Ukraine Invasion Updates

                     This page collects the Critical Threats Project (CTP) and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) updates on the invasion of Ukraine. In late February 2022, CTP and ISW began publishing daily synthetic products covering key events related to renewed Russian aggression against Ukraine. These Ukraine Conflict Updates replaced the “Indicators and Thresholds for Russian Military Operations in Ukraine and/or Belarus,” which we maintained from November 12, 2021, through February 17, 2022.

This list also includes prominent warning alerts that CTP and ISW launched outside the crisis update structure. These products addressed critical inflection points as they occurred.

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• Maps on Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes
• Recent Updates
• February 2022 - July 2023 Updates
• Related Reads

Maps on Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes

This interactive map complements the static daily control-of-terrain maps that CTP and ISW produce with high-fidelity and, where possible, street level assessments of the war in Ukraine.

Click here to access the archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that produced daily by showing a dynamic frontline.

The Critical Threats Project and the Institute for the Study of War are publishing a summary of the methodology of our map for those who would like to learn more about the tradecraft for mapping conventional military operations from the open sources.

Previous versions of these static maps are available in our past publications. 

Recent Updates

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 22, 2026

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) falsely claimed that Russian forces have encircled Dobropillya — an intensification of the Kremlin's cognitive warfare campaign alleging encirclements across various sectors of the frontline to falsely present Ukrainian defenses as collapsing. The Russian MoD claimed on September 22 that the Russian Central Grouping of Forces encircled Dobropillya and are advancing toward Oleksandrivka (northwest of Dobropillya).[1] The MoD’s vague statement notably did not include a map or any evidence to support these false claims. ISW has observed no evidence to support the Russian MoD's encirclement claims, which are incompatible with recent Ukrainian statements. The chief of staff of a Ukrainian artillery reconnaissance battalion stated on September 22 that Russian forces have not made major advances in the Dobropillya direction and that the Russian military command frequently postpones its own deadlines due to heavy personnel casualties and inconsistencies between its plans and the battlefield realities.[2] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on September 20 that Ukrainian forces maintain positions south and northeast of Dobropillya.[3]

The Kremlin is likely intensifying its encirclement claims against the backdrop of the ongoing UN General Assembly (UNGA) session and recent Ukrainian successes on the northern flank of the Fortress Belt. Russian military officials have repeatedly made false claims about the encirclement of Ukrainian forces, including in Kursk Oblast in October 2024, in Kupyansk in Fall and Winter 2025-2026, and in the Rubtsi direction (northwest of Lyman) in June 2026.[4] The Russian MoD and Russian milbloggers have most recently claimed an encirclement of Ukrainian forces in northeastern Ukraine between the Velykyi Burluk and Vovchansk directions.[5] The Russian MoD is likely proliferating its claims of encirclement now to support Russian diplomatic engagements at the September 21-28 UNGA session that will aim to push for Ukrainian capitulation to end the war.

The Russian MoD's latest claim about Dobropillya also comes as Ukrainian forces have eliminated the Russian salient north of Lyman in recent months, forcing the Russian military command to rethink its wider plans to use Russian offensive activity in the Lyman and Dobropillya directions to conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt and all of Donetsk Oblast.[6] The MoD's false claim of an encirclement around Dobropillya aims in part to divert attention from these recent Ukrainian successes.

Russian authorities are reportedly training some regional government officials for possible mobilization scenarios. The Udmurt Republic will hold a two-day long “Organization of Mobilization Training in State and Local Government Bodies" training program for 20 state and municipal employees.[7] The program will reportedly run until December 5, and its modules will include lessons about the transition of the Russian economy to wartime conditions, the organization of mobilization planning, the military registration of citizens in the reserves, the protection of classified information, and the monitoring of mobilization preparations. The Udmurt Republic has reportedly held these training sessions before, but the program comes amid increasing indications that the Kremlin may conduct some form of mobilization in the near future and indicates that Russian authorities are preparing regional civil servants and government employees for the administrative and economic challenges inherent in mobilization.[8] The increasing Russian casualty rate and declining volunteer recruitment rate will likely force Russian President Vladimir Putin to order some form of mobilization in the near future to continue the current tempo of Russian offensive operations in Ukraine.[9] It is still unclear, however, if Putin has made a final decision about conducting a mobilization and, if he has, what kind of mobilization he will order. The Kremlin has heavily targeted Russian federal subjects with large ethnic minority groups like the Udmurt Republic for contract recruitment and covert force generation in recent years.[10] The Kremlin may attempt to minimize public backlash regarding a future mobilization by concentrating recruitment efforts in these regions while insulating wealthier and politically significant areas such as Moscow and Leningrad oblasts.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and US President Donald Trump expressed their willingness to end the war in Ukraine during a September 22 joint press conference on the sidelines of UNGA. Zelensky expressed hope that Trump could help end the war in Ukraine before the upcoming winter.[11] Trump stated that Russia and Ukraine “are going to make a deal” but did not announce specifics. Trump also noted that Ukraine's long-range strike campaign against Russian oil refineries has “dealt a serious blow” to Russia's diesel industry. Zelensky told journalists, after his closed meeting with Trump, that the United States will convey Ukraine’s proposal for a ceasefire of long-range strikes on energy infrastructure to Russia and noted his openness for a trilateral meeting with Trump and Putin.[12]

Key Takeaways:

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) falsely claimed that Russian forces have encircled Dobropillya — an intensification of the Kremlin's cognitive warfare campaign alleging encirclements across various sectors of the frontline to falsely present Ukrainian defenses as collapsing.
• The Kremlin is likely intensifying its encirclement claims against the backdrop of the ongoing UN General Assembly (UNGA) session and recent Ukrainian successes on the northern flank of the Fortress Belt.
• Russian authorities are reportedly training some regional government officials for possible mobilization scenarios.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and US President Donald Trump expressed their willingness to end the war in Ukraine during a September 22 joint press conference on the sidelines of UNGA.
• Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces advanced on September 22.  
• Russia launched 212 drones and an unspecified number of missiles against Ukraine overnight.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range drone strike campaign against Russian oil refineries on September 21 and 22.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 21, 2026

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky emphasized Ukraine’s eagerness to establish an energy ceasefire with Russia and announced that he will meet US President Donald Trump on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly session. Zelensky stated on September 20 that he spoke with Trump by phone and that the two agreed to meet during the United Nations General Assembly session in New York City.[1] Axios reported on September 20, citing sources familiar with this phone call, that Trump and Zelensky discussed Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries, and Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence Service Head Rustem Umerov stated that Zelensky will likely meet with Trump on Tuesday, September 22.[2] Trump stated on Truth Social on September 21 that Russia has”lost control of its diesel oil industry due to its war in Ukraine.”^[3] Zelensky responded to Trump’s Truth Social post on September 21, emphasizing that Ukraine is willing to engage in a mutual ceasefire of strikes on energy and food infrastructure and is ready to work with its partners amidst strong diplomatic proposals.[4]

The predictable September 18-20 State Duma election results continue the Kremlin’s efforts to militarize the Russian government and particularly the United Russia Party and to portray public support for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war effort in Ukraine and potential future aggression against NATO. United Russia won 355 out of 450 seats (about 78 percent) in the Duma as per preliminary election results on September 21, an eight percent increase from the 315 Duma seats United Russia currently holds.[5] Both figures are well above the 226 threshold for an absolute majority. United Russia Party General Council Secretary Vladimir Yakushev stated on September 21 that 49 veterans had won seats on the United Russia ticket, accounting for about 11 percent of the total number of Duma seats.[6] Yakushev retracted an earlier statement in which he claimed that 86 veterans and two members of the Russian military patriotic youth education movement Yunarmiya won seats and that United Russia mandates in the Duma. Kremlin-coopted war correspondent and United Russia Party candidate Yevgeny Poddubny stated on August 19 that United Russia intended to elect between 40 and 100 veterans to the State Duma in the 2026 elections.[7] 49 seats are on the lower end of Poddubny’s range but still constitute just under 14 percent of the total United Russia presence in the Duma, according to the preliminary results. These veterans represent a significant bloc that will support Putin’s efforts to militarize United Russia, the broader State Duma, and the Russian government as a whole.

Russian officials continue to project the election results as a successful referendum on the war in Ukraine and Putin’s broader foreign policy. Chief of the Yunarmiya General Staff and United Russia member Captain Vladislav Golovin emphasized voter turnout in the elections (57 percent in preliminary results) and claimed that the voter turnout level and presence of election observers confirm the Russian government’s legitimacy.[8] Russian state media outlet Moskovsky Komsomolets published an opinion piece on September 21 arguing that Putin won a “new national referendum” on support for the war in Ukraine.[9] Russian Federation Council Chairperson Valentina Matviyenko celebrated the elections as showing Russian citizens “understanding” of Putin’s policies and the Russian values that Russia is fighting for.[10] This article and statement follow statements from Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson and United Russia Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on September 20 that the election results will confirm Russian parties’ and voters’ support for Putin’s policies, including foreign policy.[11] Putin will likely use the Duma election results to justify increased demands on Russian society, such as mobilization in some form, and claim societal approval for further aggression against Ukraine and potential future aggression against NATO.

Russia is expanding the production of key composite materials used in Geran-type strike drones and is constructing underground facilities at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) to protect its drone production from Ukrainian strikes. Russia is taking steps to expand its polyacrylonitrile (PAN)-based carbon fiber production capacity at the Alabuga-Volokno facility, a subsidiary of Russian state nuclear energy agency Rosatom, by 500 tons per year by 2029, according to Politico.[12] This production could allow Russia to produce an additional 28,000 Geran strike drones per year, a 78 percent increase over current annual production. Alabuga-Volokno is part of Russia’s Geran drone production complex at the Alabuga SEZ in the Republic of Tatarstan. Satellite imagery captured between May and July 2026 shows clearing operations for the expansion project adjacent to Alabuga-Volokno’s current carbon fiber factory, according to a Ukrainian official speaking to Politico. An entry on a Russian government website from May 2026 confirmed that Alabuga-Volokno planned to build a new carbon fiber production line with a capacity of up to 500 tons per year at this facility.[13] Russian forces extensively use carbon fiber for the airframe of delta-wing Geran-1, Geran-2, Geran-3, and Geran-4 drones and for the fuselage skin, wings, and tail assembly of the jet-powered Geran-5 drone.[14] A People’s Republic of China (PRC) state-owned company supplied Alabuga-Volokno with 46 tons of PAN precursors to produce carbon fiber earlier in 2026.[15] A Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) channel reported on September 19, citing satellite imagery collected on an unspecified date, that Russia has constructed 42,000 square meters (4.2 hectares) of underground space for future production facilities.[16] The underground workshop is part of a broader construction site at the Alabuga SEZ covering about 500 hectares that Russia began developing in late April 2026, and Russia is building the new carbon fiber facility next to a passive air defense perimeter of lattice towers constructed between May and July 2026.[17]

European intelligence officials warned that Russia may take openly aggressive action against NATO in the next several months while Baltic State officials continue to emphasize that there are no signs of preparations for an imminent attack. Czech Security Information Service (BIS) Head Lieutenant General Michal Koudelka stated to the Guardian in an article published on September 20 that Russia may conduct a military operation against NATO in a matter of “months, not years,” and that this activity could involve increased drone activity in NATO countries, a “limited incursion,” or false-flag incidents.[18] Latvian State Security Service (VDD) Director General Normunds Mežviets also acknowledged that Russia is preparing unspecified actions against Europe but stated that the VDD has not observed signs of an “imminent attack.”

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky emphasized Ukraine’s eagerness to establish an energy ceasefire with Russia and announced that he will meet US President Donald Trump on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly session.
• The predictable September 18-20 State Duma election results continue the Kremlin’s efforts to militarize the Russian government, particularly the United Russia Party, and to portray public support for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war effort in Ukraine and potential future aggression against NATO.
• Russia is expanding the production of key composite materials used in Geran-type strike drones and is constructing underground facilities at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) to protect its drone production from Ukrainian strikes.
• European intelligence officials warned that Russia may take openly aggressive action against NATO in the next several months while Baltic State officials continue to emphasize that there are no signs of preparations for an imminent attack.
• Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces advanced.
• Russia launched 172 drones against Ukraine overnight.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets on September 21.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 20, 2026

Ukrainian forces conducted their largest combined missile and drone strike package against strategic targets in Moscow Oblast on the night of September 19 to 20, ahead of the final day of voting in the Russian State Duma elections. Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure on the night of September 19 to 20 in the absence of a Russian agreement to the energy ceasefire that US President Donald Trump proposed on September 14.[1] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has repeatedly reaffirmed Ukraine’s willingness to engage in a mutual energy strikes moratorium, while Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly rejected each proposal thus far.[2]

Moscow City Mayor Sergei Sobyanin claimed on September 20 that Russian air defenses downed over 1600 Ukrainian drones since September 19, including 450 on the approaches to Moscow City — the largest Ukrainian strike package against Russia since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022.[3] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck Russian Gazpromneft-Moscow Oil Refinery in Kapotnya Raion, Moscow City (roughly 450 kilometers from the Ukrainian border) on the night of September 19 to 20, causing a large fire and damaging the refinery's AVT-6 primary oil processing unit, another complex oil processing unit, and an isomerization unit.[4] The Gazpromneft-Moscow Refinery is one of Russia’s largest oil refineries with an annual processing capacity of about 12 million tons of oil. Ukrainian defense manufacturer FirePoint reported that its FP-1 drones hit the Moscow Oil Refinery and Russian logistics company Modern Warehouse Technologies LLC warehouses near Sofyino (roughly 450 kilometers from the Ukrainian border).[5] FirePoint reported that the strikes forced the Moscow Oil Refinery to pause refining operations and that the total percentage of offline Russian refining capacity increased from 10 to 14 percent as a result.[6] Geolocated footage published on September 20 shows large fires at the Gazpromneft-Moscow Oil Refinery and at the Modern Warehouse Technologies LLC near Sofyino.^[7] Russian officials acknowledged Ukrainian strikes in 17 Moscow municipalities and that the strikes caused fires at the refinery and the warehouse complex.[8] Zelensky reported on September 20 that Ukrainian forces used FP-1, RZ-100, MICH-2000, Palyanytsia-type, Vendetta-type, Lyutyi-type, Bars-type, and Sichen long-range strike drones; Flamingo cruise missiles; and a new “Pelican” strike vehicle in the strike package.[9] There is conflicting reporting about what the Pelican strike vehicle may be. A Russian milblogger claimed that Zelensky's statement about the “Pelican” referred to Ukraine's newly developed FP-7 ballistic missile but noted that the FP-7's stated range of 300 kilometers is not large enough to reach Moscow from Ukraine.[10] A different Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) source reported that the Pelican strike vehicle is a one-way attack drone, not an FP-7 ballistic missile.[11] ISW is unable to independently verify whether Ukrainian forces used FP-7 ballistic missiles in the September 19 to 20 strike package.[12]

Russia's failure to defend against the Ukrainian strikes prompted discontent among Russians, including in the ultranationalist information space, as the State Duma elections concluded. Russian authorities in Moscow Oblast notably did not activate air alert sirens or warn civilians of incoming air threats with short message service (SMS) messages on September 20, though Russian authorities did restrict mobile service — one of the countermeasures that Russian authorities employ during Ukrainian strikes — without major announcements. Moscow Oblast residents complained that Moscow authorities did not sound air alert sirens or send SMS notifications of incoming strike danger as Russian authorities had done during much smaller strike packages.[13] Some residents complained on the Telegram channel of Moscow Oblast Governor Andrey Vorobyov before the channel closed comments. A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger criticized Russian authorities' reporting on the strikes, stating that these official responses undermine the public's trust in Russian authorities and that mobile service restrictions do “not really help.”[14] Russian authorities appear to have prioritized achieving a high voter turnout at the Duma elections over public safety, even though Ukrainian forces hit Russian strategic oil and logistics infrastructure and did not deliberately target Russian polling stations or other electoral infrastructure.

The Kremlin is presenting the initial and pre-determined September 18 to 20 State Duma election results as confirmation of Russian society’s broad support for the war effort in Ukraine despite the ruling United Russia Party’s exit numbers being granted a comparatively conservative margin. The Russian Central Election Commission (CEC) reported on September 20 that initial results from the first 13.88 percent of ballots show that: United Russia received 57.54 percent of the vote, the Communist Party (CPRF) received 13.67 percent, and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) received 9.27 percent thus far.[15] Russian CEC Head Ella Pamfilova stated that the CEC will release the full preliminary results at 1100 local time on September 21 and the final results on September 25.[16] United Russia received 49.82 percent of the vote, the CPRF received 18.93 percent, and the LDPR received 7.55 percent in the 2021 Duma elections, so the initial results of the 2026 election represent a minor increase for United Russia.[17] United Russia's victory is far short of a sweeping victory that United Russia would have liked to project to bolster their claims of Russians uniting around United Russia and Putin, likely because of the need to acknowledge societal discontent from the consequences of Russia's war in Ukraine.[18]

Russian officials presented these initial figures as confirmation of Russian society’s support for the war in Ukraine. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed that the election results will confirm Russian political parties' and voters' commitment to supporting Putin's foreign policy.[19] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson and United Russia Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev stated that United Russia will continue to support Putin’s foreign policy objectives and efforts to achieve victory over Russia's “enemies.”[20] The Kremlin has recently taken great efforts to cast United Russia as the chief party responsible for implementing Putin’s policies and as the victory party in Ukraine, and to cast the election as a referendum on the war in Ukraine itself.[21] The Kremlin will likely struggle to balance acknowledging genuine societal discontent over the war in Ukraine with efforts to present major political events such as the Duma elections as confirmation of widespread support for the war effort.

Numerous sources, including domestic Russian election observers, reported large-scale election violations and manipulation of the vote count in the September 18 to 20 voting period. Russian election authorities reportedly engaged in ballot stuffing, detained or disqualified several hundred observers from the CPRF and the opposition Yabloko Party (after banning Yabloko candidates from participating in the elections at all), and threatened to dismiss some public sector employees who did not vote.[22] Individuals wearing Russian military uniforms reportedly stopped voters at polling stations in Novosibirsk and issued conscription notices or attempted to convince voters to sign contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[23]

Ukraine's 3rd Army Corps publicized details on the second phase of Operation Vivaldi in the Lyman direction, which included liberating Shandryholove, Derylove, and Drobysheve (all northwest of Lyman). Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps Commander Brigadier General Andrii Biletskyi stated on September 20 that Ukrainian forces liberated 50 square kilometers as part of Phase Two of Operationl Vivaldi and eliminated 800 Russian personnel.[24] Biletsky noted that the Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps prepared for ground operations by landing a wave of drones and unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) over 10 kilometers behind the frontline to harass the Russian tactical rear and facilitate combined arms operations. Ukrainian forces have demonstrated through Operational Vivaldi a limited ability to break out of positional warfare and reintroduce limited elements of mechanized maneuver at the tactical level, likely facilitated in part by this use of UGVs.[25]

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 19, 2026

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to greatly exaggerate the extent of Russian advances across the frontline to construct a false narrative of Russian battlefield progress for domestic and international audiences. The unusual MoD statement comes in the midst of Russian State Duma elections and shortly before the convening of the United Nations General Assembly in New York. The Russian MoD claimed on September 19 that Russian forces have seized over 5,300 square kilometers and more than 220 settlements in Ukraine since the start of 2026, including over 670 square kilometers and 27 settlements so far in September 2026.[i] ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have seized only 147.7 square kilometers and 40 settlements, but have lost a net of 20 settlements in 2026. Including areas into which Russian forces have infiltrated but do not control brings the total Russian gains to 718.8 square kilometers this year, still far below the Russian MoD's September 19 claims. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Ukrainian forces, on the other hand, have liberated at least 972.56 square kilometers and 60 settlements in 2026. The Russian MoD's September 19 claims are part of a longstanding Kremlin effort to use aggrandized claims of battlefield advances to convince Ukraine and its partners that Ukrainian defenses will collapse and that Ukraine should surrender in the face of an allegedly inevitable Russian victory.[ii] Exaggerated Russian claims likely also result from the culture of pervasive lying within the Russian military. Ukrainian forces have, in fact, successfully contested both the strategic and the operational initiative since late 2025, having held Russian forces to near-zero gains since March 2026 and having conducted successful counterattacks that have liberated significant amounts of territory in the Kupyansk, Oleksandrivka, and Lyman directions.[iii]

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 18, 2026

The Kremlin continues to deny that Russia will conduct mobilization after its September 18-20 State Duma elections, likely in an effort to dissuade Russian citizens from fleeing abroad. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on September 18 that Russian authorities have no plans to conduct a covert mobilization after the elections.[1] Bloomberg reported on September 18 that Russian government and military recruitment officials have been attempting to open accounts at foreign banks and move assets abroad, while also encouraging their relatives to leave Russia, amid concerns over an upcoming mobilization.[2] Russian officials have repeatedly denied that Russia will conduct involuntary reserve call-ups, likely in an effort to appease Russian society and avoid public upheaval or mass emigration such as occurred as a result of the 2022 involuntary reserve call-up.[3]

The Kremlin will have to change its recruitment practices and likely conduct some form of involuntary reserve call-up in order to sustain its war effort in Ukraine over the mid- to long-term if it continues operations that generate casualties at the current rate. Russia’s current casualty rate exceeds its recruitment rate by thousands per month, and the Russian war effort is even so failing to achieve its operational and strategic objectives.[4] Russian denials of mobilization do not indicate that Russia will not conduct mobilization, as Putin has shown no inclination to accept a ceasefire or lower the objectives he has given the Russian military to accomplish. These denials instead signal Putin’s concerns about the likely reaction of Russian society to involuntary mobilizations. It remains unclear when or what form of mobilization Putin may choose to order.

Poland has changed its air defense posture in response to increasing Russian strikes against border infrastructure and drone and other incursions into the territories of states neighboring Ukraine. Military aviation “preventively” operated in Polish airspace on September 17 in order to protect eastern Poland amid Russian strikes against central Ukraine, according to the Polish Armed Forces Operational Command.[5] Polish Minister of National Defense Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz similarly stated on September 3 that Polish air forces would expand their protection of Polish airspace, including with F-16 fighter jets and helicopters, due to Russian drone incursions in recent weeks.[6] Aviation in Poland is likely sortieing while Russian air targets are still operating in central Ukraine because the expansion of Russia’s use of its faster jet-powered Geran-type drones has significantly reduced the time available for neighboring states to react to Russian drones nearing or entering their airspace from Ukraine.[7] Sortieing aircraft more often, however, will increase the financial costs and maintenance requirements for NATO air forces and thus reflects a real way in which Russian drone incursions into NATO airspace impose costs on alliance members.

Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk reported on September 17 that intelligence indicates that Russia plans to conduct drone and missile strikes against states on NATO’s eastern flank supporting Ukraine, such as Poland.[8] Tusk added that the Kremlin intends these strikes to appear to be “random” and will make official claims that the strikes were accidents. Tusk assessed that the strikes aim to weaken NATO states’ motivations to invoke NATO’s Article 5 and to show that the article is only “theoretical.” ISW continues to assess that both intentional and unintentional Russian drone incursions enable the Russian military to test NATO air defenses and erode the meaning of NATO’s Article 5 collective defense provision.[9]

Russian President Vladimir Putin seized several prominent foreign enterprises under the pretext of defending Russian national security as he continues to expand and exercise his power to nationalize foreign and Russian assets. Putin signed a decree on September 17 that places 16 Russian companies, including Russian subsidiaries of French companies Auchan and Lemana PRO (formerly Leroy Merlin) and of the Swiss company Nestlé, under the “temporary management” of L.E.V. Management, effective immediately with no expiration date.[10] Putin enacted this decree on the basis of an existing April 2023 decree that authorized the Russian government to take “temporary management” of any property, securities, or shares belonging to persons associated with countries that Russia designates as “unfriendly” and that threaten Russian national security or property rights.[11] Both Putin’s September 17, 2026, and April 2023 decrees authorize indefinite “temporary management” over an enterprise’s property rights, effectively constituting nationalization of private assets.[12] Both decrees also designate the Russian Federal Agency for State Property Management (Rosimushchestvo) — an entity responsible for channeling revenues from nationalized property into the Russian federal budget — as the manager for any property seized under the decree, while also allowing Putin to appoint another organization as the manager at his discretion. Putin’s September 17 decree authorizes L.E.V. Management to manage all 16 companies’ assets instead of Rossimushchestvo for an unspecified reason. Independent outlet Novaya Gazeta Europe identified the director of L.E.V. Management as retired Russian Major General Andrei Krayushkin, who served as the first deputy head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ Migration Department from 2016 until at least 2020.[13] ISW has repeatedly assessed that Putin is likely setting conditions for a broader nationalization of Russian private assets to support state revenues as he more desperately seeks fiscal relief and additional revenues amid rising war costs.[14]

The details of Ukraine’s restructuring of the military command arrangements in and around Donetsk Oblast are becoming clear as the new organizations come formally into operation. The Ukrainian military command disbanded the Eastern Group of Forces (GoF) and replaced it with newly formed Azov GoF and Center GoF, according to Ukrainian news outlet Hromadske.[15] The Center GoF AoR runs from the Lyman direction to the Kramatorsk-Kostyantynivka area in the Fortress Belt, and the Azov GoF AoR covers the Dobropillya tactical area to the south.[16] Ukraine’s Operational Command East announced on September 17 that General Major Viktor Nikolyuk left his post as the commander of Ukraine’s Eastern GoF, which defended Donetsk Oblast, and is returning to the command of Ukraine’s Operational Command East.[17] Ukrainian Joint Forces Group Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated on September 18 that the Ukrainian military command is transferring the Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps and the responsibility for the Lyman direction from the Joint Forces Group to the Center GoF.[18] Trehubov stated that the Joint Forces Group will retain responsibility over the Kupyansk and South-Slobozhansk directions.

Ukraine is attempting to increase the resilience of its energy system in preparation for Russia’s anticipated intense winter strike campaign targeting Ukraine’s energy grid. Ukrainian Energy Minister Denys Shmyhal reported on September 17 that Ukraine is planning to restore and build over 10 GW of power capacity and is modernizing and integrating its energy system with the European one in anticipation of a Russian winter strike campaign against Ukraine’s energy network.[19] Shmyhal added that Ukraine is also building a decentralized and flexible system. Shmyhal did not specify the progress or timeline of Ukraine’s energy modernization, integration, and resilience-building efforts. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk stated on September 17 that Russia plans to destroy road and rail border crossings in Ukraine and potentially on the Polish or Moldovan sides of the border to prevent Ukraine’s partners from carrying out relief efforts to support Ukraine’s energy infrastructure in the wintertime.[20] Russia attempted in Winter 2025/2026 to split Ukraine’s energy grid in half along the west-east axis and create energy islands that were cut off from Ukraine’s electricity generation, international deliveries, and transmission systems.[21] Deeper integration of Ukraine’s energy network with the European one and decentralization would create additional redundancies necessary to increase the resilience of the entire energy grid against a Russian strike campaign, particularly as Russian forces are able to regularly strike Ukraine’s western regions and international borders.

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin continues to deny that Russia will conduct mobilization after its September 18-20 State Duma elections, likely in an effort to dissuade Russian citizens from fleeing abroad.
• The Kremlin will have to change its recruitment practices and likely conduct some form of involuntary reserve call-up in order to sustain its war effort in Ukraine over the mid- to long-term if it continues operations that generate casualties at the current rate.
• Poland has changed its air defense posture in response to increasing Russian strikes against border infrastructure and drone and other incursions into the territories of states neighboring Ukraine.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin seized several prominent foreign enterprises under the pretext of defending Russian national security as he continues to expand and exercise his power to nationalize foreign and Russian assets.
• The details of Ukraine’s restructuring of the military command arrangements in and around Donetsk Oblast are becoming clear as the new organizations come formally into operation.
• Ukraine is attempting to increase the resilience of its energy system in preparation for Russia’s anticipated intense winter strike campaign targeting Ukraine’s energy grid.
• Russia launched 93 drones against Ukraine overnight.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and energy infrastructure on the night of September 17 and 18.
• Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces advanced.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 17, 2026

Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi in the Lyman direction demonstrates Ukraine’s recent progress in restoring elements of tactical maneuver on the battlefield, enabled in part by Ukraine’s shaping operations and intermediate-range strike campaign that degrades Russian electronic warfare (EW) capabilities. Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps Commander Brigadier General Andrii Biletskyi stated on September 17 that a Ukrainian counteroffensive against the Russian salient north of Lyman — Operation Vivaldi — thwarted Russia’s plan to encircle the Fortress Belt from the north through Lyman and Svyatohirsk and the south through Dobropillya.[1] Biletskyi stated that Russian forces intended northern and southern pincers to converge in Barvinkove, Kharkiv Oblast, thereby seizing the whole of Donetsk Oblast. Biletskyi stated that Ukrainian forces operationally defeated the Russian northern pincer in the Lyman direction and that the Vivaldi Operation continues.

The Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps reported on September 17 that Ukraine’s systematic intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian logistics in occupied Luhansk Oblast has degraded Russian fuel supplies to the frontline and strained Russia’s ability to use drones and EW to protect against Ukrainian drones.[2] EW systems have significant power-consumption requirements, and Russian forces rely on diesel-powered generators to power EW systems to counter Ukrainian drones. Ukraine’s campaign targeting Russian logistics and energy supplies directly supported the suppression of Russian EW systems, aiding Ukrainian efforts to achieve tactical drone overmatch in support of Ukrainian mechanized advances in the Lyman direction.

Ukrainian forces achieved operational surprise by leveraging rigorous operational security (OPSEC) and counter-drone operations to degrade Russian forces’ operational awareness. Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps Deputy Commander Major Maksym Zhorin stated on September 16 that Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi in the Lyman direction was successful due to strict adherence to informational silence and a lack of reporting on the ongoing counteroffensive, which misled Russian military leadership and facilitated Ukrainian advances. Zhorin stated that Ukrainian forces managed to keep their advances secret thanks in part to a “Protective Drone” system, which consists of various EW systems and helped Ukrainian forces neutralize around 20,000 Russian drones.[3] Ukrainian forces previously leveraged OPSEC to achieve operational surprise during Ukraine’s Spring 2026 Oleksandrivka Counteroffensive, when Ukrainian forces intentionally conducted flag-raising missions at safe distances to conceal the true extent of Ukrainian positions.[4] Ukrainian forces have notably achieved operational surprise during two recent counteroffensives by using rigorous OPSEC. The pervasive culture of lying within the Russian military likely further degrades Russian operational awareness and leads to tactical and operational mistakes due to inaccurate assessments of the real battlefield situation.[5]

Russian forces are transferring armor and drone support assets to the Dobropillya direction for future mechanized assaults in Fall 2026. Ukraine’s 1st Corps (Azov National Guard) Commander Brigadier General Denys Prokopenko stated on September 11 that the Russian 51st and 8th Combined Arms Armies (CAAs, both Southern Military District [SMD]) and the 41st CAA (Central Military District [CMD]) are preparing for future mechanized assaults in the Dobropillya direction in the fall, seeking to exploit seasonal weather changes that are more conducive to mechanized assaults.[6] Prokopenko stated that roughly 1,200 drone crews from Russia’s elite Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Systems — about one-third of Rubikon’s total force — are operating in the Dobropillya direction, indicating that Russian forces likely intend to use drones to support battlefield air interdiction to shape the battlefield as well as enable Russian mechanized attacks.[7] Prokopenko added that Russian forces will likely begin reinforcing their existing assault units, which consist roughly of 200 infantry personnel, with mechanized columns of roughly 50 armored vehicles to divert the attention of Ukrainian forces and raise the probability of a successful breakthrough. Prokopenko assessed that the Russian offensive campaign would culminate in September 2026 and that Russian forces would begin to shift their tactics towards attempting mechanized breakthroughs by October 2026, with Russian forces attempting to seize at least one Fortress Belt settlement by the end of their fall campaign to create a bridgehead for further offensives.

Both Ukrainian and Russian forces have been experimenting with reintroducing limited elements of mechanized maneuver at the tactical level to break out of positional warfare and restore maneuver on the battlefield, with Ukrainian efforts being significantly more effective so far.[8] Russia’s accumulation of armored assets in the Dobropillya direction indicates that the Russian military command may intend to expand the role of mechanized assaults amid fall weather in an attempt to achieve a breakthrough in the Dobropillya direction and envelop the Fortress Belt from the south.[9]

Ukrainian forces are intensifying their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets, including by conducting a suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses (SEAD/DEAD) campaign in Rostov Oblast. Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) reported on September 17 that it struck two Russian An-26 and one An-12 military transport aircraft and three helicopters at the Rostov-Central Airfield in Rostov Oblast (roughly 200 kilometers from the frontline).[10] Geolocated footage published on September 16 shows a large explosion at the Rostov Airbase in Rostov Oblast after the Ukrainian strike.[11] Ukrainian forces have been increasingly striking Russian military assets in Rostov Oblast since at least June 2026, including airfields, air bases, and air defense systems, in an effort to degrade Russian strike and air defense capabilities.[12]

Russia continues to rely on North Korea to wage war against Ukraine and alleviate Russian labor shortages. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on September 17 that North Korea sent between 30,000 and 50,000 soldiers to Russia to receive military training and work with Russian drone operators.[13] Zelensky stated that North Korea decided not to deploy North Korean soldiers to Ukraine in order to avoid taking on a large number of casualties comparable to what North Korean soldiers suffered during Ukraine’s operations in Kursk.[14] Zelensky stated on August 8, 2026, that Russia was preparing to receive as many as 50,000 North Korean troops but did not specify where or when these troops would deploy.[15] The Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT) — an international coalition formed to monitor and report on violations and evasions of United Nations sanctions against North Korea — reported on September 16 that between 15,000 and 30,000 North Koreans worked at drone factories in Russia, including at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in the Republic of Tatarstan, as of the end of 2025.[16] The MSMT reported that the Russian government has created a special student visa scheme that camouflages North Korean workers as students. ISW has previously reported on Russia’s efforts to grant fake student visas to North Koreans or otherwise relax Russian visa requirements in an effort to alleviate Russian labor shortages.[17]

Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda publicly acknowledged on September 16 that Russia may be deliberately allowing Russian drones to deviate from their intended course and enter NATO airspace in order to punish countries supporting Ukraine. Nauseda stated on September 16 that recent drone incursions into European airspace indicate that Russia is engaging in increasingly aggressive behavior, following his recent statement that a Russian drone entered Lithuanian airspace on the night of September 14 to 15.[18] Nauseda stated that Russia may be deliberately allowing its drones to “deviate” from their intended course and enter the airspace of the Baltic states. Nauseda stated that Russia benefits from the ambiguity of its actions against Europe, regardless of whether Russian drone incursions are accidental or intentional, as this ambiguity keeps Baltic societies “in suspense.” Nauseda’s statement echoes Moldovan President Maia Sandu’s August 18 statement that Russia deliberately launches some of its drones into Moldovan and NATO airspace.[19] ISW continues to assess that such drone incursions are part of Russia’s “Phase Zero” campaign that aims to set informational and psychological conditions for potential future provocations against NATO, including through Russian false flag provocations, sabotage, EW interference, and overflights.[20]

The US House of Representatives passed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 on September 16, which authorizes the US to impose tariffs of up to 100 percent on the five largest importers of Russian oil and natural gas.[21] US President Donald Trump will need to sign the bill before it comes into force.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi in the Lyman direction demonstrates Ukraine’s recent progress in restoring elements of tactical maneuver on the battlefield, enabled in part by Ukraine’s shaping operations and intermediate-range strike campaign that degrades Russian electronic warfare (EW) capabilities.
• Ukrainian forces achieved operational surprise by leveraging rigorous operational security (OPSEC) and counter-drone operations to degrade Russian forces’ operational awareness.
• Russian forces are transferring armor and drone support assets to the Dobropillya direction for future mechanized assaults in Fall 2026.
• Ukrainian forces are intensifying their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets, including by conducting a suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses (SEAD/DEAD) campaign in Rostov Oblast.
• Russia continues to rely on North Korea to wage war against Ukraine and alleviate Russian labor shortages.
• Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda publicly acknowledged on September 16 that Russia may be deliberately allowing Russian drones to deviate from their intended course and enter NATO airspace in order to punish countries supporting Ukraine.
• The US House of Representatives passed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 on September 16, which authorizes the US to impose tariffs of up to 100 percent on the five largest importers of Russian oil and natural gas.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk.
• Russia launched 157 drones, 10 Banderol/Dan-T loitering munitions, and an unspecified number of missiles at Ukraine overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 16, 2026

Russian President Vladimir Putin is framing the State Duma elections as a referendum on his war in Ukraine after setting conditions to ensure his desired outcome. Putin stated on September 16 that participating in the State Duma elections scheduled for September 18-20 is a "responsibility" for all Russian citizens and contributes to strengthening Russia against external actors who seek to weaken Russia and undermine Russian sovereignty.[1] Putin stated that voting is a "common contribution" to Russia's victory in its war in Ukraine and highlighted that residents of "Donbas and Novorossiya" - referring to the four Ukrainian oblasts that Russia illegally annexed in 2022 - will vote in the Duma elections for the first time. Putin is presenting the State Duma elections, whose results are predetermined, as a referendum on support for his war in Ukraine. The Kremlin regularly manipulates Russia's domestic elections to suit Putin's goals, and Putin will present his party's inevitable victory as evidence of widespread domestic support for the war.[2] The Russian Supreme Court disqualified the Russian opposition party Yabloko from the State Duma elections on August 11, denying Russians the option of supporting a party with a pro-ceasefire platform as Putin continues to further consolidate the Russian political system around the war.[3] Russian occupation authorities have taken coercive measures to ensure the election results Putin desires in occupied Ukraine, including by staffing voting locations with armed soldiers.[4] United Russia party officials, including United Russia Chairperson Dmitry Mevedev, have confirmed their commitment to rallying public support for the war in Ukraine by positioning United Russia as the party of victory in Ukraine.[5] The Kremlin is setting conditions to demand long-term societal sacrifices such as mobilization by framing the State Duma election results as confirmation of popular support for the war effort in Ukraine despite the constant repetition of its claim that mobilization is not on the horizon.

Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda confirmed that a Russian Gerbera drone entered Lithuanian airspace on the night of September 14 to 15.[6] Nauseda told reporters on September 15 that Lithuanian authorities identified the drone that had entered Lithuanian airspace on the night of September 14 to 15 as a Russian Gerbera-type strike drone. Lithuania’s National Crisis Management Center Head Vilmantas Vitkaukas stated on September 15 that the drone flew from Belarusian airspace into Lithuania.[7] Nauseda added that the drone was likely not targeting Lithuania and that Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) had inadvertently diverted the Russian drone into Lithuanian airspace.[8] Nauseda stated that further incidents could occur in the future and that Lithuania needs to be able to detect these air vehicles "while they're still over neighboring countries" in order to give Lithuanian or NATO assets enough time to prepare to down the drones. Nauseda's statement is in line with ISW's assessment that NATO may need to reconsider its approach to air defense as a matter of self-defense against Russian drone strikes against NATO countries, regardless of whether the Russian drone incursions are accidental or intentional.[9]

Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov awarded the commander of a Russian frigate that fired two flares at a Danish Air Force helicopter on September 14 with the Military Distinction Medal for his "skillful and decisive actions."[10] The Danish helicopter was conducting routine surveillance of the frigate in international waters in the Baltic Sea when the Russian frigate fired flares.[11]

Ukrainian forces struck and killed the commander of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) Major General Anton Grunis in a targeted drone strike in occupied Donetsk City on September 12. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi posted geolocated footage on September 16 and reported that Ukrainian forces struck and killed Grunis, call sign "Grozny," in a targeted strike in occupied Donetsk City (roughly 55 kilometers from the frontline) on September 12.[12] Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander Major General Apti Alaudinov confirmed that Grunis died, but did not specify the cause.[13] The 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade is the primary fighting force in Kostyantynivka itself.[14] Putin notably met Grunis in a staged meeting with several Russian commanders on July 3 to make greatly exaggerated claims of Russian advances, and Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov later gave Grunis the Hero of Russia award for his brigade's participation in the claimed seizure of Kostyantynivka.[15] Brovdi noted that Grunis is the seventh Russian military commander at the brigade, division, or army echelon that Ukraine’s USF has successfully targeted and killed.[16]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed that Russian drones targeted his plane in Moldova twice in the past two weeks. Zelensky stated on September 15 that Russian drones entered Moldovan airspace on September 9 as Zelensky was preparing to depart from the Chisinau Airport and then again as he returned from Moldova to Ukraine on September 11.[17] Zelensky noted that Ukrainian officials did not previously disclose the September 11 incident and that Ukraine cannot confirm whether either incursion was intentional. Zelensky emphasized that both incidents demonstrate Russia’s effort to intimidate him and other foreign leaders through repeated drone incursions into NATO and European airspace. Russian forces have been escalating incursions into states neighboring Ukraine in recent weeks and recently conducted a precision drone strike intended to hit a passenger train carrying current and former European officials near the Ukrainian-Polish border.[18]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin is framing the State Duma elections as a referendum on his war in Ukraine after setting conditions to ensure his desired outcome.
• Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda confirmed that a Russian Gerbera drone entered Lithuanian airspace on the night of September 14 to 15.
• Ukrainian forces struck and killed the commander of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) Major General Anton Grunis in a targeted drone strike in occupied Donetsk City on September 12.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed that Russian drones targeted his plane in Moldova twice in the past two weeks.
• Russia launched 80 drones against Ukraine overnight.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Lyman tactical area, on the eastern flank of the Fortress Belt, and in the Oleksandrivka direction. Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman tactical area and western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 15, 2026

The Ukrainian military gave its first explicit confirmation of ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive operations against the Russian salient northwest of Lyman. Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps Commander Brigadier General Andrii Biletskyi confirmed on September 15 that Ukrainian forces have been conducting a counteroffensive — Operation Vivaldi — against the Russian salient north of Lyman.[1] Biletskyi stated that Ukrainian forces have cleared or liberated a total of 85 square kilometers, including liberating Serednie (northwest of Lyman) and clearing Russian infiltrators from Novoselivka (south of Serednie), Yarova (southwest of Novoselivka), Oleksandrivka (west of Serednie), and the outskirts of Korovii Yar (northwest of Serednie). Biletskyi noted that these Ukrainian gains were only the first phase of Operation Vivaldi and that Ukrainian forces will continue the operation. Ukrainian forces have likely made additional gains beyond what Biletskyi has reported, and Russian sources are beginning to acknowledge these gains. Russian forces are shelling Ukrainian positions in Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman) with tube artillery, according to geolocated footage published on September 15.[2] A prominent Russian milblogger additionally acknowledged that Russian forces are attempting to push Ukrainian forces from Kolodyazi — a coy acknowledgement that Ukrainian forces have likely liberated Kolodyazi in conjunction with the geolocated footage.[3] Russian milbloggers and a source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces continue to indicate that the situation for Russian forces continues to deteriorate in the area, including north and south of Kolodyazi.[4]

The Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps conducted an intermediate-range strike campaign to interdict Russian logistics and degrade fuel supplies as part of Operation Vivaldi. The 3rd Army Corps published an additional video discussing Operation Vivaldi, noting that its drone operators additionally isolated Russian logistics through two stages of strikes: first at depths of up to 50 kilometers from the frontline, then expanding up to 120 kilometers from the frontline.^[5] The 3rd Army Corps stated that these Ukrainian strikes forced Russian forces to shut down a pipeline supplying fuel from Russia to occupied Luhansk Oblast; to move support elements of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army, Moscow Military District) from occupied Ukraine to Voronezh Oblast; and to disperse Russian fuel and ammunition depots, communications hubs, command posts, and transports, including into Russia and in forests, further inhibiting Russian logistics. Ukrainian forces have been conducting an intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian logistics, particularly tanker trucks and fuel depots, against areas throughout occupied Ukraine since Spring 2026.[6] The 3rd Army Corps campaign against occupied Luhansk Oblast appears to have run concurrently and in conjunction with other strike campaigns, including by Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces. The 3rd Army Corps report corroborates many statements from a source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces that Russian forces, particularly the 144th Motorized Rifle Division and its subunits, have been struggling with logistics in the Borova and Lyman directions due to Ukraine’s strike campaign into occupied Luhansk Oblast.[7] Ukrainian forces have continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against both occupied Luhansk Oblast in the east and areas of occupied southern Ukraine, and these strikes will likely continue to enable Ukraine to achieve operational effects on the battlefield.[8] Russian forces will likely continue to struggle defending against these strikes as they have thus far because of their air defense and manpower constraints.[9]

Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi has achieved the operationally-significant objective of disrupting the Russian effort to conduct a wide encirclement of Ukraine's Fortress Belt. Ukraine’s gains thus far north of Lyman have rendered unfeasible the already-unrealistic Russian plan to encircle the Fortress Belt from the north and south. The prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger agreed with ISW’s assessment, acknowledging that Ukraine’s successes will delay Russia’s offensive on Slovyansk — the Russian objective after the seizure of Lyman itself.^[10] The milblogger warned that the northern flank of the Russian Southern Grouping of Forces (operating in the area southeast of Lyman and east of Kramatorsk) is now vulnerable to Ukrainian counterattacks and interdiction efforts. The milblogger stated that Russian forces also lost positions south of Lyman and are struggling to recapture positions within Lyman itself because of the Ukrainian advances. Russian milbloggers continue to blame the culture of “beautiful reports,” in which exaggerated claims of Russian advances from battlefield commanders to the higher command impact operational planning, for enabling Ukrainian advances.[11] Another prominent milblogger claimed that some Russian military commanders are attempting to cover up the degree of Russian losses by rapidly forming assault troops of untrained personnel in efforts to recapture territory, but that the higher Russian military command is now aware of the situation on the ground.[12]

Russian forces continue prioritizing attacks aimed at advancing frontally on the Fortress Belt from the south and encircling the Fortress Belt from the southwest over efforts to advance on the cities from the east, even though the Lyman effort has failed.[13] The Russian military command may still be internalizing the loss of the Lyman salient and tactical initiative in the area or may seek to cut Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to the Fortress Belt from the west. The Russian military command also likely seeks to achieve informational effects by continuing to make claimed or actual advances in Donetsk Oblast, Russia’s stated priority effort, that the Kremlin can portray as victories domestically and internationally. Ukraine’s ongoing counteroffensive undermines this Russian cognitive warfare effort, however, and will likely continue to do so as Ukrainian forces continue and later release more information about Operation Vivaldi.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky restated on September 15 Ukraine’s willingness to engage in a mutual ceasefire on energy targets with Russia amidst US President Donald Trump’s push for this ceasefire. Zelensky reiterated that Ukraine is prepared to support a mutual halt to strikes against critical infrastructure and take steps towards de-escalation.[14] Zelensky emphasized that Ukraine’s participation in this proposed ceasefire depends on Ukraine’s US partners ensuring that “Russia is truly ready to stop the war” and presumably its strikes against Ukrainian critical infrastructure. Zelensky has repeatedly offered mutual ceasefires, including moratoriums on energy infrastructure strikes, while the Kremlin has repeatedly rejected these offers.[15] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov deflected from the US and Ukrainian-proposed ceasefire on energy infrastructure on September 15. He called the US-proposed ceasefire “a very good idea” and “a good initiative,” but noted that an energy ceasefire will not solve global energy market issues and that Russia needs the West to lift sanctions on Russia to “saturate” the global market with Russian energy.[16]

The Kremlin continues to publicly and explicitly outline its continued commitment to its maximalist war aims in Ukraine and deflect from opportunities for de-escalation. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated during an embassy roundtable on the situation in Ukraine on September 14 that Russia has not “fundamentally changed its position” from the start of the war, effectively reiterating Russia’s commitment to its original and maximalist war aims.[17] Lavrov reiterated the war aims that Russian President Vladimir Putin first identified before the full-scale invasion: preventing NATO’s expansion on Russia’s borders, ensuring the rights of Russian-speaking people in Ukraine, and Ukraine’s “denazification” and “demilitarization”— referring to Russia’s original aims of severely limiting the Ukrainian military such that Ukraine cannot defend itself, the removal of the current Ukrainian government, and the installation of a pro-Russian puppet government in its place.[18] The Kremlin continues to not engage in good faith with US officials and with Ukraine, to deflect from proposals to de-escalate the war, and instead insists that Ukraine meet all its demands.

A Russian frigate fired flares against a Danish helicopter providing routine surveillance of the frigate in international waters in the Baltic Sea on September 14. The Danish Armed Forces reported on September 14 that a Russian frigate fired two flares at a Danish Air Force Fennec helicopter engaging in surveillance operations in international waters off Gedser and that one of the flares passed within a short distance of the helicopter.[19] Danish Defense Minister Jeppe Bruus stated on September 15 that this was the first incident of its kind and that the incident demonstrates Russia’s increasing willingness to take risks.[20] The Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated on September 15 that this Russian action is completely unacceptable and that Denmark has summoned the Russian ambassador to discuss the incident.[21]

Several sabotage attempts occurred across Europe between September 14 and 15 that are consistent with the modus operandi of Russian military forces and agents, although Russian involvement in them has not been confirmed. The Lithuanian Ministry of National Defense reported on September 15 that Italian fighter jets operating as part of the NATO air defense mission intercepted an unspecified drone in Lithuanian airspace on the night of September 14 to 15.[22] Lithuania’s National Crisis Management Center Head Vilmantas Vitkaukas stated on September 15 that the drone flew from Belarusian airspace and most likely had an explosive device.[23] The Lithuanian Armed Forces stated that Lithuanian authorities are investigating the incident.[24] Italian Defense Minister Guido Crosetto stated on September 15 that the drone was likely Russian, and a Ukrainian military source told Reuters that the drone debris appears to be from a Geran-2.[25] Germany’s State Criminal Police reported that German authorities discovered unspecified drone debris east of Lake Steinheder, just one kilometer away from the Wunstorf Air Base of the German Armed Forces.[26] German outlet Bild stated that German authorities have been aware of the incident since September 14. Dutch State Railway Infrastructure Manager ProRail reported on September 15 that unspecified actors deliberately placed pipes and other materials on railway tracks, causing 35 disruptions to passenger and cargo rail services across the Netherlands that authorities have since resolved.[27] ISW is unable to independently verify the actors responsible for these incidents.

The US Treasury Department announced on September 14 that it imposed additional sanctions against Russian state-majority owned bank VTB for its involvement in Iranian sanctions evasion and increasing Russian-Iranian bilateral trade.[28] The US Treasury Department noted that VTB Bank began increasing its presence in Tehran in January 2025. The United States imposed prior rounds of sanctions against VTB Bank in February 2022 and January 2025 for its affiliation with the Russian state, role in the Russian economy, and facilitation of Russian-People's Republic of China (PRC) efforts to evade sanctions.^[29]

Key Takeaways:

• The Ukrainian military gave its first explicit confirmation of ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive operations against the Russian salient northwest of Lyman.
• The Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps conducted an intermediate-range strike campaign to interdict Russian logistics and degrade fuel supplies as part of Operation Vivaldi.
• Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi has achieved the operationally-significant objective of disrupting the Russian effort to conduct a wide encirclement of Ukraine's Fortress Belt.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky restated on September 15 Ukraine’s willingness to engage in a mutual ceasefire on energy targets with Russia amidst US President Donald Trump's push for this ceasefire.
• The Kremlin continues to publicly and explicitly outline its continued commitment to its maximalist war aims in Ukraine and deflect from opportunities for de-escalation.
• A Russian frigate fired flares against a Danish helicopter providing routine surveillance of the frigate in international waters in the Baltic Sea on September 14.
• Several sabotage attempts occurred across Europe between September 14 and 15 that are consistent with the modus operandi of Russian military forces and agents, although Russian involvement in them has not been confirmed.
• The US Treasury Department announced on September 14 that it imposed additional sanctions against Russian state-majority owned bank VTB for its involvement in Iranian sanctions evasion and increasing Russian-Iranian bilateral trade.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction and the Fortress Belt Outer Encirclement Effort.
• Russian forces launched 200 drones against Ukraine overnight.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against oil, defense industrial, and military infrastructure in Russia.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 14, 2026

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to reiterate Ukraine's willingness to engage in a mutual energy strikes moratorium in line with US President Donald Trump's recent statement regarding a strikes moratorium. Trump stated on September 14 that Ukraine and Russia have agreed to not strike each other's energy infrastructure but did not provide further details.[1] Zelensky responded that Ukraine proposed a potential agreement to its partners in which Ukraine would halt strikes against Russian food, energy, and other critical infrastructure if Ukraine's partners can ensure that Russia would reciprocate the same terms.[2] Zelensky stated that Ukraine "expect[s] specifics" from its partners regarding this proposal. Russian officials have not responded to either Trump or Zelensky's September 14 statements as of this writing.

Zelensky has repeatedly, including recently, offered a mutual ceasefire in which both Russia and Ukraine refrain from striking each other's energy infrastructure, and Russian President Vladimir Putin has rejected each offer thus far.[3] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on September 14, ahead of Trump's September 14 statement, that the Kremlin welcomes Trump's September 13 call for Ukraine to refrain from striking Russian diesel infrastructure.[4] Peskov refused to answer a media question about Russia's willingness to stop striking Ukrainian infrastructure in return, however.[5] Ukraine‘s ongoing strikes against Russian energy infrastructure aim in part to incentivize Russia to stop striking Ukrainian energy infrastructure, which Russia does consistently each winter as part of its long-standing campaign to demoralize the Ukrainian populace.[6]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to reiterate Ukraine's willingness to engage in a mutual energy strikes moratorium in line with US President Donald Trump's recent statement regarding a strikes moratorium.
• Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances on September 14.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in Krasnodar Krai overnight. Russia launched 102 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 13, 2026

Russian forces conducted a drone strike against a train leaving Ukraine and infrastructure at the Yahodyn border crossing on the Ukrainian-Polish border on September 13, as European officials were crossing the border. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on September 13 that Russia conducted a drone strike against a passenger train locomotive and a gas station in Volyn Oblast near the Ukrainian-Polish border.[1] The Ukrzaliznytsia deputy director for passenger transportation stated that a Russian drone hit the locomotive of a train traveling from Kyiv City to Warsaw, and Ukrzaliznytsia reported that the drone struck the locomotive two kilometers from the Polish border.^[2] Volyn Customs Spokesperson Valentyna Chernysh stated that a Russian strike also damaged a gas station near the Yahodyn-Dorohusk border checkpoint on the morning of September 13, causing a fire.[3] Geolocated footage published on September 13 shows the aftermath of the Russian strike against the train locomotive and the gas station.[4] Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk confirmed Russian strikes against the Ukrainian-Polish border crossing and the gas station and stated that Russian escalation is becoming a fact.[5] Polish Armed Forces Operational Command Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Jacek Goryszewski stated on September 13 that the Russian threat is “real and imminent.”^[6] The Russian Ministry of Defense acknowledged on September 13 that Russian forces struck railway infrastructure in western Ukraine that allegedly facilitates the transport of military cargo from Europe to Ukraine, although the struck passenger train departing Ukraine was clearly not bringing military cargo to Ukraine.[7]

German outlet Der Spiegel reported on September 13 that German Advisor on Foreign and Security Policy Günter Sautter, Bundestag member Robin Wagener, former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, and other European security officials were returning from Ukraine’s Yalta European Strategy (YES) annual conference through a Polish border via train.[8] The Financial Times (FT) reported on September 13 that a Russian drone hit a train at the Ukrainian-Polish border shortly after Ukrainian authorities had evacuated the train with European officials who had passed through the Yahodyn-Dorohusk crossing.[9] Western officials have regularly used a train line from Poland to Ukraine to travel to Kyiv City since the closure of Ukrainian airspace resulting from Russia’s full-scale invasion. Ukrzaliznytsia confirmed on September 13 that European security officials had been traveling to Poland from Ukraine via the Yahodyn border crossing and that the Ukrainian Central Monitoring Group evacuated the diplomatic train 15 minutes before Russian forces struck a locomotive at the Polish border.[10] Ukrzaliznytsia stated that it is quite likely that the target of the Russian strike was the train with European officials on board, which departed from the station earlier than planned due to a drone threat. The available reporting strongly supports the conclusion that the Kremlin conducted a precision drone strike intended to injure or kill current and former European government officials as they were leaving Ukraine.

Russia is increasingly targeting Ukrainian border crossings and is escalating its drone incursions into European airspace in order to intimidate NATO into abandoning its support for Ukraine. Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs Andriy Sybiha stated on September 13 that Russian strikes against the Yahodyn border crossing are Russia’s terror “knocking” on NATO’s doors.[11] Former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson called on Western officials to provide Ukraine with necessary air defense systems to protect against such strikes following the incident.[12] Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs Margus Tsahkna stated that Russia is intensifying its strikes and is increasingly striking targets closer to NATO borders, and called on the West to strengthen Ukrainian air defenses and provide Ukraine with military assistance.[13] Russian forces have struck four Ukrainian-Moldovan border crossings since August 2026.[14] Russian forces reportedly almost struck Zelensky’s plane on September 8 as it prepared to depart Chisinau Airport in Moldova.[15] Russian forces and agents continuously conduct sabotage activities, railway and infrastructure attacks, maritime blockades, and aerial drone incursions targeting European states in an effort to undermine NATO’s resolve and invalidate NATO’s Article 5 collective defense provision.[16] Russia’s increasingly aggressive activity targeting NATO member states should prompt NATO to reassess its current policy of intercepting Russian aerial targets only once they enter European airspace rather than over Ukraine as they approach NATO borders, in addition to rushing to provide Ukraine with additional air defense capabilities and the ability to strike Russian drone and missile launchers before they can release their weapons.

US officials continue to report that Ukraine, Russia, and the United States are getting closer to reaching a peace agreement to end Russia's war in Ukraine, while Kremlin officials reiterate their insistence that Ukraine surrender to Russia's full demands. Former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner stated on September 12 that Russia, Ukraine, and the United States have reached an agreement to end the war on all issues except territorial ones.[17] Kushner stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin has outlined his territorial demands, and that if Ukraine wanted to retreat to that line, then the rest of the agreement is already developed and agreed upon. Kushner acknowledged that the situation on the battlefield, which is quite dynamic, will determine territorial issues to some extent. Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov contradicted Kushner, stating on September 13 that there are many unresolved issues in negotiations including territorial ones, and that if there is a "shift" on territorial positions, then negotiations would become easier — not that an agreement was otherwise in hand.[18] Kremlin officials have frequently claimed that Ukrainian withdrawal from Donetsk Oblast is a necessary but not sufficient condition for achieving a peace settlement, and Putin has reiterated that he remains committed to his June 2024 demand that Ukraine cede territories which Russia does not occupy and has struggled and failed to seize since 2014 and 2022.[19] Those demands require Ukrainian withdrawal from the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, including areas that Russian forces have never occupied; the demilitarization and “denazification” of the Ukrainian government and society, by which Putin means the replacement of the current Ukrainian government with a pro-Russian one; and future Ukrainian neutrality, specifically excluding NATO membership.[20] Russian forces have been conducting offensive operations across the entire frontline in Ukraine in ways that are unnecessary if their focus is only, or even primarily, on seizing the rest of Donetsk Oblast.

Ukrainian forces are demonstrating that they are able to contest the initiative at the strategic and operational levels, contrary to Moscow's portrayal of Russian victory as inevitable. Russian forces have tried and failed to seize Ukraine's Fortress Belt numerous times since 2014.[21] Ukrainian forces have held Russian forces to near-zero net gains since March 2026 and recently eliminated the Russian salient north of Lyman, disrupting the Russian military command’s plans to conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast from the Lyman and Dobropillya areas.[22] Ukrainian forces retook over 745 square kilometers in Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhia oblasts in Winter and Spring 2026 (a figure that does not include recent Ukrainian gains).[23] Russian forces, on the other hand, continue struggling to reach, let alone seize, Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka — Ukraine’s heavily defended Fortress Belt.[24] Russian forces have made significant tactical gains within Kostyantynivka (the southernmost Fortress Belt city) but have been unable to complete the seizure of the town since first infiltrating into the city in October 2025. Russian forces will not seize Donetsk Oblast until 2032 at their current rate of advance — if they can seize it at all.[25] Ukrainian forces have also launched successful intermediate- and long-range strike campaigns against Russian oil refineries, airfields, marketplaces, and other military assets that are damaging the Russian economy and degrading Russia’s military capabilities.[26] The Russian war effort is failing to achieve its operational and strategic objectives as Russia’s recruitment numbers have decreased and Russian officials are setting conditions for possible involuntary reserve call-ups after Russia’s September 2026 State Duma elections.[27]

The Kremlin is therefore trying to convince the United States to force Ukraine to cede territory that Russian forces have shown no ability to take on the battlefield.  Russia’s cognitive warfare effort aims to push Ukraine and the West to cede this heavily defended territory to Russia without a fight, allowing Russia to avoid spending significant amounts of time and resources to try to seize it in combat — if Russian forces will even be able to do so. Ceding Donetsk Oblast to Russia would also set conditions for Russia to renew its aggression against Ukraine from far more advantageous positions at a time of its choosing, particularly as Putin and other Kremlin officials continue to indicate that their longer-term strategic goal of controlling all of Ukraine — not only its southern and eastern regions — remains unchanged.[28]

Kremlin officials are indicating that they will agree to US-Ukrainian proposed trilateral talks in the UAE, though the timing and the level of the delegations remain unclear. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on September 13 that Russia expects trilateral talks between Russia, the United States, and Ukraine in the foreseeable future.[29] Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov noted that the UAE has confirmed its willingness to host the talks and that Russian President Vladimir Putin will personally decide the makeup of the Russian delegation.[30] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and US negotiators have continued to support and push for a trilateral meeting and efforts to restart peace talks with Russia.[31] The Kremlin has previously either refused trilateral meetings and attempted to delay such meetings or sent lower-level officials to participate, and it is unclear at this time what level of delegation Putin may send to participate in the talks.[32]

US President Donald Trump called on Ukraine to cease strikes against Russian diesel infrastructure — a key aspect of Ukraine's long-range strike campaign intended in part to bring about a mutual ceasefire on energy infrastructure. Trump stated on September 13 that Ukraine needs to halt strikes against Russian diesel fuel infrastructure and should instead strike other unspecified targets.[33] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has repeatedly offered a mutual ceasefire in which both Ukraine and Russia refrain from attacking each other's energy infrastructure, and Russian President Vladimir Putin has rejected all of Zelensky's offers.[34] Ukraine‘s ongoing strikes against Russian energy infrastructure aim in part to force Russia to stop striking Ukrainian energy infrastructure, which Russia does consistently each winter as part of its long-standing campaign to demoralize the Ukrainian populace.[35]  Pressuring Putin to accept Zelensky's offer of a mutual ceasefire on energy infrastructure would address the diesel price issue Trump has raised while protecting the Ukrainian people from the serious harm that the Russian attacks cause.

Ukraine's long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure is also intended to reduce Russia’s ability to fund Putin's invasion of Ukraine, as oil and gas exports are one of Russia’s main sources of government revenues.[36] ISW has previously observed that Ukrainian strikes have exacerbated Russia’s existing economic challenges, with Russian oil and gas revenues from January to May 2026 falling by about a third year-on-year to three trillion rubles (roughly $42.1 billion) and consumer gasoline prices rising 6.88 percent in June 2026 amidst ongoing inflationary pressure.[37] Russian opposition outlet Sota reported on September 13 that the Russian fuel crisis forced the Russian Central Bank to keep the key interest rate at 14 percent despite continued Russian efforts to lower the key rate to curb inflation.^[38] Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil infrastructure have also degraded Russian military capabilities, leaving Russian military forces on the frontline with limited fuel supplies and degrading Russian air defense capabilities on the Black Sea and elsewhere.[39]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted a drone strike against a train leaving Ukraine and infrastructure at the Yahodyn border crossing on the Ukrainian-Polish border on September 13 as European officials were crossing the border.
• The available reporting strongly supports the conclusion that the Kremlin conducted a precision drone strike intended to injure or kill European government officials and former officials as they were leaving Ukraine.
• Russia is increasingly targeting Ukrainian border crossings and is escalating its drone incursions into European airspace in order to intimidate NATO into abandoning its support for Ukraine.
• Russia’s increasingly aggressive activity targeting NATO member states should prompt NATO to reassess its current policy of intercepting Russian aerial targets only once they enter European airspace rather than over Ukraine as they approach NATO borders, in addition to rushing to provide Ukraine with additional air defense capabilities and the ability to strike Russian drone and missile launchers before they can release their weapons.
• US officials continue to report that Ukraine, Russia, and the United States are getting closer to reaching a peace agreement to end Russia's war in Ukraine, while Kremlin officials reiterate their insistence that Ukraine surrender to Russia's full demands.
• Ukrainian forces are demonstrating that they are able to contest the initiative at the strategic and operational levels, contrary to Moscow's portrayal of Russian victory as inevitable.
• The Kremlin is therefore trying to convince the United States to force Ukraine to cede territory that Russian forces have shown no ability to take on the battlefield.
• Kremlin officials are indicating that they will agree to US-Ukrainian proposed trilateral talks in the UAE, though the timing and the level of the delegations remain unclear.
• US President Donald Trump called on Ukraine to cease strikes against Russian diesel infrastructure — a key aspect of Ukraine's long-range strike campaign intended in part to bring about a mutual ceasefire on energy infrastructure.
• Pressuring Putin to accept Zelensky's offer of a mutual ceasefire on energy infrastructure would address the diesel price issue Trump has raised while protecting the Ukrainian people from the serious harm that the Russian attacks cause.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Fortress Belt Eastern Flank and western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure and military assets.
• Russian forces launched 453 drones and Banderol loitering munitions overnight and an additional 323 drones and 10 Banderol loitering munitions during the day on September 13.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 12, 2026

forces have successfully contested the initiative at both the strategic and operational levels starting in late 2025 and persisting throughout 2026 for the first time since the August 2024 Kursk Offensive.  Ukrainian forces have held Russian forces to near-zero net gains since March 2026, and have conducted successful counterattacks in the Kupyansk, Oleksandrivka, and now Lyman directions.[i] Ukrainian counterattacks defeated Russian efforts to push into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, regained lost ground in and around Kupyansk and have defeated subsequent Russian efforts to regain it, and now have destroyed a significant Russian salient that threatened the northern flank of Slovyansk and the entire Donetsk Oblast Fortress Belt. Russian forces have made limited but significant gains in and around Kostyantynivka and east of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk, but are fighting to maintain momentum in these areas and elsewhere along the front line. The situation remains dynamic, and Russian commanders are reportedly pressing Russian President Vladimir Putin for a massive mobilization likely aimed at restoring their ability to seize and hold the initiative. It remains unclear how such a mobilization, if Putin actually orders it, will change the theater dynamics in the face of Ukraine's current advantages in both tactical and operational drone operations and drone-infantry integration.

Ukrainian successes in eliminating the Russian salient north of Lyman over the past several months have disrupted the Russian military command's plans to conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast from the Lyman and Dobropillya areas. Russian forces have been advancing toward Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka from the east and Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka from the south while also trying to encircle the entire Fortress Belt from the north and southwest. Russian forces on the southern flank of the Fortress Belt have been trying to seize Dobropillya and advance from the Pokrovsk-Dobropillya sector northward to the area west of Druzhkivka and Kramatorsk, while Russian forces on the northern flank of the Fortress Belt similarly have been trying to seize Lyman, cross the Siverskyi Donets River, and advance west-southwest to the area west of Slovyansk. The Russian military command aimed for these two prongs eventually to encircle the entire Fortress Belt and the Ukrainian forces defending the cities. Ukrainian forces have eliminated the Russian salient north of Lyman in recent months and have long defended against Russian efforts to seize Lyman itself, however, disrupting this two-pronged encirclement effort.

The Russian military command will likely need to reassess its campaign designs for the southern and northern flanks of the Fortress Belt given the elimination of its salient north of Lyman and particularly if Ukrainian forces are able to fully push Russian forces back to the Zherebets River and use the canalizing terrain to create a stable defensive line. Elements north of Lyman, although the exact seam between the two formations' areas of responsibility (AoRs) is unclear.[ii] It is also unclear how much damage to these two formations Ukrainian forces have inflicted in the course of their months-long counterattack. The Russian military command may redeploy surviving elements of these two armies away from the Lyman area to other areas of the front if it assesses that Russian forces will be unable to resume their efforts to encircle Slovyansk or the Fortress Belt from the north and if it is confident that it can prevent Ukrainian forces from making further advances with a reduced force presence in the area. It is unclear if the Russian military command will also adjust the objective for the forces fighting, largely without success, in the Dobropillya area now that Ukrainian forces have essentially eliminated the northern half of the encirclement effort.

The Russian military command may alternatively double down on efforts to seize Lyman, possibly with some forces that had been attacking within the former salient north of Lyman, in order to try to recreate the northern prong of the envisioned encirclement. Russian forces have failed to seize Lyman since Fall 2022, however, and have had to resort to infiltration tactics in and near the town in 2026 due to Ukrainian fortifications and drone-based defenses. Russian forces are unlikely to be able to leverage reinforcements to conduct successful larger-scale infantry or mechanized assaults in the foreseeable future, however, following this dramatic setback.

Many Russian milbloggers are acknowledging that Ukrainian forces have largely eliminated the Russian salient north of Lyman and that fighting is mainly ongoing along the Zherebets River in the area. Russian milbloggers claimed on September 9 through 11 that Ukrainian forces had effectively cut the Russian salient north of Lyman and pushed Russian forces to the Zherebets River.^[iii] One milblogger claimed on September 11 and 12 that Ukrainian forces forded the river.[iv] Ukraine's Strategic Communications Center amplified this milblogger claim on September 12, but Ukrainian officials have not publicly confirmed Ukrainian advances in the area as of this writing.[v] One prominent milblogger noted that Ukrainian forces have been counterattacking in the area for months and complained that the Russian military command did not pay enough attention to the area in that time.[vi]

Russian milbloggers have reported in recent days that fighting was ongoing along the Zherebets River near Ivanivka (on the western bank of the river) and Terny (on the eastern bank), with one source adding that Ukrainian forces likely surrounded Russian forces in Ivanivka.[vii] Russian milbloggers stated on September 9 to 12 that Ukrainian forces advanced between Novoliubivka and Katerynivka and that fighting was ongoing near Balka Zhuravka (just east of Novoliubivka on the other side of the Zherebets River), indicating that Ukrainian forces advanced to the river in the northern part of the former salient.[viii] Russian milbloggers stated that fighting is ongoing near Kolodyazi (roughly two kilometers west of the river), suggesting that Ukrainian forces have not advanced to the river in the southern part of the salient yet. One Russian milblogger, who acknowledged that the Russian salient was essentially gone, claimed that fighting is still ongoing in some areas within the salient, including near Shandryholove, Stavky, and Derylove, and Ridkodub.[ix] Some individual Russian elements may still be operating within the former salient as Ukrainian forces continue to clear the area. The full extent of Ukrainian advances in the Lyman direction and the shape of the frontline in the area remains unclear, due to limited open-source evidence about the salient. ISW will continue to update its assessment as more open-source evidence becomes available.

Russian generals have reportedly asked Russian President Vladimir Putin for an additional 800,000 troops to sustain and likely expand Russian offensive operations in the face of enormous Russian casualty rates. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Oleh Ivashchenko stated in an interview with The Times published on September 10 that Ukrainian intelligence suggests that Russian generals have asked Putin to mobilize an additional 800,000 troops above current recruitment levels after the September 2026 State Duma elections.[x] Ivashchenko added that Russia’s current casualty rate exceeds its daily recruitment rate, with about 60 percent of casualties being killed in action, an extraordinarily high ratio of killed to wounded when the standard ratio in modern war is 1:3.

Russia’s does not have the training and administrative capabilities to absorb, integrate, and train 800,000 recruits at one time, particularly if Russian authorities try to do so alongside the semi-annual conscription cycle that normally starts in October. Putin signed a law in November 2026 allowing Russian military conscription administrative processes to occur year-round in an effort to avoid the challenges the Russian military faced in 2022 when attempting to do a large-scale involuntary reserve call-up at the same time as the semi-annual fall conscription process.[xi] The law aimed to mitigate bureaucratic bottlenecks that complicated Russia’s force generation efforts during large-scale involuntary call-ups, but Ivashchenko stated that Russian military can simultaneously absorb, including mobilizing, equipping, feeding, training, and integrating, no more than 300,000 to 500,000 recruits.[xii] Russian forces are already suffering from administrative and training bottlenecks for their ground forces and drone operators at their current recruitment rate, and the mobilization of hundreds of thousands of additional recruits would almost certainly exacerbate those challenges.[xiii] Putin is more likely to choose a more gradual and covert mobilization due to the constraints in Russia’s training and bureaucratic capabilities and concerns about public reception than to order a sudden, massive involuntary reserve call-up like the one he ordered in 2022.[xiv]

The increasing Russian casualty rates and declining recruitment rate will likely force Russia to conduct some form of mobilization in the near term, but the type and scope of mobilization Putin may choose is unclear at this time. Putin and other Russian officials have repeatedly denied that Russia was preparing for mobilization in the weeks leading up to the September 18-20 State Duma elections.[xv] Ivashchenko reported that Russia is currently recruiting around 1,000 to 1,200 people every day, and Ukrainian General Staff data shows that Russian forces suffered an average of 1,374 casualties per day since the beginning of July 2026.[xvi] Russia’s current force generation system based on volunteer recruitment continues to struggle to recruit enough soldiers to replace current losses, and it remains unclear how long Russian forces will be able to sustain their current footpace offensive tempo without some form of mobilization.[xvii] ISW has observed indicators that suggest that Russian authorities have been preparing multiple courses of action for conducting mobilization, allowing them to execute whichever sort of mobilization Putin might order. Russia’s most likely course of action is to conduct rolling call-ups that that in the short term help replace Russia’s battlefield casualties. Russia’s least likely course of action is a sudden large call-up that would allow Russian forces to temporarily flood battlefield with poorly trained servicemembers in a short time span but would be very unpopular with the Russian population and would likely yield diminishing returns due to Russia’s existing training, administrative, and logistical constraints.

The Russian General Staff likely wants to use the additional 800,000 troops to implement its offensive plans throughout the front rather than only in Donetsk, and the scope of any potential mobilization likely depends on what operations Putin authorizes. Ukrainian officials have repeatedly reported that the Russian General Staff has made plans for additional offensive operations throughout the whole theater of war, including in the Chernihiv-Kyiv direction, very likely aiming to extend the front line and exploit Ukraine’s manpower limitations.[xix] The Russian General Staff likely asked Putin for 800,000 troops to be able to execute all of its planned offensive operations, not just to support a focused deployment to priority efforts in Donetsk Oblast. The type and scope of a possible Russian mobilization will thus very likely depend on what operations Putin authorizes. Any compulsory mobilization is a personal decision for Putin and is contingent on his perception of battlefield realities and regime stability.[xx]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to support a future trilateral Ukrainian-Russian-US meeting and to suggest efforts to restart peace talks with Russia. Zelensky on September 11 called for Ukraine, Russia, and the United States to move to a trilateral meeting.[xxi] Zelensky stated that he is willing to travel to the Group of 20 (G20) leaders’ summit in Miami in December 2026 if Russian President Vladimir Putin also attended.[xxii] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded that Zelensky could come to Moscow if he wants to meet with Putin.[xxiii] Zelensky also called for Russia and Ukraine to find ways to "unblock" the Black Sea and to discuss moratoriums on long-range strikes against energy and grain infrastructure, efforts that Zelensky said could act as a starting point for peace negns

Ukraine's ongoing long-range strike campaign and Western sanctions are actively preventing the Russian oil industry from recovering its processing capacity and oil exports. The International Energy Agency (IEA) reported on September 11 that it has revised its baseline outlook for Russian oil processing over the next 18 months to around four million barrels a day, a 30 percent decrease pre-2022 levels but noted that even this latest assessment may understate the Russian refining industry's problems.[xxv] The IEA reported that Ukrainian strikes caused disruptions to Russia’s oil refining system and a near halt to product exports, adding that the approach of colder weather could compound the stress on the Russian energy system. The IEA reported that Ukrainian forces are conducting more precise strikes against the refineries' secondary-processing units that require up to eight months to repair and are using multiple drone waves against single sites that overwhelm Russia's passive and active air defenses. The IEA assessed that international sanctions against the Russian energy industry are limiting Russia's access to replacement equipment, complicating efforts to repair facilities that Ukrainian forces have struck. The IEA report follows Russian Central Bank Chairwomen Elvira Nabiullina’s September 11 acknowledgement that Russia’s fuel market shortages – the effects of Ukraine's long-range strike campaign against Russian energy infrastructure – were the primary cause of Russia’s accelerated price growth over the summer and are constraining Russia’s economy.[xxvi]

Ukraine has intensified the tempo of its refinery strike campaign and improved its targeting so as to cause maximum pain to the Russian oil industry. Ukraine has struck at least 26 different Russian oil refineries since the beginning of 2026, mainly targeting combined electric desalination and atmospheric and vacuum distillation units (ELOU-AVT). Crude oil desalting and distillation are essential steps in treating and separating crude oil into various fractions, such as refinery gases or naphtha, making ELOU-AVT units critical components for refinery operations that function as the heart of the facility.[xxvii]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces in late 2025 and throughout 2026 have successfully contested the initiative at both the strategic and operational levels for the first time since the August 2024 Kursk Offensive.
• Ukrainian successes in eliminating the Russian salient north of Lyman over the past several months have disrupted the Russian military command's plans to conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast from the Lyman and Dobropillya areas.
• The Russian military command will likely need to reassess its campaign designs for the southern and northern flanks of the Fortress Belt given the elimination of its salient north of Lyman and particularly if Ukrainian forces are able to fully push Russian forces back to the Zherebets River and use the canalizing terrain to create a stable defensive line.
• Many Russian milbloggers are acknowledging that Ukrainian forces have largely eliminated the Russian salient north of Lyman and that fighting is mainly ongoing along the Zherebets River in the area.
• Russian generals have reportedly asked Russian President Vladimir Putin for an additional 800,000 troops to sustain and likely expand Russian offensive operations in the face of enormous Russian casualty rates.
• Russia’s does not have the training and administrative capabilities to absorb, integrate, and train 800,000 recruits at one time, particularly if Russian authorities try to do so alongside the semi-annual conscription cycle that normally starts in October.
• The increasing Russian casualty rates and declining recruitment rate will likely force Russia to conduct some form of mobilization in the near term, but the type and scope of mobilization Putin may choose is unclear at this time.
• The Russian General Staff likely wants to use the additional 800,000 troops to implement its offensive plans throughout the front rather than only in Donetsk, and the scope of any potential mobilization likely depends on what operations Putin authorizes.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to support a future trilateral Ukrainian-Russian-US meeting and to suggest efforts to restart peace talks with Russia.
• Ukraine's ongoing long-range strike campaign and Western sanctions are actively preventing the Russian oil industry from recovering its processing capacity and oil exports.
• Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces advanced on September 11.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 11, 2026

The Russian Central Bank, along with its Chairwoman, Elvira Nabiullina, appears to be advocating for a more cautious monetary policy amidst rising inflationary pressure. The Russian Central Bank announced on September 11 that it decided to keep the key interest rate at 14 percent after lowering the rate 10 times over the past 18 months.[1] The Central Bank noted that price pressure has intensified in recent months and that price growth acceleration is between five and six percent due to temporarily decreased production capacity in certain sectors. The Central Bank estimated that annual inflation will range between six and seven percent in 2026 and will return to four percent in 2027. The Central Bank highlighted that core inflation indicators rose to seven percent in July 2026, compared to an average of 4.6 percent in the previous quarter. Nabiullina echoed the Central Bank and noted the increase in pro-inflationary risks (or risk factors that increase inflation).[2] Nabiullina added that the Central Bank will clarify the scope of further key interest rate decreases in October 2026. Nabiullina stated that the Central Bank raised its key rate forecast for 2027, expecting the monetary policy to become tighter with less room for reducing the key interest rate than the Central Bank had expected in the first half of 2026.[3] Nabiullina added that Russia’s fuel market shortages were the primary cause of accelerated price growth over the summer but claimed that the impact of Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian supply chains remains insignificant.[4]

Russian President Vladimir Putin has continuously pressured the Russian Central Bank to lower the key interest rate as part of Putin’s efforts to impose a looser monetary policy in order to expand capital and liquidity availability for the Russian military and defense industry.[5] Nabiullina has consistently advocated for a more cautious monetary policy – often trying to resist the Kremlin’s demands.[6] The Russian economy has been experiencing growing wage inflation resulting from significant labor shortages and the Kremlin’s voluntary conscription campaign’s bonus system that has been necessary to sustain Russia’s war in Ukraine without resorting to involuntary reserve call-ups.[7] Ukraine’s long-range strike campaigns against Russian energy infrastructure -- the effects of which Nabiullina acknowledged -- and the recent strikes against Russian logistics facilities are generating additional inflationary pressures on the already-strained Russian economy.[8] Putin has only recently started to prioritize combating inflation at the expense of growth and investment, and the Central Bank’s decision to maintain the key rate at 14 percent is likely a reflection of Putin’s concerns as well as his hopes that the Kremlin’s new air defense policies may reduce the effectiveness of Ukraine’s strikes and ease one of the inflationary pressures on the Russian economy.[9] Nabiullina has repeatedly succumbed to the Kremlin’s pressure to lower the key interest rate, but Putin’s recent prioritization of combatting inflation may allow her most recent effort to constrain monetary policy to hold.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney signed a 100-year partnership agreement on September 10 that includes a Drone Deal to expand joint drone production.[10] Zelensky stated that Canada pledged more than $2 billion, with more than $1 billion toward Ukrainian air defenses, including missiles, Patriot interceptors, and co-production of F-16 fighter jets and drones.[11] Canada will provide about 350 million Canadian dollars (about $252 million) toward air defense interceptors through the United States' Joint Ukraine Multinational Program – Services, Training and Articles Rapid Timeline (JUMPSTART) and nearly 435 million Canadian dollars (about $313 million) in loan guarantees through the European Reconstruction and Development Bank, including for Ukraine to purchase gas and generators during Winter 2026.[12] Carney stated that Canada will send a third of Canadian-produced drones to Ukraine over the next two years and that Canada is ready to join the European-Ukrainian Freyja anti-ballistic missile interceptor development project.[13]

Key Takeaways:

• The Russian Central Bank, along with its Chairwoman, Elvira Nabiullina, appears to be advocating for a more cautious monetary policy amidst rising inflationary pressure.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney signed a 100-year partnership agreement on September 10 that includes a Drone Deal to expand joint drone production.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets, and fuel and logistics infrastructure on the night of September 10 to 11. Russia launched 162 drones against Ukraine overnight.
• Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces advanced on September 11.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 10, 2026

Ukrainian forces conducted their deepest long-range drone strike thus far in the war, striking one of Russia’s largest gas complexes nearly 3,000 kilometers from the Ukrainian border. The Ukrainian General Staff and Special Operations Forces (SSO) reported on September 9 that Ukrainian forces struck the Novy Urengoy Gas Condensate Treatment Plant and the Purovsky Gas Processing Plant in Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug (roughly 2,840 and 2,780 kilometers from the Ukrainian border respectively) — Ukraine’s farthest strikes thus far in the war.[1] The SSO noted that the Novy Urengoy Gas Condensate Treatment Plant’s annual capacity is 19.5 million tons, and the Purovsky Gas Processing Plant’s annual capacity is 13.4 million tons. Russia has long sought to establish and control the Northern Sea Route to cement Russia’s position in the Arctic Sea and use it as an alternative shipping route amidst Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign against Russian port infrastructure in the Black and Baltic seas.[2] The strike against targets in Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug demonstrates Ukraine’s ability to conduct long-range strikes against Russian energy infrastructure throughout all of European Russia and from the Norwegian border to beyond the Urals, exploiting Russia's lack of air defenses to cover its vast territory.

United Russia Party Chairperson and Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev formally articulated United Russia's commitment to supporting a protracted war in Ukraine and solidified the party’s pro-war stance as part of Russia’s informal state ideology. Medvedev emphasized in a September 10 interview to Russian newspaper Vedomosti Russia’s commitment to the war in Ukraine, to the long-term militarization of Russian society, and to demands for increased economic sacrifices by Russian society.[3] Medvedev outlined the need for Russian society to remain on a permanent war footing even after the war in Ukraine ends. Medvedev indicated that the post-war Russian defense industry should reorient toward stockpiling weapons to repel the supposedly existential threat to Russia posed by NATO and US allies in the Pacific. Medvedev attempted to justify increased tax burdens and obfuscated the Kremlin’s condition setting efforts for the nationalization of private enterprises by claiming that current challenges justify state intervention in the economy. Medvedev also denied that Russia will conduct a mobilization, despite growing indications that the Kremlin is setting conditions for mobilization following the September State Duma elections.^[4]

Russian President Vladimir Putin described the United Russia Party as the war party tasked with executing Putin’s ideological aims on August 22.[5] Medvedev is using his position as the United Russia Chairperson to reaffirm the United Russia Party's pro-war platform and to position the party as the leader of a pro-war and ultranationalist informal Russian state ideology. The Kremlin has continuously worked to militarize Russian society through youth militarization, militarized education, and Russia’s Time of Heroes program, which places veterans of the war in Ukraine in government positions throughout Russia and in occupied Ukraine.[6] United Russia's posturing as the sole executor of Putin's policies defending Russia against a supposedly hostile global encirclement is similar to one of the roles in which the Communist Party cast itself in the Soviet Union. This posturing supports the Kremlin's efforts to centralize power, silence dissent, and set conditions to demand greater social sacrifices from the Russian public to support war in Ukraine and beyond.[7]

A Russian drone entered Moldovan airspace as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s plane was preparing for takeoff at the Chisinau Airport, Moldova on September 9. Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Store stated on September 9 that a drone “nearly struck” Zelensky's plane as it prepared to depart the Chisinau Airport, Moldova.[8] A Moldovan government spokesperson stated that Moldovan authorities closed the country’s airspace due to a drone threat, delaying Zelensky’s takeoff.^[9] Moldovan authorities allowed Zelensky’s plane to take off after confirming that the drone had crashed roughly 160 kilometers from the airport.[10] The Moldovan Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on September 10 that Moldovan authorities later identified the downed drone as a Russian Shahed-type strike drone.[11] A source within Zelensky’s administration told Agence France Pressure (AFP) on September 10 that Store “exaggerated” the drone risk.[12]

Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk stated on September 10 that Polish and Ukrainian security services prevented an unspecified direct threat against a Polish-Ukrainian border crossing overnight.^[13] Tusk noted that Poland expects further Russian provocations at Polish border crossings with Ukraine. Tusk added that Poland and Europe must prepare for “various scenarios” on Europe’s eastern flank.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces conducted their deepest long-range drone strike thus far in the war, striking one of Russia’s largest gas complexes nearly 3,000 kilometers from the Ukrainian border.
• United Russia Party Chairperson and Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev formally articulated United Russia's commitment to supporting a protracted war in Ukraine and solidified the party’s pro-war stance as part of Russia’s informal state ideology.
• A Russian drone entered Moldovan airspace as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s plane was preparing for takeoff at the Chisinau Airport, Moldova on September 9.
• Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk stated on September 10 that Polish and Ukrainian security services prevented an unspecified direct threat against a Polish-Ukrainian border crossing overnight.
• Ukrainian forces struck Russian ports along the Black and Caspian Sea coasts on the night of September 9 to 10. Russia launched 149 drones against Ukraine overnight.
• Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces advanced on September 10.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 9, 2026

Russian milbloggers continue to acknowledge Ukrainian counterattacks near Lyman and are criticizing the pervasive culture of lying within the Russian military. Russian milbloggers claimed on September 9 that the situation in the Lyman direction is increasingly deteriorating for Russian forces and that Russian forces had to withdraw from unspecified forward positions in the area.[1] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces have been counterattacking in the area for months, despite the fact that the Russian military command reported and other milbloggers’ maps depicted an "optimistic view" of the situation.^[2] The milblogger argued that “beautiful reports” — a term milbloggers have coined to refer to the pervasive culture of lying within the Russian armed forces and misinformation about the state of the frontlines —need to be “absolutely forbidden.” Ukrainian forces recently demonstrated their full control over Svyatohirsk (northwest of Lyman), just days after Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed that Russian forces control the settlement.[3] Russian milbloggers notably acknowledged Ukraine’s refutation about Svyatohirsk and have been increasingly expressing frustration about Russian officials’ false claims of advance, particularly around Lyman. Russian milbloggers also highlighted how these false reports create operational risks for Russian forces, because Russian forces cannot call for fire missions on locations Russian forces earlier claimed to control, and because units in adjacent sectors may plan operations based on inaccurate battlefield assessments.[4]

The current extent of the frontline in the Lyman direction remains unclear due to limited open evidence about Ukrainian forces’ progress during a recent counteroffensive. ISW’s mapping methodology underestimates the likely extent of Ukrainian gains in the ongoing counterattacks in the Lyman direction. Additional publicly available information will likely reveal the full extent of Ukrainian gains in the Lyman direction over time. ISW will continue to update its assessment as more evidence becomes available.

The Kremlin is conducting increasingly expansionary fiscal policy amid high war spending, which stifles Russia’s economic growth and forces Russian authorities to sacrifice non-war related spending, likely at the expense of citizens’ wellbeing. The Russian Ministry of Finance published on September 9 a preliminary assessment of the federal budget that shows that the Russian federal budget deficit reached 5.8 trillion rubles ($67.87 billion or 2.5 percent of Russian GDP) between January and August 2026, which is 1.5 times higher than the Russian budget deficit in the same period in 2025.[5] Russian authorities notably forecasted the budget deficit to be 3.8 trillion rubles ($44.47 billion or 1.6 percent of Russia’s GDP) for all of 2026 — an estimate that is approximately 35 percent lower than the actual budget deficit as of September. The ministry’s data suggests that the two main causes of an increased budget deficit are rising expenditures relative to total revenues and declining oil and gas revenues. The data indicates that Russian budget expenditures grew to 31.72 trillion rubles ($371.17 billion), a 14.7 percent rise from January-August 2025, at a faster rate than Russian budget revenue, which rose by 9.2 percent to 25.93 trillion rubles ($303.42 billion). The Russian Ministry of Finance reported that the unanticipated rise in federal budget expenditures during this period was due to the conclusion and advance payment of government contracts, likely defense-related contracts. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on September 9 that the Russian government is not discussing raising taxes due to the rising budget deficit and that the deficit itself should not be a cause for concern as the economy remains stable.[6] Bloomberg reported on August 27 that the Russian government cut spending on non-war related budget items by 35 percent following a cash shortage in April 2026, indicating that Russia’s war-related spending increased enough to both offset the non-war related spending reductions and increase budget expenditures by 48 percent from 2025 to 2026.[7]

The Russian Central Bank published a document on August 31 on the main directions of Russian monetary policy from 2027 to 2029, outlining three forecast scenarios for the economy, including a “pro-inflationary” scenario that forecasts the Russian inflation rate to be between 4.5 and 5.5 percent and GDP growth to reach between one and two percent in 2027.[8] These numbers align with the Russian Central Bank’s September 2 survey of Russian economists who forecasted a 4.6 percent inflation rate and 1.2 percent GDP growth in 2027.[9] These forecasted figures indicate continued high inflation and weak growth figures, driven by the Russian government’s expansionary fiscal policy, tight monetary policy, and war-focused economy.[10] Russian President Vladimir Putin has recently prioritized combating inflation at the expense of growth and investment in an effort to downplay the effects of the Russian war spending and international sanctions against Russia ahead of the upcoming State Duma elections slated for September 18-20.[11] ISW continues to assess that Russia’s high defense spending and tight monetary policy are crowding out the Russian economy, leading to stagnant GDP growth and high inflation, and forcing Putin to cut non-war related spending, likely at the expense of the wellbeing of Russian citizens.[12]

Russia may be attempting to establish a rough analogue to Ukraine’s Brave1 defense platform in order to support decentralized procurement for good and limited defense articles that would bolster Russian air defense of industrial infrastructure. Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec launched the first Russian industrial marketplace that claims to enable companies to advertise products, search for ready-made solutions, and build supply chains on September 9.[13] Rostec stated that the platform features over 1,250 civilian products produced by over 180 companies and research organizations and noted that the most in-demand listings are counter-drone solutions, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and aerostatic and aerodynamic systems — all goods relevant for military and defense solutions required for Russia’s war in Ukraine. Rostech stated that 60 percent of applications to join the new platform came from Russian corporations and large businesses, although the full composition of the platform's user base remains unclear, and it is uncertain whether Russian military personnel can or will use it as Ukrainian units use the Brave1 platform.

Russian officials have been increasingly shifting responsibility for air defense to individual enterprises and regional governments since late May 2026.[14] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on September 9 that Russian private businesses and other government organizations lacked clarity on how and whence to obtain measures to counter Ukrainian drones and claimed that the marketplace is meant to address this issue.[15] Russia has long been struggling to defend its vast rear due to the lack of air defense systems, manpower shortages, and civil-military coordination issues.[16] Russian Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug Governor Dmitry Atryukhov reported on September 9 that Russian air defense downed a drone in Novy Urengoy, and geolocated footage published on September 9 shows smoke plumes rising from the Novy Urengoy Condensate Preparation Plant (roughly 3,000 kilometers from Russia’s international border with Ukraine).[17] The fact that Ukrainian drones penetrated so deeply into the Russian rear demonstrated how Russia’s air defenses remain inadequate to protect such a large area, and how poor coordination between industry and the military has left industrial targets exposed.

Russian forces have reportedly suffered over 1.5 million personnel casualties thus far in the war. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 9 that Russian forces suffered over 1.5 million casualties (roughly one percent of the Russian population) since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.[18] ISW has evidence to assess that Russian forces have gained an additional 12.12 percent of Ukrainian territory in this time period. (Russian forces occupied about seven percent of Ukraine’s territory in Crimea, Donetsk Oblast, and Luhansk Oblast since 2014.) Russian forces continue suffering significant personnel losses while achieving marginal battlefield gains.^[19]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian milbloggers continue to acknowledge Ukrainian counterattacks near Lyman and are criticizing the pervasive culture of lying within the Russian military.
• The Kremlin is conducting increasingly expansionary fiscal policy amid high war spending, which stifles Russian economic growth and forces Russian authorities to sacrifice non-war related spending, likely at the expense of citizens’ wellbeing.
• Russia may be attempting to establish a rough analogue to Ukraine’s Brave1 defense platform in order to support decentralized procurement for good and limited defense articles that would bolster Russian air defense of industrial infrastructure.
• Russian forces have reportedly suffered over 1.5 million personnel casualties thus far in the war.
• Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces advanced on September 9.
• Ukrainian forces struck multiple military targets along the Black Sea coast of Krasnodar Krai on the night of September 8-9, in part to reduce Russia's cruise missile strike capabilities. Russia launched an unspecified number of Iskander-M ballistic missiles and S8000 Banderol-type loitering munitions and 196 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 8, 2026

Russian President Vladimir Putin likely used his September 8 phone call with US President Donald Trump to push Putin’s misrepresentation of the battlefield situation. Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov stated on September 8 that Putin and Trump discussed the results of Putin’s September 6 meeting with US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner and prospects for ending the war.[1] Ushakov claimed that Putin gave Trump an “objective and thorough” overview of the situation on the battlefield in Ukraine and explained ways in which the US can quickly resolve the war.[2] Putin’s understanding of the war is, in fact, severely distorted by the Russian military’s systematic lying, which is emboldening Putin to insist on his maximalist demands.[3] Putin regularly makes absurd and aggrandizing claims of Russian advances on the battlefield to construct a narrative of continuous and inevitable Russian military success.[4] Putin likely used the call with Trump to present his distorted picture of the frontline in an attempt to convince Trump that the US should force Ukraine to capitulate to Russia’s demands ostensibly before Ukraine’s battlefield situation worsens.

Senior Kremlin officials parroted Putin’s claims about the battlefield situation and doubled down on Putin’s demands for Ukrainian capitulation. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that the situation for Ukraine worsens each day and that Russian peace terms will harden as the war continues.[5] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that US negotiators are recognizing the “realities on the ground” and that negotiations must address the “root causes” of Russia’s war in Ukraine — a shorthand the Kremlin often uses to discuss its original war aims from 2021 and 2022.[6] Kremlin officials’ statements demonstrate that Putin’s negotiating position has not changed since the US offered a 28-point peace plan very favorable to Russia in November 2025, despite the fact that the trajectory of the war has notably shifted in Ukraine’s favor.

The Kremlin is notably maintaining its long-standing position that Ukraine accept all of Russia’s demands even as the battlefield dynamics have fundamentally changed. Russia has previously rejected as insufficient even the 2025 28-point peace plan, with Russian officials insisting that any peace agreement must reflect the “realities on the ground” and eliminate the “root causes” of the war.[7] The 28-point plan was predicated on the idea that the frontline situation was shifting in Russia’s favor following a period of relatively notable Russian gains. ISW assesses that Russian forces made net advances of 2,403.77 square kilometers (2,485.22 square kilometers including infiltrations) across the frontline between May 20 and November 20, 2025, when discussions of the 28-point plan became public. Russian forces made significant tactical gains in the Pokrovsk, Kupyansk, and Hulyaipole directions in that period. But the frontline dynamics in the past six months have been very different: ISW assesses that Russian forces suffered net losses of territory into which they had advanced — 195.19 square kilometers — and gained a net 361.47 square kilometers, including infiltrations across the frontline between March 8 and September 8, 2026, following Witkoff and Kushner’s visit to Kyiv.[8]

Ukrainian forces made significant gains on the battlefield in Winter and Spring 2026.[9] They launched the Oleksandrivka counteroffensive in Spring/Summer 2026 that liberated 26 settlements and over 745 square kilometers in Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[10] Russian forces, on the other hand, continue struggling to reach, let alone seize, Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka — Ukraine’s heavily defended Fortress Belt — contrary to continuous Russian claims that Russian forces’ rate of advance is consistent with Putin’s most recent deadline to seize the whole of Donetsk Oblast by December 31, 2026.[11] Ukrainian forces have also changed the dynamics of the war in important ways beyond the front line since 2025. They have launched successful intermediate- and long-range strike campaigns against Russian oil refineries, airfields, marketplaces, and other military assets that are damaging the Russian economy and degrading Russia’s military capabilities.^[12] The Kremlin refuses to adjust its negotiation position on the war in Ukraine based on the true state of the war and remains committed to its original war demands.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to express support for US proposals for intensifying negotiations by moving to a trilateral format. Zelensky stated on September 7 that Ukraine wants to resume trilateral negotiations with the US and Russia in September or October 2026 — in line with Witkoff and Kushner’s September 6 proposal for resuming negotiations in that format.[13] Zelensky noted that there are no concrete plans for these trilateral meetings at this time, however. Kremlin officials have repeatedly refused trilateral meetings and attempted to delay such meetings or send lower-level officials to participate.[14] Zelensky’s demonstrated support for the US proposal for serious negotiations contrasts with the Kremlin’s insistence on Ukrainian capitulation and repeated rejection of compromises that would enable meaningful negotiations.

A Russian drone spent just under one hour flying in Moldovan and Romanian airspace on September 8. The Moldovan Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Romanian Ministry of National Defense reported that a Shahed-type drone entered Moldovan airspace from the direction of Ukraine, flew into Romanian airspace, and finally returned to Moldovan airspace before crashing near Mihăileni Vechi, Moldova, on the afternoon of September 8.[15] A Ukrainian open-source channel claimed that the drone was a Geran-4, but ISW cannot independently confirm this.[16] The Romanian and Moldovan official reports about the drone’s flight path and the time-ticks of its movements support the assertion that it was jet-powered, however. Russia has significantly increased its use of jet-powered Geran drones in recent weeks.[17]

Romanian authorities reported other likely Russian drones over and near Romanian territory in recent days. NATO forces reacted to a group of air targets moving near Romania’s border with Ukraine on September 6, and Romanian forces found unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) off the coast of Romania on September 3 and 4.^[18]

The Kremlin benefits from such drone incursions into NATO and Moldovan airspace, particularly if Russia is using its faster jet-powered drones that limit the reaction times of states neighboring Ukraine. ISW has no basis to assess whether the Russian drones’ flights over and near Moldova and Romania were intentional. Moscow nonetheless likely sees such drone incursions into Moldovan and Romanian airspace as advantageous even if unintentional because they serve to focus NATO’s attention on its own defenses, call into question NATO’s Article 5 mutual defense guarantee, and support efforts to deter NATO states from supporting Ukraine. Russia’s possible use of its faster Geran-4 drones gives Moldovan and NATO forces even shorter time frames during which they can react.[19] Challenges for Moldovan and NATO air defenses defending against such drones increase, especially if NATO and Moldovan forces continue not to engage with aerial threats until they cross national borders. A Russian Geran-4 drone can fly at up to 450 kilometers per hour and can reach the Moldovan border from Odesa City within six minutes and the Romanian border within 20 minutes. These incursions using Russia’s latest Geran modifications aim to further test NATO and Moldovan defenses and the response of the entire NATO alliance.

Russian and open-source sources continue to report unconfirmed Ukrainian counterattacks near Lyman. ISW is not prepared to assess the extent or results of these counterattacks at this time, however. Russian and open-source sources have increased reporting about ongoing Ukrainian counterattacks near Lyman in recent days.[20] Ukrainian forces recently proved that Ukrainian forces control Svyatohirsk (northwest of Lyman) and that Russian forces are not present in the settlement, which Russian milbloggers acknowledged.[21] There is limited evidence to assess Russian and Ukrainian control of terrain in the Lyman direction at this time, however. ISW’s mapping methodology underestimates the extent of likely Ukrainian gains in the ongoing counterattacks in the Lyman direction, and additional publicly available information will likely reveal the full extent of Ukrainian gains in the Lyman direction over time. ISW will continue to update its assessment as more evidence becomes available.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin likely used his September 8 phone call with US President Donald Trump to push Putin’s misrepresentation of the battlefield situation.
• The Kremlin is notably maintaining its long-standing position that Ukraine accept all of Russia’s demands even as the battlefield dynamics have fundamentally changed.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to express support for US proposals for intensifying negotiations by moving to a trilateral format.
• A Russian drone spent just under one hour flying in Moldovan and Romanian airspace on September 8.
• The Kremlin benefits from such drone incursions into NATO and Moldovan airspace, particularly if Russia is using its faster jet-powered drones that limit the reaction times of states neighboring Ukraine.
• Russian and open-source sources continue to report unconfirmed Ukrainian counterattacks near Lyman. ISW is not prepared to assess the extent or results of these counterattacks at this time, however.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against oil infrastructure in Russia. Russia launched an unspecified number of Onyx anti-ship missiles and Iskander-M, S-400, and KN-23 ballistic missiles, 32 Kh-101 cruise missiles, and 166 drones against Ukraine overnight.
• Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction and Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 7, 2026

The Ukrainian military demonstrated, and a Kremlin-affiliated milblogger acknowledged, the falsity of one of Russian President Vladimir Putin's more outrageous claims of fictitious Russian gains in Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps (AC) Commander Brigadier General Andriy Biletskyi published a video on September 7 showing himself calmly speaking in Svyatohirsk (north of Slovyansk), demonstrating unchallenged Ukrainian control over that settlement contrary to Putin's September 1 claims that Russian forces had seized it.[1] Biletskyi stated that Ukrainian forces comfortably control Svyatohirsk and that Ukraine considers the settlement to be in its “rear area.” ISW has observed evidence to assess that the closest Russian forces were 13 kilometers away from Svyatohirsk in late Spring/early Summer 2026, and numerous reports indicate that the current Russian line is even further away amidst ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive operations. A Russian source published archival and doctored footage on September 5 purporting to show Russian control over Svyatohirsk, presumably to support Putin’s false claims, but a Russian milblogger responded to this footage on the same day and denied that Russian forces maintain positions even close to Svyatohirsk.[2]

A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger acknowledged on September 7 that Biletskyi’s video was a clear demonstration of Ukrainian control over Svyatohirsk and observed that the Russian military command and the agencies responsible for Russian cognitive warfare efforts should have realized how easy it would be for Ukrainian forces to dispel Putin's grossly exaggerated claims in this area.[3] The milblogger noted that false reports of captured settlements such as Svyatohirsk create operational risks for Russian forces because they cannot call for strikes on locations they claim to control and because units in adjacent sectors may plan operations based on this inaccurate battlefield picture. The milblogger noted that Russia’s failure to impose accountability for such dishonesty will increase deceptive reporting and may produce even strategic consequences.

