pass through Kherson, Zaporizhia, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts – a call for Russia to not only gain control over parts of Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts that Russian forces do not currently occupy but to control parts of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, which Russia has not formally claimed or illegally annexed. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev recently reiterated his previous calls for Russia to occupy most of Ukraine as a buffer zone – apart from a relatively small area of Volyn and Lviv oblasts along Poland’s border – and leave Ukraine as a rump state, which underscores the extent of long-term Russian territorial objectives in Ukraine.[14] Palisa’s map does not suggest whether Russia may have military plans to seize additional territory of Ukraine beyond 2026, but it is unlikely that Russian President Vladimir Putin would be satisfied with seizing slightly more than half of Ukraine if Russian forces could fulfill their purported 2026 plans.

The Russian military is likely unable to achieve its purported 2026 objectives, given the significant manpower and materiel losses Russian forces have sustained over the last three years of war and the Russian forces’ inability to achieve operational maneuver on the battlefield. Putin’s theory of victory depends on the Western alliance backing Ukraine, abandoning Ukraine as a necessary condition to bring about this scale of advance.[15] Russian forces have thus far failed to restore operational maneuver on the battlefield in Ukraine and conduct the kind of rapid, mechanized maneuver necessary to make operationally significant breakthroughs of Ukrainian defensive lines, and have not done so since 2022.[16] Western sources estimated that Russia has suffered almost one million casualties and lost well over 10,000 tanks and armored vehicles over the last three years of war.[17] Russian forces would also be pursuing complicated offensive operations in the face of mined gray zones, Ukrainian defensive lines, Ukrainian drones, and populated Ukrainian towns and cities along a thousand-kilometer-long frontline. Any operational plan that would require the Russian command to spread its limited offensive capabilities along the entire frontline to make significant advances from Odesa to Chernihiv oblasts would likely exacerbate Russian combat power shortage issues and undermine the Russian military’s ability to achieve its objectives.[18]

Russian forces would only be able to achieve these reported operational objectives if the situation along the frontline changes dramatically in the near future, such as Russia suddenly restoring operational maneuver or the sudden collapse of Ukrainian defensive lines. ISW previously assessed that delays in Western aid provision to Ukraine in 2023 and 2024 provided Russian forces with sufficient leverage to regain the battlefield initiative and make operationally significant gains, and that the Kremlin is currently engaged in an effort aimed at convincing the West that Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable and that the West should abandon supporting Ukraine.[19] Russia's only real hope of winning its war in Ukraine is to convince the West to abandon Ukraine, and Putin is therefore seeking to prevent the future supply of Western military aid to Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that Western aid remains vital to Ukraine's ability to defend itself against Russian aggression and is crucial for ensuring a just and enduring peace in Ukraine and long-term security in Europe.[20] Russia is very unlikely to seize half of Ukraine if the international coalition continues supporting Ukraine.

Russian forces conducted the second-largest series of missile and drone strikes of the war overnight on June 5 to 6. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on June 6 that Russian forces launched 452 projectiles, including 407 Shahed and mock drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[21] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched six Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Kursk and Voronezh oblasts; 36 Kh-101 cruise missiles from airspace over Saratov Oblast and the Caspian Sea; two Iskander-M cruise missiles from occupied Dzhankoy, Crimea; and one Kh-31P anti-radar missile from airspace over the Black Sea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 406 drones and missiles, including 199 Shahed and decoy drones, of which 169 were "lost" or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW); four Iskander-M/KN-23 missiles, and an additional two of these missiles were lost and did not reach their targets; 30 Kh-101 cruise missiles; and two Iskander-K cruise missiles.

Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strikes hit 19 locations, including civilian infrastructure, high-rise buildings, and energy infrastructure in Kyiv, Lviv, Ternopil, Chernihiv, and Kremenchuk cities and elsewhere in Kyiv, Volyn, Sumy, Poltava, Khmelnytskyi, and Cherkasy oblasts.[22] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that these Russian strikes injured at least 49 civilians and killed at least three.[23] The Ukrainian Attorney General's Office reported that Russian strikes against Kyiv City alone killed at least three and injured 22.[24] Russian forces notably conducted their largest strike series of the war with 479 total drones and missiles less than a week prior, on the night of May 31 to June 1.[25]

Ukrainian forces continue efforts to innovate and expand their air defense umbrella to counter Russian strike packages. Ukrainian Deputy Strategic Industries Minister Anna Hvozdiar reported that Ukrainian forces are testing drones to intercept other strike drones and that Ukrainian forces have downed over 160 Shahed drones over Kyiv Oblast since February 2024 using these interceptors.[26] Russian forces have recently been adapting their strike packages and drone strike packages to effectively penetrate and overwhelm Ukraine's air defense umbrella and inflict maximum damage, and attempting to combat Ukraine's drone and counter-drone capabilities.[27]

Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Russian military facilities, airfields, and defense industrial base (DIB) facilities overnight on June 5 to 6. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck Engels Air Base in Saratov Oblast and at Dyagilevo Air Base in Ryazan Oblast, damaging at least three fuel and lubricant tanks at Engels and causing a fire and secondary explosions in the area.[28] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that it is still clarifying the damage at Dyagilevo Air Base but that there are reports of a large fire in the area. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko published footage showing fires at an oil depot in Engels and the Dyagilevo Air Base.[29] Saratov Oblast Governor Roman Busargin and other Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian drones struck an industrial enterprise in Engels and caused a fire.[30] Kovalenko reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the JSC Progress Plant in Michurinsk, Tambov Oblast, which produces stabilization and control systems for missile, artillery, and aviation systems.[31] Kovalenko also implied that Ukrainian forces struck an unspecified Russian military facility in Bryansk Oblast.[32] A geolocated image shows a large fire with possibly secondary detonations at the Bryansk International airport near Oktyabrskoye.[33] Russian opposition media, citing sources in the Russian Ministry of Emergency Services, reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Mi-8 combat helicopter and damaged a Mi-35 combat helicopter parked at the Bryansk airport.[34] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces downed 174 drones over Russia and occupied Ukraine overnight, including an unspecified number of drones in Bryansk, Saratov, Ryazan, and Kursk oblasts.[35]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 6 that Ukrainian forces conducted strikes against Russian military command posts of the 72nd Motorized Rifle Division (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), including its 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment, near Kulbaki, Kursk Oblast.[36]

Russia's Central Bank lowered its key interest rate for the first time since September 2022, likely prematurely due to increased Kremlin pressure to project economic stability. The Russian Central Bank announced on June 6 that it had lowered its key interest rate from a 22-year high of 21 percent to 20 percent.[37]

ISW has observed reports of rising tensions between Kremlin officials and the Central Bank, namely between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina, over Russia's compounding economic constraints related to sanctions and labor shortages that very likely factored into the Central Bank's decision.[38] The Kremlin intensified pressure on Nabiullina to lower the key interest rate from 21 percent and maintain the facade that Russia's economy is stable. Putin postured the Russian economy as "stable and reliable" in December 2024, soon after Nabiullina raised the key interest rate to 21 percent – the highest since 2003 – in October 2024 to combat rising inflation rates and blamed Nabiullina for mishandling rising interest rates.[39] ISW observed unverified reports in March 2025 of a federal audit of the Central Bank, and Russian officials indicated in the days leading up to the announcement that they "expect" the Central Bank to lower the key interest rate.[40]

The Kremlin has repeatedly claimed that the Russian inflation rate hovered around nine to 10 percent, when the actual figure is likely closer to 20 percent as of March 2025.[41] The Kremlin's efforts to pressure the Central Bank into prematurely lowering its key interest rate to maintain the facade of economic stability will likely drive further economic instability and contribute to elevated levels of inflation.

Key Takeaways:

• A senior Ukrainian official reported that the Russian military intends to seize half of Ukraine by the end of 2026. Russian forces are highly unlikely to be able to make such large advances in such a narrow time frame, given Russia’s current offensive capabilities and assuming that the flow of Western aid to Ukraine continues.
• The Russian military command’s purported objectives for 2026 extend far beyond Russia’s formal territorial demands and aim to seize a significant part of central Ukraine and most of southern and eastern Ukraine.
• Russia’s purported military campaign plans for 2025 and 2026 are consistent with long-standing Russian territorial objectives and recent statements by pro-Kremlin voices in the information space.
• The Russian military is likely unable to achieve its purported 2026 objectives, given the significant manpower and materiel losses Russian forces have sustained over the last three years of war and the Russian forces’ inability to achieve operational maneuver on the battlefield. Putin’s theory of victory depends on the Western alliance backing Ukraine, abandoning Ukraine as a necessary condition to bring about this scale of advance
• Russian forces conducted the second-largest series of missile and drone strikes of the war overnight on June 5 to 6.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Russian military facilities, airfields, and defense industrial base (DIB) facilities overnight on June 5 to 6.
• Russia's Central Bank lowered its key interest rate for the first time since September 2022, likely prematurely due to increased Kremlin pressure to project economic stability.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Belgorod and Sumy oblasts and near Lyman and Velyka Novosilka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 5, 2025

Russian forces are reportedly sustaining an average of 1,140 casualties per day and suffering disproportionately high personnel casualties for marginal, grinding territorial gains. Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) news agency ArmyInform reported on June 5 that an unnamed NATO official stated that Russian forces are sustaining an average casualty rate of 1,140 personnel per day, of whom nearly 975 are killed in action (KIA) – a much higher number of killed than the standard one-to-three KIA-to-wounded-in-action (WIA) ratio.[1] The NATO official noted that Russian forces suffered approximately 160,000 casualties from January to April 2025 and that Russian losses remain high despite a slight decrease in May 2025 "due to a slowdown in the pace of hostilities." Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on May 13 that Russian forces suffered about 177,000 casualties since January 1, 2025 (an average daily casualty rate of 1,351).[2] This daily casualty rate is lower than the record high average daily casualty rate of 1,523 that Russian forces reportedly suffered in November 2024, but Russian forces are still expending quantities of manpower that are disproportionate to their marginal territorial gains.[3] Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Pavlo Palisa stated on June 4 that Russia seized only 0.4 percent of Ukraine's total territory in 2024 and just 0.2 percent thus far in 2025, which is largely consistent with ISW's assessment of Russian advances in 2024 and 2025, respectively.[4] Palisa stated that Russia is suffering roughly 167 casualties per square kilometer of advance. ISW continues to assess that Russia's disproportionately large manpower and materiel losses for marginal territorial gains across the theater are unsustainable in the medium-term and unlikely to result in significant and rapid gains.[5]

The Kremlin continues efforts to falsely portray Russia as willing to engage in good-faith negotiations to end the war in Ukraine, despite Russia’s repeated refusal to offer any concessions. Russian President Vladimir Putin used his first phone call to Pope Leo XIV on June 5 to falsely claim that Ukraine is escalating the war, whereas Russia is interested in achieving a resolution to the war in Ukraine through "political and diplomatic means."[6] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on June 5 that Putin thanked the Pope for the Vatican’s willingness to contribute to a peaceful resolution to the war in Ukraine.[7] Putin notably did not propose any Russian concessions or indicate that the Kremlin has relented any of its demands of Ukraine that amount to Ukraine's full capitulation. The Kremlin readout claimed that Putin instead told the Pope that any potential resolution must eliminate the war’s "root causes," reiterating a long-standing Kremlin rhetorical line aimed at falsely blaming Ukraine for Russia's invasion. Senior Russian officials have repeatedly defined these root causes as NATO's alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward and Ukraine's alleged violations of the rights of Russian-speaking minorities in Ukraine.[8] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev notably claimed on June 3 that Russia seeks a ”swift victory” in Ukraine and the ”complete destruction” of Ukraine’s government, indicating that the Kremlin remains uninterested in good faith peace negotiations and a near-term resolution to the war that does not acquiesce to its demands.[9] Putin’s conversation with the Pope is likely part of the Kremlin’s ongoing effort to protract negotiations by falsely portraying Russia as interested in meaningful peace negotiations and improve Russia’s negotiating position by making additional battlefield gains.

Ukraine's allies and partners continued to provide military aid to Ukraine during the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein format) on June 4 and 5. Dutch Defense Minister Ruben Brekelmans stated on June 4 that the Netherlands will allocate a package worth 400 million euros (roughly $457 million) to strengthen Ukraine's military security.[10] The package will consist of more than 100 vessels, including patrol boats, transport boats, interceptors, and special operations ships; more than 50 naval drones; weapons systems; sensors; spare parts; and training for Ukrainian specialists. Luxembourg's Defense Minister Yuriko Backes stated on June 5 that Luxembourg will increase its military aid to Ukraine by 50 percent by the end of 2025.[11] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on June 4 that Belgium announced a long-term initiative to provide annual aid in the amount of one billion euros (roughly $1.1 billion) until 2029 and that Belgium will transfer a mine-clearing ship to Ukraine.[12] Umerov stated that Canada allocated $45 million for drones, electronic warfare (EW) equipment, IT solutions, and an unspecified number of Bison and Coyote armored personnel carriers (APCs).[13] Umerov stated that Norway will allocate $7 billion worth of aid to Ukraine in 2025, including $700 million for drones, with a focus on supporting the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB), and $50 million to the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) Trust Fund.[14] Umerov stated that Belgium, Sweden, Italy, Turkey, and Estonia joined the EW Coalition, and Swedish Defense Minister Pal Jonson stated that Sweden will co-chair the coalition with Germany.[15] Umerov stated on June 5 that Denmark, Sweden, Canada, Norway, and Iceland will initially contribute 428 million euros (roughly $489 million) to develop the "Danish model" in which Ukraine's partners buy Ukrainian-manufactured weapons for the Ukrainian military and that Ukraine's partners expect to contribute 1.3 billion euros (roughly $1.5 billion) to the "Danish model" in 2025.[16] Umerov stated that a portion of the funds will come from profits from frozen Russian assets.

Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced on June 5 the launch of a new initiative for joint production of Ukrainian weapons in Ramstein states in order to supply weapons to the Ukrainian military and to increase Ramstein states' industrial capacity.[17] Umerov announced the temporarily named "Ramstein Investments in the Defense Industry" initiative that will allow Ukrainian companies to invest in production in Ramstein partner states and vice versa .[18] Umerov noted that the needs of the Ukrainian military take priority, so everything produced at such enterprises under the initiative will go to the Ukrainian military as long as the war continues.[19] Umerov stated that an unspecified western European company announced the production of modern anti-Shahed missiles in Ukraine; that the UK will produce Lightweight Multirole Missiles (LMM) and launchers with Ukraine; that German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall will build Lynx armored fighting vehicles in Ukraine; and that Ukrainian enterprises are already producing ammunition under Norwegian and Finnish licenses.

North Korea reaffirmed its support for Russia's war effort in Ukraine during Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu's visit to North Korea on June 4. North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un reaffirmed North Korea's "unconditional support" for Russia's war effort in Ukraine and commitment to implementing the bilateral Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership during the visit.[20] ISW will report further on this meeting and Russian-North Korean cooperation in its upcoming Adversary Entente Task Force update.

Russian authorities cracked down on a publication that has previously speculated about several Russian command changes. Russian law enforcement sources told Russian state news agency TASS that authorities detained three employees of the state-owned Ural regional information agency Ura.ru on June 5 after searching the publication's editorial office in Yekaterinburg.[21] TASS and Russian state outlet RBC claimed that the investigation may be due to Ura.ru allegedly receiving funding from an organization designated as a foreign agent and that journalists allegedly bribed a law enforcement officer to obtain sensitive internal reports.[22] Ura.ru has notably reported on several Russian military command changes ahead of official announcements in previous years, including Leningrad Military District (LMD) and Central Military District (CMD) changes during Russia's war in Ukraine.[23]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces are reportedly sustaining an average of 1,140 casualties per day and suffering disproportionately high personnel casualties for marginal, grinding territorial gains.
• The Kremlin continues efforts to falsely portray Russia as willing to engage in good-faith negotiations to end the war in Ukraine, despite Russia’s repeated refusal to offer any concessions.
• Ukraine's allies and partners continued to provide military aid to Ukraine during the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein format) on June 4 and 5.
• Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced on June 5 the launch of a new initiative for joint production of Ukrainian weapons in Ramstein states in order to supply weapons to the Ukrainian military and to increase Ramstein states' industrial capacity.
• North Korea reaffirmed its support for Russia's war effort in Ukraine during Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu's visit to North Korea on June 4.
• Russian authorities cracked down on a publication that has previously speculated about several Russian command changes.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Hulyaipole and in western Zaporizhia. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and near Kupyansk, Lyman, and Toretsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 4, 2025

The Kremlin is fixating on recent train derailments in Russia in order to further long-standing Kremlin narratives claiming that Ukraine is an illegitimate negotiating partner that is uninterested in peace, likely to distract the broader information space from recent Kremlin officials' statements about Russia's own disinterest in a negotiated settlement. Russian President Vladimir Putin held a meeting with members of the Russian government on June 4 and discussed the May 31 collapse of two railway bridges in Kursk and Bryansk oblasts.[i] The meeting included a staged statement from a children's doctor who promoted the Kremlin's longstanding justifications for its initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and full-scale invasion in 2022. Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin claimed during the meeting that Ukrainian special services "without a doubt" conducted an operation to down railway bridges in Kursk and Bryansk oblasts on May 31, but did not present concrete evidence to link the collapsed bridges to Ukraine. Putin claimed that the train derailments confirm that the "already illegitimate" Ukrainian government that previously "seized power" is "gradually degenerating into a terrorist organization." Putin questioned if Russia can negotiate with "terrorists" and questioned why Russia should agree to Ukraine's proposed 30-day or longer ceasefires, claiming that Ukraine will use the ceasefires to continue to receive Western weapons provisions, mobilize military personnel, and prepare "other terrorist acts." Putin claimed that the Ukrainian government "does not need peace at all" and values power over peace. Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov stated that Putin later emphasized Ukraine's alleged "terrorism" during a phone call on June 4 with US President Donald Trump.[ii] Ushakov repeated Putin's claim that Ukraine has "degenerated into a terrorist organization."

Kremlin officials have long alleged that the current Ukrainian government is "illegitimate," and Putin previously questioned on March 27 how Russia can negotiate with Ukraine as "neo-Nazi formations" are allegedly ruling the country.[iii] Putin has also repeatedly used questions about Ukrainian force generation and Western weapons deliveries to reject Ukraine's previous ceasefire proposals.[iv] Putin's June 4 claims that the Ukrainian government is a "terrorist organization" with which Russia cannot negotiate, and which will exploit any longer-term ceasefire, is the latest iteration of this Kremlin effort to justify delaying the negotiation process and prolonging the war by attacking Ukraine's sovereignty as a legitimate negotiating partner. The Kremlin is likely link its messaging surrounding the train derailments and Ukraine's alleged perpetuation of "terrorism" in order to distract from Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev's claim on June 3 that Russia needs the negotiations in Istanbul to result in Russia's "swift victory and the complete destruction" of the Ukrainian government and not a "compromise[d] peace on someone else's delusional terms."[v]

Putin also used his June 4 phone call with Trump to further falsely portray Ukraine as an illegitimate negotiating partner that is uninterested in peace. Ushakov stated that Putin talked with Trump about the May 31 train derailments in Russia, the June 1 Ukrainian strikes against Russian military air bases, and the June 2 Ukrainian-Russian negotiations in Istanbul.[vi] Putin alleged to Trump that Ukraine was responsible for the train derailments. Ushakov claimed that Russia "did not succumb" and attended the Istanbul negotiations despite Ukraine's "provocations." Putin's statements to Trump are also likely aimed at distracting from Russia's own disinterest in negotiations and continued preparations for a prolonged war effort so as to avoid possible future US sanctions by painting Ukraine as a bad actor.[vii]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to express Ukraine's willingness to negotiate with Russia to establish a just and lasting peace. Zelensky stated on June 4 that the Ukrainian delegation to Istanbul has not received a response to the ceasefire proposal it presented during the June 2 Ukrainian-Russian talks.[viii] Zelensky also proposed that Ukraine and Russia implement a comprehensive ceasefire until Russian President Vladimir Putin meets with Zelensky in order to demonstrate a mutual commitment to de-escalation.[ix] Zelensky stated that Ukraine is ready to negotiate with Russia any day and that Russia can choose the location of negotiations. Zelensky said that he is willing to meet with Putin even without a ceasefire in order to prove Ukraine's willingness to negotiate.

Ukrainian and Western officials and open-source analysts continue to clarify the battlefield damage resulting from Ukraine's "Operation Spider Web" long-range drone strike series against Russian air bases on June 1. Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) published new footage on June 4 from Operation Spider Web showing Ukrainian drones approaching the wings, sides, tops, and underbellies of Russian fixed-wing aircraft at various airfields.[x] The SBU reported that the footage shows first-person view (FPV) drones striking A-50 airborne early warning and control (AWACS) aircraft, Tu-95 and Tu-160 strategic bombers, Tu-22 supersonic bombers, An-12 transport aircraft, and Il-78 aerial refueling tankers at Belaya Air Base in Irkutsk Oblast; Olenya Air Base in Murmansk Oblast; Dyagilevo Air Base in Ryazan Oblast; and Ivanovo Air Base in Ivanovo Oblast. Some of the clips in the video show aircraft on fire. The SBU stated that Ukrainian drones struck 41 Russian aircraft. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the SBU stated that Russia will be unable to restore half of the Russian aircraft that Ukraine struck or that it will take Russia years to restore them.[xi] A senior NATO official reported to Ukrainian news outlet Suspilne that Operation Spider Web damaged 40 Russian aircraft and confirmed that the operation destroyed 10 to 13 aircraft.[xii] The official also stated that Russia may respond to the loss of its strategic bombers, which Russia uses to launch cruise missiles against Ukraine, by adjusting strike packages to include more drones and ballistic missiles and fewer cruise missiles. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported that a NATO official stated that Russian forces previously used the destroyed aircraft to launch over 3,000 cruise missiles that have struck critical infrastructure and civilian targets in Ukraine since February 2022.[xiii]

Maxar satellite imagery collected on June 4 indicates that Ukrainian drone strikes destroyed at least two Tu-22 bombers and three Tu-95 bombers at Belaya Airbase (see embedded imagery below). Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) group AviVector posted satellite imagery on June 4 that indicates that Ukrainian drones destroyed four Tu-95MS bombers and one An-12 transport aircraft at Olenya Airbase.[xiv] AviVector assessed that Ukrainian forces destroyed seven Tu-95MS bombers, four Tu-22M3 bombers, and one An-12 transport aircraft and likely damaged a Tu-95MS bomber at Olenya and Belaya airbases.

Ukrainian special services reportedly used artificial intelligence (AI) to direct drones during Operation Spider Web. The SBU stated on June 4 that it used "autonomous artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms and manual operator intervention" to conduct the June 1 strikes against Russian air bases.[xv] The SBU stated that some drones lost signal during flight and switched to performing their missions using AI along a preplanned route. ISW recently assessed that Russia and Ukraine have demonstrated some integration of limited AI capabilities into drone operations but have not deployed them at scale on the battlefield.[xvi] Promises of an immediate AI and machine learning (ML) drone revolution are premature as of June 2025, even in the wake of Operation Spider Web, given that both Russian and Ukrainian forces will need to allocate more time, testing, and investment to deploy these drones on the frontlines en masse.

Ukraine’s Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) announced on June 4 that the UK will invest a total of £350 billion (roughly $474 billion) to provide Ukraine with 100,000 drones in 2025 — a tenfold increase from the 10,000 drones that the UK provided Ukraine with in 2024.[xvii] The UK MoD stated that the UK has already provided Ukraine with 140,000 rounds of artillery ammunition in 2025. The UK will also allocate an additional £247 million (roughly $335 million) for the training of Ukrainian forces in the UK through the Interflex training project and will contribute £40 million (roughly $52 million) to materiel procurement efforts within the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) mission.[xviii] German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius announced during a meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein format) on June 4 that the first Ukrainian long-range weapons system produced in Ukraine with German financial backing could enter service with the Ukrainian military within ”just a few weeks.”[xix]

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin is fixating on recent train derailments in Russia in order to further long-standing Kremlin narratives claiming that Ukraine is an illegitimate negotiating partner that is uninterested in peace, likely to distract the broader information space from recent Kremlin officials' statements about Russia's own disinterest in a negotiated settlement.
• Putin also used his June 4 phone call with Trump to further falsely portray Ukraine as an illegitimate negotiating partner that is uninterested in peace.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to express Ukraine's willingness to negotiate with Russia to establish a just and lasting peace.
• Ukrainian and Western officials and open-source analysts continue to clarify the battlefield damage resulting from Ukraine's "Operation Spider Web" long-range drone strike series against Russian air bases on June 1.
• Ukrainian special services reportedly used artificial intelligence (AI) to direct drones during Operation Spider Web.
• Ukraine’s Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Toretsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 3, 2025

Kremlin officials publicly acknowledged that Russia seeks the “complete destruction” of Ukraine, indicating Moscow’s disinterest in good faith peace negotiations and a near-term resolution to the war. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on June 3 in posts on his Russian- and English-language Telegram channels that Russia needs the negotiations in Istanbul to result in Russia's "swift victory [in Ukraine] and the complete destruction" of the Ukrainian government and not a "compromise[d] peace on someone else's delusional terms."[i] Medvedev stated that Russia's June 2 Istanbul memorandum was in line with these goals and threatened that Russia will "explode" everything and "disappear" anyone who opposes Russia in response to the June 1 long-range Ukrainian drone strikes against Russia. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on June 3 that Russia's Istanbul memorandum is aimed at "eliminating the root causes" of the war in Ukraine and that people should not expect "immediate decisions" from Istanbul.[ii] Peskov stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin is interested in a future trilateral meeting with US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, but that Putin wants to hold this meeting after all of the technical details are worked out as part of a future ceasefire or long-term peace agreement.[iii]

Russian state media has previously cautioned the Russian public against expecting any significant results from ongoing Ukrainian–Russian negotiations, although Russian officials continue to falsely project interest in good faith peace negotiations to US and Western officials.[iv] Russian officials have recently engaged with the United States in a series of bilateral meetings and as part of ongoing US efforts to mediate an end to the war in Ukraine, but Russian officials have yet to demonstrate a willingness to compromise on any of their long-standing demands to bring about peace in Ukraine.[v] ISW noted on June 2 that Russia's Istanbul memorandum reflects the Kremlin's long-standing public demands for Ukraine to make significant territorial and political concessions while Russia offers no concessions of its own.[vi] ISW continues to assess that Russia remains committed to pursuing demands that amount to nothing short of Ukraine's full capitulation and that Russia will continue to pursue this objective so long as Putin believes Russia can militarily defeat Ukraine.

Ukraine struck the Kerch Strait Bridge on June 3 for the third time since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reported that SBU agents mined the underwater support pillars of the Kerch Strait Bridge and detonated the equivalent of 1,100 kilograms of TNT at 0444 on June 3.[vii] The SBU reported that the operation took several months to plan and execute and stated that this is the third time that Ukraine has conducted an operation against the bridge. The SBU reported that the structural integrity of the bridge is in critical condition. The SBU released an image of the bridge which indicates that the explosion did not damage the roadway, though the force of the explosion threw structural elements onto the roadway. Geolocated footage published on June 3 shows an explosion at the base of the Kerch Strait Bridge.[viii] Russian opposition outlets Sota and Astra and Russian milbloggers circulated footage indicating that Ukraine conducted a naval drone strike against the bridge around 1500 on June 3, though it is unclear if the strike caused damage to the structure.[ix] Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated that damage to the Kerch Strait Bridge undermines Russia’s ability to resupply Russian units and facilities in Crimea.[x] The Kerch Strait Bridge is a critical Russian logistics route, and Russian forces heavily defend the bridge with layered air defense, anti-sabotage measures, and personnel who monitor surface and underwater activity.[xi] Russian sources claimed that authorities temporarily halted traffic across the bridge, but later claimed that traffic resumed.[xii] Russian state media and the Russian government have not responded to the strike as of this publication.