The pervasive culture of lying within the Russian armed forces paradoxically both damages Russian forces' ability to fight effectively and supports exaggerated Kremlin claims that Putin weaponizes to enhance Russia's negotiation position. Russian milbloggers continue to highlight the consequences of Russia’s pervasive culture of lying, which Russian milbloggers speak of as generating “beautiful reports” that exaggerate the extent of Russian advances so much that they harm military operations.[4] The Kremlin continues to insist, however, on its delusional depiction of the current battlefield as the basis for negotiations, demanding Ukraine’s full capitulation and its withdrawal from the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, including large and heavily populated areas that Russian forces have never occupied.[5] Putin has shown that he is sensitive to the accusation that he is detached from the current battlefield realities in Ukraine by claiming on September 1 that his understanding of the battlefield is ”quite objective,” yet he continues to make absurd claims of fictional Russian gains.^[6] The Kremlin’s continued willingness to tolerate and seek to benefit from the pervasive lying of the Russian military continues to both damage its own ability to fight effectively and to fuel Putin's insistence on his ability to achieve all his aims by military force. Negotiations to secure the durable and lasting peace that US President Donald Trump has said he aims for cannot be based on Russian lies. They can only be based on the actual realities of the battlefield and the real trajectory of the war, which does not favor Russia.

Key Takeaways:

• The Ukrainian military demonstrated, and a Kremlin-affiliated milblogger acknowledged, the falsity of one of Russian President Vladimir Putin's more outrageous claims of fictitious Russian gains in Donetsk Oblast.
• The pervasive culture of lying within the Russian armed forces paradoxically both damages Russian forces' ability to fight effectively and supports exaggerated Kremlin claims that Putin weaponizes to enhance Russia's negotiation position.
• Negotiations to secure the durable and lasting peace that US President Donald Trump has said he aims for cannot be based on Russian lies. They can only be based on the actual realities of the battlefield and the real trajectory of the war, which does not favor Russia.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction and Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
• Russia launched 92 drones against Ukraine overnight. Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and oil infrastructure on the night of September 6 to 7.  

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 6, 2026

Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated Russia’s unwillingness to make any meaningful compromises in the peace negotiations process to end the war in Ukraine. Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov stated on September 6 that Putin reasserted his commitment to reach all of Russia’s war aims through military means and emphasized Russia’s commitment to addressing the so-called “root causes” of the war during Putin’s meeting with US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner on September 5.[1] Putin outlined his uncompromising demands for Ukraine’s full capitulation as a prerequisite for “peace” negotiations in Ukraine on June 14, 2024. Those demands require Ukrainian withdrawal from the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, including areas that Russian forces do not currently occupy; the demilitarization and "denazification" of the Ukrainian government and society by which Putin means the replacement of the current Ukrainian government with a pro-Russian one; and future Ukrainian neutrality, specifically excluding NATO membership.[2] Ushakov’s statement following Putin’s meeting with Witkoff and Kushner indicates that the Kremlin remains unwilling to make any meaningful compromises to Russia’s maximalist demands.

Putin is doubling down on the fictional battlefield situation that he defines as “reality” and insisting that his misrepresentation of the actual state of the war become the basis for any peace negotiations on Ukraine. Ushakov claimed on September 6 that Putin provided a comprehensive assessment to Witkoff and Kushner of Russian “significant advances” along the frontline — an exaggerated claim that does not match realities on the ground.[3] A person close to the Kremlin stated prior to Witkoff’s and Kushner’s Moscow visit that there would not be a peace agreement until Russian forces seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast and noted that Putin is confident that Russian forces could seize the whole of Donetsk Oblast by the end of 2026 — the most recent Kremlin deadline for accomplishing that goal.[4]

The Russian military systematically misinforms Putin about the state of the front line in part due to the pervasive culture of lying within the Russian armed forces that milbloggers refer to as “beautiful reports.”[5] Russian high-ranking military commanders also routinely present exaggerated Russian advances as part of Russia’s systematic cognitive warfare effort to portray Russian forces as making sweeping advances and Ukrainian defenses as collapsing.[6] The lies and distortions of Russian military commanders at many levels are likely leading Putin to harden his perception that Russian forces can achieve his intended objectives in Donetsk Oblast by the end of 2026 and thus that he need not make any compromises in his aims.

Russia is failing to achieve its battlefield objectives in reality, however, and is specifically failing in its priority objective of seizing the remainder of Donetsk Oblast by the end of 2026. Putin has set no fewer than 15 reported deadlines for the seizure of Donetsk Oblast since February 2022, and Russian forces have failed to meet every one.[7] Russian forces will not meet Putin’s new deadline of seizing all of Donetsk Oblast by December 31, 2026.[8] Russian forces have been fighting for Kostyantynivka since October 2025 and have not seized it in 11 months.[9] Russian forces have not reached, much less entered or seized, the other Fortress Belt cities of Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka, and will not be able to seize all three within the remaining four months of 2026, considering that they have failed to complete the seizure of even one in nearly a year. Putin’s battlefield fiction remains divorced from the reality of Ukraine’s defensive abilities, Russia’s own degraded offensive capabilities, and the difficult and expansive terrain Russian forces must still fight through to achieve Putin’s strategic goal in the region. Putin’s many deadlines to seize all of Donbas reflect in part his need to provide a significant informational victory to the Russian people. Putin has promised Russians victory in exchange for enduring the burdens of war without bringing Russian society to a full wartime footing.

Russian forces will not seize Donetsk Oblast until 2032 at their current rate of advance — if they can seize it at all. The Russian rate of advance across the theater was 2.91 square kilometers per day in August 2026, a slight increase compared to recent months.[11] The average Russian rate of advance for Russian forces’ priority effort in Donetsk Oblast was lower at only 2.36 square kilometers per day in August. Russian forces would take until October 2, 2032, to seize the remaining 19 percent of Donetsk Oblast at this rate — over a year after the next State Duma elections, which will likely be held in September 2031.

ISW is not prepared to assess that Russian forces will be able to take the rest of Donetsk Oblast on any timeline, however. Russian forces will have to fight attritional urban battles through the cities of Ukraine’s Fortress Belt before attempting to advance across fields — terrain that Russian forces have historically struggled to advance through. The Russian rate of advance has slowed significantly across the theater since 2025, when Russia’s rate of advance had already begun to slow.[12] Ukraine has proven that it can contest the tactical initiative in several areas of the frontline and hinder Russian logistics in 2026, and Russia has struggled to counter these Ukrainian efforts.[13] Neither the trajectory nor any likely dynamics of the current conflict suggest that Russian forces will be able soon to accelerate their rate of advance dramatically as long as Western support for Ukraine continues at roughly current levels.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with Witkoff and Kushner in Kyiv City on September 6 and agreed on fundamental principles for ending the war in Ukraine, including security and economic guarantees for post-war Ukraine. Zelensky reported that he held two bilateral rounds of talks with the US delegation and one round of multilateral talks with the national security advisors of the UK, Germany, and France about how to end the war in Ukraine.[14] Zelensky stated that the Ukrainian and US delegations discussed security and economic guarantees for Ukraine and territorial issues as part of a peace plan and agreed to hold Ukrainian-European-US talks in the near future. Zelensky stated that he also discussed European air defense and energy assistance to Ukraine with US and European partners if the war continues through the upcoming winter, which Zelensky assessed to be the most likely scenario. Zelensky noted that Ukrainian forces have grown stronger on the battlefield, which puts Ukraine in a stronger negotiation position with the US and Russia.[15]

Russia’s September 6 strikes against airports near Kyiv prevented the US delegation from flying to Kyiv City and forced it to travel instead by train.[16] Ukraine and Russia have previously agreed to halt long-range strikes against Kyiv and Moscow cities until the end of the day on September 7 to facilitate the delegation’s travel.[17] No Russian regional officials reported Ukrainian strikes against Russian territories on the night of September 4 to 5 ahead of Witkoff’s and Kushner’s arrival in Moscow.[18] Russian forces hit objects in Bucha Raion and Fastiv, Kyiv Oblast on the night of September 5 to 6 ahead of the US delegation’s arrival to Kyiv City, however.[19] Bucha Raion and Fastiv are 38 and 60 kilometers from central Kyiv, respectively. Russian sources acknowledged that Russian forces continued strikes near Kyiv City despite the three-day ceasefire to which Moscow is only very narrowly adhering.[20]

Witkoff and Kushner reportedly stated that they wanted to return to a trilateral Ukrainian-US-Russian negotiations format following their discussion with the Ukrainian and Russian sides.[21] President Donald Trump will consult with Witkoff and Kushner on their meeting with Putin and Zelensky and will call Putin and Zelensky on September 7, according to a US official.[22] Zelensky stated that the issue of Donbas is the issue of Russia’s entire war of attrition against Ukraine because Putin has made it the focus of his immediate demands.[23]

Putin’s demands transcend Donbas, however, as both his 2024 speech (to which Russian officials constantly allude) and Russia’s military operations demonstrate. Russian forces have been conducting offensive operations across the entire frontline in Ukraine in ways that are unnecessary if their focus is only, or even primarily, on seizing the rest of Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces are conducting significant offensive operations in northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts explicitly in an effort to create a “buffer zone” along the international border — one of Putin’s repeated demands.[24] Russian forces are simultaneously conducting offensive operations in Zaporizhia Oblast in order to join the Orikhiv and Hulyaipole directions to advance on Zaporizhzhia City, bypassing south-facing Ukrainian defenses.[25] These offensives are larger and more costly than would be needed simply to fix Ukrainian forces away from the defense of Donbas, and neither do they directly support Russian efforts to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast. They do, however, pursue other explicitly stated Putin objectives, which is why they continue and why Putin is unlikely to halt the fighting even if Russian forces manage to seize all of Donetsk Oblast, which itself remains unlikely.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated Russia’s unwillingness to make any meaningful compromises in the peace negotiations process to end the war in Ukraine.
• Putin is doubling down on the fictional battlefield situation that he defines as “reality” and insisting that his misrepresentation of the actual state of the war become the basis for any peace negotiations on Ukraine.
• The lies and distortions of Russian military commanders at many levels are likely leading Putin to harden his perception that Russian forces can achieve his intended objectives in Donetsk Oblast by the end of 2026 and thus that he need not make any compromises in his aims.
• Russia is failing to achieve its battlefield objectives in reality, however, and is specifically failing in its priority objective of seizing the remainder of Donetsk Oblast by the end of 2026.
• Russian forces will not seize Donetsk Oblast until 2032 at their current rate of advance — if they can seize it at all.
• ISW is not prepared to assess that Russian forces will be able to take the rest of Donetsk Oblast on any timeline, however.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with Witkoff and Kushner in Kyiv City on September 6 and agreed on fundamental principles for ending the war in Ukraine, including security and economic guarantees for post-war Ukraine.
• Putin’s demands transcend Donbas, however, as both his 2024 speech (to which Russian officials constantly allude) and Russia’s military operations demonstrate.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure and the suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses (SEAD/DEAD) campaign in Rostov Oblast on the night of September 5 to 6. Russian forces launched 108 drones against Ukraine overnight.
• Russian forces have achieved tactically-significant advances in the Hulyaipole direction in the past several months.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 5, 2026

The US delegation arrived in Moscow City on September 5 as Ukraine and Russia reached a temporary agreement to halt long-range strikes against Kyiv and Moscow cities for three days to facilitate the delegation's travel. US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner arrived in Moscow City on September 5, and Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO and key Kremlin negotiator Kirill Dmitriev greeted them upon arrival.[1] US President Donald Trump stated on September 4 that Witkoff's and Kushner’s visit to Russia aims to discuss a proposal to end the war in Ukraine.[2] Sources close to the Kremlin reported on September 4 that the Kremlin’s expectations for the US delegation’s visit to Russia are extremely low as Russian President Vladimir Putin is willing to end the war only on his increasingly tough terms, according to Bloomberg.[3]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on September 5 that Ukraine will adhere to a long-range strikes ceasefire covering Kyiv and Moscow cities until the end of the day on September 7 after Zelensky spoke with Witkoff and Kushner on September 5.[4] Putin met with Witkoff and Kushner on September 5 and confirmed that he also ordered Russian forces to halt strikes against Kyiv City for three days starting at midnight on September 5.[5] Putin acknowledged that Ukrainian forces reduced the number of their strikes against Russia during Witkoff's and Kushner’s visit to Russia. The long-range strikes ceasefire for Kyiv and Moscow cities comes as Ukraine expects Witkoff and Kushner to arrive in Kyiv City on September 6.

Putin rejected a broader frontline ceasefire proposed by Ukraine during the US delegation’s visit. Ukrainian forces received orders on September 4 to observe a ceasefire along the frontline from midnight on the night of September 4 to 5 until the end of the day on September 8, according to sources within several Ukrainian brigades.[6] Sources added that Ukraine proposed the frontline ceasefire but noted that Russia and Ukraine have not reached a formal agreement at the time of writing. Putin acknowledged during his meeting with Witkoff and Kushner on September 5 that Ukraine proposed a broader three-day ceasefire but noted that Russia did not agree to it.[7]

Russian officials continue discussing efforts to strengthen Russian air defense systems in order to defend against Ukraine’s long-range strikes. Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed on September 5 his support for United Russia Party candidate Yevgeny Poddubny's proposal to allow Russian volunteers with fitness category D (unfit for military service) to serve in regional air defense units, such as the BARS (Combat Reserve) formations, and protect Russian facilities from Ukrainian drone strikes.[8] Putin promised to discuss ways to improve Russian air defense with the General Staff and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and noted that Russian air defense units require a single commander rather than a unified coordination center.[9] Russian air defenses have repeatedly struggled to defend Russia’s vast rear against Ukrainian long-range strikes due to the lack of air defense systems, manpower shortages, and civil-military coordination challenges, particularly as the Russian government attempts to further deflect the responsibility for providing air defense protection onto private businesses.[10]

Key Takeaways:

• The US delegation arrived in Moscow City on September 5 as Ukraine and Russia reached a temporary agreement to halt long-range strikes against Kyiv and Moscow cities for three days to facilitate the delegation's travel.
• Putin rejected a broader frontline ceasefire proposed by Ukraine during the US delegation’s visit.
• Russian officials continue discussing efforts to strengthen Russian air defense systems in order to defend against Ukraine’s long-range strikes.
• Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces advanced on September 5.
• Russian forces launched an unspecified number of Iskander-M or KN-23 ballistic missiles and 167 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 4, 2026

Russian sources falsely and baselessly claimed that Russian forces encircled 2,000 Ukrainian forces northeast of Kharkiv City. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on September 3 that elements of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces (GoF) seized Vasylivka, Blahodatne, and Dovzhanka (all northeast of Kharkiv City).[1] The Russian Northern GoF additionally claimed on September 3 that Russian forces seized Slyzneve (northeast of Kharkiv City) and baselessly claimed that Russian forces completed an encirclement of 2,000 Ukrainian soldiers.[2] Several Russian milbloggers amplified claims about a Russian encirclement of Ukrainian forces northeast of Kharkiv City along the international border on September 3 and 4.[3] Russian sources did not present any visual evidence to support their claims, and some Russian sources even cast doubt on the claims about a grand encirclement. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger acknowledged on September 3 that claims about Russian forces’ complete encirclement of Ukrainian forces required further confirmation, for example.[4] The Ukrainian 16th Army Corps directly refuted the Russian claims about the seizures of the mentioned settlements on September 3, directly refuting claims that Russian forces had encircled any Ukrainian forces in the corps’ area of responsibility.^[5] The 16th Corps emphasized that Russian false encirclement claims emerged against the backdrop of a growing gasoline crisis in Russia, Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil refineries and warehouses, and the upcoming State Duma elections. Russian high-ranking officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, and the Russian MoD have continuously made exaggerated claims about Russian battlefield performance — including false claims about large encirclements of Ukrainian forces — as part of Russia’s systematic cognitive warfare effort to portray Russian forces as making sweeping advances and Ukrainian defenses as collapsing. Putin recently and baselessly claimed that the Russian Western GoF encircled 13 Ukrainian battalions with a total of around 5,000 servicemembers on the eastern shore of the Oskil Reservoir near Pisky-Radkivski (south of Borova and roughly 16 kilometers from the frontline) on September 2, for example.^[6]

Russian forces attempted to assassinate Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) head Oleksandr Poklad with a Geran-type drone strike on September 4. Russian forces conducted a strike against the SBU headquarters in Kyiv City on September 4, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Russian forces specifically targeted Poklad’s office.[7] Zelensky held an in-person meeting with Poklad following the strike.[8] Ukrainian Presidential Advisor on Defense Technologies Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov stated on September 4 that a Russian remote-controlled Geran-type drone struck the SBU building.[9] Beskrestnov added that Russian forces likely maintained connection with the drone through a device with a mesh network repeater and internet access that a Russian agent activated within a five-kilometer radius of the SBU headquarters during the strike.[10] Russian forces similarly attempted to assassinate Beskrestnov in a targeted strike with four Shahed drones on April 20, 2026.[11]

The Russian Geran drone platform adaptations are improving their ability to conduct successful high-precision strikes. Beskrestnov stated on September 4 that Russian forces are prioritizing the production of jet-powered Geran-4 drones that can reach speeds up to 550 kilometers per hour — significantly faster than Geran-3 drones — complicating Ukrainian interception efforts.[12] Beskrestnov added that Russia is attempting to increase the speed of low-cost strike vehicles that increasingly reach speeds comparable to subsonic cruise missiles, including Geran-5, S8000 Banderol, Dan-T and Dan-M, and the new UMPB-5R glide bomb. Ukrainian sources also estimated that Russian forces can maintain live operator control via a chain of mesh-controlled Geran-type drones up to 150-175 kilometers from the furthest mesh ground control station, a twofold increase in the technology’s previous range compared to 2025.[13] The increasing Russian jet-powered drone speed and flight range at which Russian operators can remotely control them are allowing Russian forces to conduct high-precision strikes against valuable and dynamic targets.

The Kremlin’s behavior indicates Russia’s unwillingness to guarantee the safety of the US delegation during their reported upcoming visit to Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on September 4 that US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner will visit Ukraine on September 6 following a visit to Russia.[14] Kremlin newswire TASS confirmed the US delegation’s upcoming visits to Russia and Ukraine.[15] Witkoff and Kushner reportedly had concerns about their safety during their trip to Ukraine, according to sources close to US President Donald Trump’s Administration.[16] Ukraine ceased its long-range strikes against Moscow Oblast during CIA Director John Ratcliffe's visit to Moscow City on August 26.[17] Russian President Vladimir Putin has made no indication that Russia will cease its strikes against Ukraine during Witkoff and Kushner‘s visit to Ukraine. Putin’s apparent unwillingness to guarantee the safety of the US delegation in Ukraine indicates the Kremlin’s unwillingness to accept the United States as a mediator in peace negotiations and highlights Russia’s efforts to coerce the United States to negotiate solely with Russia.

Russian President Vladimir Putin appears committed to his existing expensive and inefficient force generation mechanism through volunteer recruitment. Putin again denied any plans for mobilization and claimed that Russian forces are not experiencing personnel shortages during an address to the Eastern Economic Forum on September 3.[18] Putin claimed that Russian people voluntarily sign military service contracts with the Russian MoD and that rumors about military mobilization are attempts to influence the State Duma elections slated for September 18-20. Putin is likely attempting to appease and reassure Russian society amidst growing fears of involuntary mobilization, as it remains unpopular in Russia.[19] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev similarly denied the need for Russia to conduct involuntary reserve call-ups on August 28.[20]

Russia's expedited efforts to establish its Rassvet satellite constellation as a replacement for Starlink are facing significant challenges which may degrade the constellation's lifespan. ISW assessed on August 31 that Russia will need to significantly increase the number of successful Rassvet satellite launches in order to achieve capabilities analogous to SpaceX's Starlink constellation.[21] Russia’s development and use of the Rassvet constellation reportedly already presents significant risk for Ukraine as the constellation enhances the accuracy of Russian strike and reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in real time. Stable and 24/7 connectivity over Ukraine, however, will require significant expansion of the constellation.^[22] Russia remains constrained by both its launch capacity and the success rate of its satellite launches despite efforts to expedite satellite deployment. Ukrainian Presidential Advisor on Defense Technologies Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported on September 4 that half of Russia’s 36 satellites failed to reach their intended orbits, reportedly due to engine defects, but noted that Russia is already preparing the next batch of satellites for launch.[23] ISW initially assessed — and available data continues to indicate — that Russia’s most recent Rassvet satellites have not yet reached their planned orbital altitude, with some satellites exhibiting signs of technical issues.[24] Satellites orbiting at lower altitudes have shorter operational lifespans due to increased atmospheric drag from upper layers of Earth’s atmosphere and greater fuel expenditure than satellites operating at higher altitudes. Rassvet satellites’ slow — but incomplete — ascension thus may negatively impact the planned service life of the constellation.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian sources falsely and baselessly claimed that Russian forces encircled 2,000 Ukrainian forces northeast of Kharkiv City.
• Russian forces attempted to assassinate Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) head Oleksandr Poklad with a Geran-type drone strike on September 4.
• The Russian Geran drone platform adaptations are improving their ability to conduct successful high-precision strikes.
• The Kremlin’s behavior indicates Russia’s unwillingness to guarantee the safety of the US delegation during their reported upcoming visit to Ukraine.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin appears committed to his existing expensive and inefficient force generation mechanism through volunteer recruitment.
• Russia's expedited efforts to establish its Rassvet satellite constellation as a replacement for Starlink are facing significant challenges which may degrade the constellation's lifespan.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military, oil, and defense-industrial infrastructure on September 3 and 4. Russian forces launched one Kh-31P anti-radar missile and 121 drones against Ukraine overnight.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 3, 2026

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to use contradictory language about the possibility of achieving peace in Ukraine to obscure Moscow’s true objectives. Putin addressed the Eastern Economic Forum on September 3 and unassuredly stated that, in his opinion, there is a chance that Russia and Ukraine can hold constructive peace talks.[1] Putin added that only Russia and Ukraine can ultimately resolve the war in Ukraine and that all other countries, including the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC), are supporting negotiations processes, rather than leading them. Putin stated on September 1 that Russia cannot negotiate directly with Ukraine because it considers the country to be a "terrorist entity" and that US involvement is critical in negotiations, notably in contradiction to his September 3 remarks.[2] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov similarly reiterated on September 3 Russian demands that equate to full Ukrainian capitulation, feigning willingness to negotiate by proposing demands that Ukraine could never agree to.[3] Putin and senior Kremlin officials are likely intentionally using contradictory language to obfuscate the true nature of Moscow's unwillingness to engage in good faith negotiations, trying to portray itself as a willing negotiator while simultaneously maintaining its maximalist demands of Ukrainian capitulation.^[4]

Putin continues to downplay the war’s mounting economic and demographic costs to ordinary Russians, portraying persistent economic challenges as indicators of Russia's economic resilience and gradual stabilization. Putin claimed that Russia currently has an annual inflation rate of 6.3 percent — a rate that differs from the Russian Central Bank and Russian state-owned bank Sberbank’s estimates of six to seven percent and 6.5 percent, respectively.^[5] Putin claimed that inflation in Russia is “falling” and “gradually normalizing,” portraying the 6.3 percent rate as evidence that the Kremlin's economic policies are succeeding. The Russian Ministry of Economic Development, however, increased its inflation rate estimate to 6.32 percent on August 31 from its July 2026 estimate of 5.98 percent, showing that inflation during this period increased.[6] Putin also attempted to frame Russia's declining unemployment rate of 2.3 percent across Russia and 2.2 percent in the Russian Far East as a sign of positive economic health, while simultaneously promoting employment incentivization programs in the Far East. Putin also refused to respond to a question on the effects of the war in Ukraine on Russian demographics. Russia’s very low unemployment rate and new employment programs are consequences of Russia’s yearslong struggles with labor shortages fueled by Putin's war in Ukraine and declining birth rates, which are particularly strong in the Far East.[7] Russia is facing these issues likely in part due to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) prioritizing recruitment in poor and rural regions to shield urban Russians from the demographic effects of the war.[8] Putin is likely trying to reassure the Russian domestic populace that the Russian government is taking appropriate measures to address Russia’s economic challenges ahead of the upcoming September State Duma elections by downplaying the effects that the cost of the war and international sanctions have on the Russian economy.[9]

Putin attempted to portray the Russian government as promptly responding to the Ukrainian drone threat while continuing to deflect responsibility for providing air defense onto private businesses. Putin vaguely acknowledged that Ukrainian strikes are causing economic and other adverse effects on Russian oil refining capabilities and fuel exports but claimed that Russian authorities will complete repairs on the remaining facilities that Ukrainian forces damaged “in the very near future.”^[10] Putin attempted to present what will likely be very costly and drawn-out repairs as an easy fix that the Russian government is quickly addressing, downplaying the long-term impacts that repeat Ukrainian strikes will likely have on Russian oil refining capabilities. Putin stressed the importance of air defenses in repelling Ukrainian strikes but focused primarily on the new legal obligations requiring private Russian companies to fund and maintain air defense capabilities to protect their facilities. Putin also stated that his August 24 decree — which authorized the federal government to seize critical infrastructure facilities failing to adequately protect or repair their assets — is not a nationalization measure but rather a mechanism requiring critical infrastructure companies to install air defense systems.[11] Russian authorities notably began requiring private businesses and other entities outside of the federal government to maintain their air defenses in late May 2026 amidst Russian forces’ failure to protect Russia’s vast rear.[12] Ukrainian long-range strikes have increasingly forced Putin to publicly acknowledge the economic effects that over four years of war have had on Russia as the Kremlin fails to shield the Russian population and business community from witnessing these strikes and experiencing their effects. Putin likely is attempting to present himself as aware of the current domestic problems while assuring the Russian public that the Russian government is taking appropriate measures to address these challenges ahead of the upcoming September State Duma elections.

Ukrainian forces conducted an unmanned surface vessel (USV) strike on the Port of Sochi demonstrating Ukraine’s ability to strike deeper into the Russian Black Sea coast and further restrict Russia’s Black Sea Fleet (BSF) operations. The Ukrainian Navy reported on September 3 that a Ukrainian USV struck the Russian multi-purpose support ship Nefrit in the Port of Sochi, Krasnodar Krai, causing an explosion and a smoke plume.[13] The nautical distance between Sochi and the Ukraine-controlled Black Sea coast is approximately 820 kilometers, and the USV strike demonstrates Ukraine’s ability to precisely strike Russian ports situated farther on the Black Sea coast. Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Second Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated on September 3 that Russian forces have not deployed missile-equipped vessels from Russian ports over the past three months due to security concerns, maintenance requirements, and resource conservation, and instead launched all sea-based cruise missiles from the areas near the naval bases in Russia.[14] Pletenchuk stated that Russian forces have not been able to repair and conduct maintenance of their ships and submarines over the past two years, likely due to the increased Ukrainian drone threat. Pletenchuk stated that these vessels require repairs due to their frequent use for unspecified missions, likely referring to sea-launched cruise missile strikes.

Ukraine’s sustained strikes against BSF vessels demonstrate that Ukrainian USVs and other unmanned systems continue to pose a significant threat to Russian naval assets in the Black Sea, even after the Russian naval command withdrew several vessels from the BSF headquarters in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea, to Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai.[15] Ukrainian technological innovations, such as incorporation of first-person view (FPV) drone launchers into USV systems, allow Ukrainian forces to precisely strike Russian vessels, air defense positions, and port infrastructure across BSF’s area of responsibility (AoR), which spans across the Black and Azov seas. Ukrainian strikes are effectively denying the BSF the ability to freely operate in the region, subsequently decreasing the effectiveness of sea-launched cruise missiles that traditionally benefit from a geographically wider launch area. The Ukrainian interception rate of sea-launched Kalibr missiles has reportedly reached nearly 100 percent, likely as a result of Russian forces launching these missiles from farther distances.[16]

Unknown actors reportedly attempted to assassinate Commander of the Russian 22nd Heavy Bomber Aviation Division (Long Range Aviation, Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS]) Major General Nikolai Varpakhovich in Saratov Oblast on September 3. Russian law enforcement agencies told Russian business outlet Kommersant on September 3 that unknown actors shot an unspecified VKS officer in Engels, Saratov Oblast, on the morning of September 3.[17] Russian insider sources claimed that Varpakhovich was the target, that he is currently in critical condition, and that authorities have not apprehended the assailant.[18] The Saratov Oblast Investigative Committee (Sledkom) opened a criminal case for attempted murder.[19] Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) charged Varpokhovich in absentia on August 31 for his involvement in the cruise missile strike against the Okhmatdyt Children's Hospital in Kyiv City in July 2024.[20] This is notably the fourth assassination attempt on a Russian officer in rear areas since August 1.[21]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to use contradictory language about the possibility of achieving peace in Ukraine to obscure Moscow’s true objectives.
• Putin continues to downplay the war’s mounting economic and demographic costs to ordinary Russians, portraying persistent economic challenges as indicators of Russia's economic resilience and gradual stabilization.
• Putin attempted to portray the Russian government as promptly responding to the Ukrainian drone threat while continuing to deflect responsibility for providing air defense onto private businesses.
• Ukrainian forces conducted an unmanned surface vessel (USV) strike on the Port of Sochi demonstrating Ukraine’s ability to strike deeper into the Russian Black Sea coast and further restrict Russia’s Black Sea Fleet (BSF) operations.
• Ukraine’s sustained strikes against BSF vessels demonstrate that Ukrainian USVs and other unmanned systems continue to pose a significant threat to Russian naval assets in the Black Sea, even after the Russian naval command withdrew several vessels from the BSF headquarters in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea, to Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai.
• Unknown actors reportedly attempted to assassinate Commander of the Russian 22nd Heavy Bomber Aviation Division (Long Range Aviation, Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS]) Major General Nikolai Varpakhovich in Saratov Oblast on September 3.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk, Novopavlivka, and Oleksandrivka directions. Russian forces advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.
• Russia launched 163 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 2, 2026

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to exaggerate Russian forces’ battlefield performance to assert that Russian military victory in Ukraine is inevitable. These claims continue to be divorced from the battlefield reality on the ground, however. Putin stated during a press conference on September 1 that Russian forces are increasing the pace of their offensive in Ukraine and that the seizure of Donetsk Oblast is proceeding as planned.[1] Putin claimed that Russian forces seized 15 settlements equal to 270 square kilometers in Donetsk Oblast in August 2026. Putin claimed that Russian forces are between one-and-a-half and four kilometers from the eastern outskirts of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk and southern Druzhkivka. Available open source evidence does not support Putin’s claims, however. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces seized 73.14 square kilometers and advanced and infiltrated into 104.44 square kilometers of Donetsk Oblast in August 2026. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces consolidated positions in or seized only 90.35 square kilometers across the entire theater in August 2026.[2] Putin has issued no fewer than 15 separate deadlines for Russian forces to seize the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, none of which Russian forces have met.[3]

Putin claimed that the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces seized Svyatohirsk (north of Slovyansk), an extreme claim disconnected from all available evidence. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces at the maximum extent of recent advances in late Spring/early Summer 2026 were as far as 13 kilometers from Svyatohirsk, with the current Russian line likely further than 13 kilometers from Svyatohirsk given ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive operations near Lyman, the full extent of which remains unclear.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 1, 2026

Russian forces’ rate of advance marginally increased in August 2026, but Russia’s Spring-Summer 2026 offensive has failed to achieve operational maneuver or rapidly collapse Ukrainian lines. Russian gains remain slow and limited. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces consolidated positions in or seized about 90.35 square kilometers of territory in Ukraine in August 2026, averaging 2.91 square kilometers seized per day. Including Russian infiltrations, Russian forces advanced or infiltrated into about 123.53 square kilometers — an average pace of 3.98 square kilometers per day. Russian forces’ main territorial gains in August 2026 have been in the Fortress Belt area, Donetsk Oblast. Even there, Russian forces managed to achieve only marginal tactical gains and have thus far failed to complete the seizure of Kostyantynivka. Russian forces maintain a presence (either through advances or infiltrations) in 72.23 percent of Kostyantynivka and have failed to completely seize the settlement, even after months of increased infiltrations and urban fighting.[1] Russian advances in August 2026 remain a fraction of Russia’s gains during the same period in 2025, even when including infiltrations. Russian forces seized 505.55 square kilometers in August 2025, for example, highlighting how Russian forces’ rate of advance continues to slow. Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations across the theater in August 2026, notably in the Lyman and Oleksandrivka directions, and ISW has observed evidence to assess that Ukrainian forces liberated at least 129.81 square kilometers in August 2026.[2] This figure is very likely conservative, as ISW's methodology underestimates the extent of likely Ukrainian gains in the ongoing counteroffensive in the Lyman direction, and additional collection will likely reveal the full extent of Ukrainian gains in the Lyman direction in Fall 2026. ISW will continue to update its assessment as more evidence becomes available.

Russian forces continued suffering a high casualty rate in August 2026 for the second month in a row, paying an increasingly high price for limited battlefield gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 1 that Russian forces suffered 42,020 casualties in August 2026 — the second month in a row that Russian forces suffered over 40,000 casualties in a single month.[3] Russian forces suffered an average of 340 casualties per square kilometer of territory seized or infiltrated and 465 casualties per square kilometer seized in August 2026. Russia’s current force generation system based on volunteer recruitment continues to struggle to recruit enough soldiers to replace current losses, and it remains unclear how long Russian forces will be able to sustain their current footpace offensive tempo at their current loss rate without some form of mobilization.[4]

Senior German officials and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen explicitly attributed the August 5 drone attack targeting Germany's Leipzig/Halle Airport to Russia.[5] German Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt and Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul stated on September 1 that Russia is responsible for the attack at the Leipzig/Halle Airport. Dobrindt stated that Germany and its European partners clearly identified Russian involvement in planning and executing this “hybrid operation” and noted that the perpetrators employed tactics consistent with known Russian modus operandi, including the drone‘s configuration, components, ignition technology, and explosive payload. German authorities discovered a drone containing explosives near a Ukrainian Antonov cargo plane overnight on August 4 to 5 and reported that a second drone collided with another cargo plane that was aborting its landing due to the first drone incident.[6] This attack is not simply a "hybrid operation” but one attack in a series of attacks, all part of Russia‘s larger continued “Phase Zero” campaign, which aims to set informational and psychological conditions for potential future conventional threat against NATO by conducting attacks that test the limits of Western responses.[7]

Other recent incidents in Germany and Poland fit within the Russian pattern of provocations against European and NATO states but have yet to be officially attributed to Russia. German Brandenburg State Interior Minister Jan Redmann confirmed on September 1 that German police and emergency services found and defused a “double-digit” number of explosive devices near the Janschwalde coal-fired power plant in Brandenburg, Germany.[8] Polish Interior Minister Marcin Kierwinski stated on September 1 that a fire at the Polish WB Electronics production facility in Skarzysko-Kamienna on August 31 was likely arson.[9] Polish media outlet Defence 24 reported on August 31 that a large fire broke out at the JFG Composites warehouse in Lublin, Poland, marking two significant fire incidents (likely arson events) at defense industrial sites in Poland in less than 24 hours.[10] Such incidents fit within the known pattern of Russian sabotage attacks against European defense industrial base entities that Russia has been intensifying since 2025.[11]

Additional details regarding Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi’s efforts to erect new operational commands to defend Donetsk Oblast are emerging. Ukrainian news outlet Hromadske reported on September 1 that the formation that Brigadier General Andriy Biletsky will command will have an area of responsibility (AoR) spanning from the Lyman direction to the Kramatorsk-Kostyantynivka area in the Fortress Belt, and that the formation under the command of Commander Brigadier General Denys Prokopenko will have an AoR over the Dobropillya sector to the south.[12] Hromadske reported that Drapatyi appointed former Deputy Commander of the Air Assault Forces’ 7th Rapid Reaction Corps Colonel Emil Ishkulov as the 11th Army Corps commander and acting 19th Army Corps Commander Brigadier General Valeriy Skred to command the 19th Army Corps. Both the 11th and 19th Army Corps are responsible for the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk area (the Fortress Belt) and will report to Biletsky’s command. Hromadske quoted a Ukrainian General Staff source who said that the new formations’ priority is to stop Russian forces’ advances. Zelensky announced the creation of two new formations to support the Ukrainian defense in Donetsk Oblast under the command of Biletsky and Prokopenko on August 26.[13]

Russian forces are shifting their strike tactics to maximize civilian harm by leveraging jet-powered drones over slower and less effective piston engine-driven drones, likely because jet-powered drones are more difficult to intercept. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated on September 1 that Russian forces launched five times more jet-powered drones in July 2026 compared to June 2026 and over 2,800 jet-powered drones in August 2026.[14] Ihnat noted that Ukraine’s interception rate against standard piston-engine-driven drones is between 90 and 95 percent, whereas the interception rate against jet-powered drones is lower at around 60 percent. Russian forces began regularly using jet-powered drones as part of daily strike packages for the first time in August 2026. Russia began intensifying its use of jet-powered drone strikes in late April 2026 in response to Ukraine’s high intercept rate against piston-engine drones. Russia increased the proportion of jet-powered drones within its strike packages to around 56 percent in August 2026, despite decreasing the total number of long-range drones launched against Ukraine. Russia used 6,583 long-range drones against Ukraine in April 2026, whereas Russia only used 4,943 such drones in August 2026 when Russia had prioritized production of Geran-4 and Geran-5 jet-powered drones.

Russian forces have recently adopted new tactics by striking Ukrainian cities continuously throughout the day in addition to conducting overnight strike packages. Russia’s previous strikes concentrated most strikes in the evening while not launching large drone salvos during the day. Russia is notably not significantly increasing the overall number of strike vehicles as part of the new daytime strikes but is using a comparable number of vehicles throughout the day. Russia has been conducting continuous daytime and overnight drone strike waves against Ukraine, particularly targeting Kyiv City, since August 27.[15] Russian strike packages since late Summer 2026 have been increasingly targeting shopping centers, food warehouses, and other private civilian facilities.[16] Russia’s continued use of these tactics likely aims to increase civilian damage and force Ukrainians to seek shelter more often, resulting in significant disruptions in daily life and the Ukrainian economy, likely to demoralize Ukraine’s population.[17]

Russian President Vladimir Putin is augmenting the force that ensures his personal safety and the security of Russian high-ranking officials. Putin signed a decree on August 31 expanding Russia's Federal Protective Service (FSO) staff, the Russian state security agency responsible for the physical protection of high-ranking government officials, from 785 to 812 personnel — the fourth increase of the FSO’s staff since February 2022.[18] The FSO sharply increased security around Putin and his senior officials in Spring 2026 amidst Ukrainian drone strikes and intensified assassinations and assassination attempts against senior Russian officials across Russia.[19] There have been at least five assassination attempts against high-ranking Russian military officials since December 2025, including an improvised explosive device (IED) detonation targeting Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) Commander Colonel General Alexander Chayko on August 1.[20] Putin is likely responding by increasing personal security to support regime stability and the safety of his inner circle. Putin has taken several other measures to enhance his personal safety, including spending time in underground bunkers, moving air defense systems closer to his residences, and censoring the Russian information space en masse.[21]

Putin conducted a substantial reshuffle within Russian law enforcement agencies on August 31, likely in preparation for potential mobilization following the State Duma elections. Putin dismissed 13 Russian officials, including Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations’ Main Directorate Head Alexey Anikin, Ministry of Internal Affairs’ Main Directorate Criminal Investigation Department Head Sergey Kuzmin, Ministry of Justice’s Department Deputy Director Anastasia Leletina, Ministry of Internal Affairs’ Criminal Investigation Main Directorate Deputy Head Sergey Savochkin, and Kursk Oblast Investigate Committee Head Andrey Guzev, among others, according to Russian insider source VChK-OGPU.[22] The source reported that Putin appointed 15 Russian officials to various law enforcement apparatuses, including Russian Ministry of Justice’s Protection of National Interests from External Influence Department Deputy Director Aleksandr Akulov, Ministry of Internal Affairs’ Main Directorate Criminal Investigation Moscow Department Head Mikhail Vanichkin, Moscow Oblast Ministry of Emergency Situations’ Main Directorate Deputy Head Vladimir Lavrushenko, Investigative Committee Deputy Chairman Andrey Maslov, and Penza Oblast Investigative Committee’s Investigative Directorate Head Andrei Fishman. ISW is unable to confirm the report at this time. If true, such a law enforcement reshuffling would be substantial, especially given that the shuffle concerned officials responsible for Kursk and Penza oblasts, which could be particularly vulnerable to civil unrest in the event of a potential mobilization. ISW has observed Russian law enforcement officers conducting coercive recruitment efforts in Penza and Kursk oblasts since at least June 2026.[23] The Kremlin has been setting conditions for involuntary reserve call-ups since at least October 2025, although the presence of such conditions does not mean Putin himself has decided to conduct mobilization.[24] ISW continues to assess that any compulsory mobilization is a personal decision for Putin and is contingent on his perception of battlefield realities and regime stability.[25]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces’ rate of advance marginally increased in August 2026, but Russia’s Spring-Summer 2026 offensive has failed to achieve operational maneuver or rapidly collapse Ukrainian lines. Russian gains remain slow and limited.
• Russian forces continued suffering a high casualty rate in August 2026 for the second month in a row, paying an increasingly high price for limited battlefield gains.
• Senior German officials and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen explicitly attributed the August 5 drone attack targeting Germany's Leipzig/Halle Airport to Russia.
• Additional details regarding Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi’s efforts to erect new operational commands to defend Donetsk Oblast are emerging.
• Russian forces are shifting their strike tactics to maximize civilian harm by leveraging jet-powered drones over slower and less effective piston-engine-driven drones, likely because jet-powered drones are more difficult to intercept.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin is augmenting the force that ensures his personal safety and the security of Russian high-ranking officials.
• Putin conducted a substantial reshuffle within Russian law enforcement agencies on August 31, likely in preparation for potential mobilization following the State Duma elections.
• Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces advanced on September 1.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil refineries and military assets.
• Russia launched an unspecified number of Iskander-M, KN-23, and S-400 ballistic missiles, Zirkon anti-ship missiles, Kalibr sea-based cruise missiles, Kh-31P anti-radar missiles, and Banderol-type loitering munitions against Ukraine overnight.
• Russian forces also launched 218 Shahed-type strike drones overnight on August 31 to September 1 and 99 strike drones during the day on September 1.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 31, 2026

Russia's second batch of Rassvet satellites appears to have failed to reach intended operational altitudes, marking another setback in Moscow's efforts to rapidly develop a Russian analogue to Starlink. None of the 16 Rassvet satellites from the second batch launched on July 19 have reached their anticipated altitude of 550 kilometers as of August 31, according to data from live satellite tracker N2YO.[1] Many of these satellites ended up at altitudes between 300 and 400 kilometers, and some are experiencing orbital decay; and at least two satellites are reportedly heading for reentry into Earth's atmosphere. These altitudes are well short of the intended 870-kilometer operational altitude for the Rassvet satellites.[2] Satellites orbiting at lower altitudes have shorter operational lifespans due to increased atmospheric drag from upper layers of Earth's atmosphere and greater fuel expenditure than satellites operating at higher altitudes.[3] It is unclear how long the lower-altitude Rassvet satellites will remain in orbit, but they will likely not operate for as long as Russia projected. Only 12 of the original 16 Rassvet satellites launched on March 24 had entered their anticipated altitude, reportedly 550 kilometers, as of July 31 and remain at such altitudes as of August 31.[4] These 12 satellites reportedly provided Russian forces with two windows of connectivity with ground terminals for up to an hour and a half per day over Ukraine.[5]

Russia is likely rushing to launch Rassvet satellites to compensate for the loss of Starlink connectivity over Ukraine. The February 1 shutdown of Russia's access to Starlink communications forced Russia to lean into the Rassvet system and likely accelerated Russia's planned timeline to create a fully operational alternative to Starlink. The apparent failure of all 16 satellites from the second launch to reach their intended operational altitudes suggests Russia may have been unprepared to accelerate constellation deployment at this pace and will likely face additional delays. The existing Rassvet satellite constellation still presents a threat to Ukraine as it may allow Russian forces to conduct more precise strikes against Ukraine using remotely controlled unmanned systems and leverage Rassvet satellite communications even during limited windows of connectivity.[6] Even partially successful Rassvet launches could allow Russian forces to increasingly use satellite communications on the battlefield and in their strikes against Ukraine.

Russia will likely continue struggling to establish an analogous version of the Starlink constellation unless it dramatically increases the number of successful Rassvet satellite launches. Russian aerospace company Bureau 1440, which is developing the satellites, noted that Russia plans to conduct “dozens” more launches to deploy “hundreds" more satellites.[7] Ukrainian Presidential Advisor on Defense Technologies Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov assessed on May 31 that Russia will need to successfully launch at least 200 to 300 satellites to achieve stable, 24/7 connectivity over Ukraine and plans to launch several hundred more satellites in coming years, but that Russia is likely not capable of achieving this goal in the near term.[8] Russia is unable to launch satellites at the required tempo and scale partly because it remains dependent on the Soyuz-2.1b medium-class launch vehicle — a costly and scarce asset — to conduct these launches.[9] Russia has reportedly only conducted six to eight launches using its Soyuz-2.1b vehicle across all space and commercial space launches since 2022.[10] Russia would only be able to launch a maximum of 128 Rassvet satellites per four years at such launch frequency, and it is not guaranteed that all launched satellites would be operable. Only 37.5 percent of the launched Rassvet satellites reached sustainable operational altitudes as of August 2026. Russia may also not be able to devote all its Soyuz-2.1b launch capabilities to Rassvet satellites due to other space launches. Russia’s failure to launch its second batch of Rassvet satellites to the necessary altitude, as well as the frequency at which it can conduct such launches, will make Russia’s goal of launching ”hundreds” of new satellites into orbit in a short period of time exceedingly difficult in the near term.[11]

Ukrainian strikes against Rassvet satellite production and launch sites threaten to further degrade Russia's ability to establish a successful constellation on a timeline Russia deems acceptable. Ukrainian forces struck the Progress Space Rocket Center overnight on August 14 to 15, a facility that produces Soyuz-type launch vehicles.[12] Ukraine also attempted a strike against the Plesetsk Cosmodrome on August 23, two days before Russian forces launched a Soyuz-2.1b medium-class launch vehicle that may have been carrying a GLONASS-K1 satellite for Russia's GPS alternative.[13] Russia reportedly launched both batches of Rassvet satellites from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome, and Ukraine’s attempted strike on August 23 suggests that Ukrainian forces can threaten not only Russia's limited supply and production of launch vehicles but also the scarce launch infrastructure to place satellites into orbit.[14] Ukrainian strikes against facilities and sites key to Russia‘s satellite and space industry may hinder Russia’s ability to launch satellites and further delay Russia‘s goal to establish its own analogue of Starlink in the near-term, including for use on the battlefield in Ukraine.[15]

Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to remain in favor of conducting covert mobilization following Russia's September 18-20 State Duma elections and appears committed to sustaining his existing force generation mechanism. Russian sources told The Economist on August 30 that Putin is committed to deploying between an additional 300,000 and 400,000 troops to the frontline in Ukraine.[16] The Economist stated that Putin will not need to declare a new wave of mobilization and will likely use regional governments to recruit additional servicemen via coercive mechanisms, though it is unclear if this statement is from The Economist's sources or its own assessment. Russian officials are continuing to publicly posture that Russia does not need to conduct involuntary reserve call-ups. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev on August 28 denied any plans for mobilization in Russia because the Russian military has enough contract servicemembers to fight in Ukraine.[17] Russian Permanent Representative to the United Nations Vasily Nebenzya similarly claimed on August 21 that Russia does not need and is not planning a large-scale mobilization at this moment.[18] Some regional authorities are also leaning into existing covert mobilization mechanisms which coerce Russians into signing service contracts. Russian military authorities have intensified an aggressive recruitment effort in Penza Oblast since at least June 2026 by detaining and coercing Russian men into signing military contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) in Penza City, Kamenka, Kuznetsk, and other cities.[19]

The Kremlin is likely attempting to appease and reassure the Russian society amidst growing fears of involuntary mobilization, and ahead of the State Duma’s September 18-20 elections, as mobilization remains highly unpopular in Russia.[20] The Kremlin has been setting conditions for some form of mobilization and associated civil unrest, as ISW has previously assessed, but the presence of these measures does not mean that Putin has imminently made a decision about whether to conduct large-scale reserve call-ups.[21] These measures instead give Putin the option to conduct such call-ups at a time of his choosing in the future, should he choose to do so. ISW continues to assess that any compulsory mobilization is a personal decision for Putin and is contingent on his perception of the battlefield reality and regime stability.[22]

Russian President Vladimir Putin met separately with People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on August 31 ahead of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit.^[23] Putin used these meetings to highlight Russia's cooperation with the PRC and India on the Northern Sea Route in the Arctic Sea and discussed further avenues for economic cooperation with Xi and Modi. Putin has historically sought complete Russian control over the Northern Sea Route, but has seemingly relaxed this position in recent years to instead use the Arctic as an avenue for revenues and cooperation with allies and partners after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[24] Russia will also likely seek to use the Northern Sea Route as an alternative to shipping — and sanctions evasion schemes — through the Black and Caspian seas because of Ukraine's escalating long-range drone strikes and European seizures of sanctioned vessels.

Russian officials continue to implicitly threaten NATO in the Arctic as part of their rhetorical efforts to deter NATO defensive and cohesion measures in the region. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov published an article on August 31 accusing NATO of militarizing the Far North in a "direct threat" to Russian security and an attempt to turn the Arctic region into a "new front" against Russia.[25] Russian Ambassador to Norway Nikolay Korchunov claimed on August 31 that Russia poses no threat to Norway or other NATO states but is responding to NATO military escalations along Russia’s northern flank.[26] The Kremlin has been employing similar rhetoric regarding the Arctic in an effort to deter NATO from conducting military exercises in response to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and other forms of aggression and threats against NATO since 2022.[27]

US, Ukrainian, and Russian officials appear to be resuming limited bilateral negotiations to end Russia's war in Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on August 31 that he spoke with US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner to discuss setting a date for Witkoff's and Kushner's visit to Ukraine aimed at developing solutions to end the war.[28] Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov attended the G20 Summit in Asheville, North Carolina, on August 31, at the invitation of the US Presidential Administration, for the first time since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in 2022.[29] Siluanov reportedly discussed with US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent the US-proposed 28-point peace plan from November 2025, a plan that Russian officials repeatedly rejected.[30]

Key Takeaways:

• Russia's second batch of Rassvet satellites appears to have failed to reach intended operational altitudes, marking another setback in Moscow's efforts to rapidly develop a Russian analogue to Starlink.
• Russia is likely rushing to launch Rassvet satellites to compensate for the loss of Starlink connectivity over Ukraine.
• Russia will likely continue struggling to establish an analogous version of the Starlink constellation unless it dramatically increases the number of successful Rassvet satellite launches.
• Ukrainian strikes against Rassvet satellite production and launch sites threaten to further degrade Russia's ability to establish a successful constellation on a timeline Russia deems acceptable.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to remain in favor of conducting covert mobilization following Russia's September 18-20 State Duma elections and appears committed to sustaining his existing force generation mechanism.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin met separately with People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on August 31 ahead of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit.
• Russian officials continue to implicitly threaten NATO in the Arctic as part of its rhetorical efforts to deter NATO defensive and cohesion measures in the region.
• US, Ukrainian, and Russian officials appear to be resuming limited bilateral negotiations to end Russia's war in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Sumy, Borova, and Slovyansk directions and the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, and Russian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction and Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Belgorod Oblast, including Ozon (Wildberries’ main competitor) marketplaces, on the night of August 30 to 31.  
• Russia launched one Kh-59 cruise missile and 121 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 30, 2026

Ukrainian forces are intensifying a long-range strike campaign against Russian airfields and drone launch sites while conducting suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses (SEAD/DEAD) in Russia’s border regions to degrade Russian strike and air defense capabilities. Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Pantsir-S1 air defense system, an aviation ammunition depot, and a Sopka-2 radar system at the Yeysk Airfield in Yeysk, Krasnodar Krai (roughly 180 kilometers from the front line); a strike drone launch site, ammunition depots, a technical and operational unit, and RSP-27 (DRL-27) and Nebo-SV radar systems at the Millerovo Airfield in Millerovo, Rostov Oblast (roughly 170 kilometers from the front line); and a drone launch site in Oryol Oblast overnight on August 30.[1] Geolocated footage published on August 30 shows a fire at the Yeysk Airfield following the Ukrainian strikes, and NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data shows multiple heat anomalies at the Yeysk and Millerovo airfields.[2] Ukrainian forces have recently intensified strikes against Russian strike and air defense assets in heavily defended military airfields in Rostov Oblast, Krasnodar Krai, and occupied Crimea, including the most recent strike against the Engels-2 Airbase in Saratov Oblast on August 28.[3]

Ukrainian forces recently conducted a clearing mission with foot-mobile infantry in the Kupyansk direction, likely following a condition-setting effort aimed at suppressing Russian drone strike capabilities in the area. The Ukrainian 2nd Khartiya Corps reported on August 30 that Ukrainian forces have cleared two square kilometers of a forested area southwest of Zapadne and continue to advance west of Dvorichna (both north of Kupyansk).[4] The 2nd Khartiya Corps posted a geolocated video showing at least 15 to 20 Ukrainian servicemembers running into the forested area, and it is likely that Ukrainian forces conducted up to a platoon-sized infantry assault.[5] The footage shows that Ukrainian forces operated freely in the open field, which suggests that Ukrainian forces had likely successfully suppressed Russian drone capabilities in the area beforehand, such that Russian forces had not been able to repel the advance. Ukrainian forces previously seized seven and a half square kilometers of windbreaks southwest of Dvorichna and advanced into northern Zapadne.[6] Ukrainian forces recently struck Russian manpower concentrations, unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs), radars, electronic warfare (EW) systems, communication antennas, and Molniya-type strike drones in the Kupyansk direction.[7] ISW previously observed that both Ukrainian and Russian forces have been trying to restore tactical maneuver on the battlefield since 2025.[8] Ukraine’s recent counterattacks, including in the Kupyansk direction, and suppressions of Russian drone-based defenses are likely part of such efforts.[9]

Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign against Russian marketplaces continues to impose high financial and operational costs on Russian logistics chains and the Russian economy writ large. Russian Sberbank CFO and Management Board Deputy Chair Taras Skvortsov stated on August 29 that consumer spending on Russian marketplaces has decreased by 15 percent in recent weeks and noted that marketplaces have taken up 15 percent of all Russian consumer spending.[10] The Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) reported on August 30 that Russian marketplaces have sharply increased commissions and logistics commissions, with Ozon (Wildberries’ main competitor) charging commissions and logistics costs averaging 47.8 percent of product value between April and June 2026. SZRU reported that Ozon started charging up to 55 percent in commissions for sellers that use Ozon's warehouses under the fulfillment-by-operator (FBO) warehousing model.[11] SZRU reported that Russia’s average marketplace retail profitability fell from approximately 15 to five percent between 2025 and 2026, rendering certain product categories unprofitable. SZRU noted that Russian marketplaces are preparing to further increase tariffs in the second half of 2026 to offset the costs associated with the restoration of damaged infrastructure and security concerns, likely referring to Ukrainian drone and missile strikes. Ukrainian forces have recently intensified strikes against Russian marketplaces to disrupt military-related supply chains and strain the Russian economy.[12]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces are intensifying a long-range strike campaign against Russian airfields and drone launch sites while conducting suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses (SEAD/DEAD) in Russia's border regions to degrade Russian strike and air defense capabilities.
• Ukrainian forces recently conducted a clearing mission with foot-mobile infantry in the Kupyansk direction, likely following a condition-setting effort aimed at suppressing Russian drone strike capabilities in the area.
• Ukraine's long-range strike campaign against Russian marketplaces continues to impose high financial and operational costs on Russian logistics chains and the Russian economy writ large.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk and Slovyansk directions.
• Russia launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles and 130 drones against Ukraine overnight. Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil refineries on the night of August 29 to 30.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 29, 2026

Russian forces launched a prolonged combined drone and missile strike series against Ukraine, primarily targeting Kyiv City and Oblast, that lasted for more than 28 hours in an effort to maximize civilian damage and disrupt daily civilian functions on August 28 and 29. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched over 550 S8000 Banderol loitering munitions, Shahed- and Gerbera-type strike drones, and Parodiya-type decoy drones against Ukraine throughout the day on August 28, overnight on August 28 to 29, and throughout the day on August 29.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched an unspecified number of Onyx anti-ship missiles and Iskander-M ballistic missiles from occupied Crimea overnight on August 28 to 29.[2] The Air Force noted that an unspecified number of air targets struck 15 locations and that debris fell at four locations. The Air Force's data suggests that Ukrainian forces intercepted six Banderol loitering munitions and about 86 percent of Russian strike drones on August 28 and 29. The Air Force ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian ballistic missiles launched and intercepted as of August 11.[3] CNN reported that Ukrainian air raid alerts lasted for more than 28 hours in total between midnight on August 27 and midday on August 29 — an abnormally prolonged timeframe in which Russian forces most likely sought to exhaust Ukrainian air defenses, disrupt civilian daily functions, and increase the degree of damage inflicted later in the strike series.[4] Kyiv City Mayor Vitaliy Klitschko reported that Russian drones struck Kyiv City for the third consecutive day, injuring at least five people and damaging residential and civilian infrastructure.[5] Russian forces likely sought to exhaust Ukrainian forces defending Kyiv, particularly ahead of the August 28 to 29 strikes.

Ukrainian officials also noted that Russian strikes damaged civilian infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; energy, port, and transportation infrastructure in Odesa Oblast; and civilian infrastructure in Mykolaiv Oblast.[6] Russian combined and prolonged strike packages continue inflicting substantial damage in ways that disproportionately impact civilians despite a high Ukrainian drone interception rate.[7] Russia adopted daytime strike patterns in addition to its nighttime strikes in early April 2026 to cause significant disruptions in civilian daily life and the Ukrainian economy.[8]

Russian forces struck an ammunition warehouse on the western outskirts of Kyiv City on August 29, triggering secondary detonations and killing at least 37 people. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on August 29 that Russian forces struck a warehouse near Myla, Kyiv Oblast, implying that the warehouse contained unspecified ammunition near civilian infrastructure.[9] The strike caused a fire and secondary detonations, damaging at least 130 residential buildings and a retirement home, killing at least 37, including the Dmytrivska hromada head Taras Didych, who was part of the rescue team, and injuring at least 42.[10] Ukrainian authorities also restricted movement along a section of the M-06 Kyiv City-Chop highway following the secondary detonations.

The Russian government extended the fuel export ban for direct producers despite continued efforts to posture stable domestic fuel supplies. The Russian Cabinet of Ministers voted on August 29 to extend the export ban on diesel, marine fuel, and gas oils for direct producers until September 30 in order to maintain stable supplies for the domestic fuel market.[11] The previous direct producer restrictions remained in effect until August 31, 2026. Russian officials imposed in late July 2026 a general ban on gasoline and jet fuel exports through the end of 2026.^[12] The head of the Russian state energy company Rosneft, Igor Sechin, claimed on August 29 that Rosneft is meeting domestic fuel demands despite restrictions on its refining capacity.[13] Many Russian federal subjects and areas in occupied Ukraine continue struggling with fuel shortages, however, as Russia's refining capacity reportedly hit a 20-year low in mid-August 2026.[14] Continued Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil infrastructure are reducing Russia’s ability to export fuel, depriving Moscow of the ability to fully benefit from the rise in global oil prices in the past few months due to the war in the Middle East, and forcing more people in Russia to feel the impacts of the war in Ukraine.[15]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces launched a prolonged combined drone and missile strike series against Ukraine, primarily targeting Kyiv City and Oblast, that lasted for more than 28 hours in an effort to maximize civilian damage and disrupt daily civilian functions on August 28 and 29.
• Russian forces struck an ammunition warehouse on the western outskirts of Kyiv City on August 29, triggering secondary detonations and killing at least 37 people.
• The Russian government extended the fuel export ban for direct producers despite continued efforts to posture stable domestic fuel supplies.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya direction.
• Ukrainian forces struck the warehouses of major Russian online retailers in Rostov Oblast on August 27 to 28.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 28, 2026

Ukrainian forces struck a Russian strategic bomber at the Engels-2 Airbase in Saratov Oblast, demonstrating Ukraine’s ability to strike heavily defended targets in Russia’s rear. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on August 28 that Ukrainian forces struck a Tu-95MS strategic bomber at Engels-2 Airbase.[1] Satellite imagery purportedly of the Engels-2 Airbase shows damage to the right wing of a Tu-95MS bomber.[2] The Tu-95MS is a nuclear-capable strategic bomber that Russian forces regularly use to fire air-launched cruise missiles against Ukraine.[3]

Russian budgetary challenges resulting from its costly war effort, Ukraine's long-range strike campaign, international sanctions, and economic mismanagement are manifesting in concrete operational problems. Bloomberg reported on August 28, citing insider sources, that Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov warned Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin in April 2026 about a negative budget balance in the Russian Federal Treasury budget account, prompting immediate spending restrictions.[4] The Russian Federal Treasury budget account reportedly ran a 5.5 trillion-ruble (roughly $63.8 billion) shortfall in April 2026, causing a temporary operational problem for Russian authorities. Bloomberg reported that authorities imposed austerity measures in April 2026 that required 35 percent cuts in funding for spending other than for the war effort and that the Russian government instructed federal agencies to prepare for a 15 percent reduction in staffing. Bloomberg had previously reported that Russian authorities unsuccessfully petitioned Russian President Vladimir Putin to cut defense spending amidst Russia’s growing budgetary crisis.[5] ISW has observed numerous indicators that these issues — which reportedly came to a head in April 2026 — continue to trouble Russian officials, prominent Russian economists, and ordinary Russians.[6]

This operational problem was reportedly short-term and apparently manageable, but it indicates that structural flaws and chronic economic mismanagement are requiring Russian authorities to engage in more complex and challenging fiscal management than is necessary under normal economic circumstances. The economic and fiscal challenges resulting from Russia's war in Ukraine, compounded by the effects of Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign, are imposing significant economic hardship on Russian society, including in the major urban centers of Moscow and St. Petersburg that Russian President Vladimir Putin has traditionally sought to protect from the effects of the war.[7] Putin continues to renege on his tacit social contract with Russians in which he would shield them from the impacts of the war in return for their continued support. That such reports are emerging less than a month before the September 20 State Duma elections that Putin has turned into a high-stakes referendum on his war in Ukraine emphasizes the magnitude of the fiscal challenges that the war is presenting to the Kremlin.[8] Putin's choice to prioritize the war effort is generating avoidable operational problems for Russian officials who will have to continue to react dynamically and with painful mitigations to increasingly adverse economic conditions. Russian officials will likely remain able to respond such that Russia will be able to continue its war effort even as the economy struggles for a considerable time, and there is no near-term or imminent likelihood that the Russian economy will collapse.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) will likely expand its access to Russians’ personal and medical information ahead of rumored involuntary reserve call-ups after the September 20 State Duma elections. The Russian MoD published a draft amendment to a law on August 28 that would expand the personal data Russian defense officials would be able to obtain from Russian federal bodies, companies, and organizations when assessing citizens and servicemembers for certain military positions.[9] The draft amendment would allow Russian military officials to access personal information including registration, income and employment, education, disability, tax, banking, and medical information for Russian citizens liable for military service. This most recent Russian MoD draft amendment is part of a long-term Russian effort to establish a unified digital system to support the conscription and mobilization process.[10] The Russian MoD may be seeking greater access to the personal information of Russians relevant to their ability to serve in the military to set conditions for a more rapid involuntary mobilization that Russian President Vladimir Putin is reportedly considering to be conducted after Russia’s September State Duma elections.[11] This draft amendment is not an indicator that Putin has definitely chosen to conduct mobilization but rather that the MoD is preparing in case Putin makes such a decision. Access to this personal information would likely benefit Russian conscription and force generation mechanisms regardless of an involuntary reserve call-up. ISW continues to assess that the decision to order an involuntary reserve call-up in Russia remains a highly personal decision for Putin that he will make based on his perception of the battlefield situation and his assessment of his regime’s stability.[12]

Russian forces conducted an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test launch as part of the Kremlin's nuclear saber-rattling to project military strength. The Russian Ministry of Defense reported on August 28 that Russian forces conducted a training launch of an unspecified solid-propellant mobile ICBM from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome in Arkhangelsk Oblast.[13] Russian forces conducted a Yars ICBM test launch in late May 2026.[14] The test launch is almost certainly unrelated to US CIA Director John Ratcliffe’s August 25 visit to Moscow, as such tests are normally pre-planned well in advance.[15] ICBM test launches are part of Russia’s long-term nuclear saber-rattling campaign to project military strength and deter Western countries from actions contrary to Russian interests, including providing military support to Ukraine.[16]

Russia is portraying its Starlink-jamming electronic warfare (EW) system as a breakthrough capability as part of its cognitive warfare effort to dissuade the United States from granting Ukraine access to Starlink over Russian territory. Russia reportedly launched serial production of the Volna Kupol Garant EW system that can allegedly disrupt connections to the Starlink satellite internet constellation, according to a Russian defense industry source speaking to Kremlin newswire TASS.[17] The source stated that the Volna Kupol Garant system disrupts the operation of Starlink satellites in low Earth orbit, rather than targeting local ground terminals, by directing a powerful narrow radio signal that blinds the satellites' receiving antennas. The source claimed that the simultaneous use of several Volna Kupol Garant systems could temporarily collapse Starlink services and that Russia could share this technology with other countries. Ukrainian forces have repeatedly struck Volna Kupol Garant systems in occupied Ukraine and Russia using drones equipped with alternative communication technologies.[18] The Volna Kupol Garant system appears to be largely stationary, limiting its effectiveness in protecting mobile equipment, the primary targets of Ukrainian Starlink-equipped drones.[19] TASS likely intends to signal to both Russians and the West that the Volna Kupol Garant system is capable of defending objects in deep rear areas of Russia and that there is therefore no point in giving Ukraine access to Starlink over Russian territory. Russian forces already possess air-defense systems capable of countering Ukrainian drones but lack the quantities of such systems and the manpower to operate them needed to defend Russia’s vast rear areas.[20] The Volna Kupol Garant system will likely suffer from the same problems due to its high cost — $1.5 million dollars per system — and limited 20-square-kilometer range.[21]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces struck a Russian strategic bomber at the Engels-2 Airbase in Saratov Oblast, demonstrating Ukraine’s ability to strike heavily defended targets in Russia’s rear.
• Russian budgetary challenges resulting from its costly war effort, Ukraine's long-range strike campaign, international sanctions, and economic mismanagement are manifesting in concrete operational problems.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) will likely expand its access to Russians’ personal and medical information ahead of rumored involuntary reserve call-ups after the September 20 State Duma elections.
• Russian forces conducted an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test launch as part of the Kremlin's nuclear saber-rattling to project military strength.
• Russia is portraying its Starlink-jamming electronic warfare (EW) system as a breakthrough capability as part of its cognitive warfare effort to dissuade the United States from granting Ukraine access to Starlink over Russian territory.
• Ukrainian forces made limited tactical advances in the Kostyantynivka direction.
• Ukrainian forces are conducting repeat strikes against Russian oil refineries to keep them offline. Russia launched 164 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 27, 2026

US Central Intelligence Agency Director John Ratcliffe's visit to Moscow suggests that Russia may be preparing to conduct an act of aggression against a NATO member in the relatively near term to invalidate NATO's Article 5. A near-term Russian attack is highly unlikely to involve a full-scale conventional invasion of a NATO state. Ratcliffe delivered a warning to Russia not to attack NATO countries according to “sources briefed on the matter” cited by the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) on August 26.[1] Ratcliffe warned Russian officials not to escalate conflict with the US' NATO allies, particularly Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, according to two “sources familiar with the matter” cited by Politico on August 26.[2] Ratcliffe’s arrival in Moscow on a C-17 military transport aircraft and his use of an American motorcade suggests that the US regarded the intelligence it had as reasonably urgent and sensitive and not merely warning of a distant threat. Public reports of US intelligence community assessments note only that Russian action is possible "in the next few years,“ but the manner of Ratcliffe’s travel indicates concern about a shorter timeline.[3] A CIA director’s personal visit to deliver a message is unusual and is generally reserved for sensitive matters of the highest importance. Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) director Sergey Naryshkin confirmed on August 27 that he met Ratcliffe.[4] Russian insider source VChK-OGPU also claimed on August 26 that two departmental heads from the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), including the head of the service department responsible for operations in former Soviet states, were present at the meeting.[5]

The nature of the Russian threat that the US is reportedly attempting to deter in 2026 is significantly different from the threat of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in late 2021. The last trip by a CIA director to Moscow was in November 2021 when William Burns made a final effort to deter Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[6] The context of Ratcliffe’s visit to Moscow in 2026 is very different, and comparisons between the two visits fail to capture key distinctions. Russian forces were already deep into a significant buildup of equipment, personnel, and other military assets on the border with Ukraine in late 2021 and early 2022 preceding Russia’s full-scale invasion.[7] ISW has collected no specific indicators that Russia is preparing to conduct a large-scale invasion of the Baltic states, and ISW has observed no evidence of a similar large-scale buildup in the Russian border area with the Baltic states.  Estonian and Latvian officials noted that their assessment of Russian threats has not changed, suggesting that Baltic states have also not observed a buildup of Russian forces on their borders.[8] Russia could, however, conduct strikes against targets in Baltic states or a limited land incursion with a small force. This sort of attack would not necessarily require a large, visible military buildup and so would not generate the type of indicators that analysts observed in 2021. It remains unclear whether Russian President Vladimir Putin has directed or approved that Russian forces conduct any operations, but Ratcliffe’s visit is noteworthy and itself suggests that the US has indications that Russia is preparing for an act of aggression sooner than simply within “the next few years.”  

The Kremlin continues to deflect Western concerns and deny any intention of conducting aggression against NATO, but these statements are part of a larger effort to create ambiguity and to degrade the alliance’s resolve to counter Russian threats. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on August 27 that media reports about Russia's alleged aggression against NATO countries “have nothing to do with reality” and that Russia is facing an aggressive policy from Europe.[9] Russian State Duma Defense Committee member Andrei Kolesnik claimed on August 27 that Russia will not attack Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia unless they engage in aggressive actions against Russian territories, including Kaliningrad Oblast.^[10] Russian official statements are part of Russian cognitive warfare efforts rather than expressions of the Kremlin’s actual position. The Kremlin has also repeatedly made clear that it takes a very broad view of what would constitute NATO aggression, including domestic policies NATO states pursue toward their own citizens of Russian descent or language.[11] The Kremlin notably denied that Russia would invade Ukraine throughout late 2021 and early 2022, mocking such claims right up to the eve of the invasion itself, as part of efforts to retain surprise despite a large and visible military buildup and also to delay and deter Western and Ukrainian preparations to counter the Russian threat.[12] The Kremlin has repeatedly advanced anti-NATO narratives and has explicitly threatened NATO member states since at least 2022.[13] The Kremlin appears to be deliberately creating ambiguity regarding its intention of launching any sort of attack against NATO, likely in order to disseminate fear and paralyze the alliance’s decision-making capabilities about defending itself as well as to deter it from continuing to send armaments to Ukraine.

Baltic state officials and government-affiliated analysts emphasized that NATO should take the Russian threat seriously but that their immediate threat assessment has not changed. Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna stated August 27 that the "threat emanating from Russia and possible provocations against NATO must be taken seriously," as NATO allies do, but emphasized that Estonia’s threat assessment regarding Russia has not changed.[14] Latvian presidential advisor Martins Dregeris stated on behalf of Latvia’s President Edgars Rinkevics on August 27 that Latvia’s assessment of a military threat has not changed and that the risk of a conventional Russian invasion is low.[15] Latvia’s Prime Minister Andris Kulbergs emphasized that Latvian citizens should not be concerned about Ratcliffe’s visit to Moscow.[16] The Estonian Ministry of Defense amplified statements from the director of Estonian think tank the International Centre for Defense and Security, Kristi Raik, that there is "no ground" to compare the situation in Ukraine in late 2021 and the Baltic states now, as there was clear intelligence in 2021 that Russia was preparing to invade but no such intelligence now.[17] Raik argued that Western countries should not let the fear of escalation limit their support for Ukraine and implicitly framed warnings of a Russian action against NATO as intended to deter European support for Ukraine, which any such Russian action would partly aim to achieve.[18]

Baltic governments have repeatedly warned of an increased risk of Russian actions, including drone incursions, sabotage, and other limited military actions, and are arguing that Ratcliffe’s visit does not indicate that their already heightened risk assessment has further increased into warnings of an imminent large-scale Russian invasion.[19] ISW concurs with such an assessment. The recent statements from Baltic officials indicate that Baltic countries are currently primarily focused on reassuring their populations that there is little risk of a full-scale Russian invasion of the Baltic states. The near-term Russian threat that Ratcliffe may have been communicating is not solely limited to a full-scale invasion, however, and Russia could limit its actions in scope to achieve other objectives beyond immediate territorial gains.

Russia may conduct air, missile, or drone strikes or a limited incursion against one or more Baltic states to test and seek to break NATO's resolve to invoke and respond under Article 5. A limited Russian attack against NATO's eastern flank would aim to invalidate Article 5 by creating a situation in which the North Atlantic Council, which must vote unanimously to honor the Article 5 mutual defense clause of the NATO charter, is unable to agree about whether or how to respond to a Russian attack. The Kremlin would likely choose an operation that it believes will maximize the possibility that NATO states would fail to unify on a decisive response and thus fail to send military assistance as an alliance to the member that had been attacked. NATO's failure to agree to invoke Article 5 or to implement a unified and decisive response would significantly damage NATO's credibility and severely erode the credibility of Article 5 in particular – one of Putin's major longstanding strategic objectives beyond Ukraine.[20]

Several unidentified drones entered Moldovan airspace on the night of August 26 to 27, demonstrating that the Kremlin continues to accept the risk that Russia’s war against Ukraine can cause damage to other states, including Moldova and NATO states bordering Ukraine. The Moldovan Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on August 27 that five unidentified drones entered Moldovan airspace from various locations along the Moldovan-Ukrainian border area in Odesa Oblast on the evening of August 26 and the morning of August 27 during regular Russian strikes against Ukraine.[21] ISW continues to assess that such incidents demonstrate that Putin continues to normalize the threat that its strike campaign against the westernmost parts of Ukraine poses to European states, including Moldova and eastern NATO members.[22]

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 26, 2026

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi proposed a headquarters restructuring to support the Ukrainian defense in Donetsk Oblast during a meeting with President Volodymyr Zelensky on August 26.[1] Zelensky announced that two new formations would be established under the command of Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps Commander Brigadier General Andriy Biletsky and 1st Corps (Azov National Guard) Commander Brigadier General Denys Prokopenko. The announcement did not contain information about the deployment or reallocation of combat forces or the structure of the new formations.

Russian forces are conducting two main efforts attacking the northern and southern tips of Ukraine's Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast — Russia's primary objective in its Spring-Summer 2026 offensive. Russian forces have intensified efforts to advance toward Slovyansk from the eastern and southeastern directions following unsuccessful attempts to attack Slovyansk from the northeast through Lyman at the beginning of the Russian Spring-Summer 2026 offensive.[2] Russian forces are also actively advancing in Kostyantynivka in the south of the Fortress Belt, but Ukrainian forces continue to have a limited presence in the settlement.

Russian forces continue to infiltrate into and around Kostyantynivka as part of the broader campaign to seize Ukraine's Fortress Belt and all of Donetsk Oblast, while Ukrainian forces continue holding positions in northern and northwestern parts of the city. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on August 26 that Russian main body elements have yet to enter most of Kostyantynivka to consolidate the penetrations that have been made by lead elements consisting of small infantry groups within and around Kostyantynivka.[3] Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces continue to hold positions in northern and northwestern Kostyantynivka but recently withdrew their main body elements from southeastern Kostyantynivka to the eastern bank of the Kryvyi Torets River.[4] Mashovets added that individual Ukrainian forces continue to operate in central and southeastern Kostyantynivka as far south as the northern outskirts of Ivanopillya. Mashovets reported on August 26 that Russian forces recently infiltrated along the Novodmytrivka-Molocharka line north of Kostyantynivka up into Stinky in an effort to outflank Ukrainian forces east of Kostyantynivka and west of Chasiv Yar (northeast of Kostyantynivka). Mashovets reported that Russian forces seized Illinivka, are operating northwest of Stepanivka, and infiltrated north of the Dovha Balka – Illinivka road (all southwest of Kostyantynivka).

Russian officials have repeatedly emphasized the seizure of Kostyantynivka as an important step toward setting conditions to capture the entire Slovyansk-Druzhkivka-Kramatorsk agglomeration and all of Donetsk Oblast.^[5] Russian forces first infiltrated into Kostyantynivka in October 2025 and have been trying to seize the city for roughly the past 10 months.[6] The Kremlin claimed that Russian forces seized Kostyantynivka as early as July 5, contrary to available evidence of Ukrainian forces maintaining their positions in the city.[7] ISW continues to assess that Russian infiltrations and limited advances in and around Kostyantynivka will not enable Russian forces to achieve a rapid operational breakthrough against the remainder of the Fortress Belt or all of Donetsk Oblast, even if Russian forces complete the seizure of the city.[8]

Russian forces are meanwhile intensifying their battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign against Slovyansk that aims to disrupt Ukrainian logistics and set conditions for Russian ground offensive operations against Slovyansk. BAI refers to the use of airpower for strikes against targets in the near rear behind the frontline to impact battlefield operations in the near term. Russian forces have been heavily striking Slovyansk and its environs in recent months to degrade Ukrainian logistics and defenses ahead of dedicated ground operations to seize the city.[9] Slovyansk Military Administration Head Vadym Lyakh reported on August 26 that Russian forces began using Smerch and Tornado-S multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), in addition to glide bombs and strike drones, against Slovyansk and have increased the strike density in the surrounding area.[10] Lyakh noted that Russian forces conducted at least five glide bomb strikes against Slovyansk on the morning of August 26 and that Russian airstrikes damaged at least 13 residential buildings. Russian forces also conducted five FAB-500 glide bomb strikes against Raihorodok (just northeast of Slovyansk) according to geolocated footage published on August 25.[11]

Russian forces have been intensifying their BAI campaign against Slovyansk over the last several months, particularly with glide bombs, and are now bringing MLRS into this effort. ISW previously assessed that Russian glide bomb strikes are enabling infantry advances in and near Kostyantynivka, as the strikes turn portions of the city into rubble that Russian infiltrators can exploit for cover and concealment, and Russian forces are likely applying lessons learned from Kostyantynivka to set conditions for future offensives against Slovyansk.[12] Russian forces still need to secure several tactical objectives before they can begin an offensive against Slovyansk, however, including seizing several large settlements east and southeast of Slovyansk such as Rai-Oleksandrivka and Mykolaivka and the surrounding areas. Russian forces are nonetheless actively preparing the battlespace for intended future offensive ground operations against Slovyansk.

The United Russia Party is reportedly planning to increase its control over State Duma committees to establish United Russia as the dominant force in Russian domestic politics. Sources in the Kremlin and Russian State Duma told Russian state-aligned business newspaper Vedomosti on August 26 that United Russia lower house deputy speaker Pyotr Tolstoy is the leading candidate to replace Liberal Democratic Party of Russia leader Leonid Slutsky as the State Duma International Affairs Committee Chairperson following the September State Duma elections.[13] Tolstoy and Slutsky have both repeatedly promoted ultranationalist narratives against the West and publicly rejected meaningful negotiations to end the war in Ukraine.[14] The potential replacement of Slutsky, a Kremlin loyalist and advocate of Russia’s war in Ukraine, with a United Russia politician, indicates the growing prioritization of United Russia party membership in Duma committees.[15] The Kremlin uses Duma deputies on the International Affairs and Defense committees to amplify state narratives about Russian foreign policy and the war in Ukraine.[16] Tolstoy’s potential appointment is likely part of President Vladimir Putin’s efforts to strengthen United Russia’s control over the State Duma and turn it into the executor of a pro-war and ultranationalist informal Russian state ideology.[17]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi proposed a headquarters restructuring to support the Ukrainian defense in Donetsk Oblast during a meeting with President Volodymyr Zelensky on August 26.
• Russian forces are conducting two main efforts, attacking the northern and southern tips of Ukraine's Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast — Russia's primary objective in its Spring-Summer 2026 offensive.
• Russian forces continue to infiltrate into and around Kostyantynivka as part of the broader campaign to seize Ukraine's Fortress Belt and all of Donetsk Oblast, while Ukrainian forces continue holding positions in northern and northwestern parts of the city.
• Russian forces are meanwhile intensifying their battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign against Slovyansk that aims to disrupt Ukrainian logistics and set conditions for Russian ground offensive operations against Slovyansk.
• The United Russia Party is reportedly planning to increase its control over State Duma committees to establish United Russia as the dominant force in Russian domestic politics.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya and Kupyansk directions.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil and dual-use logistics infrastructure and Russian military assets. Russia launched 162 drones against Ukraine overnight.  

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 25, 2026

Russia is escalating strikes against Ukrainian-Moldovan border infrastructure in conjunction with its campaign against Ukrainian port and maritime infrastructure. Russian forces have increasingly targeted Ukraine-Moldova border infrastructure along key routes that Ukraine uses to conduct imports and exports with Europe in August 2026.[1] Russian forces have struck the Zatoka and Mayakyi bridges (southwest and west of Odesa City respectively), as well as the Vynohradivka-Vulcănești, Reni-Giurgiulești, and Tabakyi border crossings (all northwest of Izmail) between late July and late August 2026.[2] A Ukrainian State Border Guards Service spokesperson stated on August 25 that Russian forces struck border crossings along the Moldova-Odesa Oblast border three times since August 20.[3] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are striking Ukraine’s transportation and border infrastructure to disrupt its international ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into Moldova. Russian forces are likely increasingly targeting Ukrainian GLOCs in this area to further disrupt Ukraine’s land-based export routes amid its parallel campaign against Ukrainian port infrastructure affecting Ukraine’s sea lines of communication (SLOCs) to specifically prevent Ukrainian grain exports and generally degrade the Ukrainian economy.[4] Russian forces are likely intensifying such strikes as part of a dual effort to both isolate Ukraine from Europe and degrade Ukraine’s ability to export grain and other exports, while also creating an environment of insecurity to dissuade Moldova, Romania, and international shippers from using these crossings.

Russian forces are using the strikes along the Ukrainian-Moldovan border to achieve broader political effects. Russian military leadership is increasingly incorporating strikes on Ukraine’s border areas into its broader strike packages as an intimidation tactic meant to create a perception that Moldovan accession into any western structures becomes a liability to those structures. These Russian strikes increase regional political and commercial risks as Russia seeks to deter Romania and Moldova from supporting Ukraine. Russia is increasingly acceptant of the risk that strikes in border areas pose and is increasingly using them to test Moldovan and NATO responses to incursions and their air defenses while normalizing these violations.

The Kremlin is attempting to address concerns about Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decree that set conditions for nationalization of critical infrastructure facilities. Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov claimed on August 24 that Putin’s decree authorizing the Russian government to take over management of critical infrastructure facilities failing to adequately protect their assets against drone strikes or other security threats or to restore a damaged facility in a timely manner does not entail nationalization, but rather temporary management to address security-related risks.[5] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on August 25 that Russian critical infrastructure facilities face the threat of Ukrainian drone strikes, but their owners do not always pay due attention to security.[6] Putin’s August 24 decree fails to specify the requirements or deadlines that could trigger the temporary management takeover that can only end at Putin’s personal discretion, however, setting conditions for Russia’s indefinite seizure of private assets.[7] Kremlin officials are likely rushing to address the opacity of the original decree, as Russian information space voices have questioned its practicality or enforceability.[8]

Russian official statements do not appear to have calmed the nerves of the Russian domestic populace and business community, however. Russian business newspaper Kommersant reported on August 24 that the mechanism raised questions among experts and market participants due to the unclear grounds for initiating the management takeover and the responsibility boundaries between facility owners and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[9] Independent Russian media outlet The Bell reported on August 24 that it is difficult for private companies to protect their facilities, since only Rosgvardia (Russia’s heavily militarized internal security force), the Russian MoD, security and intelligence agencies, and private military contractors can interfere with a drone in any way, including by jamming its signal, shooting at it, or intercepting it.[10] The decree in its current form does not meaningfully contribute to Russian efforts to protect critical infrastructure facilities but rather sets conditions for widespread nationalization of Russian private assets under the pretext of defending critical enterprises against Ukrainian strikes.

Russia launched another satellite into orbit on August 24 for military purposes, potentially as part of its broader efforts to establish a Rassvet (Russian analogue to Starlink) satellite constellation. The Russian MoD reported that the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) launched a Soyuz-2.1b medium-class launch vehicle with an unspecified payload from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome in Arkhangelsk Oblast and successfully inserted the spacecraft into an orbit on the morning of August 24.[11] The Russian MoD reported that VKS ground assets established communication with the spacecraft and assumed operational control over the system. Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi assessed that Soyuz-2.1b may have been carrying a GLONASS-K1 satellite as part of Russia’s Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS) but noted that there is currently insufficient data to confirm the payload.[12] ISW cannot independently verify the type or status of the spacecraft.

Ukrainian forces reportedly attempted to strike the Plesetsk Cosmodrome on August 23, likely in an attempt to prevent Russian forces from launching the satellite into orbit.[13] Russian forces have previously used the Plesetsk Cosmodrome to test-launch Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) satellites for Russia’s Rassvet constellation and other military satellites, including GLONASS.[14] Ukrainian forces have previously struck several Russian rocket-production and launch sites and space communications centers in an effort to prevent Russia from launching satellites into orbit and establishing the Rassvet constellation.[15]

US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director John Ratcliffe reportedly arrived in Moscow on an unscheduled trip, marking what would be Ratcliffe’s first visit to Russia since becoming CIA director. Sources familiar with the situation told CBS on August 25 that Ratcliffe arrived in Moscow City for unspecified meetings, and flight data indicates that a US Air Force plane landed at Vnukovo Airport in Moscow City on the morning of August 25 and departed four hours later.[16] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov denied any knowledge of a US military plane landing at any Moscow Airport.[17]

Key Takeaways:

• Russia is escalating strikes against Ukrainian-Moldovan border infrastructure in conjunction with its campaign against Ukrainian port and maritime infrastructure.
• Russian forces are using the strikes along the Ukrainian-Moldovan border to achieve broader political effects.
• The Kremlin is attempting to address concerns about Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decree that set conditions for nationalization of critical infrastructure facilities.
• Russia launched another satellite into orbit on August 24 for military purposes, potentially as part of its broader efforts to establish a Rassvet (Russian analogue to Starlink) satellite constellation.
• US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director John Ratcliffe reportedly arrived in Moscow on an unscheduled trip, marking what would be Ratcliffe’s first visit to Russia since becoming CIA director.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil and energy infrastructure. Russia launched an unspecified number of Iskander-M ballistic missiles, Kh-31P anti-radar missiles, and 150 drones against Ukraine overnight.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk and Borova directions.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 24, 2026

Ukrainian forces appear to be conducting a concerted suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses (SEAD/DEAD) campaign against Russian air defense assets in Russian border regions as part of their broader campaign targeting Russian economic and military assets within Russia and occupied Ukraine. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian MiG-29 fighter jet and a Kamov Ka-52 helicopter at the Millerovo Air Base in Dolotinka, two air-surveillance radars and an air-defense sensor in Rostov Oblast, and an air surveillance radar system and a shelter for the Zala-type reconnaissance drone crew in occupied Crimea on the night of August 23 to 24.[1] Geolocated footage published on August 24 shows Ukrainian forces striking the MiG-29 fighter jet.[2] Ukrainian forces previously conducted a series of strikes against Russian strike and air defense assets in Rostov Oblast and Krasnodar Krai and occupied Crimea on the night of August 22 to 23.[3] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 24 that Ukraine’s August 23 strike damaged Russian Su-33 and MiG-29 fighter jets and an Orion-type strike and reconnaissance drone in Krasnodar Krai.[4] Geolocated footage published on August 23 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian aircraft in Krasnodar Krai.[5]

Ukrainian forces also struck Ozon (another Russian analogue to Amazon and Wildberries’ main competitor) logistics centers in Makhachkala, the Republic of Dagestan; Nevinnomyssk, Stavropol Krai; and Enem, the Republic of Adygea on the night of August 23 to 24, according to geolocated footage published on August 24.[6] The Ozon Press Service confirmed on August 24 that Ukrainian strikes caused fires at logistics centers in the Republic of Dagestan and Krasnodar Krai.[7] ISW has observed evidence of Ukrainian forces intensifying their strike campaign against Ozon warehouses since August 22.[8] Russian forces have been heavily targeting Wildberries logistics centers across Russia since roughly July 17 and are now appearing to be expanding their strike campaign to Ozon warehouses as part of Ukraine’s systematic strike campaign against Russian marketplaces.[9]

Russian President Vladimir Putin is setting conditions for the widespread nationalization of Russian private assets under the broad pretext of defending critical enterprises against Ukrainian strikes, likely in part to generate additional state revenues. Putin signed a decree on August 24 that authorizes the Russian government to seize Russian “critical infrastructure facilities” that fail to adequately protect their assets, including against drone strikes, or restore a damaged facility in a timely manner.[10] The decree defines “critical infrastructure facilities” as any fuel, energy, industrial, communications, utilities, transport, or essential services facilities, and essentially allows the Kremlin to seize any enterprise of its choice, leaving almost all privately-owned infrastructure in Russia vulnerable to nationalization. The decree allows the Russian government to assume “temporary management” over critical facilities that can end only at Putin’s personal discretion, setting conditions for Russia’s indefinite seizure of private assets. The decree designates the Russian Federal Agency for State Property Management (Rosimushchestvo) — an entity responsible for channeling revenues from Russian nationalized property into the Russian federal budget — as the manager for any property seized under the decree.[11] The Kremlin could also use the decree to alleviate the burden from the strained Russian economy and avoid subsidizing Russian private enterprises, such as Wildberries and Ozon, which Ukrainian strikes have extensively damaged.[12] ISW has repeatedly assessed that Putin is becoming increasingly desperate for economic relief as the financial cost of the war in Ukraine rises and is likely setting conditions for the broader nationalization of private assets to support state revenues.[13]

Russia is introducing additional relief measures for Russian enterprises in an effort to mitigate economic damage that Ukraine's ongoing strike campaign imposes. The Russian Ministry of Finance reportedly proposed on August 24 the extension of tax and insurance payment deadlines for Wildberries and other retailers and legal entities until July 28, 2027.[14] The Russian Ministry of Finance proposed that the government would provide support to legal entities and individual entrepreneurs whose losses exceed five percent of their annual income. Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov claimed that these support measures will reduce the financial burden on affected entrepreneurs and will help enterprises resume operations.

Russian milbloggers have recently acknowledged that the Ukrainian strike campaign against Russian marketplaces has strained the Russian economy and have criticized Russian marketplaces for taking advantage of Russian state benefits. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed on August 24 that Ozon and Wildberries collectively employ over 1.2 million sellers and deliver goods to collectively 100 million customers in Russia.[15] The milblogger claimed that Russia will attempt to redistribute Ozon’s logistical flows and strengthen its air defense to protect its assets against further Ukrainian strikes. A Russian insider source claimed on August 24 that Wildberries has been seeking money from the Russian government to repair the damage from strikes instead of strengthening the security of its facilities on its own.[16] The source also added that Ozon’s entire policy is based on the desire to maintain “excess profits.” The Kremlin appears to be attempting to alleviate the burden from Russian business owners at the expense of economic efficiency, likely in an effort to appease an increasingly dissatisfied population amidst intensifying Ukrainian strikes.[17]

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues efforts to protect an aging cadre of loyalists by manipulating mandatory retirement ages, this time extending Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin's term until August 7, 2027.^[18] Bastrykin has served as the Russian Investigative Committee Head since 2010 and will turn 73 years old in August 2026, reaching the standard mandatory retirement age.[19] Putin notably signed a law in March 2021 that removes the mandatory retirement age for senior presidential appointees, allowing them to serve past the age of 70.[20] Putin also amended another law in October 2024 that states that an Investigative Committee official can serve until the maximum age of 65 in order to allow Bastrykin to serve until he turns 70.[21] Putin appears to continue to raise the retirement age of government and military officials to retain an aging cadre of loyalists and keep his inner circle in positions of power.[22] Putin’s repeated extension of Bastrykin’s term likely indicates that Putin will continue using Bastrykin’s leadership of the Investigative Committee to support Putin’s escalating campaign to nationalize Russian economic assets and maintain Putin's domestic law enforcement priorities.^[23]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces appear to be conducting a concerted suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses (SEAD/DEAD) campaign against Russian air defense assets in Russian border regions as part of their broader campaign targeting Russian economic and military assets within Russia and occupied Ukraine.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin is setting conditions for the widespread nationalization of Russian private assets under the broad pretext of defending critical enterprises against Ukrainian strikes, likely in part to generate additional state revenues.
• Russia is introducing additional relief measures for Russian enterprises in an effort to mitigate economic damage that Ukraine's ongoing strike campaign imposes.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues efforts to protect an aging cadre of loyalists by manipulating mandatory retirement ages, this time extending Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin's term until August 7, 2027.
• Russia launched two Onyx anti-ship missiles, six Kh-31P/Kh-59 guided aerial missiles, and 143 drones against Ukraine overnight. Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military and energy infrastructure.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk and Hulyaipole directions and western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 22, 2026

Russian President Vladimir Putin used his August 22 speech at the United Russia Party Congress to further establish United Russia as the war party, thus setting conditions to use the party's inevitable victory in the upcoming State Duma elections as evidence that the Russian people support a protracted war in Ukraine while further solidifying the party’s pro-war stance as a central part of Russia's informal state ideology. Putin stated that the United Russia Party has a duty to do “everything possible to achieve victory” in Ukraine.[1] Putin is continuing efforts to make United Russia the only party that matters and to charge it with executing his own ideological aims, moving it toward the position that the Communist Party occupied in the Soviet Union.[2] The elimination of the only nominally anti-war party, Yabloko, from the election was part of this effort.[3]

Charging United Russia to do everything possible to win the war in Ukraine also furthers Putin's long-term efforts to cohere Russian society around a pro-war, hyper-nationalist state ideology, bypassing the constitutional constraints on the formal adoption of a Russian state ideology.^[4] Making victory in the war against Ukraine the center of United Russia’s platform sets conditions for Putin to demand further significant sacrifices for the Russian war effort, claiming a “popular” electoral mandate to do so. Such sacrifices will likely include some form of involuntary reserve call ups and demands that Russians continue to accept the effects of Ukrainian long-range strikes and massive casualties for minimal frontline gains. Putin's insistence on making United Russia, the dominant party in Russia, a war party highlights the fact that he is not looking for an off-ramp in Ukraine and is extraordinarily unlikely to make compromises for peace unless compelled to do so. His efforts to cohere Russian politics and society around aggressive ultranationalism and revanchism will likely have effects even after Putin himself leaves the scene.

Putin framed Russia's ongoing combined strike campaign against Ukraine as a victory to the Russian public in order to offset Russia's lack of tactical success on the battlefield and present Russia as having the capability to formulate kinetic responses to Ukrainian actions. Putin claimed in an August 22 interview that Russia’s intensified combined strike campaign against Ukraine disrupts Ukraine's domestic defense industrial base (DIB) and supports Russia’s frontline forces.[5] Putin attempted to falsely portray Russia's strike campaign as a direct response to Ukraine’s intensified long-range strikes since March 2026, despite Russia conducting a deliberate and consistent strike campaign against Ukrainian civilians and civilian infrastructure since February 2022.[6] Putin highlighted the effects of Russia’s combined strike campaign against Ukraine, likely in an effort to offset Russia’s lack of any meaningful tactical successes and mounting socio-economic issues that even Putin himself cannot effectively conceal from the Russian public.

Putin continues preparing Russian society for a prolonged war in Ukraine despite incremental and gradual battlefield advances and mounting personnel losses. Putin falsely said in the interview that Russian forces continue advancing in all directions of the frontline at an increased pace.[7] Russian forces have, in fact, lost control of 27.09 square kilometers in August 2026 so far, not counting areas into which Russian troops may have infiltrated (but do not doctrinally control), according to the evidence that ISW has observed. Russian forces have seized or infiltrated 8.52 square kilometers in August 2026 so far at an average rate of 0.39 square kilometers per day. Russia’s rate of advance has been steadily declining since January 2026.[8] The Ukrainian General Staff’s reports of Russian casualties indicate that Russian forces suffered around 29,120 casualties from July 31 to August 22, 2022 – an average of 1,074 casualties per square kilometer of territory seized.[9] Putin's lies these fictional battlefield gains are likely meant to sustain Russian support for the war and willingness to make additional sacrifices for the supposed victory toward which Putin claims to be leading his people.

Putin acknowledged the effects of Ukrainian long-range strikes on Russia’s fuel infrastructure and emphasized the need to improve Russia’s air defense systems. Putin said in his August 22 interview that Ukrainian long-range strikes inflict casualties and cause “economic damage.”^[10] Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs President Alexander Shokhin stated on August 20 that Ukrainian drone strikes reduced Russia’s oil refining capacity by 25 to 30 percent and degraded mineral fertilizer and chemical production.[11] Shokhin noted that Ukrainian strikes against logistics infrastructure, such as Wildberries, affect both domestic and export-oriented Russian markets. Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign has significantly reduced Russian seaborne oil and grain exports and oil refining capacity, caused fuel shortages, and degraded Russian microelectronics production.[12] Putin acknowledged the need to improve Russia’s air defense system and expand its capabilities through coordination between state-owned enterprises and private businesses – admitting Russia’s failure to protect its vast territory against Ukrainian long-range strikes.[13] Putin is attempting to highlight his awareness of the current domestic problems while assuring the Russian public that Ukraine’s 40-day strike campaign to pressure Russia to negotiate has failed to achieve its desired outcome.[14] Putin is likely prepared to accept increasing economic hardship for Russian society, including for urban populations Putin previously sought to shield in Moscow and St. Petersburg, while pursuing his unchanged theory of victory, which rests on the premise that Russia can win a war of attrition and outlast both Ukraine’s ability to defend and Western support for Ukraine.^[15]

Putin reiterated his continued unwillingness to engage in any meaningful peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. Putin said that Ukraine's and Europe's peace proposals are “exotic” and "unacceptable" to Russia and noted that Russia will only participate in negotiations that reflect "ground realities."[16] Putin appears to believe that Russia’s missile strike campaign will pressure Ukraine into surrendering to Russian maximalist demands amidst a global Patriot interceptor shortage. The Kremlin’s continued rejection of any meaningful peace proposals demonstrates Russia’s unwillingness to negotiate and aims to unite the Russian public around a pro-war platform ahead of the September State Duma elections.[17] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has repeatedly reiterated his commitment to peace negotiations and a willingness to make meaningful compromises that actually are in line with battlefield realities, while Russian officials continue to reject proposals that fail to fulfill Russia’s maximalist demands for Ukraine’s complete capitulation.[18] Putin’s insistence on Russia’s ability to achieve all of his demands despite Russia’s battlefield failures and inability to defend its own domestic infrastructure renders his own negotiating position “exotic.”

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin used his August 22 speech at the United Russia Party Congress on August 22 to further establish United Russia as the war party, thus setting conditions to use the party's inevitable victory in the upcoming State Duma elections as evidence that the Russian people support a protracted war in Ukraine while further solidifying the party’s pro-war stance as a central part of Russia's informal state ideology.
• Putin framed Russia's ongoing combined strike campaign against Ukraine as a victory to the Russian public in order to offset Russia's lack of tactical success on the battlefield and present Russia as having the capability to formulate kinetic responses to Ukrainian actions.
• Putin acknowledged the effects of Ukrainian long-range strikes on Russia’s fuel infrastructure and emphasized the need to improve Russia’s air defense systems.
• Putin reiterated his continued unwillingness to engage in any meaningful peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian port, oil, and dual-use logistics infrastructure.
• Russian forces launched an unspecified number of ballistic and quasi-ballistic missiles, three cruise missiles, and 271 drones against Ukraine overnight.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in central Kostyantynivka, northeast of Oleksandrivka, and west of Orikhiv.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 21, 2026

North Korea reportedly deployed drone operators to Kursk Oblast to support Russia’s war in Ukraine, which will allow North Korean forces to gain valuable tactical and technological skills critical for contemporary warfare. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Head Major General Vadym Skibitskyi reported on August 21 that 8,500 new North Korean troops already operating mostly in Kursk Oblast include a 400-person drone unit whose operators could survey and strike targets in Ukraine.[1] Skibitskyi added that the deployed North Korean troops will not fight within Ukraine but will reinforce Russia’s rear areas and free up Russian manpower. Skibitsky reported that North Korea has deployed or rotated around 25,000 soldiers through the Russian military so far and that Russian President Vladimir Putin may ask North Korean dictator and Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) General Secretary Kim Jong Un for up to 50,000 additional North Korean troops in September 2026. ISW previously observed evidence of North Korean forces operating first-person view (FPV) and reconnaissance drones alongside Russian troops in Kursk Oblast during their first Russian deployment in August and October 2025, which provided North Korean troops with valuable tactical and technical experiences.[2] Elements of the innovative Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies have been operating in the Sumy-Kursk Oblast international border area for a prolonged period and could pass down valuable lessons learned from prior Russian offensives (particularly in the Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole directions) to North Korean forces should they operate together.[3] Ukrainian intelligence suggests that North Korean troops are currently only operating within Russia, but any potential deployment of North Korean forces to Ukraine itself would be a dramatic escalation of North Korean involvement in the war in Ukraine that would require the international community, particularly South Korea, to reassess diplomatic positions.

Ukrainian forces are adapting their tactics and domestically developing technological solutions to target Russia’s ballistic missile launchers and jet-powered drones in ways that circumvent the need for foreign materiel assistance amidst global air-defense interceptor shortages. Sources told The Financial Times (FT) on August 21 that Ukraine is seeking approval to use Starlink-equipped drones to strike Russian ballistic missile launchers up to 200 kilometers inside Russia.[4] Authorization to access Starlink over geographically defined segments of Russia would allow Ukrainian forces to conduct more accurate strikes against Russian mobile ground-based ballistic missile launchers, given Ukraine’s integration of Starlink-equipped drones during the intermediate-strike campaign against Russian logistics in occupied Ukraine.[5] Russian combined drone and missile strike packages have shifted in Summer 2026 to rely on ballistic and quasi-ballistic missiles to exploit Ukraine’s Patriot and ballistic missile interceptor shortage.[6] Ukraine’s request for restricted Starlink use demonstrates an alternative approach to countering Russian ground-based ballistic missiles that does not require the actual shipment of missile interceptors from the United States and other Ukrainian partners. Reliable low-latency satellite access over Russia could also allow Ukraine to effectively and accurately target mobile ground-based missile launchers in Russia and offset the wider surface-to-air missile (SAM) shortage.

The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on August 21 that Ukraine developed the Alexa Spatium jet-powered interceptor drone, which is capable of intercepting Russian jet-powered Geran-3, Geran-4, and Geran-5 strike drones, reconnaissance drones, helicopters, and other targets.[7] Russian forces have recently prioritized the production and use of faster jet-powered Geran-4 and Geran-5 drones in combined drone strike packages.[8] The ability of Geran-4 and Geran-5 drones to reach and sustain higher flight speeds compared to piston engine-driven drones complicates Ukraine’s ability to catch up and intercept them.[9] An effective jet-powered drone interceptor can provide a cost-effective interception method and reduce the need for conventional SAM and man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS), which will in turn reset the technological offense-defense race.[10]

A senior Russian official reiterated the Kremlin’s continued unwillingness to engage in any meaningful negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov stated on August 21 that Russia will only accept a peace proposal that aligns with Russian President Vladimir Putin's war aims and reflects the “ground realities.”^[11] Putin’s maximalist and often-repeated war aims include Ukraine’s complete capitulation, the installation of a pro-Russian puppet government in Kyiv, and severe limitations on the Ukrainian military and Ukraine’s NATO membership aspirations.[12] Russian officials’ continued invocation of “battlefield realities” fails to address Russia’s declining rate of advance and incremental and gradual tactical successes and instead requires that Ukraine concede to Russia’s unwavering demands.[13] Ryabkov’s statement confirms Putin’s commitment to continue the war in Ukraine despite the growing economic and military strain.[14] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has repeatedly reiterated his commitment to peace negotiations and a willingness to make meaningful compromises to end the war, despite Russian efforts to falsely paint Ukraine as the intransigent party in peace efforts.[15] 

Key Takeaways:

• North Korea reportedly deployed drone operators to Kursk Oblast to support Russia’s war in Ukraine, which will allow North Korean forces to gain valuable tactical and technological skills critical for contemporary warfare.
• Ukrainian forces are adapting their tactics and domestically developing technological solutions to target Russia’s ballistic missile launchers and jet-powered drones in ways that circumvent the need for foreign materiel assistance amidst global air-defense interceptor shortages.
• A senior Russian official reiterated the Kremlin’s continued unwillingness to engage in any meaningful negotiations to end the war in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces struck Russian military airfields and oil infrastructure. Russian forces launched 135 long-range strike drones against Ukraine.
• Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 20, 2026

Russian forces launched a massive combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine, continuing a pattern of stockpiling ballistic and cruise missiles for several days to amass enough for major attacks that cause significant civilian casualties. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on August 20 that Russian forces launched an unspecified number of ballistic and quasi-ballistic missiles; surface-to-surface and air-to-surface cruise missiles; ship-launched cruise missiles; Banderol-type loitering munitions; Shahed-type strike drones; and Gerbera-, and Parodiya-type decoy drones on the night of August 19 to 20.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down a majority of the drones and cruise missiles, that unspecified air targets struck 28 locations, and that debris fell at two locations. Ukrainian forces intercepted about 88.6 percent of the Russian cruise missiles, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on August 20 that Ukrainian forces generally intercept 93 percent of cruise missiles.[2] The Ukrainian Air Force ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian ballistic missiles launched and intercepted as of August 11.[3]

Russian ballistic missile strikes damaged residential buildings, a children's hospital, a school, industrial facilities, and fuel infrastructure in Kyiv City and Kyiv Oblast, killing at least 12 and injuring at least 40 in Kyiv City alone.[4] Ukrainian Prime Minister Serhiy Koretskyi reported that Russian strikes against Kyiv City lasted for almost nine hours and noted that Russian forces also struck Red Cross facilities and food warehouses near Boryspil, Kyiv Oblast.[5] Ukrainian officials also reported that Russian forces struck civilian, critical, and energy infrastructure in Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Odesa, and Mykolaiv oblasts, a gas station in Kharkiv Oblast, and logistics infrastructure in Zhytomyr Oblast.[6]

Zhytomyr Oblast Military Administration Head Vitaliy Bunechko reported on August 19 that Russian forces conducted a jet-powered drone strike against a police department in Zhytomyr City, Zhytomyr Oblast during the day, and the Ukrainian State Emergency Service noted that the strike killed three, including two police officers, and injured 53 people.[7] Russian strikes continue inflicting substantial damage in ways that disproportionately impact civilians, despite a high Ukrainian interception rate of all projectiles except for ballistic and quasi-ballistic missiles. Russian forces continue launching prolonged waves of ballistic and cruise missiles and long-range drones to overwhelm Ukrainian air defense systems and to exhaust air defenders and civilians.[8] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will continue the pattern of stockpiling cruise and ballistic missiles for periodic large, combined strike packages.[9]

Russia continues to set conditions to augment strike packages with North Korean missiles, including with upgraded KN-30 ballistic missiles. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) confirmed on August 20 that North Korea transferred around 50 KN-23, KN-24, and KN-30 (Hwansong-11C) ballistic missiles to Russia as of July 2026.[10] The KN-30 is an upgraded version of the KN-23 ballistic missile and is capable of carrying a warhead of up to 2,500 kilograms.[11] ISW has not observed evidence of Russian forces using the KN-30 against Ukraine. The GUR reportedly added that Russia began deploying six launchers for North Korean missiles in Voronezh Oblast and that the launchers will be able to launch a total of 120 missiles.[12] North Korean missiles could reportedly strike Sumy, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Poltava, Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhia oblasts from Voronezh Oblast. Ukrainian military expert Anatoly Khrapchinsky stated that Russian forces do not always leverage all of their launchers in each strike package, however, noting that Russia has about 160 Iskander launchers that can carry two missiles each, but that Russian forces launch on average only 16 to 26 missiles per strike package. Khrapchinsky added that Russian Iskander-M missiles are accurate to within five to 20 meters, whereas the North Korean KN-23 missiles regularly miss their target by hundreds of meters or even kilometers. The North Korean missiles also carry a significantly larger warhead weighing up to a ton — compared with the standard 480-kilogram warhead on Russia's Iskander-Ms — and result in larger craters and shock waves.

Russian aerial drones penetrated Moldovan and Romanian airspace, and a Russian naval drone was destroyed close to a Romanian natural gas platform on August 20, demonstrating that the Kremlin has accepted the risk that its war against Ukraine will cause damage to other states, including NATO states. The Moldovan Ministry of Defense reported that a likely Russian Shahed-136/Geran-2-type drone entered Moldova airspace near Kotlovyna, Odesa Oblast, flew in Moldovan airspace for six minutes, then departed for Ukrainian airspace near Etilua, Gagauzia (roughly six kilometers from the Ukrainian border) on the morning of August 20.[13] The Romanian Ministry of National Defense reported that a drone of unspecified origin crashed in an uninhabited area four kilometers northeast of Grindu, Tulcea County (roughly five kilometers from the Ukrainian border) on the morning of August 20, causing a fire.[14] The Romanian Ministry of National Defense reported that a Romanian F-16 fighter jet destroyed a naval drone about 80 miles east of Constanta (along the Black Sea coast roughly 116 kilometers from the Ukrainian border) near the Neptune Deep natural gas platform on the morning of August 20.[15] Romanian authorities did not specify the origin of the naval drone, but Romanian Defense Minister Radu-Dinel Miruță stated that the naval drone was not Ukrainian.[16] Such incidents are likely an intended consequence of Russian strike packages that now take Russian unmanned systems so close to the airspace or waters of NATO states and Moldova that the drones regularly cross these boundaries.

Moldovan President Maia Sandu stated on August 18 that Russia deliberately launches some of its drones into Moldovan and NATO airspace and that authorities can assess intent based on the trajectory of the drones.[17] ISW is unable to confirm the intent of Russian drone incursions into the airspace of other states, but the net effect of these incidents normalizes the incursion of Russian weapons into and damage within Moldovan and NATO territory. Russian forces could prevent such violations of other states' sovereign airspace and waters by redesigning their strike packages and moving strike vehicle trajectories away from NATO and Moldovan territory. That Russian forces have not adjusted their strike campaigns, along with the increasing frequency of these incidents, indicates that the Kremlin intends to normalize these violations against NATO.

 The Kremlin will likely cause a significant number of Russian combat veterans of the war in Ukraine to be elected to the Russian State Duma in the September 2026 elections, particularly as members of the United Russia Party, as part of a concerted effort to militarize Russian society and cohere a pro-war and ultranationalist elite. Russian President Vladimir Putin stated on August 19 that Russia must prepare in advance for the return of Russian servicemembers from the frontline in Ukraine when the war ends and must facilitate their reintegration into the Russian labor force and society.[18] All-Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company Deputy Head, Kremlin-coopted war correspondent, and United Russia Party candidate Yevgeny Poddubny claimed on August 19 that the United Russia Party intends to elect between 40 and 100 combat veterans to the State Duma in the upcoming September 18-20 Duma elections.[19] The Russian State Duma consists of 450 deputies elected for five-year terms and currently includes 310 deputies from the ruling United Russia Party.[20] The Kremlin appears to be aiming to have combat veterans make up as much as roughly 22 percent of the newly elected Duma, suggesting that the Kremlin intends to further militarize the Russian government and build up a cadre of loyal ultranationalist veterans who will support the Kremlin’s aggressive policies.[21] United Russia Party General Council Secretary Vladimir Yakushev stated on June 8 that 20 graduates of the Time of Heroes program – a Russian government initiative that places Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine into local, regional, and federal positions of power – have won the United Russia preliminary vote.[22] Yakushev stated that 10 of the veterans will run on party lists in the September 2026 Duma elections while the other 10 will compete in single-mandate constituencies. Another prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on August 20 that the Kremlin is increasingly promoting Russian veterans into the Russian government because a Duma deputy with combat experience wields a "special kind of legitimacy” that is ”difficult to publicly challenge.”^[23] The milblogger stressed that Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine should ultimately become “a new elite” that will shape and determine Russia’s future.[24] These Kremlin-coopted Russian milbloggers are likely preparing Russian society for a more heavily militarized State Duma after the September 2026 elections.

The Russian government continues to respond inadequately to gasoline shortages and appears to be focused on mitigation strategies and ad hoc solutions instead of addressing the issue directly. Russian Deputy Prime Minister and Economic Minister Alexander Novak claimed on August 19 that the Kremlin is "monitoring” the gasoline shortage crisis across Russian regions and noted that Russia began importing fuel, banned fuel exports, and introduced lower-grade fuel in response.[25] Novak claimed that several Russian refineries will complete repairs and resume refining operations "soon," and that "the situation will improve significantly." Ukraine’s long-range strikes continue to have compounding consequences throughout the Russian economy. The Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) reported on August 19 that rising fuel prices are impacting Russian transportation and cargo flows.[26] The SZRU noted that the cost of road freight transport increased 4.5 to 5.5 percent and that Russian companies are trying to shift cargo flows to rail and sea, an effort that can only partially mitigate the problem because of the longer transit times of such forms of transportation. The SZRU reported that road freight transport costs increased significantly on routes between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia due to a fuel collapse in the Zabaikalsky Krai. No solutions that Russian officials have attempted appear to have significantly reduced gasoline shortages across Russia or the compounding effects within the Russian economy associated with them.[27]

Neither the Kremlin nor Russian milbloggers appear to believe that Russia will be able to fully intercept Ukrainian strike packages any time soon. Russian officials are increasingly shifting the burden of air defense to individual enterprises and regional governments to attempt to counter the effect of Ukrainian long-range strikes, but all of these entities are struggling to counter Ukrainian drones.[28] Russian milbloggers also continue to acknowledge the persistent issues Russia faces in combatting Ukrainian strike packages. Two prominent Russian milbloggers acknowledged on August 20 that Russian officials and private enterprises have very unrealistic expectations about establishing air defenses for strategic and industrial objects, as neither industrial enterprises nor Russian forces are equipped to adequately repel Ukrainian drones and missiles.[29] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger acknowledged on August 19 that Russia cannot expect to totally intercept Ukrainian long-range drones and that Russia needs passive protection including anti-drone nets, shelters, and infrastructure redundancy to protect industrial assets.[30] This milblogger claimed that the Russian federal government, regional governments, and industrial enterprises should continue to share the responsibility for defense against Ukrainian strikes. Russian milbloggers called for establishing a layered approach that includes new air defense adaptations and defensive infrastructure.[31] ISW continues to assess that Russia will likely fail to adequately meet its growing air defense needs through its own defense industrial production and will be unable to cover both the frontline and its vast deep rear.[32] The layered and decentralized approach Russian officials and Russian milbloggers are proposing will require significant time and resources and would not necessarily overcome Russia‘s significant air defense needs or geographic limitations. Defensive fortifications around key industrial and commercial sites across Russia would also undermine the Kremlin’s ability to portray a sense of normalcy to the Russian public, which it has continually sought to do.[33]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces launched a massive, combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine, continuing a pattern of stockpiling ballistic and cruise missiles for several days to amass enough for major attacks that cause significant civilian casualties.
• Russia continues to set conditions to augment strike packages with North Korean missiles, including with upgraded KN-30 ballistic missiles.
• Russian aerial drones penetrated Moldovan and Romanian airspace, and a Russian naval drone was destroyed close to a Romanian natural gas platform on August 20, demonstrating that the Kremlin has accepted the risk that its war against Ukraine will cause damage to other states, including NATO states.
• The Kremlin will likely cause a significant number of Russian combat veterans of the war in Ukraine to be elected to the Russian State Duma in the September 2026 elections, particularly as members of the United Russia Party, as part of a concerted effort to militarize Russian society and cohere a pro-war and ultranationalist elite.
• The Russian government continues to respond inadequately to gasoline shortages and appears to be focused on mitigation strategies and ad hoc solutions instead of addressing the issue directly.
• Neither the Kremlin nor Russian milbloggers appear to believe that Russia will be able to fully intercept Ukrainian strike packages any time soon.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure and military assets on the night of August 19 to 20.
• Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and in the Pokrovsk direction.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 19, 2026

Russian President Vladimir Putin is attempting to present Russia's poor economic performance in a positive light as he is unable to conceal the damage that over four years of war and Ukrainian long-range strikes have done to the Russian economy. Putin stated that Russia's GDP growth is currently around one percent, characterizing the growth as "modest" but positive.[1] Putin acknowledged that "external pressure" and "terrorist attacks" — the Kremlin's code for Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign — are affecting Russia's economic growth. Putin tacitly acknowledged that Ukrainian strikes against Wildberries facilities in late July and August 2026, which are imposing growing operational and financial costs on Russia, mean that some logistics and warehouses require “restoration” but claimed that all trade infrastructure is operating effectively.[2] Putin sought to reassure the Russian public that he is taking appropriate measures to address Russia’s economic challenges ahead of the upcoming September State Duma elections. He tried to present the Russian government as prioritizing quality of life issues for Russian citizens even as the Kremlin also tries to prepare Russian society to make more sacrifices for his failing war. The Russian people have been increasingly feeling the effects of war in the form of rising inflation and the price of goods, gasoline shortages, and labor shortages.[3] Putin is likely acknowledging the damage Ukrainian strikes are doing to the Russian economy to portray himself and his United Russia party as aware of the economic and social struggles of the Russian people and to avoid appearing isolated from economic realities ahead of the elections.

Putin has been able to present a fictional picture of the Russian military's performance on the battlefield to the Russian public more readily than he can dissemble about the economic situation. The Kremlin has conducted a broad censorship campaign aimed at controlling the narrative of the progress of the full-scale invasion since 2022, making it easier for Putin to present a much more positive vision of the war’s progress than the military situation actually supports.[4] Ukrainian long-range strikes, however, have forced Putin to publicly acknowledge the economic effects that over four years of war have had on Russia as the Russian population and business community see those strikes and their effects themselves in ways that censorship cannot control.

Gasoline shortages are continuing across Russia, including in areas Putin has sought to shield from negative consequences of the war. Russian state newspaper Izvestia reported on August 18, citing data from Russian crowd-sourced mobile application GdeBENZ (which provides Russians real-time fuel availability and prices), that gasoline was available at only 28 percent of all Russian gas stations, down from 41 percent the previous week.[5] Fuel availability has reportedly declined across several Russian oblasts that are frequent targets of Ukrainian long-range strikes, including Moscow Oblast.[6] Russian state-owned oil company Gazprom Neft‘s hotline acknowledged to Russian business outlet RBK that it has instituted gasoline quotas at some gas stations in Moscow City but claimed that it was making efforts to increase supply.[7] Izvestia correspondents confirmed on August 17 that 21 gas stations in Moscow City and Moscow Oblast were experiencing varying levels of gasoline shortages, particularly of high-quality gasoline. The correspondents reported that only seven of the 21 gas stations were selling AI-92 gasoline, six were selling AI-95, and only five were selling AI-98 gasoline. The Kremlin has long sought to shield residents of urban areas in western Russia, particularly Moscow and St. Petersburg, from the impacts of its war in Ukraine.[8] Renewed gasoline shortages across Russia, including in Moscow, resulting from Ukraine's long-range strike campaign, indicate that the Kremlin's ability to shield Moscow residents is becoming tenuous.

The Russian government’s attempts to alleviate gasoline shortages are having compounding effects, including in other key economic sectors. Russian business newspaper Kommersant reported on August 19 that Russia is also experiencing shortages in motor oil due to the reduced availability of raw inputs and difficulties importing motor oil.[9] Kommersant reported on August 18 that the Russian Government Commission on Economic Development and Integration met in mid-August 2026 to discuss a possible ban on the export of aromatic hydrocarbons.[10] Aromatic hydrocarbons are used in lower-quality gasoline but are necessary for a number of defense-related products, including synthetics, rubbers, and polymers. Kommersant noted that refineries produce aromatic hydrocarbons and decide how much to release to the domestic market rather than using them to produce gasoline. Kommersant noted that Russian refineries are now using more aromatic hydrocarbons to produce lower-octane gasoline in order to alleviate the ongoing Russian fuel shortages following a July 2 decree allowing them to do so.[11] Reallocation of aromatic hydrocarbons to the production of lower-quality gasoline is exacerbating shortages in other sectors, including in the availability of motor oil, as fueling with lower-octane gasoline requires more motor oil to maintain vehicles. The Russian government’s attempts to increase the domestic flow of gasoline supplies are increasing stressors on other parts of the Russian petrochemical industry and on industrial production dependent on petroleum products other than gasoline or diesel. Even these measures, however, have not resolved ongoing fuel shortages in Russia.

Kremlin concern about social disorders resulting from fuel shortages has reportedly led to the deployment of paramilitary forces in some areas. A Russian insider source claimed on August 18 that Putin deployed Rosgvardia (Russia’s heavily militarized internal security force) units to gas stations in Moscow Oblast.[12] Rosgvardia personnel have reportedly deployed to at least 13 gas stations in Russia and occupied Crimea amidst ongoing fuel shortages in Summer 2026.[13] Putin is deploying additional Rosgvardia manpower to patrol gas stations, likely in order to manage civil unrest and violence occurring at gas stations due to severe fuel shortages and sales restrictions.[14] Putin’s deployment of Rosgvardia personnel also likely suggests that the Kremlin expects the Russian fuel crisis and fuel-related violence to protract. The deployment of Rosgvardia troops indicates that the Kremlin does not have confidence in the ability of Russian regular police forces to manage the scale of fuel-related civil unrest.

The Kremlin is also expanding the legal authorities of Russia’s emergency forces, likely in part in anticipation of more widespread public unrest. Russia's legislative commission approved a draft bill on August 18 allowing Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations' rescue forces to use physical force and firearms if the forces cannot fulfil their duties through nonviolent means, according to a source within the Kremlin and another source within the legislative commission.[15] The bill allows rescue forces to use firearms to prevent attempts to seize military equipment and to protect Ministry of Emergency Situations’ personnel. Deputy chairman of Russia’s Security and Anti-Corruption Committee reported that the bill will also provide a legal tool for Russian rescue forces to counter Ukrainian drone strikes during evacuations in occupied Ukraine and in emergency situations. Russian officials are framing the bill solely as a counter-drone measure. The draft bill provides the Kremlin with additional means to suppress domestic unrest, including through violent means if necessary. The Kremlin is amending Russia’s civil defense law likely in anticipation of public discontent amidst continuing domestic gasoline shortages and possibly in anticipation of involuntary mobilization that Putin is reportedly considering for after the September State Duma elections.

Russian authorities are restricting mass gatherings in Moscow's Red Square, likely out of fear of protests and domestic unrest. The organizers of the Spasskaya Bashnya (Savior Tower) military music festival announced on August 17 the cancellation of the music festival, originally scheduled for August 21 to 30, "for reasons beyond the organizers' control."[16] Russia has held the Spasskaya Bashnya music festival annually in Red Square since 2007 (except 2020), and it includes military bands of the Russian Ministry of Defense, Rosgvardia, Federal Security Service (FSB), and other federal security agencies.[17] Russian authorities also cancelled an annual concert in Red Square for Russia Day planned for June 12.[18] Ukraine's Center for Countering Disinformation noted that the cancellations of mass events in Red Square follow protests against the Russian Supreme Court's decision to ban the opposition Yabloko Party from the September 18 to 20 State Duma elections.[19] Large public events in Red Square would likely draw a large security presence to manage even without fear of protests or civil unrest, and the cancellations of these events indicate that Russian authorities have chosen to preserve the bandwidth of their security forces amid the new competing requirements imposed by the effects of the war in general and of Ukraine's strike campaign in particular.

The Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) confirmed Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s appointment of Yevheniy Khmara as the Ukrainian Defense Minister on August 19. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed Khmara as interim defense minister on July 16 and submitted Khmara's candidacy for acting defense minister to the Verkhovna Rada on August 18.[20] The Verkhovna Rada also confirmed Zelensky’s reappointment of Andriy Sybiha, who has served as the Ukrainian Foreign Affairs Minister since September 2024.[21]

Russia and Ukraine recently conducted an exchange of prisoners of war (POW). The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 19 that Russia returned 103 Ukrainian servicemembers to Ukraine, most of them wounded and/or seriously ill.[22] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on August 19 that Ukraine returned 103 Russian servicemembers who were immediately sent to Belarus to receive psychological and medical assistance.[23]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin is attempting to present Russia's poor economic performance in a positive light as he is unable to conceal the damage that over four years of war and Ukrainian long-range strikes have done to the Russian economy.
• Gasoline shortages are continuing across Russia, including in areas Putin has sought to shield from negative consequences of the war.
• The Russian government’s attempts to alleviate gasoline shortages are having compounding effects, including in other key economic sectors.
• Kremlin concern about social disorders resulting from fuel shortages has reportedly led to the deployment of paramilitary forces in some areas.
• Russian authorities are restricting mass gatherings in Moscow's Red Square, likely out of fear of protests and domestic unrest.
• The Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) confirmed Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s appointment of Yevheniy Khmara as the Ukrainian Defense Minister on August 19.
• Russia and Ukraine recently conducted an exchange of prisoners of war (POW).
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast, and Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.
• Ukrainian forces struck the Ufa Oil Refining Hub, which includes three separate refineries, in Ufa, Republic of Bashkortostan (about 1,200 kilometers from the international border) overnight on August 18 to 19.
• Russian forces launched 2 Iskander-M ballistic missiles and 65 drones against Ukraine overnight.  

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 18, 2026

Russian state-owned bank Vnesheconombank (VEB) fired Chief Economist Andrey Klepach following media reporting of a negative economic assessment he offered that contradicts Russian President Vladimir Putin’s theory of victory in Ukraine. Klepach provided an assessment of Russia's economic and geopolitical challenges to the Moscow Exchange’s Nikitsky Club on May 21, concluding that the Russian war economy is stagnating as high defense spending, restrictive monetary policy, sanctions, and Ukrainian strikes constrain growth and investment.[1] Independent Russian media outlet the Moscow Times reported on Klepach’s assessment on August 14, and other Russian media outlets circulated his statements on August 15.[2] Independent Russian media outlet the Bell reported on August 16, citing a source close to Klepach, that VEB Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Igor Shuvalov fired Klepach that day after a “call from above,” and another source confirmed that Klepach’s dismissal was related to his economic assessment.[3] The Bell noted that Klepach served as the chief economist of VEB for 12 years and as a deputy minister of economic development for six years before that. He served in that capacity under Russian Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina and current Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov while they were ministers of economic development. Klepach stated in his May 21 assessment that Russia can sustain a war of attrition without collapsing but that it cannot do so without risking a social crisis and falling further behind the United States, China, and Ukraine economically and technologically. Klepach stated that Ukrainian strikes against Russian port, petroleum, chemical, and logistics infrastructure are a noticeable macroeconomic barrier to Russian economic expansion, which he notes will likely slow to near-zero annual growth in 2026.

Klepach stated that Russian defense spending has greatly increased since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, leading the Russian military-industrial complex to increasingly crowd out the civilian economy, increasing constraints on civilian industrial sectors and causing them to contract.

Klepach stated that Russia’s high defense spending and tight monetary policy, likely referring to the high key interest rate that peaked at 21 percent in June 2025 and currently stands at 14 percent, are ”squeezing” the economy, assessing that investment will decline by 2.5 percent in real terms in 2026 and will likely see no growth in 2027.[4] The Kremlin continues to pressure the Central Bank to reduce the key interest rate to project economic stability and expand the capital available to the Russian defense industry despite ongoing fiscal inflationary pressures.

Putin clearly articulated a theory of victory in Ukraine relying on protracted attritional warfare at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) on June 7, 2024.[5] Putin’s theory of the case assumes that Russian forces will be able to continue gradual, creeping advances indefinitely; prevent Ukraine from conducting successful operationally significant counteroffensive operations; and that Russia can prevail in a war of attrition by outlasting Ukrainian will and that of Ukraine’s external supporters.[6] ISW has previously observed that Russia is increasingly struggling to sustain its method of waging a protracted attritional war, as losses exceed recruitment rates and financial and material costs rise, and that the Kremlin is exaggerating its tactical advances to present the appearance of continuous military gains.[7] ISW has, in fact, assessed that the Russian military is systematically misinforming Putin about the state of the front line in part due to the pervasive culture of lying within the Russian armed forces that milbloggers refer to as “beautiful reports.”[8] Putin is likely more aware of Russia’s economic problems than he is of the military situation but determined to similarly present an appearance of economic stability despite evidence of Russia’s ongoing economic issues.[9]

There is considerable evidence that Klepach’s assessment of the Russian economic problems aligns with reality, undermining the validity of Putin’s theory of victory. Russian business newspaper Vedomosti reported on August 18 that Russian businesses have transferred 384 billion rubles (about $4.5 billion) in “voluntary” contributions to the Russian federal budget in 2026, roughly one-and-a-half times the total amount collected through this mechanism in 2025. Putin personally called on Russia’s top business leaders to make such contributions on March 26, 2026, to ease the burden for the protracted attritional war on the Russian treasury.[10] Klepach stated that the Kremlin may cut expenditures by 600 billion rubles (about $7.1 billion) in 2027 compared to 2026, reflecting the reality of the pressure on the Russian treasury despite this measure and increased revenues from higher crude oil prices.[11] ISW continues to assess that the Russian government has adopted suboptimal economic policies to sustain its war in Ukraine, leading to many of Russia’s current economic issues, including increased and unsustainable war spending, growing inflation, significant labor shortages, and reductions in Russia’s sovereign wealth fund, that impose complex challenges on Russia’s monetary and macroeconomic policy — all of which are concerns that Klepach acknowledges.[12]

The Russian population is also reacting to the perception of economic decline in ways that can further damage Russian economic and fiscal policy. The Washington Post reported on August 18, citing Russian Central Bank data, that Russians withdrew 286.4 billion rubles (about $4.5 billion) in June 2026, $7.3 billion in July 2026, and $3.4 billion in the first two weeks of August 2026.[13] A senior executive at Sberbank, Russia’s biggest retail financial institution noted that withdrawals in 2026 may end up being nearly double those of 2022. A bank run, combined with the other factors contributing to Russian economic decline, may pose serious domestic challenges for the Kremlin in the run up to the September 18-20, 2026, State Duma elections. The significance of those challenges is increased by reports that Putin is considering and preparing for a large-scale mobilization after the election.[14] Russia’s economy is not likely to collapse rapidly absent some additional major shock, but Russia’s economic deterioration increases the domestic costs Putin must face in demanding even more sacrifice from the Russian people for his unsuccessful war.[15]

The Kremlin continues reiterating its determination to prevent Russia’s deteriorating economic realities from reducing its maximalist war aims by refusing to engage in meaningful negotiations to end the war. Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov emphasized on August 18 that Russia's negotiating position rules out freezing the current frontline, effectively reiterating Russia's commitment to continuing the war.[16] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov had similarly stated on August 14 that Russia is unwilling to accept a ceasefire that freezes the current frontline and reiterated Russia’s commitment to continuing the war until Russia can secure a settlement on its own terms.[17] Senior Kremlin officials continue refusing negotiations likely because they must act on Putin’s belief that Russian forces can win the war of attrition by making gradual, creeping advances indefinitely while outlasting Western support for Ukraine and Ukraine's ability to defend itself.[18] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has repeatedly reiterated his commitment to peace negotiations and a willingness to make meaningful compromises to end the war, despite Russian efforts to falsely paint Ukraine as the intransigent party in peace efforts.[19]

Moldovan President Maia Sandu stated on August 18 that Russia deliberately launches some of its drones into Moldovan and NATO airspace. Sandu said that Moldovan authorities can differentiate between Russian drones intentionally launched to violated Moldovan and NATO airspace and those that did so accidentally based on the drones’ trajectories.[20] Sandu is notably the first European head of state or senior official to explicitly state that Russian forces intentionally launch some of their drones into the European airspace. ISW continues to assess that such drone incursions are part of Russia’s “Phase Zero” campaign that aims to set informational and psychological conditions for potential future provocations against NATO, including through Russian false flag provocations, sabotage, electronic warfare (EW) interference, and overflights.[21]

Zelensky submitted Acting Defense Minister Yevheniy Khmara’s candidacy as defense minister for Verkhovna Rada’s (Parliament) approval on August 18.[22] Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Speaker Ruslan Stefanchuk reported on August 18 that the Verkhovna Rada will consider the candidacy in the near future. Zelensky appointed Khmara interim defense minister on July 16.[23]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian state-owned bank Vnesheconombank (VEB) fired Chief Economist Andrey Klepach following media reporting of a negative economic assessment he offered that contradicts Russian President Vladimir Putin’s theory of victory in Ukraine.
• There is considerable evidence that Klepach’s assessment of the Russian economic problems aligns with reality, undermining the validity of Putin’s theory of victory.
• The Russian population is also reacting to the perception of economic decline in ways that may further damage Russian economic and fiscal policy.
• The Kremlin continues reiterating its determination to prevent Russia’s deteriorating economic realities from reducing its maximalist war aims by refusing to engage in meaningful negotiations to end the war.
• Moldovan President Maia Sandu stated on August 18 that Russia deliberately launches some of its drones into Moldovan and NATO airspace.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky submitted Acting Defense Minister Yevheniy Khmara’s candidacy as defense minister for Verkhovna Rada’s (Parliament) approval on August 18.
• Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, and Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russia on the night of August 17 to 18. Russia launched 147 drones against Ukraine overnight.  

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 17, 2026

Russia is expanding launch sites for its long-range strike drones along the border with Ukraine and Belarus, likely to intensify its strikes against Ukraine and possibly NATO. The Telegraph reported on August 16 that Russia has built 59 new drone-launching rails at 10 different sites along its border with Ukraine and Belarus and that each base can house over 1,000 drones.[1] The Telegraph cited analysis of a drone intelligence firm that suggests that about 20 of the new launch-rails are extensively long, indicating that Russian forces may use them to launch Geran-4 and Geran–5 jet-powered strike drones that can fly at a range of 450 to 850 kilometers and 950 to 1000 kilometers, respectively.[2] Russia is likely building these additional launch sites in western Russia to increase its capacity to launch larger long-range drone salvos as part of Russia‘s regular strike packages across Ukraine. Russia also likely seeks to specifically use jet-powered Geran-4 and Geran-5 drones to strike deeper into western Ukraine by leveraging the drones’ greater speed and survivability to penetrate Ukrainian air defenses.^[3] Russia is also likely moving its drone launching sites into western Russia in an attempt to protect Russian drone infrastructure from Ukrainian drones. Ukrainian forces have successfully struck Russian one-way attack drone launch points near occupied Donetsk City, for example, so establishing alternative launch points further away in Russia may improve their survivability.^[4] Russia also may be preparing to use its Rassvet satellite constellation (the Russian version of Starlink) by leveraging new launch sites, which could allow Russian forces to conduct higher-precision strikes against Ukraine‘s rear and air defense systems from multiple directions.[5] New Russian drone launch bases could also support future Russian strike packages against NATO, should the Kremlin decide to do so, as the bases would enable larger salvo volume, and the launching stations would support drone ranges into NATO territory.

A likely Russian strike vehicle — reportedly a Russian Banderol cruise missile / loitering munition — crashed in a corn field in Moldova on August 17, further demonstrating how the Kremlin has accepted the risk of Russian strike vehicles hitting countries bordering Ukraine during Russian strikes against western Ukraine. The Moldovan Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that an unidentified aerial object entered Moldovan airspace on August 17 and likely exploded near Talmaza (roughly 20 kilometers from the Ukrainian border), causing a fire.[6] The Ukrainian Air Force reported on August 17 that a Russian Banderol loitering munition flew into Moldovan airspace from Odesa Oblast.[7] The Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned the violation of Moldovan airspace and stated that Russian war against Ukraine continues to jeopardize Moldova’s security.[8] The Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation reported on August 17 that at least 12 likely Russian drones and missiles entered European airspace between July 15 and August 15.[9] Increasingly frequent Russian drone incursions into European and NATO airspace demonstrate that Russian President Vladimir Putin has adopted a reckless policy that accepts the risk of Russian drones entering European and NATO airspace as an acceptable consequence of its strikes against the westernmost parts of Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that these drone incursions are part of Russia's “Phase Zero” campaign that aims to set informational and psychological conditions for potential future provocations against NATO, including through Russian false flag provocations, drone incursions, sabotage, electronic warfare interference, and overflights.[10] ISW continues to assess that NATO may need to consider negotiating possible air defense agreements with Ukraine as a matter of self-defense against Russian drone strikes against NATO countries, regardless of whether the Russian drone incursions are accidental or intentional.[11]

Russia’s intensified missile strike campaign against Ukraine reportedly contributed to record high monthly civilian casualties in July 2026. The United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (UN HRMMU) reported on August 12 that conflict-related violence in Ukraine killed at least 437 civilians, including 17 children, and injured at least 2,610, including 166 children, in July 2026 — the highest number of civilian casualties in Ukraine since May 2022 and the highest number of child casualties since April 2022.[12] The UN HRMMU noted that the July 2026 civilian casualty rate is around a 30 percent increase from the previous record of at least 293 killed and 1,990 injured in June 2026 and that the vast majority of civilian casualties are in Ukrainian-controlled areas.[13] The UN HRMMU reported that missile and long-range drone strikes, particularly strikes against large population centers in Ukraine, remain the leading cause of the high number of civilian casualties, accounting for 183 civilian deaths and 967 civilian injuries, about 38 percent of the total civilian casualties in June 2026. The UN HRMMU reported that Russia’s short-range drone strikes caused the highest number of civilian casualties near the front thus far in the war in July 2026. Russian forces have recently intensified missile strikes against Ukraine and have launched at least 376 missiles in July 2026, the highest number of missiles launched in a month since Russia began large-scale missile and drone strikes against Ukraine.[14]

Key Takeaways:

• Russia is expanding launch sites for its long-range strike drones along the border with Ukraine and Belarus, likely to intensify its strikes against Ukraine and possibly NATO.
• A likely Russian strike vehicle — reportedly a Russian Banderol cruise missile / loitering munition — crashed in a corn field in Moldova on August 17, further demonstrating how the Kremlin has accepted the risk of Russian strike vehicles hitting countries bordering Ukraine during Russian strikes against western Ukraine.
• Russia’s intensified missile strike campaign against Ukraine reportedly contributed to record high monthly civilian casualties in July 2026.
• Ukrainian sources provided an updated battle damage assessment (BDA) of a recent Ukrainian strike against Rostov Oblast. Russia launched 128 drones against Ukraine overnight.
• Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces advanced on August 17.  

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 16, 2026

Ukrainian forces have struck seven of Wildberries’ 10 largest logistics centers since July 2026 as part of the ongoing Ukrainian strike campaign aimed at degrading the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) and dual-use logistics network. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on August 16 that Ukrainian forces struck another Wildberries warehouse on August 15-16, meaning Ukrainian forces have now struck and stopped operations at seven of Wildberries' 10 largest logistics centers.[1] The Ukrainian MoD reported that Ukraine’s August 15-16 overnight strikes hit Wildberries’ largest logistics hub (with an area of 250,000 square meters) in the Koledino Industrial Park in Podolsk, Moscow Oblast (roughly 420 kilometers from the international border). The Wildberries Press Service confirmed that Ukrainian strikes caused a fire at the facility and forced the company to reorganize its logistics chains.[2] Moscow Oblast Governor Andrey Vorobyov also acknowledged the strike on the Podolsk Wildberries facility.[3] Geolocated footage published on August 16 shows Ukrainian forces striking the warehouse in Koledino, causing a fire.[4]

The Ukrainian MoD reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a warehouse in Domodedovo, Moscow Oblast (roughly 430 kilometers from the international border), on the night of August 15 to 16.[5] Geolocated footage published on August 16 shows a fire at the Severnoye Domodedovo logistics complex.[6] Moscow Oblast Governor Andrey Vorobyov acknowledged the Ukrainian strike on Domodedovo.[7]

Ukrainian officials have noted that Ukrainian forces are striking Wildberries warehouse as the company is involved in supplying the Russian military, including with drone components and navigation equipment.[8] Reuters reported in early August 2026 that Ukrainian strikes had destroyed at least 1.18 million square meters of Wildberries’ warehouse space, representing one fifth of Wildberries’ total warehouse capacity at that time, and the impact of the Ukrainian strike campaign on the company has only grown since.[9] ISW continues to assess that a Ukrainian strike campaign against Wildberries logistics centers is putting additional pressure on Russia's economy and already-overstretched air defenses.[10] Russia's inability to protect Wildberries' largest logistics hubs despite the ongoing Ukrainian campaign against such targets demonstrates how Russia lacks a sufficient number of air defenses to protect all of the necessary infrastructure in its rear.

 Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces have struck seven of Wildberries’ 10 largest logistics centers since July 2026 as part of the ongoing Ukrainian strike campaign aimed at degrading the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) and dual-use logistics network.
• Ukrainian forces struck a Russian defense industrial facility in Rostov Oblast on the night of August 15 to 16.
• Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces made confirmed advances on August 16.
• Russia launched an unspecified number of Onyx anti-ship missiles, Iskander-M/S-400/KN-23 ballistic missiles, and Kh-59/69 cruise missiles, and 106 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 15, 2026

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers continue exaggerating Russian advances in the Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole directions as part of the systematic Russian cognitive warfare effort to propagate claims of expansive Russian gains for informational effects. Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov publicly inspected the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces (GoF) on August 15, and the Russian MoD claimed that the GoF seized Rybalske (southwest of Oleksandrivka) and 19 settlements as part of the grouping's summer campaign.[1] A Russian milblogger that frequently publishes footage from the area of responsibility (AoR) of the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces, Voin DV, published a large quantity of footage on August 14 and 15, which Voin DV claimed were filmed between August 12 and 14, showing Russian servicemembers waving flags reportedly in Yehorivka, Berezove, Kalynivske, Maliivka, Stepove, Novoheorhiivka, Novomykolaivka, Ternove, Verbove, Oleksiivka, Zlahoda, and east of Velykomykhailivka (all southeast of Oleksandrivka in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast); Voskresenka, Oleksandrohrad, Zeleny Hai, Myrne, Tovste, Novokhaste, Piddubne, Yalta, and Zaporizhzhia (all east and northeast of Oleksandrivka in Donetsk Oblast); Rybalske, Pryvilne, Rybne, Krasnohirske, and Novohryhorivka (all southeast of Oleksandrivka in Zaporizhia Oblast), Novoselivka, Luhivske, and Charivne (all southwest of Hulyaipole in Zaporizhia Oblast).[2] Voin DV claimed that the published footage is in response to recent Ukrainian flag-raising footage, likely referring to Ukraine’s August 12 announcement that Ukraine’s January — August 2026 counteroffensive in the Oleksandrivka direction liberated 26 villages.[3] ISW has reason to assess that much of the footage posted by Voin DV is not credible, as some pieces of footage are likely AI-generated or AI-altered, while other footage features older footage falsely presented as recent.[4] Voin DV claimed on August 15 that Russian forces seized Ukrainian positions west of the Oleksandrivka-Khrystoforivka line (southwest of Oleksandrivka), penetrated Ukrainian defenses west of Rivne and Kopany toward Shyroky and Chervonyi Yar (all north and northeast of Oleksandrivka), and advanced west of Novoselivka.[5] Another Russian milblogger claimed on August 15 that Russian forces advanced near Novoselivka, Dolynka (northwest of Hulyaipole), and Lyibytske and in the direction of Velykomykhailivka.[6] The Russian MoD's and Russian milbloggers' reporting patterns are consistent with the Kremlin’s systematic cognitive warfare effort to fabricate claims of Russian tactical successes in areas where Russian forces do not maintain enduring positions to falsely portray the frontline as collapsing, contrary to available evidence.[7]

Ukrainian forces used combined arms approaches to leverage drones in support of infantry forces and achieved elements of mechanized maneuver at the tactical level during the Ukrainian 2026 Oleksandrivka counteroffensive. The spokespersons of two Ukrainian brigades that participated in Ukraine’s 2026 counteroffensive operation in the Oleksandrivka direction reported on August 13 that Ukrainian brigades and drone units supported Ukrainian assault groups – likely mechanized infantry – to overcome active Russian resistance throughout the operation.[8] One spokesperson added that effective command and control contributed to Ukraine’s ability to advance in the Oleksandrivka direction, and a Ukrainian source with access to Ukrainian military sources reported that Ukrainian forces outright seized 19 of the 26 settlements that were entirely Russian-occupied (as opposed to being contested, or with Russian forces present on the settlement‘s or the settlements‘ outskirts. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on March 12 that Ukrainian forces in the Oleksandrivka direction were advancing both with dismounted infantry and with armored fighting vehicles (AFVs).[9] These reports suggest that Ukrainian forces managed to employ elements of mechanized maneuver at the tactical level to retake several settlements. The spokespersons additionally reported that Ukrainian forces liberated Filiya (northeast of Oleksandrivka) as part of the counteroffensive operation on a prior unspecified date. The other spokesperson noted that Ukrainian forces have full control over the liberated settlements and have cleared approaches to them.

Ukrainian forces conducted an FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile strike against an enterprise critical to Russia’s efforts to develop domestic satellite communications for the battlefield in Ukraine overnight on August 14 to 15. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 15 that Ukrainian forces struck the Progress Space Rocket Center in Samara City, Samara Oblast (roughly 1,488 kilometers from the Russian-Ukrainian border), causing a fire.[10] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the Progress Space Rocket Center is one of Russia’s rocket and space industry’s key enterprises and produces Soyuz-type launch vehicles, including the Soyuz-2.1b three-stage carrier rocket involved in the deployment of Russia‘s Rassvet satellite constellation — the Russian analogue of Starlink. Ukrainian defense manufacturer Fire Point confirmed on August 15 that Ukrainian forces used FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles to strike the Progress Space Rocket Center.[11] Geolocated footage published on August 15 shows smoke rising over the Progress Space Rocket Center.[12] Samara Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Fedorishchev acknowledged that Ukrainian forces struck an unspecified industrial facility in Samara City.[13] Russia reportedly began deploying Rassvet communications satellites into low orbit in late March 2026 after SpaceX cut off Russia’s access to Starlink terminals on February 1, 2026, and Russian forces reportedly already leverage the Rassvet satellites for precise drone strikes in Ukraine.[14]

RAND engineer Michael Bohnert amplified reporting on August 15 that two of five Ukrainian Flamingo cruise missiles struck the Progress Space Rocket Center despite Russia reportedly deploying four A-50U Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft to assist in intercepting Ukraine’s Flamingo cruise missiles.[15] Ukrainian and Russian sources recently reported Russia’s increased use of A-50U AWACS aircraft to identify and help intercept Ukrainian cruise missiles, including in Samara Oblast.[16] Russian forces reportedly have fewer than ten operational A-50 AWACS aircraft and four or five of the modernized A-50U variant as of June 1, 2025.[17]

Ukrainian forces appear to be targeting Russian ballistic missile launch infrastructure amidst Ukraine’s ongoing anti-ballistic missile interceptor shortage. Ukrainian officials reported on August 15 that Ukrainian forces struck the Savasleyka Air Base in Nizhny Novgorod Oblast (roughly 680 kilometers from the Russian-Ukrainian border), causing a fire.[18] The air base houses a branch of the Russian Ministry of Defense's 4th State Center for Aviation Personnel Training and Military Tests as well as Russian MiG-31K fighter jets that Russia uses to launch Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles against Ukraine.[19] A source that reports on successful Ukrainian strikes published footage on August 15 reportedly showing a fire at the air base.[20] Ukraine last struck the Savasleyka Air Base in August 2024 and April and June 2025.[21]

Key Takeaways:

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers continue exaggerating Russian advances in the Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole directions as part of the systematic Russian cognitive warfare effort to propagate claims of expansive Russian gains for informational effects.
• Ukrainian forces used combined arms approaches to leverage drones in support of infantry forces and achieved elements of mechanized maneuver at the tactical level during the Ukrainian 2026 Oleksandrivka counteroffensive.
• Ukrainian forces conducted an FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile strike against an enterprise critical to Russia’s efforts to develop domestic satellite communications for the battlefield in Ukraine overnight on August 14 to 15.
• Ukrainian forces appear to be targeting Russian ballistic missile launch infrastructure amidst Ukraine’s ongoing anti-ballistic missile interceptor shortage.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction.
• Russian forces launched 152 long-range drones at Ukraine overnight on August 14 to 15.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 14, 2026

Kremlin officials continue reiterating Russia’s unwillingness to engage in any meaningful peace negotiations that fail to fulfill Russia’s demands for Ukraine’s complete capitulation, despite Ukraine’s repeated negotiation efforts. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov emphasized on August 14 that Russia is unwilling to accept a ceasefire that freezes the current frontline and reiterated Russia’s commitment to continue the war in Ukraine until Russia can secure a “long-term, reliable, and sustainable” settlement on its own terms.[1] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on August 12 during a meeting with the United Russia Party’s expert council that Russia will suspend or end the war in Ukraine “exclusively” on Russia’s terms, obliquely referencing Russia’s maximalist war aims of Ukraine’s complete capitulation.[2] The Kremlin appears to be doubling down on outright rejection of the concept of negotiations in order to unite the Russian public around a pro-war platform ahead of the September 18-20, 2026 State Duma elections. The Kremlin’s routine rejection of all Ukrainian ceasefire and peace proposals signals Russia’s continued unwillingness to end the war in Ukraine on any terms that fall short of fulfilling Russia’s maximalist demands.[3] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has repeatedly reiterated his commitment to peace negotiations and a willingness to make meaningful compromises to end the war, despite Russian efforts to falsely paint Ukraine as the intransigent party in peace efforts.[4]

Russia rejected Turkish and Ukrainian proposals for a moratorium on strikes against maritime targets in the Black Sea, further underscoring the fact that Moscow is systematically refusing even the most limited diplomatic proposals from Ukraine and third-party states. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan stated on August 8 that Turkey proposed to Russia and Ukraine a bilateral moratorium on strikes against merchant ships in the Black Sea.[5] Reuters reported on August 13, citing a source familiar with the matter, that Ukraine sent an offer to Russia through an unspecified third party suggesting that Russia and Ukraine both halt strikes against civilian maritime targets in the Black Sea over fears of the impact of such strikes on global food supply.[6] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on August 14 in response to Fidan's August 8 statement that Russia did not receive an official request from Turkey for such a moratorium, but that Russia does not advise a mechanism similar to the 2022-2023 Black Sea grain initiative.[7] The 2022-2023 Black Sea Grain Initiative, which the United Nations (UN) and Turkey brokered with Russia, allowed cargo ships to sail between ports in Odesa Oblast and the Bosphorus Strait without fear of Russian drone strikes.[8] Russian officials repeatedly threatened to dissolve the Black Sea Grain Initiative and refused to extend the deal, leading to its eventual collapse in July 2023.[9] Zakharova claimed that there is no basis for a “half measure” that would give Ukraine a temporary respite, effectively rejecting the Turkish and Ukrainian moratorium proposals. Russian forces intensified their strike campaign against Ukrainian port infrastructure and internationally flagged vessels in the Black Sea throughout June, July, and August 2026 in order to degrade Ukraine’s economy and disrupt Ukraine‘s ability to export grain.[10] Ukrainian and Turkish proposals follow Ukraine’s intermediate- and long-range strike campaigns that have targeted Russian ground and maritime supply routes and Russian tankers, including those belonging to its shadow fleet, in the Azov-Black Sea region in July 2026.[11] Ukraine has notably decreased the frequency of these strikes following a request from US Vice President JD Vance near the end of July 2026.[12] Zakharova’s blatant rejection of the Turkish and Ukrainian proposed limited ceasefire in the Black Sea demonstrates Russia’s continued unwillingness to engage in any meaningful negotiations, even those limited in scope.

The technological offense-defense drone race in Ukraine is advancing rapidly and expanding the kill zone. Former Ukrainian service member and drone warfare expert Dmytro Putiata reported on August 2 that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian first-person view (FPV) drone that was operating radio-controlled frequency hopping and spread spectrum (FHSS) technology, enabling the drone to evade Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) jamming and fly up to 40 kilometers in depth.[13] FHSS allows Russian drone operators to rapidly switch frequency bands, significantly increasing the drone’s EW resistance. FHSS-enabled drones will likely contribute to the expanding kill zone — the area (currently within 15 to 25 kilometers from the frontline) wherein the saturation of tactical strike and reconnaissance drones poses an elevated risk to any personnel or equipment.[14] The FHSS-enabled FPV drone represents the latest Russian technological adaptation to evade Ukrainian EW jamming. Russian forces previously began using drones operated on fiber optic wires to mitigate EW jamming in Fall 2024, after which Ukrainian forces responded by innovating and investing in interceptor capabilities.[15] Ukraine will likely continue to develop capabilities aimed at countering Russian FHSS-enabled FPV drones in order to reset the technological offense-defense drone race.

Key Takeaways:

• Kremlin officials continue reiterating Russia’s unwillingness to engage in any meaningful peace negotiations that fail to fulfill Russia’s demands for Ukraine’s complete capitulation, despite Ukraine’s repeated negotiation efforts.
• Russia rejected Turkish and Ukrainian proposals for a moratorium on strikes against maritime targets in the Black Sea, further underscoring the fact that Moscow is systematically refusing even the most limited diplomatic proposals from Ukraine and third-party states.
• The technological offense-defense drone race in Ukraine is advancing rapidly and expanding the kill zone.
• Ukrainian forces hit a Russian oil refinery in Leningrad Oblast and a Wildberries warehouse in Tver Oblast overnight on August 13 to 14. Russian forces launched 112 drones against Ukraine overnight.
• Russian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 13, 2026

Russian President Vladimir Putin visited the Kuril Islands, whose occupation by Russia Japan disputes, for the first time on August 13, likely in response to the more assertive defense policy Japan has recently adopted. Putin visited the largest Kuril Island, Iturup – which Japan calls Etorofu – and held several meetings, including with Sakhalin Oblast Governor Valery Limarenko, Russian Pacific Fleet Commander-in-Chief Admiral Viktor Liina, Sakhalin Oblast Federal Security Service (FSB) Border Service Head Sergey Makhorin, and the acting commander of the Russian 68th Guards Army Corps (Eastern Military District [EMD]), Alexey Shvedov.[1] Elements of the 68^th Guards Army Corps are fighting in the Oleksandrivka direction.[2] Putin’s visit to the disputed Kuril Islands is likely part of the Kremlin’s response to Japan’s 2026 Defense White Paper, published earlier in August, and aims to undermine Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s efforts to improve Japan’s defense capabilities.[3] Putin criticized the Japanese White Paper for identifying Russia as one of Japan’s critical threats.[4] Putin’s comments addressed the need for Russia to “ensure security” on “all of its borders, all of its territories,” a noteworthy statement in the context of frequent Russian air operations requiring Japan to scramble aircraft in response, as noted by the White Paper.[5] Takaichi strongly condemned Putin’s visit to Etorofu and reiterated Japan’s territorial claims to the Kuril Islands.[6] Russia and Japan never signed a formal peace treaty at the end of the Second World War, and the dispute over the Kuril Islands remains, which Japan refers to as the Northern Territories.[7]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues emphasizing Ukraine’s need for US-produced Patriot interceptor missiles to defend against Russian ballistic missile strikes during Winter 2026-2027. Zelensky stated in a CNN interview aired on August 13 that Ukraine needs significantly more Patriot interceptor missiles than it is receiving to repel larger and more frequent Russian ballistic missile strikes.[8] Zelensky noted that Russia is exploiting Ukraine’s very low Patriot interceptor missile stockpiles and is launching twice as many ballistic missiles per month as it did in 2025.

Polish Deputy Defense Minister Magdalena Sobkowiak-Czarnecka stated on August 13 that the Polish government is considering supplying Patriot interceptors to Ukraine and could make a decision in the coming days.[9] Sobkowiak-Czarnecka noted that Polish Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Wladyslaw Kosiniak-Kamysz is inclined to approve the transfer to ensure that Ukraine can intercept Russian missiles over Ukrainian territory before they fly into Polish airspace. A Russian Kh-101 cruise missile crashed in eastern Poland on the night of July 29 to 30, although no Russian ballistic missiles have yet landed in Poland.[10] Russia’s increasing use of ballistic missiles reflects Putin’s belief that Russia can exploit the ongoing Patriot interceptor missile shortage to pressure Ukraine into accepting Russia’s maximalist demands while delaying meaningful negotiations and protracting the war in Ukraine.[11]

An improvised explosive device (IED) explosion in occupied Sevastopol reportedly killed Russian Captain 1st Rank Robert Shageev on August 13.[12] Captain Shageev reportedly served as commander of the Zaporizhzhia – Ukraine’s only submarine at the time – before defecting to Russia in 2014 and serving as the deputy commander of the Russian 4th Separate Submarine Brigade (Black Sea Fleet).[13] Russian officials confirmed the death of an individual serving in the Russian Ministry of Defense but not his identity.[14]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin visited the Kuril Islands, whose occupation by Russia Japan disputes, for the first time on August 13, likely in response to the more assertive defense policy Japan has recently adopted.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues emphasizing Ukraine’s need for US-produced Patriot interceptor missiles to defend against Russian ballistic missile strikes during the winter 2026/2027.
• An improvised explosive device (IED) explosion in occupied Sevastopol reportedly killed Russian Captain 1st Rank Robert Shageev on August 13.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a large strike against Russian oil infrastructure and Wildberries facilities in the Bashkortostan Republic on the night of August 12 to 13. Russia launched 133 drones against Ukraine overnight.
• Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk and Slovyansk directions.  

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 12, 2026

Ukrainian officials announced on August 12 the results of Ukraine's Oleksandrivka direction counteroffensive, which took place between January and August 2026. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi, Deputy Chief of the General Staff Major General Ihor Skybyuk, and Airborne Assault Forces Commander Major General Oleh Apostol on August 12 to discuss the results of the Ukrainian counteroffensive operation in the Oleksandrivka direction, which lasted from January 29 to August 12, 2026.[1] Zelensky reported that the operation aimed to disrupt the Russian Spring-Summer 2026 offensive and push Russian forces from Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. The Ukrainian Airborne Assault Forces Command reported on August 12 that Ukrainian forces liberated over 745 square kilometers of territory in the Oleksandrivka direction and cleared over 300 square kilometers of Russian infiltrators since January 29, 2026.[2] ISW assesses that Ukrainian forces have liberated roughly 626.69 square kilometers in the Oleksandrivka direction and northern part of the Hulyaipole direction (where Ukrainian forces also counterattacked) between January 29 and August 12, 2026, but ISW’s conservative mapping methodology likely underestimates Ukrainian advances. [3]

The Ukrainian military command reported that Ukrainian forces liberated 26 total settlements in Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhia oblasts as part of the Oleksandrivka counteroffensive operations. These settlements include Sichneve, Maliivka, Stepove, Berezove, Ternove, Zaporizke, Novomykolaivka, Kalynivske, Pryvillya, Tsehelne, Zlohoda, and Novoheorhiivka (all southeast of Oleksandrivka) in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; Voskresenka, Oleksandrohrad, Myrne, Piddubne, Tovste, Zirka, Yalta, Hrushivske, Novokhatske, and Zeleny Hai (all east or northeast of Oleksandrivka) in Donetsk Oblast; and Novohryhorivka, Rybne, Krasnohirske, and Pryvilne (all southeast of Oleksandrivka) in Zaporizhia Oblast.[4] The Ukrainian Airborne Forces Command noted that Ukrainian forces conducted some of the Ukrainian flag raisings at a “safe distance” from the real Ukrainian positions for operational security reasons, suggesting that Ukrainian forces have likely since advanced beyond at least some of the above-mentioned settlements.[5] Geolocated footage published on August 11 indicates that Ukrainian forces hold positions southeast of Ternuvate and Vozdvyzhivka (southwest of Oleksandrivka) in areas where Russian sources claimed Russian forces had advanced, indicating that much of the Russian claims of advance in the Oleksandrivka direction and near the northern seam with the Hulyaipole direction are likely largely exaggerated.[6]

The Oleksandrivka counteroffensive operations showcase Ukraine’s ability to make relatively significant tactical advances and reintroduce limited aspects of mechanized maneuver on localized segments of the frontline. The Oleksandrivka counteroffensive was one of the two mutually reinforcing Ukrainian drives in the Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole directions that began in late 2025 and early 2026 to push Russian forces from Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and undermine Russian preparations for their Spring-Summer 2026 offensive.[7] Ukraine’s tactical successes in the Oleksandrivka direction in the first eight months of 2026 are likely the result of several mutually supporting factors, including the maturation of the Ukrainian command’s operational planning, a coherent suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses (SEAD / DEAD) campaign, the intensifying intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian logistics, Ukraine’s tactical-level drone overmatch, and the surprise February 1 Starlink cutoff for Russian forces operating in Ukraine.[8] The Oleksandrivka counteroffensive operations have likely had cascading effects on other sectors of the front, forcing Russian forces to choose between defending against the Ukrainian counterattacks in the Oleksandrivka direction or allocating manpower and materiel to offensive operations elsewhere on the frontline amid a declining Russian recruitment rate.[9] ISW assesses that Russian forces lost about 233.74 square kilometers across the entire frontline when only accounting for advances from January 29 to August 12 and only seized or infiltrated into 382.98 kilometers across the frontline in the same time period, by contrast, further highlighting the significance of Ukrainian tactical successes in the Oleksandrivka direction in the same time period.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to warn that Russia is preparing for large-scale involuntary reserve call-ups after the September 2026 Russian State Duma elections.^[10] Zelensky stated on August 11 that Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reporting indicates that Russia is planning to mobilize “several hundred thousand” personnel by the end of 2026 and the same number in 2027. Zelensky noted that Russia plans to continue its voluntary recruitment drives during this time. Zelensky recently warned that Russian President Vladimir Putin is conducting low-profile preparations to potentially mobilize 500,000 troops as Russia has been struggling to recruit enough personnel to replace its battlefield losses.[11] Zelensky noted that Russia suffers about 30,000 personnel casualties per month, of which about 60 percent are killed in action (KIA). Russia’s recruitment challenges and high casualties will likely force Putin to make a difficult decision about conducting some form of mobilization to augment volunteer recruitment by the end of the year. ISW continues to assess that any form of compulsory military mobilization is a personal decision for Putin, which is contingent on his perception of the battlefield situation and the stability and integrity of the Kremlin.[12]

The Kremlin is likely seeking to deter Japan from adopting a more assertive defensive posture it perceives as unfavorable to Russian interests. Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Russian Pacific Fleet Commander-in-Chief Admiral Viktor Liina during the final stage of Pacific Fleet exercises in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Sakhalin Oblast on August 12, and Putin and Liina largely used their public remarks to criticize Japan‘s defensive posture.[13] Putin claimed that the “potential for conflict" in the Asia-Pacific region is growing as NATO is “seeping“ into the region, establishing new military-political blocs and deploying new weapons systems. Putin notably criticized Japan’s decision to list Russia as a primary threat in its annual Defense White Paper, which Japan published on August 4.[14] Putin claimed that Russia is “not threatening Japan” and that Japan’s escalating rhetoric and sanctions against Russia for the war in Ukraine are unprovoked. Putin claimed that Russia has no territorial claims against Japan but implied that Japan’s territorial claims over the Kuril Islands are threatening to Russia. Putin also criticized the current Japanese government and called for relations to return to the state they were in under former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Liina largely amplified Putin’s main talking points, criticizing Japanese defense policy and spending. Putin’s and Liina’s comments likely aim to undermine Japan’s efforts to improve its defense capabilities and address challenges in its security environment. The Kremlin’s response to Japan’s 2026 Defense White Paper is notably more muted than the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) response, which included accusing Japan of “hyping up” the threat of the PRC and using the PRC as an excuse to remilitarize.[15] Putin likely intended to signal that Japan should adjust its defense policy in line with Russian interests while maintaining a degree of rhetorical distance from the PRC’s harsh response to Japan’s 2026 white paper.

Putin is also attempting to deter European Union (EU) seizures of Russian shadow fleet vessels. Putin also used his meeting with Liina to criticize the EU’s “recent decisions” related to Russia’s shadow fleet vessels, likely referring to the EU’s adoption of legal mechanisms that expand powers of European authorities to inspect Russian shadow fleet vessels and the 21st package of EU sanctions announced on July 23, 2026 that target Russian shadow fleet tankers and oil refineries.[16] Putin criticized the EU’s legal mechanisms to seize shadow fleet vessels and sell their cargo, as well as threatening that Russia may “respond in kind” to Western vessels sailing through the Pacific Fleet’s area of responsibility. Liina responded that the Pacific Fleet has the capacity to inspect and detain vessels of “unfriendly states.” European states have been taking increasingly concerted steps to counter Russia’s shadow fleet in 2026.[17] Putin likely feels additional pressure to protect these vessels as Ukraine’s strike campaigns against Russia’s oil refining infrastructure and vessels transporting oil in the Black and Azov seas further constrain Russian energy revenues that fund the war effort.[18]

Russia will likely continue to rely on its use of a relatively small number of jet-powered Geran drones in its nightly strikes against Ukraine until Ukraine can develop sufficient countermeasures and the technological offense-defense race resets. Ukraine's GUR told Ukrainian military outlet Militarnyi on August 12 that Russia produces about 3,000 Geran-4 and Geran-5 jet-powered strike drones per month at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in the Republic of Tatarstan and at other Russian defense industrial enterprises.[19] The GUR added that Russia seeks to expand its production capacity at the Alabuga SEZ, with Militaryi noting that satellite imagery captured in early July 2026 showed ongoing construction at the enterprises that began in May 2026.[20] The GUR stated that Russia halted its production of Geran-3 drones, a jet-powered adaptation of the Geran-2 equipped with a Kometa-M12 anti-jamming navigation system, in line with recent statements from GUR Deputy Head Major General Vadym Skibitskyi that Russia is focusing production on Geran-4 and Geran-5 drones.[21] The GUR noted that Russian forces are increasing their use of Geran-4 and Geran-5 drones in their strike packages due to the drones' technical abilities that allow them to penetrate Ukrainian air defenses. The GUR stated that Russia has stockpiled about 6,200 Geran-type drones for future strikes against Ukraine as of August 2026.[22] The GUR added that Russia’s limited production capacity does not permit Russia to sustain repeated strike packages with very large numbers of drones, noting that Russian forces now typically launch 150 to 300 Geran drones per strike package as Russia builds up its stockpiles — as opposed to very large salvoes of 600 to 1,000 drones that have characterized Russian strike packages in early 2026.

Russia may be able to reduce the number of drones it launches nightly as it shifts towards using more powerful jet-powered drones that Ukraine struggles to intercept. Russia is also currently focusing on its use of ballistic missiles to take advantage of Ukraine's lack of anti-ballistic interceptors, and Russia does not require large numbers of drones to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses to allow the ballistic missiles to penetrate and strike their targets.[23] Russia may transition to larger drone packages in the future, however, in an attempt to again overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses once Ukraine develops sufficient countermeasures to intercept the jet-powered drones at a high rate. The dynamic between Russian drone production and Ukrainian interception innovations is exemplary of the offense-defense cycle of innovation and adaptation that has characterized the technical dimension of the war thus far.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian officials announced on August 12 the results of Ukraine's Oleksandrivka direction counteroffensive, which took place between January and August 2026.
• The Oleksandrivka counteroffensive operations showcase Ukraine’s ability to make relatively significant tactical advances and reintroduce limited aspects of mechanized maneuver on localized segments of the frontline.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to warn that Russia is preparing for large-scale involuntary reserve call-ups after the September 2026 Russian State Duma elections.
• The Kremlin is likely seeking to deter Japan from adopting a more assertive defensive posture it perceives as unfavorable to Russian interests.
• Putin is also attempting to deter European Union (EU) seizures of Russian shadow fleet vessels.
• Russia will likely continue to rely on its use of a relatively small number of jet-powered Geran drones in its nightly strikes against Ukraine until Ukraine can develop sufficient countermeasures and the technological offense-defense race resets.
• Russia launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile, one Kh-31P anti-radar missile, an unspecified number of Kh-35 cruise missiles, and 138 drones against Ukraine overnight.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a large strike against Russian naval and grain infrastructure in Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, on the night of August 11 to 12.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction. Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 11, 2026

Russian forces conducted another combined ballistic/quasi-ballistic missile and drone strike against Ukraine on the night of August 10 to 11, heavily targeting civilian and industrial infrastructure in Kyiv and Zaporizhzhia cities. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched an unspecified number of Iskander-M ballistic missiles, North Korean-provided KN-23 ballistic missiles, and Zirkon anti-ship missiles (which fly on ballistic trajectories) from Kursk, Rostov, Voronezh, and Oryol oblasts.[1] Russian forces also launched 120 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type strike drones, and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force added that most of the Shahed-type drones were jet-powered. Ukrainian forces reportedly downed 98 drones; an unspecified number and type of Russian air targets struck 21 locations; and debris fell at five. The Ukrainian Air Force typically reports how many missiles Russian forces launch and how many Ukrainian forces down. Bloomberg reported on August 11, noting the shift in the Air Force's reporting, that a source stated that Ukrainian authorities changed the format as a security measure in response to Russian strikes.[2]

The Ukrainian Air Force reported that the main targets of the overnight strikes were Kyiv Oblast and Zaporizhzhia City.[3] Ukrainian officials reported that a Russian ballistic missile struck a children's hospital in Kyiv City, damaging a gas pipe and the building's glazing.[4] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Russian missile and guided glide bomb strikes against Zaporizhzhia City killed at least six and injured at least 19.[5] The Metinvest Group confirmed that Russian forces conducted a ballistic missile strike against Zaporizhstal, a steel and pig iron manufacturer in Zaporizhzhia City, killing seven employees and injuring 21.[6] Metinvest reported that the strikes damaged Zaporizhstal's coke and blast furnace production plants and stopped production. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed that Russian forces struck Zaporizhstal and also claimed strikes against Ukraine's postal service Nova Poshta and a transport and logistics center in Kyiv City.[7] Zelensky stated that Russian forces also struck electrical substations in Kherson and Kharkiv oblasts overnight and unspecified infrastructure in Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, and Mykolaiv oblasts.

Russian forces are likely launching small numbers of North Korean-provided KN-23 ballistic missiles in nightly strike packages in an attempt to battle-test the missiles and improve their accuracy. Zelensky reported on August 11 that Russian forces launched a North-Korean provided KN-23 missile against Zaporizhzhia City.[8] Russia recently resumed using KN-23 missiles to strike Ukraine, striking Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on the night of July 29 to 30 with a KN-23 for the first time since Summer 2025.[9] Ukrainian officials recently reported that North Korea sent at least 40 KN-23 missiles to Russia, and Russia appears to be launching very few KN-23 missiles at a time.[10] Russia may be testing the missiles after reports that earlier North-Korean provided KN-23s were highly inaccurate and that Russia has since worked with North Korea to improve the missiles.[11] ISW continues to assess that the addition of more North Korean missiles to Russia’s arsenal will allow Russia to intensify its ballistic missile strikes against Ukraine in the near future without having to dip into its S-400 and Zirkon missile stocks.[12]

Russia may be preparing to base North Korean missileers and ballistic missiles at a training center currently under construction in Voronezh Oblast. South Korean outlet EToday reported on August 11 that it obtained Voronezh Oblast government documents outlining ongoing plans to finish construction on a Rosgvardia training center in the region by the end of 2026.[13] EToday suggested that North Korean forces may deploy to the new training center, citing Ukrainian officials' recent reports that Russia plans to base a North Korean missile unit in Voronezh Oblast. It is unclear if North Korean forces are going to deploy to the base in Voronezh Oblast. However, if they were to deploy, it is unclear if the North Koreans would deploy before construction is complete. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Andriy Chernyak stated in early August 2026 that a North Korean missile unit would deploy to Russia’s 112th Missile Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army, Moscow Military District) in Voronezh Oblast and that the North Korean unit may be equipped with 120 ballistic missiles — likely KN-23s.[14] The 112th Missile Brigade is permanently based in Shuya, Ivanovo Oblast, and received Iskander-M ballistic missiles in 2014.[15] Russia likely created a temporary forward base for the brigade in Voronezh Oblast, which is closer to Ukraine than Ivanovo Oblast, in order to reduce the distance and flight time between the missile launch point and the intended targets in Ukraine.

The Russian Supreme Court disqualified Russian opposition party Yabloko from the September 2026 State Duma elections, likely in order to prevent Russians from having the option to support the party's anti-war platform. The Russian Supreme Court upheld a lawsuit from the Rodina Party on August 10 and annulled the registration of Yabloko candidates from the Duma elections.[16] Rodina's lawsuit from August 7 advocated for Yabloko’s disqualification from the Duma elections for violating copyright and promoting extremist slogans.[17] Former Russian space agency Roscosmos head and current Zaporizhia Oblast occupation senator Dmitry Rogozin founded Rodina in 2003.[18] A Russian Central Electoral Commission representative cited Russian Federal Service for Financial Monitoring (Rosfinmonitoring) data in court, alleging that the Yabloko Party received foreign funding from the United States and Germany.[19]

Yabloko's exclusion from the upcoming Duma elections represents a further consolidation of the Russian political system around the war in Ukraine. Yabloko has been campaigning under the slogan “For peace and freedom” while advocating for a ceasefire in Ukraine.[20] Yabloko was the only registered party that opposed the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.[21] The Kremlin has repeatedly cracked down on Yabloko Party members in recent years, opening criminal cases against them for alleged violations of foreign agent laws and disqualifying top Yabloko candidates from pre-war Duma elections.[22] Yabloko Party founder Grigory Yavlinsky stated on August 10 that the Supreme Court’s decision shows that the Kremlin is frightened of Yabloko’s anti-war rhetoric and noted that Yabloko will appeal the decision.[23] The Kremlin is likely aware of growing public discontent about the war in Ukraine as Ukrainian strikes against the Russian rear lead to mounting costs at home, and fears that Yabloko may be able to capture some of this discontent, even if marginally.

The Kremlin likely also aims to reduce the risk of the ruling United Russia Party not achieving the Kremlin's desired outcome in the upcoming elections. Yabloko secured only 1.34 percent of the federal party-list proportional vote during the 2021 Russian State Duma elections, failing to pass the five percent threshold to secure Duma seats.[24] Yabloko has not run a candidate since the full-scale invasion began in 2022. Yabloko has been gaining marginal popularity in recent months, and party supporters protested in front of the Supreme Court on August 10, but Yabloko nonetheless likely poses only a limited threat to United Russia and the Kremlin-controlled opposition parties.[25] The Kremlin's efforts against Yabloko show that it is unwilling to risk even losing a few percentage points in the elections, suggesting that the Kremlin intends to use the Duma elections as a referendum on its war in Ukraine. Russian elections are neither free nor fair, and the Kremlin controls the final tallies, but Moscow is likely fearful that too much visible public support for Yabloko will jeopardize the public's willingness to believe the numbers the Kremlin puts forward in September.[26]

The Kremlin was permissive of Yabloko in earlier years of the war, but the growing persecution of the party and its eventual disqualification show how its priorities have shifted. Yavlinsky advocated for a ceasefire in Ukraine as part of his presidential bid in December 2023, and the Kremlin likely allowed Yavlinsky to criticize the Russian government's war policies at that time in order to preserve its veneer of electoral legitimacy.[27] The party's 2026 disqualification suggests that the Kremlin is less concerned about making its elections seem free and fair to the Russian people and international observers than it was at the start of the full-scale invasion and is more worried about anti-war sentiment gaining popularity in the country.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted another combined ballistic/quasi-ballistic missile and drone strike against Ukraine on the night of August 10 to 11, heavily targeting civilian and industrial infrastructure in Kyiv and Zaporizhzhia cities.
• Russian forces are likely launching small numbers of North Korean-provided KN-23 ballistic missiles in nightly strike packages in an attempt to battle-test the missiles and improve their accuracy.
• Russia may be preparing to base North Korean missileers and ballistic missiles at a training center currently under construction in Voronezh Oblast.
• The Russian Supreme Court disqualified Russian opposition party Yabloko from the September 2026 State Duma elections, likely in order to prevent Russians from having the option to support the party's anti-war platform.
• Yabloko's exclusion from the upcoming Duma elections represents a further consolidation of the Russian political system around the war in Ukraine.
• The Kremlin likely also aims to reduce the risk of the ruling United Russia Party not achieving the Kremlin's desired outcome in the upcoming elections.
• The Kremlin was permissive of Yabloko in earlier years of the war, but the growing persecution of the party and its eventual disqualification show how its priorities have shifted.
• Ukrainian forces continue their long-range strike campaigns against Wildberries warehouses and oil refineries in Russia.
• Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces made confirmed advances on August 11.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 11, 2026

Russian forces conducted another combined ballistic/quasi-ballistic missile and drone strike against Ukraine on the night of August 10 to 11, heavily targeting civilian and industrial infrastructure in Kyiv and Zaporizhzhia cities. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched an unspecified number of Iskander-M ballistic missiles, North Korean-provided KN-23 ballistic missiles, and Zirkon anti-ship missiles (which fly on ballistic trajectories) from Kursk, Rostov, Voronezh, and Oryol oblasts.[1] Russian forces also launched 120 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type strike drones, and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force added that most of the Shahed-type drones were jet-powered. Ukrainian forces reportedly downed 98 drones; an unspecified number and type of Russian air targets struck 21 locations; and debris fell at five. The Ukrainian Air Force typically reports how many missiles Russian forces launch and how many Ukrainian forces down. Bloomberg reported on August 11, noting the shift in the Air Force's reporting, that a source stated that Ukrainian authorities changed the format as a security measure in response to Russian strikes.[2]

The Ukrainian Air Force reported that the main targets of the overnight strikes were Kyiv Oblast and Zaporizhzhia City.[3] Ukrainian officials reported that a Russian ballistic missile struck a children's hospital in Kyiv City, damaging a gas pipe and the building's glazing.[4] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Russian missile and guided glide bomb strikes against Zaporizhzhia City killed at least six and injured at least 19.[5] The Metinvest Group confirmed that Russian forces conducted a ballistic missile strike against Zaporizhstal, a steel and pig iron manufacturer in Zaporizhzhia City, killing seven employees and injuring 21.[6] Metinvest reported that the strikes damaged Zaporizhstal's coke and blast furnace production plants and stopped production. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed that Russian forces struck Zaporizhstal and also claimed strikes against Ukraine's postal service Nova Poshta and a transport and logistics center in Kyiv City.[7] Zelensky stated that Russian forces also struck electrical substations in Kherson and Kharkiv oblasts overnight and unspecified infrastructure in Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, and Mykolaiv oblasts.

Russian forces are likely launching small numbers of North Korean-provided KN-23 ballistic missiles in nightly strike packages in an attempt to battle-test the missiles and improve their accuracy. Zelensky reported on August 11 that Russian forces launched a North-Korean provided KN-23 missile against Zaporizhzhia City.[8] Russia recently resumed using KN-23 missiles to strike Ukraine, striking Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on the night of July 29 to 30 with a KN-23 for the first time since Summer 2025.[9] Ukrainian officials recently reported that North Korea sent at least 40 KN-23 missiles to Russia, and Russia appears to be launching very few KN-23 missiles at a time.[10] Russia may be testing the missiles after reports that earlier North-Korean provided KN-23s were highly inaccurate and that Russia has since worked with North Korea to improve the missiles.[11] ISW continues to assess that the addition of more North Korean missiles to Russia’s arsenal will allow Russia to intensify its ballistic missile strikes against Ukraine in the near future without having to dip into its S-400 and Zirkon missile stocks.[12]

Russia may be preparing to base North Korean missileers and ballistic missiles at a training center currently under construction in Voronezh Oblast. South Korean outlet EToday reported on August 11 that it obtained Voronezh Oblast government documents outlining ongoing plans to finish construction on a Rosgvardia training center in the region by the end of 2026.[13] EToday suggested that North Korean forces may deploy to the new training center, citing Ukrainian officials' recent reports that Russia plans to base a North Korean missile unit in Voronezh Oblast. It is unclear if North Korean forces are going to deploy to the base in Voronezh Oblast. However, if they were to deploy, it is unclear if the North Koreans would deploy before construction is complete. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Andriy Chernyak stated in early August 2026 that a North Korean missile unit would deploy to Russia’s 112th Missile Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army, Moscow Military District) in Voronezh Oblast and that the North Korean unit may be equipped with 120 ballistic missiles — likely KN-23s.[14] The 112th Missile Brigade is permanently based in Shuya, Ivanovo Oblast, and received Iskander-M ballistic missiles in 2014.[15] Russia likely created a temporary forward base for the brigade in Voronezh Oblast, which is closer to Ukraine than Ivanovo Oblast, in order to reduce the distance and flight time between the missile launch point and the intended targets in Ukraine.

The Russian Supreme Court disqualified Russian opposition party Yabloko from the September 2026 State Duma elections, likely in order to prevent Russians from having the option to support the party's anti-war platform. The Russian Supreme Court upheld a lawsuit from the Rodina Party on August 10 and annulled the registration of Yabloko candidates from the Duma elections.[16] Rodina's lawsuit from August 7 advocated for Yabloko’s disqualification from the Duma elections for violating copyright and promoting extremist slogans.[17] Former Russian space agency Roscosmos head and current Zaporizhia Oblast occupation senator Dmitry Rogozin founded Rodina in 2003.[18] A Russian Central Electoral Commission representative cited Russian Federal Service for Financial Monitoring (Rosfinmonitoring) data in court, alleging that the Yabloko party received foreign funding from the United States and Germany.[19]

Yabloko's exclusion from the upcoming Duma elections represents a further consolidation of the Russian political system around the war in Ukraine. Yabloko has been campaigning under the slogan “For peace and freedom” while advocating for a ceasefire in Ukraine.[20] Yabloko was the only registered party that opposed the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.[21] The Kremlin has repeatedly cracked down on Yabloko party members in recent years, opening criminal cases against them for alleged violations of foreign agent laws and disqualifying top Yabloko candidates from pre-war Duma elections.[22] Yabloko party founder Grigory Yavlinsky stated on August 10 that the Supreme Court’s decision shows that the Kremlin is frightened of Yabloko’s anti-war rhetoric and noted that Yabloko will appeal the decision.[23] The Kremlin is likely aware of growing public discontent about the war in Ukraine as Ukrainian strikes against the Russian rear lead to mounting costs at home, and fears that Yabloko may be able to capture some of this discontent, even if marginally.

The Kremlin likely also aims to reduce the risk of the ruling United Russia party not achieving the Kremlin's desired outcome in the upcoming elections. Yabloko secured only 1.34 percent of the federal party-list proportional vote during the 2021 Russian State Duma elections, failing to pass the five percent threshold to secure Duma seats.[24] Yabloko has not run a candidate since the full-scale invasion began in 2022. Yabloko has been gaining marginal popularity in recent months, and party supporters protested in front of the Supreme Court on August 10, but Yabloko nonetheless likely poses only a limited threat to United Russia and the Kremlin-controlled opposition parties.[25] The Kremlin's efforts against Yabloko show that it is unwilling to risk even losing a few percentage points in the elections, suggesting that the Kremlin intends to use the Duma elections as a referendum on its war in Ukraine. Russian elections are neither free nor fair, and the Kremlin controls the final tallies, but Moscow is likely fearful that too much visible public support for Yabloko will jeopardize the public's willingness to believe the numbers the Kremlin puts forward in September.[26]

The Kremlin was permissive of Yabloko in earlier years of the war, but the growing persecution of the party and its eventual disqualification show how its priorities have shifted. Yavlinsky advocated for a ceasefire in Ukraine as part of his presidential bid in December 2023, and the Kremlin likely allowed Yavlinsky to criticize the Russian government's war policies at that time in order to preserve its veneer of electoral legitimacy.[27] The party's 2026 disqualification suggests that the Kremlin is less concerned about making its elections seem free and fair to the Russian people and international observers than it was at the start of the full-scale invasion and is more worried about anti-war sentiment gaining popularity in the country.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted another combined ballistic/quasi-ballistic missile and drone strike against Ukraine on the night of August 10 to 11, heavily targeting civilian and industrial infrastructure in Kyiv and Zaporizhzhia cities.
• Russian forces are likely launching small numbers of North Korean-provided KN-23 ballistic missiles in nightly strike packages in an attempt to battle-test the missiles and improve their accuracy.
• Russia may be preparing to base North Korean missileers and ballistic missiles at a training center currently under construction in Voronezh Oblast.
• The Russian Supreme Court disqualified Russian opposition party Yabloko from the September 2026 State Duma elections, likely in order to prevent Russians from having the option to support the party's anti-war platform.
• Yabloko's exclusion from the upcoming Duma elections represents a further consolidation of the Russian political system around the war in Ukraine.
• The Kremlin likely also aims to reduce the risk of the ruling United Russia party not achieving the Kremlin's desired outcome in the upcoming elections.
• The Kremlin was permissive of Yabloko in earlier years of the war, but the growing persecution of the party and its eventual disqualification show how its priorities have shifted.
• Ukrainian forces continue their long-range strike campaigns against Wildberries warehouses and oil refineries in Russia.
• Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces made confirmed advances on August 11.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 10, 2026

Russian forces are reprioritizing the production of their long-range strike systems to those that can more reliably penetrate Ukrainian air defenses and accurately strike their targets. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Head Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated on August 10 that Russia has been reprioritizing the production of ballistic and cruise missiles since April 2026 in an effort to exploit Ukrainian shortages of Patriot interceptor missiles.[1] Skibitskyi stated that Russian forces are also increasingly using ballistic missiles to strike Ukrainian defense-industrial base (DIB) facilities in order to prevent Ukraine from producing its own ballistic missiles. Skibitskyi reported that Russian forces have more than tripled the monthly launches of ballistic missiles against Ukraine from April to July 2026.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 9, 2026

Russian forces continue experimenting with new technological innovations to restore mechanized maneuver at the tactical level and break out of positional warfare. Russian forces are experimenting with equipping tanks with modernized active protection systems (APS) — systems that provide kinetic defenses to protect vehicles from incoming strikes — to enhance tanks’ survivability against Ukrainian drones in the kill zone. Geolocated footage posted on August 7 shows Ukrainian first-person view (FPV) drones striking a Russian T-72B3M tank equipped with an Arena-M APS that was likely depleted near occupied Volodymyrivka (east of Dobropillya).[i] Russian forces previously conducted a notable reduced company-sized mechanized assault in the Dobropillya direction, one of Russia’s priority sectors, with between seven and nine tanks and two armored fighting vehicles in late July 2026, and Ukrainian forces eliminated at least one T-72B3A tank equipped with an Arena-M APS at that time.[ii] The footage published on August 7 is likely from the July mechanized assault. Russian engineers initially designed the Arena-M system to protect armored vehicles from incoming rockets, missiles, and high explosive anti-tank shells in their immediate vicinity by intercepting them with counter-munitions, but Russian forces reportedly developed and introduced an "anti-drone” capability to intercept approaching FPV drones in 2025.[iii] Ukrainian sources reported on August 9 that one Arena-M system equipped on a Russian tank intercepted seven Ukrainian FPV drones during the Russian mechanized assault, increasing the number of FPV drones Ukrainian forces needed to destroy the tank by 15 to 20.[iv]

Russian forces appear to be deploying Arena-M systems in an effort to increase the survivability of their tanks against Ukraine’s “tactical reconnaissance strike complex” (TRSC) — a system of persistent drone threats coupled with legacy crewed weapons, artillery, and prepared defenses in depth — in order to restore mechanized maneuver to the battlefield.[v] The Arena-M system, by itself, likely will not be an effective countermeasure to Ukrainian FPVs alone, as the system can be overwhelmed and only increases the cost and effort required of Ukrainian forces defending against the Russian mechanized assault.

The Arena-M system alone is currently insufficient to protect Russian mechanized assaults from Ukrainian drones, let alone all of the other weapons that Ukrainian forces use to create the kill zone. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that the Arena-M holds only 12 counter-munitions, a magazine depth which could have been sufficient for lower-tempo operational environments featuring lower FPV drone density, such as the battlefield in Ukraine from 2023 to 2025, but that these capabilities are insufficient in current combat conditions that feature a significantly greater and ever-growing density of drones.[vi] Another Russian milblogger acknowledged that Arena-M by itself is insufficient to restore maneuver to the battlefield and called for Russian forces to integrate the Arena-M and other APS systems into a layered air defense that could allow Russian forces to increase the survivability and maneuverability of their armored vehicles and personnel.[vii] The Arena-M APS also notably does not incapacitate Ukrainian defensive measures (such as crewed weapons, field fortifications, landmine fields, indirect fires, and other systems) that, along with FPV drones, create the kill zone. Russian forces previously attempted to restore operational maneuver in 2025 through their battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign but were largely ineffective.[viii] The July 2026 deployment of the Arena-M in a mechanized assault demonstrates continued Russian efforts to employ novel innovations and tactics in an attempt to break out of positional warfare.

Russian forces will likely continue efforts to restore maneuver despite the failure of the late July 2026 Dobropillya mechanized assault. Ukraine has also been undertaking efforts to restore mechanized maneuver to the battlefield at the tactical level since late 2025.[ix] Combat in Ukraine will likely become less positional and feature more tactical maneuver as both sides continue employing novel tactics and technologies.[x]

Russian forces continued to heavily target Odesa Oblast on the night of August 8 to 9. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 11 missiles of various types, most of which were ballistic missiles or travelled on ballistic trajectories, and up to 100 drones and loitering munitions, including jet-powered drones and six Banderol loitering munitions, against Odesa Oblast on the night of August 8 to 9.[xi] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defenses downed one missile, five of the Banderols, and 72 percent of the drones; that three missiles did not reach their targets; and that missiles and drones hit nine locations. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on August 9 that Russian forces struck residential and port infrastructure in Odesa Oblast, injuring at least eight people.[xii] Odesa Oblast's primary utility and water management company, Infoxvodokanal, reported energy and water outages in several raions in the region following the strikes.[xiii] Russian forces have intensified their strike campaign against Ukrainian port infrastructure in Odesa Oblast and vessels calling at Ukrainian Black Sea ports since at least July 10.[xiv] The Ukrainian Ministry of Community and Territorial Development reported that Russian forces struck 67 seaport facilities, 35 civilian vessels in ports, and 22 ships in the Ukrainian sea corridor in total in July 2026.[xv]

Russian forces struck the Mayaki bridge on the M-15 Odesa City-Reni highway connecting southern Ukraine to Moldova and Romania on August 9. Russian milbloggers reported that Russian forces struck the Mayaki road bridge on the M-15 highway.[xvi] One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces destroyed the bridge, while other Russian milbloggers published footage purporting to show that the bridge remains operational.[xvii] A local news outlet for Izmail City (located near the bridge) reported on August 9 that a Russian strike damaged the bridge, and Ukraine's State Border Guard Service reported on August 9 that Ukrainian authorities temporarily restricted traffic on the M-15 highway following Russian strikes.[xviii] Russian forces previously struck the Mayaki bridge in December 2025.[xix]

Russian forces likely targeted the Mayaki bridge to disrupt Ukrainian grain and other exports via the alternative land corridor that Ukraine has been using since Russian strikes disrupted Ukrainian maritime exports. Russian forces have been intensifying their efforts to degrade Ukraine's export capacity since July 2026.[xx] Then Ukrainian Minister of Agrarian Policy and Food Mykola Solskyi reported that Russian strikes destroyed 60,000 tons of grain in the Chornomorsk port in Odesa Oblast on the night of July 19, and Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated on July 31 that Russian strikes damaged more than 20 ships near the Black Sea and substantially slowed cargo flows in the shipping corridor, for example.[xxi] Ukraine’s main farmers union, Ukrainian Agri Council, stated on July 15 that Ukraine has lost about one third of its grain export capacity due to Russian missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian port infrastructure.[xxii] Ukrainian Minister of Agrarian Policy and Food Taras Vysotskyi recently reported that Russian strikes have forced Ukraine to seek alternative routes via the Danube River for its grain and cargo exports.[xxiii] Russian forces are likely shifting their strike targets from the Ukrainian sea corridor to the land corridor to specifically prevent Ukrainian grain exports and generally degrade the Ukrainian economy.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan stated on August 9 that Turkey proposed a Russian Ukrainian moratorium on strikes against merchant ships in the Black Sea.[xxiv] Fidan stated that Russia and Ukraine received the proposal and that Turkey is waiting for a response.

Russia is reportedly preparing to receive as many as 50,000 North Korean troops. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in an interview on August 8 that Russia and North Korea have agreed to deploy 30,000 to 50,000 North Korean personnel to an unspecified location (or locations) in Russia in an unspecified time frame.[xxv] Zelensky previously warned on July 25 that Russia has been preparing bases in Voronezh Oblast since June 2026 to receive another 30,000 North Korean soldiers.[xxvi] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Andriy Chernyak told Reuters in an article published on August 5 that an unspecified North Korean missile unit has started to deploy to western Russia, possibly equipped with 120 ballistic missiles of an unspecified model and six missile launchers.[xxvii] Chernyak stated that Russia plans to base the North Korean missile unit, which includes about 90 North Korean soldiers, in Voronezh Oblast within Russia’s 112th Missile Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army, Moscow Military District). ISW continues to assess that North Korean deployments of personnel and provisions of missiles to Russia for its war against Ukraine will provide North Korea with valuable frontline combat experience and weapons testing – as Russia and North Korea have done in the past.[xxviii]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces continue experimenting with new technological innovations to restore mechanized maneuver at the tactical level and break out of positional warfare.
• The Arena-M system alone is currently insufficient to protect Russian mechanized assaults from Ukrainian drones, let alone all of the other weapons that Ukrainian forces use to create the kill zone.
• Russian forces will likely continue efforts to restore maneuver despite the failure of the late July 2026 Dobropillya mechanized assault.
• Russian forces continued to heavily target Odesa Oblast on the night of August 8 to 9.
• Russian forces struck the Mayaki bridge on the M-15 Odesa City-Reni highway connecting southern Ukraine to Moldova and Romania on August 9.
• Russian forces likely targeted the Mayaki bridge to disrupt Ukrainian grain and other exports via the alternative land corridor that Ukraine has been using since Russian strikes disrupted Ukrainian maritime exports.
• Russia is reportedly preparing to receive as many as 50,000 North Korean troops.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses (SEAS / DEAD) campaign against air defense assets in Russia.
• Russia launched 202 drones and 17 Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic, Onyx anti-ship, and Kh-31P anti-radar missiles against Ukraine overnight.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk and Borova directions.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 8, 2026

Russia is reportedly planning to launch a large-scale strike campaign against energy infrastructure in Kyiv City over the coming weeks. Ukraine’s Strategic Communications Center reported on August 8, citing US intelligence, that Russia is preparing to conduct a major strike campaign against energy infrastructure in Kyiv City ahead of Ukraine’s Independence Day on August 24.[1] Russia could reportedly draw on its strategic reserve of ballistic missiles in order to cause maximum damage by August 24.

Russia began its Fall 2025 and Winter 2025-2026 strike campaign against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure in early September 2025, and Russia may aim to start its 2026-2027 strike campaign in August in order to take advantage of Ukraine's ongoing shortages of ballistic missile interceptors.[2] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky noted on August 5 that Ukraine has been receiving almost three times fewer anti-ballistic missile interceptors as compared to the start of 2026.[3] Russia has been exploiting Ukraine's insufficient interceptor stockpiles in recent months and has been able to launch relatively small numbers of quasi-ballistic and ballistic missiles in recent weeks that have caused significant damage nonetheless.[4] Russian ballistic missile strikes against Kyiv City energy infrastructure will likely cause significant damage as Ukraine struggles to defend against these missiles.

Russian strikes against Kyiv City's energy infrastructure in the coming weeks will disrupt Ukrainian efforts to repair and strengthen the energy facilities that Russia damaged in Winter of 2025-2026. Ukraine has been working to repair and fortify previously damaged energy infrastructure ahead of expected Russian energy strikes in Winter 2026-2027.[5] Russia may aim to start its strikes against energy infrastructure earlier than anticipated in 2026 in order to interrupt these ongoing Ukrainian efforts. Russia will likely still conduct strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure in the upcoming winter, which will likely be more destructive after Russia hinders Ukrainian efforts to fortify its facilities in August.

Russian strikes against Kyiv City's energy infrastructure in August may force Russia to adjust the size and composition of its strike packages. Russia has been conducting coordinated strike campaigns against Ukrainian gas stations, port infrastructure, and logistics in Summer 2026.[6] Upcoming strikes against energy infrastructure may require Russia to deintensify or stop these other strike campaigns or to expand the size of its strike packages in order to accommodate a larger target set. Russia has largely been using Geran-type drones to strike port infrastructure, however, so Russia may be able to continue such drone strikes while using its ballistic missiles to strike energy infrastructure.[7]

It is unclear how many energy facilities Ukraine has been able to repair since last winter and therefore how many energy targets are available for Russia to strike in 2026. Russian strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure during its Fall 2025 and Winter 2025-2026 campaign inflicted significant damage by mid-January 2026 that required an estimated $64 to 70 billion to repair.[8] Ukrainian First Deputy Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal stated on August 3 that last year's strike campaign damaged or destroyed facilities accounting for about 80 percent of Ukraine’s power generation and left Ukraine with a six-gigawatt power generation shortfall.[9]

Unspecified drones conducted multiple overflights over a Patriot air defense system repair base in Germany on August 7. German news outlet Tagesschau reported on August 7, citing a police report, that two drones conducted six overflights overnight of the Bundeswehr base in Mechernich, which houses German military equipment and maintains and repairs US Patriot air defense systems.[10] One of the drones reportedly approached the base at a distance of 40 kilometers and may have been a Fly-380 vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) drone for surveying, mapping, and surveillance. German officials have not attributed a specific actor to the drone incident as of this writing. The repeated pattern of reconnaissance over the site suggests a coordinated and planned series of reconnaissance missions characteristic of sophisticated coordinated activity.

Western media reported on August 7, citing US officials familiar with intelligence reports, that a drone containing explosives at Germany’s Leipzig/Halle Airport that German officials discovered on August 5 belonged to a Russian intelligence service.[11]

A Ukrainian Maya decoy drone reportedly exploded in Bulgaria on the morning of August 8. Bulgarian Prime Minister Rumen Radev stated on August 8 that an unidentified drone, likely a Ukrainian “Maya” decoy drone, exploded in a field in Bulgaria about 100 meters from the Bulgaria-Romania border, about 200 meters from a Romanian gas compressor station, and about one kilometer from a Bulgarian gas compressor station along the Trans-Balkan gas pipeline.[12] Bulgarian Defense Minister Dimitar Stoyanov stated on August 8 that the strength of the explosion indicates that the drone was carrying a significant amount of explosives but that there is no reason to believe that the incident was intentional. Ukrainian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Heorhii Tykhyi stated that Ukraine did not deliberately target Bulgaria.[13] It is unclear as of this writing why a decoy drone included explosives.

Key Takeaways:

• Russia is reportedly planning to launch a large-scale strike campaign against energy infrastructure in Kyiv City over the coming weeks.
• Russia began its Fall 2025 and Winter 2025-2026 strike campaign against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure in early September 2025, and Russia may aim to start its 2026-2027 strike campaign in August in order to take advantage of Ukraine's ongoing shortages of ballistic missile interceptors.
• Russian strikes against Kyiv City's energy infrastructure in the coming weeks will disrupt Ukrainian efforts to repair and strengthen the energy facilities that Russia damaged in Winter of 2025-2026.
• It is unclear how many energy facilities Ukraine has been able to repair since last winter and therefore how many energy targets are available for Russia to strike in 2026.
• Unspecified drones conducted multiple overflights over a Patriot air defense system repair base in Germany on August 7.
• A Ukrainian Maya decoy done reportedly exploded in Bulgaria on the morning of August 8.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced northeast of Kharkiv City.
• Russia launched six missiles and 151 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 7, 2026

Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly had a phone call on August 6 with the commander of a Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) division, indicating that Russian forces are prioritizing advances in the Pokrovsk and Dobropillya directions with the intent of encircling Ukraine's Fortress Belt from the southwest. The Kremlin published a transcript of a phone conversation ostensibly between Putin and the commander of the Russian 76th Guards VDV Division in which the commander discussed the combat situation in the unit’s area of responsibility (AoR) in the Dobropillya direction.[1] The voice purporting to be the division commander identifies himself in the audio recording as Colonel Shikhabidov, who is reported by multiple Russian sources to have died in May 2025.[2] Russian sources report that the current commander of the division is Denis Shishov.[3] Putin does not name the commander during the conversation. The error calls into question the authenticity of the exchange. “Colonel Shikhabidov” claimed that elements of the 76th Guards VDV Division seized Pokrovsk, Hryshyne, Novooleksandrivka, Vasylivka, and Shevchenko in the Pokrovsk direction and continue to carry out combat tasks in the area. Putin asked “Shikhabidov” if the division would be able to accomplish its assigned tasks on time, and “Shikhabidov” responded that it would do so and that the timelines were realistic.

Putin’s alleged conversation with the commander of the unit operating in the Dobropillya direction likely indicates that Dobropillya direction is a priority sector for Russian forces. Russian forces often use “elite” VDV and naval infantry units in key frontline areas. Putin awarded the unit with the Guards title on August 6 – an additional indicator that the 76th Guards VDV Division will likely continue offensive operations in the Pokrovsk and Dobropillya direction.[4] ISW first observed evidence of the 76th Guards VDV Division operating in the Pokrovsk direction in September 2025.[5] Putin notably praised the division for advancing faster than any other Russian units in the area, and Russian forces will likely intensify offensive operations in the Dobropillya and Pokrovsk directions to envelop Ukraine’s Fortress Belt from the southwestern flank.

The Russian timelines for the completion of this wide envelopment are extremely unrealistic, however. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces lost 2.23 square kilometers in the Dobropillya tactical area in June 2026 and advanced 34.67 square kilometers in the area in July 2026. ISW has also observed evidence to assess that Russian forces lost 3.12 square kilometers in the Pokrovsk operational area in June 2026 and advanced 45.96 square kilometers in the area in July 2026, including Russian advances northeast of Dobropillya. The Russian monthly rate of advance in July 2026 is higher than the rate of advance in June 2026 but is still insufficient to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast by Putin’s newly set deadline of December 31, 2026.[6] It remains highly unlikely that Russian forces will be able to seize the Fortress Belt or the rest of Donbas any time soon, if at all.

Putin’s call with the 76th Guards VDV Division commander is likely also a response to emerging accusations that he is out of touch with the battlefield reality in Ukraine. Putin rarely meets with tactical-level commanders, usually receiving reports from higher-level officers instead. Putin most recently held a meeting with Russian unit commanders operating in Kostyantynivka on July 3 during which they and he falsely claimed that Russian forces had seized Kostyantynivka and advanced beyond it toward Druzhkivka.[7] Russian units are likely not providing Putin accurate reports on the frontline situation and are generating a fictional picture of Russian military success for higher-level military commanders and Putin.[8] The apparent misidentification of the commander who spoke with Putin raises additional questions about the veracity of internal Russian reports on the battlefield situation.

Ukraine's intermediate-range strike campaign against the Russian rear, along with Ukrainian tactical drone overmatch on the frontline, are slowing down Russian operational tempo across the frontline. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on August 7 that USF’s average daily rate of Russian manpower detection and elimination fell by 16.3 percent from 374 soldiers per day in July 2026 to 313 soldiers per day in August 2026. Brovdi stated that the drop is associated with Russian forces suffering “abnormal losses” during breakthrough attempts across the frontline since the end of July 2026 and the limited Russian logistics capabilities in southern occupied Ukraine.[9] The reported decrease in the operational tempo of Russian forces likely results from a combination of the intensification of Ukrainian intermediate-range strikes against Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) from Russia to occupied Ukraine and the expansion of the Ukrainian tactical kill zone along the frontline, both of which inhibit the movement of Russian reinforcements to the front line to conduct assaults. Ukrainian forces have reportedly achieved tactical drone overmatch and expanded the kill zone in some frontline areas in summer 2026, initially driving higher Russian casualties on the battlefield.[10] Ukraine’s intermediate strike campaign against Russian logistics, military equipment, and manpower has been impeding Russian advances across the theater and inhibiting Russian troop movement towards the frontline for some time, as ISW has previously reported.[11]

An improvised explosive device (IED) explosion in central Moscow City on August 1 reportedly killed Russian Major General Valery Plokhotnyuk. Russian insider source VChK-OGPU claimed on August 6 that Major General Valery Plokhotnyuk died as a result of the IED detonation in Moscow City on August 1, which likely targeted Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) Commander Colonel General Alexander Chayko.[12] Russian opposition outlets Mediazona and Agentsvo confirmed Plokhotnyuk’s death on August 6, using Russian state registries.[13] Plokhotnyuk previously served as the chief of staff of the Russian 49th Combined Arms Army (CAA) and was promoted to the rank of major general in 2021.[14]

The US Senate passed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia Act of 2026, which imposes 100% tariffs on US imports from the five largest importers of Russian crude oil and natural gas, among other provisions, on August 7.[15] The bill expands sanctions against a diverse set of Russian entities, including Russian individuals involved in Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB), Russian financial institutions, and foreign vessels transporting Russian crude oil and coal.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly had a phone call on August 6 with the commander of a Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) division, indicating that Russian forces are prioritizing advances in the Pokrovsk and Dobropillya directions with the intent of encircling Ukraine's Fortress Belt from the southwest.
• The Russian timelines for the completion of this wide envelopment are extremely unrealistic, however.
• Putin’s call with the 76th Guards VDV Division commander is likely also a response to emerging accusations that he is out of touch with the battlefield reality in Ukraine.
• Ukraine's intermediate-range strike campaign against the Russian rear, along with Ukrainian tactical drone overmatch on the frontline, are slowing down Russian operational tempo across the frontline.
• An improvised explosive device (IED) explosion in central Moscow City on August 1 reportedly killed Russian Major General Valery Plokhotnyuk.
• The US Senate passed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia Act of 2026, which imposes 100% tariffs on US imports from the five largest importers of Russian crude oil and natural gas, among other provisions, on August 7.
• Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka directions.
• Russia launched 147 drones against Ukraine overnight.  