Western officials and open-source analysts continue to clarify the battlefield damage following the Ukrainian long-range drone strike series (Operation Spider Web) on June 1. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yurii Ihnat told Ukrainian outlet Ukrainska Pravda on June 2 that Ukrainian officials estimated about 10 to 12 of Russia's 19 Tu-160 bombers and 36 of Russia's 57 Tu-95 bombers were operational prior to Ukraine’s June 1 strikes on Russian airbases.[xiii] Bloomberg reported on June 2 that a senior Western official stated that Ukrainian special services likely destroyed or damaged at least seven Tu-95 bombers and four Tu-22 bombers during the June 1 strike.[xiv] Bloomberg also assessed that Russia will likely struggle to repair and replace aircraft damaged in the June 1 strike as its strategic aviation fleet relies on critical Western components that Russia has failed to source in the wake of Western sanctions. The New York Times (NYT) reported on June 3 that Western officials and military analysts assessed that Ukrainian special services likely destroyed or damaged six Tu-95 bombers, four Tu-22M bombers, and one A-50 airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft, and that Ukrainian special services may have destroyed or severely damaged up to 20 Russian strategic aircraft during the strike.[xv] Ukraine-based open-source intelligence organization Frontelligence Insight assessed on June 3 that satellite imagery and open-source analysis indicate that Ukrainian special services likely destroyed or damaged 11 bombers of various types and one An-12 transport aircraft.[xvi] Frontelligence noted that publicly available satellite imagery has yet to confirm reporting that Ukrainian special services destroyed or damaged over 20 bombers. Ukrainian military observer Tatarigami and journalists from the Telegraph and Insider stated on June 3 that Ukrainian special services shared a video of Ukrainian drones striking at least two A-50 airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft and that Ukraine may release this video soon.[xvii] ISW has not observed the video’s publication as of the time of this report but will continue to monitor for additional information.

Russia continues to produce and stockpile missiles and drones to strike Ukraine, demonstrating Russia's continued commitment to winning the war through military means. Ukrainian outlet New Voice (NV) reported on June 3, citing Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), that Russian forces had stockpiled over 13,000 ballistic, cruise, and other missiles as of mid-May 2025, including: almost 600 Iskander-M ballistic missiles, over 100 Kinzhal hypersonic ballistic missiles, almost 300 Kh-101 cruise missiles, over 400 Kalibr cruise missiles, up to 300 Kh-22/32 cruise missiles, about 700 Oniks cruise missiles and Zirkon anti-ship missiles, about 60 North Korean-produced KN-23 ballistic missiles, and about 11,000 S-300/400 air defense missiles.[xviii] NV reported that the GUR also estimated that Russia can produce roughly 150–200 missiles per month, including: 60 to 70 Iskander-Ms, 10 to 15 Kinzhals, 20 to 30 Kh-101s, 25 to 30 Kalibrs, up to 10 Kh-32s, and 20 to 30 total Oniks and Zirkon missiles. Russia had been launching increasingly large strike packages against Ukraine containing missiles prior to June 1, and Ukraine's June 1 strikes targeting Russian airfields and bombers will degrade Russia's ability to conduct further large air-launched cruise missile strikes against Ukraine. Ihnat told Ukrainska Pravda that the June 1 strikes did not destroy all of Russia's strategic bombers and that Russia retains the ability to strike Ukraine with missiles launched from strategic bombers.[xix] Ihnat noted that roughly half of all Russian long range strike drones launched against Ukraine are decoys, while the other half are real Shahed drones. Shahed drones have long dominated Russian strike packages, and Russian forces have recently been using more ground-launched ballistic missiles than air-launched cruise missiles. ISW continues to assess that Russian efforts to increase domestic drone and missile production and ongoing adaptation of strikes packages are likely part of a broader effort to prepare for a long war in Ukraine and possibly a future war against NATO.[xx]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced a series of Ukrainian military command changes on June 3. Zelensky appointed former Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi as the Commander of Ukraine’s Joint Forces Command.[xxi] Zelensky appointed Drapatyi as the Commander of Ukrainian Ground Forces on November 29, 2024, and Drapatyi recently submitted his resignation in response to a June 1 Russian missile strike on a Ukrainian training unit.[xxii] The position of Ukrainian Joint Forces Commander has been vacant since February 26, when Zelensky appointed then Joint Forces Commander Major General Andriy Hnatov as Chief of the Ukrainian General Staff.[xxiii] Zelensky and Umerov also announced on June 3 that they appointed Brigadier General Oleh Apostol as Commander of the Ukrainian Air Assault Forces, Major General Ilhor Skybiuk as Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Major Robert Brovdi (callsign "Madyar") as Commander of the Unmanned Systems Forces, and Colonel Vadym Sukharevskyi as Deputy Commander of Operational Command "East."[xxiv] Sukharevskyi previously served as Commander of Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces.[xxv]

Key Takeaways:

• Kremlin officials publicly acknowledged that Russia seeks the “complete destruction” of Ukraine, indicating Moscow’s disinterest in good faith peace negotiations and a near-term resolution to the war.
• Ukraine struck the Kerch Strait Bridge on June 3 for the third time since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
• Western officials and open-source analysts continue to clarify the battlefield damage following the Ukrainian long-range drone strike series (Operation Spider Web) on June 1.
• Russia continues to produce and stockpile missiles and drones to strike Ukraine, demonstrating Russia's continued commitment to winning the war through military means.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced a series of Ukrainian military command changes on June 3.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced near Kurakhove.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 2, 2025

Ukrainian and Russian delegations met in Istanbul on June 2 and only reached agreements about prisoner of war (POW) exchanges. Russia's refusal to give Ukraine its memorandum with its terms for a peace settlement before the meeting ensured that the meeting was largely unproductive and further protracted the negotiation process. The Ukrainian and Russian delegations met in Istanbul for roughly one hour.[1] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov, who led the Ukrainian delegation in Istanbul, stated that Ukraine proposed a 90-day ceasefire, the release of all prisoners of war (POWs), the return of Ukrainian children whom Russian authorities have abducted, and another round of Ukrainian-Russian talks between June 20 and 30 to prepare for a meeting between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Russian President Vladimir Putin.[2] The Russian delegation appears to have rejected Ukraine's proposal for a 90-day ceasefire. The Ukrainian and Russian delegations agreed to conduct an "all for all" exchange of seriously ill and wounded POWs and POWs aged 18 to 25, which the Russian delegation later claimed would involve at least 1,000 total POWs.[3] The delegations also agreed to exchange the bodies of dead servicemembers in a “6,000 for 6,000” format. Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky, who led the Russian delegation, stated that Russia proposed a two-to-three-day ceasefire on unspecified areas of the front to allow both sides to retrieve bodies from the battlefield.[4] Medinsky stated that Ukraine and Russia will create permanent medical commissions to conduct regular exchanges of seriously wounded POWs without having to wait for ”political decisions."[5] Umerov noted that Russia first gave its memorandum with its terms for a peace settlement to Ukraine during the meeting and that Ukraine will study the document for a week before deciding on further action.[6] Umerov stated on May 28 that Ukraine, in contrast, had already presented its memorandum to Russia — well ahead of the June 2 talks.[7] ISW continues to assess that Russia is trying to disrupt the peace process and prolong the war in order to make additional battlefield gains.[8]

Ukrainian and Russian media published the major points of both sides' memorandums on June 1 and 2, respectively. Ukranian outlet Suspilne published the full text of Ukraine's memorandum on June 1, which reflected Umerov's statements about Ukraine's proposals during the June 2 Ukrainian-Russian talks.[9] Ukraine's memorandum calls for:

• A complete and unconditional ceasefire in the sky, on land, and at sea as a precondition to peace negotiations;
• Confidence building measures, including the return of all Ukrainian children and civilians and the exchange of all POWs;
• The goal of negotiations to be a permanent, lasting peace agreement, as part of which Ukraine receives reliable security guarantees and maintains its territorial integrity and ability to join any security alliance, including NATO;
• And for Russia and Ukraine to continue negotiations after the June 2 Istanbul meeting, work towards confidence building measures, and prepare for a future Zelensky-Putin meeting.

Kremlin newswire TASS published photos of Russia's memorandum following the Ukrainian-Russian talks on June 2.[10] Russia's memorandum is divided into three sections: the first section defines Russia's demands for the "final settlement" of the war; the second section proposes two different sets of pre-conditions that Russia would accept as part of a ceasefire; and the third section outlines Russia's ideal timeline for negotiations. The first section of Russia's memorandum lists demands that Ukraine should concede to as part of a long-term peace agreement, including:

• International recognition of Russia's occupation of all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and Crimea and the complete withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from these oblasts;
• Indefinite Ukrainian commitment to neutrality (a promise to never join military alliances and coalitions), a ban on future foreign military deployments and infrastructure in Ukraine, termination of all of Ukraine's existing security agreements, and a permanent ban on Ukraine having nuclear weapons;
• And protection of the "full rights, freedoms, and interests" of Russians and Russian-speaking populations in Ukraine and legislation against the "glorification and propaganda of Nazism."

The second section of Russia's memorandum demands that Ukraine and Russia pursue one of two paths toward a ceasefire. The first path requires Ukraine to completely withdraw from the unoccupied areas of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts up to an unspecified distance beyond the oblasts' borders. The second path requires Ukraine to agree a different set of Russian demands, including:

• Ban redeployments of all its units, except as part of withdrawals from Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts;
• End all Ukrainian force generation efforts, begin demobilization, end martial law, and organize presidential elections within 100 days of ending martial law, and elect a new government;
• And terminate all foreign military assistance, including the supply of satellite imagery and intelligence, and ban all foreign military deployments to Ukraine.

The third section of Russia's memorandum recommends that Russia and Ukraine sign a longer-term ceasefire agreement after exchanging the bodies of dead servicemembers and a two-to-three-day general ceasefire to retrieve bodies from the battlefield. The memorandum demands that Ukraine completely withdraw from Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts within 30 days of the beginning of the ceasefire and that Ukraine elect a new government before Russia and Ukraine sign a formal peace agreement.

Russia's memorandum reflects the Kremlin's long-standing public demands for Ukraine to make significant territorial and political concessions while Russia offers no concessions of its own. Russia's memorandum is imbued with its long-standing demand that any peace settlement address Russia's perceived "root causes" of the war - namely the eastern expansion of NATO since the early 1990s and Ukraine's supposed discrimination against Russian-speakers and Russian culture.[11] The Kremlin has called for the "denazification" and "demilitarization" of Ukraine since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022, and ISW has previously noted that these terms amount to demands for regime change, the installation of a pro-Russian proxy government in Ukraine, and significant limitations on Ukraine's ability to defend itself against future Russian aggression.[12] Kremlin officials have consistently demanded regime change in Ukraine and falsely claimed that all pro-Western Ukrainian governments since Ukraine's 2014 Revolution of Dignity have been "illegitimate."[13] Putin and other Kremlin officials have repeatedly argued that Russia should not conclude or respect any agreements with the current "illegitimate" Ukrainian government, and ISW has previously noted that any peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine must include Russia's explicit recognition of the current Ukrainian government.[14] The current Ukrainian government is legitimate, however, and continues to abide by the Ukrainian Constitution, such that Russia's demand that Ukraine elect a new government before concluding a long-term peace agreement is simply another demand for regime change.