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 6, 2026

Lithuanian officials continue warning of a possible Russian false-flag operation against NATO’s eastern flank using seized Ukrainian drones. Lithuanian Defense Minister Robertas Kaunas stated on August 6 that Russia may use Ukrainian-manufactured drones to conduct a false-flag operation against the Baltic states.[1] Polish Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Wladyslaw Kosiniak-Kamysz issued a similar warning on July 21 that Russia may use seized Ukrainian drones to conduct a sabotage attempt against NATO, along with other recent Western warnings.^[2] Ukrainian military outlet Militarnyi reported on August 1, citing images published by former Ukrainian Presidential Advisor on Defense Technologies Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov, that Russia has potentially begun using seized Ukrainian long-range drones for potential provocations.^[3] Latvian Defense Minister Raivis Melnis stated on August 6 that there are no indicators of imminent Russian aggression against any critical infrastructure in Latvia.[4] ISW continues to assess that Russia is conducting a “Phase Zero” campaign that aims to set informational and psychological conditions for potential future provocations against NATO and that Russian false flag provocations, along with drone incursions, sabotage, electronic warfare interference, and overflights, are part of this campaign.[5] Russia regularly violates Baltic airspace and may do so with Ukrainian drones as part of an information operation and/or false flag attack to test NATO’s response.^[6]

Russia continues to form combat units using Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in direct violation of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. The Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) Volunteer Corps announced on August 6 that Russian forces formed the first Ukrainian Volunteer Spetsnaz Brigade comprised of Ukrainian POWs and former Ukrainian servicemembers who allegedly defected to Russia.[7] The Russian military formed this brigade by merging several irregular so-called volunteer units, including the Maxim Krivonos and Alexei Berest battalions and the Alexander Matrosov, Martyn Pushkar, and Slobodskoy detachments (all of which reportedly either are partially comprised of Ukrainian POWs or Ukrainian soldiers who reportedly defected to Russia).[8] At least one Russian military blogger openly discussed how this new brigade is comprised of Ukrainian POWs — a noteworthy statement given the fact that using POWs in combat is a war crime.[9] ISW first observed reports of Russian forces forming combat units using Ukrainian POWs in November 2022, with the most recent Russian “Bogdan Khmelnitsky” battalion with Ukrainian POWs operating under the Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) Internal Affairs Ministry's "Kaskad" formation in western Donetsk Oblast in December 2023.[10] Russia’s use of Ukrainian POWs in combat formations is likely a violation of the Geneva Convention on POWs, which prohibits the use of POWs in military activities on the side of the power that has captured them and states that “no POW may at any time be sent to or detained in areas where he may be exposed to the fire of the combat zone” and shall not “be employed on labor which is of an unhealthy or dangerous nature.”[11]

Ukrainian Brigadier General Serhiy Sobko has reportedly assumed the post of the acting Ukrainian Armed Forces deputy commander-in-chief.[12] Sobko previously served as the chief of staff of the 11^th Army Corps from January 2024 until now, and as Ukrainian Territorial Defense Forces chief of staff between 2022 and 2024.[13]

Key Takeaways:

• Lithuanian officials continue warning of a possible Russian false-flag operation against NATO’s eastern flank using seized Ukrainian drones.
• Russia continues to form combat units using Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in direct violation of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
• Ukrainian Brigadier General Serhiy Sobko has reportedly assumed the post of the acting Ukrainian Armed Forces deputy commander-in-chief.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure in Russia on the night of August 5 to 6.
• Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
• Russia launched two Onyx anti-ship missiles, two Kh-31P anti-radar missiles, and 101 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 5, 2026

Russian President Vladimir Putin reshuffled military commanders, including those associated with logistics and Russia's Unmanned Systems Forces (USF), against the backdrop of Ukrainian strike campaigns that these services have failed to defend against. Putin met with senior Russian military commanders and defense officials on August 5 and announced a reorganization of leadership and duties regarding Russian military logistics, supplies, and procurement.[1] Putin appointed Central Military District (CMD) Commander Colonel General Valery Solodchuk as deputy defense minister for logistics, replacing Colonel General Alexander Sanchik.[2] Sanchik was appointed to the position of Southern Military District (SMD) commander in November 2024 and has also served as deputy defense minister for logistics since November 2025.[3] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) clarified that Solodchuk will be responsible for rear-area logistics as deputy defense minister for logistics, Sanchik will be responsible for procurement, and Deputy Defense Minister for Military-Technical Provision Alexey Krivoruchko, who was previously responsible for military-technical support, is responsible for the development of advanced weapons and technology.[4] Putin also appointed CMD Chief of Staff Colonel General Denis Lyamin as commander of the USF. BBC's Russia service and several Russian milbloggers claimed in December 2025 that Lieutenant Colonel Yuri Vaganov was USF commander, but Russian officials never confirmed this appointment.[5] Putin's appointment of Lyamin indicates that Vaganov was likely ousted from his role before the Kremlin chose to publicize this appointment. Russian milbloggers have heavily criticized Vaganov for lack of military education and experience, as he sold plumbing fixtures before February 2022.[6] These demotions come amid Ukraine's intermediate- and long-range strike campaigns which aim in part to degrade Russian logistics from rear areas to the frontline and which Russian forces, including the USF, have proven unable to counter in the near-term.[7]

Putin also appointed EMD Commander Colonel General Andrey Ivanayev to replace Solodchuk as CMD commander and EMD Chief of Staff Colonel General Pyotr Bulgaruev to replace Ivanayev as EMD commander.[8] The command changes in the USF and Russian ground forces largely represent reshufflings of existing high-level commanders rather than the promotion of new commanders who may change the way Russia wages war. Putin has largely circulated senior commanders around the battlefield and high command for much of the war, with the exception of some purges of commanders deemed disloyal in the aftermath of the June 2023 Wagner Group rebellion.[9]

 Russian forces launched a relatively small strike package against Ukraine on the night of August 4 to 5, nonetheless causing significant civilian damage and casualties due to Russia's use of ballistic and quasi-ballistic missiles that Ukraine was unable to intercept. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched four Zirkon/Onyx anti-ship missiles from Kursk and Rostov oblasts; 24 Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles from Bryansk and Kursk oblasts; and 115 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and Italmas-type strike drones and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[10] The Ukrainian Air Force noted that most of the Shahed-type drones that Russian forces launched overnight were jet-powered drones and that Russia's primary target was Kyiv Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 98 drones while missiles and 17 strike drones struck 26 locations. Debris reportedly fell at six locations.

The Russian strikes inflicted high civilian casualties, killing at least 16 people and injuring at least 29 in Kyiv Oblast alone.[11] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces primarily targeted civilian warehouse facilities, including warehouses of Ukrainian shopping center network Epicenter, Ukrainian online retailer Rozetka, and Ukrainian postal service Nova Poshta in and near Kyiv City.[12] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces also struck railway infrastructure near Kyiv City and in Sumy Oblast and civilian infrastructure in Odesa Oblast.[13] The Kyiv Oblast Military Administration reported that the air quality temporarily worsened in a number of settlements in the oblast due to fires after the Russian strikes.^[14] The administration also reported that strikes against Holosiivsky Raion caused an ammonia leak that Ukrainian authorities subsequently contained.^[15]

Ukrainian forces did not intercept any of the 28 missiles that Russia launched overnight, as Russia continues to purposefully exploit Ukraine's depleted stocks of anti-ballistic missile interceptors. All missiles that Russian forces launched overnight were either ballistic missiles or missiles following ballistic trajectories that only US-produced Patriot systems and their analogues can intercept.[16] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky noted on August 5 that Ukraine has been receiving three times fewer anti-ballistic missile interceptors since the start of 2026, largely due to the war in the Middle East.[17] Russia launched a record number of missiles against Ukraine in July 2026 and has been undertaking a campaign in recent weeks that leans more heavily into missile strikes while decreasing the number of drone strikes.[18]

North Korea has escalated its involvement in Russia's war in Ukraine, reportedly deploying missileers and over 100 ballistic missiles to Russia. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Andriy Chernyak told Reuters in an article published on August 5 that an unspecified North Korean missile unit has started to deploy to western Russia, possibly equipped with 120 ballistic missiles of an unspecified model and six missile launchers.[19] Chernyak stated that Russia plans to base the North Korean missile unit, which includes about 90 North Korean soldiers, in Voronezh Oblast within Russia's 112th Missile Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army, Moscow Military District). It is unclear if the North Korean elements are deploying to a forward deployment area of the 112th Missile Brigade in Voronezh Oblast, as the brigade is based in Ivanovo Oblast.[20] Chernyak added that North Korea already sent a batch of 40 North Korean KN-23/24 ballistic missiles and personnel to Russia but that top-level talks in September 2026 will finalize the configuration and number of missiles of this planned deployment.[21] Chernyak noted that the North Korean missile that Russian forces used in their strike on July 29 to 30 came from the earlier batch of 40 North Korean-provided missiles. Reuters' Ukrainian military sources stated that the KN-23/24 missiles have a greater range and can carry larger payloads than Russia's Iskander-M ballistic missiles but are less accurate and have often led to high civilian casualties. Russia’s use of North Korean missiles will also provide North Korea with battlefield testing and feedback to improve the missiles — as Russia and North Korea have done in the past.[22]

North Korea previously sent infantry, sappers, and construction workers to Kursk Oblast in late October 2024, and North Korea's deployment of missileers is new and noteworthy.[23] North Korea seems to be trying to gain combined arms knowledge from its involvement in Russia's war. North Korean missileers will bring new combat lessons to North Korea beyond those that North Korean soldiers previously gained fighting and operating in Kursk Oblast.[24] It is unclear why North Korea chose to deploy its missileers and missiles to Russia now, but Russia and North Korea may aim to take advantage of Ukraine's current depleted stocks of ballistic missile interceptors to test the performance of North Korean missiles, including those possibly launched by North Korean soldiers operating North Korean launchers.

The addition of more North Korean missiles to Russia's arsenal will likely allow Russia to intensify its ballistic missile strikes against Ukraine in the near future without having to dip into its S-400 and Zirkon missile stocks. Russia increasingly leveraged Zirkon and altered S-400 missiles (both of which follow ballistic trajectories) in its July 2026 strikes, likely to offset the strain on Russia’s traditional ballistic missile production and stockpiles.[25] Ukrainian defense source Militarnyi estimated on July 19 that Russia had used up to two-thirds of its planned annual production of Zirkon missiles in just the first 19 days of July 2026.[26] A Ukrainian defense expert, citing data from the GUR, reported on July 23 that Russian forces have been able to intensify their ballistic missile strikes by increasingly relying on altered S-400 systems.[27] The addition of roughly 160 North Korean ballistic missiles will allow Russia to increase the number of ballistic missiles in each strike package or to sustain similarly sized packages for longer. The North Korean missiles, with their higher payloads but lower accuracy, will likely cause higher degrees of destruction and casualties, particularly among civilian infrastructure and civilians.

Unspecified actors likely piloted a drone containing explosives at Germany's Leipzig/Halle Airport, a known hub for transporting Western-provided military equipment to Ukraine.[28] German authorities announced that a drone containing explosives was found near a Ukrainian Antonov cargo plane at the airport's south runway overnight on August 4 to 5 and that German personnel had diffused the explosives.[29] German media reported that the detonator had broken off the drone, preventing the explosives from detonating.[30] The drone incident forced authorities to divert and delay several flights. German authorities stated that a flying object, reportedly a second drone, collided with another cargo plane that was aborting its landing at Leipzig/Halle Airport due to the first drone incident, slightly damaging the plane.[31] German Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt stated that the explosive-laden drone at a German airport represents a new level of threat and assessed that the actors involved are not amateurs and may have been familiar with existing German counter-drone capabilities.[32] German authorities have not attributed a specific actor to the drone incident.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin reshuffled military commanders, including those associated with logistics and Russia's Unmanned Systems Forces (USF), against the backdrop of Ukrainian strike campaigns that these services have failed to defend against.
• Russian forces launched a relatively small strike package against Ukraine on the night of August 4 to 5 nonetheless causing significant civilian damage and casualties due to Russia's use of ballistic and quasi-ballistic missiles that Ukraine was unable to intercept.
• Ukrainian forces did not intercept any of the 28 missiles that Russia launched overnight, as Russia continues to purposefully exploit Ukraine's depleted stocks of anti-ballistic missile interceptors.
• North Korea has escalated its involvement in Russia's war in Ukraine, reportedly deploying missileers and over 100 ballistic missiles to Russia.
• The addition of more North Korean missiles to Russia's arsenal will likely allow Russia to intensify its ballistic missile strikes against Ukraine in the near future without having to dip into its S-400 and Zirkon missile stocks.
• Unspecified actors likely piloted a drone containing explosives at Germany's Leipzig/Halle Airport, a known hub for transporting Western-provided military equipment to Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaigns against Wildberries warehouses and Russian oil infrastructure on August 4 and 5.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and Slovyansk and Oleksandrivka directions on August 4 and 5.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 4, 2026

Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) conducted at least 100 successful strikes against Russia in its initial 40-day strike operation against a wide target set, likely intending to generate several separate and sometimes mutually reinforcing effects that all aim to increase the cost to Russian President Vladimir Putin of continuing to wage war on Ukraine. The SBU announced on August 4 that its drone operators conducted over 100 strikes against strategic Russian objects, including defense industrial base (DIB) enterprises, air bases, air defense assets, command posts, warships, tankers, oil refineries, and transport and military logistics since starting the campaign on June 26.[1] The SBU highlighted that its operators struck the Yevpatoria Aircraft Plant and airbases in occupied Saky, Hvardiiske, Belbek, and Baherove in Crimea; hit Engels Airbase in Saratov Oblast and Khanskaya Airbase in the Adygea Republic; destroyed a Tu-95MS strategic bomber, two Su-35 fighter jets, and two L-39 combat training aircraft; and hit 14 Russian oil refineries and other oil infrastructure objects, two cargo ships, and two shadow fleet oil tankers. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on August 4 that he approved another SBU operation but did not specify the duration, type, or target set.[2]

Ukraine's escalating strike campaigns against Russian military, logistics, DIB, and economic assets include far more than the SBU strikes. Ukrainian forces have struck at least 19 Wildberries warehouses across Russia since the first strike against Wildberries facilities on July 18.^[3] Ukrainian forces have reportedly conducted at least 200 strikes against Russian cargo ships and oil tankers in the Black and Azov seas and at least 24 oil and gasoline infrastructure objects, degrading Russia's refining capacity by at least one third.[4] Some Kremlin-coopted Russian milbloggers attempted to dismiss the Ukrainian strike campaign as unsuccessful, but one milblogger acknowledged that the Ukrainian strikes were “painful” for Russia.[5] Ukrainian forces have also conducted an intensive strike campaign against electricity infrastructure in Crimea, causing protracted blackouts.[6] Additional Ukrainian strikes have targeted bridges and other transportation infrastructure in and around the peninsula.[7]

Ukraine's strike campaigns are increasing the strain on Russian businesses, people, and air defenses. Bloomberg reported on August 4 that Ukraine's strikes forced Russia to export near-record amounts of crude oil as Russia's oil refining capacity reached the lowest rates since May 2002.[8] Bloomberg reported, citing energy markets analysis platform EA Analytics, that Russia's crude processing rates averaged 3.6 million barrels per day in July 2026, about a third below the seasonal norm. Russian business outlet RBK reported on August 4, citing sources in the Russian shipping and insurance industries, that Russian insurance companies have effectively stopped covering military and terrorist risks for cargo ships operating in the Black and Azov seas after the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) sent out a navigational warning for these waters from July 12 to 18 amid increased Ukrainian vessel strikes.[9] RBK noted that foreign insurance companies have raised their rates for war insurance in the Black and Azov seas. Ukraine's strike campaign has increased the cost of the war for small and medium-sized Russian businesses reliant on the Wildberries platform, as well as on the Russian consumers who utilize the Wildberries service, largely in urban areas that the Kremlin has sought to shield from the war.[10] The Ukrainian strikes have also likely inhibited the operations of at least some DIB enterprises.

Ukrainian forces have also continued their suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses (SEAD/DEAD) campaign across the theater, making Russia's rear areas even more vulnerable to further Ukrainian strikes beyond the initial 40-day operation and forcing Russia to utilize valuable and sparse Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft.[11] Russia has failed to adequately respond to Ukraine's intensifying strike campaigns in recent months, pulling manpower and resources to defend rear areas and strategic targets that Russia could have instead allocated to the frontline.[12] Russia will likely continue to struggle to develop countermeasures to the Ukrainian strike campaigns in the near term.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) conducted at least 100 successful strikes against Russia in its initial 40-day strike operation against a wide target set, likely intending to generate several separate and sometimes mutually reinforcing effects that all aim to increase the cost to Russian President Vladimir Putin of continuing to wage war on Ukraine.
• Ukraine's strike campaigns are increasing the strain on Russian businesses, people, and air defenses.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.
• Russian forces launched one ballistic missile and over 100 long-range strike drones against Ukraine overnight. Ukrainian forces continued striking Russian military assets on August 4.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 3, 2026

Russian forces are replicating aspects of their Summer-Fall 2025 battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign that set conditions for late 2025 advances near Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole to prepare for offensive operations against the Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast. BAI refers to the use of airpower to strike targets in the near rear behind the frontline to impact battlefield operations in the near term.^[1] Russian forces conducted a campaign that generated partial BAI effects to facilitate subsequent ground advances in the Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole directions over several months in late 2025.[2] Russian forces used a combination of drones, missiles, and glide bombs in their 2025 BAI campaign to strike targets such as Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs), vehicles, training grounds, and railways and isolate Ukrainian logistics in both Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole. Russian forces appear to again be engaging in a similar BAI campaign in 2026, now targeting Slovyansk and Kramatorsk — the cities that make up the northern tip of Ukraine's Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast.

The main objective of the ongoing Russian BAI campaign against the Fortress Belt — as with previous BAI campaigns — is to isolate Ukrainian forces defending the Fortress Belt from sustained logistics. Ukrainian and Russian sources have repeatedly commented on the negative effects that Russian strikes are having on Ukrainian logistics, recently noting that nighttime logistics missions in Kramatorsk and Slovyansk are difficult for Ukrainian forces to conduct.[3] Russian forces have been increasingly targeting Ukrainian locomotives that are critical for Ukrainian logistics, for example, and the Russian military command reportedly provided Russian troops with 1,000 Molniya fixed-wing loitering munitions in July 2026 and issued orders to intensify strikes against Ukrainian logistics in and near Kramatorsk.[4] Russian forces are also starting to strike major bridges in the Fortress Belt area to further disrupt Ukrainian logistics. Geolocated footage posted on August 2 shows the aftermath of a recent Russian multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) strike that heavily damaged the Cherivkovsky Bridge over the Kazennyi Torets River in eastern Slovyansk.[5] The bridge connects Slovyansk to the H-20 highway and leads to Kramatorsk. Russian milbloggers noted that the bridge served as an important Ukrainian logistics route between Slovyansk and Kramatorsk and claimed that it was one of three bridges in Slovyansk capable of handling heavy vehicles.[6]

The ongoing Russian BAI campaign aims to shape the battlefield ahead of planned Russian offensive operations against Slovyansk and Kramatorsk in the future, although Russian forces remain unlikely to advance quickly to or through these cities in the near term. Russian forces have been infiltrating into Kostyantynivka in recent months but have not seized the city, despite Russian claims otherwise.[7] The situation in and near the city is deteriorating, however, and fighting will likely continue in Kostyantynivka for several weeks as Russian forces try to consolidate the positions they have gained through infiltrations.[8] Russian infiltrators are already starting to move north of the city toward Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka.[9] Russian forces are also attempting to infiltrate into and seize Lyman (northeast of Slovyansk), but ISW has not observed evidence that Russian forces have entered the town.[10] Russian forces nonetheless are likely preparing now for intended future offensive operations against Slovyansk and Kramatorsk. Russia's 2025 BAI campaigns notably took months to set conditions for subsequent advances in the Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole.[11]

Russian forces appear to be more heavily relying on glide bomb strikes in their 2026 BAI campaign compared to their 2025 campaigns. ISW has observed numerous reports of Russian glide bomb strikes against Slovyansk and Kramatorsk and nearby settlements in recent weeks.[12] These glide bomb strikes likely aim to penetrate and destroy hardened Ukrainian targets, such as bridges and strongpoints.[13] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on August 3 that Russian forces struck Ukrainian positions in Raihorodok (northeast of Slovyansk) with FAB-250 and FAB-500 glide bombs and LMUR helicopter-launched air-to-surface missiles.[14] Russian forces also recently struck Pavlohrad, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast – a major logistics hub along several highways to Donetsk Oblast — three times in late July 2026, suggesting that Russian forces have resumed their use of longer-range glide bombs to strike logistics hubs further from the frontline.[15] ISW recently assessed that Russian glide bomb strikes are enabling infantry advances in and near Kostyantynivka, as the strikes turn the cities into rubble that Russian infiltrators can exploit for concealment.[16] Russian forces may be increasingly turning to glide bombs in their BAI campaigns as Ukrainian counter-drone measures and electronic warfare (EW) systems degrade Russia's ability to use drones at the same scale as previously.[17]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced more personnel changes within the Ukrainian government and security services on August 3. Zelensky appointed Ukrainian Defense Council Secretary Rustem Umerov as the head of Ukraine's Foreign Intelligence Service and Internal Affairs Minister General Ihor Klymenko as the Defense Council secretary.^[18] Zelensky stated that Umerov will continue to coordinate work to secure drone deals with partner states, including in the Middle East, and to oversee the negotiation process with the United States.[19] Zelensky also dismissed Ukrainian Ambassador to the United States Olha Stefanishyna from her position.[20]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces are replicating aspects of their Summer-Fall 2025 battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign that set conditions for late 2025 advances near Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole to prepare for offensive operations against the Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast.
• The main objective of the ongoing Russian BAI campaign against the Fortress Belt — as with previous BAI campaigns — is to isolate Ukrainian forces defending the Fortress Belt from sustained logistics.
• The ongoing Russian BAI campaign aims to shape the battlefield ahead of planned Russian offensive operations against Slovyansk and Kramatorsk in the future, although Russian forces remain unlikely to advance quickly to or through these cities in the near term.
• Russian forces appear to be more heavily relying on glide bomb strikes in their 2026 BAI campaign compared to their 2025 campaigns.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced more personnel changes within the Ukrainian government and security services on August 3.
• Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances on August 3.
• Russia launched 181 drones against Ukraine overnight. Ukrainian forces continued striking Russian military assets on August 3.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 2, 2026

An improvised explosive device (IED) detonated in central Moscow City on August 1, potentially targeting Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) Commander Colonel General Alexander Chayko. It is unclear as of this writing if the explosion killed or injured Chayko. Russian officials reported that an IED detonated at a restaurant in central Moscow City on August 1.[1] Russian officials stated that the detonation killed the woman who reportedly carried the explosive disguised as a gift, a security guard, and one of the restaurant's patrons. Russian officials reported that 21 people sustained injuries in the blast, but did not disclose additional information about the incident, specify the identities of the casualties, or blame a responsible actor. Multiple independent and insider Russian sources claimed that the explosion may have been an assassination attempt against Chayko, who was reportedly celebrating his 55th birthday at the restaurant in conjunction with his May 2026 appointment as VKS commander.[2] Russian sources claimed that the explosion may have injured Chayko's daughter, Maria.[3] Baza, a Russian source affiliated with Russian law enforcement, reported that two injured people later died in the hospital, bringing the death toll to five.[4] Russian business newspaper Kommersant reported that the event was heavily guarded, and sources claimed that personnel from the Russian Federal Protective Service (FSO), a Russian state security agency responsible for protecting high-ranking government officials, were guarding the event but were off duty.[5] A Russian insider source further claimed that high-ranking Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officials, government officials, Russian State Duma deputies, and Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) generals were in attendance at the private event at the restaurant.[6]

Neither official nor unofficial sources have confirmed Chayko's status following the attack, but Chayko has an extensive service history in Ukraine. Chayko served as the chief of staff of the Russian Force Grouping in Syria from 2015 to 2017 and was the overall commander of the Russian Force Grouping in Syria in three separate periods between September 2019 and December 2022.[7] Chayko subsequently served as a commander of the Eastern Military District (EMD) between February 24, 2022, and May 26, 2022, during which he oversaw failed Russian efforts to encircle Kyiv City at the start of the full-scale invasion.[8] Chayko notably commanded Russian forces responsible for widespread violence against civilians in Kyiv Oblast in 2022, including in Bucha.[9] The Russian MoD again appointed Chayko as the commander of the Russian Force Grouping in Syria in December 2024 during the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime.[10] The Russian MoD appointed Chayko to the position of commander-in-chief of the VKS in May 2026 amidst domestic criticisms of Russian air defense and air campaign failures.[11] The VKS is responsible for air-launched glide bomb and missile strikes against Ukrainian frontline and rear areas, and such glide bomb strikes have in part been enabling Russian infantry advances on the ground and are increasingly striking Ukrainian cities further from the frontline.[12]

Russian forces are leveraging new jet-powered Banderol loitering munitions and Geran-4 Seeker drones in their strike campaigns against Ukraine's Black Sea port infrastructure and railway infrastructure. Ukrainian Presidential Commissioner for Sanctions Policy Vladyslav Vlasiuk stated to Bloomberg on July 31 that 80 percent of recent Russian strikes against the ports in the greater Odesa City area have involved Banderol loitering munitions.[13] Vlasiuk stated that Russian forces aim to use the Banderol to fill the gap between their cheap, slow Shahed-type drones and the faster and more accurate Kh-101 cruise missiles. Vlasiuk noted that the cheap Banderol drones contain a 150-kilogram warhead that is bigger than a Shahed warhead and that the Banderol can fly faster than Ukrainian drone interceptors. Bloomberg added that the Banderol has a relatively short range of a few hundred kilometers, so Russian forces have been launching strikes on Odesa City from occupied Crimea.

Ukrainian defense source Militarnyi assessed that recently published photos of Russia's jet-powered Geran-4 Seeker drones, which Militarnyi noted Russian forces are widely using to strike port infrastructure and ships in the Black Sea, show that Russian forces have reworked the drone's nose to include an optoelectronic guidance system.[14] Militarnyi added that the Geran-4 drones also include an additional fixed camera, which open-source analysts have identified as a Chinese 180-degree wide-angle camera that likely provides Russian forces with primary terrain overviews and broad situational awareness.[15]

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on August 1 that Russian forces are mostly using Geran-4 drones in their strikes against Ukrainian railway infrastructure, especially against rolling stock in border and frontline areas, from July 19 to 31.[16] The milblogger claimed that the largest number of damaged rolling stock in the second half of July occurred in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and that Russian forces are mostly targeting locomotives while only occasionally striking traction substations, rail tracks, and rail depots.

Key Takeaways:

• An improvised explosive device (IED) detonated in central Moscow City on August 1, potentially targeting Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) Commander Colonel General Alexander Chayko. It is unclear as of this writing if the explosion killed or injured Chayko.
• Russian forces are leveraging new jet-powered Banderol loitering munitions and Geran-4 Seeker drones in their strike campaigns against Ukraine's Black Sea port infrastructure and railway infrastructure.
• Ukrainian forces recently struck multiple oil refineries, a strategic bomber base, and a Wildberries warehouse in Russia.
• Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces made confirmed advances on August 2.
• Russia launched 133 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 1, 2026

The Russian rate of advance in Ukraine remains low two and a half months into the Russian Spring-Summer 2026 offensive, which has failed to make any operationally significant gains. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have advanced in 37.85 square kilometers of territory in Ukraine (smaller than the area of Manhattan) in July 2026 for an average of 1.22 square kilometers per day. Russia's monthly rate of advance has not changed significantly since February 2026, prior to the start of its Spring-Summer 2026 offensive, which began in mid-March 2026.[1] Russian forces have infiltrated into more territory in July 2026 than in recent months, advancing or infiltrating into about 121.56 square kilometers of territory in all. Even the Russian rate of advance and infiltration in July 2026 is a fraction of Russia's rate of advance in July 2025, when Russian forces seized 455.74 square kilometers. Russian forces leaned into conducting additional infiltration missions into Kostyantynivka, Donetsk Oblast in July 2026, but Russia's increased infiltrations have not resulted in the seizure of Kostyantynivka or the achievement of any operationally significant objectives.[2] The Russian monthly rate of advance in 2026 has been much lower than Russia's rate of advance during the same period in 2025, even when including infiltrations.

Continued Ukrainian counterattacks, Ukraine's intermediate range strike campaign, and Ukrainian drone dominance continue to constrain Russia's rate of advance and ability to field mechanized vehicles. Russian forces have conducted a few mechanized assaults in isolated areas of the theater in July 2026, but these assaults did not result in meaningful gains.[3] The Kremlin has been optimizing the Russian military for positional warfare rather than maneuver warfare for several years, but Ukrainian adaptations are significantly slowing Russian advances in 2026 compared with previous years.[4] There is no indication that Russian forces will be able to accelerate their advances dramatically or restore maneuver to the battlefield at this time.

Russian forces reportedly suffered the highest casualty rate of 2026 thus far in July, paying an increasingly high price for no significant increase in the rate of advance — despite the Kremlin's cognitive warfare effort to deny this fact. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 1 that Russian forces suffered 42,860 casualties in July 2026, a new monthly high for the war.[5] The Ukrainian General Staff's data indicates that Russian casualties have been steadily increasing since February 2026, when Russian forces suffered 26,090 casualties. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on July 31 that Russian forces have suffered almost 700,000 killed in action (KIA) and about 1.6 million total casualties since February 2022.[6] The Ukrainian General Staff's casualty rates indicate that Russian forces suffered an average of 353 casualties per square kilometer of territory seized or infiltrated in July 2026, and a staggering 1,132 casualties per square kilometer seized.

The Kremlin is desperately attempting to disguise its slow rate of advance in Ukraine through exaggerated claims of advance, but even Moscow’s claimed rate of advance is only about footpace. Russian forces have advanced, infiltrated, or claimed to have advanced in 18.49 square kilometers per day in July 2026. The Kremlin and senior Russian military command have leaned into their cognitive warfare campaign, attempting to falsely show that Russian forces are advancing in all sectors of the front, that Ukrainian lines are collapsing, and that the West should abandon Ukraine as a hopeless cause.[7] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Kremlin newswire TASS each made exaggerated claims on July 31 about the number of settlements that Russian forces allegedly seized in July 2026 as part of this informational effort.[8] This Russian informational effort also likely aims to convince Russians that the sacrifices they are making for the war, including the staggering casualty rates, economic burden, Ukrainian strikes in Russia, and Kremlin censorship measures, are worth it.[9] But even the Kremlin's most extensive claims do not have Russian forces advancing faster than footpace, a rate of advance far slower than the Kremlin would need to collapse Ukrainian lines and rapidly seize the areas Moscow reportedly aims to capture by the end of 2026.

Russian forces continued to exploit Ukraine's shortage of Patriot interceptor missiles by launching another large ballistic missile and drone strike series against Ukraine overnight on July 31 to August 1, primarily targeting Kyiv Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on August 1 that Russian forces launched 35 missiles and 185 drones and prioritized targeting Kyiv Oblast while also targeting Dnipropetrovsk, Sumy, Kharkiv, and Poltava oblasts.[10] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched four Zirkon/Onyx anti-ship/ cruise missiles from Kursk and Rostov oblasts; 27 Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles from Bryansk and Kursk oblasts; and two Kh-31 anti-radar missiles and two Kh-59/Kh-69 cruise missiles from the Black Sea. The Ukrainian Air Force added that Russian forces launched 185 Shahed, jet-powered Shahed, Gerbera, and Italmas-type drones; Banderol cruise missile/loitering munitions; and Parodiya-type decoy drones from Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities and occupied Donetsk City and Hvardiiske, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that four Zirkon/Onyx and 26 Iskander-M/S-400 missiles as well as 23 strike drones struck 23 locations; that drone debris fell at two locations; and that three missiles did not reach their targets as of 0930 local time. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defenses intercepted or suppressed one Iskander-M/S-400 missile, one Kh-59/69 missile, and 154 strike drones, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky attributed Ukraine's inability to intercept more ballistic missiles to Patriot interceptor missile shortages.[11]

Kyiv City and Kyiv Oblast officials reported that Russian ballistic strikes on Kyiv City killed nine people and wounded 33, including four children, and that the strikes caused fires and damage in seven Kyiv City districts.[12] Kyiv City Mayor Vitaliy Klitschko reported that Russian forces twice struck the territory of the Kyivmedspetstrans emergency and transport organization, destroying five ambulances and damaging four buildings and vehicles that service healthcare institutions.[13] Zelensky added that Russian strikes damaged 18 residential buildings, a school, and the Lithuanian Embassy in Kyiv City.[14] Lithuanian President Gitānas Naūseda confirmed that a Russian missile exploded near the Lithuanian Embassy in Kyiv City, damaging the embassy building.[15] Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kēstutis Budris announced that the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry (MFA) will summon a Russian embassy representative in Lithuania in response to the strike.[16] Mufti of Ukraine's Umma Religious Administration of Muslims Murat Suleymanov reported that Russian strikes damaged the Umma's main mosque for the third time.[17] ISW continues to assess that Russia has been escalating its missile strikes — particularly ballistic missile strikes — against Kyiv City in an effort to take advantage of Patriot interceptor shortages and inflict maximum damage on Ukrainian civilian, defense, and energy infrastructure.[18]

Russian forces launched a record number of missiles against Ukraine in July 2026 — notably firing more missiles than it is producing per month and increasingly leveraging its S-400 and Zirkon missiles to compensate for shortfalls in ballistic missile stockpiles. The Ukrainian Air Force data suggests that Russia launched at least 376 missiles against Ukraine in July 2026, the highest number of missiles launched in a single month since Russia began large-scale missile and drone strikes against Ukraine.[19] Russia launched nearly 90 more missiles in July 2026 than the 288 missiles launched in February 2026, the second-highest monthly total.[20] Russia previously conducted comparable large-scale missile strike series in October 2025 and December 2022, launching 270 missiles in each series. Russian forces reportedly launched over 30 Zirkon/Onyx anti-ship missiles; over 120 Iskander-M, S-400, and KN-23 ballistic missiles; over 140 Kh-101 and Kalibr cruise missiles; and over 60 Kh-59/Kh-69 cruise missiles in July 2026.[21]

Russian forces have likely increasingly tapped into their stockpiles and used newly produced missiles to sustain the higher intensity of ballistic missile strikes in July 2026. The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on July 18 that Russia had over 100 Iskander-M and around 50 KN-23 ballistic missiles; over 60 Iskander-K and over 450 Kalibr cruise missiles; up to 100 Kh-101 cruise missiles; over 120 Zirkon anti-ship missiles; over 600 Onyx cruise missiles; over 400 S-300/S-400 missiles, and up to Kh-69 guided missiles in stocks.[22] The GUR had previously reported that Russian stockpiles had up to 110 Iskander-M, 200 Iskander-K, 690 Onyx, 230 Zirkon, 120 Kh-101, and 460 Kalibr missiles as of April 2026, indicating that Russia's escalating strikes in the Summer 2026 have marginally depleted Russian stockpiles while Ukrainian forces conduct strikes on the Russian defense industry to disrupt production.[23] Ukrainian defense source Militarnyi, citing unspecified Ukrainian intelligence reports, reported on July 19 that Russia produces about 60 Iskander-M ballistic missiles and 40 missiles for the S-400 complex monthly.[24] A Ukrainian defense expert, citing data from GUR, reported on July 23 that Russia produced 50 Iskander-M, 60 Kh-101, and three Zirkon missiles per month as of July 18.[25]

The Kremlin appears to be increasingly tapping into its comparatively larger Zirkon and S-400 stockpiles, likely to offset the strain on Russian ballistic missile production and stockpiles. The Ukrainian defense expert noted that Russian forces have been able to intensify their ballistic missile strikes against Ukraine by increasingly relying on refurbished S-400 systems.[26] An open-source intelligence analyst also assessed in June 2026 that Russia has been increasingly relying on Zirkon missiles and that these missiles do not function as hypersonic cruise missiles but rather as maneuverable quasi-ballistic systems.[27] Militarnyi also estimated on July 19 that Russia had used up to two-thirds of its planned annual production of Zirkon missiles in July 2026.[28]

Russia's alternative to the Starlink satellite network is reportedly already providing Russian forces the connectivity over Ukraine necessary to conduct precision drone strikes, increasing Ukraine's urgent need for expanded Starlink connectivity over Russia to disrupt Russian strike packages before they are launched. Ukrainian satellite communications expert Volodymyr Stepanets told Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi that the first operational batch of 12 of 16 Russian Rassvet satellites has largely completed its deployment into orbit as of July 31.[29] Russian aerospace company Bureau 1440 developed Rassvet satellites as an alternative to SpaceX's Starlink and launched the first batch of satellites in late March 2026, shortly after SpaceX cut off Russia's unauthorized access to Starlink terminals in early February 2026.[30] Stepanets stated that the deployed Rassvet satellites already provide Russian forces “quite dense coverage,” particularly during two windows per day. N2YO satellite tracking service suggested that Rassvet satellites are positioned in orbits that allow them to pass over Ukraine four times a day and ensure a stable connection with the ground terminal during two or three flyovers, creating a temporary connectivity window for an hour to an hour and a half.[31] Militarnyi reported that Russian forces can use these connectivity windows to operate unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) and heavy strike and reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in real time. Such capabilities can support attacking moving targets deep in the rear of Ukrainian forces, among other things. Militarnyi reported that Russia could gain two additional connectivity windows after the second batch of 16 Rassvet satellites reaches operational altitudes between October and November 2026. The Kremlin had previously stated that Rassvet will begin commercial operations in 2027, and Militarnyi estimated that Russia could secure 24/7 connectivity over Ukraine by mid-summer 2027.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reportedly asked US President Donald Trump to widen Ukraine's Starlink access in an effort to expand Ukraine's mid- and long-range strike capabilities over Russia.[32] Such access would allow Ukrainian forces to attack moving targets deep in Russian rear areas, particularly the launchers of Russian ballistic missiles. Starlink support to such Ukrainian operations could help offset the global shortage of Patriot missile interceptors.

Key Takeaways:

• The Russian rate of advance in Ukraine remains low two and a half months into the Russian Spring-Summer 2026 offensive, which has failed to make any operationally significant gains.
• Russian forces reportedly suffered the highest casualty rate of 2026 thus far in July, paying an increasingly high price for no significant increase in the rate of advance — despite the Kremlin's cognitive warfare effort to deny this fact.
• The Kremlin is desperately attempting to disguise its slow rate of advance in Ukraine through exaggerated claims of advance, but even Moscow’s claimed rate of advance is only about footpace.
• Russian forces continued to exploit Ukraine's shortage of Patriot interceptor missiles by launching another large ballistic missile and drone strike series against Ukraine overnight on July 31 to August 1, primarily targeting Kyiv Oblast.
• Russian forces launched a record number of missiles against Ukraine in July 2026 — notably firing more missiles than it is producing per month and increasingly leveraging its S-400 and Zirkon missiles to compensate for shortfalls in ballistic missile stockpiles.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil and gasoline infrastructure in Russia on July 31 and August 1.
• Russian forces are reportedly increasing the intensity of drone and glide bomb strikes on Ukrainian fuel and energy infrastructure, including gas stations.
• Russian forces are increasingly targeting Ukrainian civilian logistical centers and warehouses.
• Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces made confirmed advances on August 1.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 31, 2026

The Russian Northern Grouping of Forces and high military command are likely lying to the Kremlin about the extent of Russian gains in northern Ukraine in order to further the narrative that Russian forces are actively advancing across the entire theater, including a part of the frontline that has been largely stagnant for nearly two years. The Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on July 29 that Russian forces seized Nova Sich (north of Sumy City) in Sumy Oblast and then claimed on July 30 that Russian forces seized Mala Slobidka (northwest of Sumy City) and Mohrytsya (northeast of Sumy City) in Sumy Oblast and Virivka (northeast of Kharkiv City) in Kharkiv Oblast.[1] The Russian Northern Grouping of Forces has claimed to have seized a new settlement in its area of responsibility — which encompasses the frontline in Sumy Oblast, the area northwest to northeast of Kharkiv City, and the Velykyi Burluk direction in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast — nearly every day since at least July 22.[2] The increase in the Russian high command's claims of advance in northern Ukraine is notable as ISW has not observed indications that Russian forces have conducted the necessary quantity of force redeployments, equipment concentration, or intensified offensive operations commensurate with the amount of territory they are claiming to have seized in recent days.

Russian commanders are utilizing a variety of informational tools to support their efforts to aggrandize the extent of Russian advances. The Ukrainian 16th Army Corps (AC) spokesperson, callsign "Hants," stated that Russian forces have redeployed elements of the 34th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) from the Sumy direction to the Velykyi Burluk direction following Ukrainian advances in the area.[3] Russian forces recently launched a rare mechanized assault near Artilne (northeast of Velykyi Burluk) and dismounted infantry, even though the battlefield situation has not changed to such an extent that Russian forces can reliably field mechanized vehicles in the kill zone (an area in the near rear of elevated drone strike risk) or on the frontline.[4] Russian dismounted infantry continue conducting infiltration missions across the Northern Grouping of Forces' area of responsibility, and servicemembers continue filming videos and using AI to alter or generate footage of Russian soldiers holding flags in settlements into which Russian forces may have only infiltrated to falsely claim them as seized.[5] Small Russian redeployments below the regimental echelon for defensive operations, small and rare mechanized assaults, infiltration missions, flag-raising videos, and AI-altered footage notably do not replace actual advances or constitute doctrinal control of terrain.

 The Kremlin is using these exaggerated claims of advance as part of its ongoing cognitive warfare effort to falsely portray Russian forces as advancing across the battlefield in order to convince Ukraine's partners to abandon their support. The Russian Northern Grouping of Forces and Ministry of Defense (MoD) have heavily celebrated their claimed advances in recent days.[6] Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov claimed on July 30 that the purported seizure of Mohrytsya, a settlement with a pre-war population reportedly of about 850 people, is a "strategic success."[7] Russian Northern Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Yevgeny Nikiforov previously briefed Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov in a highly-publicized meeting on the evening of July 3, a meeting the Kremlin likely hoped that Western news would report on ahead of Putin's July 4 phone call with US President Donald Trump.[8] Nikiforov and Gerasimov heavily exaggerated Russian advances in northern Ukraine and elsewhere in the theater as of July 3, as Gerasimov and other military commanders have done at least once a month since January 2026.[9] The Kremlin likely uses these meetings as part of a targeted information campaign to convince the United States and other Western states that Russia's war is going so well that the West should just abandon Ukraine, thereby enabling Russia to continue waging its war against a Ukraine with less material and technological support, which would potentially alleviate some of the burdens of its war effort. The Russian war effort is struggling writ large as Russia's recruitment numbers have decreased. Russian officials are setting conditions for possible involuntary reserve call-ups, and as pervasive economic issues, fuel shortages, and censorship campaigns generate increasing discontent among Russian society.[10] The Kremlin has undertaken great effort to disguise these issues both from its populace and from the Western governments it seeks to influence, and aggrandized claims of advance – including those which Russian officials repeat directly to Western leaders – are part of this facade.

Available battlefield evidence does not corroborate Russian claims of advances in northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts. The Ukrainian Northern Grouping of Forces refuted on July 30 the Russian MoD's claims that Russian forces seized Mala Slobidka and Mohrytsya, stating that these claims are part of a wider Russian informational effort.[11] The Ukrainian Kursk Grouping of Forces also refuted Russian MoD claims on July 30 that Russian forces seized Nova Sich, stating that Ukrainian forces maintain full control of the settlement.[12] The Ukrainian 16th AC reported on July 25 that Russian forces do not control Bily Kolodyaz (northeast of Kharkiv City) in Kharkiv Oblast, contrary to Russian claims of seizing it, but noted that Russian infantry have begun to infiltrate the settlement and its surrounding forests. This report also indicates that Russian forces likely do not control Yurchenkove (immediately southwest of Bily Kolodyaz). Local Kharkiv Oblast outlet Kharkiv Today added that Russian forces recently used AI-altered footage to falsely claim that they seized Bily Kolodyaz, likely referring to a video that Russian forces circulated on July 27 that purportedly showed a Russian servicemember holding a Russian flag in the eastern outskirts of Bily Kolodyaz, which was likely AI-generated or -altered.[13] Ukrainian 14th AC Spokesperson Colonel Vitaliy Sarantsev reported that Ukrainian forces still control Kozacha Lopan (north of Kharkiv City) but that Russian forces are again infiltrating into the settlement. Ukrainian 16th AC spokesperson "Hants" reported on July 30 that Russian forces have not completely seized Artilne, suggesting that Russian forces have also likely not seized Ivashkyne (west of Artilne), despite the Russian MoD claims that Russian forces seized Artilne on July 22 and Ivashkyne on July 24.[14] The spokesperson’s statement suggests that the July 29 Russian mechanized assault near Artilne likely failed to consolidate Russian positions in Artilne or neighboring Ivashkyne.[15]

Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in some areas of northern Ukraine, contradicting the Russian narrative of theater-wide and unchallenged advances. "Hants" also stated that Ukrainian forces liberated Odradne (east of Velykyi Burluk) on a prior date, consistent with ISW's assessment indicating that Ukrainian forces liberated Odradne as of May 15.[16] Geolocated footage published on July 30 indicates that Ukrainian forces conducted a mechanized assault northeast of Khatne (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[17] Several Russian milbloggers claimed on July 31 that Ukrainian forces conducted counterattacks near Nova Sich, Mohrytsya, Ivolzhanske (north of Sumy City), and Pysarivka (north of Sumy City), likely inhibiting the Russian rate of advance in these areas.[18]

 Prominent Kremlin co-opted milbloggers are notably refuting the official Russian military narrative about the situation in northern Ukraine. A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger criticized Russian forces for using AI to create or alter footage fabricating Russian advances, particularly in the Velykyi Burluk direction.[19] The milblogger also reiterated long-held criticisms that Russian forces are sending small infantry groups to infiltrate into a settlement and then film videos of the soldiers holding flags to falsely imply that Russian forces have seized the settlement. The milblogger condemned these lies as a broader issue endemic to Russian military culture and called for reform at all echelons. Another prominent Russian milblogger responded to the first milblogger, claiming that the military commander responsible for the AI-altered footage in the Velykyi Burluk direction may have wanted to preserve manpower, to aggrandize a claim of seizing an unimportant position or that the commander was under-resourced and unable to complete an objective.[20] Both milbloggers criticized the altered footage as part of the "beautiful reports" phenomenon, in which reports of false advances inhibit Russian tactical and operational planning and require Russian units to expend more manpower and resources to advance in worse conditions.[21] A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces directly accused the Northern Grouping of Forces command of aggrandizing claims and of claiming that any settlement into which Russian forces had infiltrated was actually seized even when Russian forces had not seized it and even withdrew.[22] The source directly challenged whether Russian forces had seized Mohrytsya, Mala Slobidka, Yurchenkove, and Virivka, all of which the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on July 30 or 31 and claimed that Russian forces have not even reached Ivolzhanske (north of Sumy City) despite claiming to have seized it in June 2026. It remains notable that the Russian military command's claims of advances are so unrealistic that even pro-Kremlin and Kremlin-affiliated ultranationalist milbloggers are criticizing Russian commanders for them.

 Ukrainian defense company F-Drones delivered the first 2,000 first-person view (FPV) drones to the US military as part of the US Department of Defense's (DoD) Drone Dominance Program. Ukrainian defense company F-Drones told Ukrainian source Militarnyi on July 31 that the US military received the first 2,000 F10 FPV drones from F-Drones as part of the DoD’s first stage of Gauntlet I of the Drone Dominance Program, a program in which the DoD purchases small, lethal drones through 2028.[23] Militarnyi reported that F10 is the first Ukrainian drone that received official export approval to the United States. Ukraine continues to be an essential partner in experience, technology, and expertise exchange in the use of unmanned systems and adaptation to drone-dominated battlefields for the United States and NATO.[24]

Key Takeaways:

• The Russian Northern Grouping of Forces and high military command are likely lying to the Kremlin about the extent of Russian gains in northern Ukraine in order to further the narrative that Russian forces are actively advancing across the entire theater, including a part of the frontline that has been largely stagnant for nearly two years.
• The Kremlin is using these exaggerated claims of advance as part of its ongoing cognitive warfare effort to falsely portray Russian forces as advancing across the battlefield in order to convince Ukraine's partners to abandon their support.
• Available battlefield evidence does not corroborate Russian claims of advances in northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts.
• Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in some areas of northern Ukraine, contradicting the Russian narrative of theater-wide and unchallenged advances.
• Prominent Kremlin co-opted milbloggers are notably refuting the official Russian military narrative about the situation in northern Ukraine.
• Ukrainian defense company F-Drones delivered the first 2,000 first-person view (FPV) drones to the US military as part of the US Department of Defense's (DoD) Drone Dominance Program.
• Russia launched 255 drones against Ukraine overnight.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 30, 2026

Russian forces conducted a large-scale strike series against Ukraine on the night of July 29 to 30 that featured a particularly large number of missiles and aimed to exploit Ukraine's shortage of ballistic missile interceptors. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 284 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and Italmas-type strike drones and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Oryol, and Kursk cities and Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast.[1] Russian forces also launched a total of 74 missiles – four Zirkon/Onyx anti-ship missiles from Kursk Oblast; nine Iskander-M/S-400/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Bryansk, Voronezh, and Kursk oblasts; and 61 Kh-101/Kalibr cruise missiles from Vologda Oblast and Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed one ballistic missile, 54 cruise missiles, and 265 drones; that three anti-ship missiles, six ballistic missiles, two cruise missiles, and 17 drones struck 20 locations; and that debris fell at 13 locations. Ukrainian authorities were reportedly clarifying information about eight of the missiles as of 0900 this morning. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned on the evening of July 29 that Russia had prepared a massive strike a few days ago, which Russian forces would highly likely launch on the night of July 29-30.[2]

Russian missile strikes targeted a wide swathe of Ukraine's deep rear and resulted in high civilian casualties. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that the large-scale strike series mostly targeted Kyiv and Lviv oblasts and included simultaneous waves from various directions.[3] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, educational, port, and civilian infrastructure in Lviv, Kyiv, Poltava, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, Sumy, Vinnytsia, Cherkasy, Kirovohrad, Zhytomyr, and Ivano-Frankivsk oblasts.[4] A Russian ballistic missile strike against Radushne, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, destroyed a residential building and killed two parents and four of their children.[5] Zelensky reported that at least eight people died and dozens more were injured in the overnight strikes.[6]

Russian forces continue to increase the number of missiles while decreasing the number of drones in strike packages, likely to exploit Ukraine’s shortage of ballistic missile interceptors, as Ukraine's drone interception rate remains high. The July 29-30 strike package notably caused significant damage even though the number of strike vehicles and decoys in the package (358 air targets) was not the largest that Russia has launched against Ukraine. Russian forces have launched larger salvos containing over 500 drones and missiles multiple times in recent months.[7] The overnight strike nonetheless had devastating effects due to its use of ballistic missiles that Ukrainian forces have few ways to defend against at the moment. Russian forces have overall been launching fewer drones and more missiles recently, having launched 4,606 drones and 376 missiles so far in July and 5,749 drones and 181 missiles in June. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger noted on July 30 that Russian forces have been unable to massively deploy Shahed-type drones to strike deep in the Ukrainian rear due to the saturation of Ukrainian air defenses effective against Shahed-type drones and limitations in Russia's communication capabilities that restrict the drones' ranges.[8] The milblogger noted that Russian forces primarily used air-to-air missiles to strike western Ukraine on July 29-30 but added that Russia does not have as many of these missiles as it does drones.

Russia also used at least one North Korean-provided ballistic missile for the first time since Summer 2025 following reported recent North Korean missile deliveries to Russia. The Ukrainian Air Force noted that Russian forces launched an unspecified number of North Korean-provided KN-23 missiles overnight.[9] Zelensky reported that preliminary information indicates that Russian forces used a North Korean missile for the first time in a long time to strike Radushne, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[10] A source told Reuters on July 30 that Russia's use of North Korean missiles suggests that Russia has compiled a stock of the missiles, and another source reportedly stated that the last Ukrainian-confirmed use of a North Korean missile in a Russian strike package was early August 2025.[11] Zelensky warned on July 25 that North Korea was sending additional ballistic missiles to Russia.[12] North Korea's provision of more missiles to Russia furthers Russia's ongoing efforts to move away from massive drone strikes and to instead lean more heavily into its large missile strikes to exploit Ukraine’s current shortage of interceptors capable of intercepting ballistic missiles. Russia's use of North Korean missiles also provides North Korea with battlefield testing and feedback to further improve the missiles – as Russia and North Korea have done in the past.[13]

A likely Russian Kh-101 cruise missile crashed in eastern Poland during Russia's large-scale missile strikes against western Ukraine on the night of July 29 to 30. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk reported on July 30 that an armed missile, likely a Russian Kh-101 cruise missile, entered Polish airspace and fell in a field near Tarnawa-Kolonia, Lublin Voivodeship (roughly 90 kilometers from the Polish-Ukrainian border).[14] Tusk noted that there is no reason to think that Polish territory was the intended target of the missile.[15] The Polish Armed Forces Operational Command reported that Russian long-range aviation was undergoing intense combat observations, and Poland observed at least 12 missiles flying over western Ukraine that potentially posed a threat to Polish airspace.[16]

Russian missile and drone incursions into NATO territory during Russian strikes on Ukraine appear to be a risk the Kremlin has accepted. Russian drones have violated NATO airspace and struck NATO territory or neighboring Moldova before, but this is the first time that a Russian missile has done so.[17] Such Russian behavior, regardless of whether these instances are deliberate or accidental, continues to demonstrate how Russian President Vladimir Putin has adopted a reckless policy that accepts the risk that Russian missile and drone strikes on western Ukraine may also strike neighboring states, including those in NATO.[18] ISW continues to assess that NATO may need to consider negotiating possible air defense agreements with Ukraine as a matter of self-defense against Russian drone strikes against NATO countries, regardless of whether the Russian drone incursions are accidental or intentional.[19]

Ukrainian forces are attempting to help NATO defend its airspace and territory during large Russian missile and drone strikes that threaten NATO members. Tusk stated that Ukrainian fighter pilots attempted to intercept the missiles that were approaching the Polish border.[20]

Ukraine's continued strike campaign against Wildberries warehouses (the closest Russian equivalent to Amazon) throughout Russia is imposing significant costs on the company's retailers and consumers. Ukrainian forces have been undertaking a deliberate campaign to strike Wildberries facilities throughout Russia and occupied Ukraine since July 17-18, with Ukrainian officials reporting that the logistics centers supply the Russian military with drone components and navigation equipment.[21] Wildberries reported that Ukrainian forces conducted additional drone strikes against its warehouses on the night of July 29 to 30, hitting facilities in Penza Oblast and the Republic of Udmurt.[22]

ISW recently assessed that intensified Ukrainian strikes against Wildberries facilities will likely increasingly inconvenience Russians who utilize the platform.[23] Many Russian retailers who sell through Wildberries have been complaining about the consequences they are personally facing after strikes have destroyed their merchandise.[24] Leningrad Oblast Governor Alexander Drozdenko claimed on July 30, for example, that about 1,500 Wildberries sellers in the region lost their goods to fires after recent Ukrainian drone strikes against the company's warehouses.[25]

Russian authorities appear to be focusing on resolving Wildberries' supply issues affecting ordinary Russians, as opposed to the more pressing issue of protecting the Russian rear against Ukrainian strikes. Russian Deputy Prime Minister and Economic Minister Alexander Novak chaired a meeting on July 30 of a government subcommittee on enhancing the stability of the financial sector and individual economic sectors to discuss assistance to Wildberries' partner sellers whose products Ukrainian strikes have damaged.[26] Novak emphasized the Russian government's need to provide support to affected small and medium-sized businesses. Economic Development Minister Maxim Reshetnikov outlined three key tasks that the Russian government must address soon to ensure stable retailer operations, all of which focused on ensuring supplies to consumers.[27]

Russia was notably unable to cope with its massive air defense requirements even before the start of the Ukrainian campaign against Wildberries in mid-July. Ukraine's strikes on this new target set will only strain Russian air defenses further. ISW continues to assess that Russia will likely fail to adequately fulfill its growing air defense needs because the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) and military will struggle to rapidly strengthen the air defense umbrella to cover both the frontline and its vast rear simultaneously.[28] Ukrainian forces will likely be able to continue — if not intensify — their long-range strike campaign, and increased investment in Ukraine’s ability to conduct strikes in Russia's vulnerable rear significantly degrades Russia’s ability to continue protracting the war. Russian authorities similarly focused on resolving consequences to consumers — as opposed to issues with air defenses — when Ukrainian strikes caused wide-scale fuel shortages at the start of the summer, further highlighting Russia's inability to take serious action toward strengthening its air defense umbrella at this time.[29] Russia’s exposed rear areas and continued inability to defend its airspace present a major vulnerability that Ukraine — if supported — can exploit.

Recently appointed Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi is starting to make personnel changes as he takes command of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Drapatyi on July 29 relieved Major General Oleksandr Gruzevych as the chief of staff and deputy commander of the Land Forces; relieved Major General Volodymyr Karpenko as the commander of the Logistics Forces; and terminated the secondment of the commander of the Missile Forces and Artillery, Major General Andriy Malinovsky, to the General Staff, where he had been overseeing Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russia since 2024.[30] Ukrainian media organization Babel reported that its source stated that a presidential decree will create a new command to coordinate and optimize the joint work of Ukraine's long-range strikes.

The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and government continue to undergo personnel shuffles. The Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers approved the appointment of human rights activist Lyubov Galan as the deputy minister of defense overseeing the development and preservation of human capital in the Ukrainian military and Ukrainian state-owned defense enterprise manager Ukroboronprom Acting CEO Serhiy Boev as the deputy minister of defense for European integration.[31] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed former Economy Minister Oleksiy Sobolev as the deputy head of the Ukrainian presential office with a focus on the economy, Olena Voronova as the head of the personnel department of Ukraine's Security Service (SBU), and former Head of the SBU Center of Command and Control Brigadier General Oleh Fedoriv as the head of the SBU's Alpha Special Operations Center in place of Acting Defense Minister Yevheniy Khmara.[32]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted a large-scale strike series against Ukraine on the night of July 29 to 30 that featured a particularly large number of missiles and aimed to exploit Ukraine's shortage of ballistic missile interceptors.
• Russian missile strikes targeted a wide swathe of Ukraine's deep rear and resulted in high civilian casualties.
• Russian forces continue to increase the number of missiles while decreasing the number of drones in strike packages, likely to exploit Ukraine’s shortage of ballistic missile interceptors, while Ukraine's drone interception rate remains high.
• Russia also used at least one North Korean-provided ballistic missile for the first time since Summer 2025 following reported recent North Korean missile deliveries to Russia
• A likely Russian Kh-101 cruise missile crashed in eastern Poland during Russia's large-scale missile strikes against western Ukraine on the night of July 29 to 30.
• Russian missile and drone incursions into NATO territory during Russian strikes on Ukraine appear to be a risk the Kremlin has accepted.
• Ukrainian forces are attempting to help NATO defend its airspace and territory during large Russian missile and drone strikes that threaten NATO members.
• Ukraine's continued strike campaign against Wildberries warehouses (the closest Russian equivalent to Amazon) throughout Russia is imposing significant costs on the company's retailers and consumers.
• Russian authorities appear to be focusing on resolving Wildberries' supply issues affecting ordinary Russians, as opposed to the more pressing issue of protecting the Russian rear against Ukrainian strikes.
• Recently appointed Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi is starting to make personnel changes as he takes command of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
• The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and government continue to undergo personnel shuffles.
• Russian forces continued their campaigns against Ukrainian port infrastructure and merchant ships.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian port and oil infrastructure on the night of July 29 to 30.
• Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances on July 30.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 29, 2026

Russia's superior aviation capabilities are allowing Russia to use glide bomb strikes to enable infantry advances in and near Kostyantynivka. Russian forces are widely using glide bomb strikes against Kostyantynivka and other cities in Ukraine's Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast to turn the cities into rubble, physically destroy Ukrainian strongpoints and ground control stations, and allow Russian infiltrators to enter and eventually seize and consolidate positions.[1] The commander of a Ukrainian drone unit reported that Russian guided glide bomb strikes against Kostyantynivka are the main form of Russian successes in the area and are imposing major challenges for Ukrainian forces.[2] Russian forces debuted the tactic of using glide bomb strikes at scale to destroy Ukrainian positions to enable ground force advances with the February 2024 seizure of Avdiivka and subsequently used such strikes to support offensives against other settlements, such as Vuhledar in October 2024, Kurakhove in December 2024, and Toretsk in August 2025.[3] Russian forces continue to rely on their aviation overmatch into 2026, even as Russian infantry tactics have switched from larger-scale infantry attacks and mechanized assaults to mostly small group infiltrations. Russian forces have also been leveraging glide bomb strikes in their battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign in 2025 and 2026, particularly against Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the tactical and operational rear.[4] (BAI refers to the use of airpower to strike targets in the near rear behind the frontline to impact battlefield operations in the near term.)

Efforts to degrade Russian aviation capabilities likely will deprive Russian forces of an important tactical advantage and help further reduce the tempo of Russian advances. Russia's reliance on glide bomb strikes to facilitate ground advances is a vulnerability Ukraine and its Western partners can exploit. Ukraine has already significantly degraded Russia’s ground-based air defense network in sectors of the theater through a sustained suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses campaign (SEAD / DEAD) since late 2025.[5] Ukraine continues working to degrade Russian combat aviation, including with F-16 and Gripen fighter jets and other anti-air means, and continued Western support for these Ukrainian efforts can significantly reduce Russia's aviation advantage.[6] A degradation of Russia’s aviation capabilities will deprive Russian forces of key means that the Russian military relies on for brute force tactical advances, and thus likely slow Russian advances on the ground, hindering Russia's ability to destroy Ukrainian key fortified positions, leverage rubble to conceal infantry, and interdict Ukrainian logistics.

The situation in and near Kostyantynivka is deteriorating, but Russian forces have not seized the city despite Russian claims. Fighting will likely continue for several weeks as Russian forces try to consolidate the positions they have gained through infiltrations. Urban combat continues throughout large portions of Kostyantynivka, with Ukrainian and Russian positions intermixed and Russian forces conducting infiltration missions within the city. Geolocated footage published on July 25 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions that Russian infiltrators bypassed in southwestern Kostyantynivka, and geolocated footage published on July 29 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian forces in southwestern Kostyantynivka — an area in which Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[7] Geolocated footage published on July 28 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in central Kostyantynivka after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[8] Ukrainian online media outlet Hromadske reported on July 29 that Ukrainian servicemembers stated that there are Russian soldiers continuing to infiltrate the city and that Russian forces are complicating Ukrainian defense, though Ukrainian units are still rotating infantry through positions in the city, and Ukrainian forces’ rear is not at risk of encirclement for at least several more weeks.[9]

Russian forces are also infiltrating beyond Kostyantynivka's northern outskirts. Hromadske reported that a Ukrainian commander stated that Russian forces have essentially seized Molocharka (just north of Kostyantynivka) and are moving into Izhevka (northwest of Molocharka).[10] The press service of the Russian Southern Grouping of Forces claimed on July 29 that elements of its 1008th Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps) are operating within Druzhkivka and posted footage of Russian forces near the city's stele.[11] Geolocations of the footage near the stele indicate that Russian infiltrators are operating on the southern outskirts of Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka, however — in line with other Russian milblogger claims that Russian forces have advanced to Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka.[12] These positions are likely limited and not consolidated at this time, however.

The Kremlin denied that Russia is preparing for mobilization, likely to assuage growing public concerns and possibly signal Russian President Vladimir Putin's desire to continue volunteer recruitment over compulsory reserve call-ups for as long as possible. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on July 28 that recent reports that Russia is preparing for mobilization are false provocations and Ukrainian propaganda aimed at destabilizing Russia ahead of the September 2026 State Duma elections.[13] Medvedev also claimed that social media platforms are spreading false recruitment advertisements calling on Russians to sign up for military service to avoid mobilization in the future.[14] Medvedev claimed that Russia has no need for mobilization and that Russia had fully met its recruitment needs, reportedly recruiting about 200,000 people for contract military service and 16,000 volunteers during the first half of 2026.[15] Medvedev also claimed that Russia recruited around 40,000 service members to serve within the Russian Unmanned Systems Forces over the same period.[16] Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartopolov and propagandist Vladimir Solovyov similarly recently rejected the prospects for mobilization.[17]

Such Kremlin denials are likely in response to numerous emerging reports and laws that suggest that Russia is undergoing preparations to conduct mobilization. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky recently stated, citing Ukrainian intelligence, that Russian forces are preparing to launch a new, "significant" mobilization wave in Fall 2026 and that Putin is actively taking low-profile preparation measures to potentially mobilize 500,000 troops.[18] Kremlin state media also notably presented Medvedev's July 29 denials as a response to Zelensky's July 27 interview with SkyNews, in which Zelensky had similarly highlighted Putin's preparations for mobilization.[19] A prominent Russian milblogger, whose war coverage frequently appears on Russian state media, also recently called on Russians to sign up for military service on their own terms before the Kremlin announces mobilization — notably contradicting Medvedev's claims that such recruitment advertisements are false.[20] A Russian insider source also claimed that the Russian state-owned United Shipbuilding Corporation has recently increased its eligibility criteria for specialists who would be exempt from a compulsory reserve call-up, effectively freeing up more of the labor force for a potential mobilization.[21] A source from the United Shipbuilding Corporation reportedly stated that the corporation's new management is simultaneously trying to find ways to shorten payrolls by relieving employees who could face mobilization or sign up to fight in Ukraine. The Russian government passed numerous laws in July 2026, possibly in preparation for mobilization, including laws allowing people with criminal records to sign military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) during formal mobilization periods.[22] The Russian government is also reportedly considering new restrictions on the Russian population to quell resistance to mobilization.[23]

The Kremlin's continued emphasis on volunteer recruitment suggests that Putin is continuing Russia's same inefficient and expensive volunteer recruitment as he weighs his options about force generation in the meantime. The Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation observed that Russian federal subjects have been steadily increasing volunteer enlistment bonuses, with the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug and Republic of Dagestan offering recruits sign-up bonuses up to 4.1 million rubles (about $5,250).[24] The Russian volunteer recruitment campaign, however, has been increasingly failing to achieve its 2026 recruitment goals amidst increasing casualties on the battlefield.

Russia is not on track to meet its annual recruitment target for 2026. Former Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported in March 2026 that the Kremlin planned to recruit 409,000 troops in 2026, and Zelensky stated that Russia had only recruited 221,000 troops by late July 2026 while suffering 225,500 casualties.[25] Medvedev’s statement that Russia recruited about 200,000 soldiers in the first half of 2026 further indicates that Russian recruitment will fall short of the 409,000 target by year’s end, assuming a constant recruitment rate. This recruitment challenge will likely impose Putin with a difficult decision point on whether to conduct some form of mobilization to augment volunteer recruitment by the end of the year. ISW continues to assess that any form of compulsory military mobilization is a personal decision for Putin that is contingent on his personal perception of the battlefield situation and his perception of the stability and integrity of the Kremlin. It remains unclear whether or how Putin will decide to implement mobilization.[26]

The Kremlin continues setting conditions to block Telegram and deny the open internet in Russia, possibly in preparation for compulsory military mobilization. The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) charged Telegram co-founder and CEO Pavel Durov on July 29 with aiding terrorism and placed him on an international wanted list because Telegram allegedly failed to remove channels and bots that Ukrainian intelligence services, unspecified terrorists, and other extremist organizations allegedly used to coordinate “acts of sabotage and terrorism, mass murder, and cyber fraud.”[27] A Russian lawyer claimed on July 29 that FSB’s charges against Durov do not mean that Russia is banning Telegram or that using Telegram is illegal, but noted that Telegram users may face criminal liability if they use Telegram to engage in criminal terrorist activities.^[28] A prominent, Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger attempted to justify the Kremlin’s criminal charges against Durov, claiming that Russian security services have a right to demand Telegram’s cooperation and deflected assertions that the Kremlin is intensifying its censorship campaign against Telegram as a platform for open discourse in Russia.[29] The Kremlin is likely attempting to quell fears about a potential Telegram ban as it has significantly intensified its campaign to crack down on the open internet in Russia, including access to Telegram, since 2025.[30] Russian State Duma Defense Committee member Andrei Kolesnik claimed on July 29, however, that Russian intelligence agencies may declare Telegram a terrorist resource due to Durov’s reluctance to remove channels that the Russian government deems unfavorable.[31] The Kremlin has repeatedly taken measures to censor Telegram and its administrators and users under the pretext of combatting terrorism, extremism, and discreditation of the Russian Armed Forces.[32] The FSB’s charges against Durov are likely a continuation of the Kremlin’s efforts to set conditions to block Telegram in the future, which may also support Russian President Vladimir Putin’s preparations to control societal backlash in the event of military mobilization.

Key Takeaways:

• Russia's superior aviation capabilities are allowing Russia to use glide bomb strikes to enable infantry advances in and near Kostyantynivka.
• Efforts to degrade Russian aviation capabilities likely will deprive Russian forces of an important tactical advantage and help further reduce the tempo of Russian advances.
• The situation in and near Kostyantynivka is deteriorating, but Russian forces have not seized the city despite Russian claims. Fighting will likely continue for several weeks as Russian forces try to consolidate the positions they have gained through infiltrations.
• The Kremlin denied that Russia is preparing for mobilization, likely to assuage growing public concerns and possibly signal Russian President Vladimir Putin's desire to continue volunteer recruitment over compulsory reserve call-ups for as long as possible.
• Russia is not on track to meet its annual recruitment target for 2026.
• The Kremlin continues setting conditions to block Telegram and deny the open internet in Russia, possibly in preparation for compulsory military mobilization.
• Russia launched 60 drones against Ukraine overnight.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian energy and industrial infrastructure on July 28 and 29.
• Russian forces recently advanced in the Velykyi Burluk and Slovyansk directions.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 28, 2026

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with US President Donald Trump in Washington, DC, on July 28 to discuss strengthening Ukrainian air defenses and diplomatic efforts to end Russia’s war against Ukraine. Zelensky stated that he had a “good” meeting with Trump and that they discussed US licenses for Ukraine to produce unspecified Patriot interceptor missiles and efforts to intensify the diplomatic process to end the war.[i] The Financial Times (FT) reported on July 28, citing a source familiar with the meeting, that US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff and former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner have agreed to visit Kyiv City for the first time as part of efforts to end the war.[ii] US political activist Laura Loomer, citing a White House source, reported that Witkoff and Kushner may visit within the next two weeks (by August 11).[iii] Witkoff and Kushner have visited Moscow City multiple times since Trump came into office in January 2025.[iv]

Russian President Vladimir Putin is trying to present himself as well informed about the battlefield situation in Ukraine, as Russian milbloggers continue to complain about Russian commanders lying about Russian advances. Putin answered a question at a staged event with Russian Navy personnel on July 26 about the sources he uses to get information about the frontline.[v] Putin stated that he primarily relies on information from official sources but that he analyzes the entire range of information he receives to draw his final conclusions. Putin reported that he gets information from Russian commanders, soldiers, special services, and officials. Putin noted that there are also “bloggers” that he sometimes reads, claiming that some of the bloggers “hit the nail on the head” and produce good work while others only pursue their own interests. Putin claimed that information from unspecified public groups is also sometimes useful but can include “information garbage” and be “dangerous” for those who do not have a “basic understanding of...current events.” Russian milbloggers have long complained that Russian commanders and officials lie about Russian advances on the battlefield, however.[vi] ISW has previously observed a leaked Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) map from April 2026 featuring heavily exaggerated Russian frontline claims in western Zaporizhia Oblast, for example.[vii] A Russian milblogger claimed on July 28 that the situation for Russian forces is only positive in the Oleksandrivka direction but that “things are worse” in other areas of the front even as Ukrainian officials are reporting less frequently on Ukrainian battlefield successes.[viii] Another Russian milblogger responded, stating that Russian commanders have repeatedly sent assault units on missions based on an inaccurate understanding of the frontline, assuming Russian soldiers are close to the Ukrainian positions they are meant to attack when they are in fact still as far as four kilometers away.[ix] The Kremlin has notably coopted several prominent milbloggers who accept and promote the Kremlin’s fabricated narrative of such sweeping Russian advances, calling into question the degree to which Putin’s consumption of “blogger” sources improves his understanding of the real situation on the battlefield.[x]

Kremlin officials are reportedly considering a wide range of options to support a potential mobilization in the future, as Russian President Vladimir Putin likely continues to weigh his options. Russian opposition source Verstka reported on July 28, citing sources in and close to the Russian government, that Russian officials are discussing the potential introduction of new restrictions on the Russian population in the event of a mobilization after the September 2026 Russian State Duma elections.[xi] Verstka cited two political strategists working with the Kremlin who stated that a “serious” failure on the frontline or in Russian recruitment efforts may trigger a mobilization and that some security officials are advocating for full or partial martial law to prevent civil unrest in the event of mobilization. The security officials are reportedly advocating for tougher penalties for currency law violations, tightened controls over foreign assets, virtual private network (VPN) restrictions, and the introduction of exit visas. Russian officials appear to be debating the implementation of mobilization in the fall, but Putin has likely not yet made a final decision. The Kremlin is setting conditions to facilitate a mobilization, should Putin choose to do so in the future, however. Putin signed a law on July 26 expanding Rosgvardia’s and the Russian MoD’s access to information about Russian military personnel and their families in the Unified State Registry of Civil Registry Offices, which the Russian MoD noted will reduce bureaucratic procedures and paperwork processing times.[xii] This law follows proposals from Rosgvardia on July 21 to expand its civil defense regulations to protect Russian society from unspecified “dangers” during mobilization, martial law, and wartime.[xiii] The Kremlin has been streamlining the bureaucracy associated with mobilization since 2025, with Putin signing a law in November 2025 changing the Russian military conscription administrative process to a year-round cycle in place of the previous semi-annual cycles, thereby significantly expanding the rate at which Russia could call up and process a larger volume of conscripts and reservists.[xiv] ISW continues to assess that mobilization is a very personal decision for Putin that is contingent on his personal perception of the battlefield situation and the integrity of the Kremlin, and that it remains unclear whether or how Putin will decide to implement mobilization.[xv]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with US President Donald Trump in Washington, DC, on July 28 to discuss strengthening Ukrainian air defenses and diplomatic efforts to end Russia’s war against Ukraine.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin is trying to present himself as well informed about the battlefield situation in Ukraine, as Russian milbloggers continue to complain about Russian commanders lying about Russian advances.
• Kremlin officials are reportedly considering a wide range of options to support a potential mobilization in the future, as Putin likely continues to weigh his options.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian logistics and industrial infrastructure from July 27 to 28.
• Russian forces launched 131 drones against Ukraine overnight on July 27 to 28.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kostyantynivka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 27, 2026

Russian President Vladimir Putin is trying to militarize Russian society and to shift the responsibility for the war in Ukraine onto Russian State Duma deputies and the Russian population. Putin gave a speech on July 26 for Russia's Navy Day in which he heavily emphasized the importance of Russia's national unity around the war effort in Ukraine.[1] Putin claimed that Russia needs to "imbue the consciousness" of its civil society with the importance of the war and to preserve this sense of national unity even after the war ends. Putin emphasized that there is nothing more important at this time than Russian forces fighting in Ukraine. Putin also claimed that Russian volunteers are eager to help the Russian military and are worried that Russian forces will no longer need their help in peacetime — an attempt to portray the Russian population as willing to continue the war and bear the necessary sacrifices to achieve victory in Ukraine. Putin also held a meeting with Russia State Duma deputies on July 27, during which he highlighted the unity of the Russian government around the war effort and claimed that the Duma has passed a total of nearly 3,000 bills in the past five years (since 2021), with two-thirds of the bills passing with support from all factions to support Russian forces, defense enterprises, society, and domestic economy during the war.[2] Putin noted that Duma deputies collectively passed laws to integrate illegally occupied Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts into Russia. Putin likely highlighted the role of Duma deputies and ordinary citizens in Russia's military effort in an effort to deflect personal responsibility for the continuing costly war and to portray them as fully supportive of Putin's decisions ahead of the Duma elections in September 2026.

Putin continues efforts to persuade personnel mobilized in 2022 to sign contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and continue fighting in Russia's war against Ukraine. Putin had likely scripted an encounter with a mobilized Russian Caspian Flotilla sailor during his meeting with Russian Navy commanders on Russia's Navy Day on July 26. The sailor claimed that he intends to sign a contract with the Russian MoD after he was mobilized and had fought in Ukraine since September 2022. Putin responded that the sailor's story is a great example of a mobilized serviceman finding their calling during this war.^[3] Putin likely highlighted the sailor's story as an example of a mobilized servicemember who has achieved professional fulfillment through military service while embracing his duty to defend the Russian state. The Russian MoD notably attempted to survey and coerce Russian mobilized servicemen to switch to contract service in mid 2025, likely in an attempt to retain these forces in the event of demobilization.[4] ISW has previously observed reports of Russian military authorities incentivizing and coercing mobilized servicemembers into signing Russian MoD contracts.[5] The Kremlin likely continues to promote narratives and pursue measures aimed at retaining mobilized personnel within the Russian Armed Forces and to alleviate some societal concerns over lack of demobilization for personnel mobilized in 2022.

Putin continues to marginally increase the authorized end strength of the Russian Armed Forces as part of ongoing Russian military reforms. Putin signed a decree on July 27 setting the strength of the Russian Armed Forces at 2,426,130 total personnel, including 1,535,000 military personnel.[6] The decree aims to create military construction units within the Russian Armed Forces.[7] Putin last issued such a decree on June 12, increasing the authorized end strength to 2,399,130 total personnel, including 1,510,000 military personnel.[8] Putin’s July 27 decree marks an increase of 27,000 total personnel, of which 25,000 are military personnel. Russia has expanded the authorized end strength of the Russian Armed Forces nearly every year since launching the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, increasing the size by 137,000 personnel in 2022, 170,000 in 2023, and 180,000 in 2024.[9] The 2026 increases have been marginal in comparison to previous expansions. ISW continues to assess that the increases in authorized end strength support the expansion of the Russian force structure that then-Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced in January 2023, since the formation of new Russian military districts, formations, and subordinate units requires more personnel to fully staff them.[10]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin is trying to militarize Russian society and to shift the responsibility for the war in Ukraine onto Russian State Duma deputies and the Russian population.
• Putin continues efforts to persuade personnel mobilized in 2022 to sign contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and continue fighting in Russia's war against Ukraine.
• Putin continues to marginally increase the authorized end strength of the Russian Armed Forces as part of ongoing Russian military reforms.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian export and oil infrastructure from July 26 to 27.
• Russia launched 147 drones against Ukraine overnight on July 26 to 27.
• Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances on July 27.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 26, 2026

The Russian Navy is forming unmanned systems regiments, likely in part to protect Russian vessels from intensified Ukrainian strikes against Russian naval assets in the Black and Azov seas. Russian Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Alexander Moiseyev stated on July 26 that the Russian Navy formed its first unmanned systems regiment within the Northern Fleet on July 1, 2026, and plans to form additional unmanned systems regiments within the Northern Fleet in 2026 and incorporate a similar structure within the Russian Pacific Fleet in 2027.[1] Moiseyev claimed that the Russian Navy has commissioned 20 ships, vessels, and boats and plans to commission an additional 21 ships into the Russian Navy by the end of 2026, including the first nuclear-powered submarine armed with the Zirkon hypersonic missile system.[2] Russia began forming a dedicated Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) in 2024, whose elements are currently operating on the frontlines in Ukraine, in an effort to centralize drone operations.[3] The newly announced unmanned systems regiments will be subordinate to the Russian Navy and appear to be separate from USF, which has operated in support of Russian ground forces in Ukraine. The Russian military command is likely forming these regiments in part to protect Russian vessels and ports from Ukrainian drone strikes, including in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov.[4] The expansion of USF structures and command systems to the Russian Navy is also a reflection of the way the Russian military writ large is trying to integrate unmanned systems throughout the wider force. Russian forces have implemented a wide range of measures to defend against Ukraine’s intensifying intermediate-range strike campaign against occupied Ukraine and Russia, including against Russian vessels in the Black and Azov seas by relocating and dispersing ships, installing anti-drone netting, and introducing mobile task force units and aviation patrol, but have largely failed to defend against and adapt to Ukrainian strikes.[5]

Russian President Vladimir Putin used Russia's Navy Day to project strength while reinforcing expansive territorial claims beyond Ukraine. Putin stated on July 26 that the Russian Navy plays a vital role in achieving Russia's war goals in Ukraine and is a key element in ensuring Russian global security.[6] Putin emphasized that Franz Josef Land is a Russian archipelago - a collection of islands exclusively inhabited by military personnel - and claimed that Russia has begun re-establishing its presence there in response to external militarization and rivalry with Russia in the Arctic.[7] Putin stated that Russia intends to protect its interests in the Northern Sea Route as it runs largely through Russian territorial waters and that Russia will also ensure the security of Kaliningrad by all available means in the event of any threat.[8] Putin's references to these small Arctic islands and Russian claims to the Northern Sea Route are part of the Kremlin's continued effort to project Russian strength globally while reinforcing territorial claims beyond Ukraine.[9]

A Romanian F-16 fighter jet intercepted an unidentified drone in Romanian airspace on July 26 for the third time in three days. Romanian Prime Minister Nicusor Dan stated that a Romanian F-16 intercepted a drone in the Sulina-Chilia area (near Romania’s southeastern border with Ukraine) at about 1015 local time.[10] Romanian authorities previously intercepted drones over Romanian airspace on July 24 and 25.[11] Romanian authorities have not yet specified the origin of the drone and are still investigating the origins of the intercepted drones from July 25 and 26.[12] Romanian authorities confirmed that the intercepted drone from July 24 is a Russian Shahed.[13] Romanian Foreign Minister Oana Țoiu summoned the Russian Ambassador to Romania, Vladimir Lipaev, on July 26 following the drone interception on the morning of July 26.[14]

Key Takeaways:

• The Russian Navy is forming unmanned systems regiments, likely in part to protect Russian vessels from intensified Ukrainian strikes against Russian naval assets in the Black and Azov seas.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin used Russia's Navy Day to project strength while reinforcing expansive territorial claims beyond Ukraine.
• A Romanian F-16 fighter jet intercepted an unidentified drone in Romanian airspace on July 26 for the third time in three days.
• Russia launched one Kh-59/69 cruise missile, seven Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles, and 136 drones against Ukraine overnight on July 25 to 26.
• Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances on July 26.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 25, 2026

Russian President Vladimir Putin likely used a meeting with Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev to justify his refusal to freeze the frontline in Ukraine and his decision to continue waging the war as he has been. Putin met with Tokayev in Omsk for the Russian-Kazakhstan Interregional Cooperation Forum on July 25, and Tokayev claimed that it is difficult for many to understand the origin of the Russian war in Ukraine and called for Russia and Ukraine to freeze the frontline and return to Istanbul-format negotiations.[1] Putin did not respond to Tokayev in the public part of the meeting, but Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that Putin later gave Tokayev a detailed account of the war and told him that it is impossible to freeze the current frontline because Russia must achieve its battlefield objectives.[2] Peskov reiterated the Kremlin’s assertion that fighting could stop “by the end of the day today” if Ukraine “makes the appropriate decisions.” Kremlin officials have consistently called for Ukraine to capitulate to Russia’s maximalist war demands, which the Kremlin has repeatedly emphasized include all of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts before even beginning peace negotiations, which are not guaranteed to result in a meaningful peace agreement.[3] Putin has faced dropping approval and trust ratings, an increasingly struggling economy, and mounting casualties for minimal gains in Ukraine as he continues to wage his war largely in the same way he has been since 2022.[4] The Kremlin continues to signal to Russians that they should be prepared to bear the costs of a long war against Ukraine and likely used Putin’s meeting with Tokayev as a venue to remind Russians of this justification.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that Russia continues to prepare for involuntary reserve call-ups and is preparing to receive about 30,000 new North Korean troops amid staggeringly high battlefield casualties. Zelensky stated on July 25 that Russian forces suffered about 222,500 casualties, including 131,000 killed and 93,000 wounded, from January to July 2026 (about 31,785 casualties per month) and only recruited about 221,000 personnel (about 31,571 personnel recruited per month) during the same time period.[5] Zelensky noted that most of the wounded Russian soldiers are severely wounded, as Russian forces have poor frontline medicine. Zelensky stated on July 24 that Ukraine has intelligence that the Kremlin is preparing for a “significant” wave of involuntary reserve call-ups in Fall 2026, but did not specify if this formal mobilization would consist of a large call-up or rolling-call ups.[6] Russia has been setting conditions to conduct rolling partial reserve call-ups since at least October 2025 and recently passed bills expanding the pool of recruitable Russians convicted of crimes and setting conditions to suppress civil unrest resulting from mobilization.[7] Russia is holding elections for its State Duma (parliament) in mid-September 2026, and Russian President Vladimir Putin would likely wait until after these elections to announce a new wave of mobilization, which will be very unpopular amongst a Russian population that has faced mounting economic, social, and emotional costs of Putin’s war for the past four and a half years.[8]

Zelensky also warned that Russia has been preparing bases in Voronezh Oblast since June 2026 to receive another 30,000 North Korean soldiers and additional North Korean ballistic missiles.[9] Zelensky did not specify when these North Korean soldiers or munitions would arrive in Russia. North Korea has sent an estimated 15,000 soldiers to Russia, where they supported Russia's effort to push Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast in late 2024 into 2025 and have since performed rear area functions, freeing up Russian military personnel to fight on the front lines in Ukraine.[10] It is unclear what functions these North Korean personnel would perform or where in the theater they would operate. ISW has not observed reports of North Korean forces fighting in Ukraine, and Russia and North Korea likely remain hesitant to deploy North Korean military personnel to occupied Ukraine due to the risk of inciting a Western response. 30,000 North Korean soldiers replacing Russian personnel in rear areas in Russia would free up at least some manpower for Russian offensive operations on the frontline, but would not give Russia more than a month's worth of personnel at their current casualty rates.

Russia is expanding its gasoline export ban until the end of 2026. Russian Deputy Prime Minister and Economic Minister Alexander Novak stated that Russia is extending the gasoline export ban until the end of2026 and will consider lifting the ban on diesel exports "as the market recovers." The Russian government temporarily banned gasoline and diesel exports on April 1 and July 8, respectively, as Ukraine ramped up its long-range strike campaigns against Russia's oil refining capacity and intermediate-range campaign against Russian logistics, including the deliveries of fuel to occupied Ukraine and the frontline.[11] Many areas of Russia and occupied Ukraine continue to struggle with fuel shortages, though Russian officials are increasingly posturing that the economic situation and fuel crisis are stabilizing.[12] Ukraine’s strikes continue reducing Russia’s ability to export fuel, depriving Moscow of the chance to fully benefit from the rise in global oil prices in the past few months due to the war in the Middle East.[13]

A Romanian F-16 fighter jet intercepted an unidentified drone in Romanian airspace for the second time in two days on July 25. Romanian President Nicusor Dan stated that a Romanian F-16 intercepted the drone about 10 kilometers west of the Sfantu Gheorghe commune (along the Danube River delta near Romania’s southeastern border with Ukraine) at about 0830 local time.[14] Romanian authorities have not yet specified the origin of the drone. Romanian F-16s intercepted a Shahed-like drone in southeastern Romania on July 24, and Romanian authorities have since confirmed that the drone is a Russian Shahed.[15] Russia’s war in Ukraine, including Russian mass drone strikes against Ukraine, continues to present persistent threats to Romania and the NATO alliance.[16]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin likely used a meeting with Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev to justify his refusal to freeze the frontline in Ukraine and his decision to continue waging the war as he has been
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that Russia continues to prepare for involuntary reserve call-ups and is preparing to receive about 30,000 new North Korean troops amid staggeringly high battlefield casualties.
• Russia is expanding its gasoline export ban until the end of 2026.
• A Romanian F-16 fighter jet intercepted an unidentified drone in Romanian airspace for the second time in two days on July 25.
• Ukrainian forces struck Russian energy, logistics, and military assets on July 24 and 25. Russia launched 157 drones and two Kh-59/69 cruise missiles against overnight on July 24 and 25.
• Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces made confirmed advances on July 25.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 24, 2026

Ukrainian forces appear to have struck at least 10 Wildberries warehouses (the closest Russian equivalent to Amazon) in Russia and occupied Ukraine in the past week. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert "Magyar" Brovdi heavily implied on July 24 that Ukrainian forces struck two Wildberries facilities in Leningrad Oblast and an additional Wildberries facility in occupied Simferopol, Crimea.[1] Geolocated footage publishes on July 24 shows apparent drone strikes and fires at two separate Wildberries logistics centers in Shushary and Utkina Zavod, St. Petersburg, and in occupied Simferopol, Crimea.[2] Wildberries CEO Tatiana Kim acknowledged on July 24 the strikes against the St. Petersburg centers and the Simferopol Wildberries facility and claimed that first responders saved some warehouse space and goods.[3] Wildberries reported on July 24 that it temporarily suspended operations at the Shushary and Utkina Zavod logistics facilities.[4] Russian opposition sources reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a Wildberries warehouse in Tver City, and footage published on July 24 shows a fire reportedly in Tver City.[5] Acting Tver Oblast Governor Vitaly Korolev claimed that there was a fire at an unspecified logistics facility in Elevator, Tver City following a Ukrainian drone strike.[6] Ukrainian forces struck two Wildberries logistics facilities in Moscow and Tambov oblasts between July 17 and 18, one Wildberries facility in Moscow Oblast between July 19 and 20, two Wildberries facilities in Krasnodar and Stavropol krais between July 21 and 22, and one Wildberries facility near Voronezh City between July 22 and 23 in addition to the four hit on the night of July 23 to 24.^[7]

Intensified Ukrainian strikes against Wildberries facilities may impose additional requirements on Russia's already-stretched air defenses and will likely increasingly inconvenience Russians who utilize the Wildberries platform. A Russian insider source claimed on July 24 that Russia is urgently building additional fixed Pantsir air defense positions throughout Moscow Oblast following the July 17 to 19 strikes against Wildberries facilities in the oblast.[8] Ukraine's increasing strike campaigns against deep rear areas of Russiastrikes on military logistics and targets at the intermediate-range, and efforts to isolate occupied Crimea are already imposing additional manpower and materiel requirements on Russia in addition to Russia's existing requirements to staff and defend the frontline.[9] Russia will struggle to include Wildberries warehouses and similar facilities in the growing list of rear-area assets it must defend.[10] Disruptions in Wildberries services will likely continue to inconvenience Russians in urban areas such as Moscow and St. Petersburg, whom the Kremlin has sought to shield from the war effort. Strikes against Wildberries facilities may also place financial pressure on elites in Russian President Vladimir Putin's inner circle.[11]  Russian Presidential Administration Chief of Staff Anton Vaino and First Deputy Chief of Staff Alexei Gromov reportedly either back or co-own Wildberries.^[12] Recent Ukrainian strikes against Wildberries facilities have reportedly caused about 170 billion rubles (about $2.2 billion) of damage as of July 24, which is likely to place pressure on the elites that own, operate, and maintain stake in Wildberries writ large.[13] Putin notably reportedly asked Russian elites to financially back his war effort in March 2026, breaking a promise he made to oligarchs in July 2000 that he would uphold the privatization of Soviet assets as long as the oligarchs remained out of Russian politics and pledged allegiance to Putin.[14] Russian elites have since reportedly sought to move money abroad to protect their assets from Russian nationalization.[15]

The Russian Central Bank slightly lowered its key interest rate for the fifth time in 2026 while attempting to portray Russia’s economy as stable in line with recent Kremlin messaging. The Russian Central Bank announced on July 24 that it lowered its key interest rate from 14.25 to 14 percent — one of its smallest decreases in recent months — and reiterated the need for a gradual key rate reduction.^[16] The Central Bank claimed that Russia’s annual inflation was 5.9 percent as of July 20 and that the annual inflation in 2026 will increase to about six to seven percent due to fuel price increases (resulting in large part from Ukrainian strikes on Russian energy infrastructure). The Central Bank also slightly raised its average key rate forecast range through the end of 2026 from about 14 to 14.5 percent to about 14.5 to 14.6 percent and lowered its forecast for Russian economic growth in 2026 from 0.5 to 1.5 percent to about zero to one percent. Russian Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina acknowledged on July 24 that rising fuel prices are contributing to rising prices of other goods and services but noted that the Russian Central Bank considers the accelerated price growth temporary.[17] Nabiullina claimed that the current inflation expectations are natural and may decline as the Russian fuel market stabilizes, reiterating claims that the fuel crisis is already stabilizing in many Russian federal subjects.[18] Nabiullina stated that the Central Bank assumes that Russian companies will restore their production capacity by the end of 2026. Nabiullina’s statements are likely intended to reassure Russian society that Russia’s economy is stabilizing despite the ongoing fuel shortage crisis due to Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign and broader Russian economic issues.[19] Russia continues to struggle with increased and unsustainable war spending, growing inflation, significant labor shortages, and reductions in Russia’s sovereign wealth fund.[20] Russia’s inflation rate is also likely much higher than the Central Bank claims, with the cost of Russia’s monthly minimum food basket growing by 7.9 percent since the start of 2026.[21] ISW continues to assess that the Central Bank is lowering the key rate to project stability and expand capital availability to the Russian defense industry despite also pursuing inflationary fiscal policies.[22]

Romanian aircraft shot down an unspecified drone in Romanian airspace on July 24, while an overnight explosion damaged a cargo vessel bound for Ukraine off the Romanian coast. Romanian President Nicusor Dan stated on July 24 that a Romanian F-16 fighter jet shot down an unspecified drone over an uninhabited area in Romanian airspace around 1100 local time.[23] Romanian Armed Forces Joint Staff Acting Commander Brigadier General Gheorghe Maxim reported that Romanian aircraft intercepted the drone over southeastern Romania.[24] Romanian military officials stated that the drone was not headed toward Bucharest or flying near any military bases or the Cernavoda Nuclear Power Plant. Chief of the Romanian Defense Staff General Gheorghița Vlad stated that Romanian authorities are still investigating the drone's type and origin but noted that the drone visually resembles a Russian Shahed or Geran-2 (Shahed variant) drone. The Romanian Department of Emergency Situations reported on July 24 that an explosion impacted the Liberian-flagged Christiana B dry cargo ship, which was carrying coal from Norfolk, Virginia to Ukraine, about 22 nautical miles southeast of Sfantu Gheorghe, Romania — within the Romanian Exclusive Economic Zone.[25] The Romanian Department of Emergency Situations noted that the explosion was likely either a result of a maritime drone strike or a naval mine detonating and that it caused damage to a warehouse on the vessel. While the actors involved in the July 23 to 24 incidents are unclear, Russia's war in Ukraine continues to present persistent threats to Romania and the NATO alliance. Russian forces recently intensified strikes against cargo vessels traveling to Ukraine in the Black Sea, and a Russian drone previously struck a multi-story apartment complex in Galati, Romania, on the evening of May 28 to 29.[26]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces appear to have struck at least 10 Wildberries warehouses (the closest Russian equivalent to Amazon) in Russia and occupied Ukraine in the past week.
• Intensified Ukrainian strikes against Wildberries facilities may impose additional requirements on Russia's already-stretched air defenses and will likely increasingly inconvenience Russians who utilize the Wildberries platform.
• The Russian Central Bank slightly lowered its key interest rate for the fifth time in 2026 while attempting to portray Russia’s economy as stable in line with recent Kremlin messaging.
• Romanian aircraft shot down an unspecified drone in Romanian airspace on July 24, while an overnight explosion damaged a cargo vessel bound for Ukraine off the Romanian coast.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian energy and logistics assets on July 24. Russian forces launched five Kh-59/69 guided missiles and 180 drones against Ukraine overnight.
• Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces made confirmed advances on July 24.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 23, 2026

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio rejected the Russian narrative that the United States and Russia reached any kind of an agreement to end Russia’s war in Ukraine during the August 2025 Alaska Summit. Rubio stated following his meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on July 23 that Russian “proposals” at the Anchorage Summit failed and that peace will only come through new "concepts and ideas," which Rubio stated the United States is willing to support.[i] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claimed on July 23 that Lavrov reaffirmed to Rubio Russia’s readiness for negotiations and commitment to US “proposals,” to which Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed at the Alaska Summit.[ii] Russian officials routinely invoke the alleged “Anchorage agreements” to advance narratives about Russia’s willingness to negotiate, despite the lack of any public statements following the summit and US officials' recent rejections of such Russian narratives.[iii]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues reiterating his commitment to peace negotiations with the United States and Russia. Zelensky met with US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner on July 22 and discussed peace negotiations efforts.[iv] Zelensky reiterated on July 23 his intent to conduct trilateral US-Ukrainian-Russian negotiations sometime in Fall 2026 but noted that if the timing was up to him, these talks would occur in July 2026.[v] Zelensky has repeatedly reiterated his commitment to peace negotiations and willingness to make meaningful compromises to end the war, despite Russian efforts to falsely paint Ukraine as the intransigent party in peace efforts.[vi]

Key Takeaways:

• US Secretary of State Marco Rubio rejected the Russian narrative that the United States and Russia reached any kind of an agreement to end Russia’s war in Ukraine during the August 2025 Alaska Summit.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues reiterating his commitment to peace negotiations with the United States and Russia.
• Ukrainian forces likely continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian energy and logistics assets on July 22 and 23. Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile, five Kh-59/69 guided missiles, and 168 drones against Ukraine overnight.
• Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances on July 23.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 22, 2026

The Kremlin continues to reiterate Russia’s commitment to its maximalist war aims of complete Ukrainian capitulation while Russian forces fail to achieve operationally significant gains. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on July 22 that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s June 2024 speech emphasizing Russia’s maximalist war aims, including Ukraine’s complete withdrawal from Ukrainian-controlled territory in Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and the abandonment of Ukraine’s NATO accession aspirations before any peace negotiations, are still the basis of the Kremlin’s conditions for ending the war in Ukraine.[1] Bloomberg reported on July 22, citing three people close to the Kremlin, that Russia is unwilling to return any Russian-occupied territories in Ukraine as part of any peace proposal and that Putin is committed to the military seizure of the remainder of Donetsk Oblast and the establishment of a “buffer zone” along the border areas of northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts.[2] Bloomberg noted, citing two sources close to the Kremlin, that Russia will return to peace negotiations only after seizing all of Donetsk Oblast, an objective that one source close to the Kremlin claimed that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has assured Putin that Russian forces can achieve by the end of 2026. Russian forces are extremely unlikely to achieve this objective before the end of 2026, however, and the Russian rate of advance in Ukraine has slowed such that ISW is not prepared to assess that Russian forces can seize all of Donetsk Oblast on any timeline.[3] The Kremlin appears to be rejecting any territorial concessions as part of a peace proposal and is reasserting Russia’s maximalist demands, which Putin presented in 2024 at a time when Russian forces were achieving notable battlefield advances, even as Russian forces struggle to achieve meaningful territorial advances across the frontline. The Russian MoD amplified a Russian propaganda Telegram channel on July 22 claiming that Russian forces seized 2,226 square kilometers of territory in the first six months of 2026.[4] ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces seized a net total of only 81.1 square kilometers thus far in 2026, due in part to a significant Ukrainian Spring-Summer 2026 counteroffensive and seized or infiltrated 626.85 square kilometers thus far in 2026. Russian forces do not control territory into which they have only infiltrated. Russian officials continue exaggerating Russian battlefield successes to construct a false reality that appears to be shaping Putin’s understanding of the situation and encouraging him to persist in refusing compromise on his demands.[5]

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on July 22 that “American colleagues” have not yet rejected their “proposals” to which Russia agreed in Anchorage and that US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin reached unspecified agreements during the August 2025 Alaska Summit.[6] Lavrov appears to have started accepting the reality that the United States and Russia did not sign any formal or legally binding agreements in Anchorage but is persisting in Kremlin claims that agreements were reached. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently confirmed on June 25 that Russia and the United States did not reach any agreement to end Russia’s war in Ukraine during the Alaska Summit.[7] Lavrov is likely trying to set conditions to persuade the United States to officially commit to their Anchorage proposals ahead of or during his meeting with Rubio on July 23.

The Kremlin appears to be setting conditions for potential mobilization and is preparing for possible civil unrest in Russia resulting from mobilization. The Russian State Duma passed a bill on July 22 that allows citizens with unexpunged and active criminal records, including for crimes related to drug smuggling and organized crime, to sign contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) during formal mobilization periods.[8] Russian Deputy Defense Minister and Russian MoD Main Military-Political Directorate Head Army General Viktor Goremykin stated on July 22 that the July 22 bill will expand the number of Russians eligible for military service and facilitate Russian recruitment efforts for the war in Ukraine in 2026.[9] Russia’s militarized internal security force, Rosgvardia, published proposed amendments on July 21 to expand its civil defense regulations to protect Russian society from unspecified “dangers” during mobilization, martial law, and in wartime.[10] Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a bill in November 2025 that allows him to deploy reservists to combat areas without declaring mobilization, and ISW assessed at the time that the Kremlin would likely leverage this bill to conduct rolling partial reserve call-ups.[11] The Kremlin appears to be setting conditions to announce formal mobilization and potentially declare martial law in Russia in anticipation of civil unrest as mobilization remains highly unpopular within Russian society. Mobilization remains a very personal decision for Putin and is ultimately contingent on Putin’s personal perception of the battlefield situation and the Kremlin’s stability, and it remains unclear whether Putin will make such a decision in the near future or what his mobilization announcement would look like.

Russian President Vladimir Putin is attempting to downplay Russia’s economic problems despite the ongoing fuel shortage crisis and broader Russian economic decline. Putin held a meeting on July 22 on the current Russia’s economic situation and claimed that Russia’s economy is stable despite “external attempts to destabilize the fuel and energy sector,” referring to Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign against Russian energy infrastructure.^[12] Putin dismissed Russian fuel market issues as temporary and claimed that they will not affect Russia’s economic dynamics. Putin claimed that Russian Ministry of Economic Development data indicates that Russia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew by 0.3 percent in May 2026 and by 0.2 percent in the first five months of 2026. Putin claimed that the Russian government ran a 196-billion-ruble (about $2.51 billion) surplus in June 2026 and that the Russian money supply grew by 13 percent year on year as of July 1, 2026. Putin’s July 22 statements follow a recent string of Russian officials attempting to portray Russia’s economy as stable despite the ongoing fuel shortages and other economic issues. Russian Deputy Prime Minister and Economy Minister Alexander Novak and Russian State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin both claimed on July 21 that Russian economic policies are stabilizing the fuel market, and Zaporizhia Oblast occupation governor Yevgeny Balitsky claimed on July 20 during a meeting with Putin that Russian authorities secured energy facilities in occupied Zaporizhia against Ukrainian drone strikes.[13]

Putin himself admitted during the July 22 meeting that Russia’s economy has shown “modest” GDP growth, and the data Putin presented suggests that Russia’s economy will likely continue struggling with inflation as the money supply increases.[14] Russian food supplier and manufacturer association Rusprodsoyuz told Kremlin newswire TASS on July 21 that the cost of Russia’s monthly minimum food basket grew by 7.9 percent since the start of 2026, signaling that Russia’s economy is struggling with inflation.[15] ISW has observed a number of indicators of Russia’s economic decline, including the fact that the Moscow Exchange Composite Stock Index (IMOEX) on July 16 experienced the largest single-day decline since September 2022, Russia’s reduction of agricultural exports amidst Ukrainian strikes against energy infrastructure and vessels in the Azov and Black seas, and reports of Russian capital flight.[16] Russian business newspaper Kommersant reported on July 20, citing a report by analytics agency Platts, that Russian refineries have yet to fulfill over 81 percent of the gasoline purchase requests despite some oil refineries resuming fuel sales.[17] Russian authorities continue to struggle to mitigate fuel shortages and energy disruptions in Russia and occupied Ukraine including in occupied Crimea, with little indication that these shortages are temporary as Putin and other Russian officials claim.[18] ISW continues to assess that the Russian government has adopted suboptimal economic policies to sustain its war in Ukraine, leading to many of Russia’s current economic issues, including increased and unsustainable war spending, growing inflation, significant labor shortages within the construction and services industries, and reductions in Russia’s sovereign wealth fund.[19]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed Ukrainian General Staff Deputy Chief Major General Ihor Skybyuk as the chief of the Ukrainian General Staff on July 22 to replace Major General Andriy Hnatov.[20] Skybyuk has served as the deputy chief of the Ukrainian General Staff since June 3, 2025 and was the Ukrainian Airborne Assault Forces commander from February 11, 2024 to June 3, 2025.[21]

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin continues to reiterate Russia’s commitment to its maximalist war aims of complete Ukrainian capitulation while Russian forces fail to achieve operationally significant gains.
• The Kremlin appears to be setting conditions for potential mobilization and is preparing for possible civil unrest in Russia resulting from mobilization.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin is attempting to downplay Russia’s economic problems despite the ongoing fuel shortage crisis and broader Russian economic decline.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed Ukrainian General Staff Deputy Chief Major General Ihor Skybyuk as the chief of the Ukrainian General Staff on July 22 to replace Major General Andriy Hnatov.
• Ukrainian forces struck two additional logistics facilities of Russia’s largest online retailer Wildberries (roughly equivalent to Russia’s version of Amazon) overnight on July 21 to 22. Russia launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile, three Kh-59/69 cruise missiles, and 216 drones against Ukraine overnight. 
• Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka direction.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 20, 2026

Russian milbloggers rebutted Russian official statements that Russian forces have secured the M-14 Rostov-Crimea highway — the primary land route connecting mainland Russia to occupied Crimea against Ukrainian mid-range drone strikes. Russian President Vladimir Putin met Zaporizhia Oblast occupation governor Yevgeny Balitsky on July 20, and Balitsky claimed that Russian forces had established "complete control," likely referring to security against Ukrainian drone strikes, over the M-14 Rostov Oblast-Crimea highway (which Russian occupation officials denote as the R-280 highway) in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast and significantly degraded Ukrainian drone operations against the highway.[1] Balitsky also claimed that authorities have secured all energy facilities against Ukrainian strikes. Balitsky’s claims provoked backlash from the Russian ultranationalist information space. A Russian milblogger directly refuted Balitsky’s statements as “incorrect” because Ukrainian forces regularly strike the M-14 highway, driving up insurance premiums for Russian vehicles delivering fuel to occupied Crimea.[2] The milblogger noted that Ukrainian drones also often fly over the M-14 highway as part of Ukraine's intensified intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian naval targets in the Sea of Azov. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces have conducted fewer strikes against Russian vehicles along the M-14 highway recently but only because there is significantly less traffic due to the threat of Ukrainian drones, not because Russian air defenses are becoming more effective.[3] ISW has observed evidence of at least four Ukrainian strikes along the M-14 highway between July 1 and July 20 following weeks of significant interdiction efforts against the highway in May and June 2026.[4] The Ukrainian intermediate-range interdiction campaign against occupied southern Ukraine has forced Russian forces to dedicate manpower and weapons, including drone crews and interceptor drones, to defending against Ukrainian strikes and now has appeared to have at least partially deprived Russian forces of a significant ground line of communication (GLOC) connecting Russia to occupied Crimea from the north. It is notable that the strike campaign has prompted continued responses from Putin and other Kremlin officials, and that Russian ultranationalists are challenging the official fictitious narrative about the success of Russian efforts to defend against Ukrainian strikes.

Russia's continued long-range strike campaign against cities across Ukraine reportedly contributed to record high civilian casualties in the war in June 2026. The United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (UN HRMMU) reported on July 14 that conflict-related violence in Ukraine killed at least 293 civilians and injured at least 1,990 in June 2026 — the highest number of civilian casualties in Ukraine since April 2022.[5] The UN HRMMU noted that the June 2026 civilian casualty rate is about a 10 percent increase from the previous record of at least 282 killed and 1,794 injured in May 2026 and that the vast majority of civilian casualties are in Ukrainian-controlled areas.[6] The UN HRMMU reported that missile and long-range drone strikes, particularly strikes against large population centers in Ukraine, remain the leading cause of the high number of civilian casualties, accounting for 126 civilian deaths and 907 civilian injuries, about 45 percent of the total civilian casualties in June 2026. The UN HRMMU reported that long-range strikes have killed 1,396 civilians and injured 7,978 since January 1, 2026, and civilian casualty rates have increased by 37 percent since June 2025. The UN HRMMU reported that Russia’s short-range drones caused the highest number of civilian casualties near the front thus far in the war in June 2026.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian milbloggers rebutted Russian official statements that Russian forces have secured the M-14 Rostov-Crimea highway — the primary land route connecting mainland Russia to occupied Crimea against Ukrainian mid-range drone strikes.
• Russia's continued long-range strike campaign against cities across Ukraine reportedly contributed to record-high civilian casualties in the war in June 2026.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure and air defense systems on July 19 and 20.
• Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances on July 20.
• Russia launched two Kh-59/69 guided missiles and 94 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 20, 2026

Russian milbloggers rebutted Russian official statements that Russian forces have secured the M-14 Rostov-Crimea highway — the primary land route connecting mainland Russia to occupied Crimea against Ukrainian mid-range drone strikes. Russian President Vladimir Putin met Zaporizhia Oblast occupation governor Yevgeny Balitsky on July 20, and Balitsky claimed that Russian forces had established "complete control," likely referring to security against Ukrainian drone strikes, over the M-14 Rostov Oblast-Crimea highway (which Russian occupation officials denote as the R-280 highway) in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast and significantly degraded Ukrainian drone operations against the highway.[1] Balitsky also claimed that authorities have secured all energy facilities against Ukrainian strikes. Balitsky’s claims provoked backlash from the Russian ultranationalist information space. A Russian milblogger directly refuted Balitsky’s statements as “incorrect” because Ukrainian forces regularly strike the M-14 highway, driving up insurance premiums for Russian vehicles delivering fuel to occupied Crimea.[2] The milblogger noted that Ukrainian drones also often fly over the M-14 highway as part of Ukraine's intensified intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian naval targets in the Sea of Azov. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces have conducted fewer strikes against Russian vehicles along the M-14 highway recently but only because there is significantly less traffic due to the threat of Ukrainian drones, not because Russian air defenses are becoming more effective.[3] ISW has observed evidence of at least four Ukrainian strikes along the M-14 highway between July 1 and July 20 following weeks of significant interdiction efforts against the highway in May and June 2026.[4] The Ukrainian intermediate-range interdiction campaign against occupied southern Ukraine has forced Russian forces to dedicate manpower and weapons, including drone crews and interceptor drones, to defending against Ukrainian strikes and now has appeared to have at least partially deprived Russian forces of a significant ground line of communication (GLOC) connecting Russia to occupied Crimea from the north. It is notable that the strike campaign has prompted continued responses from Putin and other Kremlin officials, and that Russian ultranationalists are challenging the official fictitious narrative about the success of Russian efforts to defend against Ukrainian strikes.

Russia's continued long-range strike campaign against cities across Ukraine reportedly contributed to record high civilian casualties in the war in June 2026. The United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (UN HRMMU) reported on July 14 that conflict-related violence in Ukraine killed at least 293 civilians and injured at least 1,990 in June 2026 — the highest number of civilian casualties in Ukraine since April 2022.[5] The UN HRMMU noted that the June 2026 civilian casualty rate is about a 10 percent increase from the previous record of at least 282 killed and 1,794 injured in May 2026 and that the vast majority of civilian casualties are in Ukrainian-controlled areas.[6] The UN HRMMU reported that missile and long-range drone strikes, particularly strikes against large population centers in Ukraine, remain the leading cause of the high number of civilian casualties, accounting for 126 civilian deaths and 907 civilian injuries, about 45 percent of the total civilian casualties in June 2026. The UN HRMMU reported that long-range strikes have killed 1,396 civilians and injured 7,978 since January 1, 2026, and civilian casualty rates have increased by 37 percent since June 2025. The UN HRMMU reported that Russia’s short-range drones caused the highest number of civilian casualties near the front thus far in the war in June 2026.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian milbloggers rebutted Russian official statements that Russian forces have secured the M-14 Rostov-Crimea highway — the primary land route connecting mainland Russia to occupied Crimea against Ukrainian mid-range drone strikes.
• Russia's continued long-range strike campaign against cities across Ukraine reportedly contributed to record-high civilian casualties in the war in June 2026.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure and air defense systems on July 19 and 20.
• Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances on July 20.
• Russia launched two Kh-59/69 guided missiles and 94 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 19, 2026

Russian forces conducted one of their largest ballistic missile strikes thus far in the war on the night of July 18 to 19, predominantly targeting Kyiv Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on July 19 that Russian forces launched 40 missiles against Ukraine overnight, including 10 Zirkon anti-ship missiles, 25 Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles, three Onyx anti-ship missiles, and three Kh-59/69 guided cruise missiles; and 125 Shahed-, Gerbera-, and Italmas-type strike drones; Banderol loitering munitions; and Parodiya-type decoy drones.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 108 drones, 17 Iskander-M/Zirkon/S-400 missiles, and one Kh-59/69 guided cruise missile. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that 23 missiles and 10 drones struck 20 locations and that debris fell on 18 locations. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russian forces conducted one of the largest ballistic strike packages against Kyiv Oblast since 2022, primarily against Kyiv City, killing at least one civilian and injuring 16.[2] Zelensky stated that Russia has been stockpiling missiles for the past several days in preparation for the strike.[3] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces also struck civilian and energy infrastructure in Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts.[4] The Ukrainian postal service Nova Poshta reported on July 19 that Russian forces conducted three strikes against the Nova Poshta sorting terminal in Kharkiv Oblast, killing three civilians, as part of an ongoing campaign targeting postal infrastructure.[5] Russian forces have been increasingly launching large ballistic missile packages, accompanied by a smaller number of drones, in recent weeks, as Russian forces are taking advantage of global Patriot interceptor missile shortages.[6]

Russian forces have launched more ballistic missiles against Ukraine thus far in July than Russia reportedly produces each month. Ukrainian defense source Militarnyi reported on July 19 that Russia used up to two-thirds of its planned annual production of Zirkon missiles in July 2026 alone and that Russia launched more ballistic missiles in July than Russia's reported total monthly production volume.[7] The Ukrainian Air Force reports for July indicate that Russia has launched 107 ballistic missiles and 20 Zirkon missiles against Ukraine in July thus far.[8] Militarny cited unspecified Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR) reports indicating that Russia produces about 60 Iskander-M ballistic missiles and 40 missiles for the S-400 complex monthly. Russia appears to be dipping into its stockpiles to continue increasing the number of ballistic missiles it launches against Ukraine, as these missiles have a higher success rate than drones and cruise missiles. Russian forces have simultaneously decreased the number of drones they launch in each overnight package, launching 2,955 thus far in July 2026 compared to 5,749 in June 2026.[9]

Ukrainian forces continued their strike campaign against Russian vessels in the Black Sea as part of the ongoing effort to deny Russia's ability to sustain logistics and transport fuel to occupied Crimea and to isolate the peninsula. The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) reported on July 19 that Ukrainian forces struck the Russian shadow fleet tanker Avero in the Black Sea – one of four that Ukrainian forces struck from July 10 to 19.[10] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on July 19 that Ukrainian forces struck 13 submarine stations in occupied Crimea and four Russian tankers in the Black Sea overnight.[11] Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces have struck 176 Russian vessels in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov between July 6 and July 19. Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces also struck and destroyed five Russian ferries – Lavrentiy, Panagiya, Eysk, Maria, and SKS-One – between July 6 and 19, which were responsible for around 80 percent of military transportation from the port of Kavkaz, Krasnodar Krai, to occupied Crimea, and degraded the Kerch ferry crossing's capacity by 75 percent.[12] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 19 that Ukrainian forces also struck a floating crane in the Sea of Azov that supported Russian maritime logistics.[13] The Caspian Pipeline Consortium claimed on July 19 that Ukrainian drones struck a Russian maritime terminal in Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, causing fire and halting oil loading at the terminal.[14]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to meet with senior Ukrainian military commanders.[15] Zelensky stated on July 18 that he spoke with both Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine General Oleksandr Syrskyi and former Ukrainian Minister of Defense Mykhailo Fedorov.[16] Zelensky stated that he is aware of communication issues between the Ukrainian Army and other military structures and that “decisions regarding the army will be worked out.”[17]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil and energy infrastructure and naval vessels on July 18 and 19.

• Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 18, 2026

Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov again aggrandized Russian battlefield advances in Donetsk Oblast on July 18, but several of his claims are not corroborated by any available evidence. Gerasimov conducted a choreographed inspection of the Western Grouping of Forces headquarters on July 19 and made a speech in which he presented an assessment of Russian advances on several areas of the battlefield between the Kupyansk and Pokrovsk directions that are exaggerated beyond current battlefield realities.[1] Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces entered Pidlyman (immediately south of Borova); seized Pyskunivka and reached Mykolaivka (both east of Slovyansk); advanced to within five kilometers of Kramatorsk; entered Oleksiyevo-Druzhkivka (northwest of Kostyantynivka); entered Dobropillya and Hannivka (immediately north of Dobropillya); have nearly seized Shevchenko, Krasnoyarske, and Svitle (all east to southeast of Dobropillya); and seized Myrne (northeast of Pokrovsk).[2] Gerasimov also reiterated his claim that Russian forces are advancing west from Kupyansk towards Shevchenkove, though Russian forces have not yet seized Kupyansk and do not currently have any consolidated advances in the town besides limited infiltration zones. ISW has observed no evidence to assess that Russian forces have entered Dobropillya, Hannivka, Oleksiyevo-Druzhkivka, Svitle, or Krasnoyarske, and has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have only infiltrated in a small part of Shevchenkove. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have infiltrated as close as 8.5 kilometers from Pidlyman, three kilometers from Pyskunivka, nine kilometers from Mykolaivka, and 6.1 kilometers from both Kramatorsk and Oleksiyevo-Druzhkivka. ISW has observed evidence to assess Russian forces have advanced to between 7.2 to 7.3 kilometers from Dobropillya and Hannivka and infiltrated or advanced to about 2.2 kilometers from Svitle and 3.2 kilometers from Krasnoyarske. ISW had not observed claims from Russian milbloggers or media (which usually first release breaking news of most recent Russian gains) in Pidlyman, Krasnoyarske, Svitle, or Oleksiyevo-Druzhkivka, or that Russian forces reached Mykolaivka.

Gerasimov and other senior Russian commanders have held choreographed meetings to make aggrandized claims at least once a month since January 2026, likely as part of a cognitive warfare effort intended to falsely portray Russian forces as advancing across the theater and Ukrainian lines as imminently collapsing.[3] Gerasimov's July 18 speech was unusually short and reiterates several claims from recent speeches, however.[4] The shortened speech and relatively few new claims of advance may reflect the relatively short amount of time between the July 18 speech and the July 3 meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin and other senior Russian commanders.[5] This difference may also reflect the reality that Russian forces have few gains to report. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have lost terrain at a rate of about 1.6 square kilometers per day between July 1 to 17, 2026, and Russian forces will likely continue to struggle to achieve meaningful territorial advances as they have in recent months.[6] Putin, Gerasimov, and other senior Russian commanders have routinely advanced claims that intend to convince Russians, Ukrainians, and the West that a Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable.[7] These claims of advance continue to portray Putin's fabricated reality that significantly differs from that portrayed by all available evidence, however.

Continued Ukrainian strikes against vessels in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov are reportedly compelling Russian forces to divert Russian elite drone units from the frontline and are hampering Russian energy and agricultural logistics. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 18 that Ukrainian forces struck two tankers, two crane vessels, and one tugboat in the Azov and Black Seas on the night of July 17 to 18.[8] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on July 18 that Ukrainian forces struck eight dry cargo ships, one gas tanker, one tugboat, and two crane vessels in the Black Sea and one oil tanker in the Sea of Azov on July 18, likely referring to some of the same strikes as the Ukrainian General Staff.[9] Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces have struck 172 Russian naval vessels in the past 13 days (since about July 5). Brovdi reported that Ukrainian strikes have compelled Russian forces to redeploy up to 200 drone crews of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies from the frontline, all of the 51st Air Defense Division (4th Air Force and Air Defense Army, Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and under the operational control of the Southern Military District [SMD]), and an entire, anti-aircraft regiment from the Black Sea Fleet (BSF) (likely the 1096th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment) to defend against Ukrainian drone strikes targeting naval vessels.[10] Brovdi reported that Russian forces are assigning one Rubikon drone crew to defend each vessel.

Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) source Voidgroup stated on July 17, citing sources in the Russian military command vertical in occupied Crimea, that Russian BSF Commander Admiral Sergei Pinchuk issued an order dated July 10 that elements of the BSF compile lists to evacuate the families of Russian servicemembers from occupied Crimea.[11] Voidgroup noted that the order may only apply to BSF units stationed in occupied Sevastopol and not all of Crimea. Voidgroup noted that the order applies to the elements of the 4th Air Force and Air Defense Army, the 166th Naval Engineering Service Detachment, the 1127th Missile and Artillery Armament Repair Plant, the 13th Black Sea Fleet Ship Repair Plant, the 639th Medical Equipment and Supplies Support Center of the Russian Ministry of Defense, and other medical, meteorological, administrative, and training elements based or stationed in Sevastopol. Captain First Rank of the Ukrainian Naval Reserve officer Captain First Rank Andriy Ryzhenko reported on July 18 that Ukrainian forces struck over 100 river-sea class vessels in the last ten days (since about July 10) that ferry up to 7,000 tons of fuel each to Crimea, and that Crimea needs about 5,000 tons of fuel per day just for civilian use.[12] Reuters reported on July 17 that Ukrainian strikes against Russian vessels in the Azov and Black seas and strikes against Russian energy infrastructure are disrupting the Russian agricultural industry.[13] Analyst for grain market research firm SovEcon Andrey Sizov assessed that Russian wheat exports could fall short by five to 10 million tons if Russia cannot export wheat through the Sea of Azov. Ukrainian strikes against Russian ships in the Black and Azov seas since the beginning of the Ukrainian 40-day intermediate and long-range strike campaign on June 25 are diverting Russian military resources and disrupting Russian exports and efforts to provide fuel to Crimea.[14] Ukrainian forces will likely continue to strike both energy infrastructure in Russia and vessels transiting to Russia and occupied Crimea, and Ukrainian strikes appear to be having a cumulative effect and hampering the Russian economy outside of the energy industry.[15]

Ukrainian forces struck two logistics facilities of Russia’s largest online retailer Wildberries (roughly equivalent to Russia’s version of Amazon) overnight on July 17 to 18, causing significant damage to the facilities. Russian officials and the Wildberries Press Service claimed on July 18 that Ukrainian drones struck two Wildberries warehouses in Elektrostal, Moscow Oblast, and Kotovsk, Tambov Oblast overnight, causing fires at both facilities.[16] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported that Ukrainian forces had struck two significant logistics facilities in Moscow and Tambov oblasts roughly 500 kilometers and 700 kilometers from the frontline overnight.[17] The current scale of the damage is unclear, though some Russian and investigative sources have offered potential figures. Independent Russian investigative source The Bell reported, citing a source familiar with the situation, that the Ukrainian strikes may have damaged about 10 to 15 percent of Wildberries’ total warehouse space and assessed that the Elektrostal warehouse is likely Wildberries' largest warehouse.[18] The Bell's source assessed that the strikes are not likely to paralyze Wildberries’ broader logistical capacity but will likely significantly disrupt its services in Moscow Oblast —Wildberries' largest market. Russian business newspaper Vedomosti reported, citing two real estate consultants, that Wildberries may have lost about 350 square kilometers or seven percent of its total warehouse capacity.[19] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces Commander Major Robert "Magyar" Brovdi and Russian opposition source Vazhnye Istorii separately estimated that the strikes could cause Wildberries almost 100 billion rubles (about $1.28 billion) in losses.[20] Russian opposition source Meduza reported that Russian e-commerce platform Ozon changed its terms of agreement between Ozon and sellers using the Ozon platform in June 2026, removing Ozon's obligation to compensate the seller for the loss or damage of goods in a case of force majeure, but that Russian media only picked up on this change after the July 17 to 18 strikes.[21] These Ukrainian strikes stand to inconvenience major Russian online retailers, the smaller businesses who use these retailers as platforms, and the Russians who utilize these platforms to purchase goods — particularly in the Moscow area. These inconveniences come amid ongoing Russian economic issues and decreasing approval ratings for Russian President Vladimir Putin and may increase societal strain if such strikes continue.

The strikes on the Wildberries facilities prompted a significant reaction in the Russian information space. Moscow Oblast Governor Andrei Vorobyov claimed the Elektrostal strike injured at least 37 people and killed one.[22] Tambov Oblast Governor Yevgeny Pervyshov claimed that the Kotovsk strike injured at least 25 and killed seven.[23] Russian officials broadly condemned the Ukrainian strikes as criminal terrorist acts and accused Ukrainian forces of deliberately targeting civilian areas.[24] Russian forces have consistently hit Ukrainian civilian logistics and postal infrastructure in Ukraine throughout the war, however.[25] Russian authorities may seek to escalate this information effort in order to accuse Ukraine of war crimes and targeting civilians as they have in the past.[26]

Mykolaiv Oblast Military Administration Head Vitaly Kim resigned from his post on July 17.[27] Kim stated that he will take up the post of minister of veterans' affairs, though he has not officially received a new appointment as of July 18.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov again aggrandized Russian battlefield advances in Donetsk Oblast on July 18, but several of his claims are not corroborated by any available evidence.
• Continued Ukrainian strikes against vessels in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov are reportedly compelling Russian forces to divert Russian elite drone units from the frontline and are hampering Russian energy and agricultural logistics.
• Ukrainian forces struck two logistics facilities of Russia’s largest online retailer Wildberries (roughly equivalent to Russia’s version of Amazon) overnight on July 17 to 18, causing significant damage to the facilities.
• Mykolaiv Oblast Military Administration Head Vitaly Kim resigned from his post on July 17.
• Ukrainian forces struck Russian oil and energy infrastructure overnight on July 17 to 18.
• Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces made confirmed advances on July 18.
• Russia launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles, two Onyx anti-ship missiles, three Kh-59/69 cruise missiles, and 90 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 17, 2026

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) appears committed to optimizing Russian forces for continued positional warfare in Ukraine — not for the mechanized maneuver required to make rapid, large-scale gains. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov held a Russian MoD board meeting on July 17 with deputy defense ministers Alexey Krivoruchko, Dmitry Shcherbinin, Vasily Osmarov, Anna Tsivileva, and Army General Yunus-Bek Yevkurov; Deputy Defense Minister for Logistics Colonel General Alexander Sanchik; First Deputy Defense Minister Leonid Gornin; and Russian State Council Secretary Alexei Dyumin to discuss the progress toward achieving objectives that the board set at the end of 2025.[1] Sanchik and Krivoruchko emphasized that the Russian MoD improved the mobility of Russian assault units by prioritizing the procurement of small, motorized vehicles such as motorcycles, buggies, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).[2] Sanchik added that Russia increased supply deliveries on the battlefield by integrating unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Krivoruchko claimed that Russian forces trained 8,000 UAV specialists in the first half of 2026 and that the MoD more than doubled its drone deliveries to Russian troops from 2025 deliveries.[3] ISW has previously assessed that Russian forces are experiencing administrative and training bottlenecks for recruitment of drone operators and continue facing specialists' shortages in unmanned systems units amid declining recruitment rates, contrary to Krivoruchko’s claims.[4] Sanchik and Krivoruchko’s statements indicate that Russian forces continued to prioritize and optimize for attacks on small, motorized vehicles over armored mechanized vehicles such as tanks and continued supplying kit such as UGVs to sustain forces in "kill zone" and positional warfare conditions. The Russian MoD therefore remained committed to enabling Russian forces to facilitate slow, grinding advances rather than resuming fast-paced maneuver warfare, as senior Russian defense officials previously outlined these optimizations during the last Russian MoD board meeting on December 17, 2025.[5]

Russian forces are actively continuing to prioritize a mode of warfare that is failing to enable them to advance. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces are losing 1.6 square kilometers per day thus far in July 2026 and will likely continue to struggle to achieve meaningful territorial advances as they have in recent months.

Russia’s prioritization of its war efforts in Ukraine and suboptimal economic policies are reportedly triggering a broader economic decline in Russia. The Moscow Exchange Composite Stock Index (IMOEX) fell by 4.24 percent to about 2,022 points at the end of the day on July 16 — marking the steepest single-day decline since September 26, 2022 — and declined again to 1,958 points on July 17 by the end of the main trading session.^[6] Russian majority state-owned VTB Bank’s shares on the IMOEX Index fell by six percent to an all-time low of 57.8 rubles (about $0.74) per share on July 16.^[7] The Russian Central Bank reported July 15 that its Business Climate Indicator (BCI) decreased by 4.5 points to negative 3.6 points in July 2026 — the lowest level since April 2022 and lower than after the Fall 2022 partial mobilization.^[8] The BCI is a monthly survey-based measure of economic activity in Russia designed to show how businesses assess their current economic conditions. The Russian economy is likely experiencing a financial decline that extends beyond the recent fuel shortages across Russia and occupied Ukraine amid Ukraine’s strike campaign against Russian oil refineries and fuel infrastructure. Russia’s emphasis on sustaining the war effort and building up its defense industrial base (DIB) throughout the war has, in part, led to many of Russia’s current economic issues, including increased and unsustainable war spending, growing inflation, significant labor shortages within the construction and services industries, and reductions in Russia’s sovereign wealth fund.[9] Devaluations of Russian state-owned banks, along with Russia’s ongoing and escalating nationalization campaign, likely detract stakeholders from investing in the Russian economy.[10] These factors, including Russia’s censorship campaign to control internet access that impacts Russians' ability to conduct business, likely also have a compounding negative effect on Russia’s economic performance that the Kremlin will likely fail to adequately address in the mid- to long term.[11]

A Russian state-affiliated polling center recorded one of the sharpest drops in Russian President Vladimir Putin's approval ratings since the start of the war in Ukraine following several months of steady decline. The Kremlin-linked Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) published on July 17 the results of a poll taken from July 10 to 12, measuring a five percent drop in Putin's approval rating to about 66 percent, one of the largest drops in Putin's approval rating since February 2022.[12] The FOM also recorded that trust levels in Putin dropped from 69 to 67 percent in the same time period. The FOM's drop in Putin's approval ratings now coheres more closely with the polling from the Russian state-owned All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM), which recorded Putin's approval rating at about 66 percent in a poll published on July 10.[13] Both the FOM and VTsIOM have recorded relatively steady declines in Putin's approval and trust ratings since March 2026, but the percentage points that each has published have not closely cohered until now despite both having connections to the Russian government.[14] Data from the FOM and VTsIOM remains unreliable in terms of gauging what percentage of Russians are actually discontent with the Russian government, but it remains notable that Russian state-owned and state-affiliated polling centers believe it necessary to acknowledge growing societal discontent that is likely related to the broader costs of the Russian war effort in Ukraine, which are increasingly burdening ordinary Russians.[15]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced further personnel changes within the Ukrainian government on July 17. Zelensky appointed on July 17 the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) First Deputy Head Oleksandr Poklad as the acting SBU head following Zelensky’s appointment of outgoing SBU Head Yevheny Khmara as the interim defense minister on July 16.[16] Zelensky proposed that Internal Affairs Minister General Ihor Klymenko become the secretary of the National Security and Defense Council and noted that he is preparing a formal decree to send to the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) for approval.[17] Zelensky announced on July 16 that he dismissed Timur Tkachenko as the head of the Kyiv City Military Administration and has yet to appoint his replacement.[18] Former acting Digital Transformation Minister Oleksandr Bornyakov announced on July 16 that he is leaving the ministry following the appointment of Oksana Ferchuk as the minister of digital transformation earlier on July 16.[19]

Key Takeaways:

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) appears committed to optimizing Russian forces for continued positional warfare in Ukraine — not for the mechanized maneuver required to make rapid, large-scale gains.
• Russia’s prioritization of its war efforts in Ukraine and suboptimal economic policies are reportedly triggering a broader economic decline in Russia.
• A Russian state-affiliated polling center recorded one of the sharpest drops in Russian President Vladimir Putin's approval ratings since the start of the war in Ukraine, following several months of steady decline.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced further personnel changes within the Ukrainian government on July 17.
• Russia launched one Kh-31P anti-radar missile, seven Kh-59/69 guided missiles, and 130 drones against Ukraine overnight.
• Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces made confirmed advances on July 17.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 16, 2026

The Ukrainian government approved a series of personnel changes in the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed an interim defense minister on July 16. The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) approved on July 16 Zelensky’s endorsement to appoint former state-owned energy company Naftogaz CEO, Serhiy Koretsky, as the Ukrainian prime minister to replace Yulia Svyrydenko.[1] The Rada approved the reappointment of the First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Energy Denys Shmyhal and Finance Minister Serhiy Marchenko.^[2] The Rada approved the appointment of Chief of Ukraine's National Police General Ivan Vyhivskyi as the minister of internal affairs; McKinsey & Company partner Oleksandr Kravchenko as the minister of economy; acting Digital Transformation Minister Oksana Ferchuk as the minister of digital transformation; Mykolaiv Oblast Military Administration Head Vitaliy Kim as the minister of veterans affairs; former Deputy Chair of the Rada Committee on State Power Organization, Local Self-Government, Regional Development, and Urban Planning Vitaliy Bezgin as minister of communities, territories, and internally displaced persons; and Kyiv Oblast Administration Head Mykola Kalashnyk as minister of reconstruction, infrastructure, and transport.

Zelensky appointed on July 16 former acting head of the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) Yevheny Khmara as the interim defense minister to replace Mykhailo Fedorov, but the Rada has not considered Khmara's appointment at this time.[3] Fedorov stated that he rejected Zelensky’s offer to become a presidential adviser or to remain on Zelensky's team in another unspecified manner.[4] Fedorov’s dismissal sparked large-scale protests in cities across at least 18 Ukrainian cities, including in Kyiv, Lviv, and Kharkiv.[5] Former Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) advisor on defense technology and drone and electronic warfare (EW) expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov announced on July 15 that he will no longer assist the Ukrainian MoD following Fedorov's dismissal.[6] Former adviser to the Ukrainian defense minister Serhii Sternenko also announced on July 15 that he no longer works at the Ukrainian MoD.[7] Ukrainian Air Force Deputy Commander Colonel Pavlo Yelizarov announced on July 16 his resignation following Fedorov’s dismissal.[8]

Ukraine’s drone strike campaign aimed at denying Russia the ability to sustain logistics and transport fuel to occupied Crimea is likely further degrading Russia’s already outstretched air defenses and imposing new protection dilemmas. Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain 2nd Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk reported on July 16 that Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces' (USF) operations in the Azov Sea have paralyzed Russian fuel shipping and complicated Russian supply deliveries to occupied Crimea.[9] Pletenchuk stated that Ukrainian forces have expanded their drone strike campaign against Russian maritime supply routes to the Black Sea and are threatening Russian seaborne lines of communication (SLOCs), particularly the Novorossiysk-Bosphorus and Don-Bosphorus SLOCs. Pletenchuk noted that the Azov-Black Sea region accounts for up to 20 percent of the Russian crude oil exports and that the Novorossiysk Port in Krasnodar Krai is the largest seaport in Russia. Pletenchuk stated that Ukrainian forces are targeting Russian efforts to transport fuel via small river-to-sea tankers. Pletenchuk also noted that Russian forces are increasingly relying on SLOCs after Ukrainian forces started to effectively interdict Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) connecting occupied Crimea to Rostov Oblast via southern Ukraine. Pletenchuk stated that Russian forces failed to bolster air defenses along Azov-Black Sea SLOCs despite repeated Ukrainian coastal warnings about navigation restrictions in the area over the past three years. Pletenchuk noted that Russian forces will be unable to protect all vessels due to air defense shortages and that Russian warships will be in danger of Ukrainian strikes if they escort cargo ships. Pletenchuk reported that Ukrainian strikes are disrupting Russia’s aviation fuel supplies to airfields in occupied Crimea and will likely lead to future aviation fuel shortages and impact Russia’s ability to defend the Black Sea region against Ukrainian drones. Pletenchuk stated that Russian forces are avoiding relying on the Kerch Strait Bridge for logistics because of previous Ukrainian operations against the bridge and concerns of Ukrainian strikes. Pletenchuk implied that Ukrainian forces reportedly have not targeted the bridge because Russian forces will need to rely on the bridge to withdraw from occupied Crimea to Russia. Ukraine's intensifying intermediate- and long-range strike campaign targeting Russian ground and maritime supply routes in the Azov-Black Sea region will likely continue to isolate occupied Crimea and disrupt Russian military logistics, likely degrading Russian offensive operations and impeding further Russian advances in southern Ukraine.[10] ISW continues to assess that the increasing frequency, size, and depth of Ukraine’s intermediate- and long-range strike campaign, now expanding to include strikes in the Azov-Black Sea region, will continue forcing Russia to overstretch its air defenses across a wide swathe of territory.[11]

Russia is reportedly turning to India for additional gasoline supplies as Ukraine's long-range strike campaign continues to reduce Russian oil refining capacity. Reuters reported on July 15, citing two sources familiar with the matter, that top Russian energy companies — including state-owned companies such as Rosneft, Gazprom Neft, and Lukoil — are approaching Indian oil refiners for additional gasoline supplies.[12] A source told Reuters that at least one cargo of Indian gasoline has sailed to Russia and that there will be additional shipments in the future. Reuters reported, citing maritime intelligence firm Kpler and its satellite imagery, that the Comoros-flagged Agni tanker departed the Vadinar Port, India, with 42,000 metric tons of gasoline between June 18 and 20, transferred the gasoline to the Garnet tanker near Egypt between July 6 and 7, and that the Garnet tanker is expected to arrive in Vitino Port, Murmansk Oblast around July 26. Shipping sources told Reuters that the Varg tanker departed from Vadinar Port with unspecified quantities of gasoline and is expected to travel through the Suez Canal to transfer gasoline onto an unspecified vessel off the coast of Egypt to sail toward Russia. A source told Reuters that Russia is unlikely to regain about 40 percent of its refining capacity for at least two months (until about mid-September 2026) even if Ukraine stops striking Russian oil refineries. Sources at three Indian state oil refineries stated that Russian companies approached them for additional gasoline supplies but noted that the Indian oil refiners have no surplus gasoline volumes to export. A source familiar with the matter stated that further Indian gasoline supplies could reach Russia through a network of intermediary ship-to-ship transfers and noted that Russia could seek diesel supplies, although the source claimed that Russian diesel supplies are currently sufficient. Ukraine's long-range strike campaign against Russian oil refining infrastructure has been decreasing Russian oil refining capacity, exacerbating gasoline shortages in most Russian regions and in occupied Ukraine for the past several weeks, and forcing Russia to export its crude oil supplies and import refined gasoline from countries like India.[13] Ukraine will likely continue its long-range strike campaign to further force Russia to seek refined gasoline from external sources.

Russian elites are reportedly moving money abroad to protect their financial assets from Russian economic risk and the Kremlin’s effort to nationalize private assets. Bloomberg reported on July 16 - citing six "wealthy Russians," additional sources familiar with the thinking of several Russian billionaires, corporate filings, and property purchase records - that several of Russia's richest people, including some close to Russian President Vladimir Putin, are shifting their financial portfolios toward cryptocurrency, gold, foreign properties, and other private investments abroad.[14] Bloomberg noted that informal financial outflows through cryptocurrency have increased, including through the A7A5 stablecoin that pro-Kremlin Moldovan politician Ilan Shor's company A7 owns. Bloomberg reported that Russian elites are increasingly concerned about recent high-profile asset seizures and the state of the Russian banking sector and wider economy. The Kremlin has recently taken steps that challenge the status quo relationship between Putin and Russia’s oligarchs, stemming from the privatization of assets during the 1990s.[15] Putin reportedly requested that Russian oligarchs donate to the war effort during a meeting with Russia’s top businessmen on March 26, 2026, breaking a promise he made to the oligarchs in July 2000 that he would uphold the privatization of Soviet assets as long as the oligarchs remained out of Russian politics and pledged allegiance to Putin. Russia’s Prosecutor General nationalized Russia’s largest agricultural holding on May 5, 2026.[16] The Russian economy continues to show increasing strain from the war effort and structural issues affecting economic growth, inflation, and the banking sector.[17] Elements of the Russian elite appear to be increasingly concerned about these developments and the security of their domestic assets amidst the Kremlin’s creeping expropriation and nationalization efforts and appear willing to take measures to secure their assets.

Polish authorities are warning that Russia is conducting surveillance of NATO air defense integration exercises near the Baltic Sea, likely as part of Russia's Phase Zero efforts. Polish Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Wladyslaw Kosiniak-Kamysz warned on July 15 about the Russian surveillance of NATO's air defense integration and reported that Poland scrambled fighter aircraft and intercepted two Russian Su-30SM2 fighters operating from Kaliningrad Oblast and that Swedish aircraft escorted the Russian aircraft over the Baltic Sea.[18] Kosiniak-Kamysz stated that the Russian aircraft did not approach Polish airspace. ISW continues to assess that Russia is conducting a "Phase Zero" campaign that aims to set informational and psychological conditions for potential future provocations against NATO.[19]

Key Takeaways:

• The Ukrainian government approved a series of personnel changes in the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed an interim defense minister on July 16.
• Ukraine’s drone strike campaign aimed at denying Russia the ability to sustain logistics and transport fuel to occupied Crimea is likely further degrading Russia’s already outstretched air defenses and imposing new protection dilemmas.
• Russia is reportedly turning to India for additional gasoline supplies as Ukraine's long-range strike campaign continues to reduce Russian oil refining capacity.
• Russian elites are reportedly moving money abroad to protect their financial assets from Russian economic risk and the Kremlin’s effort to nationalize private assets.
• Polish authorities are warning that Russia is conducting surveillance of NATO air defense integration exercises near the Baltic Sea, likely as part of Russia's Phase Zero efforts.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and energy infrastructure in Russia on July 15 and 16.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction, and Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast.
• Russia launched eight Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles, four Kh-22/32 cruise missiles, one Kh-21P anti-radar missile, and 146 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 15, 2026

Russian forces are resuming their strike campaign against Ukrainian port infrastructure along the Black Sea coast. ISW has observed an intensified Russian strike campaign against Ukrainian port infrastructure in Odesa Oblast and vessels calling at Ukrainian ports since at least July 10.[i] Odesa Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Kiper reported on July 14 that Russian forces struck two Tanzanian- and Liberian-flagged merchant ships sailing along the Black Sea corridor and a Marshal Islands-flagged civilian vessel at the Odesa City Port.[ii] Ukrainian grain exporter Kernel Holding reported on July 14 that Russian strikes against the Chornomorsk Port in Odesa Oblast damaged the company's terminal and destroyed about 25,000 tons of sunflower oil.[iii] The Ukrainian State Emergency Service reported that Russian forces conducted a missile strike against civilian infrastructure in Odesa City on the night of July 14 to 15, and the Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces conducted an air strike against Odesa Oblast on the morning on July 15 following the overnight strikes.[iv] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has been specifically highlighting its reported strikes against Odesa Oblast in the past few days, likely to generate informational effects.[v]

The Russian strikes likely aim to degrade the Ukrainian economy and reduce Ukraine's export capacity. Bohdan Kostetskyi, an operating partner at agricultural consulting agency Barva Invest, stated on July 15 that the recent Russian strikes against Ukrainian ports have effectively stopped deep-water grain exports.[vi] Kostetskyi stated that most major grain traders have suspended their grain purchases and that some export terminals have temporarily halted operations. Kostetskyi reported that grain prices on the domestic Ukrainian market are falling as traders are unwilling to pay higher procurement prices since they have to factor in higher logistics costs. Kostetskyi stated that shipowners are increasingly refusing to call at Ukrainian ports after the recent Russian strikes, citing force majeure. A Russian milblogger claimed on July 15 that the Russian strikes aim to reduce the number of crews and captains who are willing to sail this route.[vii] Another Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian strikes aim to reduce the Ukrainian military's ability to use the ports for logistics.[viii]

The Russian strikes are likely also a response to Ukraine's recent strike campaign against Russian vessels in the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea, but such Russian strike tactics are not new. Ukrainian forces have reportedly struck 136 Russian vessels in the seas since July 6, and Russia may be in turn striking port infrastructure and vessels at sea to push Ukraine to stop its own strike campaign.[ix] Russian forces have long been striking Ukrainian port infrastructure throughout the war, however, as part of wider efforts to hinder Ukrainian grain exports and drive up the cost of shipping via the Black Sea.[x] Russian forces in particular tried to use its strikes against Ukrainian ports to extract Western and Ukrainian concessions after Russia's withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative – the 2022-2023 agreement that created a safe corridor for shipping from Ukrainian ports to sustain global grain shipments.[xi]

Russia appears to be struggling to deliver its rising seaborne crude oil exports as Ukraine's long-range strike campaign is reducing Russia's refining capacity. Bloomberg reported on July 14 that Russian crude oil at sea reached about 135 million barrels by July 12 and that the equivalent of 1.9 million barrels per day is on vessels that are not yet showing a final destination.[xii] Bloomberg, citing tanker tracking data, reported that five tankers with Ural crude oil are anchored off the Mersa El-Hamra Port on the Egyptian Mediterranean coast and that another five tankers are in the Riau archipelago east of Singapore -- a known gathering place for shadow fleet vessels that transport sanctioned oil. Bloomberg also reported that Russia’s four-week average seaborne crude oil shipments remained almost unchanged at 4.21 million barrels per day from June 14 to July 12. Bloomberg noted that the value of Russia’s weekly crude oil exports increased by about $40 million to $1.44 billion between July 5 and 12 despite decreasing crude oil prices. Ukrainian forces have significantly intensified their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure, including strikes against all of Russia’s major oil refineries, forcing Russia to increase its seaborne crude oil exports.[xiii] Russia appears to be unable to successfully process all of the increased supply of crude oil, and Russian profit margins from crude oil exports remain unclear, however.

Polish and Baltic officials continue to report that Russia may be planning a false flag attack against NATO. Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda stated on July 15 that Lithuania has unspecified intelligence about Russian plans for a "targeted kinetic operations" against unspecified NATO infrastructure.[xiv] Nauseda did not specify that Lithuania is the target but stated that Lithuania has increased its protection of critical transport and energy infrastructure in response to the threat. Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski also stated on July 14 that Poland suspects that Russia is planning to use drones framed as Ukrainian drones to strike a NATO country or targets in Russia, enabling Russia to "respond" to these false flag attacks.[xv] Polish outlet Onet reported on June 30, and Sikorski later confirmed on July 9, that the United States warned Poland that Russia was considering conducting provocations against unspecified NATO countries.[xvi]

Estonian Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur reported that Russia, for the first time on July 9, conducted a live-fire exercise on Lake Peipus, which sits on the Russian-Estonian border.[xvii] Pevkur noted that Russia did not notify Estonian authorities about the exercise in advance and that a Russian exercise on a lake - as opposed to near the land border - was "unusual." Estonian authorities noted that the exercise nonetheless fits the larger pattern of Russian provocations along its border with NATO. ISW continues to assess that that Russia is conducting a ”Phase Zero” campaign that aims to set informational and psychological conditions for potential future provocations against NATO.[xviii]

Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov confirmed on July 15 that he is stepping down from his position.[xix] The Financial Times (FT) reported on July 15 that two sources stated that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky removed Fedorov and is preparing to put forward current Ukrainian Minister of Internal Affairs Ihor Klymenko as his replacement.[xx] Serhii Sternenko, an advisor to Fedorov, also reported that Zelensky would nominate Klymenko as defense minister.[xxi] Fedorov's dismissal is part of anticipated wider changes to the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers that Zelensky first announced on July 12.[xxii] Ukraine’s parliament reportedly will vote on further changes to the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers, including appointing a new prime minister, on July 16.[xxiii]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces are resuming their strike campaign against Ukrainian port infrastructure along the Black Sea coast.
• The Russian strikes likely aim to degrade the Ukrainian economy and reduce Ukraine's export capacity.
• The Russian strikes are likely also a response to Ukraine's recent strike campaign against Russian vessels in the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea, but such Russian strike tactics are not new.
• Russia appears to be struggling to deliver its rising seaborne crude oil exports as Ukraine's long-range strike campaign is reducing Russia's refining capacity.
• Polish and Baltic officials continue to report that Russia may be planning a false flag attack against NATO.
• Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov confirmed on July 15 that he is stepping down from his position.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in Russia on July 12. Russian forces launched two Kh-59/69 cruise missiles and 122 drones against Ukraine overnight.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 14, 2026

Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) recruitment programs are reporting failing to compensate for the rising Russian casualty rate amid costly advances in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) reported on July 12 that the Russian MoD recruited about 195,000 personnel contract soldiers as of early July 2026 — less than 50 percent of Russia’s annual contract recruitment goal of 409,000.[1] SZRU reported that Russia’s daily recruitment rate fell from about 1,200 people per day in 2024 to 1090 recruits per day in mid-2026 and noted that Russia’s recruitment rate is insufficient to accomplish Russia’s annual goal. SZRU noted that growing battlefield losses have forced the Russian MoD to relax its medical and other administrative standards for recruit candidates and intensify efforts to recruit students, foreigners, and residents in Russian-occupied Ukraine. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on July 14 that Russian forces currently suffer over 400 casualties per each square kilometer that Russian forces seize in Donetsk Oblast.[2] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces suffered around 1,298 casualties per square kilometer they seized or infiltrated in June 2026 compared to an average of 68 casualties per kilometer seized in June 2025 at the theater level.[3] ISW's calculations differ from those in Syrskyi’s statement due to a number of methodological factors. ISW’s assessment accounts for theater-wide casualties while Syrskyi’s figures specifically refer to the Donetsk Oblast. ISW is unable to independently estimate Russian casualty levels within individual Ukrainian oblasts. It is also unclear how Syrskyi’s statistics account for the areas in which Russian forces conduct infiltration missions, suffer casualties, but do not successfully seize. Ukrainian forces also recently liberated areas near Lyman, and it remains unclear how territorial control changes resulting from newly Ukrainian liberated-territories factor into the Russian casualty rate when calculating the quantity of square kilometers that Russian forces seized. Syrskyi’s figures all the same provide a helpful metric for quantifying the overarching trend in how Russian forces pay very steep prices for meager tactical gains, regardless of the specific methods used to quantify such figures. Russia’s high casualty rates, regardless of calculation method, reflect Ukraine’s ability to undermine Russian battlefield operations and inflict significant personnel losses.[4] Russia’s casualty rate overtook its recruitment rate in March 2026, and Russian forces will likely continue struggling to generate replacements amid the rising casualty rate without compulsory mobilization.[5]

The Coalition of the Willing reaffirmed the necessity that Ukraine receive binding security guarantees for Ukraine as part of a larger peace plan and reiterated the members’ commitment to participate in peace negotiations. The Coalition of the Willing met in Paris on July 13 and issued a joint statement reaffirming its support for Ukraine, calling for an “immediate and complete ceasefire” in Ukraine and direct peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine with the participation of the United States and Europe.[6] The coalition reiterated that there can be no meaningful peace agreements surrounding Ukrainian and European interests and security without Ukrainian and European participation. The coalition supported US President Donald Trump’s July 7 statement at the NATO Summit in Ankara in support of providing security guarantees to Ukraine. The coalition emphasized that politically and legally binding security guarantees for Ukraine are essential for a durable peace following a ceasefire to deter future Russian aggression and to European stability and security.

The Kremlin continues to reject security guarantees for Ukraine and seeks to deny European participation in peace negotiations on Ukraine. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on July 14 that unspecified “Europeans” are attempting to undermine unspecified “existing agreements” between Russia and the United States, possibly referencing the supposed agreements that the Kremlin claims the US and Russia reached at the August 2025 Alaska Summit, but that in fact were never reached.[7] Lavrov reiterated Russian President Vladimir Putin‘s June 2024 speech emphasizing Russia‘s maximalist war aims, including Ukraine’s complete withdrawal from Ukrainian-controlled territory in Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and the abandonment of Ukraine’s NATO accession aspirations before Russia would agree to a ceasefire and start peace negotiations.[8] Lavrov reiterated that US President Donald Trump and Putin "concluded" an agreement during the August 2025 Alaska Summit in Anchorage but acknowledged that the US and Russia did not sign any documents formalizing any agreement [9] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently confirmed on June 25 that Russia and the United States did not reach any agreement to end Russia’s war in Ukraine during the August 2025 Alaska Summit.[10] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on July 14 that Russia opposes European participation in peace negotiations and added that Russia will not agree to any security guarantees for Ukraine without Russia’s participation, rejecting US President Donald Trump’s and the Coalition of the Wiling’s efforts to facilitate a lasting peace in Ukraine.[11] The Kremlin has routinely tried to exclude European leaders from being involved in the peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine, including rejecting proposals for European peacekeepers and security guarantees and portraying the United States and Russia as the only relevant negotiating actors.[12] The Kremlin’s repeated rejection of any meaningful Western security guarantees for Ukraine further demonstrates Russia’s unwillingness to accept any agreement that falls short of Ukraine’s full capitulation.[13]

Ukraine's Western partners continue efforts to boost Ukraine's air defense umbrella, particularly to combat Russian ballistic missiles. Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Ukraine signed a joint declaration at the Coalition of the Willing meeting on July 13 in Paris to create the Integrated Anti-Ballistic Missile Coalition to accelerate the production of anti-ballistic air defense systems.^[14] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that he hopes Ukraine's Freyja anti-ballistic missile interceptor will be in operation within the next 12 months (by mid-July 2027). Zelensky added that Ukraine will be the first to receive the new French-Italian Sol-Air Moyenne-Portée/Terrestre New Generation (SAMP/T NG) air defense systems and that France will provide Ukraine with two SAMP/T systems in 2026.[15] Ukrainian forces downed five of the eight ballistic missiles Russian forces launched on the night of July 13 to 14 — a notably higher interception rate compared to the past five Russian strike packages that included ballistic missiles, in which Ukrainian forces downed none of the missiles.^[16] Russian forces have been taking advantage of Ukraine’s depleted stocks of Patriot missile interceptors in recent weeks to maximize the destructive potential of their strike packages.[17] European efforts to boost Ukraine's anti-ballistic air defense umbrella will complement US efforts to grant Ukraine a license to produce an unspecified type of interceptor missile for Patriot air defense systems, which are critical for Ukraine’s ability to defend against Russian ballistic missiles.[18]

France and Italy granted Ukraine licenses to produce French-Italian glide bombs and French SCALP missiles in Ukraine as Ukraine's partners continue efforts to boost Ukraine's own defense industrial base (DIB). Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and French President Emmanuel Macro announced on July 14 that France granted Ukraine the licenses to produce Armement Air-Sol Modulaire (AASM) precision-guided glide bombs and SCALP cruise missiles in Ukraine.[19] France and Italy also granted Ukraine the licenses to produce Aster 30 surface-to-air missiles in Ukraine until the end of 2026. The joint declaration also announced Ukraine's initial order of 16 French Rafale fighter jets from the total 100 that Ukraine stated it would buy in November 2025. France will transfer the first four Rafale fighter jets after Ukrainian personnel complete training for pilots and mechanics, which could begin in France in 2026. The joint declaration added that France will deliver air-to-ground and air-to-air missiles, including laser-guided anti-drone missiles, Missile d'Interception de Combat et d'Auto-defense (MICA) missiles, and beyond-visual-range air-to-air METEOR missiles. Ukraine's growing fleet of Rafale jets could enable Ukraine to launch more SCALP/Storm Shadow missiles to augment and sustain its intermediate-range strike campaign.

Ukrainian forces struck the Salavat Oil Refinery on the night of July 13 to 14, the only major Russian refinery that Ukrainian forces had not previously struck in 2026. The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Gazprom Neftokhim Salavat Oil Refinery in Salavat, Republic of Bashkortostan (roughly 1,300 kilometers from the international border), resulting in a fire and damaging the AVT-6 primary oil distillation unit and other production facilities.[20] A Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) channel reported that satellite imagery collected on July 14 indicates that the Ukrainian strikes struck both the AVT-6 and AVT-4 primary processing units.[21] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Salavat refinery is one of the largest in Russia and has a processing capacity of about 10 million tons of oil per year.[22] The Ukrainian SSO reported that the refinery was the last major Russian gasoline production facility that Ukrainian forces had not struck thus far in 2026 and that Ukrainian drones traveled roughly 1,500 kilometers from their launch point to the refinery.[23] Geolocated footage published on July 14 shows fire and smoke coming from the Salavat Oil Refinery.[24] Republic of Bashkortostan Head Radiy Khabirov acknowledged that Ukrainian drones targeted an industrial area in Salavat.[25] Russian officials appear to have been unable to provide sufficient air defense protections for the refinery, despite the established pattern that Ukraine has been targeting major refineries since Spring 2026.

The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Afipsky Oil Refinery in Afipsky, Krasnodar Krai (roughly 375 kilometers from the frontline) and a transshipment area near Gelendzhik, Krasnodar Krai (roughly 370 kilometers from the frontline) overnight.[26] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Afipsky Oil Refinery is one of the key oil enterprises in southern Russia with a production capacity of about 6.25 million tons per year. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces use the transshipment infrastructure near Gelendzhik to ship oil and support Russian military and naval logistics. Imagery published on July 14 reportedly shows a fire at Afipsky Oil Refinery.[27] On July 14, the Krasnodar Krai Operational Headquarters acknowledged a fire at the refinery.[28]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) recruitment programs are reporting failing to compensate for the rising Russian casualty rate amid costly advances in Ukraine.
• The Coalition of the Willing reaffirmed the necessity that Ukraine receive binding security guarantees for Ukraine as part of a larger peace plan and reiterated the members’ commitment to participate in peace negotiations.
• The Kremlin continues to reject security guarantees for Ukraine and seeks to deny European participation in peace negotiations on Ukraine.
• Ukraine's Western partners continue efforts to boost Ukraine's air defense umbrella, particularly to combat Russian ballistic missiles.
• France and Italy granted Ukraine licenses to produce French-Italian glide bombs and French SCALP missiles in Ukraine as Ukraine's partners continue efforts to boost Ukraine's own defense industrial base (DIB).
• Ukrainian forces struck the Salavat Oil Refinery on the night of July 13 to 14, the only major Russian refinery that Ukrainian forces had not previously struck in 2026.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
• Russian forces launched eight Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles, two Kh-59/69 guided cruise missiles, and 135 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 13, 2026

Ukrainian forces continue to intensify and expand their strike campaign aimed at denying Russia's ability to sustain logistics and transport fuel to occupied Crimea and isolate the peninsula. The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) reported on July 13 that Ukrainian forces conducted a large-scale strike operation on the night of July 12 to 13, simultaneously striking Russian military, logistics, and fuel facilities in occupied Crimea and Russia.[1] The SBU reported that Ukrainian forces struck two Russian project 12150 Mangust-class patrol boats in the Black Sea; hangars with military and special equipment at the Baherove military air base in occupied Crimea; three stationary radar stations that Russia uses to detect Ukrainian unmanned service vehicles (USVs) and drones in an unspecified location; the Yeisk and Maria cargo and passenger ferries at the Krym ferry terminal in occupied Kerch, Crimea; the Lavrentiy and Panagia cargo and passenger ferries and three oil tanks in the port of Kavkaz, Krasnodar Krai; a railway warehouse with oil tanks at the Kavkaz freight station, Krasnodar Krai; and an oil tank farm at an oil depot in Vyazniki, Stavropol Krai. Ukrainian forces are engaged in a systematic multipronged interdiction campaign aimed at isolating Crimea and denying Russia the ability to sustain logistics to the peninsula, striking bridges, major highways, and rail infrastructure from occupied Kherson Oblast to occupied Crimea; Kerch Strait crossings and ferries moving between occupied Crimea and Krasnodar Krai; and fuel tankers and vessels in the Sea of Azov.[2] The SBU's July 12 to 13 overnight strikes demonstrate the enhanced planning capabilities of Ukrainian forces in their ability to simultaneously conduct such strikes against various targets in support of Ukraine's effort to isolate the Crimean Peninsula. Continued Ukrainian strikes, if sustained, can continue to disrupt Russia's ability to sustain logistics to the peninsula, which can degrade frontline Russian offensive operations and impede Russian advances in southern Ukraine.

Ukrainian forces reportedly liberated six settlements and 120 square kilometers in the Oleksandrivka direction over an unspecified time period as part of their ongoing counterattacks in the area supported by intensifying intermediate-range strikes. A Ukrainian regiment operating in the Oleksandrivka direction announced on July 13 that Ukrainian forces liberated Ternove, Zaporizke, Novoheorhiivka, Vorone, Sichneve, and Maliivka (all southeast of Oleksandrivka), liberating 120 square kilometers and advancing 25 kilometers in depth.[3] The regiment seemingly deleted its original announcement without issuing a formal statement retracting its initial report later on July 13. Several Ukrainian media outlets have reported on and republished the regiment’s announcement, and these secondary reports remain available.[4] Ukrainian forces began counterattacks in the Oleksandrivka direction in Winter 2026, liberating around 480 square kilometers in Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia oblasts since January 2026.[5] The regiment reported that Ukrainian forces have been systematically striking Russian drone crews and ground lines of communications (GLOCs) in the area to prepare the battlespace for Ukrainian counterattacks. The regiment reported that it inflicted critical losses on elements of the Russian 120th Naval Infantry Division (Baltic Fleet) (newly formed from the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade) operating in the area and destroyed a personnel concentration of the Russian 656th Motorized Rifle Regiment (29th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) in Temyrivka (southeast of Zaporizke) which Russian forces relied on to conduct logistics, forcing Russian units to retreat.[6] Ukraine’s tactical success in the Oleksandrivka direction over the last several months, supported by Ukraine’s intensified intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian logistics, which has degraded Russian forces’ ability to conduct offensive operations, continues to force Russia to choose between defending against Ukrainian counterattacks or allocating manpower and resources to priority sectors.[7]

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 12, 2026

Ukrainian forces have struck 90 Russian oil tankers in the Sea of Azov since July 6 as part of their intensified campaign to isolate occupied Crimea.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on July 12 that Ukrainian forces struck 14 vessels in the Sea of Azov overnight on July 11 to 12, including four ferries and 10 tankers that Russia uses to transport oil and petroleum products and circumvent sanctions.[2] Ukrainian forces began intensifying strikes against vessels in the Sea of Azov on July 6 as part of efforts to prevent Russia's ability to adapt to Ukraine's strikes against land-based logistics between Russia and occupied Crimea that have caused severe gasoline shortages.[3] Ukrainian strikes against Russian seaborne gasoline transports over the past week represent a new phase in Ukraine’s efforts to isolate occupied Crimea from the Russian logistics network and to disrupt Russian seaborne shipping routes, especially for petroleum products and grain.[4]

Ukraine’s successful long- and intermediate-range strike campaigns continue to fuel Russian milblogger concerns about Russia's inadequate air defense capabilities and the Kremlin's poor decision-making that have left Russia and occupied Ukraine vulnerable to Ukrainian strikes. A prominent Russian milblogger complained on July 12 that Ukrainian strikes are causing a crisis in western and other parts of Russia, in part due to Russian officials' "blatant carelessness," and emphasized that Russia will not be able to quickly correct these issues.[5] The milblogger assessed that the Russian Navy cannot reliably defend Russian vessels in the Sea of Azov due to bureaucratic inertia and that Russia cannot quickly build refineries or substations to replace damaged ones. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger similarly complained on July 12 that Russia is struggling to protect its tankers in the Sea of Azov against Ukrainian drones, largely due to the lack of a unified shipping protection system.[6] The milblogger called for Russia to create a single system — rather than one that works through separate agencies — that oversees mobile fire groups in ports and on tankers, constant route surveillance, and the dispersal of Russian tanker convoys. Another Russian milblogger claimed on July 11 that Russia is relying on the Soviet-era air defense model that defends against heavy missile strikes but cannot effectively intercept small Ukrainian drones flying at low altitudes.[7] The milblogger called for Russia to expand its use of mobile fire groups and drone interceptor crews. Ukraine’s long-range strike campaigns against Russian energy and military infrastructure and seaborne gasoline transports continue to expose vulnerabilities in the Russian air defense umbrella and will likely continue to challenge the Kremlin’s ability to defend Russia and occupied Ukraine against Ukrainian strikes.[8] Russia's inability to adapt its air defense systems to the rapidly adapting drone warfare that has characterized the past few years of the war in Ukraine is at odds with the offense-defense race that has characterized both sides' strike campaigns.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced forthcoming changes to the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers, including the reassignment of the current prime minister, Yulia Svyrydenko. Zelensky stated on July 12 that he will implement personnel changes in the Cabinet of Ministers and will reassign Svyrydenko to lead a new, unspecified initiative with an unspecified “key partner.”^[9] Zelensky stated that each new appointee in the cabinet will focus on the implementation of agreements between Ukraine and its partners, including the production of Patriot air defense interceptors with US licenses and efforts with Europe to create an anti-ballistic air defense system.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces have struck 90 Russian oil tankers in the Sea of Azov since July 6 as part of their intensified campaign to isolate occupied Crimea.
• Ukraine’s successful long- and intermediate-range strike campaigns continue to fuel Russian milblogger concerns about Russia's inadequate air defense capabilities and the Kremlin's poor decision-making that have left Russia and occupied Ukraine vulnerable to Ukrainian strikes.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced forthcoming changes to the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers, including the reassignment of the current prime minister, Yulia Svyrydenko.
• Russian forces launched nine Kh-59/69 guided cruise missiles, four Kh-31 anti-radar missiles, and 115 drones against Ukraine overnight.
• Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 11, 2026

The recent, intensified Ukrainian strikes against Russian seaborne gasoline tankers in the Sea of Azov have reportedly forced Russia to close some maritime routes. The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on July 11 that Ukrainian forces struck 28 Russian vessels, including 21 tankers, four tugboats, two dry cargo ships, and a dredger in the Azov Sea on the night of July 10 to 11.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the oil tankers transported Russian petroleum products in violation of international sanctions and that the remaining vessels supported Russian military logistics and transported cargo — presumably in the Sea of Azov.[2] Brovdi implied that Russian authorities appear to have stopped maritime traffic through the Kerch Strait.[3] Brovdi reported on July 11 that Ukrainian forces have struck a total of 76 vessels between July 6 and 11, including in the Sea of Azov. Reuters reported on July 10, citing three grain export industry sources, that Russian authorities temporarily suspended seaborne shipping through the Don-Azov Canal, which connects the Sea of Azov with the Don River, following recent Ukrainian strikes against Russian vessels in the Sea of Azov.[4] One of the sources stated that Russian border guards stopped accepting requests for passage through the Kerch Strait as of 1810 local time on July 10 and did not specify when the suspension would expire. Ukrainian strikes against Russian seaborne gasoline transports over the past week represent a new phase in Ukraine's efforts to isolate occupied Crimea from the Russian logistics network and disrupt Russian seaborne shipping routes, especially for petroleum products and grain.[5]

Starboard Maritime Intelligence data indicates a possible 55 percent decline in vessels with active automatic identification system (AIS) transponders in the Sea of Azov between June 30 and July 11. Ship-tracking data from Starboard Maritime Intelligence recorded 267 possible vessels with active AIS transponders in the Sea of Azov on June 30 but only 120 possible vessels with active AIS transponders in the Sea of Azov on July 11, potentially marking a 55 percent decrease. Starboard data from June 30 shows active AIS transponder ships throughout the Sea of Azov, along the coasts of Russia and occupied Ukraine, and at Russian and occupied Ukrainian ports. Starboard data from July 11 shows substantially fewer active AIS transponder ships throughout the Sea of Azov, with most ships clustered near ports, coasts, or in the Taganrog Bay. Starboard data from both June 30 and July 11 also shows multiple AIS transponder locations at inland points in Russia and occupied Ukraine. AIS data can be spoofed and jammed, leading to AIS signals appearing on land or outside their vessel's actual operating path. The Starboard data shows a methodologically consistent count of AIS transponders actively reporting locations, spoofed or otherwise, in the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait and therefore does not represent the exact number of vessels in these areas.

Intensified Ukrainian strikes against seaborne vessels may have prompted Russian vessels to alter their behavior in the Sea of Azov in any of several ways consistent with the Starboard data and AIS signal anomalies. Fewer ships may be sailing in the Sea of Azov due to the increased threat of Ukrainian strikes. Some ships sailing in the Sea of Azov may have turned off their AIS transponders, consistent with Russian attempts to obfuscate the location of Russian ships in general and ships in the Sea of Azov specifically.[6] Starboard data from June 10 and 11 also indicates that Russia continues to jam AIS transponder signals, as it has been doing since prior to the most recent Ukrainian strikes against ships in the Sea of Azov, possibly as a precaution against the enduring threat of Ukrainian drone strikes.

Russian consumer gasoline prices are skyrocketing amid Ukraine's intensifying long-range strike campaign against Russian oil refineries and gasoline producers. Kremlin news agency Interfax reported on July 11, citing data from the Russian Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat), that consumer prices for gasoline increased by an average of 6.88 percent in June 2026 compared to much lower increases of 0.85 percent in May 2026, 0.61 percent in April 2026, 1.08 percent in March 2026, 0.61 percent in February 2026, and 1.35 percent in January 2026.[7] Interfax noted that consumer prices for AI-92 gasoline increased by 7.3 percent, AI-95 gasoline by 6.7 percent, AI-98 gasoline by 3.1 percent, and diesel fuel by 7.1 percent in June 2026. Interfax reported that consumer gasoline prices increased by 19.9 percent from June 2025 to June 2026,  by 11.13 percent in all of 2024, and by 10.78 percent in all of 2025. Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russian oil infrastructure and intermediate-range strikes against fuel deliveries to and within occupied Ukraine during the summer months, when Russia experiences increased demands for fuel for the tourist season, are severely limiting the amount of gasoline and other fuel available for consumers in Russia and occupied Ukraine and are very likely a main driver of the spike in consumer gasoline prices in June 2026.[8] At least 78 of Russia's 83 federal subjects as well as occupied Ukraine are experiencing gasoline shortages due to Ukraine's intensified strike campaigns.[9] Ukraine will likely continue intensifying its strike campaigns as Russia struggles to find solutions to the air defense insufficiencies that have contributed to the success of the Ukrainian campaigns, exacerbating fuel shortages for both domestic civilian consumers and even impacting near rear and frontline Russian logistics.[10]

Russia appears to have been engaged in a hacking operation that targeted civilian cameras across European NATO member states and in Ukraine. The Telegraph reported on July 10, citing the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) and Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD) that Kremlin-based hackers have been spying on NATO military bases in Europe by hacking into civilian cameras pointing at military equipment transportation routes to identify the types of weapons Ukraine received.[11] The Dutch intelligence services reported that the Russian operation targeted European NATO members states, including the Netherlands, and Ukraine. The Telegraph speculated that hackers likely accessed civilian doorbell systems to monitor weapons transportation routes.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky authorized the creation of a long-range strike command and a new rapid-response branch within the Ukrainian Armed Forces on July 10. Zelensky signed a decree on July 10 ordering the creation of the Long-Range (Global) Influence Command subordinate to the Ukrainian Armed Forces and ordering Ukrainian authorities to appoint a commander of the new formation.[12] Zelensky noted that the Long-Range (Global) Influence Command's objective is to degrade Russia's warfighting potential, likely referring to suppressing Russian military targets in the deep rear.[13] Zelensky signed a second decree on July 10 ordering the creation of the Joint Rapid Response Forces within Ukraine’s Ground Forces and appointed 8th Airborne Assault Corps Commander Brigadier General Dmytro Voloshyn as its commander.[14]

Key Takeaways:

• The recent, intensified Ukrainian strikes against Russian seaborne gasoline tankers in the Sea of Azov have reportedly forced Russia to close some maritime routes.
• Starboard Maritime Intelligence data indicates a possible 55 percent decline in vessels with active automatic identification system (AIS) transponders in the Sea of Azov between June 30 and July 11.
• Intensified Ukrainian strikes against seaborne vessels may have prompted Russian vessels to alter their behavior in the Sea of Azov in any of several ways consistent with the Starboard data and AIS signal anomalies.
• Russian consumer gasoline prices are skyrocketing amid Ukraine's intensifying long-range strike campaign against Russian oil refineries and gasoline producers.
• Russia appears to have been engaged in a hacking operation that targeted civilian cameras across NATO countries and in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky authorized the creation of two new commands within the Ukrainian Armed Forces on July 10.
• Russian forces launched six Iskander-M and S-400 ballistic missiles, four Kh-59/69 guided cruise missiles, two Kh-31 anti-radar missiles, and 121 drones against Ukraine overnight.
• Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, and Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 10, 2026

The Russian oil refining industry is failing to meet the rising domestic gasoline demand as the Ukrainian long-range strike campaign continues to degrade Russia's oil refining capacity. Reuters reported on July 10, citing two industry sources and its own calculations, that Russian gasoline production fell to about 65 percent of the average seasonal consumption and that Russian production is not meeting the seasonal gasoline demand.[1] The two industry sources told Reuters that the seasonal gasoline demand increased by 40,000 and 45,000 metric tons per day (a deficit of around 35 percent) and that Russia's total gasoline demand typically reaches between 115,000 and 120,000 metric tons per day during the peak summer driving season. Reuters noted that Russian gasoline production fell short of domestic demand by 25 percent in June 2026. Intermediaries told Reuters that Russia is tapping into federal stockpiles and receiving 6,000 metric tons of gasoline per day from Belarus. Reuters noted that Ukrainian combined strikes against Russia’s largest gasoline producers, including the Lukoil- Nizhegorodnefteorgsintez (NORSI) and Omsk oil refineries in Nizhny Novgorod and Omsk oblasts, respectively, forced Russia to temporarily halt production at these facilities.[2] Reuters reported on July 9, citing two sources familiar with the matter, that the Saratov Oil Refinery suspended operations on July 7 after a Ukrainian drone strike damaged the only CDU-6 primary oil refining unit at the facility.[3] It is unclear how long the Saratov Oil Refinery will remain out of commission, as it also reportedly previously halted operations in March and May 2026 following Ukrainian strikes.[4]

Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak acknowledged on July 10 that some Russian oil refineries have partially halted production because of Ukrainian drone strikes and noted that Russian authorities will ensure additional gasoline supplies to Russian federal subjects.[5] Regional authorities in Russia and in occupied areas, including Crimea, continue imposing restrictions on gasoline sales and adapting to the worsening gasoline shortages across Russia, and some authorities are even calling on Russians to work remotely and limit travel to reduce gasoline consumption.[6] Kazakhstan's Ministry of Internal Affairs reported on July 9 that they deployed 59 police posts along its international border and imposed some entry restrictions for foreign cars to combat illegal fuel exports, likely referring to individuals seeking to illegally transport gasoline back to Russia.[7] Kazakhstan's Ministry of Internal Affairs indicated that the number of individuals caught attempting to smuggle gasoline out of the country illegally sharply rose in June 2026. Ukraine’s successful long-range strike campaign against Russian fuel infrastructure since March 2026 has decreased Russia’s ability to produce and refine oil, leading to intensifying gasoline and diesel shortages that the Russian government is struggling to mitigate.[8]

A Russian state-owned polling institution indicated that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s approval ratings continued to fall in early July 2026 after a sharp decline at the end of June 2026. The Russian state-owned All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM) published on July 10 the results of a poll indicating that Putin’s approval rating fell by 0.9 percent to 66 percent and that trust in Putin fell by one percent to 72.3 percent between June 29 and July 5.[9] Polling from VTsIOM and other Russian state and independent polling agencies indicated that Putin’s trust and approval ratings sharply fell in late June 2026 after weeks of steady decline since March 2026.^[10] It remains notable that a Russian state-owned polling center believes it necessary to acknowledge the growing societal discontent that is likely related to the intensifying gasoline shortages across Russia.[11]

Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski confirmed recent US warnings that Russia might be planning to conduct provocations against unspecified NATO states. Sikorski stated during a press conference with French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot on July 9 that Poland has "credible information" that Russia is planning to conduct provocations against unspecified NATO countries.[12] Sikorski noted that his statement is a public warning aimed at dissuading Russia from carrying out such provocations, and Barrot confirmed that France has similarly observed an increase in Russian provocations.[13] Polish outlet Onet reported on June 30 that the United States reportedly warned Poland that Russia is considering a limited military provocation against Poland, and Sikorski’s statement serves as a confirmation of those reported warnings.[14] Sikorski’s statement and the repeated US and European warnings are consistent with ISW's long-term assessment that Russian false flag provocations are part of the Russian “Phase Zero” campaign to set informational and psychological conditions for potential future provocations against NATO.[15]

Key Takeaways:

• The Russian oil refining industry is failing to meet the rising domestic gasoline demand as the Ukrainian long-range strike campaign continues to degrade Russia's oil refining capacity.
• A Russian state-owned polling institution indicated that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s approval ratings continued to fall in early July 2026 after a sharp decline at the end of June 2026.
• Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski confirmed recent US warnings that Russia might be planning to conduct provocations against unspecified NATO states.
• Ukrainian forces conducted long-range strikes against Russian energy infrastructure in Russia on the night of July 9 to 10. Russian forces launched 137 drones against Ukraine overnight.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 9, 2026

The Kremlin appears to be struggling to adjust its narrative line in response to the Trump administration's recent denial of Russian negotiating tactics and acknowledgement of Ukrainian battlefield successes. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on July 9 that the US has always supplied military aid to Ukraine, attempting to downplay the importance of US President Donald Trump’s July 7 decision to grant Ukraine a license to produce an unspecified Patriot interceptor missile.[i] Peskov stated that the Kremlin sees Trump’s statements as a "misconception" rather than an escalation.[ii] Peskov also stated on July 9 that Trump did not call Russian President Vladimir Putin on July 8 but noted that Putin remains open to talking with Trump.[iii] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova reiterated on July 8 the Kremlin’s narrative that the US remains disinterested in contributing to European security and that European states are preparing for a long-term conflict with Russia.[iv] Peskov's and Zakharova's responses suggest that the Kremlin has not yet developed a coherent information response to recent Trump administration efforts to push back against Russian narratives. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, for example, confirmed on July 6 that there was no written agreement following the US-Russia Summit in Alaska in August 2025, undermining Russian attempts to weaponize the summit for negotiations purposes.[v] Senior US officials have also recently acknowledged Ukrainian tactical and operational successes, contrary to the Russian narrative that its forces are advancing across the entire frontline.[vi] The Kremlin appears to be attempting to downplay recent developments, including the importance of the Patriot licensing deal, in order to keep the door open for negotiations with the United States in the hopes that Russia can still extract concessions from Ukraine and its partners.

An anonymous Russian general reportedly acknowledged that the Kremlin is inflating Russian battlefield successes to generate a false perception of Russian sweeping advances while maintaining its commitment to a war of attrition that Russia cannot win in a continued attempt to convince Ukraine and the West to capitulate to Russia's demands. Russian journalist Dmitry Kolezev published an interview on July 6 with an alleged active-duty Russian general who spoke on the condition of anonymity, during which the general claimed that the Russian military command is reporting to Russian President Vladimir Putin that Russian forces will seize Donbas by the end of 2026.[vii] The general's statements reflect a July 9 Reuters report, which cited three sources close to the Kremlin as saying that Putin believes that Russian forces will soon seize Donbas, and is therefore rejecting the idea of negotiations or a ceasefire on the current frontline.[viii] The general claimed that the Kremlin would need to recruit at least 55,000-60,000 servicemembers per month to replace the current Russian casualty rates and seize Donbas by the deadline — an objective that he called “unrealistic” given Russian manpower shortages and falling recruitment rates.[ix] The general reaffirmed that Putin remains committed to his theory of victory which rests on the premise that Russia can win a war of attrition by having Russian forces maintain the initiative and advance across the entire theater indefinitely, thereby outlasting both Ukraine's ability to defend and Western support for Ukraine.[x] The general claimed that the Kremlin is operating on the assumption that Ukraine will soon experience a domestic politic crisis and that the Kremlin's exaggerated claims of Russian advances will influence the United States administration to force Ukraine to capitulate to Russia's demands, such as withdrawing Ukrainian forces from Donbas. The general claimed that Putin’s recent statements about Russian forces seizing Kostyantynivka and Kupyansk are part of such informational effort to convince the United States and Europe that Russian victory is inevitable, such that they should withdraw support from Ukraine. The general noted that the Kremlin is prioritizing seizing Donbas over all other objectives, including protecting the sky over occupied Ukraine and that the Kremlin is considering declaring mobilization either publicly or covertly to address manpower shortages in order to seize Donbas. The general claimed that Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov’s July 5 statement that Russia’s ”SVO” (Spetsialnaya Voennaya Operatsiya or Special Military Operation - the term that the Kremlin uses to refer to its war against Ukraine) has turned into a ”real war” is a condition-setting effort to prepare the Russian population for potential mobilization in the near future.[xi] Putin signed a bill in November 2025 that enables Russia to deploy reservists to combat areas without declaring mobilization, and ISW assessed at the time that the Kremlin would likely leverage this bill to conduct rolling partial mobilization.[xii] Mobilization is a very personal decision for Putin and is ultimately contingent on Putin’s personal perception of the battlefield situation and regime stability, as mobilization remains highly unpopular among the Russian public. The Russian general’s statements are consistent with ISW continued assessment that Putin's assessment of the battlefield is divorced from reality and that Putin will soon have to make difficult decisions to either continue the war at the risk of regime stability or engage in peace negotiations that he has thus far shown no interest in doing.

Ukrainian forces appear to have initiated a new phase in their campaign to isolate occupied Crimea by targeting Russian seaborne gasoline tankers. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on July 9 that Ukrainian forces struck 14 Russian vessels in the Sea of Azov on the night of July 8 to 9, including 12 gasoline tankers, the Alfeo tugboat and one dry cargo ship.[xiii] Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Chelsea-6, Aura, Sonar-1, Ilya Repin, Galiaskar Kamal, Venera-3, Penelope, and five other gasoline tankers. Brovdi added that Ukrainian forces struck 35 Russian fuel tankers, dry cargo ships, and unspecified special vessels in the past 96 hours.[xiv] An alleged active-duty Russian general reportedly told Russian journalist Dmitry Kolezev on July 6 that Russia cannot effectively counter Ukraine's intermediate-range strike campaign after the Russian General Staff disbanded the Crimean Defense Group in 2024 due to the lack of naval equipment to defend the peninsula.[xv] Ukraine’s continuous intermediate- and long-range strike campaign against Russian land transportation routes is degrading logistics between Russia and occupied Crimea, forcing occupied Crimea to rely on seaborne gasoline supplies to address gasoline shortages.[xvi] Ukrainian intensifying strikes against Russian seaborne fuel tankers demonstrate a new phase in Ukraine’s ability to rapidly adapt to Russia’s shift toward seaborne fuel transportation and will likely continue to disrupt Russia’s ability to sustain logistics and transport fuel between Russia and occupied Crimea in an effort to isolate the peninsula.[xvii]

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin appears to be struggling to adjust its narrative line in response to the Trump administration's recent denial of Russian negotiating tactics and acknowledgement of Ukrainian battlefield successes.
• An anonymous Russian general reportedly acknowledged that the Kremlin is inflating Russian battlefield successes to generate a false perception of Russian sweeping advances while maintaining its commitment to a war of attrition that Russia cannot win in a continued attempt to convince Ukraine and the West to capitulate to Russia's demands.
• Ukrainian forces appear to have initiated a new phase in their campaign to isolate occupied Crimea by targeting Russian seaborne gasoline tankers.
• Ukrainian forces conducted long-range strikes against Russian energy infrastructure in Russia on the night of July 8 to 9. Russian forces launched 2 Iskander-M ballistic missiles and 94 drones against Ukraine overnight.
• Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces made confirmed advances on July 9.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 8, 2026

US President Donald Trump stated that the United States will grant Ukraine a license to produce an unspecified type of interceptor missile for Patriot air defense systems, which are critical for Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian ballistic missiles. Trump stated on July 8 that the United States will provide Ukraine a license to produce unspecified Patriot air defense interceptors and that the production could begin in two to three months.[1] It is unclear whether Trump will approve licensing for Ukraine to produce more capable PAC-3 interceptors or the simpler PAC-2 interceptors. Trump noted that the United States has not yet informed the US manufacturer about licensing Ukraine to produce Patriot interceptors. It is unclear how long it will take for Ukraine to begin producing the interceptor missiles, however, as production capacity will depend on the availability of the base components that go into the Patriot interceptor and the scaling of the entire supply chain that produces those components. Ukrainian forces are quite successful at intercepting cruise missiles and drones, but struggle to intercept ballistic missiles due to Ukraine’s insufficient supply of interceptor missiles. Ukrainian forces notably did not intercept any ballistic missiles in Russia's two most recent massive strike packages overnight on July 1 to 2 and July 5 to 6.[2] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Head Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated on July 8 that Russia can produce between 60 and 65 Iskander ballistic missiles per month.[3] Russia may exploit the gap before Ukraine can produce its own Patriot interceptor missiles and intensify ballistic missile strikes against Ukraine to inflict maximum damage before Ukraine is able to more reliably defend itself.

Ukrainian forces are intensifying strikes against Russian fuel tankers as Russia increasingly relies on seaborne transportation of gasoline to occupied Crimea from Russia. Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk reported on July 8 that Russia has shifted to using fuel tankers to transport fuel between Russia and occupied Ukraine, particularly from occupied Mariupol and Berdyansk ports via the Sea of Azov, to address gasoline shortages in occupied Crimea, as Ukrainian strikes are denying Russia the use of the M-14 Rostov-Crimea highway.[4] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on July 8 that Ukrainian forces struck nine Russian fuel tankers in the Azov Sea overnight on July 7 to 8, and that Ukrainian forces struck 19 Russian fuel tankers, a cargo ship, and a ferry over the past 72 hours.[5] The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) reported on July 8 that a Ukrainian Sea Baby naval drone struck the Suezmax-class Russian shadow fleet tanker Blue off the coast of occupied Yalta (roughly 263 kilometers from the frontline).[6] The SBU noted that Russia previously used the Blue tanker to transport significant volumes of oil and petroleum products to circumvent international sanctions. Ukrainian forces struck eight Russian shadow fleet tankers, including Venera-3, Sanar-1, Sanar-17, Klimena, Teti, Alexei Savrasov, Ivan Cheremisinov, and Penelopa tankers on the night of July 6 to 7 in an effort to inhibit Russian gasoline transports to occupied Crimea.[7] Ukraine's continuous intermediate- and long-range strike campaign against Russian land transportation routes is degrading the logistics routes between Russia and occupied Crimea, forcing occupied Crimea to rely on seaborne fuel supplies to address fuel shortages.[8]

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure and military assets deep into Russia on July 7 and 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the TAIF-NK JSC oil refinery in Nizhnekamsk, Republic of Tatarstan (roughly 1,115 kilometers from the international border), overnight.[9] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the TAIF-NK oil refinery is one of the largest refineries in Russia with a production capacity of over 8 million tons. Geolocated footage published on July 8 shows a fire at the TAIF-NK JSC oil refinery in Nizhnekamsk, Republic of Tatarstan, following the Ukrainian strike.[10] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Saratov Oil Refinery in Saratov Oblast (roughly 600 kilometers from the frontline) overnight, causing explosions and fires at the refinery.[11] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the refinery has a production capacity of about 7 million tons of petroleum products per year and produces gasoline, diesel, and aviation fuel for Russian forces. Geolocated footage published on July 8 shows a fire at the Saratov oil refinery in Saratov Oblast following the strikes.[12] Saratov Oblast Governor Roman Busargin acknowledged on July 8 that Ukrainian forces struck and damaged infrastructure in Saratov Oblast.[13] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Borisoglebsk military airfield in Voronezh Oblast (roughly 335 kilometers from the frontline).^[14] The Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) noted that the Borisoglebsk military airfield houses Russian Su-34, Su-35S, and Su-30M aircraft, which Russian forces regularly use to strike Ukrainian territory and train flight crews.[15] Geolocated footage published on July 8 shows a fire at the Borisoglebsk military airfield, and NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data from July 8 shows heat anomalies at the airfield following the Ukrainian strikes.[16] Ukrainian defense source Militarnyi published satellite imagery collected on July 7 that showed several Su-35s, two Mi-8 helicopters, eight Yak-130 training aircraft, and one Mi-26 helicopter at the airfield.[17] The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) reported on July 8 that Ukrainian forces struck the Cherkasy linear production and dispatching station (LVDS) in the Bashkortostan Republic (roughly 1,500 kilometers from the international border with Ukraine), causing a fire near the oil tank farm and production facilities.[18] The SBU noted that the station is one of Russia’s key facilities within the Transneft-Ural petroleum network and transports almost two million tons of light petroleum products from the Ufa Oil Refinery per year. Geolocated footage published on July 8 shows smoke rising from the station following the Ukrainian strikes.[19] Russian state-owned energy company Gazprom claimed on July 8 that unspecified drones struck the Krasnodarskaya compressor station in Smolenskaya, Krasnodar Krai (roughly 370 kilometers from the frontline), a key part of the Russian gas supply chain through the Blue Stream pipeline that transports Russian gasoline to Turkey.[20] Ukrainian forces have been intensifying the scope and scale of their long-range strikes against Russian oil infrastructure in Russia over the last several months, exploiting overstretched Russian air defenses.[21] The Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil production and transport infrastructure will likely intensify the spread and severity of fuel shortages in Russian regions and occupied Ukraine.[22] Russia has largely failed to repel and adapt to Ukrainian long-range strikes, and numerous Russian milbloggers recently blamed the Russian federal government for failing to create a cohesive air defense system that can adequately protect private businesses and critical infrastructure from Ukrainian long-range strikes that continue to degrade Russia’s industrial capabilities and oil refining capacity.[23]

Ukrainian forces conducted a second phase of Operation Auchan in June 2026 aimed at disrupting Russian offensive capabilities, specifically targeting Russian artillery. Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov reported on July 7 that Ukrainian forces conducted the second phase of Operation Auchan “a few weeks ago” (in June 2026) and struck 231 Russian artillery targets, completely destroying 171 of the targets.[24] Fedorov noted that Ukrainian forces specifically developed a new munition to defeat Russian artillery systems for this phase of the operation. Ukrainian forces conducted the first phase of the operation in Summer 2025, which significantly reduced Russia’s ability to conduct mechanized offensive operations in an unspecified sector of the theater for six months. Ukrainian strikes have been increasingly striking Russian artillery systems in recent months, with Ukrainian General Staff reports indicating that Ukrainian forces struck 1,447 in March 2026, 1,834 in April 2026, 2,043 in May 2026, and 2,053 in June 2026.[25] Operation Auchan demonstrates the maturation of Ukrainian operational planning and technological adaptations to achieve operational effects to support combined arms warfare on the battlefield.

Ukraine’s Western partners continue to provide military aid to Ukraine, including through the purchase of US-produced weapons and joint drone production. NATO published a declaration on July 8 promising to allocate 70 billion euros (about $80 billion) for military equipment, assistance, and training to Ukraine in 2026 and to sustain the level of military aid in 2027.[26] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on July 7 that Ukraine signed defense cooperation agreements with Estonia, the Netherlands and Denmark for joint drone production in Ukraine and in Europe.[27] Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney announced on July 7 that Canada will allocate 925 million Canadian dollars (about $653 million) in military assistance to Ukraine, including 475 million (about $335 million) for purchasing ammunition, 400 million (about $282 million) for 35 Canadian-made armored vehicles, and 50 million (about $35 million) for critical technology and engineering equipment.[28] Norway announced on July 7 that it will allocate 268 million euros (about $306 million) to Ukraine for the purchase of Patriot air defense missiles in partnership with Denmark, Germany, and Canada through the Prioritized Ukrainian Requirements List (PURL) initiative, which funds NATO states’ purchases of US-made weapons for Ukraine.[29] Unspecified government sources told Spanish outlet El País on July 7 that Spain will allocate an additional 50 million euros ($57 million) to purchase US weapons for Ukraine under the PURL initiative.[30]

Key Takeaways:

• US President Donald Trump stated that the United States will grant Ukraine a license to produce an unspecified type of interceptor missile for Patriot air defense systems, which are critical for Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian ballistic missiles.
• Ukrainian forces are intensifying strikes against Russian fuel tankers as Russia increasingly relies on seaborne gasoline to transport gasoline to occupied Crimea from Russia.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure and military assets deep into Russia on July 7 and 8.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a second phase of Operation Auchan in June 2026 aimed at disrupting Russian offensive capabilities, specifically targeting Russian artillery.
• Ukraine’s Western partners continue to provide military aid to Ukraine, including through the purchase of US-produced weapons and joint drone production.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and Russian forces recently advanced north of Kharkiv City.
• Russian forces launched two Kh-31P anti-radar missiles, five Iskander-M and S-400 ballistic missiles, and 169 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 7, 2026

Ukraine’s intermediate-range strike campaign against a multitude of diverse targets, including Russian air defenses, petroleum product transport, other logistics, and electrical substations, is collapsing logistics in occupied Crimea. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on July 7 that Ukrainian forces struck eight Russian shadow fleet tankers, including the Venera-3, Sanar-1, Sanar-17, Klimena, Teti, Alexei Savrasov, Ivan Cheremisinov, and Penelopa tankers; one dry cargo ship; and one ferry in the Sea of Azov transporting gasoline to occupied Crimea on the night of July 6 to 7.[i] Brovdi implied that the strikes against the shadow fleet vessels will inhibit Russian efforts to transport gasoline to occupied Crimea, and a local Crimea-based Telegram also reported that the tankers were ferrying gasoline to Crimea.[ii] NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data shows two heat anomalies in the Sea of Azov north of the Kerch Strait on July 7.[iii] Brovdi reported on July 7 that Ukrainian forces also struck 44 electrical facilities in occupied Crimea and occupied southern Ukraine between July 1 and 7.[iv] Adviser to the Ukrainian Defense Minister, Serhii Sternenko, reported on July 7 that there are fires near the Saky 110 kV and Zakhidno-Krymska 330 kV substations, near the Saky railway station, and near a known S-400 air defense system position in occupied Crimea.[v] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 7 that Ukrainian forces also struck two railway bridges near occupied Rozdolne (either 110 or 214 kilometers from the frontline) and Ichki (roughly 257 kilometers from the frontline) that Russian forces used for logistics.[vi]

Ukrainian Presidential Office in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea provided a summary on July 6 of Ukrainian strikes against occupied Crimea in June 2026, including on over 15 Russian air defense systems and radar stations; oil terminals in occupied Feodosia; oil tanks at the Kamysh-Burun Combined Heating and Power Plan in occupied Kerch; substations and the Tavriisk Thermal Power Plant in occupied Sevastopol; the Hlibiv underground gas storage facility in occupied Tarkhankhut; the Simferopol gas distribution station; transport and bridge infrastructure, particularly along the A-291 Kerch – Simferopol – Sevastopol – Tavrida and M-14 Rostov-Crimea highways; the Crimean Titan plant in occupied Armyansk; and Russian naval targets.[vii] Advisor to the Crimean occupation head Oleg Kryuchkov stated on July 7 that Ukrainian strikes caused power outages in 18 raions in northern, central, western, and eastern occupied Crimea.[viii] Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo stated on July 6 that the entirety of occupied Kherson Oblast is suffering from partial or complete power outages and declared a state of emergency on July 7.[ix] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky similarly stated on July 6 that Ukrainian strikes caused some power outages in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[x] Crimea-based Russian telecommunications operators introduced emergency roaming in occupied Crimea as of July 7 so subscribers can connect to other operators' networks in the event of a complete power outage.[xi] Ukrainian forces have been recently intensifying their intermediate-range strike campaign against energy infrastructure, Russian military assets, and logistics in and to occupied Crimea in recent weeks, causing Russian officials to suspend railway service and limit road traffic. These strikes are degrading Russia's air defense umbrella, impeding its ability to defend against strikes that are increasingly interdicting logistics, depriving Russia of the ability to transport fuel to occupied Crimea, exacerbating fuel shortages, and making it difficult to live and operate in the peninsula.[xii]

Ukraine's successful intermediate- and long-range strike campaigns have forced a reckoning within the Russian ultranationalist information space, causing commentators to blame the Russian federal government for failing to create a cohesive air defense system that can adequately protect private businesses and critical infrastructure from Ukrainian long-range strikes. A prominent Russian milblogger and propagandist published a long appeal to Telegram on July 7 calling for the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to create a unified operational headquarters for civil drone defense to prevent Ukrainian forces from identifying and striking weak points in the Russian rear.[xiii] The milblogger claimed that Russian air defenses are in disarray as the Russian military and Rosgvardia (Russia's heavily militarized internal security force) are operating air defenses in different federal subjects (regions) while private businesses are also investing in counter-drone systems, but there is no unified actor monitoring drones mid-air or establishing a multi-echeloned air defense across Russia. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger criticized the Russian government on July 7 for pushing air defense responsibilities on Russian businesses and civilian structures, even though private entities lack the capacity and manpower to effectively defend against Ukrainian strikes.[xiv] The milblogger called for Russia to strengthen federal interagency coordination and create systems that can pool and properly distribute air defense resources. Another prominent Russian political commentator also called on July 6 for the Russian government to create a unified air defense structure, claiming that regional authorities lack the manpower, authority, and competence to organize region-specific air defenses, that the Russian military does not have the manpower to organize zone-based defenses, and that the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) is a "fifth wheel" in air defense operations.[xv] A Russian milblogger who has long criticized Russia's failure to guard against Ukraine's exploitations of Russian weaknesses noted on July 6 that Russia’s geographical size is increasingly becoming its weakness as it is extremely difficult for Russian air defenses to defend its vast territory against Ukrainian strikes, noting that the increasing range of Ukrainian strikes means that "there is no rear [in Russia] now.”[xvi] Russian milbloggers have complained for weeks that federal and regional administrative inconsistencies and a lack of structure have facilitated the success of Ukrainian strikes against critical Russian infrastructure as Ukraine has continued to escalate its strike campaign since March 2026.[xvii] Russia lacks the required conventional air defense systems to protect all of its critical facilities and private enterprises within western Russia and is struggling to defend important targets in reportedly well-defended areas deeper in the Russian rear.[xviii]

ISW continues to assess that Russia's refusal or inability to address the gaps in its rear air defense umbrella has led to the current issues Russia is facing, such as repeated Ukrainian strikes on major cities and the wide-scale gasoline shortages in Russia and occupied Ukraine.[xix] Russia will likely struggle to rapidly strengthen its air defense umbrella in the rear while maintaining sufficient protection in frontline areas, and Ukrainian forces will likely be able to continue — if not escalate — their long-range strike campaign until Russia is able to find a solution to these insufficiencies.[xx] Russia's efforts to recruit mobile fire teams and other air defenders for the rear will also face constraints, as these recruitment efforts are in competition with Rusia's need for manpower on the front, particularly as Russia's recruitment rates have been falling in recent months.[xxi]

The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) reportedly arrested the commander of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) on corruption charges. A Russian insider source claimed that the FSB arrested 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade Commander Major General Yuri Zazykin in the Ukrainian theater of operations on July 4 and are holding Zazykin in a pre-trial center in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[xxii] The insider source claimed that Zazykin was about to receive an appointment to the position of deputy commander of the Russian 14th AC (Leningrad Military District [LMD]) prior to his arrest. Elements of the 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade participated in the campaign for Avdiivka, which Russian forces seized in February 2024.[xxiii] Russian state media has previously heralded Zazykin for leading Russian advances in Ukraine, and Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov awarded Zazykin with the Hero of the Russia honorific in February 2025.[xxiv] ISW most recently observed elements of the 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade operating east of Dobropillya as of March 2026.[xxv] The Kremlin frequently uses corruption charges as a tool to mask the real reasons for ousting Russian military officials who have fallen from favor.[xxvi]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine’s intermediate-range strike campaign against a multitude of diverse targets, including Russian air defenses, petroleum product transport, other logistics, and electrical substations, is collapsing logistics in occupied Crimea.
• Ukraine's successful intermediate- and long-range strike campaigns have forced a reckoning within the Russian ultranationalist information space, causing commentators to blame the Russian federal government for failing to create a cohesive air defense system that can adequately protect private businesses and critical infrastructure from Ukrainian long-range strikes.
• The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) reportedly arrested the commander of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) on corruption charges.
• Ukrainian forces conducted long-range strikes against Russian military assets and energy infrastructure in Russia.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions in Kostyantynivka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 6, 2026

Russian forces launched their fourth large-scale missile and drone strike against Ukraine since June 1 on the night of July 5 to 6. This latest strike series again heavily targeted Kyiv City and caused dozens of civilian casualties. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched a total of 419 missiles and drones overnight on July 5 to 6, including six Zirkon/Onyx anti-ship missiles from Kursk Oblast; 23 Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles from Bryansk, Oryol, and Kursk oblasts; 33 Kh-101 cruise missiles from Vologda Oblast; and six Kalibr cruise missiles from Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 351 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and Italmas-type strike drones and Parodiya decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Donetsk City. Ukrainian forces downed 326 drones and 37 total missiles, including 31 Kh-101 missiles and all six Kalibr missiles. Twenty-nine ballistic missiles, including anti-ship missiles, and 18 strike drones hit 34 locations, and drone debris fell at 16 locations. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky previously warned on July 5 that Russia was preparing another massive strike against Ukraine before the July 7 to 8 NATO summit in Turkey.[2]

Zelensky and other Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged over 10 locations in Kyiv City, including residential buildings.[3] Ukraine's State Emergency Services and Ministry of Internal Affairs reported that the strike killed at least 16 people and injured 58 in Kyiv City.[4] Russian forces also struck residential infrastructure in Odesa Oblast.[5] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces struck a variety of Ukrainian defense industrial and energy infrastructure facilities, particularly in Kyiv City and Oblast.[6]

Russian forces are taking advantage of Ukraine's depleted stocks of anti-ballistic missile interceptors to maximize the destructive potential of their strike packages. Ukrainian forces successfully intercepted nearly all of the Russian cruise missiles but none of the ballistic missiles overnight. Zelensky acknowledged that Ukraine was unable to intercept Russia's ballistic missiles due to Ukraine's insufficient supply of interceptor missiles.[7] Zelensky called on Europe and the United States to use the upcoming NATO summit to support Ukraine's air defense capabilities. Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov reported that Ukraine has already contracted Patriot missile deliveries with its partners but that deliveries will not start until 2027.[8] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that Russia's Iskander-M, S-400, Zirkon, and Onyx missiles are either ballistic missiles or follow ballistic trajectories and that only US-produced Patriot systems and their analogues can intercept these missiles.[9] Ihnat reported that ballistic missiles caused most of the large-scale destruction in Kyiv City during the July 5 to 6 strikes. Ihnat assessed that Russia is increasingly using ballistic missiles to take advantage of the Patriot interceptor missile shortages both in Ukraine and globally. Ihnat assessed that Russia may increase its production of ballistic missiles over cruise missiles to take advantage of interceptor shortages in the long-term but noted that the production process is slow and costly. Ihnat stated that Russia could stockpile missiles by adjusting the frequency of its massive strike packages.

Russian forces have been decreasing the number of ballistic missiles in each strike package in recent weeks as Ukraine's interception rate has declined. Russian forces launched 29 total ballistic missiles/missiles with ballistic trajectories on the night of July 5 to 6 and have been decreasing the number of ballistic missiles launched in their large-scale strike packages throughout June and the start of July. Russian forces launched 41 ballistic missiles on the night of June 1-2, 40 on the night of June 14-15, and 28 on the night of July 1-2.[10] Russian forces have likely been decreasing their use of ballistic missiles in recent weeks, suggesting that the military command has calculated that previous strikes already heavily depleted Ukraine's interceptor stocks, such that Ukraine would be unable to repel most if not all of the ballistic missiles in later packages. The Russian military command may be confident that they no longer must launch strike packages with a large number of ballistic missiles to ensure at least some missiles result in hits even in the event of interceptions.

Russian forces likely purposely timed this latest large-scale strike package to generate informational effects ahead of the July 7 to 8 NATO summit in Turkey. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated in a post about Ukraine's overnight strikes targeting Russia that Russia will not ignore Western supplies of drones, missiles, and ammunition to Ukraine and will increase the number and intensity of Russia's strikes against Ukraine in response.[11] Russia has frequently launched large strikes against Ukraine in the lead-up to major international events, such as the August 2025 US-Russia Alaska summit and multiple bilateral US-Ukrainian, US-Russian, and European-Ukrainian talks in 2025 and 2026.[12] The Kremlin likely aims to deter Ukraine's Western partners from agreeing to continue or increase their support for Ukraine at the NATO summit out of fear of Russia escalating its strike campaign against Ukraine.