Putin demanded during a speech on June 14, 2024 that Ukrainian forces must begin to "completely withdraw" from Ukrainian-controlled territory in Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts (which the Kremlin illegally declared as annexed in September 2022) and that Ukraine officially abandons its goal to join NATO before Russia can agree to a ceasefire and peace negotiations.[15] ISW noted that Russia occupied roughly 75 percent of the four oblasts as of June 14, 2024, and Russia now occupies 79.8 percent of the four oblasts as of June 2, 2025. Ukraine currently controls the remaining twenty percent of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, which totals approximately 21,616 square kilometers of territory. The remaining twenty percent of the four oblasts is also home to five major cities (Kherson and Zaporizhzhia cities and Kramatorsk, Kostyantynivka, and Slovyansk) with a combined pre-war population of over 1.3 million people – not accounting for the thousands of people who live in the smaller towns and populated settlements throughout these oblasts.[16] Russian forces have not demonstrated the capacity to seize cities of this size since early 2022, and the Russian military is almost certainly incapable of conducting a successful offensive operation to seize one of these cities after three years of war and degradation. ISW continues to assess that Russia remains committed to pursuing demands that amount to nothing short of Ukraine's full capitulation and that Russia will continue to pursue this objective so long as Putin believes Russia can militarily defeat Ukraine.[17]

The Russian delegation dismissed Russia's systemic kidnapping of Ukrainian children. Ukrainian Presidential Office Head Andriy Yermak reported that the Ukrainian delegation gave Russia the names of "hundreds" of kidnapped Ukrainian children that Russia must return to Ukraine.[18] Medinsky claimed that the Ukrainian list contained 331 names yet downplayed this list as not "thousands" or "millions" of children but "dozens."[19] Medinsky claimed that Russia returns Ukrainian children when Russian authorities can locate the children's parents or other legal representatives and that Russia does not kidnap Ukrainian children but "saves" them.[20] Medinsky's statement downplays the true extent of Russia's pre-war preparations, legal mechanisms, and various schemes to hide and justify the forced deportation, forced assimilation, and militarization of Ukrainian children.[21] Ukraine has verified Russia's deportation of at least 19,456 Ukrainian children, and only 1,345 deported Ukrainian children have been returned to Ukraine as of June 2.[22] Yale’s Humanitarian Research Lab placed the number of deported children closer to 35,000 as of March 19, 2025.[23] Kremlin Children’s Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova (against whom the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant in March 2023 for her role in abducting Ukrainian children) claimed that Russia had “accepted” a stark 700,000 Ukrainian children between February 2022 and July 2023.[24] The United Nations (UN) Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide explicitly forbids the forcible transfer of children from one group to another group for the purpose of destroying, in whole or in part, a national or ethnic group, and considers these violations as constituent acts of genocide.[25]

Russian forces appear to be intensifying efforts to widen the frontline in northern Sumy Oblast along three axes of advance north and northeast of Sumy City. Geolocated footage published on June 2 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Andriivka (north of Sumy City) and northeast of Yablunivka (northeast of Sumy City).[26] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recently seized Oleksiivka, Novomykhailivka, and Kindrativka (all north of Sumy City) and advanced into northern Andriivka and west of Yablunivka and Kostyantynivka.[27] Russian forces have recently intensified ground assaults north of Sumy City toward Andriivka and northeast of Sumy City toward Yunakivka and toward Myropillya.[28] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on June 2 that elements of the Russian 18th Motorized Rifle Division (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are fighting along the Kostyantynivka-Kindrativka line and along the Volodymyrivka-Oleksiivka line (all north of Sumy City).[29] Mashovets stated that elements of the 104th, 234th, and 237th airborne (VDV) regiments (all of the Russian 76th VDV Division) are operating along the Loknya-Yunakivka line and west of Loknya (all northeast of Sumy City). Mashovets previously reported that Russian forces recently redeployed elements of the 752nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) and 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th AC, LMD) from the Lyman and Chasiv Yar directions respectively in order to reinforce the Russian force grouping in northern Sumy Oblast.[30]

Russian officials have long called for the establishment of a buffer zone into northern Sumy Oblast and have recently intensified efforts to set informational conditions to justify renewed offensive operations toward Sumy City.[31] Russian forces are likely attempting to advance to the Khotin-Khrapivshchyna line (south to southeast of Andriivka and Yunakivka) to within roughly 12 to 15 kilometers of Sumy City, which would place Russian forces within tube artillery range of the entirety of Sumy City. Russian forces likely intend to leverage intensified drone and artillery strikes against the city to support further advances toward Sumy City and likely aspire to conduct an offensive operation to seize the city in the future. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are highly unlikely to be able to seize Sumy City in the near- to medium-term, as Russian forces have not seized a Ukrainian city with a pre-war population greater than 100,000 since July 2022.[32]

Open-source analysts continue to clarify the battlefield damage following the Ukrainian long-range drone strike series on June 1. Open-source analysts on X assessed that available imagery published on June 2 indicates that Ukrainian special services likely destroyed or damaged four Tu-95 bombers and three Tu-22M3 bombers at Belaya Air Base in Irkutsk Oblast and one A-50 airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft at Ivanovo Air Base in Ivanovo Oblast.[33] Open-source analysts on X claimed that available video footage published on June 1 and 2 indicates that Ukrainian special services destroyed or damaged five Tu-95 bombers and one An-22 transport aircraft at Olenya Air Base in Murmansk Oblast.[34] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, who often reports on successful Ukrainian drone operations in Russia, reported on June 2 that Ukrainian forces destroyed at least 13 Russian fixed-wing aircraft and damaged over 40 aircraft in total during the strike.[35] Ukrainian military observer Tatarigami stated on June 2 that Russia has not built new Tu-95 or Tu-22M3 since 1991 and that Russia only had 70 to 90 Tupolev aircraft before the June 1 strike series.[36] ISW will continue to monitor for additional satellite imagery confirmation of Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian air bases.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian and Russian delegations met in Istanbul on June 2 and only reached agreements about prisoner of war (POW) exchanges. Russia's refusal to give Ukraine its memorandum with its terms for a peace settlement before the meeting ensured that the meeting was largely unproductive and further protracted the negotiation process. 

• Ukrainian and Russian media published the major points of both sides' memorandums on June 1 and 2, respectively. 

• Russia's memorandum reflects the Kremlin's long-standing public demands for Ukraine to make significant territorial and political concessions while Russia offers no concessions of its own. 

• The Russian delegation dismissed Russia's systemic kidnapping of Ukrainian children. 

• Russian forces appear to be intensifying efforts to widen the frontline in northern Sumy Oblast along three axes of advance north and northeast of Sumy City. 

• Open-source analysts continue to clarify the battlefield damage following the Ukrainian long-range drone strike series on June 1. 

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Velyka Novosilka. Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Chasiv Yar, and Toretsk. 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 1, 2025

Ukraine conducted a large-scale and simultaneous series of drone strikes against multiple air bases in Russia on June 1. Sources within Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) told various media outlets that the SBU conducted widespread first-person view (FPV) drone strikes that struck four air bases in Russia.[1] The SBU sources reported that Ukrainian forces struck Belaya Air Base in Irkutsk Oblast; Olenya Air Base in Murmansk Oblast; Dyagilevo Air Base in Ryazan Oblast; and Ivanovo Air Base in Ivanovo Oblast. The SBU sources confirmed that Ukrainian drone operators struck 41 Russian strategic aircraft, including A-50 long-range radar detection aircraft and Tu-95 and Tu-22M3 strategic bombers – fixed-wing aircraft that Russia uses to detect Ukrainian air defenses and launch cruise missiles against Ukraine. The SBU reported that the operation inflicted roughly $7 billion worth of damage on Russia.[2] The SBU sources confirmed that the SBU facilitated drone strikes by transporting the FPV drones to Russia at an unspecified time; storing the FPV drones in trucks carrying cargo units with retractable roofs; parking the trucks near the Russian air bases; and remotely opening the truck roofs and launching the FPVs. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed that the operation used 117 drones and destroyed 34 percent of Russia's strategic cruise missile carriers.[3] Zelensky stated that Ukrainian authorities withdrew the people who "assisted" Ukraine with the operation from Russia before the operation.[4] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted FPV drone strikes against air bases in Irkutsk, and Murmansk oblasts, causing several aircraft to catch fire.[5] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled all strikes against air bases in Ivanovo, Ryazan, and Amur oblasts and that Russian authorities reportedly linked Russian opposition outlet Mediazona reported that Ukrainian authorities planned to conduct FPV drone strikes against an air base in Amur Oblast, and Russian sources claimed that a truck carrying FPV drones near the Ukrainika Air Base in Amur Oblast caught fire before Ukrainian forces could launch the drones.[6]

Ukraine continues to innovate its drone technology and tactics to achieve operational surprise and successfully target Russian military infrastructure in the rear. The SBU was reportedly able to launch the FPV drones close to the targeted Russian air bases, which likely enabled the FPV drones to evade Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems and deny Russian air defenders enough time to detect the drones.[7] The SBU innovative use of semi-trucks to launch the FPV drones directly in Russian territory enabled Ukrainian drone operators to strike targets deep in Russia's rear and conduct the first drone strike during the war against a target in Siberia. The SBU's tactics to use FPV drones and not aircraft-type long-range drones also allowed drone operators to maintain operational surprise to inflict maximum damage and minimize Russia's response window.

Ukraine's drone strike operation against strategic Russian aircraft may at least temporarily constrain Russia's ability to conduct long-range drone and missile strikes into Ukraine. Ukraine's June 1 operation targeted aircraft that Russia uses to launch cruise missiles against Ukraine and airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) systems that Russia uses to identify Ukrainian air defense systems and coordinate Russian fighter jet targeting.[8] Russia regularly deploys Tu-95 and Tu-22M3 to launch Kh-101/Kh-555 and Kh-59/69 cruise missiles against Ukraine.[9] The downing of Russian A-50 aircraft has previously temporarily constrained Russian aviation activities over Ukraine.[10] The June 1 Ukrainian drone operation will force Russian officials to consider redistributing Russia's air defense systems to cover a much wider range of territory and possibly deploying mobile air defense groups that can more quickly react to possible similar Ukrainian drone strikes in the future.[11]

Russia will likely struggle to replace the aircraft that Ukrainian forces damaged and destroyed. Forbes reported in September 2023 that a single A-50 aircraft costs roughly $500 million, and the Kyiv Independent reported on June 1 that Russia has fewer than 10 A-50s in operation.[12] Ukrainian military observer Yuriy Butusov stated on June 1 that Ukrainian forces destroyed some strategic aircraft that Russia does not currently produce.[13] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russia no longer produces chassis for the Tu-95 and Tu-22 bombers and noted that the chassis are impossible to replace.[14] The Economist reported on June 1 that Russia likely has fewer than 90 operational Tu-22, Tu-95, and Tu-160s in total.[15] Ukrainian sources have recently noted that Russia is increasingly using Sukhoi aircraft — and not strategic bombers — to launch cruise missiles.[16] Russia likely turned to Sukhoi aircraft so as to not risk their strategic bombers, suggesting that Russia is concerned about its limited quantities of strategic bombers.

Russian officials and milbloggers continue to blame Russian leadership for failing to defend Russian military infrastructure from Ukrainian drone strikes — a widespread complaint throughout the war after successful Ukrainian strikes. Russian State Duma Deputy and former Deputy Commander of the Southern Military District (SMD) retired Lieutenant General Andrei Gurulev (who has previously criticized the Russian MoD and whom the Duma subsequently voted to remove from his position on the Duma Defense Committee) blamed Russian special services for not sufficiently protecting the air bases and allowing the trucks to move close to the targets.[17] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian senior military leadership continues to disregard the need to protect military facilities and has been relying on the fact that many critical military infrastructure facilities are located far from Ukraine.[18] Milbloggers claimed that this attitude has repeatedly led to "massive” failures and Ukraine's ability to violate Russia’s borders and airspace.[19] Milbloggers specifically criticized the Russian military command‘s decision to store strategic aircraft in open-air facilities with insufficient defenses.[20] Milbloggers have repeatedly complained about the Russian military's failure to adapt to repeated successful Ukrainian strikes against Russia and to learn from wartime mistakes.[21]

Russian state media and milbloggers attempted to frame Ukraine's strikes against legitimate Russian military targets as undermining Russia's nuclear stability and as grounds for a Russian nuclear response — mirroring the Kremlin's repeated nuclear saber-rattling throughout the war that has aimed to prevent Western support for Ukraine. Moscow-based state media outlet Moskovsky Komsomolets amplified claims from Russian political scientist Sergei Markov that the Ukrainian strikes against the air bases in Russia are grounds for the use of nuclear weapons under Russia's nuclear doctrine because the strikes targeted Russia's strategic nuclear potential.[22] Many Russian milbloggers, including Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers, made similar claims about Russia's doctrinal nuclear use and explicitly called for Russia to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine in response to the strikes.[23] Russia has attempted to use nuclear rhetoric throughout the war in order to influence the West to limit aid to Ukraine or limit Ukraine's ability to develop its own strike capabilities.[24] Russian President Vladimir Putin signed Russia's updated nuclear doctrine in November 2024 after the United States greenlit Ukraine's long-range strikes into Russia, and ISW assessed that these doctrinal updates were part of Russia's efforts to push Western decision makers to shy away from providing additional support to Ukraine.[25] ISW continues to assess that Russia's changes to its nuclear doctrine did not represent a substantial change in Russia's nuclear posture, doctrine, or the threat of the employment of nuclear weapons and that Russian nuclear use in Ukraine remains unlikely.[26] Ukraine has notably previously destroyed Russian strategic bombers and conducted long-range strikes against Russian air bases that house strategic bombers and strategic bomber production enterprises.[27]

Russian officials blamed Ukraine for the collapse of two bridges and subsequent train derailments in western Russia on May 31, likely as part of efforts to justify the recent launch of Russian offensive operations in Sumy Oblast and the Kremlin's disinterest in peace negotiations to end the war. Two railway bridges in Bryansk and Kursk oblasts collapsed on the night of May 31, causing two trains to derail.[28] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko responded to the derailments, stating that Russia may be conducting false flag operations to disrupt the peace process and prolong the war.[29] Russian officials and milbloggers largely blamed Ukraine for the collapsed bridges but did not provide any evidence to support these claims.[30] Russian State Duma Deputy Andrei Kolesnik claimed that Russia should respond harshly and not limit its response to the train derailments.[31] Chairperson of the Federation Council Committee on Constitutional Legislation and State Building Andrei Klishas claimed that the derailments indicate that a "terrorist group" controls Ukraine, which Klishas claimed has turned into a "terrorist enclave" without borders or legitimate authorities.[32] Klishas called for Russia to create a "vast" buffer zone in Ukraine to protect Russia from Ukrainian attacks and for Russia to "denazify" and "demilitarize" Ukraine and "reestablish" the Ukrainian state (a reference to Russia's original war aims to replace the current legitimate Ukrainian government with a pro-Russian proxy government and to prevent Ukraine from being able to defend itself in the future). A Russian milblogger responded to Klishas, claiming that Russia should establish a "buffer zone" that extends to western Ukraine and that Ukraine should exist as a rump state with its capital in Lviv City.[33] The milblogger's claim mirrored Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev's recent call for Russia to control a buffer zone encompassing nearly all of Ukraine, apart from a relatively small part of Volyn and Lviv oblasts.[34]

Ukrainian authorities recently reported that Russia has deployed 125,000 personnel to the borders of Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts — two oblasts in which Russian forces are conducting offensive operations that Russian officials have framed as part of efforts to create buffer zones in Ukraine.[35] ISW continues to assess that Russian offensive efforts in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts demonstrate that the Kremlin's territorial ambitions are not limited to the seizure of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and that Russia is attempting to delay negotiations and prolong the war in order to make additional battlefield gains.[36] Russian officials appear to be claiming that Ukraine is responsible for the train derailments at least partly in order to justify Russia's recent launch of offensive operations in Sumy Oblast as necessary and defensive in nature. Russian officials may be trying to frame Ukraine as the party that is not interested in peace negotiations and to justify Russia's prolongation of the war in order to achieve its original war goals.