Ukrainian forces conducted their deepest drone strike against Russia thus far in the war, striking the largest oil refinery in Russia over 2,500 kilometers from the Ukrainian border. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Omsk Oil Refinery in Omsk City overnight for the first time, causing a fire at the refinery.[13] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the Omsk Oil Refinery is over 2,500 kilometers from Ukraine and is Russia's largest refinery, with a refining capacity of over 21 million tons per year. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that preliminary information indicates that Ukrainian drones struck the ELOU-AVT-11 primary oil refining unit. Geolocated footage published on July 6 shows smoke rising from the refinery.[14] Omsk Oblast Governor Vitaliy Khotsenko acknowledged that several Ukrainian drones struck the Omsk Oil Refinery.[15]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Slavneft-Yanos Oil Refinery in Yaroslavl City overnight, causing explosions and smoke.[16] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the refinery is one of Russia's largest and has a refining capacity of 15 million tons of oil per year.[17] Footage published on July 6 shows smoke rising from the refinery.[18] Yaroslavl Oblast Governor Mikhail Evraev claimed that Russian air defense downed over 70 Ukrainian drones approaching Yaroslavl City and that drone debris injured two people in an unspecified area.[19] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Novatek Ust-Luga Oil Refinery in Slobodka, Leningrad Oblast, and the base of the Russian 26th Missile Brigade (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) near Luga, Leningrad Oblast.[20] Geolocated footage published on July 6 shows a Ukrainian drone striking the 26th Missile Brigade's base in Luga.[21] Leningrad Oblast Governor Alexander Drozdenko acknowledged that Ukrainian drones damaged infrastructure at the Luga training ground and near the Ust-Luga and Vysotsk ports.[22] Three sources in pro-government media told Russian opposition source Verstka on July 6 that the Kremlin demanded that major government-controlled media outlets refrain from publishing information about the aftermath of Ukrainian strikes on Russia and instead "strongly advised" these outlets to publish details of Russian strikes on Ukraine — indicating that the Kremlin is continuing an effort to manage and censor the information space discussion of Ukrainian long-range strikes.[23] Russia has been largely unable to defend against and adapt to Ukrainian long-range strikes in recent weeks and months, despite undertaking some limited mitigation efforts, including re-allocating air defenses and creating mobile fire groups.[24] Ukrainian forces have significantly increased the frequency, range, and intensity of strikes against Russian oil infrastructure deep in the Russian rear since March 2026, taking advantage of overstretched Russian air defenses, reducing Russia's refining capacity, and causing gasoline shortages across Russia and occupied Ukraine.[25]

Russian officials are trying to present Russia as a willing negotiator and Ukraine as the obstacle to peace ahead of US President Donald Trump's meetings with Ukraine and Europe at the July 7 to 8 NATO summit. Trump stated on July 6 that he will meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on the sidelines of the NATO summit.[26] A senior US official told Reuters that Trump will speak with Zelensky about how to end the war and will likely then follow up with Russian President Vladimir Putin.[27] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov claimed that Russia will continue contacts with the United States about a peace settlement even if the United States were to change its position on the war.[28] Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa claimed that Ukraine must be willing to negotiate in order for talks to resume — falsely framing Ukraine as the reason talks have stalled.[29] Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee Chairperson Leonid Slutsky claimed that Putin's July 4 phone conversation with Trump was a blow to European leaders who are trying to change Trump's mind about the war, particularly after recent remarks from US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and the G7.[30] Rubio stated on June 25 that there was only a “proposal” at the Alaska summit in August 2025 but that parties did not come to an agreement, and the G7 issued a joint statement reaffirming its unified support for Ukraine on June 17.[31] The Trump administration is increasingly speaking publicly about Ukrainian successes on the battlefield, including about Ukraine’s intermediate- and long-range strike campaigns against Russian military assets and energy infrastructure and tactical Ukrainian advances in several frontline sectors in Winter and Spring 2026.[32] The Kremlin is likely trying to shape the Trump administration's views of the state of the war ahead of possible renewed US and European interest in resuming negotiations and efforts to bring Putin to the negotiating table.

Russia is engaging in increasingly risky kinetic behaviors against NATO member states as part of its "Phase Zero" condition-setting campaign. Politico reported on July 6 that a Russian “Bear-F” patrol aircraft dropped over 10 sonobuoys – small submarine detection and tracking systems – near the British HMS Prince of Wales aircraft carrier in the Norwegian Sea on July 2 after repeatedly approaching the carrier in an “unsafe and unprofessional” manner.[33] Politico reported that British aircraft intercepted and escorted the Russian aircraft away from the carrier following the incident. The Russian military is increasingly approaching or operating near NATO assets at sea in a reckless manner in order to intimidate NATO and test its resolve.[34] A Russian frigate fired warning shots as a British civilian vessel in the English Channel in mid-June 2026.[35] ISW continues to assess that such Russian actions are part of Russia's intensifying “Phase Zero” campaign to set the political, informational, and psychological conditions for a potential future Russian war against NATO.[36]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces launched their fourth large-scale missile and drone strike against Ukraine since June 1 on the night of July 5 to 6. This latest strike series again heavily targeted Kyiv City and caused dozens of civilian casualties.
• Russian forces are taking advantage of Ukraine's depleted stocks of anti-ballistic missile interceptors to maximize the destructive potential of their strike packages.
• Russian forces have been decreasing the number of ballistic missiles in each strike package in recent weeks as Ukraine's interception rate has declined.
• Russian forces likely purposely timed this latest large-scale strike package to generate informational effects ahead of the July 7 to 8 NATO summit in Turkey.
• Ukrainian forces conducted their deepest drone strike against Russia thus far in the war, striking the largest oil refinery in Russia over 2,500 kilometers from the Ukrainian border.
• Russian officials are trying to present Russia as a willing negotiator and Ukraine as the obstacle to peace ahead of US President Donald Trump's meetings with Ukraine and Europe at the July 7 to 8 NATO summit.
• Russia is engaging in increasingly risky kinetic behaviors against NATO member states as part of its "Phase Zero" condition-setting campaign.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in the Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole directions.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 5, 2026

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 4, 2026

Russian President Vladimir Putin used a staged meeting with several Russian commanders on July 3 to make greatly exaggerated claims of Russian advances that do not match battlefield realities in order to construct a narrative of continuous Russian military successes. Putin met with the Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, Russian Northern Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Yevgeny Nikiforov, Southern Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Sergey Medvedev, and other Russian commanders on the evening of July 3.[1] Putin reiterated his consistent claims that Russian forces seized all of Luhansk Oblast and continue advancing across the entire frontline. Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces are advancing the fastest in the areas of responsibility (AoRs) of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces (Sumy Oblast and northern Kharkiv Oblast) and of the Eastern Grouping of Forces (the Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole directions) -- notably not where the primary Russian offensive is in Donetsk Oblast. Putin claimed that Russian forces seized 133 settlements and over 3,000 square kilometers since January 1, 2026, and Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces seized 29 settlements and 636 square kilometers in June 2026. Other Russian commanders made similar claims about the settlements and square kilometers of land that Russian forces allegedly seized in several sectors of the frontline in Ukraine. ISW has only observed evidence to assess that Russian forces seized or infiltrated into 64 settlements and seized or infiltrated approximately 621.7 square kilometers across the theater since the start of 2026, and that Russian forces have seized or infiltrated into 20 settlements and gained or infiltrated approximately 30.42 square kilometers in the theater in June 2026. These figures include settlements into which Russian forces have only partially infiltrated into, but even including partially infiltrated settlements does not match Putin’s fabricated reality.

Russian commanders made a series of exaggerated claims about the positions of Russian forces relative to the actual and claimed frontline in Ukraine, demonstrating the extent to which the Russian military command is disconnected from the battlefield itself. The commanders claimed that Russian forces are 10 kilometers from the northern outskirts of Sumy City, 22 kilometers past Siversk and 8 kilometers from Slovyansk, that Russian forces entered Dobropillya and Hannivka (immediately northeast of Dobropillya), and that Russian forces are nine kilometers from the southern outskirts of Zaporizhzhia City.[2] ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have infiltrated as close as about 13 kilometers and advanced as close as 17 kilometers from Sumy City; infiltrated as close as 13 kilometers and advanced as close as 19 kilometers from Slovyansk; infiltrated as close as eight kilometers and advanced as close as seven kilometers from Dobropillya; and infiltrated as close as 25 kilometers and advanced as close as 21 kilometers from Zaporizhzhia City.

Putin, Russian commanders, and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) made a series of other claims about seizures of smaller settlements in a number of frontline sectors during and after the meeting on July 3 and 4, likely in an effort to overwhelm the information space and make it more difficult to disprove them.[3] Putin made similar claims of exaggerated Russian advances to Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin in a carefully staged interview on June 28.[4] Putin’s and the Russian military command’s exaggerated claims about Russian battlefield performance are part of the ongoing Russian cognitive warfare narrative that seeks to portray a Russian victory in Ukraine as inevitable and Ukrainian frontlines as collapsing.[5] Putin and the Russian commanders also used the meeting on July 3 to falsely claim the seizure of Kostyantynivka and the beginning of the fall of the Ukrainian defenses along the Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast. ISW previously assessed that Russian forces reportedly suffered around 1,298 casualties per square kilometer they seized or infiltrated in June 2026 and, at that rate, Russian forces would lose 6,574,590 servicemembers in capturing the remaining 5,065.17 square kilometers of Donetsk Oblast.[6]

Putin and other Russian military commanders heavily aggrandized the claimed seizure of Kostyantynivka on July 3 and 4. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), military commanders, senior Kremlin officials, and several Kremlin-coopted milbloggers and information space voices broadly amplified Putin's claims of seizing Kostyantynivka on July 3 and 4.[7] Several Russian commanders, including Southern Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Sergey Medvedev and the commander of the Russian 6th Motorized Rifle Division, Colonel Alexander Kartakavin, on July 3 and Russian Chief of the General Staff’s Main Operations Directorate Colonel General Sergei Rudskoy on July 4, claimed that Russian forces have continued their offensive beyond Kostyantynivka and reached the southern and southeastern outskirts of Oleksiyevo-Druzhkivka to the northwest.[8] Putin received reports from Kartakavin and Russian 4th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade Commander Major General Anton Grunis about how Russian forces conducted operations to seize Kostyantynivka. Grunis and Kartakavin made detailed claims of assault elements of individual motorized rifle battalions seizing specific landmarks within Kostyantynivka, including factories, churches, and neighborhoods. The Russian military command dedicated a significant portion of the meeting to these sub-tactical reports, likely to portray Russian forces as able to advance under conditions of urban warfare and to bask in the informational victory of the claimed seizure of Kostyantynivka.

These Russian claims are not consistent with Russian forces' historical pattern of advance, however. ISW typically observes geolocated footage of Ukrainian strikes against Russian positions in areas where Russian forces have advanced, but ISW has not observed such footage of strikes against Russian forces in all areas of the city. Russian sources, including the MoD, published large amounts of footage of individual or small groups of Russian soldiers standing in or holding up flags in and near Kostyantynivka on July 3 and 4 and in recent weeks, particularly to correspond with the MoD's claims of advance.[9] This footage does not prove that Russian forces have advanced, as the footage is often cut short, obfuscating Russian positions or the fates of the soldiers in the footage. ISW also has not observed footage suggesting that Russian forces have operated vehicles, mortars, or tube artillery within the city, which would indicate that Russian forces exert a greater level of control in the city. Recent Ukrainian statements support the lack of observed evidence of a sustained Russian presence throughout the city. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukraine's Eastern Operational Command explicitly rejected the Russian claims of seizing Kostyantynivka on July 4.[10] Ukrainian military sources have indicated that there are around 100 and a maximum of 250 Russian troops within Kostyantynivka as of mid-June and that Ukrainian forces still outnumbered Russian troops in the city as of June 23 — statements that are consistent with the observed pattern of strikes against Russian and Ukrainian positions in the city and inconsistent with Russian claims of seizure.[11] Putin's senior military commanders, battlefield commanders, and Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Ukrainian forces still held positions within Kostyantynivka as of July 3 and 4, further undermining the Russian claim.[12]

Putin and other Russian officials are using the alleged seizure of Kostyantynivka to claim that the Fortress Belt and the remainder of Donetsk Oblast will fall imminently.[13] Putin particularly expounded on the importance of Kostyantynivka in precipitating the seizure of the remainder of Donetsk Oblast and its industrial capacity.[14] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed that the seizure of Kostyantynivka is an important achievement to complete Russia's war objectives.[15] Russian forces are increasingly infiltrating within Kostyantynivka and may yet seize it, but these infiltrations will not enable Russian forces to achieve a rapid operational breakthrough against the remainder of the Fortress Belt or all of Donetsk Oblast.[16] The Russian Spring-Summer 2026 offensive has thus far failed to yield operationally-significant results, and the Russian offensive against Kostyantynivka will likely culminate if and when Russian forces manage to seize the city.[17] Russian forces will likely continue to suffer significant casualties for minimal gains in their efforts against Kostyantynivka, Lyman, and elsewhere in Donetsk Oblast.

The Russian MoD and other Russian sources are publishing large quantities of footage that may be AI-altered to falsely confirm Russian exaggerated claims and complicate individual footage verification. The Russian MoD published at least 10 different pieces of footage on July 3 showing Russian servicemembers holding flags purportedly in various areas of Kostyantynivka.[18] The Russian MoD also made a series of other individual settlement claims corresponding with Putin’s meeting on July 4 and published footage of Russian forces allegedly operating in all of these settlements.[19] Other Russian sources reportedly affiliated with Russian military units published additional footage of Russian soldiers holding flags in various areas of the frontline.[20] ISW is unable to determine at this time whether much of the July 3 and 4 footage is dispositively unaltered by AI. The Russian MoD and other sources are simultaneously publishing footage from a number of frontline sectors likely to make it more challenging to detect AI-altered footage and assess from the footage whether Russian forces have advanced, infiltrated, or are just claiming to have seized an area. The Russian MoD, along with other sources propagating possible AI-altered footage, continues engaging in a sophisticated cognitive warfare effort that uses AI-altered or generated footage of flag raisings to fabricate claims of Russian tactical successes in areas where Russian forces do not maintain enduring (or, in some cases, any) positions.[21] These videos are part of the Kremlin’s systematic cognitive warfare effort to aggrandize Russian advances using exaggerated claims of gains and infiltration missions to falsely portray the frontline as collapsing, contrary to all available evidence.[22]

Putin used the July 3 meeting with Russian commanders to signal his commitment to continuing the war in Ukraine as he has been. Nikiforov claimed that Russian forces are creating a "buffer zone" in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts to ensure the security of Russian border areas but acknowledged that Russian forces are struggling to defend against Ukrainian strikes deep into Russia.[23] Putin responded to Nikiforov and claimed that Russian forces will need to advance further into northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts the more Ukrainian forces continue striking Russia. Dmitry Medvedev similarly claimed on July 4 that the "buffer zone" will run through Sumy, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kharkiv oblasts — where Russian forces have only marginally advanced.[24] Putin’s claims falsely relate Ukraine's strike campaigns with Russian advances; Ukrainian forces are using drones and missiles with ranges that a so-called "buffer zone" in Ukraine would not actually protect against. Putin claimed immediately after these statements that the areas of Ukraine where he wants to establish a "buffer zone" are "historically Russian, Russian soil," undermining the idea that continuing his war effort in the same manner he has waged it for over four years is only about protecting Russian border areas.[25] ISW has previously assessed that the so-called "buffer zone" is a vague and unattainable goal for the Russian forces, whose rate of advance has been declining, as long as there is an independent Ukraine with the ability to fight.[26] Putin’s statements on July 3 confirm again Putin’s intent to seize large parts of Ukrainian territories beyond Donetsk and Luhansk. Putin is using Ukraine’s long-range strikes in Russia as a justification for continuing Russia’s frontline offensive operations in Ukraine and the increasing costs of the war to the Russian public. Putin also criticized Europe's support of Ukraine's strike campaigns, likely to deter Ukraine’s Western partners from sponsoring Ukraine’s drone and missile innovations and force Ukraine to capitulate — the only scenario that would make Putin’s fantasies a reality.[27]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin used a staged meeting with several Russian commanders on July 3 to make greatly exaggerated claims of Russian advances that do not match battlefield realities in order to construct a narrative of continuous Russian military successes.
• Putin and other Russian military commanders heavily aggrandized the claimed seizure of Kostyantynivka on July 3 and 4.
• The Russian MoD and other Russian sources are publishing large quantities of footage that may be AI-altered to falsely confirm Russian exaggerated claims and complicate individual footage verification.
• Putin used the July 3 meeting with Russian commanders to signal his commitment to continuing the war in Ukraine as he has been.
• Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces advanced on July 4.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil and energy infrastructure and military assets in Russia on July 4. Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile, one Kh-59 guided missile, and 86 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 3, 2026

Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed late on July 3 that Russian forces seized Kostyantynivka, contrary to all available evidence of the true extent of Russian advances in the city. Putin met with Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov and several other senior Russian commanders and claimed that Russian forces seized Kostyantynivka alongside other aggrandizing claims of purported Russian advances across the entire theater, including in areas where Russian forces are actively losing ground, such as western Zaporizhia Oblast.[1] Russian forces have achieved tactical gains within Kostyantynivka in recent weeks, but the bulk of the Russian presence in the city is comprised of small groups of infiltrators interspersed with Ukrainian positions. Ukrainian military sources have indicated that about 100 to 250 Russian soldiers were in Kostyantynivka as of mid-June and that there were more Ukrainian soldiers in Kostyantynivka than Russian soldiers as of June 23.[2] Putin, Gerasimov, and other senior Russian commanders have aggrandized Russian claims of advance across the frontline in highly publicized briefings at least once a month since January 2026 as part of a cognitive warfare effort aimed at convincing the West of the falsehood that Russian forces are able to rapidly advance across the entire frontline.[3] Russian advances in June 2026 are just a fraction of those achieved in June 2025, and the Russian Spring-Summer 2026 offensive has failed to achieve operationally significant advances.[4]

 Putin likely staged the meeting with his commanders late on July 3 at least in part to influence Western media coverage of the war into the weekend, particularly the July 4 holiday in the United States. Putin and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) are already trying to capitalize on the informational victory of the claimed seizure of Kostyantynivka and will likely continue to do so in the coming days and weeks.[5] ISW will cover the July 3 statements of Putin, Gerasimov, and other Russian commanders in-depth in the July 4 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The United States reportedly warned Poland that Russia is considering kinetic provocations against Poland and other NATO states. Polish outlet Onet reported on June 30, citing five sources in the Polish special services, the Polish Ministry of Defense (MoD), connected to Polish President Karol Nawrocki, and an ambassador to Poland from an unspecified NATO state, that US officials have been warning Polish officials that Russia could conduct a limited military provocation against NATO's eastern flank that could include Poland.[6] The Polish sources told Onet that Russia would not launch a conventional full-scale invasion of Poland and offered several possible scenarios that Russia could choose to undertake, including drone strikes against critical infrastructure, "simulated airstrikes," or a provocation that could involve Russian or Belarusian soldiers crossing the international border, after which the soldiers would only withdraw after negotiations. The sources stated that Russia wants to avoid a war with NATO and wants to deter NATO military support for Ukraine. A security services source from an unspecified Baltic state told the Telegraph on July 2 that Moscow is discussing plans for a possible provocation against the Baltic states and/or Poland and that Russia may claim after-the-fact that Ukraine conducted the provocation.[7] European security sources told the Telegraph that Russia prefers a provocation against Poland over a provocation against the Baltic states.

These reported US and European warnings are consistent with ISW's long-term assessment that Russian operations such as drone and other aerial incursions, sabotage, electronic warfare (EW) interference, and overflights are part of Russia's Phase Zero campaign.[8] These Phase Zero operations aim to set informational and psychological conditions for potential future provocations against NATO.[9] Though Polish sources offered possible scenarios to Onet, the nature, timing, and other details of a potential Russian operation against NATO's eastern flank are unclear at this time.

 Russian President Vladimir Putin’s approval rating sharply fell in late June 2026 after weeks of steady decline. The Russian state-owned All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM) published on July 3 the results of a poll indicating that Putin’s approval rating fell by 3.5 percent to 66.9 percent and that trust in Putin fell by 3.4 percent to 73.3 percent between June 22 and 28.[10] Independent media outlet Agenstvo noted that this is the steepest decline in Putin’s trust rating since at least February 2022 and that the previous fastest decline was in early April 2026 when Putin’s trust rating fell by 1.8 percent within a week.[11] Independent Russian polling organization Levada Center published polling data for the month of June 2026, which demonstrated that Putin’s approval rating dropped from 79 to 74 percent, that the share of Russians who disapprove of Putin’s activities increased from 15 to 21 percent, and that the share of those who believe that Russia is moving on the right course fell from 61 to 52 percent.[12] Kremlin-linked Public Opinion Forum (FOM) published statistics on July 3 also showing drops in Putin's approval and trust levels and that 55 percent of Russians noticed anxiety in those around them.[13] Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported that this is the highest level of anxiety since the September 2022 involuntary reserve callup (during which public anxiety levels were recorded at 70 percent) and that anxiety levels only dropped to about 50 percent by the end of 2022.[14] These Russian polling centers have been tracking steady reductions in Putin’s approval rating since mid-March 2026, and it remains notable that Russian state-owned and Kremlin-linked polling centers believe it necessary to acknowledge growing societal discontent.[15] Russia's slow and costly progress on the battlefield in Ukraine, struggling domestic economy, and censorship efforts have all generated discontent in recent weeks, and the domestic fuel shortages from Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign are likely further exacerbating this discontent.[16]  Putin’s ability to demand more sacrifices from ordinary Russians for the war effort in Ukraine appears to be under significant strain.[17] Putin may look for alternative pathways to escalate the conflict and try to convince Russians to accept the ever-increasing costs associated with its war.[18]

The Russian government continues efforts to increase domestic fuel supplies amid intensifying gasoline shortages across Russia. Reuters reported on July 3, citing three sources briefed on the matter, that Russia will begin importing jet fuel from Japan through several intermediary sources in the first half of July 2026.[19] Two unspecified sources told Reuters that intermediaries will load at least 200,000 barrels of jet fuel in Chiba, Japan in July, ship them to Yeosu, South Korea, load them onto another tanker, and pass them through a network of other traders before shipping the fuel to Russia. Reuters stated that the final destination for these jet fuel barrels is unclear. Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed decrees on July 2 allowing the Russian government to temporarily reduce the sale requirement for Class 5 gasoline (Russia's domestic standard for gasoline) on the exchange from 15 percent to 10 percent of production volume from July 1 to September 30 and allowing oil refineries to produce gasoline at the Euro-3 standard (below Russia's usual standard).[20] These decrees together aim to increase the domestic availability of gasoline by loosening standards.

The Russian government’s attempts to increase the domestic flow of gasoline supplies thus far have failed to curb the increasing gasoline shortages across Russia, however. Local Telegram channels published footage on July 2 and 3 that shows long lines outside a Rosneft gas station near Chita, Zabaykalsky Krai.[21] Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai authorities briefly suspended the sale of gasoline at all gas stations in the city on July 3. Krasnodar Krai authorities acknowledged that eight gas stations were selling diesel, but none were able to sell gasoline.[22] Both Transbaikal and Krasnodar Krai have experienced gasoline shortages in the past few weeks, and these events underscore the severity of the fuel crisis in many areas of Russia.[23]  ISW has observed reports suggesting that fuel shortages are affecting all areas of occupied Ukraine and all Russian federal subjects except Ingushetia, Chechnya, Kalmykia, Chukotka, and the Nenets Autonomous Okrug as of June 25.[24] Russian State Duma Deputy Vyacheslav Markhaev harshly complained on July 3 about the intensifying gasoline shortages in Russian federal subjects and occupied Crimea, blaming Russian authorities for failing to manage and prevent intensifying shortages.[25] Ukraine’s successful long-range strike campaign against Russian fuel infrastructure since March 2026 has decreased Russia's ability to produce and refine oil, leading to intensifying gasoline and diesel shortages that the Russian government is struggling to mitigate.[26]

 Unknown actors reportedly detonated an explosive against a car carrying members of the Rylsk Raion, Kursk Oblast administration on July 3. Kursk Oblast Governor Alexander Khinshtein claimed that unspecified actors remotely detonated the explosive, injuring Rylsk Raion Head Vladimir Kovalchuk and three other members of the administration.[27]

 Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed late on July 3 that Russian forces seized Kostyantynivka, contrary to all available evidence of the true extent of Russian advances in the city.
• Putin likely staged the meeting with his commanders late on July 3 at least in part to influence Western media coverage of the war into the weekend, particularly the July 4 holiday in the United States.
• The United States reportedly warned Poland that Russia is considering kinetic provocations against Poland and other NATO states.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin’s approval rating sharply fell in late June 2026 after weeks of steady decline.
• The Russian government continues efforts to increase domestic fuel supplies amid intensifying gasoline shortages across Russia.
• Unknown actors reportedly detonated an explosive against a car carrying members of the Rylsk Raion, Kursk Oblast administration on July 3.
• Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces advanced on July 3.
• Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a long-range strike against Russian energy infrastructure in Belgorod Oblast. Russian forces launched two Kh-59/69 guided aircraft missiles and 105 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 2, 2026

Russian forces conducted a large drone and missile strike series against Ukraine on the night of July 1 to 2, primarily targeting Kyiv City and killing at least 27 and injuring at least 91.[i] The Ukrainian Air Force reported on July 2 that Russian forces launched 570 drones and missiles, including 496 Shahed-, Gerbera-, and Italmas-type strike drones, Banderol loitering munitions, and Parodiya-type decoy drones; four Zirkon anti-ship missiles; 24 Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles; 34 Kh-101 cruise missiles; eight Kalibr cruise missiles; and four Kh-59/69 cruise missiles overnight.[ii] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 476 drones, four Iskander-M/S-400s, 32 Kh-101s, all eight Kalibrs, and all four Kh-59/69s. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that 25 ballistic missiles and 12 drones struck 33 locations and that debris fell on 18 locations. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Kyiv Oblast officials reported that Russian forces struck over 20 locations in Kyiv City with ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones, primarily hitting residential buildings, an ambulance station, a scientific institute, a hotel, and an enterprise, and killed at least 27 and injured at least 90 in the city.^[iii] Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko reported that Russian forces struck at least 20 buildings directly, and damaged nearly 100 buildings in total in Kyiv City, and that additional civilians likely remain trapped under rubble.[iv] Donetsk Oblast Military Administration Head Vadym Filashkin reported that the strikes also damaged the Donetsk Oblast Intensive Care Hospital in Kyiv City (Ukraine reestablished the hospital in Kyiv City after Russian forces occupied the original in Mariupol).[v] The Ukrainian branch of the Red Cross reported that Russian strikes destroyed a large humanitarian warehouse in Kyiv City, destroying over 79 million hryvnia (about $1.76 million) worth of humanitarian assistance and critical equipment, including generators, heat pumps, medical equipment, and supplies for first responders.[vi]

Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes also damaged warehouses in Odesa Oblast, killing at least two and injuring at least 13; a shopping center, an enterprise, and a logistics terminal in Zaporizhzhia City; transport, agricultural, and fuel infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; a farm in Kharkiv Oblast; and agricultural infrastructure and a locomotive in Kirovohrad Oblast.^[vii] Zelensky reported that Russian strikes killed at least five additional civilians in Kharkiv Oblast.[viii] Ukrainian state energy operator Ukrenergo reported that Russian strikes caused power outages in Sumy, Kyiv, Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[ix]

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 1, 2026

Russia’s spring-summer 2026 offensive has failed to achieve operationally significant gains thus far, and Russian forces’ rate of advance in June 2026 is a fraction of the rate of advance that Russian forces achieved in June 2025. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces seized or infiltrated 30.42 square kilometers in June 2026 and advanced or infiltrated at an average pace of 1.01 square kilometers per day. Russian forces comparatively seized 481.25 square kilometers in June 2025, advancing at an average pace of 16.04 square kilometers per day. Russia's gains have been largely gradual and creeping for over a year, and even Russia's faster average rate of advance in 2025 was at a foot pace.[1] Russia's rate of advance has been steadily decreasing since November 2025, and Russian forces have thus far been unable to roll back the successful Ukrainian counterattacks in the Kupyansk and Oleksandrivka directions from late 2025 and spring 2026.^[2] Russian forces’ main territorial gains have been in Russia’s main effort area near Kostyantynivka in Donetsk Oblast, where Russian forces have achieved slow tactical gains at high costs in the city’s urban environs.

Comparisons of Russia’s rate of advance in June 2026 with the same period last year show that Russia’s gains have slowed significantly, even when including Russian infiltrations. Russian forces seized 2189.87 square kilometers between January and June 2025, compared to the 622.60 square kilometers into which they advanced or infiltrated in the same period in 2026. Russian forces thus seized or infiltrated only 28.43 percent as much territory in the first six months of 2026 as they advanced into in the first six months of 2025. (Russian forces did not widely use infiltration tactics in early 2025, and ISW therefore previously did not make an analytical distinction between territory that Russian forces seized versus territory that Russian forces infiltrated through but do not control.)

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 30, 2026

The Kremlin  continues to set unrealistic deadlines for the Russian military to complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast that do not align with  battlefield realities. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on June 29 that the Kremlin has issued 15 separate deadlines for Russian forces to seize the entirety of Donetsk  .[i] Zelensky stated that the Kremlin gave five separate deadlines in 2022, including March 31, May 9, June 1, September 15, and December 31. Zelensky stated that the Kremlin gave Russian forces deadlines of March 1 and December 31 in 2023; March 1 and December 31 in 2024; September 1, December 1, and December 25 in 2025; and March 31, September 1, and now a deadline of December 31 in 2026. Russian forces have repeatedly missed Putin’s demanded deadlines to seize specific territory in Ukraine, including Russian President Vladimir Putin’s early demand that Russian forces seize all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts by September  .[ii] The Kremlin’s deadlines for its military objectives continue to be divorced from the reality of Russian forces‘ battlefield performance. Russian forced advanced on average 3.79 square kilometers per day i n June 2026 - a rate far below Russian forces’ previous rate of advance in August 2025, when Russian forces advanced at a rate of 16.65  square kilometers per day.  Russian forces still need to seize about 5,305 square kilometers to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast and are highly unlikely to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast by the newly set deadline of December 31, 2026. Russian forces have shown no ability to rapidly advance or restore operational maneuver  in Donetsk Oblast .[iv] These unrealistic deadlines for advance are contributing to Russian forces on the ground submitting “beautiful reports” up the chain of command, flag raising tactics, and Russian forces' increasing use of (AI)-altered footage to claim advances in areas where Russian forces do not maintain positions.[v] Russian forces continue to expend significant resources and manpower to try to fulfill these unrealistic objectives.[vi] Putin has likely developed a false perception of the Russian military’s successes and capabilities given the larger pattern within the Russian military of misrepresenting the battlefield geometry and providing inaccurate assessments.[vii] Zelensky’s comments on failed deadlines were likely in response to Putin’s June 28 claims that Russian forces are rapidly advancing across the theater and attempts to portray Russian victory in Ukraine as inevitable.[viii]  

The Russian domestic population appears to be increasingly interested in the topic of the end of Russia’s war against Ukraine. Russian opposition source Meduza reported on June 30 that Yandex’s (Russia’s main online search engine) Wordstat service shows that there were over 137,000 search requests on Yandex asking when Russia will end its war against Ukraine from June 22 to June 28 - a record high since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022.[ix] Meduza reported that Yandex recorded a significant bulk of the searches in Moscow Oblast and St. Petersburg, Leningrad Oblast – regions where the Kremlin has prioritized installing air defense systems but largely failed to defend against Ukraine’s long-range strikes.  Meduza reported that the number of searches about when Russia will end the war has been growing for the second week in a row and that the previous peak occurred in the period of June 1 through June 7 when Ukrainian forces struck St. Petersburg, Leningrad Oblast, during the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF).[xi] Polling from the Kremlin-linked Public Opinion Forum (FOM) from June 19 to 21 found that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s approval rating fell by five percentage points from 74 percent to 69 percent betwe , shortly after Ukraine’s largest strike on Moscow Oblas t.[xii] Weekly FOM polling shows Putin's trust rating consistently falling since February 2026 .[xiii]   Putin has worked hard to shield major cities like Moscow and St. Petersburg from the effects of his war in Ukraine, but recent statisti cs suggest that the Russian public appears to grow weary of Russia’s war effort, likely as the Kremlin largely failed to isolate its constituents from the effects of Russia’s war.

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin continues to set unrealistic deadlines for the Russian military to complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast that do not align with battlefield realities.
• The Russian domestic population appears to be increasingly interested in the topic of the end of Russia’s war against Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in Russia on the night of June 29 to 30. Russian forces launched 154 drones against Ukraine overnight.
• Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances on June 30.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 29, 2026

Russian President Vladimir Putin is carefully constructing a reality that seeks to portray a Russian victory in Ukraine as inevitable while downplaying the growing domestic economic costs of the war. This constructed reality is premised on a rejection of the tactical and operational developments that have characterized 2026 thus far and a continued Russian commitment to its untenable maximalist battlefield objectives. Putin's control over the information space and his ability to shape and propagate narratives of Russian military success are critical to maintaining this false reality.

Putin appears to have accepted the reality that the August 2025 US-Russian Alaska Summit did not result in tangible or actionable diplomatic agreements. Putin stated to Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin in a likely carefully staged interview on June 28 that Russia and the United States did not reach any agreements at the Alaska Summit.[1] Putin acknowledged that there were no signed documents outlining the "spirit of Anchorage" but claimed that Russia agreed during the summit to US proposals about ending the war in Ukraine. Putin stated that Russia is ready to continue negotiations with the United States based on the Alaska Summit. The Kremlin readout of Putin's interview omitted his statements about the Alaska Summit, but Zarubin posted a video of the full interview that retained those details.[2] Putin's June 28 statement follows a similar remark from US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on June 25 that there was only a "proposal" at the summit but no official or signed written agreement.[3] Putin is likely acknowledging lack of agreements in order to avoid directly confronting the Trump administration about what happened in Anchorage, given Rubio's statements confirming the absence of a written agreement. Putin's stated readiness to return to the Alaska Summit proposals, however, aims to push the United States to resume negotiations as if the battlefield situation has not changed since August 2025. Ukraine has since liberated territory on the frontline and significantly slowed Russian advances, while engaging in successful intermediate- and long-range strike campaigns against Russia — forcing Russia into a much more defensive mode of operation than it was in as of August 2025.

Putin implicitly rejected two recent Ukrainian ceasefire proposals that aim to bring about an end to the war, continuing to highlight his own intransigence to enter good-faith negotiations. Putin claimed that Ukraine proposed to Russia a mutual ceasefire on long-range strikes.[4] Putin also claimed that Ukraine proposed a ceasefire of hostilities in areas outside of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts – essentially stopping fighting in Mykolaiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, and Sumy oblasts. This is the first public mention of these reported Ukrainian ceasefire proposals. Putin implicitly rejected these two ceasefires, however, stating that Russia is not interested in granting Ukraine such "salvation." Putin claimed that Ukraine initiated these proposals because Russian long-range strikes are more powerful and destructive for Ukraine than Ukraine's long-range strikes are for Russia and because Ukrainian forces want to make up for their manpower shortages by withdrawing from some areas of the frontline and redeploying those forces to Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts. Putin’s rejection of two new ceasefire proposals is yet another instance of Ukraine initiating – and Russia rejecting – measures to end the war.[5]

Putin and other Russian officials continue to publicly show their commitment to Russia’s original war goals. Putin stated that Russia’s main objective is “the final seizure of Donbas and Novorossiya” and that Russian forces will do “everything” to achieve all of his war goals.[6] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov similarly stated on June 29 that Putin clearly outlined Russia’s position on Ukraine in his speech at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in June 2024, in which Putin demanded that Ukrainian forces withdraw from Ukrainian-controlled territory in Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and that Ukraine abandon its goal of joining NATO prior to entering negotiations – demands that virtually amount to Ukraine’s complete capitulation.[7] Russian State Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chairperson Alexei Zhuravlyov similarly stated on June 26 that Russia can only ensure its security when Ukraine “ceases to exist.”[8]

Putin continues to make greatly exaggerated claims of Russian advances that do not match battlefield realities in order to construct a narrative of pervasive Russian military success. Putin claimed to Zarubin that Russian forces are rapidly advancing in virtually all sectors of the frontline and that Ukrainian strikes are "absolutely" not affecting Russian frontline operations.[9] Putin focused his claims about battlefield successes on the Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast, including Lyman, Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, Kostyantynivka, and Dobropillya. Putin claimed that elements of the Russian forces have cleared a majority of Lyman; advanced into Mykolaivka (east of Slovyansk); are about eight to nine kilometers from Slovyansk; and are four kilometers from Kramatorsk. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces maintain a presence (either through advances or infiltrations) in 4.3 percent of Lyman and that Russian forces have advanced to roughly 12 kilometers from Mykolaivka, 19 kilometers from Slovyansk, and 14 kilometers from Kramatorsk. 

Putin claimed that the Russian Southern Grouping of Forces has seized 96 percent of Kostyantynivka and that elements of the Russian 4th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are clearing Kostyantynivka.[10] Putin claimed that elements of the Russian 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd AC, under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) bypassed Kostyantynivka and entered Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka (between Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka). ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces maintain a presence (either through advances or infiltrations) in only 36.98 percent of Kostyantynivka and that Russian forces are roughly seven kilometers from Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka. Russian forces have infiltrated into a significant part of Kostyantynivka but have not secured control over or established enduring positions in these areas as Putin claimed.

Putin claimed that the Russian Central Grouping of Forces advanced into Hannivka (just northeast of Dobropillya) and to Dobropillya itself.[11] Putin noted that Dobropillya is only 35 kilometers from the Donetsk Oblast border (likely referring to the border north - not west - of Dobropillya), implying that it will be easy for Russian forces to quickly outflank the Fortress Belt from the west and to advance to the Donetsk Oblast administrative boundary after seizing Dobropillya. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have advanced to roughly seven kilometers from Hannivka and Dobropillya.

Putin also claimed that the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces continues to expand the "buffer zone" in northern Sumy Oblast and claimed that Ukraine will need to suffer territorial losses in the area in order to "pay for its crimes" in Kursk Oblast - referring to Ukraine's August 2024 Kursk incursion.[12] Putin claimed that Russian forces are 10.5 kilometers from Sumy City. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian infiltrators are roughly 13 kilometers from Sumy City and that Russian advances are roughly 17 kilometers from the city.

Putin briefly talked about Russian offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction but spoke vaguely about the area, likely as the Kremlin continues to refuse to acknowledge successful Ukrainian counterattacks in and around Kupyansk in late 2025.[13] Putin claimed that Russian forces are 2.5 to five kilometers from the western edge of Kupyansk, likely meaning that Russian forces have advanced 2.5 to five kilometers further west than Kupyansk's western administrative boundary. Putin claimed that Ukrainian forces previously launched unsuccessful counterattacks near Kupyansk and that Russian forces had encircled a large number of Ukrainian servicemembers in Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (just southeast of Kupyansk). Ukrainian forces liberated much of Kupyansk and its surroundings in late December 2025, and Russian forces have struggled to retake territory in the area since, including near Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi.[14] ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces currently maintain a presence in 2.39 percent of Kupyansk and 2.77 percent of Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi and that Russian forces do not maintain any consolidated positions in either town.

Russia Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 28, 2026

Russian President Vladimir Putin used his speech to the ruling United Russia Party Congress on June 28 to project Russia's strength, reinforce his resolve to achieve Russia’s objectives militarily, and reject diplomatic solutions to end his war in Ukraine. Putin claimed that Russia maintains sufficient strength, resources, and political will to resist external actors’ attempts to restrain Russia's development.[1] Putin claimed that the West cannot strategically defeat Russia and cannot win on the battlefield. Putin alleged that Ukrainian forces are retreating along the entire frontline. Putin emphasized that Russia is ready to fight for its core interests and that it is the duty of the United Russia Party to do everything possible to ensure Russian victory. Putin claimed that Russia has always been strong and won due to its national unity and that all Russians support Russian forces on the frontlines.[2] Putin's June 28 speech is only the latest attempt from the Kremlin to frame a Russian military victory in Ukraine as inevitable and the Ukrainian front as on the verge of collapsing.[3] The Kremlin continues to resort to such rhetorical lines to try to influence the West and Ukraine to give in to Russia's demands, particularly as Russia's battlefield performance continues to decline in 2026 and Russia's ability to seize its objectives militarily is in question.[4]

Putin vaguely acknowledged the effects that Ukraine's long-range strike campaign is having on Russia but attempted to dismiss concerns and promote a facade of stability. Putin stated that Russia is going through a "difficult" and "fateful" time and that the Kremlin is aware of and responding to all problems related to external attempts to restrain Russia's development.[5] Putin claimed that Ukraine is conducting "terrorist attacks" against Russian infrastructure — likely referring to Ukrainian strikes against Russian assets, including oil infrastructure. Putin reassured the Russian public that the Kremlin is taking appropriate measures to address Russia's economic challenges and will ensure the security of Russia and Russian citizens. Putin claimed that Russia will fully implement its strategically significant development programs even as the Kremlin has to adjust some plans based on the "current situation." Putin specifically claimed that the Kremlin will fulfill all its social obligations, likely to assuage concerns that the externalities caused by the war may impact social spending. Putin did not explicitly discuss Ukraine's strike campaign against Russia or the wide-scale gasoline shortages experienced across the entire country, but Putin is likely subtly trying to portray himself as cognizant of the economic and social struggles Russia is facing.[6]

The United Russia Party formally claimed to be Putin’s party for the first time since 2007. The United Russia Party published a campaign poster on June 28 that featured a drawing of Putin and the slogans, “United Russia is the president’s party,” and "Being for Putin is the bare minimum."[7] Russian opposition source Meduza noted that this is the first time since 2007 that United Russia has declared itself "the president's party."[8] Meduza noted that the slogan on the poster features the Latin letter "Z," which has become a common symbol for Russia's war in Ukraine — linking support for United Russia and Putin to support for the war. Putin's June 28 speech at the United Russia Congress likely intended to begin shaping the information space ahead of the September 2026 Russian State Duma elections, including doubling down on Russians' commitment to the war in Ukraine.[9] The Kremlin's decision to publicly tie Putin to the United Russia Party is notable and is likely intended to make it appear as if there is widespread popular support for Putin and his policies when the United Russia Party inevitably wins in the fall elections that will neither be free nor fair.

United Russia's top five State Duma candidates for the September 2026 State Duma elections are mostly long-standing Putin loyalists. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson and United Russia Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev announced on June 28 the top five leaders to represent United Russia in the September 2026 State Duma elections: Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Russian Yunarmia Chief of the General Staff Captain Vladislav Golovin, Moscow City Mayor Sergei Sobyanin, Kremlin-appointed Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova, and Kremlin-coopted and Kremlin-awarded Russian milblogger Yevgeny Poddubny.[10] Medvedev stated that the top candidates should be people whom Russians know for their deeds and strong patriotism and who defend Russia's sovereignty and national interests.[11] The official list only slightly differs from a purportedly leaked draft published in January 2026, which included Medvedev and Maryana Lysenko (a prominent Russian doctor who led City Clinical Hospital No. 52 and received the title of Hero of Labor for her work combatting the COVID-19 pandemic in Russia) instead of Lvova-Belova and Sobyanin.[12] The finalized list platforms figures that are Putin loyalists and hardline supporters of the war in Ukraine. The list is reflective of Putin's political and ideological positions that all Russians should emulate.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin used his speech to the ruling United Russia Party Congress on June 28 to project Russia's strength, reinforce his resolve to achieve Russia’s objectives militarily, and reject diplomatic solutions to end his war in Ukraine.
• Putin vaguely acknowledged the effects that Ukraine's long-range strike campaign is having on Russia but attempted to dismiss concerns and promote a facade of stability.
• The United Russia Party formally claimed to be Putin’s party for the first time since 2007.
• United Russia's top five State Duma candidates for the September 2026 State Duma elections are mostly long-standing Putin loyalists.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure on the night of June 27 to 28. Russian forces launched two Zirkon/Onyx anti-ship missiles, six Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles, and 142 drones against Ukraine overnight.
• Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 27, 2026

Ukrainian forces conducted an FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile strike against the Russian Titan-Barrikady ballistic missile development and production plant overnight on June 26 to 27. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 27 that Ukrainian forces struck the Titan-Barrikady enterprise in Volgograd City, Volgograd Oblast, overnight, causing a fire.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the enterprise produces self-propelled launchers and transport-loading vehicles for Iskander-M ballistic missiles, launchers and ground equipment for Topol-M and Yars intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and the Msta-B and Msta-S large-caliber howitzers. Geolocated footage and imagery published on June 27 shows an explosion and smoke rising from the Titan-Barricades enterprise in Volgograd City after five FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles reportedly struck three workshops.[2] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed that Ukrainian forces used Flamingo missiles to strike the Titan-Barrikady plant on June 27.[3] Volgograd Oblast Governor Andrei Bocharov confirmed on June 27 that a Ukrainian "high-speed aerial target" strike damaged an industrial facility in Volgograd City.[4] A Russian milblogger claimed on June 27 that successful Ukrainian Flamingo strikes in 2026 have likely flown at low altitudes and over water features, making them harder for Russian forces to intercept.[5] The milblogger noted that Russian forces lack sufficient Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft to maintain surveillance and detect low-flying missiles. Ukrainian forces have struck Russian AWACS aircraft at several points throughout the war, contributing to shortages.[6] Russian forces reportedly have fewer than ten operational A-50 AWACS aircraft as of June 1, 2025, of which reportedly only four or five are the modernized A-50U variant.[7] ISW previously observed reports of at least eight separate Flamingo cruise missile strikes, with the most recent strike on the night of June 9 to June 10.[8] Ukraine’s increasing use of long-range Flamingo cruise missile strikes demonstrates Ukraine’s increasing ability to sustain and intensify missile strikes against key Russian military facilities.[9]

Ukrainian forces also struck Russian oil infrastructure in Vladimir Oblast overnight as part of Ukraine’s 40-day intermediate- and long-range strike campaign to influence Russia to end the war in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) reported on June 27 that Ukrainian forces struck the Vtorovo oil pumping station near Penkino, Vladimir Oblast, as part of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s 40-day campaign against Russia, hitting technical buildings and causing a secondary detonation.[10] The SBU noted that the Vtorovo station is part of the state-owned JSC Transneft Upper Volga and a key Russian logistics hub for pumping light petroleum products for export and domestic consumption. The SBU reported that the Vtorovo station transports diesel to the Moscow Ring Oil Product Pipeline and then to large oil depots in Moscow City and to the Baltic Sea. NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data from June 27 shows a heat anomaly about 10 kilometers from the pumping station.[11] Ukrainian forces have been intensifying the scope and scale of their long-range strikes against Russian oil infrastructure in Russia over the last several months, exploiting overstretched Russian air defenses.[12] Continued Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil production and transport infrastructure will likely intensify the spread and severity of fuel shortages in Russian regions and occupied Ukraine.[13]

The United States reimposed sanctions against Russian seaborne oil exports after temporary sanctions waivers expired and were not renewed.[14] Ukrainian Presidential Commissioner for Sanctions Policy Vladyslav Vlasyuk stated on June 26 that the US sanctions against Russian oil producers Rosneft and Lukoil have re-entered force after the United States issued sanctions waivers on Russian oil exports that were already at sea since March 12.[15] The most recent US waiver on these sanctions expired as of June 17, and US officials have not indicated since June 17 that the United States would extend the sanctions waiver again.[16]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces conducted an FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile strike against the Russian Titan-Barrikady ballistic missile development and production plant overnight on June 26 to 27.
• Ukrainian forces also struck Russian oil infrastructure in Vladimir Oblast overnight as part of Ukraine’s 40-day intermediate- and long-range strike campaign to influence Russia to end the war in Ukraine.
• The United States reimposed sanctions against Russian seaborne oil exports after temporary sanctions waivers expired and were not renewed.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.
• Russian forces launched 129 drones against Ukraine overnight.  

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 26, 2026

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on June 25 that he authorized a 40-day intermediate- and long-range strike campaign to influence Russia to end the war in Ukraine.[1] The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) reported on June 26 that Ukrainian drones continued strikes against occupied Crimea as part of the 40-day operation, striking the Volga and Vyatka Project 15310 cable ships near the Zatoka shipyard, the Petropavlovsk cargo and passenger ferry, and an S-400 air defense system radar station near occupied Kerch, and that the strikes caused fires on the ships.[2] NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data from June 26 shows two heat anomalies at the Zatoka shipyard near occupied Kerch.[3] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on June 26 that Ukrainian drones struck a Russian ST-68U radar station near occupied Dzhankoi (roughly 151 kilometers from the frontline), an Imbir radar station near occupied Armyansk (roughly 84 kilometers from the frontline), the NS-2 electrical substation near occupied Mykolaivka (either roughly 200 or 206 kilometers from the frontline), the Tasunove electrical substation near occupied Tasunove (roughly 2289 kilometers from the frontline), and the Zakhidno-Krymska electrical substation near occupied Karyerne (roughly 167 kilometers from the frontline).[4] A local Crimean Telegram channel claimed on June 25 and 26 that Ukrainian forces struck a small Russian airfield near occupied Kerch (roughly 412 kilometers from the frontline), a fuel tanker truck near occupied Armyansk, a fuel tanker truck along the A291 Kerch-Sevastopol highway near occupied Hornostaivka (roughly 252 kilometers from the frontline), and a railway near occupied Ichki (roughly 263 kilometers from the frontline).[5]

Crimean occupation officials declared a state of emergency in occupied Crimea amid Ukraine's intensifying intermediate- and long-range strike campaign targeting logistics into the region. Crimean occupation head Sergey Aksyonov and Sevastopol occupation head Mikhail Razvozhaev jointly announced on June 26 that they had signed decrees declaring regional states of emergency in occupied Crimea primarily to “streamline economic issues.”[6] Aksyonov added that the emergency declarations do not impose curfews or restrictions on movement, but rather allow the occupation governments to bypass typical restrictions and bureaucracy impacting operational management and essential supply purchase. Razvozhaev claimed that the state of emergency declaration will allow the Sevastopol occupation government to restore energy facilities rapidly following Ukrainian drone strikes and to provide financial assistance to residents after power surges damaged their essential appliances.[7]

The Ukrainian strike campaigns are causing fuel shortages, water supply issues, and a widespread exodus from the occupied peninsula. Razvozhaev stated in an interview on June 25 that Crimean occupation authorities are prioritizing allocating fuel reserves to critical sectors such as healthcare, public transport, and other critical facilities, and will resume sales to civilians through QR codes after authorities have accumulated sufficient fuel reserves.[8] Razvozhaev acknowledged that power restrictions have caused some water supply outages. Crimean occupation energy operator Krymenergo claimed on June 25 that Crimea occupation authorities introduced temporary power restrictions to avoid overloading the electrical grid.[9] A Telegram channel that frequently reports on the Kerch Strait Bridge traffic reported that occupation authorities closed the bridge for six hours following Ukrainian drone strikes overnight on June 25 to June 26.[10] The Telegram channel reported that there were long lines of about 2,450 vehicles on the Kerch side of the Kerch Strait Bridge, leaving occupied Crimea while there were no lines to enter occupied Crimea from the Taman side of the bridge.[11] The people leaving occupied Crimea likely include Russian tourists or residents of occupied Crimea, Russian military and security personnel associated with the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF), and occupation administrators. The outflow of these populations from occupied Crimea may generate short-term demographic impacts that could solidify in the longer term if Ukraine’s strike campaign persists.[12]

Russian officials continue to project a facade of stability and control over the Russian economy amid intensifying country-wide gasoline shortages. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak claimed on June 26 that Russia currently has sufficient fuel reserves for the domestic market and is restructuring fuel market logistics to meet the increased demand, but stated that this restructuring will take time.[13] Novak claimed that artificial demands on fuel increased domestic fuel demand by 20 to 30 percent.[14] Novak added that Russian authorities are considering imposing a short-term export ban on diesel for a few months to increase domestic market supply since Russia reportedly has a diesel surplus.[15] Novak reported on June 23 that authorities were considering imposing a temporary ban on diesel exports.[16] Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on June 26 extending the existing ban on Russian oil companies exporting oil and petroleum products at prices complying with G7 and EU price caps until December 31, 2027.[17] Putin implemented this ban in December 2022, and his choice to extend the ban amid ongoing fuel shortages and price spikes in Russia likely intends to signal a belief that Russia does not need to comply with Western sanctions despite ongoing economic difficulties.

 Ukrainian Presidential Commissioner for Sanctions Policy Vladyslav Vlasyuk attributed the current Russian economic crisis on June 26 to the decrease in oil and gas revenues, which fell by 30 percent from January to May 2026 compared to the same period in 2025.[18] Vlasyuk noted the increasing Russian budget deficit, public debt, and high military spending as contributing factors to the Russian economic situation. Ukraine’s intensified strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure and logistics since March 2026 has impacted Russian oil and gas revenues and led to intensified fuel shortages across occupied Ukraine and in many Russian regions.[19] Intensified Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil infrastructure will likely continue exacerbating Russian supply shortages amid increasing demand that the Russian government will not be able to ignore.[20]

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov deflected blame onto the United States for the lack of a written agreement following the bilateral August 2025 Alaska Summit.[21] Lavrov asserted on June 26 that US Secretary of State Marco Rubio's June 25 statement that the United States and Russia did not conclude an agreement and only discussed proposals at the summit, asserting that the statement "raises questions for me [Lavrov] in terms of what we mean by agreement."[22] Lavrov asserted that "saying there was no agreement seems rather unsubtle" after US representatives allegedly laid out their proposals and Russia agreed to those proposals. Lavrov claimed that the Alaska Summit and continued US statements expressing support for the end of the war "could probably be taken as confirmation that there were American proposals in Alaska that we [Russia] accepted," but that Rubio's statement "raises a different question." Lavrov's statements claim that the United States, rather than Russia, is to blame for the lack of agreement to come from the Alaska Summit and stalled peace efforts since, and likely intended to do so without directly contradicting Rubio's statements. Rubio's June 25 statement contradicts the frequent Kremlin rhetorical lines invoking the existence of alleged “Anchorage agreements” or "Alaska understandings" to advance narratives about Russia’s willingness to negotiate, even though the summit ended without a planned dinner and joint press conference and did not result in any written agreement or joint statement.[23]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on June 25 that he had authorized a 40-day intermediate- and long-range strike campaign to influence Russia to end the war in Ukraine.
• Crimean occupation officials declared a state of emergency in occupied Crimea amid Ukraine's intensifying intermediate- and long-range strike campaign targeting logistics into the region.
• The Ukrainian strike campaigns are causing fuel shortages, water supply issues, and a widespread exodus from the occupied peninsula.
• Russian officials continue to project a facade of stability and control over the Russian economy amid intensifying country-wide gasoline shortages.
• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov deflected blame onto the United States for the lack of a written agreement following the bilateral August 2025 Alaska Summit.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian industrial infrastructure on the night of June 25 to 26. Russian forces launched seven Iskander-M ballistic missiles and 189 drones against Ukraine overnight.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 25, 2026

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio confirmed that Russia and the United States did not reach any agreement to end Russia's war in Ukraine during the August 2025 Alaska Summit.[1] Rubio stated on June 25 that there was only a "proposal" in Anchorage but that parties did not come to an agreement during the Summit. Rubio noted that the Russian proposal included Russian control of Donbas among other demands. Rubio himself was part of the US diplomatic delegation in Anchorage and attended the high-level meeting between US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin.[2] Putin claimed on June 23 that Russia will only negotiate on the basis of the alleged agreements from the Alaska Summit with the United States, which Rubio rejected exists.[3] Russian officials routinely invoke the alleged “Anchorage agreements” to advance narratives about Russia’s willingness to negotiate, despite the lack of public statements following the summit.[4]

The Russian cognitive warfare narrative aimed at painting the Ukrainian frontlines as collapsing appears to have so far failed to persuade Ukraine's partners to capitulate to Russia’s demands. US President Donald Trump and US Deputy Secretary of State Jeremy Levin stated on June 24 and 25 that Ukraine currently has the battlefield advantage, demonstrating that Russia failed to convince the United States that the Ukrainian frontlines are collapsing.[5] Levin emphasized on June 24 that Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russian oil infrastructure are increasing the cost of war for Russia and are forcing Russia to divert resources away from the frontlines. Kremlin officials regularly make claims, aggrandize tactical Russian advances, and present false evidence as part of a wider cognitive warfare effort attempting to portray Ukrainian frontlines as collapsing - a coordinated campaign to pressure Ukraine and its partners into capitulating to Russia's demands in negotiations.[6] Ukrainian successful long- and intermediate-range strike campaigns against Russian military assets and energy infrastructure in occupied Ukraine and Russia along with Ukrainian tactical advances in several directions in Winter and Spring 2026 are dismantling the Russian false narrative of portraying Russian victory as inevitable.[7]

Ukraine’s ongoing strike campaign against Russian refineries is exacerbating broader Russian inflationary pressures and complicating the Kremlin’s efforts to conduct expansionary monetary policy. Bloomberg reported on June 24, citing the Russian Federal Statistics Service, that Russian gasoline prices rose three percent to $0.95 USD per liter between June 16 and 22, the largest weekly increase in at least 20 years.[8] Bloomberg reported that Ukrainian strikes against Russia’s largest fuel plants have driven Russians to panic-buy fuel, causing shortages and rising prices. A source familiar with the data told Bloomberg that Russian gasoline production has fallen 15 percent since June 2025 and nine percent since May 2026, likely due to intensified Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil infrastructure. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on June 25 that widespread fuel shortages are affecting all Russian federal subjects (regions) except for Ingushetia, Chechnya, Kalmykia, Chukotka, and the Nenets Autonomous Okrug, though prices have increased nationwide.[9] Bloomberg reported that the inflationary effect of rising gasoline prices is seeping into other sectors due to increased production and transportation costs. Bloomberg reported that the Russian Economy Ministry data indicate that total annual inflation increased from 5.3 to 5.8 percent in June 2026. Economy-wide inflationary pressures may disrupt the Russian Central Bank’s continued reductions to the key interest rate. The Russian Central Bank has lowered its key interest rate nine times since June 2025  from 21 percent to 14.25 percent as Russia has attempted to increase capital available to the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) and maintain the facade of domestic economic stability.[10] Russian Central Bank Governor Elvira Nabiullina acknowledged on June 19 that the spike in domestic gasoline prices has affected June’s inflation rate and may increase inflation expectations, implying that the Central Bank may need to change its calculations about the key interest rate if Ukraine’s strikes against Russian energy infrastructure and inflation persist.[11] The Kremlin has exerted significant pressure on the Russian Central Bank and eroded its independence to lower the key interest rate as it attempts to continue expanding capital availability for the defense industry despite expansionary fiscal policies and gasoline shortages exacerbating Russian inflation.[12] The economic effects of Russia's gasoline shortage will also likely long outlast the physical gasoline shortages in the event that Russia is able to address the shortages. Russian gasoline shortages began in May 2026 and have already spread to the majority of Russian regions and caused inflation to rise in a matter of weeks.[13] Ukrainian forces will likely continue to intensify their strike campaign against Russia oil infrastructure, exacerbate shortages, and increase inflationary pressure across Russia. Expanded inflationary pressures due to the Russian gasoline supply crisis may increase Central Bank resistance to lowering the key interest rate, complicating the Kremlin’s push for expansionary monetary policies and creating administrative tensions.

The Russian military command likely continues to generate new formations on paper, but it remains unclear how or if Russia will be able to staff these formations to doctrinal endstrength. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on June 25 that the Russian military command has "adjusted its plans" and now intends to form an unspecified number of new divisions and five new brigades in 2026.[14] It is unclear whether Syrskyi is referring to an additional division and five new brigades or if he is remarking on the continued development of formations that the Russian military command announced in 2022 as part of broader military reforms. Former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced in December 2022 that the Russian military command intended to form 17 new maneuver divisions, including by expanding five existing naval infantry brigades into five divisions and later announced that Russia intended to stand up these new formations between 2023 and 2026.[15] The Russian military command also re-established the Moscow and Leningrad military districts from the former Western Military District as part of these reforms.[16] The Russian military command has formed and deployed at least 10 new Russian divisions to combat since December 2022, although none of these nominally new formations are operating at their doctrinal endstrength.[17] The Russian military command has formed the 104th Airborne (VDV) Division; transformed previously existing brigades into the 27th, 68th, 69th, and 71st motorized rifle divisions; transformed two existing naval infantry brigades into the 55th and 120th Naval Infantry divisions; and formed the 67th, 70th, and 72nd motorized rifle divisions since December 2022. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported in early 2026 that the Russian military command had only formed four new divisions out of the 17 planned maneuver divisions and up to nine brigades, which Russia had planned to form in 2025.^[18] The Russian military command reportedly also plans to reorganize its 810th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade into a naval infantry division, which would be the eleventh new maneuver division that Russia has formed since 2022.[19]  The Russian military command is generating new formations nominally and only on paper, as Russian infantry-heavy tactics and economic and recruitment constraints will likely hinder the Russian military command from effectively implementing these reforms and fully staffing new formations as they come online.[20]

French authorities seized a Russian shadow fleet oil tanker on June 25. French President Emmanuel Macron reported that the French Navy intercepted the Russian shadow fleet tanker Deliver on June 25 off the coast of Sicily in violation of maritime law.[21]  Automatic identification systems (AIS) data from the Starboard Maritime Intelligence ship-tracking platform indicates that the Deliver was flying under the Cameroonian flag and left the Port of Primorsk on June 4 and turned off its AIS tracking on June 23. European states have been increasingly seizing Russian shadow fleet tankers in recent months in an effort to degrade Russia’s ability to transport and thusly profit from sanctioned oil.[22]

Key Takeaways:

• US Secretary of State Marco Rubio confirmed that Russia and the United States did not reach any agreement to end Russia's war in Ukraine during the August 2025 Alaska Summit.
• The Russian cognitive warfare narrative aimed at painting the Ukrainian frontlines as collapsing appears to have so far failed to persuade Ukraine's partners to capitulate to Russia’s demands.
• Ukraine’s ongoing strike campaign against Russian refineries is exacerbating broader Russian inflationary pressures and complicating the Kremlin’s efforts to conduct expansionary monetary policy.
• The Russian military command likely continues to generate new formations on paper, but it remains unclear how or if Russia will be able to staff these formations to doctrinal endstrength.
• French authorities seized a Russian shadow fleet oil tanker on June 25.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure within Russia.
• Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile and 90 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 24, 2026

Belarusian signal repeaters along the Belarusian-Ukrainian border reportedly ceased operations as of June 22 following Ukrainian President Volodmyr Zelensky’s warning that Belarus must disable the repeaters no later than June 26. Zelensky stated on June 24 that the Russian-installed signal repeaters on the Belarusian-Ukrainian border, which allow Russian forces to fly guided drones at extended ranges deep into western Ukraine, have not been operational since June 22.[1] Zelensky stated that it is not clear whether Belarus fully dismantled the repeaters or simply suspended their use at this time. Zelensky has repeatedly asked Belarus to dismantle the signal repeaters along the Belarusian-Ukrainian border, as they allow Russian forces to carry out higher-precision strikes against Ukraine, and recently warned that Ukraine would strike the equipment if Belarus refused to do so by June 26.[2]

The Kremlin is intensifying pressure on Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko to expand Belarusian involvement in Russia’s war against Ukraine. Lukashenko continues trying to resist the Kremlin's demands while maintaining Russia’s approval. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on June 23, citing Russian and European officials, that the Kremlin is pressuring Lukashenko to allow Russia to more actively leverage Belarus in its war effort against Ukraine.[3] WSJ reported that the Kremlin is trying to sway Belarus into allowing Russian forces to launch drones against Ukraine from the Belarusian territory and extend the frontline westward to force Ukraine to redeploy troops from the frontline to the Belarusian-Ukrainian border. A former Russian intelligence officer briefed on the matter told WSJ that the Kremlin is threatening to withdraw financial support from Belarus in case of noncompliance. The Kremlin continues to frame Ukraine as a threat to Belarus. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on June 24 that Russia will always stand by Belarus and repel threats against Belarus, including from Ukraine, as both Russia and Belarus are security and economic allies.[4] Zelensky’s report about how Belarus de facto responded to his ultimatum favorably by disabling repeaters indicates that Lukashenko continues resisting fully committing Belarus to the Kremlin’s military endeavor. Minsk is instead trying to balance maintaining Russian support for Belarus while maintaining what remains of Belarus’ degraded sovereignty.[5] Lukashenko has resisted allowing Russia to operationalize the Belarusian Armed Forces to support Russian operations in Ukraine or full-scale recruit Belarusians into the Russian military at scale since 2022.[6]  Lukashenko and other senior Belarusian officials notably continue avoiding adopting the Kremlin’s framing that portrays Ukraine as a threat to Belarus^.[7] Lukashenko continues to stall and deflect the Kremlin's intensified attempts to drag Belarus into the war in Ukraine while maintaining relatively neutral rhetoric towards Ukraine.[8]

High-ranking Kremlin officials continue to reiterate Russia’s unwillingness to negotiate directly with Ukraine and assert Russia’s commitment to its original maximalist war aims. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev on June 24 reiterated his confidence in Russian forces’ ability to achieve all of Russia's war goals on the battlefield, dismissed Zelensky’s legitimacy as Ukraine's president, and rejected direct dialogue with Ukraine to end the war.[9] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated on June 24 that Russia is ready to listen to US negotiators during their next visit to Russia but noted that Russia will not accept freezing the current frontline as a condition to resume negotiations on Ukraine.[10] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov claimed on June 24 that Russia remains committed to the peace settlement plans that the US and Russia allegedly agreed to during the Alaska Summit in August 2025 and that the Kremlin is not interested in dealing with the European Union (EU) as a negotiator.[11] Russian officials have routinely alleged that the US and Russia reached an agreement following the US-Russian meetings in Alaska in August 2025, despite the lack of public statements following the summit and no confirmation that any agreement was reached.[12] The Kremlin alleges that the US and Russia reached an agreement in order to advance a narrative that Russia is willing to negotiate and to assert that the US is not abiding by the terms of a supposed agreement. The Kremlin has routinely tried to exclude European leaders from being involved in the peace negotiations and has rejected several Ukrainian proposals for a high-level negotiations meeting.[13] The Kremlin’s routine rejection to hold negotiations to discuss compromise peace proposals signals Moscow’s continued unwillingness to end the war in Ukraine on any terms that do not amount to Ukraine’s full capitulation to Russia and fulfill Russia’s maximalist demands.[14]

Russian authorities are implementing measures to combat intensifying gasoline shortages in Moscow City amid growing domestic gasoline and aviation fuel shortages in Russia. Russian opposition source Meduza reported on June 23 that Moscow City mayor’s office removed the requirement that fuel tankers enter Moscow City with travel permits to ensure an uninterrupted gasoline supply in Moscow City amid worsening country-wide gasoline shortages.[15] On June 24, Russian State Duma Economic Policy Committee Deputy Chairperson Mikhail Delyagin acknowledged the gasoline shortages and traffic jams in Moscow City.[16] Meduza reported on June 24 that Russian Azimuth Airlines claimed that Russia has reached a critical aviation fuel situation with rising gasoline prices and aviation fuel shortages.[17] Reuters reported on June 24 that Russia is negotiating with Kazakhstan the purchase of about 50,000 tons of AI-92 gasoline to alleviate Russian gasoline shortages.[18] Ukraine’s intensified strike campaign against Russian refineries and Russian logistics since March 2026 has renewed shortages across occupied Ukraine and extended to many Russian regions.[19] Further Ukrainian strikes against Russian energy infrastructure will likely exacerbate shortages spreading across Russia and existing gasoline and aviation fuel shortages.[20]

Key Takeaways:

• Belarusian signal repeaters along the Belarusian-Ukrainian border reportedly ceased operations as of June 22 following Ukrainian President Volodmyr Zelensky’s warning that Belarus must disable the repeaters no later than June 26.
• The Kremlin is intensifying pressure on Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko to expand Belarusian involvement in Russia’s war against Ukraine. Lukashenko continues trying to resist the Kremlin's demands while maintaining Russia’s approval.
• High-ranking Kremlin officials continue to reiterate Russia’s unwillingness to negotiate directly with Ukraine and assert Russia’s commitment to its original maximalist war aims.
• Russian authorities are implementing measures to combat intensifying gasoline shortages in Moscow City amid growing domestic gasoline and aviation fuel shortages in Russia.
• Russian forces recently marginally advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction.
• Ukrainian forces struck Russian gas processing infrastructure in Orenburg Oblast overnight on June 23 to 24. Russian forces launched 101 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 23, 2026

Russian President Vladimir Putin and senior Kremlin officials are reiterating Russia's commitment to its original war aims of complete Ukrainian capitulation as Ukraine, the United States, and Europe appear ready to restart negotiations to end the war. Putin claimed on June 23 that Russia is ready for peace talks with Ukraine but noted that Russia will only negotiate on the basis of the 2022 Istanbul Protocols, Putin's June 2024 speech to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and the alleged August 2025 Anchorage understandings with the United States — all of which amount to demands for Ukrainian capitulation.[1] Russia’s demands, as articulated in the 2022 Istanbul Protocols, would have permanently prohibited Ukraine from joining NATO, imposed severe limitations on the Ukrainian military, and banned Ukraine from receiving Western military assistance, while failing to impose any restrictions on the size or capability of Russian forces.[2] The parties notably negotiated the Istanbul Protocols in March and April 2022 under starkly different battlefield conditions compared to those in 2026, as Russia was advancing on Kyiv City and held significant portions of northeastern, eastern, and southern Ukraine, and before Ukrainian forces conducted successful counteroffensives that liberated swathes of territory in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts. Putin's June 2024 speech committed to similar maximalist goals: Ukraine's complete withdrawal from Ukrainian-controlled territory in Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and the abandonment of Ukraine's NATO accession aspirations before Russia would agree to a ceasefire and start peace negotiations.[3] Russian officials have routinely invoked the alleged "Anchorage agreements" following the US-Russian meetings in Alaska in August 2025 in order to advance narratives about Russia's willingness to negotiate, despite the lack of public statements following the summit.[4] Putin's June 23 statements, therefore, represent his view of the maximalist position from which he will start any renewed peace talks.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov similarly stated on June 23 that Russia will achieve all of its war objectives, including Ukraine's neutrality and non-nuclear status, the elimination of alleged "discriminatory" laws against the Russian language and the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), and Ukrainian respect for the illegal sham Russian referendums in occupied Crimea and Kherson, Zaporizhia, Luhansk, and Donetsk oblasts.[5] Lavrov's list of Russia's war objectives mirrors Kremlin narratives about Russia's commitment to eliminating the alleged "root causes" of the war.[6] Both Putin's and Lavrov's statements are reiterations of Russia's original war aims from 2022 that amount to complete Ukrainian capitulation, effectively signaling that any peace deal that does not address Russian demands of not only Ukraine but also of NATO and the West will not satisfy Russia.

Putin continues to rely on a negotiating tactic that aims to falsely portray the Russian military as on the verge of collapsing Ukrainian defenses. Putin claimed on June 23 that future peace negotiations must take into consideration the current "battlefield realities," a long-used Kremlin expression to refer to Russian gains on the battlefield, which all available evidence suggests are largely incremental and gradual.[7] Kremlin officials use the phrase in an attempt to paint the Ukrainian front as collapsing, such that Ukraine and its partners should capitulate to Russia's demands now out of fear of further Russian offensives.[8] Putin's June 23 reference to the alleged "battlefield realities" ignores, however, the fact that Russia's rate of advance has been steadily declining since November 2025 and that Ukraine's intermediate-range strike campaign is increasingly inhibiting Russian logistics across occupied Ukraine in ways that are beginning to manifest on the frontline.[9]

The Kremlin is conducting a cognitive warfare campaign to frame potential Ukrainian strikes against legitimate Belarusian targets that support Russian military operations as a Ukrainian escalation against Belarus and the Union State. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov used a roundtable with Belarusian Ambassador to Russia Yuri Seliverstov on June 23 to comment on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's recent requests that Belarus remove signal repeater stations from the Belarusian-Ukrainian border and warnings that Ukraine will target this equipment if Belarus fails to do so.[10] Lavrov claimed that Zelensky's requests and European support for these requests are attempts to draw Belarus into Russia's war in Ukraine.[11] Lavrov claimed that Russia is prepared to use the ”full range of measures” under the Russian-Belarusian Union State treaty on security guarantees, which enables Russia and Belarus to employ military force to ensure their security. Seliverstov notably did not repeat any of Lavrov’s talking points regarding Ukrainian requests of Belarus, and Seliverstov's response is consistent with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko's June 15 denial that Belarus would commit forces to the war in Ukraine.[12]

Signal repeaters on the Belarusian-Ukrainian border enable Russian forces to conduct precision drone strikes against the Ukrainian deep-rear and therefore would represent a legitimate military target for potential Ukrainian strikes. Zelensky noted on June 21 that four Russian-installed repeater stations in Gomel and Brest oblasts allow Russian forces to fly guided drones at extended ranges and to conduct drone strikes against energy, railway, and civilian infrastructure in Zhytomyr, Rivne, and Volyn oblasts.[13] Zelensky previously reported in December 2025 that Russian forces used Belarusian territory to bypass Ukrainian drone interception systems and credited the increase in Russian Shahed drone strikes against western Ukraine to Russia’s exploitation of Belarusian territory and technical assets.[14] Zelensky subsequently reported that Russian forces carried out precision drone strikes against a locomotive in Volyn Oblast, and ISW reported that Russia had been increasingly targeting trains and railway infrastructure since Summer 2025 to undermine Ukraine's logistics.[15] Russian forces are increasingly leveraging Belarusian territory, airspace, and repeaters to conduct precise strikes against Ukrainian moving targets, critical infrastructure, and logistics. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger noted on June 23 that Russian forces are increasingly prioritizing strikes against Ukrainian rail logistics, particularly in western Ukraine and near Belarus.[16] The milblogger observed that Ukrainian authorities quickly restored damaged static facilities that Russian forces had been striking or found alternatives, so Russian forces are now increasingly striking rolling stock in order to take advantage of Ukraine's shortages of locomotives and other types of trains that are expensive to restore. The milblogger assessed that Russian forces conducted 21 strikes against rolling stock between May 16 and June 20-21. The milblogger claimed that Russian forces conduct most of the strikes in frontline regions and areas bordering Belarus, with Russian forces reportedly destroying more than 20 locomotives in Zhytomyr Oblast between May 31 and June 6.

Belarus has materially supported Russia's war in Ukraine since 2022 and is effectively a cobelligerent with Russia. Russia has de facto annexed Belarus and has used Belarus as a sanctuary from which to launch its 2022 invasion of Ukraine.[17] Russia also used Belarusian military infrastructure and airspace to launch missile, air, and Shahed drone strikes against Ukraine since 2022.[18] Belarus is key for Russia's sanctions evasion schemes, and Russia and Belarus are increasingly integrating their economies via the Union State framework.[19] Any legitimate Ukrainian strike against Belarusian infrastructure that supports Russia's war effort in Ukraine is therefore not inherently escalatory.

The Kremlin may attempt to invoke the Union State collective security treaty in an attempt to draw Belarus into the war so that Russia can leverage Belarusian manpower and training resources. ISW previously forecast that the Kremlin could attempt to use Belarus’ population as a recruitment base to offset the systemic manpower shortages that the Russian military has been facing since May 2022.[20] ISW also forecasted that the Kremlin could seek to recruit Belarusian citizens into the Russian military, particularly as Belarusians and Russians have a single citizenship status under the Union State Treaty and, in theory, have equal rights under Union State law.[21] The Kremlin could assert that Belarusians, therefore, also have the same civic duties and responsibilities under Union State law. Russian officials may one day insist that Belarusian subjects of a de facto annexed Belarus serve within the Russian military or within Russian-controlled Union State military formations under a uniform Union State law.

Russian gains in Kostyantynivka remain limited to small group infiltrations that are not resulting in consolidated territorial control. Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed on June 23 that Russian forces are advancing on all areas of the frontline and that Russian forces are "practically reaching" Kostyantynivka.[22] Putin dismissed Ukrainian official statements that the city is a contested "gray zone" but acknowledged that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in buildings and are counterattacking. The Russian MoD continued on June 23 its recent pattern of publishing hyper-tactical details of alleged Russian gains in Kostyantynivka in order to aggrandize Russia's progress.[23] Ukraine's tactical situation in Kostyantynivka is deteriorating, but the Russian MoD and Putin are falsely framing the seizure of Kostyantynivka as imminent. Ukrainian 19th Army Corps Deputy Commander Yuriy Madyar reported on June 23 that Ukrainian forces cleared areas south of Kostyantynivka with a "minimum" number of Russian servicemembers left in the area.[24] Madyar stated that Ukrainian forces are starting operations to push Russian servicemembers from central and western Kostyantynivka. Madyar stated that Russian forces in the Kostyantynivka direction are experiencing roughly 53 losses per day compared to Ukraine's roughly three daily losses, and that Russian forces must walk 20 to 30 kilometers to get closer to Kostyantynivka as Ukrainian forces are heavily striking the surrounding areas. Madyar denied Russian claims that Russian forces have encircled Ukrainian forces in the city, reporting that there are many more Ukrainian servicemembers in Kostyantynivka than there are Russians. A Russian milblogger also noted that Russian forces are struggling to resupply positions near northern Kostyantynivka and are relying on drone drops.[25] Russian forces are increasingly infiltrating within Kostyantynivka, but these infiltrations do not amount to control of terrain in the doctrinal sense and will not enable Russian forces to achieve a rapid operational breakthrough against the Fortress Belt writ large.[26] Reports that Ukrainian forces are clearing Russian positions on Kostyantynivka's southern flank further suggest that Russian forces are unable to consolidate their positions after infiltrating and will require more manpower to actually convert infiltrations into usable frontline positions. Russia’s ongoing cognitive warfare efforts surrounding the Kostyantynivka direction, including the promotion of AI-generated footage alleging successes on the ground, aim to saturate the information space with false claims about the Russian military's successes and ability to collapse the Ukrainian lines in the near future.[27]

Kremlin officials acknowledged Ukraine's escalating long-range strikes on Russian energy infrastructure but downplayed their country-wide impact on fuel supplies. Russian President Vladimir Putin acknowledged on June 23 that Ukrainian forces are conducting large-scale drone strikes against claimed civilian infrastructure in Russia and that these drones have an unspecified "massive impact."[28] Putin claimed that Ukrainian forces conduct the drone strikes to destabilize the Russian society, deflect from alleged Russian battlefield advances, and cast doubt about the actions of the Russian Armed Forces, possibly referring to the Russian military's increasing inability to protect critical infrastructure from strikes across Russia and occupied Ukraine. Putin also attempted to downplay Ukrainian strike capabilities by claiming that the "entire West is working" to facilitate these strikes. Ukrainian forces have recently intensified their long-range strikes against Russian energy infrastructure, including striking the Moscow Oil Refinery on June 18, and Putin is likely trying to vaguely address the growing concerns in Russian society about Ukrainian strikes and growing criticism of the Kremlin's failure to repel Ukrainian strikes.[29]

Kremlin officials similarly acknowledged that Russia is increasingly facing fuel shortages but likely deliberately avoided connecting these shortages to the intensifying Ukrainian strike campaign. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak stated during a meeting with Putin on June 23 that the current situation on the Russian fuel market is challenging but manageable and noted that the Russian government is taking the necessary measures to ensure stable fuel supplies.[30] Novak reported that Russian authorities instituted a complete ban on gasoline and jet fuel exports, are considering banning diesel exports, and are introducing changes to the tax legislation to help the domestic gasoline market handle increased fuel demand. Novak noted that Russian oil refineries are delaying maintenance work and increasing production rates, and that Russia is using previously untapped fuel reserves to meet the rising market demand. Novak added that Russian state-owned oil companies bear the main burden of supplying fuel for the domestic market and that the Russian government is monitoring gasoline prices. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on June 23 that all global economies, including Russia, are impacted by the current oil price volatility.[31] Peskov is using the global oil irregularities to explain away Russian domestic gasoline shortages while refusing to acknowledge the direct impact that Ukrainian strikes against Russian energy infrastructure have had on domestic fuel shortages. Russian officials have implemented gasoline restrictions across many Russian regions stretching as far east as Kamchatka Krai since the beginning of June 2026.[32] The Kremlin will likely continue to struggle to uniformly mitigate domestic gasoline shortages in the short- to medium-term, given that intensified Ukrainian strikes against Russian energy infrastructure will likely continue to exacerbate existing shortages.[33]

The Kremlin continues threatening retaliatory strikes against Ukraine, likely to project strength amid growing domestic gasoline supply shortages. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated on June 23 that the previous Russian warning for all foreign embassies to evacuate from Kyiv City remains in effect, indirectly threatening that Russia would launch another devastating large strike package against Ukraine in the near future.[34]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin and senior Kremlin officials are reiterating Russia's commitment to its original war aims of complete Ukrainian capitulation as Ukraine, the United States, and Europe appear ready to restart negotiations to end the war.
• Putin continues to rely on a negotiating tactic that aims to falsely portray the Russian military as on the verge of collapsing Ukrainian defenses.
• The Kremlin is conducting a cognitive warfare campaign to frame potential Ukrainian strikes against legitimate Belarusian targets that support Russian military operations as a Ukrainian escalation against Belarus and the Union State.
• Signal repeaters on the Belarusian-Ukrainian border enable Russian forces to conduct precision drone strikes against the Ukrainian deep-rear and therefore would represent a legitimate military target for potential Ukrainian strikes.
• Belarus has materially supported Russia's war in Ukraine since 2022 and is effectively a cobelligerent with Russia.
• The Kremlin may attempt to invoke the Union State collective security treaty in an attempt to draw Belarus into the war so that Russia can leverage Belarusian manpower and training resources.
• Russian gains in Kostyantynivka remain limited to small group infiltrations that are not resulting in consolidated territorial control.
• Kremlin officials acknowledged Ukraine's escalating long-range strikes on Russian energy infrastructure but downplayed their country-wide impact on fuel supplies.
• The Kremlin continues threatening retaliatory strikes against Ukraine, likely to project strength amid growing domestic gasoline supply shortages.
• Ukrainian forces regained some positions in Kostyantynivka.
• Russian forces launched 135 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 22, 2026

Ukrainian forces conducted another strike near Moscow City on the night of June 21 to 22 — the third strike against Russia’s capital area in the past week. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Dubna Space Communications Center in Dubna, Moscow Oblast (just northwest of Moscow City and about 540 kilometers from the Russian-Ukrainian international border).[1] The center is a major ground hub that connects satellites with terrestrial communication networks and manages satellite links across Russia and abroad.[2] Geolocated footage published on June 22 shows smoke rising in Dubna.[3] The Dubna Space Communications Center's parent company, the State Space Communications Company, reported on June 22 that a large-scale Ukrainian drone strike hit the center but that the strike did not disrupt television broadcasts and communications.[4] Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin claimed on June 22 that Russian forces downed 84 drones en route to Moscow City in the past day and that the drone strikes did not cause any damage.[5] Ukrainian forces recently struck Moscow City, including the Moscow Oil Refinery, on June 15-16 and June 17-18.[6]

Russian authorities have reportedly been trying to strengthen air defenses covering Moscow City in recent weeks, including possibly at the expense of frontline areas. Open-source analysts assessed on June 20 that satellite imagery collected on June 4 suggests Russia started constructing a new S-400 air defense installation at the Moskvoretsky Historical and Nature Park west of Moscow City in late May 2026.[7] The open-source analysts assessed that the size and shape of the construction site are similar to other S-400 sites near Moscow City and noted that the new construction sits on one of the highest elevation points west of the capital. The Telegraph also reported on June 22 that Russia redeployed a Pantsir air defense system from an unspecified area of the frontline and installed it on a tower near the Moscow Oil Refinery in southeastern Moscow City.[8] The Telegraph noted that the Pantsir system includes a protective metal cage similar to those located near the frontline, leading Ukrainian military experts to assess that Russia redeployed the system from the frontline to Moscow City. The Telegraph added that online imagery of the moved Pantsir shows that it has only two of the standard six launch missiles on one side, suggesting that Russia may be suffering from a Pantsir interceptor missile shortage. CBS News recently reported, citing Ukrainian official sources, that Russia is experiencing a shortage of S-300 air defense missiles as Western sanctions have limited Russia's quantity of key components.[9] The Telegraph's report suggests that the shortages may be affecting multiple types of air defense systems. ISW continues to assess that Ukraine’s intensifying long-range and intermediate-range strike campaigns are imposing additional competing requirements for air defenses across Russia’s operational and deep rears, compounding Russia’s air defense challenges given the vast amount of land and large number of facilities Russia must protect.[10] Ukraine’s strike campaign has forced Russia to make difficult decisions about where to allocate its limited air defense assets.[11] Ukrainian strikes disabling Russian air defense radars over the past months are also likely contributing to Russia's inability to sufficiently repel strikes even in areas with increased air defense protection.

Ukraine continues to expand the intensity and range of its intermediate- and long-range strike campaign. Russian opposition source Meduza analyzed coordinates of Ukrainian strikes against trucks and other military targets in occupied Ukraine from open-source geolocation organization GeoConfirmed since April 2023 and found that Ukrainian forces greatly increased their median strike depth in May and June 2026 to several tens of kilometers from several kilometers in previous months.[12] French open-source analyst Clement Molin verified footage confirming that Ukrainian forces struck at least 500 Russian trucks and vehicles in occupied Ukraine between May 1 and June 18 and that geolocated footage confirms 270 such Ukrainian strikes since January 2026.[13] Meduza noted that Ukrainian forces significantly increased their strikes against rear areas of the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces', which is operating in the Hulyaipole and Oleksandrivka directions, including heavily targeting sections of the M-14 Rostov-Crimea highway in southwestern Donetsk Oblast and eastern Zaporizhia Oblast, in May 2026 but have reduced the intensity of their strikes in these areas in June 2026 as Ukrainian forces have shifted their strikes westward toward occupied Kherson Oblast and occupied Crimea. Meduza reported that Ukrainian forces have started to expand their strike campaign against Russian near rear areas in the Pokrovsk, Kostyantynivka, and Slovyansk directions. ISW has observed geolocated evidence that Ukrainian forces conducted at least 210 intermediate-range strikes in occupied Ukraine in May 2026 and 145 thus far in June 2026.

Ukrainian forces are also expanding the range of their long-range strike capabilities, with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stating on June 21 that new Ukrainian Fire Point drones recently struck targets up to 2,070 kilometers in depth and that Ukrainian drones will soon be able to strike targets up to 3,000 kilometers deep.[14] Ukrainian forces have significantly increased the range, volume, and intensity of their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure and military assets since March 2026.[15] ISW has observed geolocated evidence that Ukrainian forces conducted at least 18 long-range strikes against Russian oil infrastructure in Russia in April 2026, 33 in May 2026, and 28 thus far in June 2026.

Ukrainian strikes continue to exacerbate Russian gasoline shortages and inhibit Russian logistics to occupied Ukraine. Ukraine’s intensified strike campaign against Russian oil refineries and logistics since March 2026 has led to gasoline shortages across occupied Ukraine and in many Russian regions, and Russian authorities have thus far struggled to adjust and address these shortages.[16] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov acknowledged on June 22 that Russian fuel prices are rising amid ongoing shortages but claimed that the Russian Cabinet of Ministers is coordinating with oil companies to resolve the issue.[17] Peskov further claimed that Russian authorities are working to minimize the consequences of Ukrainian strikes against Crimea and to ensure fuel supplies to the population there.[18] Russian authorities are also introducing more restrictions on gasoline purchases and encouraging civilians to reduce their private travel to combat the shortages.[19] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that some are proposing that Russia shift to "mini refineries" to help combat the shortages but noted that this measure would not cover Russia's domestic demand and that Russia would have to return to using defunct AI-76 and AI-80 gasoline rather than replacing currently available gasoline.[20] Russian occupation authorities are also further restricting travel along key logistics arteries into occupied Crimea. Russian authorities temporarily closed traffic across the Kerch Strait Bridge on June 22, likely due to nearby Ukrainian strikes.[21] Crimean occupation authorities also recently shut off gasoline sales to any non-state entities and suspended ferry operations.[22] Crimea occupation governor Sergei Aksyonov announced on June 22 that authorities are suspending all children's camps in occupied Crimea until September 1, 2026.[23]

Ukrainian forces struck a Russian defense industrial enterprise that produces components for Russian cruise missiles and air defenses in Voronezh Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces used unspecified high-precision, air-launched cruise missiles to strike an enterprise in Voronezh City on June 22 that produces components for Russian missiles.[24] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the plant produces components for Russia's Kh-101 cruise missiles, Iskander-K cruise missiles, and Pantsir-S1 air defense systems. Geolocated footage published on June 22 shows smoke plumes near the Voronezh Semiconductor Devices Plant in Voronezh City.[25] Voronezh Oblast Governor Aleksander Gusev claimed that Russian air defense downed 18 drones and several unspecified high-speed aerial targets over Voronezh City and acknowledged that Ukrainian strikes damaged a production facility in the city.[26] Russian sources claimed that Ukraine may have used a Storm Shadow missile in the strike.[27] A Russian milblogger claimed, however, that Ukraine may have used a US-supplied Extended Range Attack Munition (ERAM) to strike Voronezh City.[28] The US Air Force launched the ERAM procurement program in 2024 specifically to provide Ukraine with affordable, mass-producible long-range strike weapons, and the United States approved a Foreign Military Sale (FMS) to Ukraine in August 2025 that allotted for up to 3,350 ERAMs.[29] ISW is unable to confirm the specific weapon Ukrainian forces employed in this strike at this time.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces conducted another strike near Moscow City on the night of June 21 to 22 —the third strike against Russia’s capital area in the past week.
• Russian authorities have reportedly been trying to strengthen air defenses covering Moscow City in recent weeks, including possibly at the expense of frontline areas.
• Ukraine continues to expand the intensity and range of its intermediate- and long-range strike campaign.
• Ukrainian strikes continue to exacerbate Russian gasoline shortages and inhibit Russian logistics to occupied Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces struck a Russian defense industrial enterprise that produces components for Russian cruise missiles and air defenses in Voronezh Oblast.
• Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.
• Russian forces launched one missile and 88 drones against Ukraine on the night of June 21 to 22.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 21, 2026

Ukrainian forces are conducting a strike campaign to deny Russia's ability to sustain logistics and transport fuel across the Kerch Strait. Ukrainian government and military officials reported on June 21 that elements of Ukraine's Security Service (SBU), Unmanned Systems Forces (USF), Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), and Special Operations Forces (SSO) jointly launched long-range drone strikes against Russian maritime logistics, oil infrastructure, and air defense systems in occupied Crimea and Krasnodar Krai overnight on June 21.[1] Ukrainian military officials reported on June 21 that Ukrainian forces struck the Port of Kavkaz at the Chushka Spit, Krasnodar Krai (northeast of the Kerch Strait Bridge), setting the tank farm of the oil transshipment complex and the territory of the oil depot on fire.[2] The USF reported that Russia relies on the oil depot at the port of Kavkaz to supply occupied Crimea and southern Ukraine with fuel.[3] Ukrainian military officials also reported that Ukrainian forces struck tanks with petroleum products at the TES-Terminal-1 oil depot in occupied Kerch, which Russia uses to transship fuel oil, liquefied gas, and light petroleum products across the Kerch Strait.[4] The USF added that the TES-Terminal-1 oil depot is located less than one kilometer from the Kerch Strait Bridge and that Russia uses the terminal to refuel the Russian ferry connection between occupied Crimea and the Port of Kavkaz.[5] Ukrainian military officials also reported that Ukrainian strikes disabled four S-400 air defense complex radar stations and two Pantsir air defense systems on the Kerch Strait Bridge.[6] The USF reported that its forces struck a Kasta-2E2 radar system in occupied Kurortne (northwest of Kerch and on the Sea of Azov coast) and a Nebo-U radar system near Kerch.[7] Geolocated footage confirmed fires at the TES-Terminal-1 and the Port of Kavkaz and Ukrainian drone strikes against the two radars north of Kurortne and west of Kerch.[8] The Krasnodar Krai Operational Headquarters claimed that Ukrainian drones struck the Panagia ferry at the Kerch Strait ferry crossing and started a fire at an oil terminal in Chushka.[9] Geolocated footage published and recorded on June 21 northeast of the Port of Kavkaz showed at least three ferries on fire.[10] Crimea occupation governor Sergei Aksyonov acknowledged that Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes against occupied Crimea on June 21 but did not specify what targets Ukrainian forces struck.[11]

Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil and transport infrastructure are already disrupting Russian logistics, straining energy supplies, and worsening fuel shortages across occupied Crimea. Aksyonov announced on June 21 that all gas stations in occupied Crimea stopped selling fuel to any non-state entities but did not provide any reasons for this emergency measure.[12] Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail similarly announced several measures to conserve fuel in Sevastopol in response to unspecified "recent developments" in occupied Crimea, likely referring to Ukrainian drone strikes.[13] Razvozhaev barred gas stations from selling fuel on June 22 and 23, shortened work hours of public transport and major retailers, suspended ferry operations, and cancelled all outdoor events starting June 22. Russian occupation officials have been increasingly tightening fuel restrictions across occupied Crimea in June 2026.[14] The Krasnodar Krai Operational Headquarters announced that Russia temporarily suspended ferry service via the Kerch Strait and advised freight traffic to detour along the M-14 highway (which Russian occupation officials denote as the R-280 highway) via occupied Mariupol, Melitopol, and Simferopol.[15] Russian officials notably restricted freight traffic across the Kerch Strait Bridge in January 2026, causing trucks to rely on ferries to transit the Strait.[16] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that there were only seven auto and rail ferries operating at the Kerch Strait crossing area and that possible damages to three of the ferries could significantly strain logistics between occupied Crimea and Russia.[17] Crimean occupation energy company Krymenergo introduced electricity consumption restrictions on June 21, citing unspecified accidents at Crimean power grid facilities.[18] Local Crimean social media users reported power outages in numerous Crimean cities, including Armyansk, Alushta, Simferopol, Sevastopol, and Dzhankoi.[19]

The Kerch Strait strikes are part of an ongoing systematic Ukrainian campaign to deny Russian forces the use of the main ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to occupied Crimea via occupied southern Ukraine. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi implied on June 21 that Ukrainian forces are trying to degrade the Kremlin's ability to use occupied Crimea as a springboard for offensive operations again by destroying Russian air defense systems, reducing of the Black Sea Fleet presence on the peninsula, and degrading Russian logistics, transportation nodes, and energy resources in the region.[20] The SBU similarly noted that the Ukrainian special operations, such as the Kerch Strait strikes, are necessary to disrupt Russian logistics and degrade Russian military potential, and the USF alluded to future strikes against.[21]

Russia has two main GLOCs into occupied Crimea — the "land bridge" that runs across occupied Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and the bridge and ferry connection across the Kerch Strait. Ukrainian forces have notably intensified their strikes against Russian GLOCs and energy infrastructure in occupied Kherson Oblast and Crimea in June 2026 after launching a simultaneous effort in May 2026 to deny Russian forces the use of the "land bridge."[22] The Ukrainian General Staff notably reported on June 21 that Ukrainian forces continued to strike railway bridges across the North Crimea Canal near occupied Rozdolne (Kherson Oblast) and near Chonhar (on the border of Kherson Oblast and Crimea), which Russian forces reportedly used to transport personnel and supplies.[23] Ukrainian forces are also conducting targeted strikes on Russian air defense and radar systems to enable further strikes against Russian logistics and are striking various oil infrastructure, such as gas compression stations, to deny Russian forces the ability to store fuel in occupied Crimea.[24] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces started a campaign targeting Russian maritime logistics between occupied Crimea and Krasnodar Krai in mid-2025 by targeting tankers and vessels in the Sea of Azov with unmanned surface and aerial vehicles (USVs and UAVs).[25] A combination of continued Ukrainian intermediate- and long-range drone strikes may further impose additional tactical to operational level dilemmas on Russian transport of personnel and equipment along both GLOCs and disrupt Russian fuel deliveries.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces are conducting a strike campaign to deny Russia's ability to sustain logistics and transport fuel across the Kerch Strait.
• Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil and transport infrastructure are already disrupting Russian logistics, straining energy supplies, and worsening fuel shortages across occupied Crimea.
• The Kerch Strait strikes are part of an ongoing systematic Ukrainian campaign deny Russian forces the use of the main ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to occupied Crimea via occupied southern Ukraine.
• Russian forces advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area, but this advance is not likely to be recent.
• Russian forces launched four missiles and 105 drones at Ukraine overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 20, 2026

Ukrainian forces continued to systematically strike bridges and other transport infrastructure supporting Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) that connect occupied Kherson Oblast with Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces struck a road bridge over the occupied Henichesk Strait, Kherson Oblast (approximately 120km from the frontline) overnight on June 20.[1] Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces use the bridge to transport supplies from occupied Crimea to Russian troops operating in southern Ukraine. A Ukrainian regiment published footage on June 20 showing Ukrainian strikes on a road bridge across the North Crimea Channel near occupied Voinka, Crimea (around 140 kilometers from the frontline) on June 17 and reported that the strikes damaged the bridge’s support columns and roadway.^[2] The regiment noted that this bridge is one of the few bridges that Russian forces can still use to cross the drained North Crimean Canal. Brovdi reported on June 20 that Ukrainian forces also struck unspecified Russian logistics transports near Armyansk and Chaplynka (approximately 81 and 54 kilometers from the frontline respectively); a roadstead tug near Skadovsk (approximately 55 kilometers from the frontline), and a fuel tanker near Chaplynka.[3] Ukrainian forces previously struck several bridges connecting occupied Kherson Oblast and Crimea and bridges over the North Crimea Canal throughout June 2026.[4] A Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) project analyzed satellite images collected on June 19 and confirmed that Ukrainian previous strikes significantly damaged the Henichesk bridge, leaving a single operational lane and prohibiting the movement of trucks.[5] The OSINT project reported that previous Ukrainian strikes against the Chonhar bridge also left a single operational lane for light vehicles while military equipment and trucks travel along the nearby pontoons.[6] The OSINT project assessed that Ukrainian strikes critically damaged a road bridge over the North Crimea Canal near Armyansk and that Russian officials built a new crossing over the drained canal. Ukrainian forces are increasing their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian GLOCs across occupied southern Ukraine, disrupting Russia’s ability to safely use supply routes from southwestern Russia to occupied Crimea.[7]

Ukrainian strikes on Russian transport and railway infrastructure are already disrupting Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and worsening Russian logistics on the left bank of occupied Kherson Oblast and Crimea. The commander of a Ukrainian artillery battery reported on June 20 that Russian forces are increasingly facing difficulties with logistics on the entire east (left) bank Kherson Oblast because Ukrainian forces systematically strike Russian GLOCs.[8] The commander added that Ukrainian strikes hinder Russian efforts to accumulate personnel, ammunition, and other supplies along the frontline in occupied Kherson Oblast. Russian train operator Grand Service Express announced on June 19 that all of the company's passenger trains traveling to and from occupied Crimea are shortening their routes and will be stopping at Kerch due to temporary closure of an unspecified section of the Crimean railway.[9] Grand Service Express did not specify the reason for the temporary closure, although it is possible that the closures could be in response to the recent Ukrainian strikes against trains traveling in occupied Crimea.[10] Russian forces increasingly have had to commit additional manpower resources to protect GLOCs from Ukrainian drone strikes. A Russian milblogger posted images on June 20 showing Russian mobile fire teams accompanying Russian fuel tankers driving to occupied Crimea.[11] Continued Ukrainian strikes against Russian GLOCs will likely have cascading battlefield effects and will likely degrade Russia’s ability to sustain logistics necessary for preparing offensive operations.[12]

Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian oil, gas, and energy infrastructure in occupied Crimea and Russia overnight on June 19 and 20. Geolocated footage published on June 20 shows a fire at a fuel and gas storage facility belonging to the Russian “TES” gas station company northwest of occupied Bakhchysarai, Crimea (northeast of Sevastopol).[13] A local Crimea-based Telegram channel, citing local reports, reported that there were at least 13 explosions in Bakhchysarai within one hour on June 20 and added that TES is the largest network of gas stations in occupied Crimea.[14] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi also reported that Ukrainian drone operators struck gas compression stations near occupied Zhuravlivka (approximately 120 kilometers from the frontline), Aromatne (approximately 220 kilometers from the frontline), Klyichi (approximately 212 kilometers from the frontline), and Lokhivka (approximately 212 kilometers from the frontline) in Crimea.[15] The NASA Fire Information for Resources Management System (FIRMS) recorded heat anomalies at the Tavriyska Thermal Power Plant (east of occupied Simferopol), and the local Crimea-based Telegram channel reported fire at the power plant following Ukrainian drone strikes and a series of explosions.[16] Adviser to the Ukrainian Defense Minister, Serhii Sternenko, reported on June 20 that Ukrainian forces targeted the Tyumen Oil Refinery (also known as the Antipinsky Oil Refinery) in Tyumen City – about 2,000 kilometers away from the international border between Russia and Ukraine.[17] Tyumen Oblast Governor Alexander Moor claimed on June 20 that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian drone attack against an unnamed oil refinery in Tyumen Oblast and that the attack did not damage the refinery.[18] Geolocated footage published on June 20 showed a smoke column at the Tyumen Oil Refinery.[19] Russian opposition outlet Astra, citing locals, reported that there were at least two explosions the area of the oil refinery and that at least 10 fire trucks arrived on scene.[20] Astra reported that the Tyumen Oil Refinery is one of the largest independent oil refineries in Russia with an annual processing capacity of around eight million tons of oil.[21] Continued systematic Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil, gas, and energy infrastructure in occupied Ukraine and Russia will likely continue to exacerbate Russian gas and fuel shortages.

Russian officials continue trying to mitigate rising gas prices as gas shortages spread across Russia amidst ongoing Ukrainian strikes against Russian energy infrastructure. St. Petersburg-based outlet Fontanka reported on June 20 that Russian federal subjects are experiencing widespread gasoline shortages and price increases despite denials from Russian officials.[22] Fontanka observed high gas prices and gas shortages in previously unaffected cities such as St. Petersburg, Voronezh, and Tula, and that Russian consumers are growing more frustrated about inconsistent pricing and availability of fuel across regions. Fontanka reported that some Russian gas station companies that are not part of vertically integrated oil companies are raising gas prices in an effort to prevent profit losses. Russian federal subjects are increasingly trying to mitigate and downplay the increasing gas prices and shortages, but Fontanka's reporting suggests that these efforts are not generating the desired effects at this time. Saratov Oblast officials noted on June 20 that they discussed the need to ensure a price cap at gas stations across Saratov Oblast despite increased demand and supply disruptions.[23] Russian opposition source Vazhnye Istorii reported on June 20 that the Tver Oblast Ministry of Industry and Trade introduced temporary gasoline sales restrictions at Surgutneftegaz and Tatneft gas stations.[24] Vazhnye Istorii added that Tula Oblast authorities reported fuel shortages at some gas stations on June 19 and attributed the situation to logistical problems and increased demand.[25] The Russian government will likely continue to struggle to uniformly mitigate gas price increases and gas shortages in the short- to medium-term given that intensified Ukrainian strikes against Russian energy infrastructure will likely continue to exacerbate existing shortages.[26]

Russian forces are trying to adapt to their use of strike drones to compensate for the sudden loss of Starlink and Ukraine’s intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and logistics in occupied Ukraine. The commander of a Ukrainian air defense anti-drone battalion reported on June 20 that Russian forces have reduced their use of BM-35 and BM-39 Italmas-type drones at operational depths after SpaceX blocked Starlink for Russian users on February 1, 2026.[27] Russian forces previously used Starlink-equipped BM-35 drones to strike dynamic moving targets in January 2026.[28] The commander noted that Russian forces are resuming the use of BM-35 and BM-39 drones at shorter distances as of June 2026 and added that successful Ukrainian interceptor strikes are forcing Russian forces to switch to using cheap reconnaissance drones (particularly the Knyaz Veshchy Oleg fixed-wing reconnaissance drones), fly reconnaissance drones at higher altitudes, and use interceptor drones to escort strike drones.[29] The commander noted that Russian Orlan-10 reconnaissance drones almost never fly over the frontline and instead fly at high speeds and for a short time. The commander stated that Russian reconnaissance drones fly in silent mode to avoid radio and electronic warfare (EW) detection. Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) advisor on defense technology and drone and electronic warfare (EW) expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov published footage on June 20 reportedly showing elements of the Russian BARS-Sarmat Unmanned Systems Special Purpose Center (formerly BARS-Sarmat Detachment) intercepting two Ukrainian strike drones along the M-14 Rostov Oblast-Crimea highway (which Russian occupation officials denote as the R-280 highway) near occupied Melitopol (approximately 67 kilometers from the frontline).[30] Beskrestnov noted that Ukraine’s strike campaign against Russian logistics is forcing Russian forces to use interceptor drones and highways to patrol ground lines of communication (GLOCs), including major highways in occupied Ukraine. Ukrainian forces are successfully leveraging Russia's loss of Starlink with Ukraine’s intermediate-range drone strike campaign to conduct strikes on dynamically moving and operationally-significant targets farther in the Russian rear in occupied Ukraine. Russian forces will likely need to further adapt their strike and interceptor drones as Ukraine continues its intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and logistics in occupied Ukraine.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces continued to systematically strike bridges and other transport infrastructure supporting Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) that connect occupied Kherson Oblast with Crimea.
• Ukrainian strikes on Russian transport and railway infrastructure are already disrupting Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and worsening Russian logistics on the left bank of occupied Kherson Oblast and Crimea.
• Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian oil, gas, and energy infrastructure in occupied Crimea and Russia overnight on June 19 and 20.
• Russian officials continue trying to mitigate rising gas prices as gas shortages spread across Russia amidst ongoing Ukrainian strikes against Russian energy infrastructure.
• Russian forces are trying to adapt to their use of strike drones to compensate for the sudden loss of Starlink and Ukraine’s intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and logistics in occupied Ukraine.
• Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka and Pokrovsk directions.
• Russian forces launched 99 drones against Ukraine on the night of June 19 to 20.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 19, 2026

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov rejected the peace conditions recently proposed by Ukraine and its European partners on June 7, demonstrating the Kremlin’s continued disinterest in peace proposals that do not accept Russian demands for Ukraine's capitulation. Lavrov published an essay on June 19 titled “Ukraine, Europe, and Global Security,” rejecting the five conditions for a just and lasting peace laid out in the joint statement proposed by Ukraine and its European partners on June 7.[1] France, the United Kingdom, and Germany issued a joint statement with Ukraine on June 7 proposing an immediate ceasefire, the resumption of negotiations, and freezing the current frontline as a starting point for negotiations.[2] Lavrov stated that Russia cannot continue meaningful negotiations with Europe, claiming that Europe cannot be a “third-party observer” or mediator of the peace negotiations due to its continued assistance to Ukraine.[3] Lavrov accused European leaders of using the premise of negotiations with Russia as a cover for “geopolitical expansion” and preparations for a claimed future attack against Russia, arguing that Russia cannot resume negotiations “through ultimatums” in reference to the June 7 proposal. The Kremlin has routinely tried to exclude European leaders from being involved in the peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine, including rejecting European peacekeepers and security guarantees and portraying the United States and Russia as the only relevant negotiating actors.[4] The Kremlin has also insisted that Ukraine, the US, and Europe accept Russia’s ultimatums.[5] Ukraine has repeatedly offered to arrange high-level peace negotiations with Russian officials, including Zelensky’s open letter to Putin on June 4, in which he offered a head of state leader-level meeting that Putin subsequently rejected.[6] The Kremlin’s routine rejection of negotiation meetings to discuss compromise peace proposals signals its continued unwillingness to end the war in Ukraine on any terms that do not amount to Ukraine’s full capitulation to Russia and fulfill Russia’s maximalist demands.