Russian forces conducted their largest combined drone and missile strike of the war that included over 400 drones against Ukraine on the night of May 31 to June 1. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched three Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Kursk and Voronezh oblasts and four Kh-101 and Iskander-K air and ground-based cruise missiles from unspecified directions.[37] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 472 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Kransnodar Krai. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed three Kh-101/Iskander-K missiles and 213 drones over northern, eastern, southern, western, and central Ukraine and that 172 drones were "lost" or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW). Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, and Odesa oblasts and damaged civilian and military infrastructure.[38]

Ukrainian forces were notably unable to down any of the three ballistic missiles that Russia launched overnight.[39] Ukrainian forces have struggled to intercept ballistic missiles due to the limited supply of US-made Patriot air defense systems and interceptors.[40] ISW continues to assess that Russia's ballistic missile strikes are forcing Ukraine to make difficult decisions about which areas of Ukraine to protect with its limited Patriot systems.[41] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yurii Ihnat stated on May 24 that Ukrainian forces are struggling to use Patriot air defense systems to down modified Russian Iskander-M ballistic missiles due to recent Russian improvements, including enhancements that enable the missile to change trajectory and perform maneuvers rather than flying in a straight line.[42] The Economist reported on May 25 that Ukrainian government sources estimate that the Kremlin has a stockpile of 500 ballistic missiles.[43]

Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Mykhailo Drapatyi submitted his resignation following a Russian missile strike on a Ukrainian training unit on June 1. Ukraine's Ground Forces reported that a Russian missile strike on a training unit in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on June 1 killed 12 and wounded over 60 servicemembers.[44] Drapatyi stated on June 1 that he submitted a request to resign from his position due to a personal sense of responsibility for the death of Ukrainian servicemembers.[45] Drapatyi stated that his decision to resign came as the result of being unable to ensure the proper execution of his orders and that Ukraine‘s military is disadvantaged by a command culture that is unwilling to accept personal responsibility for and learn from battlefield failures. Drapatyi stated that he must take responsibility and resign, as his efforts to root out this attitude among Ukraine’s Ground Forces failed.

Russian forces continue to adapt their strike packages in an effort to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses. Russia launched its highest number of drones in the war on the night of May 31 to June 1. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on June 1 that Russia is increasing the number of drones per strike each week.[46] The Economist recently reported that Russia is able to produce approximately 100 Shaheds per day, and Russia's increasingly large drone strike packages are a direct result of this increased production.[47] Ukrainian forces reportedly were unable to down 67 out of 355 drones on the night of May 25 to 26, and Ukrainian forces reportedly were unable to down 87 out of 472 Russian drones on the night of May 31 to June 1, indicating that the Russian tactic of using huge numbers of drones is proving effective.[48]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky established a delegation to participate in peace negotiations to end the war as Russian officials continue to flout their own proposed negotiation mechanisms. Zelensky issued a decree on June 1 authorizing Ukrainian political and military officials to negotiate on Ukraine’s behalf at the upcoming bilateral Ukrainian-Russian talks in Istanbul on July 2.[49] Ukrainian Minister of Defense Rustem Umerov will lead the delegation, whose other members include deputies and representatives from the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Ukrainian Navy and Air Force, the Verkhovna Rada’s Human Rights Commissioner’s Office, Ukraine's Security Service (SBU), Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), Ukraine's Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU), the Office of the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ Chief of Staff and Office of the President, and the Ukrainian General Staff. Zelensky explicitly authorized the delegation to negotiate a peace settlement with Russia and Ukraine’s Western partners. US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg told Fox News on May 31 that the Russia has failed to deliver a memorandum with its terms for a peace settlement and that Russian President Vladimir Putin failed to deliver the memorandum to US President Donald Trump during Putin's proposed timeline.[50] Zelensky also stated on June 1 that Russia had yet to present its memorandum to US, Ukrainian, or Turkish officials.[51]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine conducted a large-scale and simultaneous series of drone strikes against multiple air bases in Russia on June 1.
• Ukraine continues to innovate its drone technology and tactics to achieve operational surprise and successfully target Russian military infrastructure in the rear.
• Ukraine's drone strike operation against strategic Russian aircraft may at least temporarily constrain Russia's ability to conduct long-range drone and missile strikes into Ukraine.
• Russia will likely struggle to replace the aircraft that Ukrainian forces damaged and destroyed.
• Russian officials and milbloggers continue to blame Russian leadership for failing to defend Russian military infrastructure from Ukrainian drone strikes — a widespread complaint throughout the war after successful Ukrainian strikes.
• Russian state media and milbloggers attempted to frame Ukraine's strikes against legitimate Russian military targets as undermining Russia's nuclear stability and as grounds for a Russian nuclear response – mirroring the Kremlin's repeated nuclear saber-rattling throughout the war that has aimed to prevent Western support for Ukraine.
• Russian officials blamed Ukraine for the collapse of two bridges and subsequent train derailments in western Russia on May 31, likely as part of efforts to justify the recent launch of Russian offensive operations in Sumy Oblast and the Kremlin's disinterest in peace negotiations to end the war.
• Russian forces conducted their largest combined drone and missile strike of the war that included over 400 drones against Ukraine on the night of May 31 to June 1.
• Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Mykhailo Drapatyi submitted his resignation following a Russian missile strike on a Ukrainian training unit on June 1.
• Russian forces continue to adapt their strike packages in an effort to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky established a delegation to participate in peace negotiations to end the war as Russian officials continue to flout their own proposed negotiation mechanisms.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Toretsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 31, 2025

Russian officials' public statements continue to demonstrate that Russia maintains wider territorial goals in Ukraine beyond the four oblasts that Russia has illegally declared as annexed. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov told Kremlin newswire TASS on May 31 that Ukraine risks losing Zaporizhzhia, Dnipro, Sumy, Kharkiv, Odesa, and Mykolaiv cities if Ukraine refuses a peace settlement and claimed that every day that Ukraine delays a diplomatic solution to the war worsens the conditions for Ukraine.[1] Russia may illegally declare Dnipropetrovsk, Sumy, Kharkiv, Odesa, and Mykolaiv oblasts annexed, especially should Russian forces launch offensive operations to seize these regional centers. Russia notably did not — and still does not — occupy Zaporizhzhia City when the Kremlin annexed Zaporizhia Oblast in September 2022. Kartapolov’s statement indicates that Russia maintains territorial ambitions beyond Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts — in line with Russian officials' calls for Russia to seize Sumy City, claims that Kharkiv and Odesa cities are "Russian" cities, and increasing rhetoric about Russia's alleged historical ties to "Novorossiya" (which Russian officials have defined as all of eastern and southern Ukraine).[2] Kartopolov's statement also indicates that the Kremlin continues to assess that Russian forces will be able to fight a protracted war against Ukraine to achieve these territorial goals and is not interested in good-faith negotiations to achieve a diplomatic settlement to the war. ISW continues to assess that Russian President Vladimir Putin holds a theory of victory that assumes that the Russian military will be able to continue gradual, creeping advances in Ukraine indefinitely.[3]

The Kremlin is continuing efforts to prepare Russian society and the Russian defense industry base (DIB) for a protracted war with Ukraine and potential future war with NATO. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on May 30 allowing the Russian government to revoke the rights of shareholders of defense industrial enterprises in the event that the enterprise fails to fulfill state defense orders during martial law.[4] The decree enables the Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade to appoint a management company to act as the sole executive body of the enterprise in order to fulfill contractual obligations to the Russian government. The decree applies to civilian aviation and shipbuilding companies, military development and production companies, and government subcontractors. Putin is likely setting legal conditions to allow the Russian government to commandeer elements of Russia's economy and DIB should the Kremlin introduce full martial law in order to transition the country to a full wartime footing. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is preparing Russian society and economy for a protracted war in Ukraine, indicating that Russia is not interested in engaging in good faith negotiations to reach a diplomatic settlement to its war in Ukraine.[5]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian officials' public statements continue to demonstrate that Russia maintains wider territorial goals in Ukraine beyond the four oblasts that Russia has illegally declared as annexed.
• The Kremlin is continuing efforts to prepare Russian society and the Russian defense industry base (DIB) for a protracted war with Ukraine and potential future war with NATO.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk and Toretsk and in western Zaporizhia. Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 30, 2025

Russian officials continue to signal the Kremlin's uncompromising position ahead of proposed talks in Istanbul on June 2, suggesting that the upcoming Istanbul meeting is very unlikely to yield substantive results in support of an enduring peace in Ukraine. Russian Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN) Vasily Nebenzya claimed during a UN Security Council meeting on May 30 that Russia is prepared to fight Ukraine for as long as necessary and that Ukraine can either accept peace, presumably on Russia's terms, or face inevitable battlefield defeat.[1] Nebenzya stated that the United States recently "opened its eyes" to the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine and reiterated Russian President Vladimir Putin's demands that the West stop arming Ukraine and that Ukraine cease force generation efforts as preconditions to a ceasefire.[2] CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) and Presidential Special Representative for Investment and Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries Kirill Dmitriev also called for officials to eliminate the conflict‘s "root causes" in an English-language post to X on May 30.[3] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov previously defined the root causes of the war in Ukraine as NATO's eastward expansion following the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991 and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against Russian speakers and Russian culture.[4] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on May 29 that Russia’s delegation to the proposed bilateral discussion in Istanbul on June 2 will be the ”same” as Russia's delegation at previous talks held in Istanbul on May 15 and 16.[5] Russia sent a low-level delegation led by Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky and consisting of Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin, Chief of the Russian General Staff's Main Directorate (GRU) Igor Kostykov, and Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Fomin to the May 15-16 Istanbul talks.[6]

Russian officials' decision to reiterate long-standing demands and send the same low-level delegation to the next Istanbul meeting indicates that Russia remains disinterested in engaging in good-faith negotiations. ISW continues to assess that Russia remains dedicated to protracting peace negotiations to support continued offensive operations in Ukraine and extract additional concessions from Ukraine and the West.[7]

Russian officials are pocketing major US concessions and continuing to make further demands of Ukraine and the West. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on May 30 that Kremlin officials are encouraged by the Trump administration's understanding of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s concerns about further eastward expansion of NATO and that Russia has previously shared these concerns with the United States during closed-door negotiations.[8] Peskov stated that the US position on further NATO expansion is "very appealing" to Russia, given that the United States continues to play a mediating role in negotiations to end the war.

US officials previously indicated a willingness to consider Russia’s objections to Ukraine’s possible future NATO membership – a long-standing Russian demand that officials frequently claim to be a "root cause" of the war in Ukraine – in exchange for Russia making concessions on other demands.[9] Peskov’s statement indicates that Russian officials assess that the United States supports Russia's demand for NATO to alter its foundational open-door policy.[10] Such a commitment would effectively grant Russia a veto over elements of the NATO charter, disproportionally benefit Russia’s desired postwar security posture, and undermine US President Donald Trump‘s stated objectives of achieving a just and lasting peace in Ukraine. Russian officials are pocketing US concessions regarding negotiations and potential postwar security arrangements and are failing to make any comparable concessions, such as relinquishing Russia’s claim to currently unoccupied Ukrainian territory like Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian officials continue to signal the Kremlin's uncompromising position ahead of proposed talks in Istanbul on June 2, suggesting that the upcoming Istanbul meeting is very unlikely to yield substantive results in support of an enduring peace in Ukraine.
• Russian officials are pocketing major US concessions and continuing to make further demands of Ukraine and the West.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Novopavlivka, and Kurakhove.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 29, 2025

Russian officials continue to dictate the terms and timing of peace negotiations with Ukraine and are attempting to obfuscate the current state of negotiations. Russian officials are setting conditions to falsely accuse Ukraine of delaying negotiations. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on May 28 that Russia is prepared to present its memorandum on terms for peace negotiations during the next bilateral meeting with Ukraine and suggested that Russian and Ukrainian representatives should meet in Istanbul on June 2.[i] Lavrov claimed that Russia's memorandum proposes how to "reliably" overcome the Russia's perceived "root causes" of the war in Ukraine. Lavrov has previously defined the root causes of the war in Ukraine as NATO's eastward expansion following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against Russian speakers and Russian culture.[ii] Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky, who led the last Russian delegation in Istanbul, claimed on May 28 that he spoke with Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov and proposed a date for Russia and Ukraine to exchange their memoranda.[iii] Umerov responded to the Russian proposal on May 28 and stated that Ukraine is ready for a ceasefire and further negotiations and that Ukraine has already presented its memorandum to Russia.[iv] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on May 29 that Russia has not received a copy of Ukraine's memorandum and that Ukraine has not responded to Lavrov's proposal, however.[v]

Russia is forcing Ukraine to make concessions on the timing, terms, and location of negotiations. Russian President Vladimir Putin initially suggested on the night of May 10 to 11 "resuming" the 2022 bilateral peace negotiations in Istanbul but later rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's invitation for an in-person, one-on-one meeting in Istanbul.[vi] Ukraine's willingness to attend the May 15 to 16 talks in Istanbul with Russian officials was itself a significant concession, as holding the talks in Istanbul fit into Putin's narrative that the current talks are a resumption of the 2022 Istanbul Protocols in which Russia demanded that Ukraine effectively capitulate to Russia.[vii] US President Donald Trump previously suggested that Russia and Ukraine could move peace talks to the Vatican, but Russian officials rejected this offer and continue to suggest meetings in Istanbul.[viii] Putin unilaterally announced Easter and Victory Day ceasefires in April and May 2025, and Russia is now again unilaterally imposing timelines and terms on Ukraine.[ix] Ukraine, the United States, and European states have repeatedly called for Russia to agree to a renewable ceasefire in Ukraine before Russia and Ukraine begin negotiations for an enduring peace, calls that the Kremlin has repeatedly rejected. Russian officials are instead demanding that negotiations address both a ceasefire and long-term peace agreement in Ukraine. Russian forces will continue to press along the frontline until Ukraine accepts Russia's terms or they are no longer able to do so, and Russian officials will attempt to leverage any additional battlefield gains to extract additional concessions from Ukraine and the West during negotiations.

ISW previously assessed that Russian forces are leveraging the fact that Ukraine and Russia set no concrete deadlines for the next steps in the peace process in order to delay the process altogether and prolong the war. Medinsky stated after the May 16 Ukrainian-Russian talks in Istanbul that the two delegations agreed to "write...down in detail" the terms for peace and present a memorandum for a possible future ceasefire in the future, but did not specify a deadline.[x] Putin told journalists on May 19 that Russia would present Ukraine with a "memorandum" detailing conditions and timing for a future peace treaty as the two countries move toward conducting bilateral negotiations, but also did not specify a deadline.[xi] Lavrov claimed on May 23 that Russia would present its memorandum to Ukraine as soon as Russia and Ukraine completed their large-scale prisoner of war (POW) exchange on May 25.[xii] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha stated on May 23 that Ukraine expected Russia to present a draft proposal for an unconditional ceasefire agreement after the third and final POW exchange on May 25.[xiii] US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg told Fox News on May 27 that the United States received Ukraine’s memorandum of conditions and timelines for a potential peace treaty and is waiting for Russia to submit its version to begin reconciling the two countries’ positions.[xiv] Russian officials appear to be withholding their memorandum and may attempt to withhold the memorandum until the June 2 meeting. Russian officials may assess that Ukraine will refuse to attend the June 2 meeting if Russia does not provide its memorandum in advance as Ukraine has done and likely intend to seize on Ukraine's refusal to blame Ukraine for stalling peace negotiations.

Western reporting indicates that the People's Republic of China (PRC) is increasing drone deliveries to Russia while reducing sales to Ukrainian and Western buyers, further demonstrating China's increasingly overt support for Russia's war effort in Ukraine. Bloomberg reported on May 29 that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky recently stated that the PRC stopped selling DJI Mavic quadcopter drones, which Russian and Ukrainian forces have used for surveillance and strike missions, to Ukraine and other European countries while continuing to sell the quadcopters to Russia.[xv] Zelensky stated that Russia has domestic DJI Mavic production lines, and that "Chinese representatives" are present at these production facilities. An unnamed European official told Bloomberg that Zelensky's statements are consistent with European assessments and stated that the PRC appears to have reduced deliveries of some drone components to Western buyers while simultaneously increasing deliveries to Russia. ISW has observed recent reporting that Russian forces are fielding Chinese-made equipment, that the PRC is likely aware of and choosing not to stop Russian military recruitment efforts of PRC citizens, and that Russia has established joint production lines with PRC manufacturers for Shahed-like long range strike drones, underscoring the extent of the PRC's support for Russia's war effort.[xvi]

A Ukrainian defense manufacturer and official announced that Ukraine has fielded a long-range drone with sophisticated artificial intelligence (AI). Forbes reported on May 26 that Ukrainian startup company Strategy Force Solutions Chief Technology Officer "Andrii" stated that Ukrainian forces fielded the company's artificial intelligence (AI) powered "mothership" drone – the GOGOL-M – on autonomous missions against Russian military targets for the first time.[xvii] The GOGOL-M mothership drone can reportedly deploy two first-person-view (FPV) drones with automated target acquisition and strike capabilities, and the mothership drone reportedly has a range of 300-kilometers for one-way operations and a range of 100-kilometers to return for reuse.[xviii] The GOGOL-M mothership and compatible FPV drones reportedly use Strategy Force Solutions' SmartPilot system that leverages a combination of advanced sensors and AI to self-orient and execute predefined missions autonomously. The mothership and FPV drones notably do not rely on global positioning systems (GPS), thereby optimizing their electronic warfare (EW) resistance. "Andrii" told Forbes that Strategy Force Solutions is able to produce up to 50 GOGOL-M mothership drones and up to 400 compatible FPV drones per month. Ukrainian Digital Transformation Minister Mykhailo Fedorov confirmed on May 29 that Ukraine fielded the GOGOL-M mothership drone for the first time.[xix]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian officials continue to dictate the terms and timing of peace negotiations with Ukraine and are attempting to obfuscate the current state of negotiations. Russian officials are setting conditions to falsely accuse Ukraine of delaying negotiations.
• Russia is forcing Ukraine to make concessions on the timing, terms, and location of negotiations.
• ISW previously assessed that Russian forces are leveraging the fact that Ukraine and Russia set no concrete deadlines for the next steps in the peace process in order to delay the process altogether and prolong the war.
• Western reporting indicates that the People's Republic of China (PRC) is increasing drone deliveries to Russia while reducing sales to Ukrainian and Western buyers, further demonstrating China's increasingly overt support for Russia's war effort in Ukraine.
• A Ukrainian defense manufacturer and official announced that Ukraine has fielded a long-range drone with sophisticated artificial intelligence (AI).
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kurakhove and Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and near Kupyansk, Borova, Lyman, and Pokrovsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 28, 2025

Western insider reporting about Kremlin demands to end the war in Ukraine continues to align with repeated public statements from Kremlin officials outlining Russia's demands, indicating that Russia's goal of Ukrainian capitulation and destruction of NATO remains unchanged. Reuters reported on May 28 that three Russian sources familiar with the peace negotiations stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin wants Western states to submit a "written" pledge stipulating that NATO will not expand eastward; Ukrainian neutrality; sanctions relief; the unfreezing of Russian assets in the West; and unspecified protections for Russian speakers in Ukraine.[1] Kremlin officials have repeatedly used allegations that the Ukrainian government is discriminating against Russian-speakers in Ukraine to justify Russia's calls for Ukrainian regime change and the installation of a pro-Kremlin puppet regime.[2] Russia's demands for a ban on NATO expansion, Ukrainian neutrality, and regime change are the same demands that Russia issued before the war in 2021 and when Putin launched his full-scale invasion in February 2022.[3]

Kremlin officials have consistently and publicly called for the demands that Reuter's insider sources outlined. Russia has demanded since the outbreak of the full-scale invasion that Ukraine commit to a neutral, non-aligned status, which would require Ukraine to change its constitution and NATO to change its "open-door" policy.[4] Russian officials have also repeatedly claimed that any future peace settlement must eliminate the "root causes" of the war, which Russian officials have previously defined as NATO's alleged violation of unofficial commitments not to expand into eastern Europe and along Russia's borders in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s, and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine.[5] Kremlin officials explicitly highlighted the "root causes" of the war and Russia's demands for Ukrainian neutrality again on May 28.[6] ISW continues to assess that these demands are part of the Kremlin's efforts to force the West into surrendering Ukraine and breaking the NATO security alliance.[7]

Putin reportedly maintains his demand that Ukraine cede all of the four oblasts that Russia has illegally annexed but not fully occupied, even as Kremlin officials have signaled that Russia has territorial ambitions beyond these four oblasts. A Reuters source reportedly stated that Putin is less inclined now to make territorial compromises and continues to demand the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts — including the areas that Russian forces do not currently occupy.[8] The source stated that "Putin has toughened his position" about territory. Putin first demanded in June 2024 that Ukraine cede all of the four oblasts, and Russian officials have often reiterated this demand since.[9] The Washington Post reported on May 27 that Ukrainian military intelligence assesses that the Russian military command has deployed 125,000 personnel to the borders of Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts — two oblasts that Russia has not illegally annexed.[10] Russian forces have been conducting offensive operations aimed at creating a buffer zone in Kharkiv Oblast since May 2024.[11] Russian forces also recently launched attacks to create a buffer zone in northern Sumy Oblast, with Russian officials calling for Russia to seize Sumy City, likely to set conditions for Russia to annex the oblast.[12] Russia will likely struggle to seize the entirety of the four illegally annexed oblasts, especially as the seizure of the heavily fortified fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast and the forcing of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast will require significantly larger force groupings than the forces currently deployed in eastern and southern Ukraine. The Russian military command would have solely concentrated its efforts on seizing all of the four oblasts if the Kremlin's territorial ambitions were truly limited to the four oblasts, but the deployment of significant forces to attack in Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts suggests that Russia intends to increase its territorial demands. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin maintains significant territorial ambitions in southern and eastern Ukraine, and Russian officials within Putin's innermost circle have even called for Russia to take control of most of the country.[13]

Putin continues to demonstrate his willingness to achieve his war aims militarily through a prolonged war in Ukraine during which Russian forces would continue to only make gradual, creeping advances. One of Reuters' sources reportedly stated that Putin will try to use military victories to show Ukraine and Europe that "peace tomorrow will be even more painful" if Putin is unable to secure his desired terms in a peace deal.[14] The source stated that Putin would take advantage of any tactical battlefield opportunities to advance further into Ukraine and that Putin believes that Russia can fight for years in the face of any sanctions or other economic measures the West might place on Russia in the future. ISW has long assessed that Putin holds a theory of victory that assumes that Russian forces will be able to continue gradual, creeping advances indefinitely and to outlast and overcome Western military aid to Ukraine and Ukraine's own efforts to mobilize.[15]

Russia will likely be able to continue its current tactics that are resulting in gradual, creeping advances as long as Russia is able to replenish its losses on the frontline. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on May 28 that almost 175,000 people have arrived at military units and that more than 14,000 people have joined volunteer units since the start of 2025, for a total of roughly 1,285 people per day.[16] Medvedev also reiterated Putin's May 13 claim that 50,000 to 60,000 people voluntarily join the Russian military per month.[17] Putin's claimed recruitment rate is notably higher than Medvedev's, and ISW cannot independently verify these claims. Reports from the Ukrainian General Staff about Russia's daily losses indicate that Russian suffered a daily loss rate of 1,550 per day in January 2025; 1,261 in February 2025; 1,312 in March 2025; 1,219 in April 2025; and 1,140 between May 1 and May 28.[18] Medvedev's May 28 claim that 175,000 soldiers have joined Russian military units since January 2025 indicates that Russia is replenishing its units at about a one-for-one ratio to its loss rate. ISW continues to assess that Ukrainian forces, supported by Western aid, can inflict higher personnel loss rates on the battlefield that could push Putin to make difficult decisions and force Putin to engage in good-faith negotiations to end the war.[19]

The Kremlin continues to promote its long-standing false narratives that the threat of NATO expansion forced Russia to invade Ukraine in 2022, and that NATO continues to threaten Russia's security. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed that Russia is alarmed by the accumulation of NATO troops along Russia's border and that NATO's eastern expansion and discussions to bring Ukraine into the alliance triggered Russia into launching its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[20] Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov claimed that NATO has deployed 34,200 troops on its "eastern flank" — which runs from Finland to Turkey — since February 2022.[21] Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed in June 2024 that Russia had deployed over 700,000 Russian soldiers to Ukraine, in contrast.[22] NATO had not significantly progressed Ukraine's path to membership in the years since the 2008 Bucharest Declaration, in which NATO promised Ukraine and Georgia paths to membership but took no formal steps toward Ukrainian membership in late 2021 and 2022.[23] Putin explicitly admitted in December 2024 that former US President Joseph Biden offered in 2021 to postpone consideration of Ukraine's membership to NATO for 10 to 15 years — demonstrating that Ukraine's NATO membership was not an immediate prospect and undermining the Kremlin's attempts to blame NATO for Russia's 2022 invasion.[24] ISW continues to assess that Putin did not invade Ukraine in 2022 because he feared NATO but because he believed that NATO was weak and aimed to destroy the alliance.[25]

The Kremlin continues to promote Russian President Vladimir Putin's envisioned Eurasian security architecture — a Russian-led bloc aimed at countering the West and NATO. Putin gave a video address at the 13th International Meeting of High Representatives Responsible for Security Issues on May 28 and advocated for the creation of his desired Eurasian security architecture based on Russia-dominated international organizations, including the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).[26] Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Head Sergei Naryshkin claimed at the meeting that Russia cannot be "weak" and that Eurasian and global security are dependent on Russia's strength — placing Russia at the center of this security architecture.[27] Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov attended a CSTO defense ministers meeting on May 28 where he criticized NATO's defensive posture in Central and Eastern Europe and claimed that the West does not just threaten Russia but all CSTO member states in an effort to unify CSTO members around Russia's anti-NATO sentiments.[28]

Russia and Belarus reduced the scope of the September 2025 Zapad-2025 joint Russian-Belarussian military exercise and relocated the main maneuver away from Belarus's western borders, likely to promote a veneer of cooperation and distract from Russia's limited military capacity outside of the Ukraine theater. Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin announced in an English-language social media post on May 28 that Belarusian officials decided to reduce the scope of the Zapad-2025 joint military exercise and relocate the main maneuver away from the western border of Belarus towards central Belarus.[29] Khrenin claimed that Belarusian authorities made this decision to demonstrate Belarus' readiness for de-escalation, dialogue, and peace. Belarussian authorities would not have been able to make this decision independently without Russia. Russia and Belarus are attempting to posture themselves as unthreatening, reasonable, and cooperative to the West. Belarusian officials previously claimed that at least 13,000 personnel would participate in the Zapad-2025 exercise, and Russia and Belarus likely had to downsize the joint exercise as most of its forces are fighting in Ukraine.[30] ISW observed elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (Moscow Military District [MMD]), 20th Combined Arms Army (CAA, MMD), and 6th CAA (Leningrad Military District [LMD]), as well as roughly 4,000 Airborne (VDV) personnel, including from the 7th, 76th, 98th, and 106th VDV divisions participated in the Zapad-2021 joint exercise.[31] Significant elements of these formations are currently fighting in the war in Ukraine.[32] Russian officials unexpectedly canceled the Zapad-2023 exercise, very likely due to Russia's equipment and manpower requirements for the war in Ukraine.[33]