Lavrov reiterated that the Kremlin's unchanged negotiating position remains based on Russia's maximalist demands. Lavrov also asserted that Russia seeks to fulfill alleged agreements achieved during the August 2025 US-Russia Alaska Summit, despite the absence of any official documentation of any agreement achieved at the summit. Lavrov responded to several media questions on June 19 about the possible resumption of peace negotiations following US President Donald Trump’s recent expressed readiness to participate in peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine.[7] Lavrov added that Russia remains committed to the settlement plans that the United States allegedly proposed during the Alaska Summit in August 2025. Lavrov implied that Russian negotiators will continue to advance various efforts aimed at justifying the Russian invasion of Ukraine during upcoming negotiations with the US delegation. Lavrov also reiterated in his June 19 essay that Russia‘s maximalist demands include ensuring security of Russia’s western borders and European “guarantees” to respect Russian citizens‘ right to use the Russian language and protections of the Orthodox faith.[8] Neither the US nor Russia has released public statements or communiques about any agreement reached following the Alaska Summit, however, and the Kremlin has repeatedly exploited the lack of official documents codifying the outcomes of the Alaska Summit to conceal Russia’s continued unwillingness to compromise and commitment to its maximalist war aims.[9]

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov acknowledged the Ukrainian June 18 strikes on Moscow City and started to set information conditions to continue and intensify strike packages against Ukraine.[10] Peskov claimed on June 19 that Russian air defenses are performing well “despite everything,” likely referring to the large number of Ukrainian drones launched against Russia on June 18.[11] Peskov and Lavrov both claimed that Russia will continue to conduct regular strikes against Ukraine.[12] Russian milbloggers and Russia’s ultranationalist community continued emphasizing Russian air defense successes while expressing frustration with Russian citizens who undermined Russian operational security by publishing strike footage and its aftermath online.[13] Russian milbloggers also criticized the Russian command for not investing in air defenses against small targets such as drones, called for greater Russian commitment to the war effort, and encouraged continued Russian strikes against Ukrainian cities in an effort to trigger a mass exodus from major Ukrainian cities.[14] The Kremlin will likely use the Ukrainian strikes on Moscow City on June 18 to justify repeated devastating Russian large-scale strike packages against Ukraine. The Russian military was already significantly escalating its strike campaign against Ukraine well before Ukraine conducted its June 18 attack, however.[15]

The Russian Central Bank reduced its key interest rate to 14.25 percent as the bank’s leadership continues to advocate for a more cautious monetary policy. The Russian Central Bank announced on June 19 that it lowered its key interest rate from 14.5 to 14.25 percent, marking the lowest rate since October 2023.[16] The Russian Central Bank previously lowered its key interest rate on April 24 and March 20, 2026, both times by 50 basis points.[17] Russia’s Central Bank stated that pro-inflationary risks (or risk factors that increase inflation) are larger than disinflationary risks (economic risks associated with disinflation) in the medium term and acknowledged that the current decline in motor fuel production has raised pro-inflationary risk.[18] Russian Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina stated on June 19 that the recent spike in domestic fuel prices (a result of Ukraine’s strike campaign against Russian energy assets) has affected June's inflation rate and may increase inflation expectations, likely implying that the Russian Central Bank may need to change its calculations about the key interest rate if Ukraine’s strikes against Russian energy infrastructure and inflation persist.[19] Ukraine’s intermediate- and long-range strike campaigns against Russian oil refineries and logistics have significantly constrained Russia’s domestic gasoline supply and inflated fuel prices, and the Russian Central Bank’s and Nabiullina’s statements mark notable high-profile official acknowledgements of the impact of the Ukrainian strike campaign on the Russian economy in the short- and possibly medium-term.[20]

The reduction of the key interest rate amidst the Russian Central Bank's leadership's push for a more cautious monetary policy may indicate that the Kremlin is eroding the independence of the Russian Central Bank. Nabiullina has consistently advocated for a constrained monetary policy. Nabiullina stated on April 24 that the Central Bank had raised its average key rate forecast range as potential changes in Russia’s fiscal policy and geopolitical tensions significantly increased inflationary risks.[21] Nabiullina also claimed on April 16 that it is naive to think that higher inflation will lead to lower rates, as State Duma Committee on Financial Markets Chairperson Anatoly Aksakov advocated for a 150-basis point key rate cut (likely in order to support Russian business and war industry).[22] The Central Bank’s and Nabiullina’s acknowledgements that Russia's pro-inflationary risks are higher than disinflationary ones suggest the need for a tighter monetary policy, and continued key interest rate reductions indicate that the Bank’s leadership may be increasingly vulnerable to the Kremlin’s policy demands, and/or the demands of Russia’s war industry. ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin has exerted rising pressure on Nabiullina to lower the key interest rate to maintain the facade that Russia’s economy is stable and expand capital availability for the war industry despite expansionary fiscal policies exacerbating Russian inflation.[23] The Russian Central Bank’s recent key interest rate cuts contradict its leadership’s warnings about pro-inflationary pressures and the impact of Ukraine’s strike campaign on consumer fuel prices in Russia, which indicates that the Kremlin may be eroding the Bank’s independence in order to support Russia’s war industry and portray the Russian economy as stable.

Ukraine’s intermediate- and long-range strike campaign against Russian fuel infrastructure continues to strain gasoline supplies. Russian authorities continue to impose fuel rationing in Russia and occupied southern Ukraine while some authorities deny that Russia is facing fuel supply shortages. The Financial Times (FT) reported on June 15, citing French open-source analyst Clement Molin, that verified footage confirms that Ukraine conducted no fewer than 375 drone strikes against Russian trucks and vehicles in occupied Ukraine since May 2026 – half of which occurred on the M-14 Rostov Oblast-Crimea highway (which Russian occupation officials denote as the R-280 highway).[24] FT noted that Crimean residents spend hours in line at gas stations due to supply shortages. A Local Crimea-based Telegram channel claimed that almost 25 percent of Russian gas stations, including 85 Tatneft locations, 2,200 Rosneft locations, and all Lukoil, Teboil, and Neftmagistral gas stations, imposed restrictions on gasoline purchases.[25] Russian officials continue to deny the gasoline shortages and purchase restrictions, however. Russian state majority-owned oil company Rosneft Chief Executive Officer Igor Sechin claimed on June 19 that Rosneft did not impose any restrictions on refueling vehicles at gas stations and noted that Rosneft guarantees a stable fuel supply for Russian consumers.[26] The Russian Cabinet of Ministers announced on June 19 that Russia intends to ensure a stable supply of petroleum products and prevent “localized market imbalances.”^[27] Intensified Ukrainian strikes against Russian energy infrastructure will likely cause shortages to continue to spread across Russia and exacerbate existing shortages that the Russian government will not be able to ignore.[28]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov rejected the peace conditions proposed by Ukraine and its European partners on June 7, demonstrating the Kremlin’s continued disinterest in peace proposals that do not accept Russian demands for Ukraine's capitulation.
• Lavrov reiterated that the Kremlin's unchanged negotiating position remains based on Russia's maximalist demands. Lavrov also asserted that Russia seeks to fulfill alleged agreements achieved during the August 2025 US-Russia Alaska Summit, despite the absence of any official documentation of any agreement achieved at the summit.
• Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov acknowledged the Ukrainian June 18 strikes on Moscow City and started to set information conditions to continue and intensify strike packages against Ukraine.
• The Russian Central Bank reduced its key interest rate to 14.25 percent as the bank’s leadership continues to advocate for a more cautious monetary policy.
• The reduction of the key interest rate amidst the Russian Central Bank's leadership's push for a more cautious monetary policy may indicate that the Kremlin is eroding the independence of the Russian Central Bank.
• Ukraine’s intermediate- and long-range strike campaign against Russian fuel infrastructure continues to strain gasoline supplies. Russian authorities continue to impose fuel rationing in Russia and occupied southern Ukraine while some authorities deny that Russia is facing fuel supply shortages.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.
• Russian forces launched 90 drones against Ukraine on the night of June 18 to 19.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 18, 2026

Ukrainian forces conducted a large-scale strike against Russia on the night of June 17 to 18, heavily targeting Moscow City and striking the Moscow Oil Refinery for the second time in two days. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Moscow Oil Refinery (also know The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian air defense downed 555 Ukrainian drones overnight on June 17 to 18 and claimed later on June 18 that Russian forces downed 992 drones and four missiles in the past day.[3] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that the strikes against Moscow City were in response to the Russian strike on the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra on June 14 to 15.[4] Geolocated footage published on June 18 shows Ukrainian fixed-wing drones flying over Moscow City and a fire at the Moscow Oil Refinery.[5] All four airports in the Moscow City air hub — Vnukovo, Domodedovo, Zhukovsky, and Sheremetyevo — grounded flights due to the Ukrainian strikes.[6]in “oil rain.”[7] Moscow City Mayor Sergei Sobyanin acknowledged on June 18 that Ukrainian forces struck and started a fire at the Moscow Oil Refinery.[8] Moscow Oblast Governor Andrey Vorobyov acknowledged on June 18 that Ukrainian drones struck Moscow Oblast overnight on June 17 to 18 and on the morning of June 18, causing fires and damaging infrastructure.[9]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Gukovo Oil Depot in Rostov Oblast, causing a fire at the facility.[10] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the refinery stores and ships fuel and lubricants. Rostov Oblast Governor Yuriy Slyusar acknowledged a drone strike and fire in Gukovo.[11] Geolocated footage published on June 17 shows a fire near the Gukovo Oil Depot.[12] Yaroslavl Oblast Governor Mikhail Evrayev claimed that Ukrainian drone strikes forced Russian authorities to close traffic on the Yaroslavl City-Moscow City highway.[13]

Russian milbloggers responded to the strikes on Moscow City by remarking on the domestic realities of the war and expressed concerns about Russian air defenses and censorship. A Russian milblogger noted in a since deleted post that Ukrainian forces were able to inflict substantial damage despite Moscow City’s highly effective air defense syste[14] The milbloggers stressed that Ukraine is bringing the war to areas of Russia beyond the border regions and emphasized Russia's need to strengthen air defenses around facilities across the countr One milblogger also criticized Russian state media for downplaying the strikes and not presenting an accurate picture of reality.[16]  Th. Another milblogger added that Russia needs to change its approach or else official reports will be even more removed from reality than they w.[17] Another milblogger criticized Russian state media for reporting on the far off "special military operation" (the Kremlin's phrase for Russia's war against Ukraine) that only affected Ukraine - not Russia - and for dismissing reports of Ukrainian battlefield movements as "news."[18] The milblogger noted that Russians can now "see with their own eyes" that Russian state media claims that "everything is going well" do not correspond with reality.

Russian state media coverage of the strikes emphasized the Kremlin's information control efforts while downplaying the impacts of the strikes themselves. Russian opposition media source Meduza reported on June 18 that major Russian state media TV channels Perviy Kanal and NTV did not cover the Ukrainian strikes on Moscow City in their daytime broadcasts, that the Rossiya-1 channel only quoted official statements, and that none of the channels ran a separate strike report.[19] Meduza noted that Russian news channels instead primarily focused on the need to punish residents who film the strikes and their aftermath.

Repeated Ukrainian strikes against heavily defended Russian deep rear areas like Moscow City continue to expose Russia's weaknesses and inability to defend its domestic populace. SW continues to assess that the increasing frequency, size, and depth of Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign against heavily defended major Russian cities like Moscow and St. Petersburg demonstrate growing vulnerabilities in Russian air defenses and dilemmas in how the Kremlin chooses to interact with the domestic costs of the war it started.[20] Ukraine's overnight strike series was able to generate substantial damages,ussian milblogger claimed that Russian forces achieved a high interception rate of about 90 percent.[21] Ukraine appears to be increasing its drone capabilities such that even relatively low numbers of drones reaching their targets are generating significant effects.

Reported shortages of some Russian air defense interceptors may be exacerbating Russia's strained air defense resources. CBS News reported on June 17, citing three Ukrainian officials familiar with Russian intelligence estimates, that Russia is experiencing a shortage of S-300 air defense missiles but did not quantify the shortage.[22] A Ukrainian official told CBS News that Russia has an insufficient quantity of key components for the S-300 interceptor missiles, including guidance seekers and control modules, due to Western sanctions. CBS noted that Russia has increasingly turned to more advanced air defense systems to defend against missile strikes, with two officials noting that Russian forces have repurposed S-300 missiles for surface-to-surface strikes against Ukraine. The sources noted that Russia still has other systems that are more advanced than the S-300 to defend against strikes. CBS added, however, that Ukrainian strikes with more advanced drones have forced Russian forces to repel drone strikes with interceptor missiles that they would traditionally use against missiles – likely depleting Russia's stocks of more advanced interceptors as the stocks of S-300 missiles also decline.

The K claims of a recent alleged Ukrainian strike on a civilian passenger bus in Russia to justify its next massive long-range strike package against Ukraine. Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reported on June 18 that it intercepted official internal Russian reports concluding that Ukraine did not strike a passenger bus in Bryansk Oblast on June 17, refuting Russian and Belarusian officials' claims that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against a bus in Bryansk Oblast that was transporting a Belarusian children’s soccer team.[23] The SBU stated that internal reports from Russia's "Safe Region" state public institution for Bryansk Oblast concluded that Russia did not detect any Ukrainian drones or other objects near the area where Russian officials accused Ukraine of striking the bus.[24] Russian and Belarusian officials capitalized on the alleged strike on June 17, and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko additionally accused Ukraine on June 18 of using the strike to provoke Belarus and to drag Belarus into the war.[25] Russian and Belarusian claims about the alleged June 17 strike follow similar Russian claims in recent weeks that aim to legitimize Russia’s large-scale strike packages against Ukraine as responses to Ukraine’s alleged strikes against civilians.[26]

Russia is reportedly importing to respond to domestic shortages that are likely to worsen as the summer continues. Reuters reported on June 17, citing four industry sources, that Russia will import by sea in June 2026 to manage the gasoline shortages throughout Russia.[27] The sources stated that Russia will receive gasoline cargo shipments at one of its western ports. Reuters' sources added that Russia is also increasing gasoline imports from Belarus and has previously imported smaller volumes from Kazakhstan but that neither Belarus nor Kazakhstan have sufficient reserve capacity to support Russia if the shortages worsen. A source reported that Russia previously considered importing gasoline by sea in 2025 but that domestic supply ultimately was sufficient. Russia suffered from a similar gasoline crisis in late Summer 2025 due to Ukraine's long-range strike campaign at that time, but the 2026 shortages are hitting at the start of the high summer demand season such that the shortages this year will likely be significantly worse than year.[28] Russia's decision to import gasoline from Asia in 2026 after not doing so in 2025 also suggests that the shortages this year will be worse. Ukraine has struck Russia's western ports including those near, which will likely threaten efforts to import gasoline via western ports.[29]

Ukraine’s European allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine, including via the purchase of US-produced weapons. Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov announced on June 17 that the Netherlands will allocate 250 million euros (about $286 million) to develop Ukraine's drone capabilities and another 250 million euros for the purchase of US weapons through the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) initiative that funds the purchase of US-made weapons for Ukraine.[30] Fedorov stated that Ukraine and the Netherlands also signed an agreement on defense innovation and cooperation between defense enterprises and that the Netherlands will soon launch production of Ukrainian long- and intermediate-range dro German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius announced on June 18 that Germany will allocate $200 million to PURL and $200 million to the JUMPSTART program, which supports the purchase of PAC-3 interceptor missiles for Patriot air defense systems for Ukraine.[31] Pistorius stated that Ukraine and Germany signed an agreement to develop anabilities and to jointly produce the Termit unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) in Germany.[32] UK Defense Secretary Dan Jarvis announced on June 18 that the UK will provide Ukraine with 150,000 drones and 350 air defense missiles and radars by the end of 2026 as part of a loan package of 752 million pound (about $992 million) backed by proceeds from frozen Russian assets.[33] The Swedish Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on June 18 that it will allocate $108 million to PURL.[34] Belgian Defense Minister Teo Franken announced on June 18 that Belgium will give Ukraine seven F-16 fighter jets in 2026, including three ready for use and four for spare parts.[35]  Fedorov added on June 17 that the Ukrainian MoD expects to receive at least $60 billion in international aid in 2026 and that Ukraine's partners have already announced $40 billion so far this year, including over $20 billion from an EU loan.[36]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces conducted a large-scale strike against Russia on the night of June 17 to 18, heavily targeting Moscow City and striking the Moscow Oil Refinery for the second time in two days.
• Russian milbloggers responded to the strikes on Moscow City by remarking on the domestic realities of the war and expressed concerns about Russian air defenses and censorship.
• Repeated Ukrainian strikes against heavily defended Russian deep rear areas like Moscow City continue to expose Russia's weaknesses and inability to defend its domestic populace.
• The Kremlin is already setting conditions to weaponize claims of a recent alleged Ukrainian strike on a civilian passenger bus in Russia to justify its next massive long-range strike package against Ukraine.
• Russia is reportedly importing gasoline from unspecified Asian countries to respond to domestic shortages that are likely to worsen as the summer continues.
• Ukraine’s European allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine, including via the purchase of US-produced weapons.
• Russian forces recently marginally advanced in the Slovyansk direction.
• Russian forces launched seven Iskander-M ballistic missiles/S-400 air defense missiles and 239 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 17, 2026

The Group of Seven (G7) reaffirmed its unified support for Ukraine and its interest in re-engaging in peace talks to end the war in Ukraine. The G7 leaders issued a joint statement on June 17 outlining their agreement to increase deliveries of air defense systems and interceptors and long-range capabilities to Ukraine.[1] The G7 members stated that they will strengthen sanctions against Russia, including on Russia's oil and gas sector. A source close to the G7 summit told Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne that the memorandum of understanding (MOU) that the United States and Iran will sign on June 19 has allowed G7 leaders to re-focus on Ukraine.[2] The source added that the G7 leaders, including US President Donald Trump, acknowledged how much Ukraine has achieved since the last G7 summit in June 2025 and suggested that Trump is ready to participate in peace talks again as the situation in Ukraine has now changed. Two senior EU diplomats told Politico on June 16 that Trump is starting to form a deal in which he backs Europe on the war in Ukraine in exchange for European help demining the Strait of Hormuz.[3] Bloomberg also reported on June 17, citing sources familiar with the matter, that European Council President Antonio Costa established contact with Russia as part of efforts to end the war in Ukraine.[4] Bloomberg stated that Costa’s top adviser held two calls with an unspecified senior Russian official close to Putin in preparation for more substantive future talks. The Kremlin's apparent willingness to engage in peace talks with Europe comes as Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's repeated invitations for a head-of-state-level meeting with Putin, suggesting that the Kremlin remains committed to its effort to cut Ukraine out of the negotiating process completely.[5]

The United States, Europe, and Ukraine are reportedly in talks to extend US licenses to produce US weapons abroad, but it is unclear where this production would take place. The G7 joint statement outlined that the G7 is "ready to consider" providing Ukraine with licenses to increase Ukraine's military production — possibly referring to requests for the United States to allow production of Patriot interceptors in either Ukraine or Europe.[6] It is unclear, however, if the G7 summit reached an agreement on the matter, and there are conflicting reports about where this production would take place. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz responded on June 17 to a question about German defense companies' possible involvement in licensed weapons production in Ukraine, stating that the participating states will separately discuss the "broad licensing," including for European manufacturers.[7] French newspaper Le Parisien reported on June 17 that a diplomatic source stated that the United States and European G7 states agreed to produce air defense systems and long-range missiles “under licenses” in Ukraine.[8] An official of a G7 state told Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne that the G7 leaders spoke with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky about extending licenses to allow Patriot interceptor production in Europe, however.[9] The official stated that the United States has committed to looking into the matter but has not made a final decision.[10] Expanding production of air defense missiles for Ukraine would significantly replenish Ukraine's stock of Patriot interceptors and help Ukraine repel Russian ballistic missiles.

Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign against Russian energy infrastructure continues to cause gasoline shortages across the country, hindering Russia's crude oil production and pushing Russia to maximize crude oil exports. Russian independent outlet The Bell reported on June 16 that 53 Russian regions and all five occupied regions of Ukraine are implementing gasoline sale restrictions for private vehicles and that gas stations in 11 Russian regions have not implemented any restrictions but are nonetheless experiencing shortages.[11] The Bell noted that 18 Russian regions and all of occupied Ukraine have restricted sales to 50 liters (13.2 gallons). Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign is also impacting Russia’s oil production and exports. The International ‌Energy Agency (IEA) reported on June 17 that Russian crude oil production in May 2026 dropped to 8.7 million barrels per day — a roughly five percent drop compared to May 2025 and 10 percent below the May 2026 target.[12] The IEA noted that Russian crude oil exports increased to 5.2 million barrels per day in May 2026 — an increase of 490,000 barrels per day compared to May 2025. The IEA added that Ukrainian strikes are forcing Russia to prioritize oil product supply for the domestic market and to maximize crude oil exports. Bloomberg additionally reported on June 16 that Russia's average crude oil shipments between May 17 and June 14 reached 3.83 million barrels per day — the highest so far in 2026.[13] Bloomberg noted, however, that Russian shipments of crude oil from June 7 to June 14 decreased to 3.82 million barrels per day from 3.89 million between May 31 and June 7. Bloomberg cited data from the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) showing that Russian oil output in May 2026 averaged 9.01 million barrels a day — 690,000 barrels below Russia’s production target under the OPEC agreement. Bloomberg added that Russia has just above 120 million barrels of oil on vessels at sea ready to export — a roughly 25 percent increase from April 2026. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger acknowledged on June 17 that Russia's increased oil exports are partly due to decline in Russia’s oil refining capacity.[14] The US sanctions waiver for Russian oil and petroleum products on vessels at sea is set to expire on June 17 and the United States did not extend the waiver, which will likely intensify Russia's challenges with exporting crude oil on vessels already at sea.[15] Ukrainian forces have significantly increased the frequency, range, and intensity of their strikes against Russian energy infrastructure deep in the Russian rear in 2026, which are imposing costs on Russian domestic fuel supplies, oil exports, and refining capacity.[16]

Russia appears to be capitalizing on an alleged Ukrainian strike to narratively align Belarus with its recent information operations that aim to justify devastating Russian strikes against Ukraine. Acting Bryansk Oblast Governor Yegor Kovalchuk claimed on June 17 that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against a passenger bus in Bryansk Oblast that was transporting a children's Belarusian soccer team from Gomel, Belarus, to Gelendzhik, Krasnodar Krai, killing a woman and injuring six, including four children.[17] The Ukrainian General Staff denied the Russian claims, stating that Ukrainian forces did not conduct any drone strikes against Bryansk Oblast during the time of the alleged strike.[18] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Russian statements about the alleged strike are false and part of an information operation. Russian officials claimed Ukraine deliberately targeted civilians.[19] ISW is unable to independently verify Russian claims regarding the strike. Belarusian officials also condemned the alleged Ukrainian strike.[20] Belarusian rhetoric paralleled that of Russia with claims that Ukraine conducted the strike in order to provoke a "harsh" Belarusian response and escalate the war.[21] Russian and Belarusian claims about the alleged June 17 strike follow similar Russian claims in recent weeks that Russia's large-scale strike packages against Ukraine are justified responses to Ukraine's alleged strikes against civilians.[22]

Key Takeaways:

• The Group of Seven (G7) reaffirmed its unified support for Ukraine and its interest in re-engaging in peace talks to end the war in Ukraine.
• The United States, Europe, and Ukraine are reportedly in talks to extend US licenses to produce US weapons abroad, but it is unclear where this production would take place.
• Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign against Russian energy infrastructure continues to cause gasoline shortages across the country, hindering Russia's crude oil production and pushing Russia to maximize crude oil exports.
• Russia appears to be capitalizing on an alleged Ukrainian strike to narratively align Belarus with its recent information operations that aim to justify devastating Russian strikes against Ukraine.
• Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces recently advanced.
• Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign continues to force Russian authorities to restrict airspace across several Russian oblasts. Russian forces launched 119 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 16, 2026

Russian authorities and energy companies are increasingly restricting the sale of gasoline and diesel in Russia as Ukraine's long-range strikes against Russian oil infrastructure cause shortages. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on June 16, citing the hotlines of Russian gas station operators, that Russian state oil company Rosneft, Republic of Bashkortostan-owned fuel company Bashneft, and Rosneft subsidiary TNK have banned the sale of gasoline in fuel canisters in all Russian federal subjects, citing "increased seasonal demand."[1] Verstka reported that these gas station operators are also restricting fuel sales writ large, with some hotline operators advising customers to check restrictions at their local gas stations as they change daily, and other operators describing fuel sale limits at about 90 liters (23.7 gallons) per customer in unspecified regions of Russia. Russian news agency Interfax reported on June 16 that the Republic of Tatarstan-owned fuel company Tatneft introduced temporary limits on gasoline and diesel fuel sales at all its gas stations in Russia and is only accepting cash payment for gasoline and diesel.[2] Interfax reported that Tatneft gas stations in Chelyabinsk City are limiting sales of gasoline to 30 liters (7.9 gallons) per passenger car and limiting diesel sales to 60 liters (15.8 gallons) per passenger car and 300 liters (79.2 gallons) per truck. Russian sources reported that Tatneft had begun limiting sales of gasoline and diesel fuel in Moscow City, St. Petersburg, and Kazan as of June 12.[3] Radio Free Liberty/Radio Europe (RFE/RL) reported on June 16 that authorities and diesel companies, including Tatneft and its subsidiary TANECO, have imposed gasoline and diesel restrictions in Samara, Ulyanovsk, Orenburg, and Nizhny Novgorod oblasts and the republics of Tatarstan, Chuvashia, and Udmurtia.[4] These restrictions follow Ukraine's strikes against the Republic of Tatarstan's two largest oil refineries on the night of June 11 to 12, and at least one of the refineries reportedly halted operations following the strikes.[5] A Russian insider source claimed that central Russia, the Volga Federal Okrug, Siberia, and the Far East are increasingly suffering shortages of AI-92 and AI-95 gasoline.[6]

Russia will likely continue to struggle with fuel shortages writ large throughout the summer due to increased demand. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 16 that Ukrainian intermediate- to long-range strikes against 16 oil refineries in an unspecified time frame have reduced overall Russian refining capacity by 30 percent, that Russian oil production has fallen to around nine million barrels per day, and that Russian gasoline production has fallen to a 16-year low.[7] Russia reportedly recently extended its decision to allow some refineries to release substandard gasoline and diesel to the domestic market due to the ongoing shortages.[8] Ukraine’s intensified strike campaign against Russian refineries and Russian logistics since March 2026 has renewed shortages across occupied Ukraine and extended to some Russian regions.[9] Further Ukrainian strikes against Russian energy infrastructure will likely cause shortages to continue to spread across Russia and exacerbate existing shortages.[10]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to express willingness to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin — an invitation the Kremlin continues to reject. Zelensky met with US President Donald Trump on the sidelines of the G7 summit in France on June 16, and Trump stated that Russia “should make a deal” with Ukraine to end the war.[11] Zelensky stated on June 16 that he wants to have peace talks with Putin before the beginning of Winter 2026-2027 in a "neutral country" and stated that the United States could be a venue for such talks.[12] Zelensky stated on June 15 that he and Trump discussed on June 14 the possibility of Ukraine and Russia holding peace negotiations in the United States in a format that is more difficult for Putin to refuse.[13] Zelensky offered on June 15 to meet Putin at the G7 summit in France but stated that Russia did not provide a clear response.[14] Kremlin Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov claimed on June 16 that Russia has not received any offers to organize a meeting between Putin and Zelensky in the United States and added that Putin and Trump did not discuss the possibility of a meeting with Zelensky in the United States during their June 14 phone call.[15] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on June 16 that Zelensky did not invite Putin to meet on the sidelines of the G7 summit.[16] Ukraine has repeatedly offered to arrange high-level peace negotiations with Russian officials, including Zelensky’s open letter to Putin on June 4, in which he offered a head of state leader-level meeting that Putin subsequently rejected.[17] The Kremlin's routine rejection of such meetings signals its continued unwillingness to end the war in Ukraine on any terms that do not amount to Ukraine’s full capitulation to Russia.

Russia reportedly has one remaining operational Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) left in its arsenal but will likely seek to manufacture more. A Ukrainian private intelligence and data analysis company Dallas Analytics reported on June 16 that Russian President Vladimir Putin issued a directive to expedite the production of four additional Oreshnik IRBMs following the first Oreshnik strike on Dnipro City in November 2024.[18] Dallas Analytics added that Russia has since fired three out of the four Oreshniks in 2026 — one in Lviv Oblast on the night of January 8 to 9, and two in Bila Tserkva, Kyiv Oblast, and the reported failed strike in which an Oreshnik crashed in occupied Donetsk Oblast on the night of May 23 to 24, which would leave Russia with one operational Oreshnik from the original contract.[19] Russia's source, reportedly from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed to Dallas Analytics that Oreshnik manufacturing facilities bypassed the quality-assurance protocols to meet Putin’s deadlines. Dallas Analytics reportedly obtained sensitive Russian procurement documents from March 2025 suggesting that a vulnerability within the Soviet-designed GU-503 aviation gyroscope has compromised the Oreshnik IRBM’s precision guidance capabilities, causing the missile to deviate tens of kilometers from its intended target.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian authorities and energy companies are increasingly restricting the sale of gasoline and diesel in Russia as Ukraine's long-range strikes against Russian oil infrastructure cause shortages.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to express willingness to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin — an invitation the Kremlin continues to reject.
• Russia reportedly has one remaining operational Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) left in its arsenal but will likely seek to manufacture more.
• Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces recently advanced.
• Russian forces launched two ballistic missiles and 132 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 15, 2026

Russian forces conducted another devastating large-scale drone and missile strike series against Ukraine on the night of June 14 to 15, heavily targeting Kyiv, Dnipro, and Kharkiv cities. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 70 missiles — including six Zirkon hypersonic cruise missiles, 34 Iskander-M ballistic missiles/S-400 air defense missiles, and 30 Iskander-K/Kh-101 cruise missiles.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 611 Shahed-, Gerbera-, and Italmas-type strike drones; Banderol loitering munitions; and Parodiya decoy drones. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed five Zirkons, 15 Iskander-Ms/S-400s, 30 Iskander-Ks/Kh-101s, and 582 drones; that 20 ballistic missiles and 27 drones struck 42 locations; and that debris fell on 12 locations. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russian strikes injured at least 53 people and killed at least 11 across Ukraine, including at least 35 injured and five killed in Kyiv City alone.[2] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, energy, and education infrastructure in Kyiv, Dnipro, and Kharkiv cities and that the strikes left 140,000 residents in Kyiv City without power.[3] Ukrainian Internal Affairs Minister Ihor Klymenko reported that Russian forces conducted a double-tap strike against first responders who were responding to the initial Russian strike against Kharkiv City, killing five first responders.[4] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces also struck Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Sumy, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Mykolaiv oblasts.[5] The June 14-15 strike series is the second strike in June 2026 with 70 or more missiles.[6] ISW continues to assess that Russian President Vladimir Putin is employing massive strike packages against Kyiv City in an effort to break Ukraine’s will to fight as well as to disguise his weakness, particularly his inability to secure Russian territory, including Russia’s capital, from Ukraine’s deep strikes.[7]

Russian forces continue to adapt their strike tactics to maximize damages. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that Russia's overnight strike package differed from other recent massive missile strikes in that Russian forces did not use Kalibr cruise missiles and instead used Iskander-K cruise missiles.[8] Ihnat stated that Ukrainian forces, including F-16 fighter jets, air defense systems, and mobile fire groups, downed all of the Russian cruise missiles on June 14 to 15. Ihnat stated that drones and missiles struck from different directions such that both direct hits and falling debris from intercepted air targets caused destruction. Ihnat stated that Russian forces also flew the drones at lower altitudes and used fast jet-powered drones, making them harder to intercept.

Russian strikes damaged significant cultural sites in Kyiv, Dnipro, and Kharkiv cities. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra (a historic monastery) and the Dovzhenko Film Studio in Kyiv City; the Dnipro House of Organ and Chamber Music in Dnipro City; and the Kharkiv Art Museum in Kharkiv City.[9] The United Nations (UN) Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) condemned the strike on the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra and related monastic buildings, including the Saint-Sophia Cathedral.[10]

The Russian information space is trying to deflect blame for the June 14 to 15 strikes by either blaming Ukraine for the damage or justifying the strikes as militarily necessary. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that "confirmed reports" indicate that a Ukrainian Patriot interceptor missile struck the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra.[11] Ihnat noted that missile debris on the ground after the strike could have been from a Ukrainian air defense missile that likely shot down a Zirkon ballistic missile, but refuted the MoD's claim, stating that Ukrainian investigations have already established that a Russian Geran-2 drone struck the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra.[12] Ihnat reported that Russian sources are exploiting the presence of Patriot missile fragments to claim that Ukraine's own missiles damaged cultural sites. Ukraine's Center for Countering Disinformation similarly reported that Russia launched a large-scale disinformation campaign trying to justify massive strikes against Kyiv City cultural sites by claiming that the cultural sites are military targets or that Ukrainian forces are to blame for the damage.[13] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed that the West fabricated claims that Russia struck the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra and reiterated the Russian MoD's claim that a Ukrainian Patriot interceptor missile struck the site.[14] Other Russian officials also claimed that Ukraine staged the strike on the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra and that Ukraine is only accusing Russia of the strike to provoke a response.[15]

Russia appears to be perpetuating sophisticated information operations that use artificial intelligence (AI)-generated footage of flag raisings to fabricate claims of Russian tactical successes in Kostyantynivka. Footage published on June 15 shows Russian forces holding Russian flags on the western outskirts of Kostyantynivka, in southwestern Kostyantynivka, and in Dovha Balka (southwest of Kostyantynivka).[16] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on June 15 that Russian forces seized Dovha Balka.[17] ISW has reason to believe that the Russian flag raising videos may be AI-generated, which would be consistent with previous Russian information operations that use AI footage to claim battlefield advances.[18]

Ukrainian 19th Army Corps Commander Brigadier General Alexander Bakulin assessed on June 15 that Russia is conducting information operations about the situation Kostyantynivka.[19] Bakulin reported that Russian commanders have already reported up the chain of command that Russian forces have seized Kostyantynivka and are now attacking to make these reports reality. Bakulin noted that the Russian 4th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, SMD) recently published a high-quality video showing Russian servicemembers with Russian flags, whom Bakulin reported Ukrainian forces struck soon after. ISW continues to assess that the Russian MoD, sources associated with Russian 4th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade, and Russian state media have been engaged in informational efforts over the past few days that aim to aggrandize alleged Russian successes in Kostyantynivka.[20]

Ukrainian officials continue to report that only about 100 to 150 Russian servicemembers have infiltrated into Kostyantynivka, however. Bakulin stated that there are an estimated 93 to 153 Russian infiltrators within Kostyantynivka and that estimates of 250 to 300 Russian soldiers are somewhat exaggerated.[21] Bakulin noted that Russian forces practiced their use of infiltration tactics in the seizure of Pokrovsk but that Ukrainian forces in Kostyantynivka are taking “stronger counteractions” than they did in Pokrovsk. Bakulin added that a “very large number” of Russian units are operating in the Kostyantynivka direction and that Ukrainian logistics in the area are no worse than in other sectors of the frontline. Ukrainian servicemembers told independent Ukrainian online media outlet Hromadske in an article published on June 12 that there are between 100 and 250 Russian servicemembers operating in Kostyantynivka’s center.[22]

Ukraine's tactical situation in Kostyantynivka is deteriorating, but the Russian MoD is falsely framing the potential future seizure of Kostyantynivka as a harbinger of the immediate seizure of the entire Fortress Belt and the rest of Donetsk Oblast. The Russian MoD claimed on June 14 and 15 that Ukraine is preparing for the “imminent” loss of Kostyantynivka, Druzhkivka, and Kramatorsk and the subsequent loss of the “entire” Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration, given the ongoing “rapid” Russian advances in Kostyantynivka.[23] Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin and the commander of the Russian 1194th Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade) similarly claimed on June 14 and 15 that Russia’s seizure of the Kramatorsk-Slovyansk agglomeration depends on the seizure of Kostyantynivka.[24] Russian officials and sources have repeatedly claimed that the seizure of various settlements and towns in Donetsk Oblast, such as Pokrovsk, Chasiv Yar, and Siversk, opens the way to the Russian seizure of the whole region and will lead to the inevitable fall of the heavily fortified Fortress Belt.[25] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will likely make tactical gains in Kostyantynivka in Summer 2026, but remain unlikely to achieve a rapid operational breakthrough against the Fortress Belt writ large.[26] Russian forces would need to continue fighting through the rest of the Fortress Belt’s fortified cities and their environs, and Russian forces have not optimized their force for maneuver or urban warfare. Russia's ongoing cognitive warfare efforts about Kostyantynivka aim to further the Kremlin's false narratives that Ukrainian defenses are on the verge of collapse and that the Russian seizure of Donetsk Oblast is a matter of time in order to push the West and Ukraine to quickly cede to Russia's demands.[27] It is unclear when — if at all — Russian forces would be able to seize Donetsk Oblast, given Russia's slowing rate of advance, however.[28]

Ukraine continues to express willingness for a leader-level meeting with Russia while the Kremlin demonstrates its continued pursuit of maximalist war aims and a total intransigence to negotiate. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on June 15 that he offered to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin at the G7 summit in France to negotiate an end to Russia’s war in Ukraine, but that Russia demonstrated it was not ready to speak.[29] Zelensky stated that the United States and Europe agreed to invite Putin to the summit. Reuters reported that a Ukrainian official stated that Ukraine delivered the invitation directly to its Russian counterparts but did not receive a clear response. Zelensky's latest invitation to meet Putin follows repeated Ukrainian offers for direct negotiations in recent weeks, including Zelensky’s open letter to Putin on June 4, in which he offered a leader-level meeting that Putin subsequently rejected.[30] Russia, in contrast, remains committed to an end to the war only if Ukraine capitulates to its maximalist military and political demands. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on June 15 that Russia remains committed to the agreement the United States and Russia allegedly made during the August 2025 Alaska Summit.[31] Lavrov claimed that the European Union and the United Kingdom are sabotaging these alleged Alaska agreements.[32] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin has been exploiting the lack of public agreements from the Alaska Summit to falsely portray Russia as a willing negotiator. [33]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted another devastating large-scale drone and missile strike series against Ukraine on the night of June 14 to 15, heavily targeting Kyiv, Dnipro, and Kharkiv cities.
• Russian forces continue to adapt their strike tactics to maximize damages.
• Russian strikes damaged significant cultural sites in Kyiv, Dnipro, and Kharkiv cities.
• The Russian information space is trying to deflect blame for the June 14 to 15 strikes by either blaming Ukraine for the damage or justifying the strikes as militarily necessary.
• Russia appears to be perpetuating sophisticated information operations that use artificial intelligence (AI)-generated footage of flag raisings to fabricate claims of Russian tactical successes in Kostyantynivka.
• Ukrainian officials continue to report that only about 100 to 150 Russian servicemembers have infiltrated into Kostyantynivka, however.
• Ukraine's tactical situation in Kostyantynivka is deteriorating, but the Russian MoD is falsely framing the potential future seizure of Kostyantynivka as a harbinger of the immediate seizure of the entire Fortress Belt and the rest of Donetsk Oblast.
• Ukraine continues to express willingness for a leader-level meeting with Russia while the Kremlin demonstrates its continued pursuit of maximalist war aims and a total intransigence to negotiate.
• Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 14, 2026

British forces intercepted a Russian shadow fleet vessel in the English Channel for the first time on June 14. United Kingdom (UK) Prime Minister Keir Starmer stated on June 14 that British forces intercepted a Russian shadow fleet oil tanker attempting to pass through the English Channel.[1] The British Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on June 14 that British forces intercepted the UK-sanctioned crude oil tanker Smyrtos, which was flying the Cameroonian flag, marking the first time the UK has intercepted a shadow fleet vessel.[2] The British MoD noted that British officials will provisionally move the Smyrtos to an anchorage off the South Coast of England and will monitor it for safety concerns. Russian investigative opposition source The Insider reported, citing data from the Starboard Maritime Intelligence ship-tracking platform, that several Russian shadow fleet tankers bound for the English Channel abruptly changed course after the UK detained the Smyrtos.[3] European states have been increasingly seizing Russian shadow fleet tankers in 2026.[4] ISW continues to assess that Russia’s ability to sell oil is partially a function of its ability to transport it, and continued EU efforts against the Russian shadow fleet will degrade Russia’s ability to transport oil.[5]

US President Donald Trump spoke with both Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Russian President Vladimir Putin on June 14. Zelensky reported on June 14 that he had a phone conversation with Trump about peace negotiations, the latest developments on the battlefield, and how Ukraine's position has strengthened.[6] Kremlin Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov stated on June 14 that Trump and Putin had a phone conversation and discussed the war in Ukraine and the situation in Iran, and that Trump emphasized the need to end the war in Ukraine.[7]

The Russian military command is reportedly planning to relocate remaining Black Sea Fleet (BSF) command structures out of occupied Crimea. Crimea-based Ukrainian partisan group Atesh reported on June 14 that its agents in the headquarters of the BSF reported that the BSF military command is planning to relocate its remaining command structures currently based in occupied Sevastopol to Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, as BSF headquarters are steadily losing functionality amid severe logistics issues due to Ukraine's intensified strike campaign against Crimea.[8] Atesh agents reported that some officers are already moving their families out of Sevastopol and selling non-movable assets ahead of expected future orders. Russia is increasingly struggling to conduct logistics into occupied Crimea, with the Russian military command of the Eastern Grouping of Forces (GoF) reportedly prohibiting military cargo traffic along the M-14 Rostov-Crimea and the A-291 Kerch — Simferopol — Sevastopol Tavrida highways as of June 7.[9] ISW is unable to verify Atesh's report at this time, but ISW has increasingly observed evidence that Ukrainian strikes are inhibiting Russian logistics into occupied Crimea.[10]

Key Takeaways:

• British forces intercepted a Russian shadow fleet vessel in the English Channel for the first time on June 14.
• US President Donald Trump spoke with both Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Russian President Vladimir Putin on June 14.
• The Russian military command is reportedly planning to relocate remaining Black Sea Fleet (BSF) command structures out of occupied Crimea.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole directions.
• Russian forces launched 98 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 13, 2026

Russian forces are increasing the production rate and modernization of their ballistic missiles and drones. Available information suggests that Russia’s monthly missile production surpasses the US’ monthly PAC-3 Patriot air defense interceptor missile production. Chief Researcher of the Ukrainian State Research Institute for Armament Testing and Certification Colonel Oleksandr Zaruba reported on June 13 that Russian forces are producing between 40 and 50 Kh-101 cruise missiles, between 60 and 70 Iskander-M ballistic missiles, and around 10 Iskander-K cruise missiles monthly as of Spring 2026.[i] Zaruba noted that Russian forces are integrating technical solutions from the North Korean KN-23 ballistic missile into the Iskander-M ballistic missile to increase production.[ii] The United States currently produces around 600 PAC-3 Patriot interceptor missiles per year, or about 50 missiles per month according to the US Department oas of early 2026.[iii] Zaruba noted that Russian forces doubled the payload weight of Kh-101 warheads and modernized them to be harder for Ukrainian forces to detect and intercept.[iv] Zaruba stated that Ukrainian forces observed Russian Kh-101 missiles with automatically activating thermal decoys and chaff that disrupt radar systems during the recent strikes on Kyiv City and noted that the missile has a terrain navigation system that scans terrain to increase strike accuracy. Zaruba stated that Russian Iskander-M ballistic missiles have updated countermeasures that imitate the missile's signature to overload Ukrainian radars. Zaruba assessed that Russia is creating a new version of the Iskander-M called the Iskander-1000 with a range of up to 1,000 kilometers. Zaruba noted that Russia is working to launch drones from tactical aviation to make it harder for Ukrainian air defenses to detect these drones during strikes up to 1,000 kilometers in depth.[v]

Russia’s increasingly large and diverse strike packages highlight the critical importance of Western assistance in bolstering Ukraine’s air defense capabilities. Russian forces consistently deploy Kh-101, Iskander-M, Iskander-K, and Shahed/Geran drones to strike Ukraine and will likely use these technological adaptations to increase the scale and scope of the damage such strikes inflict. US-made Patriot air defense systems that can effectively counter Russian ballistic missiles remain critical for Ukrainian air defenses. Ukraine has also been trying to secure production licenses for Patriot interceptor missiles from the United States to allow for production in Ukraine.[vi] Ukraine has also recently tested its first anti-missile interceptor as an alternative to the PAC-3 interceptors and is working with its European partners on a joint anti-ballistic system.[vii] US and international investment into these efforts may also help bolster Ukrainian air defenses against the growing Russian missile threat.

Russia's is reportedly increasing military spending even as Russian revenues decrease. German Institute for International and Security Affairs economist Janis Kluge assessed on June 12, citing data from the Russian Finance Ministry, that Russian military spending reached 5.9 trillion rubles (about $81.4 billion) or 46 percent of the total budget spending in the first quarter of 2026 - 30 percent higher than military spending in the first quarter of 2025.[viii] Kluge reported that Russia's budget law called for military spending to decrease from 7.8 percent of GDP in 2025 to 6.2 percent in 2026 but that military spending in the first quarter of 2026 already accounted for 2.5 percent of Russia's expected GDP for all of 2026. Kluge reported that Russia's revenue was only 8.3 trillion rubles (about $114.5 billion) in the first four months of 2026, indicating that military spending is equivalent to about two-thirds of Russia's budget revenues. Kluge reported that the higher military spending in January to April 2026 is in large part due to higher classified spending, which grew by 43 percent from the first quarter of 2025 and reached 38.2 percent of all federal budget expenditures in the first quarter of 2026. Kluge added that Russia's 2026 budget law stated that about 85 percent of classified expenditures go to the Russian military. Kluge noted, however, that the Russian Finance Ministry may have moved military spending from the fourth quarter of 2025 to the first quarter of 2026 in order to avoid violating 2025 b or that Russia may have frontloaded classified spending more in 2026 than in previous years. Kluge's assessment is in line with recent Ukrainian intelligence reports that overall Russian government spending for the first four months of 2026 was 15.7 percent more than the first four months of 2025 and that military spending, social programs, and support for unspecified sectors of the economy are taking up increasing shares of Russian government spending.[ix] Russian President Vladimir Putin has recently tried to portray Russia's economic performance as strong and stable, ignoring the issues Russia's economy is facing after over four years of war.[x]

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree marginally increasing the authorized end strength of the Russian military as part of ongoing Russian military reforms. Putin signed a decree on June 12 setting the strength of the Russian Armed Forces at 2,399,130 total personnel, including 1,510,000 military personnel.[xi] Putin last issued such a decree on March 4 increasing the authorized end strength of the Russian Armed Forces to 2,391,770 total personnel, including 1,502,640 military personnel.[xii] Putin's June 12 decree is therefore an increase of 7,360 military personnel. The June 12 decree is unlikely to impact the battlefield situation in Ukraine. Russia has expanded the authorized end strength of the Russian Armed Forces nearly every year since launching the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and the 2026 expansions continue to be the smallest so far. Putin signed decrees increasing the size of the Russian military by 137,000 in 2022, 170,000 in 2023, and 180,000 in 2024.[xiii] ISW continues to assess that the increases support the expansion of the Russian force structure announced under then-Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu in January 2023, as the formation of new Russian military districts, formations, and subordinate units requires more personnel to fully staff them.[xiv]

Russia's growing long-range strike campaign against cities across Ukraine reportedly contributed to record high civilian casualties in the war in May 2026. United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) reported on June 12 that conflict-related violence in Ukraine in May 2026 killed at least 274 civilians and injured 1,763 – the highest number of civilian deaths and injuries in Ukraine since April 2022.[xv] The UN HRMMU reported that the high number is mostly due to Russia's use of powerful weapons against urban areas, including strikes with missiles and glide bombs against areas far from the frontline. The UN HRMMU reported that short-range drone strikes were the primary cause of civilian casualties near the front, with more civilians dying or sustaining injuries in this manner in May 2026 than in any other month in the full-scale invasion. The report noted that civilian casualties have historically increased during the spring and summer seasons but that the 2026 casualties so far are significantly higher than in previous years. Russia forces launched three large series of missile strikes against Ukraine in May 2026 that targeted major cities like Kyiv City and resulted in significant civilian casualties.[xvi]

Unknown actors attempted to assassinate a former Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) official with an improvised explosive device (IED) on June 12. Russian sources reported that an explosion occurred at the house of Andrei Pinchuk in Shchapovo (just south of Moscow City) after a courier delivered a package, but that Pinchuk survived the assassination attempt.[xvii] Pinchuk is a retired colonel in the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) who served as the DNR Minister of State Security from 2014 to 2015 and is a leader of veteran organization Union of Donbas Volunteers.[xviii]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces are increasing the production rate and modernization of their ballistic missiles and drones. Available information suggests that Russia’s monthly missile production surpasses the US’ monthly PAC-3 Patriot air defense interceptor missile production.
• Russia’s increasingly large and diverse strike packages highlight the critical importance of Western assistance in bolstering Ukraine’s air defense capabilities.
• Russia's is reportedly increasing military spending even as Russian revenues decrease.
• Unknown actors attempted to assassinate a former Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) official with an improvised explosive device (IED) on June 12.
• Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces advanced on June 13.
• Russian forces launched 118 drones against Ukraine overnight. Ukrainian forces struck energy and military infrastructure in Russia overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 12, 2026

 Russian forces may launch an Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) at Ukraine in the next 24 to 48 hours. The Ukrainian Air Force warned on June 12 that there is a "high probability" that Russian forces will launch an unspecified IRBM from the Kapustin Yar missile launch site in Astrakhan Oblast within the next day.[1] Ukrainian outlet RBK Ukraine reported on June 12, citing an informed source in the Ukrainian government, that the United States warned Ukraine about the threat of a Russian Oreshnik IRBM strike.[2] The Kremlin has launched Oreshniks at Ukraine at least three times in the missile's operational history, at least two of which were in 2026.[3] The Kremlin has particularly escalated its long-range strike campaign against Ukraine since Ukraine's own long-range strike campaign exposed Russian President Vladimir Putin's inability to reliably defend his capital, St. Petersburg, and other Russian cities from Ukrainian strikes, underlined in how Putin had to ask Zelensky for permission to hold Russia’s May 9 Victory Day celebration in Moscow.[4] The Kremlin's possible decision to launch another Oreshnik at Ukraine would be part of this escalation pattern and would likely be an effort to posture strength following the June 12 Russia Day holiday.

 Russian President Vladimir Putin continued to posture Russian military strength during Russia’s June 12 Russia Day holiday while also acknowledging some of the battlefield setbacks Russian forces have faced in recent months. Putin and Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov met with Russian soldiers who emphasized their commitment to a military victory in Ukraine and achieving Putin’s goals and objectives on June 12.[5] Putin lauded Russian military technological innovations, particularly in first-person view (FPV) drones, integrating artificial intelligence (AI) into drones, scaling up tactical electronic warfare (EW) systems, and Russian efforts to create a satellite constellation alternative to Starlink in order to present the Russian military as a technologically advanced and developing force. Putin also emphasized recent social support measures for Russian soldiers, veterans, and their families. Putin also reiterated long-held Kremlin rhetorical lines portraying Russia as fighting a war against NATO and reiterated Russia's strength in fighting this war. Putin likely intended to use the meeting with Russian servicemembers to project strength for the Russia Day celebrations following the embarrassment of his scaled-down Victory Day Parade on May 9 and a successful Ukrainian long-range strikes on Russian military assets in St. Petersburg, Leningrad Oblast during the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) from June 3 to 6.[6]

Putin seems to have started acknowledging some of the setbacks the Russian military is currently facing but did not discuss the full extent of Russia's military challenges. Putin claimed that Ukraine’s drone strikes are an effort to sow discord in Russian society and cause economic damage, likely referring to Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and oil infrastructure in Russia and intermediate-range interdiction campaign in occupied Ukraine that is causing fuel shortages and major logistics problems.[7] Putin claimed that Russia is strengthening its air defenses and the Russian economy is quickly recovering from Ukrainian strikes, however, and threatened retaliatory strikes against Ukraine. Putin also acknowledged that Russian forces are not advancing "as quickly as we [Russia] would like" but hedged that Russian forces are still advancing "every day gradually."[8] Putin notably did not acknowledge that Ukrainian counterattacks have made tactical gains in Zaporizhia and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts since March 2026. The Russian rate of advance across the battlefield has been steadily declining since November 2025 and Russian forces suffered a net loss of territory (not counting areas into which Russian troops have infiltrated) in April and May 2026.[9] Putin likely chose to acknowledge some of the setbacks Russian forces are facing to appear more in touch with the battlefield realities to Russian servicemembers who have directly experienced these setbacks. Ukraine has been increasing the scale and scope of its long-range and intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian logistics, military equipment, and manpower since early Spring 2026, which has impeded Russian advances across the theater and is disrupting Russian logistic routes across occupied Ukraine, particularly in southern Ukraine and into occupied Crimea.[10]

 A Russian State Duma Deputy from the Communist Party criticized the Kremlin and the broader Russian war-waging strategy ahead of Russia Day, contradicting the Kremlin's narrative. State Duma Deputy Vyacheslav Markhaev published a post on both his personal Telegram and VKontakte channels on June 11 accusing the Kremlin of using events such as the Russian Victory Day and SPIEF to demonstrate a false sense of prosperity and "personal enrichment of the elite" amid ongoing bans, restrictions, and a growing financial burden on regular Russians while not taking measures to help Russians with these issues.[11] Markhaev acknowledged that Ukrainian forces are expanding the geographical extent of their long-range strikes against Russia and accused the Russian political elite of losing touch with the needs of the Russian people. Markhaev criticized the Kremlin for publicly limiting its war goals from all of Ukraine to just the areas of Ukraine that Russia has claimed to have annexed and asserted that Russia needs a clear, public plan for finishing the war in Ukraine based on Russia’s national interests. ISW has observed no indication that Markhaev‘s social media accounts have been hacked. Russian state-owned media and Russian milbloggers, including those affiliated with the Kremlin, have not amplified Markhaev’s statements as of this writing.

 Russian sources released several pieces of footage showing Russian forces operating in Kostyantynivka as part of a deliberate cognitive warfare effort to exaggerate the Russian presence in the city. Russian forces continue to make tactical gains within Kostyantynivka, however, and Ukraine’s ability to defend the southeastern sections of the city is deteriorating. Russian sources, including a Telegram channel associated with the Russian 4th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade and Russian state newspaper Izvestia, published several pieces of geolocated footage on June 11 and 12 of Russian servicemembers operating in northern, western, central, and southwestern Kostyantynivka in what ISW assesses were a series of Russian infiltration missions likely conducted over several days.[12] Ukrainian servicemembers told independent Ukrainian online media outlet Hromadske in an article published on June 12 that there are between 100 and 250 Russian servicemembers operating in Kostyantynivka’s center and that Russian soldiers infiltrate into Kostyantynivka one at a time every six to seven hours.[13] The geolocated footage is geographically dispersed across a wider area than that which a force of 100 to 250 Russian servicemembers could effectively hold, however, indicating that Russian servicemembers filmed infiltration missions over a period of time so that Russian sources could release the footage all at once in order to create the perception that the Russian presence in Kostyantynivka is more widespread than it actually is. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces curated the release of some combat footage, and the timing and sequencing of those releases are part of the Kremlin’s cognitive warfare effort aimed at aggrandizing Russian advances to falsely portray the Ukrainian line as collapsing across the theater.[14] Russian forces have previously released flag raisings and AI-generated videos as part of this cognitive warfare effort.[15] Footage showing Russian servicemembers during and after infiltration missions — many of which are ultimately not successful — does not intrinsically indicate Russian control of terrain or a change in the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA), although Russian forces are advancing in Kostyantynivka at a rate slower than what the Kremlin would have observers believe. These Russian sources likely released the footage in a coordinated manner as part of a broader Kremlin effort to project strength, possibly in connection with the June 12 Russia Day holiday.

Russian forces continue making tactical gains in Kostyantynivka — Russia’s assessed main effort for the Spring-Summer 2026 offensive — and have likely consolidated some tactical positions within the city beyond infiltration. These gains have taken Russian forces a long time to achieve and have come at a great cost. The depth of the Russian infiltrators in the geolocated footage published on June 11 and 12 suggests that Russian forces have likely consolidated positions in southern Kostyantynivka and south of the T-0504 highway west of Kostyantynivka at a prior date.[16] Geolocated footage published June 11 and 12 also suggests and statements from Ukrainian officials confirm that Russian forces advanced in northwestern Kostyantynivka at a prior date.[17] A Ukrainian servicemember told Hromadske in an article published on June 12 that Russian servicemembers move through Berestok (south of Kostyantynivka) to Illinivka (north of Berestok) before infiltrating into Kostyantynivka, indicating that Russian forces have likely consolidated positions between Berestok and Illinivka.[18] A Ukrainian officer told Hromadske that Russian forces have wedged themselves into an unspecified part of the center of Kostyantynivka and explicitly stated that Russian actions within the city are ”no longer infiltration.” ISW has adjusted its control of terrain assessment by expanding Russian advances in Kostyantynivka on the basis of the available footage and reporting and will continue to update its assessment as more evidence becomes available.

Russian forces have been attempting to seize Kostyantynivka for 10 months after the seizure of Toretsk (southeast of Kostyantynivka) in August 2025, and have only advanced roughly a depth of eight to 10 kilometers toward and into Kostyantynivka in that time.[19] Russian forces significantly intensified offensive operations against Kostyantynivka in March 2026, and Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian military command set the deadline to seize Kostyantynivka by May 2026 — a deadline Russian forces have since failed to meet.[20] Russian forces conducted a roughly platoon-sized mechanized assault in Kostyantynivka in March 2026.[21] Russian forces also reportedly redeployed elements of the Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Division (18th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) to the Kostyantynivka-Chasiv Yar area in December 2025, likely in preparation for the Spring 2026 offensive operations against Kostyantynivka.[22] Russian forces have concentrated at least one CAA and army corps (AC) in the Kostyantynivka area and have also deployed elements of several other armies to support offensive operations against the city.[23] Russian forces also reportedly replenished 80 percent of their units attacking Kostyantynivka as of June 6.[24] Russian forces’ redeployment pattern in the Kostyantynivka direction indicates that Russian forces have sustained significant losses in their effort to advance on Kostyantynivka.

Russian forces will likely make tactical gains in Kostyantynivka in Summer 2026 but remain unlikely to achieve a rapid operational breakthrough against the Fortress Belt writ large. Russian forces will likely continue to infiltrate throughout Kostyantynivka and consolidate positions in certain areas of the city but will likely suffer high casualties in doing so.[25] Russia’s 3rd AC (under the operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) appears to be struggling to push Ukrainian forces from Chasiv Yar (northeast of Kostyantynivka), inhibiting their ability to envelop Kostyantynivka from the north.[26] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on June 12 that Ukrainian forces cleared part of the industrial zone in central Kostyantynivka and multi-story buildings on the western outskirts of Kostyantynivka.[27] The milblogger acknowledged that Russian forces are a long way from seizing Kostyantynivka. Russian forces have also struggled to make significant advances in Lyman and toward Slovyansk, despite prioritizing the area since March 2026.[28] ISW is not prepared to forecast whether or when Russian forces may seize Kostyantynivka. The loss of Kostyantynivka likely would not collapse the larger Fortress Belt or enable a Russian operational breakthrough as Russian forces would also need to continue fighting through the rest of the Fortress Belt’s fortified cities and their environs, and Russian forces have not optimized their force for maneuver warfare.

Russia is building at least five long-range drone launch sites in western Russia close to the border with Belarus likely to support drone strikes against Ukraine, possibly by exploiting Belarusian airspace. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s (RFE/RL) Belarusian service reported on June 10 that Russia began constructing five drone launch sites at existing airfields or brand-new sites in Bryansk, Oryol, and Smolensk oblasts between 45 and 200 kilometers from Russia’s international border with Belarus since Summer 2024.[29] RFE/RL reported that Russian forces are actively launching long-range strike drones against Ukraine from four of the sites — the Shatalovo Military Airfield in Smolensk Oblast, the Tsymbulova drone port in Oryol Oblast, and the launch sites near Navlya and Osavitsa, Bryansk Oblast. RFE/RL reported that Russian forces launched drones from the Seshcha Military Airfield in Bryansk Oblast from 2022 to 2023 and currently only use the airfield as a hub for military aviation and cargo. RFE/RL noted that Russia has been expanding most of these sites’ storage and launch capabilities, including installing launchers for jet-powered Shahed drones at the Shatalovo Airfield. Ukrainian military expert Anatoly Khrapchinsky stated to RFE/RL that the geographical location of these sites allows Russian forces to conduct direct strikes on Kyiv City or along the border to western Ukraine and can pass through Belarusian airspace to reach western Ukraine. Khrapchinsky noted that Russian drones can use Belarusian-based communication and relay channels to maintain stable communication with drones and added that the proximity of the launch sites to the Belarusian border increases the likelihood of Russian drones flying into Belarusian airspace due to technical malfunctions or electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian Air Forces Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that close proximity of the launch sites to the Ukrainian border allows Russia to increase the payloads of these drones without requiring more fuel. ISW continues to assess that Russia is establishing military infrastructure in and around Belarus and is setting informational conditions to further use Belarus for its own military purposes and may seek to justify launching drone strikes at Ukraine from Belarus.[30] Russia’s growing drone infrastructure in the vicinity of Belarus and the ability to operate drones in Belarusian airspace can additionally support future Russian military contingencies against NATO’s eastern flank.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces may launch an Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) at Ukraine in the next 24 to 48 hours.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin continued to posture Russian military strength during Russia’s June 12 Russia Day holiday while also acknowledging some of the battlefield setbacks Russian forces have faced in recent months.
• A Russian State Duma Deputy from the Communist Party criticized the Kremlin and the broader Russian war-waging strategy ahead of Russia Day, contradicting the Kremlin's narrative.
• Russian sources released several pieces of footage showing Russian forces operating in Kostyantynivka as part of a deliberate cognitive warfare effort to exaggerate the Russian presence in the city. Russian forces continue to make tactical gains within Kostyantynivka and Ukraine’s ability to defend the southeastern sections of the city is deteriorating, however.
• Russian forces continue making tactical gains in Kostyantynivka — Russia’s assessed main effort for the Spring-Summer 2026 offensive — and have likely consolidated some tactical positions within the city beyond infiltration. These gains have taken Russian forces a long time to achieve and have come at a great cost.
• Russian forces will likely make tactical gains in Kostyantynivka in Summer 2026 but remain unlikely to achieve a rapid operational breakthrough against the Fortress Belt writ large.
• Russia is building at least five long-range drone launch sites in western Russia close to the border with Belarus likely to support drone strikes against Ukraine, possibly by exploiting Belarusian airspace.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and in the Oleksandrivka direction.
• Ukrainian forces struck Russian oil infrastructure on the night of June 11 and 12. Russian forces launched 117 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 11, 2026

Ukrainian forces continue to interdict several bridges that support ground lines of communication (GLOCs) connecting occupied Kherson Oblast to Crimea. Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo claimed on June 11 that Ukrainian forces struck several bridges connecting occupied Kherson Oblast and Crimea: a bridge over the North Crimean Canal near occupied Preobrazhenka and Myrne; the Perekop-Armyansk Road Bridge; and the Stavky Road Bridge overnight.[1] The Stavky, Myrne, and Armyansk bridges run over the North Crimean Canal and along the M-17 Armyansk-Oleshky highway.[2]  Saldo added that Ukrainian strikes against the bridges caused unspecified damage. The commander of a Ukrainian regiment operating in the Kherson direction reported on June 11 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian logistics route to occupied Crimea through Armyansk, damaging or destroying roughly 50 Russian military cargo vehicles carrying fuel and ammunition.[3] The commander stated that Russian forces diverted logistics to the Armyansk route after Ukrainian strikes on the night of June 7 to 8 and on June 9 damaged the Chonhar bridge.[4] Saldo temporarily closed traffic via the Chonhar bridge on June 9 due to damage following the strike.[5] The commander stated that Ukrainian forces were able to strike this concentration of vehicles at least in part due to the previous Ukrainian strikes against Mariupol and the road to Berdyansk. The commander stated that the previous strikes forced Russian forces to supply the Hulyaipole direction using GLOCs from Crimea instead of GLOCs stemming from occupied Donetsk Oblast. Geolocated and satellite imagery published on June 10 shows the aftermath of Ukrainian strikes on two bridges south of Henichesk and near Armyansk.[6] A Russian monitoring Telegram channel commented on Saldo’s report, claiming that Ukrainian strikes on the night of June 10 to 11; on the night of June 7 to 8; and on June 9 temporarily disabled all land routes to occupied Crimea from occupied Kherson Oblast and that Ukrainian forces seriously damaged Chonhar Bridge.[7] Ukrainian forces are increasing their mid-range strike campaign against Russian GLOCs across occupied southern Ukraine, disrupting Russia's ability to safely use supply routes from southwestern Russia to occupied Crimea. Continued Ukrainian strikes against Russian GLOCs will likely have cascading battlefield effects and may complicate Russian preparations for offensive operations.

Russian occupation authorities are struggling to address worsening gasoline shortages in occupied Sevastopol, likely due to Ukrainian long- and intermediate-range strikes against Russian logistics and energy infrastructure. Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhaev stated on June 10 that the Sevastopol occupation administration was unable to issue a new batch of QR codes for fuel purchases, as fuel trucks were unable to reach Sevastopol on June 9 due to unspecified reasons.[8] Razvozhaev introduced a policy on June 6, requiring customers to use a pre-purchased QR code, which citizens can only access via the Russian state-controlled Max messenger app, to purchase gasoline in occupied Sevastopol.[9] Crimean occupation authorities have been increasingly tightening restrictions on gasoline purchase in recent weeks as Ukraine‘s successful strike campaign against Russian transport arteries has caused shortages of gasoline and basic goods in occupied Crimea.[10] Occupation authorities have also tightened restrictions to 20 liters (5.283 gallons) per week from the previous restriction of 20 liters per day as shortages continue to worsen.[11]

Ukrainian forces appear to have achieved a tactical drone overmatch on the battlefield and are intensifying middle-range strike campaign, reportedly driving higher Russian casualties on the battlefield amidst declining recruitment rates. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on June 11 that the Ukrainian first-person view (FPV) drones outnumber Russian FPV drones on the battlefield by a ratio of 1.5 to one and that this advantage is growing.[12] Syrskyi stated that Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces struck almost 180,000 verified targets in May 2026 alone — up 27 percent from April 2026. Syrskyi stated that Ukrainian forces conducted approximately 2,000 mid-range strikes, including against 414 Russian headquarters, control points, and personnel concentrations in May 2026 alone. Syrskyi added that Ukrainian forces completed 12,500 frontline tasks using the unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs). Finnish President Alexander Stubb stated on June 7 that Ukrainian forces killed or wounded about 35,000 Russian soldiers per month, while Russian forces recruited about 27,000 soldiers per month in the past six months.[13] Stubb noted that the ratio of killed Russian soldiers to Ukrainian soldiers is eight to one, up from the previous three to one. Stubb added that Ukrainian forces fired more missiles and drones at Russia than the Russian defense could repel for the first time in March 2026. Syrskyi similarly reported on June 11 that Ukrainian forces killed 12,500 more Russian soldiers than Russian forces managed to recruit since the beginning of 2026 — a figure consistent with Stubb’s statement. Syrskyi noted, citing information from military intelligence, that Russian forces are facing personnel shortages in the unmanned systems units, noting that only 14,500 people signed military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) — 21 percent of the annual recruitment plan for drone and unmanned systems specialists.

Ukraine has been increasing its mid-range strike campaign against Russian logistics, military equipment, and manpower since early Spring 2026, which has impeded Russian advances across the theater and is disrupting Russian logistic routes across occupied Ukraine, particularly in southern Ukraine and into occupied Crimea.[14] Russian forces are simultaneously struggling with an increasing casualty rate that has recently exceeded Russia’s recruitment rate in late 2025 and throughout 2026.[15]

Russia is establishing new and expanding existing military bases along its northern border with NATO, likely in order to support future Russian force projection capabilities against NATO. ISW assesses that Russian forces remain unlikely to conduct ground operations in the near-term, however. Norwegian, Swedish, and Danish broadcasters and a Baltic news portal reported on June 10 that satellite imagery shows that Russian forces are building and expanding their military bases along the border with Nordic and Baltic countries.[16] Danish intelligence officers and senior military officials told Danish broadcasting company DR that Russian forces are engaging in preparation for conflict rather than showing signs that the Kremlin has made a confirmed decision to go to war, especially as the majority of Russian forces are still fighting in Ukraine.[17] Former Finnish intelligence officer Marko Eklund told DR that the Russian command plans to have about 115,000 troops stationed at the northern border with NATO after the end of the war in Ukraine and that Russian forces began the construction of a new base in Novaya Vilza near Petrozavodsk (approximately 190 kilometers from the Finnish border), Republic of Karelia, which will accommodate between 4,000 and 6,000 personnel.[18] Finnish Army Chief Pasi Valimaki told Swedish broadcaster SVT that Finland expects Russia to station 80,000 soldiers at the Russia-Finland border.[19] A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that the Russian command is relocating unspecified elements of the 44th Army Corps (Leningrad Military District [LMD]), except for the command post, to the Republic of Karelia. The source claimed that the elements of the command post are currently stationed in Luga, Leningrad Oblast, and have been waiting to move to Petrozavodsk when Russia finishes constructing the bases.[20] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on June 11 that Russian forces are modernizing at least 19 barracks, infrastructure, and storage facilities in Pechenga (approximately 11 kilometers from the Finnish border) on the Kola Peninsula, Murmansk Oblast and expanding a naval infantry base and armored vehicle and landing-craft fleet near Baltiysk, Kaliningrad Oblast.[21]  Russia is establishing these bases to support potential future military actions against NATO, though such ground operations remain unlikely, as most of Russia's combat power is participating in operations in Ukraine. The establishment of these bases will support Russian efforts to more rapidly project forces against NATO following the end of active fighting in Ukraine, however, and NATO must be prepared to deter and, if necessary, defeat a Russian threat against its borders relatively quickly following the end of combat in Ukraine. 

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to fabricate evidence as part of its cognitive warfare effort to support false claims of advance. The Russian MoD posted footage on June 11, which it claimed showed elements of the Russian 126th Motorized Rifle Regiment (71st Guards Motorized Rifle Division, 14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) seizing Okhrimivka (northeast of Kharkiv City).[22] A local Kharkiv Oblast Telegram channel pointed out on June 11 that the official Russian Northern Grouping of Forces (GoF) Telegram channel had posted the same footage on June 10, claiming that it showed Russian forces striking Ukrainian forces near Ruska Lozova (just north of Kharkiv City and roughly 66 kilometers from Okhrimivka).[23] Russia has increased the sophistication of its cognitive warfare effort over the last several months, producing more complex montages with high-production editing and using artificial intelligence (AI) footage to make claims of advance in areas where Russian forces do not maintain enduring positions.[24] These videos are part of the Kremlin's systematic cognitive warfare effort to aggrandize Russian advances through exaggerated claims of gains and infiltration missions in an attempt to portray them as a sweeping, broad-front advance to falsely portray the frontline as collapsing across the theater, contrary to all available evidence.[25]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces continue to interdict several bridges that support ground lines of communication (GLOCs) connecting occupied Kherson Oblast to Crimea.
• Russian occupation authorities are struggling to address worsening gasoline shortages in occupied Sevastopol, likely due to Ukrainian long- and intermediate-range strikes against Russian logistics and energy infrastructure.
• Ukrainian forces appear to have achieved a tactical drone overmatch on the battlefield and are intensifying middle-range strike campaign, reportedly driving higher Russian casualties on the battlefield amidst declining recruitment rates.
• Russia is establishing new and expanding existing military bases along its northern border with NATO likely in order to support future Russian force projection capabilities against NATO. ISW assesses that Russian forces remain unlikely to conduct ground operations in the near-term, however.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to fabricate evidence as part of its cognitive warfare effort to support false claims of advance.
• Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate- to long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure and military assets on June 10 and 11. Russian forces launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles and 221 drones against Ukraine overnight.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 10, 2026

Russian forces recently made tactical gains in Kostyantynivka – Russia's assessed main effort for the Spring-Summer 2026 offensive. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on June 10 that two Russian tactical groups, the “Bakhmut” tactical group and the “Dzerzhinsk" (Toretsk) tactical group have advanced south of and into eastern Kostyantynivka.[1] Mashovets noted that the “Bakhmut” tactical group is mostly composed of the 3rd Army Corps (under the operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces). Mashovets stated that the "Dzerzhinsk" tactical group is operating in the area of responsibility of the 8th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]), and likely includes elements of the 3rd, 8th, 58th, 51st, and 49th CAAs [all of the SMD]); the 3rd AC; and Russian naval fleets. Mashovets reported that elements of the Bakhmut tactical group advanced from Stupochky (east of Kostyantynivka) through Novodmytrivka (immediately north of Kostyantynivka) and into northeastern Kostyantynivka and also along the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Bakhmut road up to the Kostyantynivka railway station. Mashovets claimed that Russian forces also seized the southern part on Novodmytrivka. Mashovets reported that elements of the ”Dzerzhinsk“ tactical group advanced from Illinivka (south of Kostyantynivka) into several areas stretching from northwestern Kostyantynivka to southwestern Kostyantynivka near the Kostyantynivka railway station. Mashovets assessed that the ”Dzerzhinsk” tactical group has likely been successful in achieving tactical breakthrough in western (central) part of Kostyantynivka. Mashovets reported that forward assault elements of the two tactical groups are roughly two kilometers away from each other. Mashovets noted that Russian forces have failed to seize the Kostyantynivka railway station itself and that Ukrainian forces cleared Dovha Blaka (southwest of Kostyantynivka) of Russian infiltrators.

Russian forces began their campaign for Kostyantynivka in Summer 2025 after completing the seizures of Chasiv Yar and Toretsk – settlements northeast and southeast of Kostyantynivka, respectively. The Russian campaign for Kostyantynivka began in August 2025 after Russian forces seized Toretsk and the majority of Chasiv Yar, and Russian forces began intensified efforts to seize Kostyantynivka in Winter 2026.[2] Russian forces began setting conditions for a frontal attack on Kostyantynivka in late Summer and early Fall 2025, employing a combination of a prolonged battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign, tactical interdiction efforts, infiltration missions, and mass small group assaults to advance.[3] Russian forces seized Toretsk as of August 2025 after a 14-month campaign and have since advanced roughly nine kilometers toward Kostyantynivka.[4] Russian forces seized the majority of Chasiv Yar as of August 2025 after a 26-month campaign, but Ukrainian counterattacks in March 2026 contested Russian control of the town, and Russian forces have thus far been unable to push Ukrainian forces entirely out of Chasiv Yar.[5] Russian forces also failed to make significant gains in the area west of Toretsk or from Chasiv Yar toward Kostyantynivka in June 2025, after conducting a series of intensified offensive operations and mechanized assaults, while the Russian military command increasingly prioritized the seizure of Pokrovsk in Summer and Fall 2025.[6] Russian forces deprioritized the seizure of Kostyantynivka but maintained interdiction efforts and resumed intensified offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka direction in Winter 2026.[7] Russian forces first infiltrated into Kostyantynivka itself in October 2025 and have since then infiltrated into at least 12.69 percent of Kostyantynivka.[8]

Russian forces have failed to seize Kostyantynivka by May 2026 despite committing additional reinforcements and mechanized equipment to the area. Russian forces significantly intensified offensive operations against Kostyantynivka in March 2026, with Ukrainian officials reporting that the Russian military command set the deadline of seizing Kostyantynivka by May 2026.[9] Russian forces also conducted a roughly platoon-sized mechanized assault in Kostyantynivka in March 2026.[10] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi additionally reported on May 2 that Russian forces noticeably increased their activity in the Kostyantynivka direction in April 2026.[11] Russian forces also reportedly redeployed elements of the Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Division (18th CAA, SMD) to the Kostyantynivka-Chasiv Yar area in December 2025, likely in preparation for Spring offensive operations against Kostyantynivka.[12] Russian forces have concentrated at least one CAA and AC to Kostyantynivka and elements of several other armies to support offensive operations against the city.[13] Russian forces also reportedly replenished 80 percent of their units attacking Kostyantynivka as of June 6.[14]

Russian forces will likely make tactical gains in Kostyantynivka in Summer 2026 but are unlikely to make operational gains against the Fortress Belt writ large. Russian forces will likely continue to infiltrate throughout Kostyantynivka and consolidate positions in certain areas of the city but will likely suffer high casualties in doing so. Russia's 3rd AC operating northeast of Kostyantynivka appears to be struggling to push Ukrainian forces out of Chasiv Yar, inhibiting their ability to envelop Kostyantynivka from the north. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on June 9 that Ukrainian forces recently counterattacked near Chasiv Yar and maintain control over Podilske and Mykolaivka (both west of Chasiv Yar).[15] Russian forces are also struggling to advance toward Slovyansk on the northern flank of the Fortress Belt. Russian forces launched their Spring-Summer 2026 offensive with a series of mechanized assaults around Lyman (northeast of Slovyansk), indicating that the Russian military command likely intended to prioritize advancing on Slovyansk from the northeast, but Russian forces failed to subsequently make any significant advances in the area.[16] The Russian military command likely shifted its prioritization to seizing Kostyantynivka after struggling to advance on Slovyansk. Russia's Western Grouping of Force's (GoF) area of responsibility (AoR) ranges from the Kupyansk direction through the Lyman direction and likely does not have the combat capability to make a concerted push against Slovyansk while also balancing offensive operations in the Kupyansk and Borova directions. Ukrainian forces also recently conducted counterattacks in the neighboring Borova direction, which likely forced Russian forces to choose between defending positions and attacking north and northwest of Lyman.[17]

Ukrainian forces conducted a FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile strike overnight on June 9 and 10 against a Russian military plant that produces key components for Shahed drones and missiles. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 10 that Ukrainian forces conducted FP-5 Flamingo missile strikes against a Russian VNIIR-Progress Plant in Cheboksary, Republic of Chuvashia - over 900 kilometers from the frontline in Ukraine.[18] The Ukrainian General Staff added that the plant is one of Russia’s key manufacturers of navigation equipment for high-precision weapons and produces satellite navigation receivers and Kometa-type antennas used in Shahed drones, Kalibr cruise missiles, Iskander-M operational-tactical missile systems, and unified modules for planning and correcting aerial bombs. Geolocated footage and satellite imagery published on June 10 showed smoke rising and fires at the VNIIR plant after the Ukrainian strike.[19] Chuvash Republic Head Oleg Nikolaev acknowledged that a Ukrainian missile strike damaged unspecified infrastructure in Cheboksary.[20] Russian opposition source Astra, citing footage from local outlets, noted on June 10 that Russian officials previously tried to protect the VNIIR-Progress plant with anti-drone nets following Ukrainian strikes against the plant in late 2025.[21] Ukrainian forces conducted an almost identical F-5 Flamingo missile strike against the Russian VNIIR-Progress Plant on May 5 and the missile strike on June 10 demonstrates Ukraine's increasing ability to sustain and intensify long-range strikes against key Russian military facilities.[22]

Ukrainian forces also continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure on the night of June 9 to June 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 10 that Ukrainian forces struck and caused a fire at the Kuibyshevsky (also known as Kuibyshev) Oil Refinery in Samara City, Samara Oblast.[23] The General Staff noted that the refinery is one of the largest oil refineries in Russia producing gasoline, diesel, fuel oil, and other petroleum products. Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) noted that the Kuibyshevsky Oil Refinery makes up about 2.5 percent of Russia’s total refining capacity and is located more than 1,000 kilometers from the Ukrainian border.[24] Russian state oil company Rosneft stated that the oil refinery has the capacity of about 7 million tons of oil per year.[25] Geolocated footage and satellite imagery published on June 9 and 10 shows fires and damages to the refinery following the Ukrainian strike.[26] Two unnamed industry sources told Reuters that the Kuibyshevsky Oil Refinery halted oil processing on June 10 at plant's primary crude distillation units following the strike.[27]

Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) reported on June 10 that Ukrainian forces struck Vtorovo and Lobkovo oil pumping stations near Maryinka and Lobkovo, Vladimir Oblast, overnight on June 10 at a distance of 700 kilometers from the launch point.[28] The SBU noted that both stations pump diesel fuel to the Moscow Ring Oil Product Pipeline and transport oil products to Russian Baltic Sea ports, primarily through the Primorsk oil loading port. NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data from June 10 shows heat anomalies near both pumping stations.[29] Vladimir Oblast Governor Alexander Avdeev acknowledged on June 10 that drone strikes caused fires at two industrial facilities near Kameshkovskyi and Alensandrovskyi raions, Vladimir Oblast.[30] Rostov Oblast Governor Yuri Slyusar claimed on June 10 that an unspecified drone strike caused a fire near an oil depot, and NASA FIRMS data confirmed heat anomalies at a fuel tank near Millerovo, Rostov Oblast.[31] Ukrainian forces have been successfully intensifying the scope and scale of their long-range strikes on Russian oil infrastructure in Russia over the last several months, exploiting overstretched Russian air defenses.[32] Ukrainian strikes against Russian fuel storage tanks will likely intensify the spread of fuel shortages in Russia that have already begun in some Russian regions and parts of occupied Ukraine.[33]

Ukraine tested its first anti-missile interceptor as an alternative to the US-made PAC-3 Patriot air defense interceptor missile amid global Patriot shortages. The Financial Times (FT) reported on June 10 that Ukraine tested its new FP-7.x anti-missile interceptor – a cheaper, mass-producible surface-to-air missile alternative to the US-made PAC-3 Patriot air defense interceptor missile.[34] Denys Shtilierman, the co-owner and chief designer of Ukraine's Fire Point defense industrial company, told FT that the first flight test was “pretty successful.” Shtilierman stated the missile's development timeline will depend on the speed of partner support, and that Ukraine could start mass producing FP-7.x missiles as early as August 2026 but the completed missiles will likely be ready by 2027.  A Fire Point representative stated that Ukraine intends to use the FP-7.x to counter Russian ballistic missiles and drones at a much lower cost than existing Western systems. FT reported that Ukraine’s European partners will supply the remaining components for the Ukrainian-made Freyja air defense system, including radars and the command-and-control system. The FP-7.x's development comes as Ukraine continues to face significant Patriot interceptor missile shortages.[35] The US-made Patriot systems currently remain the only effective option for intercepting ballistic missiles, and Russia continues to exploit the shortages by launching systematic large-scale, long-range ballistic missile strikes against Ukraine.

The Kremlin’s volunteer recruitment campaign continues to show signs of strain under the pressure of high battlefield losses and rising economic costs. Russian opposition source Vazhnye Istorii, citing Russian federal budget expenses data, reported on June 10 that 71,200 people received one-time enlistment bonuses after signing military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) in the first quarter of 2026, down 20 percent from 2025.[36] Vazhnye Istorii reported that 363,900 people signed contracts with the Russian MoD in all of 2025, 10 percent fewer than in 2024. Russia has been increasingly struggling to keep up with recruitment amidst increasing casualties and has had to commit reserves, increase signing bonuses, and expand covert mobilization efforts to combat these recruitment shortfalls.[37] The Kremlin remains committed to defining its main advantage over Ukraine as overwhelming numbers, but Ukraine’s tactical drone superiority throughout the theater and mid-range strike campaign have neutralized this advantage for now, inflicting disproportionately high personnel and equipment losses on Russian forces.[38] The Kremlin has been setting conditions to conduct limited, rolling reserve call-ups to make up for its losses in Ukraine amid declining recruitment rates and rising casualty rates.[39]

The Kremlin continues attempts to nationalize private assets of Russian citizens, likely to support state revenues and the costly war effort in Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed on June 10 into law permitting Russian authorities to seize property of Russian citizens accused of offenses against Russia's interests abroad.[40] Kremlin newswire TASS reported that the new amendments to Russia’s administrative offenses code cover abuse of media freedom, incitement of hatred or enmity, public calls for actions violating Russia's territorial integrity, and discreditation of the Russian military.[41] TASS also reported that the new law allows Russian authorities to seize offenders’ funds from bank deposits and accounts and specifies procedures for conducting these proceedings without their participation. Russia’s new law aligns with Kremlin’s long-term trajectory towards authoritarianism and nationalization as Putin continues to consolidate his control over the Russian society to safeguard his regime.[42] The Kremlin criminalized anti-war speech in 2022, expanded penalties for discrediting Russian forces in 2023, escalated crackdowns on dissent and pursued seizures of private assets in 2024.[43]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces recently made tactical gains in Kostyantynivka – Russia's assessed main effort for the Spring-Summer 2026 offensive.
• Russian forces began their campaign for Kostyantynivka in Summer 2025 after completing the seizures of Chasiv Yar and Toretsk – settlements northeast and southeast of Kostyantynivka, respectively.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile strike overnight on June 9 and 10 against a Russian military plant that produces key components for Shahed drones and missiles.
• Russian forces will likely make tactical gains in Kostyantynivka in Summer 2026 but are unlikely to make operational gains against the Fortress Belt writ large.
• Ukrainian forces also continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure on the night of June 9 to June 10.
• The Kremlin’s volunteer recruitment campaign continues to show signs of strain under the pressure of high battlefield losses and rising economic costs.
• The Kremlin continues attempts to nationalize private assets of Russian citizens, likely to support state revenues and the costly war effort in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and in the western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
• Russian forces launched 207 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 9, 2026

The Kremlin is seeking to delegitimize the results of Armenia’s June 8 parliamentary elections, in which Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's Civil Contract Party won a majority of the vote. Pashinyan’s Civil Contract Party won the Armenian general election on June 7 with 49.82 percent of the vote.[i] Russian government officials and Russian milbloggers emphasized false narratives on June 8 and 9 to delegitimize the Civil Contract Party’s win, by claiming that Pashinyan lost the election as he did not secure more than 50 percent of the vote, that Armenia held elections under intense pressure from the West and domestic opposition suppression, and alleged that the election featured mass election interference and fraud.[ii] The head of the Russian Federal Agency for Fishery Rosrybolovstvo also released a warning on June 8 that Russia will increase restrictions on fish imports from Armenia if “veterinary risks” arise, attempting to threaten Armenia with economic punishment for distancing itself from Russia.[iii] Russian officials are likely attempting to delegitimize Pashinyan's victory as Pashinyan has recently begun distancing Armenian connections and cooperation with Russia and no longer represents or serves the Kremlin’s interests in Armenia. Armenia's Civil Contract Party has been reorienting itself and its policies away from Russia and toward the EU in recent months and has sought to reduce Armenia's participation in the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).[iv]  The Kremlin engaged in a similar delegitimization campaign following Maia Sandu's victory in the Moldovan Presidential elections in 2024.[v] The Kremlin emphasized similar narratives of election fraud, suppression of opposition, and “illegitimate” results, suggesting that Sandu’s victory materialized only after counting Western diaspora ballots.[vi] The Kremlin continues spreading false narrative of stolen elections in post-Soviet states when those results to not favor Russian interests.

The Russian military command reportedly prohibited military cargo traffic along Russia’s main highway connecting mainland Russia to Crimea due to Ukrainian strikes. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on June 9 that the Russian military command of the Eastern Grouping of Forces (GoF) issued a decree on June 6 prohibiting military cargo traffic along the M-14 Rostov-Crimea (which Russian occupation officials denote as the R-280) and the A-291 Kerch - Simferopol - Sevastopol Tavrida highways starting on June 7.[vii] The M-14 is Russia’s main supply route connecting mainland Russia to occupied Crimea through occupied southern Ukraine. Brovdi reported that the Russian military command banned logistics traffic along these roads for safety reasons due to Ukrainian fire control over these highways. This reported restriction follows Russian occupation officials‘ earlier restrictions against commercial passenger transport vehicles’ use of the M-14 highway and the section of the Belgorod City-Mariupol (R-150) highway that runs through occupied Luhansk Oblast.[viii] Ukraine’s expanding intermediate-range strike campaign against Russia’s major ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and against railway infrastructure in occupied Ukraine since Spring 2026 are disrupting Russia’s military logistics and are very likely degrading sustainment for Russian frontline forces — an effect which will likely continue to mature in the near future or until Russian forces develop countermeasures.[ix] Ukraine will likely further expand and intensify its intermediate-range strike campaign, which will likely have cascading effects on Russian offensive operations in the coming months, especially as Ukraine’s efforts to shape the battlefield mature.

Unknown actors conducted a car bomb attack in Balashikha, Moscow City, that reportedly killed a high-ranking Russian officer. Geolocated footage published on June 9 shows a car exploding in Balashikha - a suburb of Moscow City that houses Russian military personnel and several official Russian military facilities.[x] The car bomb attack occurred within a kilometer of the 26th Central Research Institute of the Russian Ministry of Defense, within five kilometers of the Military Academy of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces, and within five kilometers of a training center of the Russian Federal Protective Service - the federal service responsible for protecting high-ranking Russian government officials.[xi] The Russian Investigative Committee (Sledkom) claimed that the footage suggests the explosive device was on the outside of the vehicle and that the explosion killed the driver.[xii] Russian insider source VChK-OGPU claimed that the explosion killed the Head of the Main Missile and Artillery directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) Colonel Damir Davydov.[xiii] Other sources speculated that the attack alternatively killed Chief of the General Staff and First Deputy Commander in Chief of the Aerospace forces (VKS) Lieutenant General Alexander Maksimtsev.[xiv] A similar improvised explosive device (IED) attack killed the deputy head of the Russian General Staff’s Main Operational Directorate, Lieutenant General Yaroslav Moskalik, in Balashikha in April 2025.[xv]

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin is seeking to delegitimize the results of Armenia’s June 8 parliamentary elections, in which Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's Civil Contract Party won a majority of the vote.
• The Russian military command reportedly prohibited military cargo traffic along Russia’s main highway connecting mainland Russia to Crimea due to Ukrainian strikes.
• Unknown actors conducted a car bomb attack in Balashikha, Moscow City, that reportedly killed a high-ranking Russian officer.
• Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets on June 8 and June 9. Russian forces launched two Kh-59/69 cruise missiles and 166 drones against Ukraine overnight.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Borova and the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 8, 2026

The Russian military command is reportedly withdrawing forces from the Kinburn Spit in Mykolaiv Oblast as Ukraine's intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian supply lines in occupied Ukraine is rendering defenses in the area increasingly untenable. Crimea-based Ukrainian partisan group Atesh reported on June 8 that one of its agents in the headquarters of the Russian Dnepr Group of Forces reported that elements of the Russian 337th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (104th VDV Division) are abandoning their positions on the northern and western parts of the Kinburn Spit due to "completely disrupted" supplies.[1] The agent reported that ammunition, fuel, and food deliveries have stopped, that Russian forces on the spit have been unable to repel Ukrainian drone strikes, and that Russian losses have been growing. The agent reported that the Russian military command has begun redeploying an unspecified number of troops from the 337th VDV Regiment to an unspecified part of the "Zaporizhia sector" (possibly referring to the Orikhiv or Hulyaipole directions), but that the remaining elements on the Kinburn Spit are "virtually depleted" due to the lack of replenishment and can no longer defend the spit. Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn stated on June 8 that he could neither confirm nor deny the Atesh report but stated that Ukrainian forces are conducting operations to establish fire control over Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in occupied Kherson Oblast so Russian withdrawals from the Kinburn Spit are possible.[2] Ukraine’s expanding intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian GLOCs in occupied southern and eastern Ukraine appears to be generating battlefield effects, which will likely continue to mature in the near future.[3] Russian forces have previously used their limited positions on the Kinburn Spit to conduct artillery strikes against Ochakiv, Mykolaiv Oblast (four kilometers from the tip of the spit across the Dniprovska Gulf).[4]

The Kremlin continues to reject peace negotiations with Ukraine despite recent repeated Ukrainian offers for direct negotiations. UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, French President Emmanuel Macron, and German Chancellor Frederich Merz issued a joint statement with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on June 7 proposing conditions for a just and lasting peace in Ukraine, including an immediate ceasefire, the resumption of negotiations, and the freezing of the current frontline as a starting point for negotiations.[5] Zelensky confirmed in an interview with Sky News on June 7 that he recently met with Russian oligarch Roman Abramovich, who was acting as an intermediary for Russian President Vladimir Putin, in Kyiv City to convey that Ukraine is willing to freeze the frontline along the current line of contact and to resume peace negotiations, including via direct negotiations with Putin.[6] Zelensky also published an open letter to Putin on June 4 after meeting with Abramovich, in which he offered a leader-level meeting.[7] Putin subsequently rejected Zelensky's offer for direct negotiations.[8] Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov reiterated on June 8 the Kremlin's commitment to the "understandings" that the United States and Russia allegedly reached at the August 2025 Alaska Summit, exploiting the lack of publicly available information about the alleged agreements in order to falsely portray Russia as a willing negotiator.[9] Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov and Duma Defense Committee member Viktor Sobolev rejected the Ukrainian-European June 8 joint statement, stating that the proposals are "unacceptable" for Russia and that Russia can only achieve its war goals by "reaching Ukraine's western borders."[10]

NATO forces downed a drone over Latvia for the first time on June 8 after Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems diverted it into Latvian airspace. The Latvian National Armed Forces reported on June 8 that French Air Force fighter jets participating in NATO's Baltic Air Policing mission downed a "foreign drone" – likely Ukrainian – that had entered Latvian airspace due to Russian EW jamming.[11] Latvian news source Delfi noted that this was the first time that NATO has downed a drone in Latvian airspace.[12] Russian EW systems previously caused a Ukrainian unmanned surface vehicle (USV) to enter Romanian territorial waters on June 5.[13] Russian officials used the June 5 incident to advance false Russian narratives claiming that Ukraine is the aggressor in the war that Russia initiated and to deflect culpability away from Moscow.[14] The Kremlin will likely continue to use such incidents near or even within NATO borders to absolve Russia of blame for any accidental Russian drone strikes or for a false flag attack against Romania or the Baltic States in the future.[15]

Key Takeaways:

• The Russian military command is reportedly withdrawing forces from the Kinburn Spit in Mykolaiv Oblast as Ukraine's intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian supply lines in occupied Ukraine is rendering defenses in the area increasingly untenable.
• The Kremlin continues to reject peace negotiations with Ukraine despite recent repeated Ukrainian offers for direct negotiations.
• NATO forces downed a drone over Latvia for the first time on June 8 after Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems diverted it into Latvian airspace.
• Russian forces launched 155 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 7, 2026

Ukraine's intermediate-range strikes against Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in occupied southern and eastern Ukraine are continuing to disrupt Russian logistics, and these operational effects will likely continue to mature in the near future. A Ukrainian drone operator commented on the Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps May 31 statement that Ukrainian forces are interdicting Russian logistics along the M-04 Izvaryne-Donetsk City-Dnipro City highway.[1] The Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps reported on May 31 that Ukrainian forces have achieved drone-enabled fire control over occupied Luhansk City, Starobilsk, Alchevsk, Bryanka, and Kadiivka, all of which are on or near the M-04.[2] The drone operator assessed that the M-04 is a more important GLOC for Russian forces than the M-14 Rostov Oblast-Crimea highway in southern Ukraine. The Ukrainian drone operator noted that the M-04 runs from Moscow City to Rostov-on-Don, Russia's Black Sea ports, and the Caucasus region. The drone operator added that the M-04 supplies occupied Crimea, southern Ukraine, Luhansk Oblast (through Millerovo and Kamensk-Shakhtinsky, Rostov Oblast), and Donetsk Oblast (through Novoshakhtinsk, Rostov Oblast). The M-04 and M-14 highways are connected, with Ukrainian forces also striking the parts of the H-20 highway that connect the M-04 to the M-14 via Donetsk City.[3] Ukrainian strikes will likely therefore generate even more profound cascading effects in Russia's operational rear in the near future.

Ukrainian strikes are continuing to complicate Russian logistics along the M-04 and M-14. Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik issued a decree on June 6 banning commercial passenger transport vehicles along the part of the M-04 that runs through the region.[4] Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko reported on June 7 that Russian forces have altered their Mariupol-Berdyansk logistics route and are now using local roads near the coast instead of the M14 highway connecting the two cities.[5] Andryushchenko added that Russian forces are trying to disguise their military vehicles as civilian ones by changing the color of the tents covering the truck beds and repainting the trucks white. The use of small roads and detours will likely slow down Russian logistics, as Ukrainian forces continue to target Russian vehicles in the near future.

The gasoline shortages in occupied Crimea are worsening due to Ukrainian long- and intermediate-range strikes. Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhaev announced on June 6 that major Crimean gas station TES will now require customers to use a pre-purchased QR code, which citizens can only access via the Russian state-controlled Max messenger app, to purchase gasoline.[6] Razvozhaev stated that the number of available QR codes on a given day will correspond to the volume of gasoline available for sale. Ravozhaev later stated on June 6 that Crimean occupation authorities had sold out of available QR codes for June 7 within two hours.[7] Razvozhaev further restricted gasoline sales to 20 liters (5.283 gallons) per vehicle per week - a sharp reduction from the previously allowed 20 liters of gas per day.[8] The combination of Ukraine's long-range strikes against Russian energy infrastructure and intermediate-range strikes against Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in southern and eastern Ukraine has likely contributed to the gasoline shortage in occupied Crimea.[9] Ukraine continued to strike Russian GLOCs on June 7, with Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo stating on June 7 that occupation authorities closed traffic through the Dzhankoi checkpoint after a Ukrainian drone strike reportedly damaged the Chonhar Bridge, which connects occupied Kherson Oblast to occupied Crimea.[10]

Occupied Crimea is starting to experience shortages of basic goods and supplies beyond gasoline. Independent Russian media source Agenstvo reported that local Crimean residents started complaining on June 5 about interruptions in deliveries to stores and resulting restrictions on the sale of some basic goods, such as buckwheat, sugar, rice, and flour.[11] Russian opposition source Astra reported on June 7 that Crimean occupation authorities are trying to cover up the cause of food and gasoline shortages by claiming that natural lulls in the harvesting cycles are temporarily reducing the availability of some products.[12] Ukraine's successful strike campaigns against Russian transport arteries in occupied Ukraine are likely to have ever-increasing effects on Russia's ability to supply occupied Ukraine with basic goods.[13]

Ukraine's successful intermediate and long-range strike campaigns are generating discontent and panic in the Russian milblogger community. A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor complained on June 7 that Ukraine is expanding its intermediate and long-range strike campaigns to strike critical and defense industrial infrastructure at operational and strategic depths and is degrading Russia's air defense radars and systems.[14] The milblogger criticized Russian bureaucracy and conflicts between the state and corporate figures for Russia's inability to respond to Ukraine's intensifying strikes. The milblogger warned that Russia is unable to analyze Ukraine's battlefield trends and is underestimating Ukraine's current and future capabilities. Another milblogger claimed that gasoline shortages in occupied Crimea are generating panic among locals.[15] Another milblogger complained that Ukrainian intermediate and long-range strikes are affecting Russian military logistics and fuel supplies in southern Russia and occupied Ukraine.[16] Some milbloggers criticized the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Chief of the General Staff, Army General Valery Gerasimov, for not conducting retaliatory strikes against Ukrainian logistics, particularly against bridges across the Dnipro River.[17] Russian milbloggers have been escalating their complaints about the effects of Ukraine's strike campaigns and Russia's inability to defend against these strikes in recent days.[18] These successful Ukrainian strike campaigns are becoming points of neuralgia in the ultranationalist information space, particularly as Russia's current poor battlefield performance, growing casualties, and economic struggles generate domestic discontent writ large.[19]

A Russian drone struck a nuclear-waste storage facility near the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) in Kyiv Oblast. Ukrainian state nuclear energy enterprise Energoatom reported that Russian forces struck the Centralized Storage Facility for Spent Nuclear Fuel in the Chornobyl Exclusion Zone at 0210 local time on June 7, causing a fire and destroying part of the building.[20] Energoatom noted that there was no spent nuclear fuel stored at the facility at the time of the strike. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the facility was located near Buryakivka, Kyiv Oblast, and that it is 15 kilometers away from the Chornobyl NPP.[21] Geolocated images published on June 7 show damage to the storage building following the Russian strike.[22] Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reported that the explosion also damaged an administrative building of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).[23] Russian strikes damaged the containment structure of Chornobyl NPP's melted-down Reactor No. 4 in February 2025 and substations supporting the NPP in January 2026.[24] The latest strike near Chornobyl NPP indicates that the Kremlin has adopted a policy that accepts reckless and high-risk drone strikes regardless of whether the strikes are accidental or intentional.[25]

Russian forces struck two civilian search and rescue Ukrainian vessels in the Black Sea on June 6, possibly with remote-controlled Shahed-type drones that allow Russian forces to conduct precise strikes on dynamic targets. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Oleksiy Kuleba stated that Russian forces struck two civilian vessels of the Ukrainian Maritime Search and Rescue Service that were conducting a humanitarian mission in the Black Sea, causing an unspecified number of casualties.[26] Kuleba stated that the Ukrainian Navy is evacuating the two vessels. Kuleba noted that the boats had special protection in accordance with international humanitarian law, as they were performing a search and rescue operation. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces used remotely controlled Geran drones (a variant of the Shahed drone) to strike the boats off the coast of Odesa City.[27] Russian forces have used remotely controlled Shahed-type drones, which allow Russian drone operators to send and receive data wirelessly and adjust the drone’s flight path in real time, to conduct precise strikes against moving targets, such as Ukrainian locomotives.[28]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine's intermediate-range strikes against Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in occupied southern and eastern Ukraine are continuing to disrupt Russian logistics, and these operational effects will likely continue to mature in the near future.
• The gasoline shortages in occupied Crimea are worsening due to Ukrainian long and intermediate-range strikes.
• Occupied Crimea is starting to experience shortages of basic goods and supplies beyond gasoline.
• Ukraine's successful intermediate and long-range strike campaigns are generating discontent and panic in the Russian milblogger community.
• A Russian drone struck a nuclear-waste storage facility near the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) in Kyiv Oblast.
• Russian forces struck two civilian search and rescue Ukrainian vessels in the Black Sea on June 6, possibly with remote-controlled Shahed-type drones that allow Russian forces to conduct precise strikes on dynamic targets.
• Russian forces launched 236 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 5, 2026

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

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Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's offer to negotiate an end to the war and reiterated the Kremlin’s commitment to fulfilling its war goals. Putin also reiterated his belief that Russian forces’ military victory is inevitable, despite available data indicating otherwise. Putin met with the heads of media companies at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) on June 4 and at SPIEF's plenary session on June 5. Putin claimed that Russian forces seized "two thousand four hundred forty thousand thousands square kilometers" (likely meaning 2,440 square kilometers rather than 2.4 million square kilometers; 2.4 million square kilometers is an area much larger than Ukraine itself) of territory in an unspecified time period and currently occupy 85 percent of Donetsk Oblast, 80 percent of Zaporizhia Oblast, and all of Luhansk Oblast.[1] Putin also falsely claimed that Russian forces are advancing across all areas of the frontline. Putin claimed that Russian forces have achieved drone parity with Ukrainian forces across the battlefield and have the advantage in some areas. Putin's June 4 and 5 statements are consistent with his theory of victory, which posits that Russia can win a protracted attritional war provided that Russian forces advance across the entire theater.[2] Russia is increasingly struggling with sustaining its method of waging protracted attritional war, and Russian battlefield performance has decreased.[3] Russia is also struggling with the compounding effects of the war on the Russian economy, declining recruitment rates, and societal discontent.[4] Ukrainian forces have intensified their intermediate- and long-range strike campaigns and contested the tactical initiative in several areas of the frontline in recent months, imposing additional challenges on Russia to continue its war effort.[5] Putin's SPIEF statements indicate that he remains committed to his war goals, his theory of victory, and his current way of waging war in Ukraine despite these mounting difficulties.