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to forward an unofficial Russian ideology formulated on Russian nationalism and to try to unify Russian society in support of Russia's war in Ukraine. The Kremlin published a video message from Putin on May 28 for Border Guards Day, addressing Russian border guards.[34] Putin claimed that Russian border guards have developed their "legendary traditions" throughout Russia's "1,000-year history" since the times of Ancient Rus' (Kyivan Rus), a medieval state based in Kyiv. Putin's reference to Ancient Rus' is part of the Kremlin's years long attempts to claim that the modern Russian state is directly tied to Kyivan Rus and to claim that Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians are one people who descended from Kyivan Rus.[35] Putin similarly referred to Russia's 1,000-year history on May 22, and Putin's continued promotion of Russian nationalism is a notable departure from his usual rhetoric promoting a civic Russian identity and nationalism based on ethnic and religious diversity.[36]

Putin also attempted to use his May 28 speech in honor of border guards to justify the use of Russian conscripts to defend Kursk Oblast. Putin used the mythos of the Second World War to glorify the role of border guards to "defend the interests of the Fatherland" and claimed that border guards have "repeatedly demonstrated themselves" in the war in Ukraine.[37] Putin claimed that he is confident that border guards will continue to repel threats to Russia and attempts to cross the state border. Putin and other Russian officials have repeatedly promised the Russian population that conscripts, whose military service is mandated by Russian law, will not be deployed to fight in Ukraine.[38] Conscripts made up a significant part of the forces that initially met the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast, however, leading to discontent among the Russian population.[39] The Kremlin has historically responded to issues surrounding the deployment of conscripts in combat zones with great concern, and Putin is likely attempting to use narratives about Kyivan Rus and the "Fatherland" to justify Russia's use of conscripts in Kursk Oblast.[40]

Ukrainian forces conducted a series of long-range drone strikes targeting Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) on May 27 and 28. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 28 that Ukrainian Special Forces and Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) struck the Kronshtadt drone factory in Dubna, Moscow Oblast.[41] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the plant specializes in producing drone ground-control systems for the Orion, Inokhodets, Molniya, Grom, Termin, Helios, and Sirius drones. Geolocated footage shows drones striking the Kronshtadt plant.[42] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the SBU also struck the Raduga plant in Dubna, which manufactures cruise missiles, including Kh-101/55 missiles, Kh-69 missiles, and Kh-59MK missiles.[43] Geolocated footage shows a drone strike against the Raduga plant.[44] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Angstrem plant in the Elma Technological Park in Zelenograd, Moscow Oblast, which is one of Russia's largest microchip manufacturing plants.[45] Geolocated footage shows Russian air defense systems downing a Ukrainian drone over Zelenograd, a drone striking the technological park, and the aftermath of the drone strikes against the technological park.[46] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, who often reports on successful Ukrainian drone strikes against Russia, reported on May 28 that Elma Park is a critical hub for Russian import substitution.[47] Kovalenko also reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Dubna Machine Building Plant (DMZ), which produces drones, avionics, and control systems. A Russian insider source claimed that the DMZ also assembles Kh-101, Kh-5, and Kh-59 cruise missiles.[48] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against the Murom Instrument Plant, which produces ignition devices, on the night of May 27 in Vladimir Oblast.[49] The Ukrainian General Staff also confirmed earlier reports that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against the Dmitrievsky Chemical Plant in Kineshma, Ivanovo Oblast on May 26.[50]

Ukraine’s Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz stated on May 28, following a meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Berlin, that Germany will finance a “significant” portion of Ukraine’s Starlink satellite systems operation costs.[51] The German Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on May 28 that Germany would supply Ukraine with ammunition, small arms, and air defense and land weapon systems and invest five billion euros (roughly $5.6 billion) in Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB).[52] The German MoD stated that Germany would support more robust cooperation between German and Ukrainian defense industrial companies. Merz stated on May 28 that Germany would help finance Ukrainian production of long-range weapons.[53]

Ukrainian authorities recently identified a Russian servicemember responsible for the execution of two Ukrainian prisoners of war (POW) in January 2025. Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reported on May 28 that Ukrainian officials and military counterintelligence identified a Russian soldier of the 40th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) suspected of executing two Ukrainian POWs on January 9, 2025, near Guyevo, Kursk Oblast (southwest of Sudzha).[54] There has been a sharp increase in credible reports and footage of Russian forces executing Ukrainian POWs throughout 2024 and 2025.[55] ISW continues to assess that Russian military commanders are either complicit in or directly enabling their subordinates to conduct systemic executions in direct violation of international law.[56]

Key Takeaways:

• Western insider reporting about Kremlin demands to end the war in Ukraine continues to align with repeated public statements from Kremlin officials outlining Russia's demands, indicating that Russia's goal of Ukrainian capitulation and destruction of NATO remains unchanged.
• Putin reportedly maintains his demand that Ukraine cede all of the four oblasts that Russia has illegally annexed but not fully occupied, even as Kremlin officials have signaled that Russia has territorial ambitions beyond these four oblasts.
• Putin continues to demonstrate his willingness to achieve his war aims militarily through a prolonged war in Ukraine during which Russian forces would continue to only make gradual, creeping advances.
• The Kremlin continues to promote its long-standing false narratives that the threat of NATO expansion forced Russia to invade Ukraine in 2022, and that NATO continues to threaten Russia's security.
• The Kremlin continues to promote Russian President Vladimir Putin's envisioned Eurasian security architecture — a Russian-led bloc aimed at countering the West and NATO.
• Russia and Belarus reduced the scope of the September 2025 Zapad-2025 joint Russian-Belarussian military exercise and relocated the main maneuver away from Belarus's western borders, likely to promote a veneer of cooperation and distract from Russia's limited military capacity outside of the Ukraine theater.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to forward an unofficial Russian ideology formulated on Russian nationalism and to try to unify Russian society in support of Russia's war in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a series of long-range drone strikes targeting Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) on May 27 and 28.
• Ukraine’s Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine.
• Ukrainian authorities recently identified a Russian servicemember responsible for the execution of two Ukrainian prisoners of war (POW) in January 2025.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 27, 2025

The Kremlin is setting conditions to establish permanent control over the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), suggesting that Russia plans to illegally occupy and annex additional territory in Ukraine. Greenpeace's Ukraine service reported on May 27 that satellite imagery from early February 2025 to May 23, 2025, shows that Russia has laid 90 kilometers of powerlines near the Sea of Azov in occupied Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts.[1] Greenpeace reported that these new powerlines are the first observed indications that Russia is acting upon its long-held plans to connect the ZNPP to the Russian power grid.[2] Russian state nuclear energy operator Rosatom Head Alexei Likhachev claimed on May 21 that Rosatom had developed a plan to bring the ZNPP to "full capacity," suggesting that Russia intends to bring the ZNPP's reactors out of their current cold shutdown state.[3] Likhachev claimed in May 2024 to agree with the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) assessment that restarting the ZNPP was currently "impossible" and that the first condition for restarting the ZNPP must be to ensure its security, either with a security guarantee or after the frontline had shifted away from the ZNPP.[4]

US President Donald Trump's April 2025 seven-point peace proposal to Ukraine included a provision for Ukraine to regain control over the ZNPP with US involvement, and the proposed Ukraine-European peace plan also contained this provision.[5] Russian officials have repeatedly rejected giving up control over the ZNPP, however.[6] Russian officials have also increased their rhetoric, invoking Russia's alleged historical ties to "Novorossiya," which Russian officials have defined as all of eastern and southern Ukraine, and Russian occupation authorities have recently called for Russia to control areas of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast near the Dnipro River that Russia has not yet illegally annexed.[7] The Russian definition of Novorossiya notably includes the area directly across from the ZNPP on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River. Russia's efforts to connect the ZNPP to the Russian power grid suggest that Russia wants to maintain its control over the ZNPP and operate it safely as Russia likely expects to significantly push the frontline away from the plant or plans to occupy and annex Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.

Russian officials are likely leveraging the fact that Ukraine and Russia set no concrete deadlines for the next steps in the peace process in order to delay the process altogether and prolong the war. US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg told Fox News on May 27 that the United States had received Ukraine’s list of conditions and timelines for a potential peace treaty and is now waiting for Russia to submit its version to begin reconciling the two countries’ positions.[8] Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky stated after the May 16 Ukrainian-Russian talks in Istanbul that the two delegations agreed to "write...down in detail" and present their versions for a possible future ceasefire, but did not specify a deadline.[9] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on May 27 that Russia is preparing its version of the memorandum.[10] Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov stated on May 27 that the success of peace negotiations will depend on the participants’ willingness to address the war’s ”root causes,” reiterating long-standing Russian demands that amount to full Ukrainian capitulation.[11] The Kremlin is likely leveraging the lack of a deadline to prolong negotiations in an attempt to extract more concessions and improve Russia’s negotiating position by making battlefield advances.

Putin continues to use orchestrated public engagements to forward the Kremlin's effort to create a militarized Russian society united against the West that supports a prolonged war in Ukraine and possible future conflict with NATO. Putin met with the supervisory board of the state-formed "Russia-Land of Opportunities" non-profit organization on May 27 and spoke with participants of the organization's programs during a highly scripted event.[12] Putin claimed that many foreigners see Russia as a "stronghold" of traditional spiritual and moral values. Putin claimed that Soviet citizens' "spirit of devotion to their people" formed the basis of the Soviet victory in the Second World War and stated that the "internal mobilization" of each Russian citizen and Russian society as a whole is the most important thing right now for Russia. Putin stated that the future of a state depends on its independence, sovereignty, and self-sufficiency; that Russia will not exist if it is not sovereign; and that "passion within society" is important for Russian sovereignty.

The general director of "Russia-Land of Opportunities," Andrei Betin, highlighted that Putin named 2025 the "Year of the Defender of the Fatherland" and noted that many Russian servicemembers who are fighting in Ukraine participate in the non-profit's programs. Putin spoke during the meeting with an active duty Russian servicemember, who proposed creating additional programs that allow Russian military personnel to work with the non-profit so that the servicemembers "will say that Russia remembers [them], Russia has not forgotten [them]." Putin claimed that the Russian government is working to create conditions for the "self-realization" of Russian servicemembers returning home from the war.  Putin highlighted how many graduates of the organization's programs have gone on to become leaders and politicians in the federal, regional, and municipal government, specifically noting that many participants of the non-profit's "Leaders of Russia. Politics" program have won State Duma elections since 2020 and forecasting that more participants of the program will run in the 2026 Duma elections.

Putin and other Kremlin officials have recently focused their rhetoric on Russia's strong "traditional and moral values" and used the mythos of the Second World War to call for unity within Russian society – likely as part of an ongoing effort to foster anti-Western sentiment in Russian society and prepare the Russian population for a prolonged war in Ukraine and a possible future conflict with NATO.[13] Putin's support for programs aimed at reintegrating Russian veterans into society suggests that the Kremlin fears political instability and the emergence of an independent veterans-based civil society – as ISW has assessed.[14] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is engaged in a campaign to create a new cadre of militarized, loyal elites to unify Russian society against the perceived threat of the West, including by co-opting Russian veterans to participate in the 2026 State Duma elections.[15]

The European Union (EU) Council approved the first phase of the European Commission’s ReArm Europe/Readiness 2030 plan. The EU Council announced on May 27 that it adopted a regulation establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) financial instrument to facilitate common defense procurement efforts between interested EU member states with the goal of boosting Europe's defense industrial production capacity.[16] The EU will provide up to 150 billion euros (roughly $170 billion) to member states. The package will benefit Ukraine by allowing Ukraine to join common procurement efforts and make military purchases with EU companies. Ukraine is eligible to receive financing through SAFE to purchase materiel, including ammunition; artillery systems; ground combat capabilities and their support systems; critical infrastructure protection; air defense systems; maritime surface and underwater capabilities; drone and anti-drone systems; Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISTAR) systems; space assets protection; artificial intelligence (AI); and electronic warfare (EW) systems. The EU's five-part ReArm Europe Plan is vital for Europe's short- and long-term security and in line with US President Donald Trump's calls for Europe to shoulder more of its own defense requirements.[17]

Ukraine's Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine. The Swedish Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on May 26 that Sweden’s government recently approved 4.8 billion Swedish kronor (roughly $499 million) worth of funding to procure materiel to support Ukraine’s defense capabilities.[18] The package allocates 480 million Swedish kronor (roughly $50 million) to the Ukraine Defense Contact Group; over one billion Swedish kronor (roughly $104 million) to the Danish procurement model that allows foreign states to buy Ukrainian-produced materiel for the Ukrainian military; 418 million Swedish kronor (roughly $43 million) for equipment procurement to support of the development of Ukraine’s ground combat capabilities; 550 million Swedish kronor (roughly $57.1 million) and 546 million Swedish kronor (roughly $56.7 million) for the Czech and Estonian ammunition initiatives, respectively; and over one billion Swedish kronor (roughly $104 million) for air defense and long-range drone procurement for Ukraine.

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin is setting conditions to establish permanent control over the Russian-occupied Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), suggesting that Russia plans to illegally occupy and annex additional territory in Ukraine.
• Russian officials are likely leveraging the fact that Ukraine and Russia set no concrete deadlines for the next steps in the peace process in order to delay the process altogether and prolong the war.
• Putin continues to use orchestrated public engagements to forward the Kremlin's effort to create a militarized Russian society united against the West that supports a prolonged war in Ukraine and possible future conflict with NATO.
• The European Union (EU) Council approved the first phase of the European Commission’s ReArm Europe/Readiness 2030 plan.
• Ukraine's Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar. Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Kupyansk, and Pokrovsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 26, 2025

Russian forces conducted one of their largest drone and missile strikes of the war against Ukraine on the night of May 25 to 26 after three nights of record strikes. The May 25-26 strike is now the second largest combined strike of the war, after Russian forces conducted the largest combined strike on the night of May 24 to 25. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched nine Kh-101 cruise missiles from the airspace over Saratov Oblast and 355 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down all nine Kh-101 missiles and 233 drones over northern, eastern, southern, western, and central Ukraine and that 55 drones were "lost." Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strikes targeted Chernihiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kharkiv, Odesa, and Kyiv oblasts.[2] Ukrainian officials stated that the strikes caused civilian casualties and damaged civilian infrastructure and private residences.

Russia has launched three of its largest strike packages against Ukraine over the last three days, including its two largest combined strikes, and eight of the largest strikes of the war since January 2025.[3] Russian strikes against Ukraine continue to disproportionately impact civilians and civilian infrastructure.[4] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on May 26 that Russia launched over 900 drones against Ukraine over the last three days and that intensified Russian strikes have a significant political meaning.[5] Zelensky stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin is choosing to continue the war rather than engage in meaningful peace negotiations and that there is no evidence that Russia is considering a diplomatic end to the war.[6] Russia may be increasing strikes against Ukraine as part of a cognitive warfare effort to weaken Ukrainian resolve and to undermine Western support for Ukraine.

Russia's increased missile stockpiling, drone production, and drone adaptations demonstrate Russia's commitment to achieving its war goals through military means in a protracted war in Ukraine. The Economist reported on May 25 that Ukrainian government sources estimate that the Kremlin has a stockpile of 500 ballistic missiles.[7] The Economist also reported that Russia is increasing its production of Shahed drones and can currently produce approximately 100 Shaheds a day — roughly four to five times their assessed daily production rate in late 2024.[8] Ukrainian military intelligence told the Economist that Russia plans to increase its production to 500 drones a day by an unspecified future deadline. Ukrainian drone engineers reported that Russia is actively innovating and adapting its Shahed drones to circumvent Ukrainian air defenses, including by using artificial intelligence (AI) and Ukrainian internet and mobile internet networks for navigation to prevent Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. A Ukrainian officer told the Economist that Russian drones are flying at an altitude of 2,000 to 2,500 meters, which is out of range of the small-caliber guns and shoulder-fired missiles that Ukrainian mobile air defense crews use. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated on May 25 that Russian forces recently set a new Shahed flight altitude record of 4,900 meters.[9] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yurii Ihnat stated on May 26 that Russia is increasing its production of both Shahed and decoy drones and that Russian forces are flying drones at higher altitudes.[10] Ihnat reported on May 25 that Russian forces have also resumed their use of Kh-22 cruise missiles after temporarily using fewer cruise missiles in their strike packages.[11] Increasingly large Russian strike packages are consistent with reports that Russia is significantly increasing its domestic Shahed drone, decoy drone, and missile production and storage capabilities. Russia's efforts to increase domestic drone and missile production and ongoing adaptations of these strike packages are likely part of a broader Russian effort to prepare for a protracted war in Ukraine and possibly a future war with NATO.[12]

Ukrainian intelligence continues to assess that the Kremlin is committed to its war aim of achieving complete Ukrainian capitulation and is preparing for a potential future conflict with NATO — in line with ISW's assessments. Ukraine's Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) Head Oleh Ivashchenko stated in an interview with Ukrainian outlet Ukrinform published on May 26 that Russia's strategic plans to gain full control over Ukraine remain unchanged.[13] Ivashchenko stated that the entire Ukrainian intelligence community agrees that Russia is trying to take control over all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts. Ivashchenko stated that Russia also has a long-term goal to establish influence over all post-Soviet states and that Russia will need two to four years after the end of hostilities in Ukraine to restore the Russian military's combat capabilities. Ivashchenko noted that Russia's ability to rearm its military after the end of its war in Ukraine will depend on Western sanctions. ISW continues to assess that Russia remains committed to pursuing demands that amount to nothing short of Ukraine's full surrender and that Russia will continue to pursue this objective so long as Putin believes Russia can militarily defeat Ukraine.[14] ISW also continues to assess that the Russian government and military are preparing for a possible future conflict with NATO.[15] Russian authorities recently renewed their years-long narrative rejecting the legality of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, likely to set conditions for Russia to deny the independence and sovereignty of other former Soviet states in the future.[16]

Ukrainian intelligence also assessed that Russia is facing a number of critical constraints in its economy and on the battlefield — in line with ISW's ongoing assessments. Ivashchenko stated that Russia's sovereign wealth fund has fallen from its pre-war level of about $150 billion to about $38 billion and that Russia's gold and foreign currency reserves are also decreasing.[17] Ivashchenko noted that Russia is suffering from serious labor shortages, which are causing problems in the Russian economy, and that Russian authorities are trying to avoid paying the financial incentives that Russia is offering new military recruits. Ivashchenko stated that roughly 80 percent of the equipment that Russian forces are using is refurbished from Russia's Soviet-era stockpiles and that only about 20 percent of the equipment is modern. Ivashchenko's statements are in line with ISW's ongoing assessment that Russia will face a number of materiel, manpower, and economic issues in the near to medium-term if Ukrainian forces continue to inflict damage on Russian forces on the battlefield at the current rate.[18] Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) will struggle to sustain Russia's current equipment and ammunition burn rates in the future, and Putin has mismanaged Russia's economy, which is suffering from increased and unsustainable war spending, growing inflation, significant labor shortages, and reductions in Russia's sovereign wealth fund.

Russia's own defense industrial production limitations are pushing Russia to rely on its allies and partners and to find cheap solutions to adapt to Ukraine's drone and counter-drone capabilities. Ivashchenko highlighted North Korea's contribution of six million artillery shells, 120 M1989 Koksan self-propelled artillery systems, and 120 M1991 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) to Russia since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion.[19] Ivashchenko stated that the People's Republic of China (PRC) is supplying machines, chemicals, gunpowder, components, and aviation equipment to at least 20 Russian defense industrial enterprises and that 80 percent of the critical electronics in Russian drones are Chinese made. Ivashchenko stated that Belarus is producing ammunition for Russia and that the Belarusian and Russian DIBs are largely integrated. Russian forces have increasingly supplied frontline units with motorcycles and Chinese- and Russian-made buggies for use in assaults — a response to Ukrainian drone advantages on the battlefield and an effort to offset significant armored vehicle losses.[20] Russia's recent extensive modifications to its long-range Shahed and decoy drones demonstrate that Russia is trying to adapt to Ukraine's successful countermeasures that have been effectively repelling Russia's drone strikes.[21] Russian forces had previously used Shahed drones to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses so as to allow Russian missiles to hit their targets, but Russia's recent modifications to the drones suggest that Russia is attempting to restore the Shahed as an effective weapon itself.[22] Russia is likely focusing on adapting the Shaheds, increasing their production rate, and launching them in increasingly large quantities as the drones are relatively cheap and can be mass produced — unlike costly missiles that Russia can only produce at a relatively much lower rate. Russia is learning lessons about how to adapt its drone and missile strike packages to most effectively penetrate a large air defense umbrella and deplete air defense missile stockpiles, and Russia will carry these lessons into any future conflict.

Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent demand for Russian forces to create a "buffer zone" along the Russia-Ukraine international border, in addition to Russia's ongoing efforts to seize the remainder of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, ignores Russia's constraints and underscores Putin's intention to increase his territorial demands. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on May 26 that the Russian military command recently redeployed elements of the 752nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) and 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) to reinforce the Russian force grouping attacking into northern Sumy Oblast.[23] Mashovets stated that elements of the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade are operating near Volodymyrivka (north of Sumy City) and in Gordeevka (just north of Volodymyrivka in Russia). Elements of the Russian 752nd Motorized Rifle Regiment have been operating in the Borova and Lyman directions since at least mid-2024.[24] ISW has observed elements of the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade engaged in combat in the Bakhmut-Chasiv Yar direction — a priority direction for the Russian military — since mid-2023 and observed reports of the brigade operating in Chasiv Yar as recently as May 6.[25] ISW has not observed additional reports of these units operating in northern Sumy Oblast but will cover any future reports about these units.

ISW previously noted that Russian forces' inability to penetrate Ukrainian defenses west and southwest of Chasiv Yar is undermining Russia's ability to prepare for major offensive operations against Kostyantynivka and the wider Ukrainian fortress belt.[26] Redeploying forces away from Chasiv Yar suggests that the Russian military command may intend to delay its offensive operation against Kostyantynivka and supports ISW's ongoing assessment that Russia does not currently have sufficient operational reserves to intensify offensive operations in several different directions simultaneously.[27] The Russian military command's decision to redeploy units away from this effort suggests that the Russian military may try to simultaneously continue advances in Donetsk Oblast and establish a buffer zone in northern Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv oblasts, however. The Russian military command may assess that Russian forces have a greater chance of significant advances in northern Sumy Oblast than near Chasiv Yar. Putin recently orchestrated a meeting with Russian officials to float the idea of creating an at least 25-kilometer-wide buffer zone in northern Sumy Oblast, and Putin ordered Russian forces to establish a buffer zone in northern Kharkiv Oblast in May 2024.[28] ISW previously assessed that Putin likely intends to leverage buffer zones in northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts to justify expanding his claims over Ukrainian territory beyond Russia's long-standing claims over Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts.[29]

Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Russian defense industrial enterprises in the Republic of Tatarstan and Ivanovo and Tula oblasts on May 25 and 26. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, who often reports on successful Ukrainian drone strikes against Russia, implied on May 26 that Ukrainian drones struck the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Yelabuga, Republic of Tatarstan, and the Dmitrievsky Chemical Plant in Kineshma, Ivanovo Oblast.[30] Russian opposition outlet Astra and Ukrainian outlet Militarnyi published footage on May 25 showing Russian air defenses appearing to defend against Ukrainian drone strikes near the Alabuga SEZ.[31] Astra reported on May 26 that at least two drones struck a warehouse at the Dmitrievsky Chemical Plant and that sources in the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations reported that the warehouse sustained damage.[32] The Ivanovo Oblast Operational Headquarters claimed on May 26 that a drone strike damaged a utility building in Kineshma.[33] Geolocated footage published on May 26 shows an explosion near the Scientific-Production Association (SPLAV) in Tula City, which manufactures multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), grenade launchers, ammunition, and guided and unguided missiles for the Russian military.[34] Astra also reported that Ukrainian drones on May 25 struck the Shcheglovsky Val Plant in Tula Oblast, which develops guided weapons, air defense systems, and small arms and produces vehicles for Pantsir-S and Pantsir-S1 air defense system.[35]

The Kremlin's ongoing cognitive warfare effort aimed at preventing future Western military assistance to Ukraine is rooted in fear and the acknowledgement that Russia's only real hope in defeating Ukraine is by isolating Ukraine from its allies. German Chancellor Friederich Merz stated on May 26 that the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and France no longer impose "any range restrictions" on Ukraine's ability to use the long-range weapons that these countries have provided and noted that Ukraine can target military positions in Russia.[36] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded to Merz and stated that such "potential decisions" would be "quite dangerous" and "run counter to attempts at a [peace] settlement."[37] Pro-Kremlin voices and Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers amplified similar sentiments, with some calling on Russia to respond and others claiming that Russia will achieve its war aims militarily.[38] Peskov's statement is part of a prolonged Russian effort to persuade Western states to cease military support for Ukraine, which Russian President Vladimir Putin himself has explicitly named as a condition for engaging in negotiations for a full ceasefire.[39] Russia's only real hope of winning its war in Ukraine is to convince the West to abandon Ukraine, and the Kremlin likely fears the impacts of continued Western military assistance on Ukraine's military capabilities.[40] Allowing Ukraine to target military warehouses and airbases in Russia also threatens Russia's ability to continue its long-range strike campaign against Ukraine, particularly as Russia seeks to demoralize Ukrainian society through increasingly large and frequent strike packages that disproportionately affect civilian areas.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted one of their largest drone and missile strikes of the war against Ukraine on the night of May 25 to 26, after three nights of record strikes. The May 25-26 strike is now the second largest combined strike of the war, after Russian forces conducted the largest combined strike on the night of May 24 to 25.
• Russia's increased missile stockpiling, drone production, and drone adaptations demonstrate Russia's commitment to achieving its war goals through military means in a protracted war in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian intelligence continues to assess that the Kremlin is committed to its war aim of achieving complete Ukrainian capitulation and is preparing for a potential future conflict with NATO — in line with ISW's assessments.
• Ukrainian intelligence also assessed that Russia is facing a number of critical constraints in its economy and on the battlefield — in line with ISW's ongoing assessments.
• Russia's own defense industrial production limitations are pushing Russia to rely on its allies and partners and to find cheap solutions to adapt to Ukraine's drone and counter-drone capabilities.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent demand for Russian forces to create a "buffer zone" along the Russia-Ukraine international border, in addition to Russia's ongoing efforts to seize the remainder of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, ignores Russia's constraints and underscores Putin's intention to increase his territorial demands.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Russian defense industrial enterprises in the Republic of Tatarstan and Ivanovo and Tula oblasts on May 25 and 26.
• The Kremlin's ongoing cognitive warfare effort aimed at preventing future Western military assistance to Ukraine is rooted in fear and the acknowledgement that Russia's only real hope in defeating Ukraine is by isolating Ukraine from its allies.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Vovchansk, Lyman, and Toretsk.

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