Putin's claims about the battlefield are incompatible with available evidence and suggest that the Russian military command is not providing Putin accurate intelligence about the reality of Russian battlefield performance. Russian advances have largely stagnated while Ukrainian forces have achieved some tactical successes in 2026. ISW continues to assess that the Russian military command’s repeated exaggerations have likely given Putin a false perception of the battlefield situation.[6] ISW has observed evidence that Russian forces have seized 99.77 percent of Luhansk Oblast, 79.93 percent of Donetsk Oblast, and 74.99 percent of Zaporizhia Oblast as of June 5. Even including areas in which Russian forces have infiltrated but do not control falls short of Putin's claims. ISW assesses as of June 5 that Russian forces maintain a presence (either through advances or infiltrations) in 99.77 percent of Luhansk Oblast, 80.82 percent of Donetsk Oblast, and 75.7 percent of Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian forces have liberated more territory than Russian forces seized in April and May 2026, highlighting Russia's dwindling battlefield performance and Ukraine's successes in halting the Russian Spring-Summer 2026 offensive.[7] Russian forces are struggling to advance in 2026 at the same rates that Russian forces did in 2025, in part due to successful Ukrainian ground counterattacks that have liberated tactically significant areas and Ukraine's growing mid-range strike campaign that is inhibiting Russian logistics and ability to sustain attacks on the frontline.[8] Given current trends it remains unclear that Russian forces will be able to seize the Fortress Belt or the remainder of Donetsk Oblast at all.

Russian officials, including Putin, are again leaning on the lack of clear information about the August 2025 Alaska Summit to falsely portray Russia as willing to negotiate with Ukraine. Putin responded to Zelensky's June 4 open letter calling for a ceasefire and a leader-level meeting, claiming that he had seen the letter "briefly" but that Putin "does not see the point in meeting."[9] Putin claimed that Russia is ready to reach an agreement with Ukraine to end the war but that such an agreement must be based on unconfirmed agreements Putin and US President Donald Trump supposedly reached during the Alaska Summit.[10] Putin claimed that Russia is willing to accept the compromises that US and Russian officials discussed during the summit. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin also claimed on June 4 and 5 that Russia agreed to US proposals to end the war at the Alaska Summit.[11] Neither the US nor Russia released public statements or communiques about any agreement reached following the Alaska Summit, however, and the Kremlin has repeatedly exploited the lack of official documents codifying the outcomes of the Alaska Summit to conceal Russia's continued unwillingness to compromise and commitment to its maximalist war aims.[12] Putin reiterated longstanding Russian demands at SPIEF on June 5, claiming that Russian military operations will end when Russia achieves its goals.[13] Putin also issued veiled nuclear threats against Ukraine, claiming that Russia is only using Oreshnik nuclear-capable intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) against Ukraine as tests and implied that Russia has not used the Oreshnik for its intended purpose.[14] Putin's nuclear saber rattling —particularly as Russia's military performance on the battlefield is dwindling — likely aims to push the West and Ukraine to capitulate to Russia's demands.

Putin also used his SPIEF remarks to posture economic strength, ignoring Russia's economic realities over four years of war. Putin broadly spoke about Russia's claimed economic successes on June 5, claiming that Russia's GDP grew by 1.3 percent in April 2026, that Russia's unemployment is 2.2 percent, and that real Russian wages have grown by over 30 percent in the last five years.[15] Putin acknowledged that the Russian economy is in a cooling period but claimed that the Russian government did so intentionally for the "health" of the Russian economy.[16] Putin's statements are in line with other Russian official statements at SPIEF, which have ignored Russia's economic problems and fuel shortages in efforts to maintain the facade of economic stability.[17] Putin's claims of economic strength do not reflect the true nature of the Russian economy, as the Kremlin has pursued a series of sub-optimal policies that will have long-term economic implications. Russian officials often highlight Russia's unemployment rate as a sign of economic prosperity, despite the fact that the extremely low unemployment rate reflects the fact that Russia is experiencing labor shortages which is causing wage inflation in the civilian and defense sectors and contributing to overall inflation.[18] Russia is also struggling with liquidity problems and high levels of external debt after having steadily depleted its sovereign wealth fund’s liquid reserves to fund its war in Ukraine, and has resorted to selling its gold reserves and raising the value added tax (VAT) to offset unsustainably high spending.[19] Russian regional and occupation authorities have also begun restricting gasoline sales in recent days in response to increasing gasoline shortages from successful Ukrainian intermediate- to long-range strikes against Russian oil infrastructure and logistics into occupied Ukraine.[20] Putin is attempting to push a narrative of a stable and growing economy despite growing fuel shortages, increasing debt, and stagnating economic growth as he prioritizes his war in Ukraine over economic health despite the mounting economic and societal costs.

Ukrainian forces are expanding their battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign to strike Russian naval vessels and railway infrastructure in occupied southern Ukraine and in the Sea of Azov. The Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) reported and geolocated footage confirmed on June 5 that Ukrainian drone operators struck five Russian cargo ships that reportedly supported Russian military logistics near the ports of occupied Berdyansk (approximately 102 kilometers from the frontline), Yalta (approximately 259 kilometers from the frontline), and Mariupol (approximately 115 kilometers from the frontline) in a single night.[21] Ukrainian USF Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported that the cargo ships also previously transported stolen Ukrainian grain and turned off their radar transponders.[22] The Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) reported on June 5 that drones struck the Natra and Zirkon cargo ships in the Taganrog Bay of the Sea of Azov, killing five Azerbaijani citizens and wounding three of a total of 25 Azerbaijani citizens on board the ships.[23] The Azerbaijani MFA stated that the cargo ships did not belong to the Azerbaijani government. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Project 10410 Svetlyak-class patrol ship near occupied Yurkyne (on the Kerch Peninsula and roughly 250 kilometers from the frontline) on June 4, likely as part of a broader effort to destroy Russian seaborne anti-drone defenses in the Azov Sea.[24] Ukrainian forces have also expanded and intensified the frequency of strikes on Russian railway infrastructure. A Ukrainian drone regiment reported on June 4 that Ukrainian drones struck two Russian locomotives near Rozdolne and Vladyslavivka (approximately 194 and 185 kilometers from the frontline, respectively), Crimea, along a railway line supporting Russian logistics between occupied Dzhankoi and Kerch, Krasnodar Krai.[25] Ukraine's intermediate-range strike BAI campaign includes extensive targeting of logistics involving Russian railway lines and naval vessels in addition to logistics along roads and highways.[26]

Romanian and Ukrainian authorities reported that Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems caused a Ukrainian unmanned surface vehicle (USV) to enter Romanian territorial waters at the Port of Constanta on June 5. The Romanian Ministry of National Defense reported that authorities spotted a maritime drone near Berth 78 in the Port of Constanta, Romania (approximately 302 kilometers from Odesa City) at around 0550 local time and noted that the drone self-destructed at around 1030 local time.[27] The Ukrainian Navy confirmed on June 5 that a Ukrainian maritime drone sailed off the coast of Romania from the Black Sea after Russian electronic warfare (EW) jamming severed Ukrainian forces’ control over the drone.[28] The Ukrainian Navy reported that Ukraine provided the necessary information to the Romanian Navy to prevent civilian casualties, and Romanian Defense Minister Radu Miruta stated that the Ukrainian warning allowed for a timely evacuation.[29] Romanian President Nicusor Dan stated that a second drone self-destructed near the port of Constanta and that two other drones detonated about 145 kilometers east of Constanta, causing no casualties or significant damage.[30] Dan stated that the drones were part of a Ukrainian defense operation and noted that the June 5 Ukrainian naval drone incident and the May 29 Russian Geran-2 drone strike in Galati are “direct consequences” of Russian aggression against Ukraine.[31]  Russian officials broadly criticized Romania's official reaction to the June 5 drone incident, deflecting Russia's culpability as the aggressor in the war.[32] Russian officials used the incident to advance false Russian narratives that Ukraine is the aggressor in the war. The Kremlin will likely continue using incidents like the May 29 Russian drone strike against Galati and the June 5 Ukrainian naval drone detonation at the Port of Constanta to absolve Russia of blame for any accidental Russian drone strikes or a false flag attack against Romania or neighboring Moldova in the future.[33]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's offer to negotiate an end to the war and reiterated the Kremlin’s commitment to fulfilling its war goals. Putin also reiterated his belief that Russian forces’ military victory is inevitable, despite available data indicating otherwise.
• Putin's claims about the battlefield are incompatible with available evidence and suggest that the Russian military command is not providing Putin accurate intelligence about the reality of Russian battlefield performance. Russian advances have largely stagnated in while Ukrainian forces have achieved some tactical successes in 2026.
• Russian officials, including Putin, are again leaning on the lack of clear information about the August 2025 Alaska Summit to falsely portray Russia as willing to negotiate with Ukraine.
• Putin also used his SPIEF remarks to posture economic strength, ignoring Russia's economic realities from over four years of war.
• Ukrainian forces are expanding their battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign to strike Russian naval vessels and railway infrastructure in occupied southern Ukraine and in the Sea of Azov.
• Romanian and Ukrainian authorities reported that Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems caused a Ukrainian unmanned surface vehicle (USV) to enter Romanian territorial waters at the Port of Constanta on June 5.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction. Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
• Ukrainian forces continue strikes against Russian military assets in border regions. Russian forces launched two cruise missiles and 216 drones toward Ukraine overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 4, 2026

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky sent an open letter to Russian President Vladimir Putin on June 4 proposing an immediate ceasefire along the current frontline and a face-to-face bilateral meeting in a third country to end the war.[i] Zelensky noted that Ukraine is ready to observe a complete ceasefire during the negotiations process and that the United States can monitor the frontline ceasefire and proposed an “all for all” prisoners of war (POW) exchange.

Russian officials continued to ignore the economic problems and fuel shortages that Russia is facing at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) and instead presented a facade of economic stability. Russian Presidential Administration Deputy Head Maxim Oreshkin stated on the sidelines at SPIEF on June 4 that Russia's economy has grown by 10 percent over the past three years while Europe’s economy grew by only three percent in the same period, that Russian unemployment is the lowest in the world, and that there are no failures in the Russian economy.[ii] Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov stated on June 4 that the Russian government will soon repay its external debt (debt owed to nonresident debtors) and that Russian real income (an individual’s income after adjusting for inflation rates) grew by more than 24 percent in just over three years.[iii] Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee Chairperson Leonid Slutsky stated that Russia’s largest banks provided a positive forecast for mortgage lending growth at SPIEF.[iv] Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak claimed on June 4 that Russian domestic fuel market remains “stable” and gas station prices are rising in line with inflation.[v]

Russia's economy is doing much worse than Russian officials claimed, however, as the Kremlin prioritizes maintaining the facade of economic stability while also pursuing economically sub-optimal policies that will have long-term economic implications. Russia’s extremely low unemployment rate reflects the fact that Russia is experiencing labor shortages and is causing wage inflation in the civilian and defense sectors, contributing to overall inflation.[vi] Russia has also been increasingly struggling with liquidity problems and high levels of external debt after having steadily depleted its sovereign wealth fund’s liquid reserves to fund its war in Ukraine.[vii] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky noted on May 18 that Russia’s federal budget deficit is already almost $80 billion in the first five months of 2026, for example.[viii] Russian officials in Belgorod, Kursk, Moscow, and Leningrad oblasts began restricting gasoline sales in recent days in response to increasing gasoline shortages due to a successful Ukrainian intermediate- to long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure.[ix] Russia’s own shortages may mature in the coming weeks and months. Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Russia’s second-largest bank VTB Andrei Kostin told Reuters on June 4 that Russia’s economic growth could stagnate this year as high borrowing costs chose capital investment. VTB does not expect the Russian economy to grow by the 0.5 percent that Russian officials are forecasting for 2026.[x] Russian officials at SPIEF are pushing a narrative of a stable and growing economic situation despite growing fuel shortages, increasing debt, and stagnating economic growth as the Kremlin prioritizes funding its war in Ukraine despite the economic costs.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) demonstrated a new battle management information system for Russian forces operating in Ukraine that Russia will likely deploy with international exercise partners during Russia’s Center 2026 strategic command-and-staff exercise in September. The Russian MoD announced on June 3 during a Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) member states defense ministerial meeting in Moscow City that Russia is currently testing a new battle management information system for Russian forces operating in Ukraine.[xi] Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec presented components of reconnaissance and strike systems, including an information management system that integrates and supports command and control at all levels in a single network from the platoon level to the level of military formations. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov claimed during the CSTO meeting that the Russian Central Grouping of Forces (GoF) operating in Ukraine is completing combat testing of the newly developed system and that the Russian military command will deploy the system across all GoFs by September 2026. Russian sources claimed in early May that newly appointed Deputy Defense Minister Dmitry Shcherbinin began overseeing the development and implementation of a new digital system for tactical situational awareness and commander decision support.[xii] Belousov's rollout date for the system coincides with Russia’s planned main strategic command-and-staff exercise, Center-2026, which is scheduled for September 28 to October 3 and is expected to include over 10 foreign military units, including several CSTO countries.[xiii] The Russian military command will likely deploy its new information management system during the Center-2026 exercise in September to share best practices in battlefield management and operational experience from the war in Ukraine with CSTO member states, including operationalizing foreign CSTO military contingents under a Russian operational command.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky sent an open letter to Russian President Vladimir Putin on June 4 proposing an immediate ceasefire along the current frontline and a face-to-face bilateral meeting in a third country to end the war.
• Russian officials continued to ignore the economic problems and fuel shortages that Russia is facing at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) and instead presented a facade of economic stability.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) demonstrated a new battle management information system for Russian forces operating in Ukraine that Russia will likely deploy with international exercise partners during Russia’s Center 2026 strategic command-and-staff exercise in September.
• Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances throughout the theater in the past day.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military infrastructure in Russia on June 4. Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile and 293 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 3, 2026

The Russian ultranationalist community presented extreme and unrealistic scenarios for Russia’s military and geopolitical future at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) that likely somewhat differ from the Kremlin's positions. Russian business newspaper Kommersant reported on June 3 that Kremlin-affiliated Russian oligarch and Orthodox nationalist Konstantin Malofeev and Russian ultranationalist ideologue Alexander Dugin presented several “future scenarios” for Russia at SPIEF.[1] The presentation slides outlined “good,” "inertial" (continuing), and “bad” scenarios for 2036 and 2050 and divided perceived threats to Russia into five categories, including geopolitics, ideology and politics, demography, economy, and technologies. The “good” scenario includes the Russian occupation of Kyiv, Odesa, Kharkiv, and other Ukrainian cities and the collapse of the European Union (EU) by 2036 and other Russian narratives about alleged imminent victory in Ukraine. The presentation’s “bad” scenario included a Russian military defeat in Ukraine, Ukraine joining NATO, the loss of Russian influence over post-Soviet countries by 2036, and the “colonization of Russia” by 2050. The presentation’s "continuing" 2036 scenario speculated that Russia would use nuclear weapons if the military situation in Ukraine remained the same, effectively threatening that Russia will use nuclear weapons against Ukraine if the war in Ukraine continues its current path. Malofeev also spoke about the potential actions of Russia and Russian “enemies” and outlined the threat dynamics from 2000 until 2026. Dugin noted that his ultranationalist think tank Tsargrad Institute also presented the “future scenarios” report at the Russian forces' General Staff Academy and will publish the report by the end of 2026. Malofeev and Dugin are part of an ultranationalist hardline community in Russia that has continuously advocated for a protracted war in Ukraine and are likely presenting the report at SPIEF to outline their personal goals and the goals of the hardliners they represent for Russia's future.[2] The Kremlin may use the unrealistic nature of these three scenarios to portray Russian President Vladimir Putin’s and other government officials' rhetoric as moderate and reasonable in comparison to the extreme scenarios presented by a small cadre of ultranationalists. The Kremlin will likely have to strike a balance between the demands and expectations of the Russian ultranationalist community, with its own rhetoric and the battlefield realities in Ukraine, however, as Putin likely does not want to risk losing the support of the ultranationalists.

Ukrainian forces conducted a series of long-range strikes against Russian military assets and oil infrastructure in St. Petersburg, coinciding with the first day of SPIEF. The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on June 3 that Ukrainian forces struck the Baltic Fleet's Project 20380 Boykiy Steregushchiy-class corvette stationed at the Kronstadt Naval Base in St. Petersburg.[3] Geolocated footage published on June 3 shows a column of smoke rising from the Kronstadt Naval Base following the Ukrainian strike.[4] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the St. Petersburg Oil Terminal, causing a fire.[5] Geolocated footage published on June 3 shows the aftermath of Ukrainian strikes on the St. Petersburg Oil Terminal.[6] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that the terminal is one of the largest oil transfer complexes in the Baltic Sea and has a capacity of 10 million tons per year. Brovdi noted that this is the 20th Ukrainian strike against oil refining infrastructure in St. Petersburg since May 1, 2026.[7] Leningrad Oblast Governor Aleksandr Drozdenko confirmed that Ukrainian drones struck infrastructure facilities in Kronstadt, as well as Kirovsky and Krasnoselsky raions.[8] Ukrainian forces have significantly increased the frequency, range, and intensity of strikes against Russian oil infrastructure deep in the Russian rear since March 2026, creating outsized impacts on Russian oil exports and refining capacity.[9] The Kremlin has historically capitalized on SPIEF to project economic strength and power to global audiences, and Ukrainian strikes against St. Petersburg on the first day of SPIEF undercut this Russian narrative. Ukrainian long-range strikes over 1,000 kilometers from the international border continue to demonstrate how Ukraine is bringing Russia's war closer to home, disrupting events that the Kremlin has historically capitalized on.[10]

Russian officials have recently intensified a pattern of weaponizing alleged Ukrainian strikes on civilian targets to justify devastating strikes on Ukraine under the guise of retaliation. Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin claimed on June 3 that Ukrainian forces struck a civilian bus on the Moscow-Simferopol route in occupied Yenakiyeve (roughly 35 kilometers from the frontline), killing eight civilians and injuring 11 others.[11] Geolocated footage published on June 3 shows the aftermath of a drone strike on the bus in occupied Yenakiyeve.[12] Russian officials claimed that Ukrainian forces deliberately struck the bus to cause civilian casualties and threatened that Russia could conduct a retaliatory military response.[13] Ukrainian officials have not commented on the alleged strike, and ISW is unable to verify Russian claims regarding the strike. Russia made claims about the alleged strike in occupied Yenakiyeve one day after the Kremlin launched another devastating drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of June 1 to 2 that killed at least 22 civilians and injured at least 130.[14] The Kremlin has started to use claims about Ukraine’s alleged strikes against civilians to justify massive strike packages against Ukraine that the Kremlin intended to conduct regardless of Ukrainian actions, causing extensive damage to civilian infrastructure and resulting in high civilian casualties.[15] Russia is likely prioritizing such devastating strikes in part to obfuscate its ongoing battlefield challenges and is likely using these accusations in an attempt to shroud these strikes in a fabricated veneer of legitimacy.

Key Takeaways:

• The Russian ultranationalist community presented extreme and unrealistic scenarios for Russia’s military and geopolitical future at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) that likely somewhat differ from the Kremlin's positions.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a series of long-range strikes against Russian military assets and oil infrastructure in St. Petersburg, coinciding with the first day of SPIEF.
• Russian officials have recently intensified a pattern of weaponizing alleged Ukrainian strikes on civilian targets to justify devastating strikes on Ukraine under the guise of retaliation.
• Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances throughout the theater in the past day.  
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and oil infrastructure on June 3. Russian forces launched 198 drones toward Ukraine overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 2, 2026

Russian forces conducted yet another devastating drone and missile strike series against Ukraine on the night of June 1 to 2, heavily targeting Kyiv City. The Russian strikes killed at least 22 civilians and injured at least 130.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 73 missiles -- including eight Zirkon hypersonic cruise missiles, 33 Iskander-M ballistic missiles, 27 Kh-101 cruise missiles, and five Kalibr cruise missiles -- and 656 Shahed, Gerbera, Italmas, Banderol, and Parodiya drones overnight.[2] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 11 Iskander-Ms, 26 Kh-101s, three Kalibrs, and 602 drones; that 30 ballistic missiles, three cruise missiles, and 33 drones struck 38 locations; and that debris hit 15 locations. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that the strike mainly targeted Kyiv City. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on June 2 that the Russian strike damaged dozens of residential buildings and civilian infrastructure locations in Kyiv City and energy infrastructure in Kharkiv City.[3] Kyiv City Mayor Vitaliy Klitschko reported that Russian strikes damaged a medical clinic, a gas station, preschools, and residential buildings in Kyiv City.[4] Klitschko reported that the strikes on Kyiv City killed at least seven people and wounded at least 90, including two children.[5] Geolocated footage published on June 1 shows fires and damage to a residential building, a medical facility, a car dealership, and a gas station in Kyiv City.[6]

Ukrainian sources reported that Russian strikes against Dnipro City damaged residential infrastructure, killed at least 16 people, and injured at least 42, including four children.[7] Russian forces reportedly used cluster munitions against Dnipro City during the June 1 to 2 strikes.[8] The Ukrainian State Emergency Services (DSNS) reported on May 5 that Russian forces conducted a double-tap missile strike against Dnipro City, killing a rescue worker who was responding to the aftermath of an earlier Russian strike.[9] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces also struck commercial, transport, residential, energy, and other critical infrastructure in Chernihiv, Mykolaiv, Poltava, Odesa, Sumy, Khmelnytsky, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[10]

Russia's June 1 to 2 strikes are part of a pattern of escalating Russian strikes against Kyiv City intended to take advantage of Patriot interceptor shortages and distract from Russia's inability to secure its deep rear from Ukrainian long-range strikes, as well as from its battlefield setbacks. The Kremlin attempted to provide several justifications to add a thin veneer of legitimacy for its June 1 to 2 strikes. Russian President Vladimir Putin held a meeting on June 1 (ahead of the start of the overnight Russian strikes) intended to reiterate claims that Ukraine's May 21 to 22 strike against a Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies headquarters in occupied Starobilsk, Luhansk Oblast, hit an exclusively civilian object, calling for Ukrainian authorities to be held responsible for the strike.[11] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that Putin issued orders to the Russian military in connection with the Starobilsk strike following the June 1 meeting.[12] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on June 2 that Russian forces conducted the June 1 to 2 strikes in response to the Starobilsk strike and publishing a list of military and defense industrial targets that Russian forces allegedly hit. The Russian strikes caused significant damage to civilian and critical infrastructure and inflicted high civilian casualties, however.[13] The June 1 to 2 strikes are also part of an escalating pattern of Russian strikes following the May 9 to 11 ceasefire, which highlighted Russia's inability to defend its deep rear from Ukrainian strikes as Putin was forced to ask Ukraine to refrain from conducting strikes during Moscow's Victory Day celebrations.[14] Putin and other Russian officials had threatened to strike Kyiv City decision making centers if Ukraine conducted deep strikes during the ceasefire, and Russia has since violated the spirit of the ceasefire by continuously conducting strikes that disproportionately affect civilians in Kyiv City.[15] Russian claims that recent strikes are in response to a single strike against occupied Starobilsk are attempting to obfuscate the reality that Russia would have very likely conducted these strikes anyway.[16] The Russian MoD recently threatened a systematic series of strikes against Ukraine as Russian ultranationalist milbloggers continue to express frustration over the lack of a significant response to Ukraine’s deep-rear strikes.[17] Russia’s use of cluster munitions and its conduct of double-tap missile strikes targeting first responders continues to demonstrate a Russian strike pattern aimed at inflicting maximum civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure. Putin is using massive strike packages against Kyiv in an effort to break Ukraine's will to fight as well as to disguise his weakness, particularly his inability to secure Russian territory, including Russia’s capital, from Ukraine’s deep strikes. He is also seeking to recover from the embarrassment of having had to ask Ukraine permission to hold even a dramatically scaled-down Victory Day parade on May 9.[18]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted yet another devastating drone and missile strike series against Ukraine on the night of June 1 to 2, heavily targeting Kyiv City. The Russian strikes killed at least 22 civilians and injured at least 130.
• Russia's June 1 to 2 strikes are part of a pattern of escalating Russian strikes against Kyiv City intended to take advantage of Patriot interceptor shortages and distract from Russia's inability to secure its deep rear from Ukrainian long-range strikes as well as from its battlefield setbacks.
• Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances throughout the theater in the past day.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 1, 2026

Ukrainian forces have largely halted the Russian Spring-Summer 2026 offensive so far, and Russian forces in May 2026 have gained a presence in only a fraction of the territory they did in May 2025. ISW observed evidence to assess that Russian forces gained control of or infiltrated 40.64 square kilometers between December 2025 and May 2026. Russian forces, however, lost 281.1 square kilometers in the same time period when only considering territory that Russian forces control. (ISW's infiltration layer shows areas in which Russian forces — sometimes very small groups of a few soldiers — have infiltrated and maintain a limited presence interspersed with Ukrainian positions but do not control.) ISW calculations show that Russian forces lost control of about 281 square kilometers in part due to the fact that ISW recodes areas in the Russian advances layer to infiltrations when new evidence allows ISW to reassess the level of control Russian forces maintain over an area. ISW’s calculations that the Russian forces lost control of 281 square kilometers thus do not inherently mean that Ukrainian forces liberated that amount of territory.

Comparisons of Russia's gains in 2025 with the same period last year show that Russia's gains have slowed significantly, even when including Russian infiltrations. Russian forces advanced into 515.84 square kilometers from December 2024 to May 2025, compared to the 40.64 square kilometers into which they advanced or infiltrated in the same time period in 2025-2026. Russian forces thus seized or infiltrated into only 7.87 percent as much territory in 2026 as they advanced into in 2025. (Russian forces were not widely using infiltration tactics in early 2025, and ISW therefore did not have a Russian infiltration layer at that time.) Russia's year-on-year performance statistics significantly worsen when comparing only areas in which ISW assesses that Russian forces exert control: the 515.84 square kilometers they seized in early 2025 compares poorly with the net loss of 281.1 square kilometers they suffered in the same period this year.

Other sources with different methodologies are also recording a slow Russian rate of advance in May 2026. A source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence reported on June 1 that Russian forces occupied only 14 additional square kilometers of territory in May 2026.[1] The source noted, however, that it has delayed publishing information about Ukrainian advances due to security reasons and that Russia's advances in May were actually negative. The current battlefield situation, in which Ukrainian and Russian positions are often interspersed and the "kill zone" is expanding, makes precise calculations about Russian and Ukrainian gains and losses difficult. ISW's methodology differs from that of the Ukrainian military intelligence-affiliated source, leading to different calculations about how many square kilometers Russian forces have seized in May. The source's overall assessment is nonetheless consistent with ISW’s.

Russia's declining gains appear to be unrelated to the seasonal weather shifts that traditionally hinder advances, but is likely the result of more comprehensive battlefield shifts in 2026. ISW assessed that Russian forces suffered a net loss of territory controlled in April 2026 but that this may have been in part related to annual seasonal patterns.[2] Russia's April 2026 decline may have been related to the muddy rasputitsa season when snow melts and rains degrade conditions for mechanized movement. Russian forces have historically increased their advances in May and June as the ground dries — as was the case in 2025. Russian gains in May 2026, however, are not following a similar pattern, suggesting that Russia's declining advances in 2026 have not been related to seasonal weather conditions. Russia's slower advances are likely related to wider changes on the battlefield, including Ukrainian ground counterattacks, Ukrainian mid-range strikes, the February 2026 block on Russia’s use of Starlink terminals in Ukraine, and the Kremlin’s throttling of Telegram.

Russian President Vladimir Putin is reportedly resisting pressure to reduce defense spending and end his war against Ukraine, despite increased warnings from economic officials about the unsustainable strain his war effort is putting on the Russian economy. Bloomberg reported on June 1, citing sources and documents that Bloomberg viewed, that senior Russian Ministry of Finance and Central Bank officials have told Putin that Russia's current level of projected war spending is on an unaffordable path and risks dangerously widening the budget deficit.[3] The sources stated that the Russian officials have proposed defense spending cuts, but that some in the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Kremlin are advocating against reduced defense spending in order to avoid damaging the many businesses that are reliant on military-related contracts. Sources stated that the Russian MoD is even demanding additional funding. The sources told Bloomberg that Putin has been aware of pressure in the Russian budget since last year but asked the Ministry of Finance to first find ways to reduce spending in non-defense sectors. Bloomberg reported that Russian officials drafted the 2026 budget, allowing for a possible 1.2 trillion to 1.5 trillion ruble (roughly $16.5 billion to $21 billion) deficit to emerge in the second half of the year because they hoped that the war would end, enabling Russia to spend less on defense. Sources told Bloomberg that oil revenue windfalls from the war in the Middle East will not be enough, as oil prices would need to stay above $100 per barrel for at least one year to improve the Russian economy. The sources noted that even such sustained high prices would not solve Russia's structural issues affecting economic growth, inflation, and the banking sector. The Russian Ministry of Finance admitted on April 9 that the Russian budget deficit reached 4.58 trillion rubles (roughly $63.5 billion) in the first three months of 2026, already exceeding the planned deficit of 3.79 trillion rubles (roughly $52.5 billion dollars) for all of 2026.[4]

Putin’s unwillingness to cut defense spending and scale down his war effort suggests that Putin believes that he will be able to win the war in the near to medium term and that the Russian economy is able to hold on until then. ISW recently assessed that Putin has likely developed a false perception of the Russian military's successes in Ukraine based on heavily exaggerated claims from the Russian high military command.[5] Putin's misunderstanding of the battlefield situation is likely contributing to his insistence that war spending remain high and to his commitment to continuing the war to achieve his goals militarily. Putin, in fact, faces a different problem, as reduced war spending would likely put sectors of the front at risk in the face of Ukrainian mid-range strike and counterattacks and allow Ukrainian forces to build upon their recent battlefield successes.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces have largely halted the Russian Spring-Summer 2026 offensive so far, and Russian forces in May 2026 have gained a presence in only a fraction of the territory they did in May 2026.
• Other sources with different methodologies are also recording a slow Russian rate of advance in May 2026.
• Russia's declining gains appear to be unrelated to the seasonal weather shifts that traditionally hinder advances but is likely the result of more comprehensive battlefield shifts in 2026.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin is reportedly resisting pressure to reduce defense spending and end his war against Ukraine despite increased warnings from economic officials about the unsustainable strain his war effort is putting on the Russian economy.
• Putin’s unwillingness to cut defense spending and scale down his war effort suggests that Putin believes that he will be able to win the war in the near to medium term and that the Russian economy is able to hold on until then.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.
• Russian forces launched 265 long-range drones at Ukraine overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 31, 2026

Ukraine’s mid-range strike campaign against Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) is disrupting Russian logistics across the theater, from occupied Luhansk Oblast to Crimea. The Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps reported on May 31 that Ukrainian forces have achieved drone-enabled fire control over Luhansk City, Starobilsk, Alchevsk, Bryanka, and Kadiivka (all roughly 50 to 90 kilometers from the frontline) as part of Ukraine’s broader operational strike campaign against Russian GLOCs in Luhansk Oblast aimed at preventing Russian forces from conducting logistics operations in rear areas.[1] The Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps reported that Ukrainian forces regularly strike Russian GLOCs, armor and ammunition depots in the area and recently reached the Izvaryne checkpoint on the international border, over 205 kilometers from Ukrainian drone operators' positions. Ukrainian forces have significantly intensified their mid-range strike campaign against Russian GLOCs across the theater over the last several months, which has been generating cascading effects on the battlefield and inhibiting Russian advances.[2] These strikes have been creating logistics problems for Russian forces throughout southern Ukraine in recent weeks and are now also affecting Russian logistics in occupied Luhansk Oblast.[3] Geolocated footage published on May 30 and 31 shows Ukrainian forces conducting strikes against Russian military equipment along the Debaltseve-Luhansk City highway, the H-32 Alchevsk-Kadiivka highway, the H-20 Kostyantynivka-Donetsk City highway, and the M-14 Mariupol-Berdyansk-Melitopol-Henichesk highway in occupied Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts.[4]

Russian milbloggers confirmed on May 31 that Ukrainian strikes are creating logistical problems for Russian forces across the theater, with one milblogger claiming that Ukrainian drones are now penetrating Russian air defenses throughout occupied Luhansk Oblast and reaching the border with Rostov Oblast.[5] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian mid-range strikes are significantly disrupting Russian logistics not only along the land corridor connecting occupied Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts with Crimea, but also throughout occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.[6] The milblogger claimed that these strikes have caused significant fuel shortages and seriously hampered Russian personnel rotations and ammunition supplies throughout occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov previously stated on May 27 that Ukraine is launching a “logistics lockdown” of Russian forces, aiming to scale its intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian logistics and supply lines.[7] Ukrainian forces have demonstrated the growing pervasiveness of their campaign in recent weeks, consistently striking along the M-03 Slovyansk-Bakhmut highway, the M-14 highway, and the M-30 Luhansk City-Donetsk City highway.[8] Ukrainian strikes against major Russian GLOCs recently forced Russian occupation officials to place restrictions on the M-14 highway — the primary land route connecting occupied Crimea to Russia.[9] Ukrainian forces are effectively expanding a deep zone of drone activity from the intermediate range to the frontline, which is disrupting Russia’s ability to transport personnel to the frontlines, supply and sustain frontline positions, and conduct the infiltration tactics on which Russian forces have relied to advance over the past several months.

Ukraine may also be expanding its drone strike campaign against Russian training grounds in occupied Ukraine. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi and the Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 30 that Ukrainian forces struck the Tryokhizbenko Training Ground of the Russian 3rd Army - likely the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army (CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) but possibly the 3rd Army Corps (AC, under the operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) — near Kryakivka, Luhansk Oblast (about 70 kilometers from the frontline).[10] Magyar reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Primorsky Posad Training Ground of the Russian 36th CAA (Eastern Military District [EMD]) in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast, where elements of the Russian 64th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) were training. Brovdi stated that preliminary information shows that the 64th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade suffered at least 31 casualties, including at least 9 killed in action (KIA), at the Primorsky Posad Training Ground but that losses are likely much higher. Russian forces were able to leverage improved drone reconnaissance capabilities in the near rear in late 2024 into 2025 to conduct several precision missile strikes against Ukrainian training grounds as part of Russia's wider battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign.[11] Ukraine may be trying to replicate these strikes against training grounds with drones in order to endanger Russian troop concentrations in the operational rear.

Russian officials continue to accuse Ukraine of striking the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). ZNPP occupation officials claimed on May 30 and 31 that Ukraine conducted two strikes against ZNPP, hitting the Unit 6 turbine hall on May 30 and a transport shop on May 31.[12] The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Ukraine's Southern Defense Forces refuted both accusations and stated that these Russian accusations are an attempt to divert attention away from Russia's illegal occupation of the plant.[13] The Ukrainian MFA noted that Russia launches a new wave of such accusations ahead of each International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) meeting. The IAEA reported on May 31 that its representatives at the plant observed damage to the turbine hall consistent with a drone strike but did not attribute the damage to a Ukrainian or Russian drone.[14] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev used the purported Ukrainian strike to threaten escalatory retaliatory strikes, claiming that Russia will conduct "symmetrical" strikes against Ukrainian or NATO nuclear power plants if strikes destroy the ZNPP.[15] Russia has systemically threatened and damaged Ukrainian NPPs throughout the course of the war.[16] Russia has also heavily militarized the ZNPP by storing military equipment next to the ZNPP’s nuclear reactors, stationing military personnel at and around the ZNPP, and launching drones from the ZNPP’s grounds.[17] Russian officials frequently make unsubstantiated accusations of Ukrainian strikes on ZNPP and civilian targets to justify escalatory behavior and intensified long-range strikes against Ukraine.[18] Russian officials may use purported strikes to justify a new massive long-range strike against Ukraine in the near future, which Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned of on May 29 and 30.[19]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine’s mid-range strike campaign against Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) is disrupting Russian logistics across the theater, from occupied Luhansk Oblast to Crimea.
• Ukraine may also be expanding its drone strike campaign against Russian training grounds in occupied Ukraine.
• Russian officials continue to accuse Ukraine of striking the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP).
• Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances throughout the theater in the past day.
• Russian forces launched 229 drones toward Ukraine overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 30, 2026

Russia is reportedly preparing to conduct another massive strike against Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned on May 29 that Ukrainian intelligence indicates that Russia is preparing a new massive strike package against Ukraine.[i] Zelensky did not specify the timeline for the planned Russian strike. Zelensky correctly warned on May 23 of a massive Russian strike ahead of Russia's devastating missile and drone strike package that included 90 missiles on the night of May 23 to 24.[ii]

Ukrainian forces struck Russian military assets, including an Iskander missile system, in Rostov Oblast on the night of May 29 to 30. Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) reported that Ukrainian strikes destroyed two Tu-142 long-range aircraft at a Russian military air base in Taganrog and an Iskander missile system at a launch position near Taganrog.[iii] Geolocated footage published on May 30 confirms the destruction of a Tu-142 at the Taganrog Airport and the Iskander system near Mykhailovka (northwest of Taganrog).[iv] Ukrainian defense source Militarnyi, citing satellite imagery and open sources, reported that the two Tu-142 aircraft have been in long-term storage at the Taganrog Aviation Plant since 2011 and that Russian forces moved them in April and May 2026 onto auxiliary runways for unclear reasons.[v] Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a Russian shadow fleet oil tanker at the Taganrog oil depot and the Kurganneftoprodukt oil terminal in Taganrog overnight.[vi] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces damaged a fuel tank at the oil terminal.[vii] Rostov Oblast Governor Yuri Slyusar claimed that Ukrainian drone strikes started fires at the port, a tanker, a fuel tank, and an administrative building in Taganrog.[viii]

The Ukrainian strike campaign against Russian supply lines in occupied Ukraine also includes remote mining in depth. A Russian milblogger claimed on May 29 that Ukrainian forces have started to remotely mine roads along the M-14 Mariupol-Melitopol highway, the same highway that Ukrainian forces are interdicting with Hornet drones to degrade Russian operational logistics.[ix] The milblogger claimed that Ukraine's remote mining could disable unarmored vehicles and cause transport disruptions and road closures. The milblogger had previously warned on May 26 that scattered mines — should Ukraine pursue this line of effort — could regularly close the road to traffic, slow traffic on alternative routes, and shut down nighttime transport.[x] Another Russian milblogger posted pictures on May 29 purportedly showing the new types of mines Ukrainian forces are dropping from drones at a depth of 100 to 150 kilometers from the frontline.[xi] Ukraine has significantly increased its mid-range drone strike campaign against ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in occupied Ukraine, particularly in southern Ukraine near Mariupol, and these reported new remote mining efforts aim to support this strike campaign to disrupt and disable Russian supplies to various sectors of the front.[xii]

The Kremlin is using the May 28-29 Russian drone strike against Galati, Romania, to set conditions to absolve Russia of blame for any accidental Russian drone strikes against Moldova, or possibly a false flag attack against Moldova, in the future. The Russian Embassy in Moldova claimed on May 29 that Moldovan authorities and their Western partners may be preparing a "staging" like the downing of the drone in Galati, Romania, on May 28-29.[xiii] The embassy claimed that the "staging" would aim to blame Russia and provoke an escalation in Moldovan-Russian relations. The embassy claimed that Romanian and Moldovan authorities are united in their Russophobic views and use "identical playbooks." The embassy claimed that statements about Russia's involvement in the May 28-29 drone downing are "unsubstantiated." A Russian Geran-2 drone struck an apartment complex in Galati on May 29, and the Kremlin has denied that it was a Russian drone.[xiv] The Russian embassy's claims set conditions to absolve Russia of any responsibility in the event a Russian drone accidentally strikes Moldova in the future. The embassy's claims may also aim to set conditions to justify a future false flag attack against Moldova with a Russian drone. ISW continues to assess that increasingly frequent Russian drone incursions into NATO airspace indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin has adopted a reckless policy that accepts the risk of Russian drones entering NATO and Moldovan airspace as an acceptable consequence of Russian strikes against Ukraine.[xv] Putin now appears to accept the risk of inflicting civilian casualties in NATO states as an acceptable consequence of Russia’s strike campaign. NATO may need to consider negotiating possible air defense agreements with Ukraine and Moldova as a matter of self-defense against Russian drone strikes against NATO countries, regardless of whether the Russian drone incursions are accidental or intentional.

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to present claims about Russia's battlefield successes that do not correspond with reality to pressure Ukraine to surrender to his demands. Putin claimed on May 29 in a press conference with journalists that Russian forces are advancing in all directions every day, such that only Russia has the "right" to say that the war is coming to its completion, and implied that Russia’s war is heading towards completing its goals.[xvi] Putin's claim implies that Russia is in such a strong battlefield position that Ukraine will have to concede to Russia's demands to end the war. Putin's claims ignore Ukraine's various battlefield successes, including significantly slowing Russia’s rate of advance, Ukraine recently liberating more territory than Russian forces seized in April 2026, and a maturing mid- and long-range strike campaign.[xvii] ISW recently assessed that the Russian military command's repeated exaggerations of the Russian military's successes on the ground have likely given Putin a false perception of the battlefield situation.[xviii] These exaggerations are likely leading Putin to believe his forces can achieve his goals in the near to medium term despite the fact that Russia's battlefield performance has steadily declined in 2026.

Russian authorities continue their attempts to find new ways to mitigate Ukraine’s growing strikes against targets deep in the Russian rear by having oblast-level officials establish a new state entity for coordinating air defense activities, which may include overseeing the establishment of new air defense units. Russian President Vladimir Putin stated on May 29 that Russia needs to continue to strengthen its air defenses.[xix] Nizhny Novgorod Oblast Governor Gleb Nikitin signed a decree on May 30 creating the new Nizhny Novgorod Oblast-level “Ministry for the Protection of Nizhny Novgorod Oblast Facilities.”[xx] Nikitin stated that the ministry will be the hub coordinating the oblast's contributions to Russia's wider air defense capabilities and the protection of the oblast’s security during the war.[xxi] Nikitin added that the ministry will support the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and protect the primary targets of Ukrainian strikes. The region's deputy prime minister, Vladimir Tuzhilin, will head the new ministry. Nikitin’s decree represents the first new oblast-level “ministry” responsible for air defense and likely represents official efforts to find new ways to combat Ukraine's growing drone threat. Leningrad Oblast similarly announced reforms in April 2026 to respond to Ukrainian strikes, including recruiting callups for air defense needs near critical infrastructure and supplying regional material and tactical assistance to Russian air defenders.[xxii] A Russian insider source recently claimed on May 28 that the Russian federal government is increasingly shifting the burden for funding air defenses to regional governments, and the new oblast reforms related to air defense are in line with this regional-level focus.[xxiii] The command and control and administrative control over any Nizhny Novgorod units that may be formed as part of the new ministry remain unclear.

Key Takeaways:

• Russia is reportedly preparing to conduct another massive strike against Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces struck Russian military assets, including an Iskander missile system, in Rostov Oblast on the night of May 29 to 30.
• The Ukrainian strike campaign against Russian supply lines in occupied Ukraine also includes remote mining in depth.
• The Kremlin is using the May 28-29 Russian drone strike against Galati, Romania, to set conditions to absolve Russia of blame for any accidental Russian drone strikes against Moldova, or possibly a false flag attack against Moldova, in the future.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to present claims about Russia's battlefield successes that do not correspond with reality to pressure Ukraine to surrender to his demands.
• Russian authorities continue their attempts to find new ways to mitigate Ukraine’s growing strikes against targets deep in the Russian rear by having oblast-level officials establish a new state entity for coordinating air defense activities, which may include overseeing the establishment of new air defense units.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka direction.
• Russian forces launched one ballistic missile, five cruise missiles, and 290 drones toward Ukraine overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 29, 2026

A Russian Geran-2 drone struck a multi-story apartment complex in Galati, Romania, on the evening of May 28-29. The Romanian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on May 29 that Russian forces struck civilian and infrastructure close to the Ukrainian-Romanian international border along the Danube River on the night on May 28 to 29, during which a drone entered Romanian airspace and struck a residential apartment building in Galati (approximately seven kilometers from the Ukrainian border), causing a fire.[1] The strike injured at least two civilians.[2] The Romanian MoD reported that two Romanian F-16 fighters and an IAR 330 SOCAT helicopter scrambled at 0119 local time on the morning of May 29 after the drone entered Romanian airspace.[3] Romanian authorities reported that the drone was a Russian Geran-2 (the Russian-produced version of an Iranian Shahed-136) and that its entire payload detonated upon impact.[4] Footage of the debris is also consistent with that of a Shahed-type drone.[5] Romanian President Nicusor Dan stated that 43 Russian drones were flying toward Romania from the east, one of which Ukrainian air defenses likely intercepted above Reni, Odesa Oblast (east of Galati along the international border with Romania and Moldova), altering its trajectory.[6] Dan stated that Russia bears the full responsibility for the drone strike, as Russia's behavior disregards international law and the safety of the citizens of a NATO member state.[7] Romanian Acting Foreign Minister Oana Toiu stated that Romania is engaging in discussions about possibly activating NATO’s Article 4 provision, a consultation between NATO member states, in response to the Russian drone strike.[8] Romania shut down the Russian consulate in Constanta and declared the Russian consul persona non grata in response to the strike.[9]

Russian drones have violated Romanian airspace at least 28 times (and drone fragments have entered Romania reportedly as many as 47 times) since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, but this is the first incursion that injured civilians in Romania or in any NATO member state.[10] The Romanian MoD noted in September 2025 — during a period of intense Russian drone incursions into NATO states bordering Ukraine, including intentionally at times — that Russian drones had conducted about 50 drone strikes near the Ukrainian-Romanian border since February 2022, including 30 strikes in which debris fell on Romanian territory.[11] Russia notably violated Polish airspace with at least 19 drones on the night of September 9 to 10 in intentional Russian incursions.[12] Increasingly frequent Russian drone incursions into NATO airspace indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin have adopted a reckless policy that accepts the risk of Russian drones entering NATO airspace as an acceptable consequence of its strikes in Ukraine. Putin now appears to accept the risk of inflicting civilian casualties in NATO states as an acceptable consequence of Russia's strike campaign.

Romanian Armed Forces Joint Staff Acting Commander, Brigadier General Gheorghe Maxim, spoke about constraints on Romania's air defense abilities on May 29. Maxim stated that Romanian law prohibits Romanian air defenses from operating in such a way that would affect the airspace of a neighboring country, including firing a projectile that could enter Ukrainian airspace.[13] Maxim stated that four minutes passed between when Romania detected the Russian drone in Romanian airspace and when the drone struck the apartment in Galati, noting that four minutes was not enough time to detect, identify, and intercept the drone. Maxim also stated that Romanian forces need to consider the risk of debris from air defense operations inflicting more damage than the drone could inflict itself, noting that Romanian forces had no opportunities to intercept the drone safely. Maxim stated that these strikes are the consequence of a conflict occurring near Romania's border that is directly affecting Romanian residents. Given the restrictions on Romania's air defense operations, NATO may need to consider negotiating possible air defense agreements with Ukraine and Moldova as a matter of self-defense against Russian drone strikes against NATO countries, regardless of whether the Russian drone incursions are accidental or intentional.

Senior Kremlin officials are leaning into two separate responses to the drone strike in Romania that together aim to deflect Russia’s responsibility for the drone incident, falsely blame Ukraine, and test NATO's response to Russian drone incursions. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on May 29 in response to the drone strike in Romania that European states are “direct participants” in the war against Russia and that “[European countries] have not seen anything yet... so they'd better get used to it. This won't be the last time."[14] Medvedev's response effectively threatens Romania and other European states with further drone strikes should these states continue to support Ukraine. Putin criticized European assertions that the drone was Russian and claimed that no one can say for sure the origin of the drone until authorities examine the wreckage.[15] Putin insinuated that the drone was Ukrainian and offered to examine the drone's wreckage to determine its origin if Romanian authorities give the wreckage to Russia. Medvedev frequently makes more radical and outlandish statements than other Kremlin officials make, but his statements still reflect threats that the Kremlin wants to - and Putin himself in the past has delivered to the West.[16] Russian State Duma deputies, who often act as bullhorns for the Kremlin’s rhetorical lines, also deflected Russian responsibility for the strike and falsely accused the West of escalating against Russia.[17] The Kremlin has observed NATO's responses to prior Russian drone incursions into NATO airspace, particularly during their height in Fall 2025, and will likely use the May 29 strike in Romania to test NATO’s response to both the drone incursion itself and the Kremlin’s rhetoric, regardless of whether the May 29 incursion was accidental or intentional. Such incursions and strikes will likely continue so long as Russian forces continue operating drones in the vicinity of NATO’s borders. NATO may need to adjust its air defense policies and frameworks to protect its own people against Russian recklessness.

Russia is reportedly allowing private businesses to purchase air defense and counter-drone systems as Russia seeks to offset the cost of its increased air defense needs on Russian federal subjects and entities outside of the federal government. Russian outlet RBK reported on May 28, citing sources in and close to the Russian MoD, that the Russian MoD approved a mechanism that allows private companies and enterprises to purchase large-caliber weapons, turrets, anti-aircraft artillery systems, radars, and mobile electronic warfare (EW) systems to equip mobile fire groups defending their facilities from drone threats.[18] A source familiar with the organization of Russian air defenses for civilian infrastructure claimed that the mechanism includes both anti-aircraft missile systems within the broader Russian air defense umbrella and the mobile fire teams made up of reservists, volunteers from regional Russian Combat Army Reserve (BARS) units, and employees of private enterprises. A source told RBK that the increasing frequency of Ukrainian strikes deep in Russia necessitates more mobile fire teams, which the source claimed are "highly effective" at intercepting Ukrainian fixed-wing drones. A source in the Russian MoD reportedly told RBK that Russian private companies have long been able to purchase "passive" defense equipment, including EW, on the open market, and Rosgvardia (Russian National Guard) controls the distribution of small arms and light weapons to security personnel. Russia is increasingly shifting the funding of air defenses to individual enterprises and regional governments and is turning to private military companies (PMCs) to defend Russian critical infrastructure against Ukrainian long-range drone strikes.[19] Russia's requirements for air defense and mobile fire group personnel are increasing both at the long-range within Russia and at the mid-range in occupied Ukraine, as Ukrainian forces are increasing the frequency and range of their drone strike campaign against Russian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) and oil and military-industrial facilities in Russia.[20]

A Russian state-owned polling institution indicated that Russian President Vladimir Putin's approval ratings fell again following a slight increase that interrupted weeks of falling approval ratings. The Russian state-owned All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM) published on May 29 the results of a poll indicating that Putin's approval rating fell by 1.9 percent to 67.5 percent from May 18 to 24 and that trust in Putin fell by 0.1 percent to 73.7 percent in the same time period.[21] VTsIOM's prior polling indicated that Putin's trust and approval ratings fell for several weeks starting in March 2026, before VTsIOM changed its methodology to include in-person polling rather than just phone calls, which likely contributed to a slight increase in Putin's approval ratings in early May 2026.[22] This slight increase in early May now appears to be temporary. VTsIOM's numbers are likely not reliable in any event, but it remains notable that a Russian state-owned institution has been acknowledging decreases in Putin's approval ratings as the Russian population increasingly bears the brunt of Putin's war effort. The Russian Public Opinion Foundation (FOM), another Russian state-owned polling agency that reported a decline in Putin's approval ratings in recent weeks, claimed that on May 29, Putin's trust and approval levels increased from the prior week, contrary to the VTsIOM's polling.[23] The Kremlin has recently pushed for Russian state and pro-Kremlin media outlets to limit reporting on some news that contributes to domestic discontent against Putin and the Russian Government, such as state censorship initiatives.[24] The discrepancy in the VTsIOM's and FOM's reporting on May 29 may be a reflection of the tension between the obvious societal discontent within Russia and the Kremlin's efforts to manipulate media coverage in order to temper this discontent.

Key Takeaways:

• A Russian Geran-2 drone struck a multi-story apartment complex in Galati, Romania, on the evening of May 28-29.
• Senior Kremlin officials are leaning into two separate responses to the drone strike in Romania that together aim to deflect Russia’s responsibility for the drone incident, falsely blame Ukraine, and test NATO's response to Russian drone incursions.
• Russia is reportedly allowing private businesses to purchase air defense and counter-drone systems as Russia seeks to offset the cost of its increased air defense needs on Russian federal subjects and entities outside of the federal government.
• A Russian state-owned polling institution indicated that Russian President Vladimir Putin's approval ratings fell again following a slight increase that interrupted weeks of falling approval ratings.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
• Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile/S-400 air defense missile, and 232 long-range drones at Ukraine overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 28, 2026

Russian President Vladimir Putin has likely developed a false perception of the Russian military's successes in Ukraine based on heavily exaggerated maps from the Russian high military command. A Ukrainian open-source cartographer and frequent geolocator published on X (formerly Twitter) on May 28 a reported leaked Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) map dated April 9 of the frontline in western Zaporizhia Oblast - the area of responsibility (AoR) of the Russian Dnepr Grouping of Forces.[1] ISW has reason to believe that the leaked Russian MoD map may be authentic. The map alleges that Russian forces seized Prymorske, Stepnohirsk, Richne, Veselyanka, Zaporozhets, Zapasne, Mali Shcherbaky, and Shcherbaky (all west of Orikhiv); southwestern Orikhiv up to the railway; and Novodanylivka, Mala Tokmachka, and Bilohiriya (all southeast of Orikhiv). Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov claimed on April 21 that Russian forces seized Veselyanka and entered Zaporozhets, and these claims are consistent with the leaked MoD map and show the Russian military command's pattern of exaggerating advances in this area of the front.[2]

ISW had not observed evidence that Russian forces had infiltrated or advanced into Orikhiv, Richne, Veselyanka, Zaporozhets, or Zapasne as of April 9.[3] ISW observed evidence that Russian forces had entered (either through infiltrations or advances) but not seized Prymorske, Stepnohirsk, Mali Shcherbaky, Shcherbaky, Novodanylivka, Mala Tokmachka, and Bilohirya as of April 9. ISW has not observed evidence that Russian forces maintain a presence in Richne, Veselyanka, or Zapasne as of May 28. ISW has also observed no evidence that Russian forces have infiltrated or advanced into Orikhiv — the Russian operational objective in this direction since 2022. ISW observed Russian forces at closest infiltrating or advancing to positions about three kilometers from Orikhiv.

The Russian military command's exaggerated claims about the Kupyansk area since late Summer 2025 show a larger pattern within the Russian military of misrepresenting the battlefield geometry at the highest levels. Gerasimov and other senior Russian officials have repeatedly presented inaccurate situation reports about the Kupyansk direction. Gerasimov claimed in late August 2025 that Russian forces had seized approximately half of Kupyansk.[4] Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed in early October 2025 that Russian forces seized two-thirds of Kupyansk, and Gerasimov claimed in late October 2025 that Russian forces had surrounded 5,000 Ukrainian troops in Kupyansk and on the eastern (left) bank of the Oskil River east of the town.[5] Gerasimov subsequently claimed in late November 2025 that Russian forces had fully seized Kupyansk, and Putin claimed at that time that 3,500 Ukrainian troops remained trapped on the eastern bank of the Oskil River.[6] Gerasimov and Russian Western Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Sergei Kuzovlev claimed in December 2025 and January 2026 that Russian forces had seized Kucherivka (east of Kupyansk), Podoly (southeast of Kupyansk), Kurylivka (southeast of Kupyansk), and Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (south of Kupyansk).[7] Gerasimov claimed on April 21 that Russian forces eliminated the purportedly surrounded Ukrainian troops on the eastern bank of the Oskil River, almost six months after Russian forces allegedly surrounded the troops.[8]

Russian milbloggers have repeatedly criticized the Kremlin and the Russian military command for lying about the battlefield situation in the Kupyansk area.[9] ISW observed evidence as of late December 2025 to assess that Ukrainian forces had largely liberated the town and were eliminating the remaining Russian infiltrators.[10] The Russian military command has nonetheless continued its exaggerated claims about Kupyansk in May 2026. Gerasimov claimed on May 16 that Russian forces were advancing toward Shevchenkove (approximately 28 kilometers west of Kupyansk), implying that Russian forces had seized Kupyansk and were advancing westward.[11]  Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov ordered on May 28 the Russian Western Grouping of Forces to increase the pace of advances in the grouping's entire AoR — the Kupyansk, Borova, and Lyman directions.[12] Russian milbloggers have widely complained that inaccurate reports of Russian advances moving up the chain of command lead to senseless assaults that aim to capture the areas that the reports already alleged as seized.[13] Belousov's order may aim for Russian forces near Kupyansk to increase their tempo of attacks in order to make the actual battlefield reality match that on the higher military command's exaggerated maps.

The Russian military command's exaggerations are likely leading Putin to believe his forces can achieve his battlefield goals in the near to medium term, despite the fact that Russia's battlefield performance has steadily declined in 2026. The Financial Times (FT) reported on May 28 that sources who talk to Putin stated that Putin believes Russian forces can capture all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts by Fall 2026, after which he intends to escalate his territorial demands.[14] ISW assessed on May 13 that Russian forces have advanced at a rate of 2.63 square kilometers per day in Donetsk Oblast since the start of 2026, however, and that it is unclear when — if at all — Russian forces would be able to seize the rest of the region at this slow rate of advance.[15]

Russia's rate of advance has significantly slowed so far in 2026 compared to 2025. ISW observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have advanced and seized 104 square kilometers in Ukraine between the start of 2026 and May 26 – compared with 1,619 square kilometers seized during the same time period in 2025. (These calculations do not include areas in which Russian forces may have infiltrated in 2026.) Russia's net gains in 2026 are significantly lower than those in 2025 even when including areas in which Russian forces have infiltrated in 2026 but have not seized, which total 628 square kilometers. The Russian military command may be attempting to paint a better picture of Russian advances to conceal the true declining rate of advance. The Russian military command likely regularly shows such exaggerated maps to Putin, shaping his false perception of the frontline and the extent of Russian advances and likely leading him to make increasingly unrealistic demands.

Russian forces are reinforcing air defenses in Moscow City in response to Ukraine's growing long-range drone campaign against the Russian deep rear. A Russian insider source claimed on May 28 that sources in the Moscow City government confirmed that the Kremlin has shifted the burden of funding new air defenses, including those in Moscow City, to regional governments.[16] The source claimed that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) installed new air defense systems in Moscow City, but that the Moscow City government financed the project through contracts with Russian state defense conglomerate Almaz-Antey. Geolocated footage published on May 28 shows a Russian Mi-26 helicopter installing a Pantsir-SMD air defense system on the roof of the Nordstar Tower in Moscow City.[17] The system features up to 48 short-range TKB-1055 mini-missiles designed to intercept small drones.[18] Russian opposition source Vazhnye Istorii reported on May 28 that the Nordstar Tower is situated within three kilometers of the Sukhoi Design Bureau headquarters, the Moscow Garrison Military Court, the Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate (GRU) headquarters, and the Russian MoD's 6th Central Research Institute.[19] Russian forces are reinforcing Moscow City air defenses following successful Ukrainian strikes on Moscow City and Moscow Oblast on May 16 to 17 and Russian restrictions in the Moscow air zone, demonstrating the increasing vulnerability of one of Russia’s densest air defense networks to Ukrainian long-range drone campaign.[20]

Russia continues to struggle to defend against Ukraine's mid-range strike campaign and is reportedly resorting to war crimes to protect Russian military vehicles in the rear. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on May 28 that Ukrainian drone strikes against southern Ukraine are having far-reaching consequences on Russian logistics beyond just causing shortages of gasoline and goods in occupied Crimea.[21]  The milblogger added that Russia needs to find a way to protect its logistics but that Russian forces do not have enough personnel to erect anti-drone tunnels over their ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and machine gun nests. Another Russian milblogger added that Ukrainian mid-range strikes are targeting GLOCs 50 to 100 kilometers from the frontline that Russian forces use to redeploy forces and that these strikes could increase the successes of future Ukrainian counterattacks on the front.[22] The milblogger noted that roadside defenses are insufficient. The milblogger called on Russian forces to significantly increase the number of mobile fire teams and interceptor crews in southern Ukraine and to find ways to strike Ukrainian drone operators. Russian opposition source Astra reported on May 27 that Russian milbloggers are discussing an alleged order from the Russian military command to combat Ukrainian drone strikes in the operational rear by repainting and disguising military vehicles as civilian ones - an act of perfidy under the Geneva Convention.[23]

Sweden pledged a total of 36 Gripen fighter aircraft to Ukraine in a large military support package on May 28. Sweden announced on May 28 that Ukraine will allocate 2.5 billion euros (about $2.9 billion) from the EU’s Ukraine Support Loan to procure up to 20 Gripen E/F fighter aircraft from Sweden and that Sweden will additionally donate 16 Gripen C/D aircraft to Ukraine.[24] Sweden also announced a military support package including unspecified long-range capabilities, ammunition, and electronic warfare (EW) capabilities. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky noted that the Swedish aid package is worth $2.7 billion, of which almost $400 million will go towards drone production.[25] Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson stated that Sweden should deliver the 16 Gripen C/D fighter aircraft in early 2027 and aims to begin the delivery of the 20 Gripen E/F aircraft in 2030.[26] Kristersson stated that Ukraine has already started aircraft maintenance and pilot training.

Zelensky stated that the Gripens will help Ukraine defend against Russian guided glide bombs.[27] Zelensky stated that the Gripen’s Meteor air-to-air missiles with a range of 200 kilometers will help to displace Russian aircraft and hinder Russia's ability to launch massive glide bomb strikes.[28] Russian forces have leveraged their sanctuary in Russian airspace where Ukrainian forces cannot intercept Russian aircraft in order to safely launch massive glide bomb strikes from a distance.[29] Ukrainian forces will likely use the Gripen fighter aircraft to deny Russian forces this sanctuary and force Russian aircraft further into the Russian rear, potentially far enough back that Russia's glide bombs cannot strike frontline targets. Ukraine has also been building out its own glide bomb strike capabilities. Ukraine has developed its own domestically produced guided glide bomb, which will likely allow Ukrainian forces to expand their battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign against Russia’s near and operational rear, including against hardened targets.[30]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin has likely developed a false perception of the Russian military's successes in Ukraine based on heavily exaggerated maps from the Russian high military command.
• The Russian military command's exaggerated claims about the Kupyansk area since late Summer 2025 show a larger pattern within the Russian military of misrepresenting the battlefield geometry at the highest levels.
• The Russian military command's exaggerations are likely leading Putin to believe his forces can achieve his battlefield goals in the near to medium term, despite the fact that Russia's battlefield performance has steadily declined in 2026.
• Russian forces are reinforcing air defenses in Moscow City in response to Ukraine's growing long-range drone campaign against the Russian deep rear.
• Russia continues to struggle to defend against Ukraine's mid-range strike campaign and is reportedly resorting to war crimes to protect Russian military vehicles in the rear.
• Sweden pledged a total of 36 Gripen fighter aircraft to Ukraine in a large military support package on May 28.
• Zelensky stated that the Gripens will help Ukraine defend against Russian guided glide bombs.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern in the Velykyi Burluk and Oleksandrivka directions. Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast.
• Russian forces launched one Kinzhal aeroballistic missile and 147 long-range drones at Ukraine overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 27, 2026

The Kremlin’s domestic contract recruitment campaign continues to show signs of strain under the pressure of high battlefield losses. There are likely internal debates within the Kremlin about whether Russia should conduct another round of involuntary reserve call-ups. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on May 27 that Ukraine is receiving internal Russian information regarding preparations for an additional mobilization in Russia to offset its high losses in Ukraine and to increase the size of the Russian contingent in Ukraine by "tens of thousands" of personnel.[1] Zelensky noted that Ukraine also received intelligence on a further increase in Russian "mobilization efforts," though it is unclear if Zelensky is referring to ongoing Russian voluntary recruitment and crypto-mobilization efforts or efforts to register and process Russian reservists.  Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to remain committed to the ongoing contract recruitment campaign for now, however. Putin signed a decree on May 25 granting debt relief of up to 10 million rubles to new recruits and the spouses of new recruits who signed a contract for at least one year with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) after May 1.[2] These apparent discussions in the Kremlin about a potential involuntary reserve call-up are likely coming from a place of weakness as Russia is increasingly struggling with poor battlefield performance, compounding effects of the war on Russian economy, declining recruitment rates, and societal discontent.[3] The Kremlin appears to remain committed to defining its main advantage over Ukraine as overwhelming numbers, but Ukraine's tactical drone superiority throughout the theater and mid-range strike campaign have neutralized this advantage for now, inflicting disproportionately high personnel and equipment losses on Russian forces.[4] The lack of significant battlefield successes, mounting war sacrifices, and casualty rates are contributing to the domestic Russian perception that the war in Ukraine is not going well for Russia, a perception that is already hindering Russian contract recruitment.[5] Any involuntary mobilization campaign would likely be significantly more unpopular among the Russian population now, while Russia's war effort is generating so much strain and discontent than it might have been in  mid- to late 2025 when Russian forces were making tactically-significant advances in multiple sectors using a campaign design that Ukraine has since been able to counter.[6]

The effect of a potential Russian involuntary reserve call-up on the battlefield remains unclear given Russia’s growing requirements for manpower and the fact that Ukrainian drone strikes are inhibiting Russian troop movement towards the frontline. Russia has to not only replace its battlefield casualties but also recruit servicemembers for the Russian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) and to defend its operational and deep rear areas from Ukrainian drone strikes.[7] Russia's voluntary recruitment efforts have waned in 2026, forcing Moscow to expand its voluntary recruitment drives to new demographics, including women and students for USF and rear area air defense operations.[8] Russian contract recruitment continues to decline despite these efforts and recent increases to one-time signing bonuses.[9] Russian forces are already suffering from administrative and training bottlenecks for their ground forces and drone operators at their current recruitment rate, and these challenges would likely have a compounding negative effect on the quality of Russian personnel in a possible involuntary call-up.[10] These training bottlenecks likely contributed to the degradation in the effectiveness of Russia’s elite Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Systems drone operators, whose elite operations initially allowed Russian forces to make substantial gains from August 2025 to late 2025.[11]

Ukraine's successful mid-range and frontline drone strike campaigns are limiting Russia's ability to transport personnel to the frontline and to supply and sustain frontline positions. Ukrainian forces began significantly intensifying their intermediate-range strike campaign in Spring 2026 and have already achieved notable operational effects, including degrading Russia’s ability to use the key Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) connecting Russia to occupied Crimea, including the M-14 Rostov-Crimea highway, and GLOCs connecting occupied southern Ukraine to Donetsk City.[12] Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov stated May 27 that Ukraine is launching a “logistics lockdown” of Russian forces, aiming to scale its intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian logistics and supply lines by increasing procurement funding for Ukraine's most effective drone units and launching large-scale competitive tenders for further funding.[13]

Ukrainian forces are also achieving temporary tactical drone overmatch in some frontline sectors.[14] Mid-range strikes are actively inhibiting Russia's ability to transport personnel to the frontlines as well as to supply and hold frontline positions, which would significantly reduce the number of additional reservists who could even get to the frontlines where they could impact Russian ground operations under current conditions. Frontline Ukrainian strikes are also inhibiting Russian infiltration missions. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on May 26 that effective Ukrainian drone reconnaissance and frontline strikes have undermined the success of the infiltration missions on which Russian forces have relied to advance for the past several months.[15] Ukrainian forces have created a deep zone of drone activity from the intermediate range to the frontline, and it is unclear that additional reserve mobilization would materially improve Russian forces’ battlefield performance unless Russian forces can first counter Ukrainian drone operations.

The Russian government is reportedly considering imposing a temporary restriction on Russian diesel and jet fuel exports after several months of Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries. Russian news agency Interfax and Russian outlet RBK reported on May 26, citing oil industry sources and sources familiar with the situation, that Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak held a meeting on May 26 where he discussed a possible temporary ban on the export of jet and diesel fuel.[16] The sources indicated that the ban could last for one or two months but that the Russian Ministry of Economic Development must approve the initiative before setting a timeline for the ban. Several sources told Interfax that the Russian government advised Russian oil companies to curb petroleum product exports after the May 26 meeting.[17] One source claimed to Interfax that the Russian government will only ban jet fuel exports but not diesel exports, as there is a sufficient supply of diesel on the market. Novak stated after the meeting on May 26 that the Russian government prioritizes domestic markets for fuel.[18] The potential temporary ban on jet and diesel fuel exports comes as Ukrainian forces have significantly increased the frequency, range, and intensity of strikes against Russian oil infrastructure since March 2026, including against refiners that produce diesel and jet fuel.[19] Russia already imposed a temporary ban on gasoline exports from April 1 to July 31, 2026.[20] Bloomberg reported on May 26 that data from analytics firm OilX indicates that the average output of a Russian oil refinery in April 2026 fell to an average of 4.69 million barrels a day, the lowest daily refining average since December 2009.[21] The Russian government’s consideration of further export restrictions on Russian petroleum products indicates that Ukrainian strikes continue imposing costs on Russia’s oil industry and are forcing Russia to make hard choices to balance domestic fuel stability, military logistics requirements, and export revenue.

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin’s domestic contract recruitment campaign continues to show signs of strain under the pressure of high battlefield losses.
• The effect of a potential Russian involuntary reserve call-up on the battlefield remains unclear given Russia’s growing requirements for manpower and the fact that Ukrainian drone strikes are inhibiting Russian troop movement towards the frontline.
• Ukraine's successful mid-range and frontline drone strike campaigns are limiting Russia's ability to transport personnel to the frontline and to supply and sustain frontline positions.
• Ukrainian forces have created a deep zone of drone activity from the intermediate range to the frontline, and it is unclear that additional reserve mobilization would materially improve Russian forces’ battlefield performance unless Russian forces can first counter Ukrainian drone operations.
• The Russian government is reportedly considering imposing a temporary restriction on Russian diesel and jet fuel exports after several months of Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in Sumy Oblast and in the Kharkiv and Borova directions. Russian forces advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.
• Russian forces launched 163 drones toward Ukraine overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 26, 2026

Russia and Belarus appear to be setting conditions to justify Russia launching drone strikes at Ukraine from Belarus. Belarusian Security Council Secretary Lieutenant General Alexander Volfovich claimed on May 26 that Belarusian forces have "recorded" 116 attempts by Ukrainian drones to cross the international border into Belarus over the past week.[1] Volfovich also claimed that some Ukrainian drone border crossings were deliberate efforts to target Belarusian border infrastructure. Volfovich's statements come over the backdrop of recent warnings from Ukrainian officials that Russia is pressuring Belarus to conduct operations against Ukraine or an unspecified NATO state.[2] Belarus is very unlikely to launch a ground invasion against Ukraine, and ISW has not independently observed or verified any buildup of Belarusian forces on Belarus-Ukraine border that would be sufficient for a ground invasion. Russia also lacks the reserves that would be required to support Belarusian troops in a ground invasion of Ukraine.[3]

Russia may instead use claimed instances of Ukrainian drones in Belarusian airspace to justify using Belarusian territory to launch "retaliatory" strikes against Ukraine. Belarusian territory would allow Russia to conduct continuous drone strikes against Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in western and northwestern Ukraine that Russian drones cannot currently easily strike with precision and heavy payloads. Russian forces' ability to use Belarusian territory to launch strikes may allow Russian Shahed-type drones and cheaper Molniya drones to target the M-06 highway that runs through western Ukrainian oblasts, including key supply routes from Poland to Ukraine and the railway connecting Poland and Ukraine. Russian forces are already targeting western Ukrainian oblasts from Russian territory, but launching the drones from Belarus would allow Russian forces to operate remotely controlled Shahed and Molniya drones, increasing their precision and ability to strike moving targets along Ukrainian GLOCs. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drone operator based in Belarus conducted a FPV-controlled Shahed strike against a Ukrainian freight train near Korosten, Zhytomyr Oblast (roughly 50 kilometers south of the Belarusian border) on December 22, 2025.[4]  Volfovich's claims and recent Ukrainian warnings about Belarus suggest that Russia is setting informational conditions to further use Belarus for its own military purposes, including to strike strategically important GLOCs in the rear of western Ukraine.

Some Russian officials appear to be walking back recent Russian threats to systematically strike Kyiv City. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov claimed on May 26 that Russia is not actually threating to strike the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) or the Ukrainian Presidential Office as those are not the "real" decision-making centers in Ukraine — in response to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs' (MFA) May 25 threat to launch a “systematic” strike series against Ukrainian decision-making centers and headquarters in Kyiv City.[5] Kartapolov claimed that Ukrainian decision-making centers are not in central Kyiv City but rather are hidden in well-fortified areas. Russian State Duma Deputy Anatoliy Wasserman claimed on May 26 that Russia could "liquidate" Ukraine by November 2026, but that Russia is not "rushing" to do so.[6] The Kremlin has been making increasing threats against Ukraine in recent weeks as Russia tries to disguise the Kremlin’s embarrassment at needing Ukraine to permit Moscow to hold its May 9 Victory Day parade, Russia’s poor battlefield performance, and at the increasing economic costs and societal tension the Kremlin is enduring as a result of over four years of war.[7] These Russian officials may be setting expectations in the domestic information space for Russia's threats against Kyiv City to not materialize in the way that Russians likely expect.

Ukraine's long-range drone strike campaign is forcing Russian authorities to restrict the use of airspace in the Moscow air zone. Russian Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) claimed on May 25 that Russian authorities will begin prohibiting civilian aircraft flights in the Moscow air zone at altitudes from zero to 5,100 meters starting on June 1.[8] The ban extends to Russian western border with Belarus, to the border with the St. Petersburg flight zone in the north, to the border with the Yekaterinburg and Samara flight zones in the east, and to the Ukrainian border zone, where Russian authorities have prohibited civil flights since February 2022. AOPA noted that the ban does not apply to scheduled or charter flights, medical assistance or evacuation flights, and flights for chemical work, monitoring pipelines or power lines, or government contracts. Russian milbloggers claimed on May 25 that the flight ban is a direct consequence of increased and intensified Ukrainian drone strikes and imprecise Russian air defense systems that failed to distinguish friendly aircraft from Ukrainian drones.[9] Russia has largely failed to defend against intensified Ukrainian strikes in the rear and Russian authorities likely imposed the civil flight ban as Russia attempts to protect its airspace from Ukrainian drones. Ukrainian forces have significantly intensified the frequency and range of long-range drone strikes since March 2026, and have taken advantage of overstretched Russian air defenses, demonstrating how Russia cannot reliably defend its capital from Ukrainian strikes.[10]

Russian authorities closed the Kaliningrad airport due to a reported drone threat for the first time. Russian state aviation regulator Rosaviatsia temporarily placed restrictions on May 25 on departures and arrivals for the Kaliningrad airport for unspecified reasons to "ensure flight safety."[11] Local Kaliningrad outlet Klops reported on May 25 that Kaliningrad activated its drone warning system for the first time and that authorities are investigating what triggered the alarm.[12] It is unclear what triggered the drone warning alarm at this time and Russian officials have not made any accusations or statements as to the cause of the alarm.

Key Takeaways:

• Russia and Belarus appear to be setting conditions to justify Russia launching drone strikes at Ukraine from Belarus.
• Some Russian officials appear to be walking back recent Russian threats to systematically strike Kyiv City.
• Ukraine's long-range drone strike campaign is forcing Russian authorities to restrict the use of airspace in the Moscow air zone.
• Russian authorities closed the Kaliningrad airport due to a reported drone threat for the first time.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in the Slovyansk direction and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russian forces launched 2 ballistic missiles and 122 drones toward Ukraine overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 25, 2026

Russia threatened systematic strikes on Kyiv City in violation of the spirit of the Victory Day ceasefire, likely to posture strength after the humiliation of the ceasefire itself. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) warned on May 25 that Russia will launch a “systematic" strike series against Ukrainian defense industrial facilities, including drone design and production sites, decision-making centers, and headquarters in Kyiv City.[1] The Russian MFA called for foreign citizens, diplomats, and international organizations to evacuate Kyiv City and warned Kyiv residents to avoid military and government infrastructure in the city. Russian forces have targeted civilian, government, defense industrial, and military objects in Kyiv City throughout the war, most recently in a May 23 to 24 strike that damaged government buildings and cultural sites.[2] Russia’s warning and continued strikes are an attempt to obfuscate Russia’s weakness, particularly following its May 9 Victory Day parade. Russian President Vladimir Putin is attempting to recover from his humiliation from having to ask Ukraine for permission to hold the Victory Day parade and to distract from Russia's inability to protect its capital and other deep-rear cities from Ukraine's intensifying long-range drone strikes.[3] Putin is also struggling to shield the Russian population from the strain on the Russian economy as a result of his war, and Russian economic and societal issues are generating domestic discontent with Putin and his government.[4] Russian forces are also failing to make operationally significant advances in their ongoing Spring-Summer 2026 offensive, as Ukrainian counterattacks, overall drone dominance, and mid–range strike campaign are inhibiting Russian advances and increasing the material and personnel cost of its offensive operations.[5]

The Kremlin is claiming that its strikes are retaliatory in response to an alleged Ukrainian strike against civilians to temper any Western urgency to respond to Russia's intensified strikes on Kyiv, but this claimed justification does not align with the Kremlin's historical pattern of behavior. The Russian MFA framed its May 25 threat against Kyiv City as a retaliation for Ukraine's May 21 to 22 strikes against a college in occupied Starobilsk, Luhansk Oblast, which Russia also used as justification for its May 23 to 24 strike series against Kyiv City.[6] Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov called US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on May 25 to inform him about the Russian threat against Kyiv City and spread the Kremlin's ongoing information operation falsely portraying Ukraine and its European partners as undermining peace efforts.[7] These justifications are thin, however. Russia has historically launched its largest strike packages immediately before and after prominent bilateral or trilateral peace negotiations, likely to disrupt and prolong the peace process.[8] Russia has not produced dispositive evidence that Ukraine's May 21 to 22 strike against Starobilsk was against an exclusively civilian object, following Ukrainian claims that Russian forces established a military quarter on the grounds of the struck college.[9] Russia has established legitimate military targets in civilian buildings before, likely in an effort to use civilians and civilian infrastructure as human shields.[10] Russia is exploiting the ambiguous situation to allege that Ukraine committed a war crime when there is no clear evidence that it was necessarily so.

Russia began intensifying strikes against Kyiv City on the night of May 12 to 13, less than a day after the Victory Day ceasefire elapsed at midnight on May 11 – over a week before Ukraine's strike against Starobilsk.[11] The Kremlin claimed that its May 23 to 24 missile and drone strikes against Kyiv City, which consisted of over 90 missiles and 600 drones, were in retaliation for the Starobilsk strike despite conducting them only a day later.[12] It is not feasible for Russia to have compiled such an extensive strike package or prepared for these strikes within 24 to 48 hours, however, and more likely spent weeks preparing for such an intensification. The Kremlin is attempting to frame the May 23 to 24 strikes and any strikes within the coming days as in retaliation for Starobilsk to obfuscate the real reason for intensifying these strikes: disguising the Kremlin's embarrassment at needing Ukraine to permit Moscow to hold its May 9 Victory Day parade, at Russia's poor battlefield performance, and at the increasing economic costs and societal tension the Kremlin is enduring as a result of over for years of war.[13] Russia has historically intensified its strikes against Ukraine to distract from Russian failures or Ukrainian successes that have embarrassed the Kremlin, such as Ukraine's Operation Spiderweb in June 2025, which exposed significant failures in Russian border protection and deep rear air defenses.[14] Russia is also likely escalating its strikes against Kyiv City to take advantage of a global Patriot interceptor shortage that is constraining Ukraine's ability to defend against missile strikes, particularly ballistic missiles. The Kremlin is likely attempting to temper the Western, particularly US, response to its intensified strikes against Ukraine and Kyiv City in particular by falsely portraying these intensifications as in response to a single incident rather than as part of a broader pattern of escalating the war and avoiding peace talks.

The Russian government’s accusations that Ukrainian forces violated international law are an attempt to distract from Russian forces’ systematic violations of international law. The Russian MFA accused Ukraine of violating the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child in conducting the Starobilsk strike.[15] Russian forces have systematically abused Ukrainian prisoners of war (POW) and conducted battlefield executions of POWs in violation of the Geneva Convention, and the Russian military command is either enabling or directly ordering these war crimes.[16] Russia has also violated the Geneva Convention by forcibly mobilizing civilians in occupied Ukraine into the Russian military and by recruiting imprisoned Ukrainian POWs to fight for Russia.[17] Russian forces continue to systematically abduct and militarize children from occupied Ukraine and have been escalating efforts to temporarily transfer and deport Ukrainian children to Russian-run summer camp programs in Russia and occupied Ukraine in Summer 2026.[18] Legal experts consulted by the New York Times in June 2024 reported that Russia’s ongoing campaign to abduct Ukrainian children and strip them of their Ukrainian identity violates the Convention on the Rights of the Child.[19] Russian forces have systematically used riot control agents in strikes across the frontline in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) have previously acknowledged Russia's usage of these weapons.[20] Russian forces regularly conduct a “human safari” across the frontline – using tactical drones to “hunt” civilians and civilian infrastructure – and publish footage of strikes on civilian targets, including a May 14 strike against a UN vehicle in Kherson Oblast.[21] This non-exhaustive list of Russian forces‘ systematic violations of international law, including the same statutes they accuse Ukrainian forces of violating, demonstrates just some of the crimes from which the Kremlin is trying to distract, as it accuses Ukrainian forces of violations of which the Kremlin has presented no proof. Russian forces’ own actions demonstrate that the Kremlin is not serious about upholding principles of international law, and its justifications for why it has and plans to strike Kyiv are thin.

Russian forces may have launched a second Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), which reportedly malfunctioned and struck occupied Donetsk Oblast during the already large and costly May 23 to 24 strike package. Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) sources reported May 25 that footage from May 24 indicates that Russian forces launched a second Oreshnik and that the missile malfunctioned and struck a location in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[22] The footage appears to show six submunitions striking the ground, and one of the Ukrainian OSINT sources reported that the Oreshnik may have struck Russian military positions near occupied Avdiivka or Yasynuvata (both roughly 40 kilometers from the frontline).[23] If confirmed, these reports would indicate that one of every four Oreshniks that Russian forces have used thus far in the war have malfunctioned. Ukrainian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) news agency ArmyInform estimated that Russia's May 23 to 24 that strike package against Ukraine cost about $361 million dollars, including $50 million for one Oreshnik IRBM.[24] Russian forces’ use of a second Oreshnik missile would increase the cost of the May 23 to 24 strike package to about $411 million.

Russian President Vladimir Putin enacted a law on May 25 allowing him to authorize the use of the Russian Armed Forces overseas to defend “Russian citizens” being prosecuted in international or foreign national courts.[25] The Russian State Duma officially passed this bill on April 14.[26] The law’s text is vague and uses ambiguous terminology. The BBC’s Russia Service interpreted on April 14 that the law applies to Russian citizens who are being prosecuted in international or national courts “vested with powers” by foreign states without Russian participation or by international bodies whose authority does not derive either from Russian international treaties, but it is unclear how Russia would apply the law. The BBC's Russia Service noted that the phrase ”vested with powers” is vague and ambiguous in the Russian legal context.[27] The law also includes an exemption for Russian citizens prosecuted on the basis of a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution adopted to implement powers provided for in Chapter VII of the United Nations (UN) Charter.[28] The text of the law is likely purposefully vague to provide the Kremlin informational flexibility in how it may invoke the law to provide a veneer of legitimacy to Russian expeditionary military operations.

Key Takeaways:

• Russia threatened systematic strikes on Kyiv City in violation of the spirit of the Victory Day ceasefire, likely to posture strength after the humiliation of the ceasefire itself.
• The Kremlin is claiming that its strikes are retaliatory in response to an alleged Ukrainian strike against civilians to temper any Western urgency to respond to Russia's intensified strikes on Kyiv, but this claimed justification does not align with the Kremlin's historical pattern of behavior.
• The Russian government’s accusations that Ukrainian forces violated international law are an attempt to distract from Russian forces’ systematic violations of international law.
• Russian forces may have launched a second Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), which reportedly malfunctioned and struck occupied Donetsk Oblast during the already large and costly May 23 to 24 strike package.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin enacted a law on May 25 allowing him to authorize the use of the Russian Armed Forces overseas to defend “Russian citizens” being prosecuted in international or foreign national courts.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka and Dobropillya tactical areas.
• Russian forces launched 262 drones toward Ukraine overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 23, 2026

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a mechanized counterattack in the Borova direction, possibly penetrating up to five kilometers into the Russian defenses. Geolocated footage published on May 22 shows Russian forces striking at least one Ukrainian armored vehicle north of Nove (southeast of Borova).[1]  A Russian milblogger claimed that the footage shows a part of the Ukrainian mechanized assault, which reportedly involved at least 15 armored vehicles near Maliivka, Lozove, and Vovchyi Yar (all southeast of Borova).[2] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on May 23 that footage released by Russian military sources suggests that Ukrainian vehicles may have penetrated up to five kilometers into Russian-controlled territory before Russian forces struck the Ukrainian vehicles.[3] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked the forward positions of the Russian 20th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]), including its 3rd and 144th motorized rifle divisions, while Russian forces were regrouping in the area.[4] Russian milbloggers acknowledged that Ukrainian forces operate in Andriivka, Ridkodub, Vovchyi Yar, and southwestern Karpivka (all southeast of Borova).[5] A Russian milblogger claimed on May 21 that Russian officials’ exaggerated claims of success in Kupyansk are allowing Ukrainian forces to exploit weak points in Russia's defensive line that the Russian military command has neglected.[6] Russian milbloggers assessed that Russian forces may struggle to prevent further Ukrainian advances south of Borova.[7]

Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign continues to exploit degraded and overstretched Russian air defenses, targeting Russian oil infrastructure and military assets on the night of May 22 to 23. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Metafrax Chemicals plant in Perm Krai – more than 1,700 kilometers from the frontline – forcing the facility to stop production.[8] Zelensky stated that Metafrax Chemicals is an important part of the Russian chemical industry and supplies products to Russia’s military-industrial complex. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Sheskharis oil terminal and Grushova oil depot in Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai (approximately 340 kilometers from the frontline), causing fires at both facilities.[9] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Sheskharis is one of the largest Russian oil terminals on the Black Sea and is part of the Transneft pipeline network with a throughput capacity of up to 75 million tons of oil per year, and has a tank farm with a volume of about 1.28 million cubic meters. The Ukrainian General Staff also noted that the Grushova oil terminal is a key part of the Sheskharis complex and one of the largest oil depots in southern Russia with a carrying capacity of around 1.2 to 1.4 million cubic meters. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a Russian shadow fleet crude oil tanker, Chrysalis, in the Black Sea. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Project 1239 hoverborne guided-missile corvette and a Kalibr cruise missile-equipped Project 11356 frigate Admiral Essen at the Novorossiysk Naval Base.[10] Ukraine has been engaged in a concerted campaign against Russian air defense assets (SEAD/DEAD) in occupied Crimea, which is further enabling Ukrainian forces to exploit degraded and overstretched Russian air defenses to strike Russian oil infrastructure and military targets in occupied Crimea and southwestern Russia.[11] Ukraine’s continuous strikes on the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) vessels demonstrate that Ukrainian drones continue to pose a significant threat to the BSF even after the Russian military command withdrew several vessels from BSF headquarters in occupied Sevastopol to Novorossiysk to protect them from Ukrainian strikes.[12]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that Russia is preparing a combined strike against Kyiv City that could include Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs). Zelensky stated on May 23 that Ukrainian intelligence, including data from US and European partners, indicates that Russia is preparing a strike using the Oreshnik system.[13] Zelensky stated that intelligence suggests that Russia is preparing a combined missile and drone strike against Ukraine, including Kyiv City, with various types of weapons and possibly medium-range systems. Zelensky warned that there would be an elevated strike risk starting on the night of May 23. Russia previously launched Oreshniks against Dnipro City in November 2024 and Lviv City in early 2026.[14] The Kremlin previously threatened to strike "decision-making" centers in Kyiv City if Ukrainian forces conducted strikes against Russia’s Victory Day celebrations in Moscow City on May 9, which Ukraine did not target.[15] Russia regularly targets Kyiv City with missiles and drones, including launching a massive strike against the city just days after the Victory Day ceasefire.[16]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a mechanized counterattack in the Borova direction, possibly penetrating up to five kilometers into the Russian defenses.
• Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign continues to exploit degraded and overstretched Russian air defenses, targeting Russian oil infrastructure and military assets on the night of May 22 to 23.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that Russia is preparing a combined strike against Kyiv City that could include Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs).
• Ukrainian forces advanced in the Borova and Hulyaipole direction.
• Russian forces launched 124 drones toward Ukraine overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 22, 2026

Western officials are increasingly reporting that Ukraine is hindering Russia's advances in Ukraine, in line with ISW's consistent assessments, but that the Kremlin likely remains committed to its original war aims despite some recognition within the Russian elite that the war is not going well. The US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) published an assessment on May 18, noting Ukraine's recent territorial gains following Russian forces' loss of access to Starlink in early February 2026.[1] NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte stated on May 21 that Ukraine's strong defenses are stabilizing the frontline and also noted Ukraine's territorial gains.[2] Ukraine's intensifying long-range and mid-range strike campaigns have also imposed increasing economic, military, and manpower costs on Russian forces' efforts to sustain the war effort for disproportionately limited gains, at least 59,000 seriously wounded, and over 800 captured prisoners of war (POWs). Zelensky's statement indicates that Russian forces have suffered an average of 1,021 personnel killed, injured, and captured per day thus far in 2026. Bloomberg reported on May 22 that some senior Kremlin officials believe that the war in Ukraine has reached a "dead end" with no clear resolution, but that Russian President Vladimir Putin still wants to resolve the war on his terms, including fully seizing Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts by the end of 2026.[3] Bloomberg's report is consistent with ISW's longstanding assessment that Putin remains unwilling to compromise his field in recent months.[4]

Ukraine's mid-range strike campaign is disrupting Russian transport arteries in occupied Ukraine and will likely complicate Russian logistics. Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo signed a decree on May 21 restricting the movement of freight vehicles on a section of the "R-280 Novorossiya highway," the occupation name for the M-14 Mariupol-Berdyansk-Melitopol-Henichesk highway in occupied Kherson Oblast, as of midnight local time on May 21.[5] The R-280/M-14 is a primary land route connecting Russia and occupied Crimea. Saldo noted that the decree includes exceptions for military transport vehicles and other essential goods. Footage published on May 21 shows the aftermath of a series of recent Ukrainian strikes on Russian military cargo along the M-14 highway, and geolocated footage published on May 22 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian trucks along the H-20 Mariupol-Donetsk City highway – another highway that Ukrainian forces have been significantly interdicting in recent weeks.[6] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger criticized Saldo’s decree, however, claiming that it will make it easier for Ukrainian drone operators to strike Russian military vehicles along the highway, as every large transport vehicle will carry important cargo.[7] Ukrainian forces have significantly intensified their mid-range strikes and battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign against Russian ground lines of communication (GLOC) in occupied Ukraine over the last several months, which has been generating cascading effects on the battlefield and inhibiting Russian advances.[8] Saldo's decision to restrict movement along the M-14 highway indicates that Ukrainian strikes have made transport along this route much more dangerous and will likely affect Russian logistics along this route within occupied Ukraine.

Ukrainian forces struck occupied Starobilsk, Luhansk Oblast, overnight on May 21 to 22. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 22 that Ukrainian forces struck a headquarters of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies near occupied Starobilsk, Luhansk Oblast, overnight.[9] Russian officials claimed that Ukrainian forces deliberately struck a dormitory of the Starobilsk Pedagogical College in three waves of drone strikes and that the site did not serve as a military or special services facility.[10] The Russian officials claimed that the strikes killed at least six and injured at least 39 students. The Ukrainian General Staff refuted Russian officials’ allegations that Ukrainian forces struck a civilian object rather than an object that Russia has used for military purposes.[11] ISW is unable to verify these reports. Russian officials, including President Vladimir Putin, used the Starobilsk strike to advance a number of longstanding Russian information operations, including a cognitive war effort falsely portraying Ukrainian forces as suffering significant setbacks across the theater.[12]

Key Takeaways:

• Western officials are increasingly reporting that Ukraine is hindering Russia's advances in Ukraine, in line with ISW's consistent assessments, but that the Kremlin likely remains committed to its original war aims despite some recognition within the Russian elite that the war is not going well.
• Ukraine's mid-range strike campaign is disrupting Russian transport arteries in occupied Ukraine and will likely complicate Russian logistics.
• Ukrainian forces struck occupied Starobilsk, Luhansk Oblast, overnight on May 21 to 22.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in Sumy Oblast and in the Borova, Slovyansk, and Pokrovsk directions and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russian forces launched 124 drones toward Ukraine overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 21, 2026

Russia and Belarus completed their combined nuclear exercises on May 21, highlighting Russia's ability to leverage Belarus for future Russian military operations and Russia's deepening de facto control over Belarus. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko presided over the second stage of combined Russian-Belarusian nuclear force exercises on May 21.[i] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces delivered nuclear munitions to Belarus and that Belarusian forces practiced receiving, equipping, and moving specialized munitions and launch vehicles for the Iskander-M ballistic missile system.[ii] The Russian MoD claimed that the exercises included the launch of a Yars intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) from the Plesetsk State Test Cosmodrome, a Zircon hypersonic missile from the Barents Sea, a Sineva ICBM from a submerged nuclear-powered strategic submarine, cruise missiles from Tu-95MS aircraft, a Kinzhal hypersonic missile from MiG-31I aircraft, and an Iskander-M missile from the Kapustin Yar Training Ground.[iii] The Russian MoD claimed that elements of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces, Northern and Pacific Fleets, Long-Range Aviation (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS]), and Leningrad and Central Military Districts took part in the missile launches.[iv] Putin claimed that Russia and Belarus plan to hold the biennial "Union Shield" exercises in 2027. The next Union Shield exercises may include a nuclear component for the first time.

The exercises with Russian nuclear weapons deployed on Belarusian territory highlight the extent to which Russia has absorbed Belarus under its de facto control. The Belarusian Constitution previously stated that Belarus was a non-nuclear state, but Belarus amended its constitution in 2022 to renounce the country’s neutrality and non-nuclear status, likely under Kremlin pressure and influence over Belarusian decision-making.[v] The exercises reflect the deterioration of Belarusian sovereignty and Russia's expanding capacity to leverage Belarus as a springboard for its own military purposes.

Ukrainian strikes continue to constrain Russian oil refining and energy revenues, even as the war in the Middle East has provided a budget windfall in the short term. Reuters reported on May 20, citing unspecified official data and sources, that virtually all major oil refineries in central Russia have halted or scaled back their fuel output following recent Ukrainian drone strikes.[vi] Reuters reported that the affected refineries total over 30 percent of Russian gasoline output and 25 percent of Russia's diesel output. The source told Reuters that the Kirishi Oil Refinery in Leningrad Oblast, one of Russia's largest oil refineries that has a processing capacity of 20 million metric tons per year, has fully halted operations since May 5. Ukrainian forces struck the Kirishi refinery on the night of May 4 to 5.[vii] Reuters noted that it is unclear if the Nizhegorodnefteorgsintez Oil Refinery, which has an annual processing capacity of 17 million tons, has been able to maintain partial operations following a Ukrainian strike on May 20.

Reuters also reported on May 20 that Russian oil and gas revenues are set to rise 39 percent year on year in May to 700 billion rubles (about $9.8 billion) due to rising oil prices from the war in the Middle East but that these revenues are expected to decline by 17 percent from April 2026.[viii] Reuters noted that Russia's oil and gas revenues from January to May 2026 declined by about a third year on year to three trillion rubles (about $42.1 billion). Reuters attributed the revenue loss from April to May to increased Russian subsidies for oil refineries and cyclical payments of profit-based tax. Declines in Russian oil revenues from April to May in particular are likely also partially the result of Ukraine's strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure. Ukrainian forces have significantly increased the frequency, range, and intensity of such strikes since March 2026, creating outsized impacts on Russian oil exports and refining capacity and undercutting Russia’s ability to profit from increased global oil price spikes.[ix] ISW observed reporting in Summer-Fall 2025 that Russia struggled to repair damage to its oil refineries from Ukrainian strikes as Western sanctions have restricted Russia's access to the necessary parts.[x] Russia will likely struggle to repair damages from this most recent intensification in Ukraine's strike campaign as well. Future Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil infrastructure will likely continue to strain Russian revenues and prevent Russia from reaping any long-term benefits from the current surge in oil prices.

Russia continues to tap into its gold reserves to cover its budget deficit. The Russian Central Bank reported on May 20 that Russia’s gold reserves declined for the fourth consecutive month in April 2026.[xi] The bank reported that the reserves totaled 73.9 million ounces of gold bars as of May 1, the lowest since March 2022. The report stated that the volume of gold bars decreased by 200,000 ounces in April 2026 and by 900,000 ounces since January 2026. Russian independent newspaper The Moscow Times reported, citing the World Gold Council, that Russia lost 27.9 metric tons of gold reserves from January to April 2026, setting a record decline since 2002.[xii] The Russian Central Bank resorted to selling its gold reserves for the first time in November 2025 to sustain high wartime spending while Russia has also steadily depleted its sovereign wealth fund’s liquid reserves in order to fund its war in Ukraine.[xiii] Russia’s growing reliance on its gold reserves underscores its mounting debt pressures as it undertakes difficult decisions to sustain its war in Ukraine.

The Kremlin is attempting to manipulate Russian media coverage to downplay the Kremlin’s censorship campaign, likely to improve the public perception of the United Russia Party ahead of the September 2026 State Duma elections. Russian opposition source Meduza, citing three employees of pro-Kremlin and state media publications, reported on May 21 that the political bloc of the Russian Presidential Administration has urged state-run and pro-government media sources to avoid using the word “ban” in their articles.[xiv] The sources stated that the Presidential Administration advised media sources to reduce their coverage of Kremlin bans, restrictions, and fines concerning freedom of speech and expression. One source stated that the media is allowed to cover the Russian government decisions to lift bans, however. One of the sources also noted that the Kremlin expects the media sources to highlight "positive and therapeutic” initiatives from the United Russia Party, including when party members speak out against bans. United Russia General Council Secretary Vladimir Yakushev stated on May 19 that the party is not a "party of prohibitions" and is publicly explaining why the Kremlin should not impose bans and censorship.[xv] Russian President Vladimir Putin has recently faced a downturn in public support amidst intensified efforts to restrict access to virtual private networks (VPNs), foreign messaging platforms, and the mobile internet, imposing tangible hardships in the everyday lives of Russians.[xvi] The Kremlin's latest restrictions on the media come against the background of brutal efforts to ban the freedom of speech, sending critical milbloggers to frontline assault units in Ukraine or imprisoning them.[xvii]

Key Takeaways:

• Russia and Belarus completed their combined nuclear exercises on May 21, highlighting Russia's ability to leverage Belarus for future Russian military operations and Russia's deepening de facto control over Belarus.
• Ukrainian strikes continue to constrain Russian oil refining and energy revenues, even as the war in the Middle East has provided a budget windfall in the short term.
• Russia continues to tap into its gold reserves to cover its budget deficit.
• The Kremlin is attempting to manipulate Russian media coverage to downplay the Kremlin’s censorship campaign, likely to improve the public perception of the United Russia Party ahead of the September 2026 State Duma elections.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russian forces launched one ballistic missile and 116 drones toward Ukraine overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 20, 2026

Russian President Vladimir Putin and the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) President Xi Jinping failed to reach an agreement on the Power of Siberia-2 pipeline and signed only comparatively minor bilateral agreements during Putin’s official visit to the PRC. Putin and Xi held a joint press conference on May 20 in which the leaders praised deep relations between Russia and the PRC and how Russia and the PRC actively cooperate in energy, noting that Russia is one of the PRC’s largest oil suppliers.[1] Kremlin Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov stated that Russia and China reached agreements on energy projects and “something else very important,” but did not specify what it was, and the parties notably failed to reach an agreement on the construction of the Power of Siberia-2 (PS-2) pipeline.[2] Russia and the PRC have been in disagreement about the PS-2 since at least 2024, as Russia faces a more immediate need for the pipeline to substitute income from exports lost since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and the PRC is using its upper hand to extract concessions from Russia on the issue.[3] Putin and Xi signed a joint statement on further strengthening their comprehensive partnership and strategic interaction, and on deepening good-neighborly friendship and cooperation, about 40 intergovernmental, interagency, and corporate documents, mainly aimed at deepening economic cooperation, as well as a joint declaration on the Establishment of a Multipolar World and a New Type of International Relations.[4] The agreements signed were relatively small in comparison to the Kremlin's hopes that Putin's visit would culminate in a signed deal on the PS-2. Ushakov highlighted on May 18 the PS-2 pipeline as one of the priority items for Putin’s official visit to the PRC, and Putin’s failure to secure a signed agreement demonstrates the current limits of Russo-Sino cooperation.[5]

Ukrainian forces appear to be regaining the tactical initiative in different sectors of the frontline in Ukraine. Ukrainian forces have conducted a series of counterattacks in different areas across the theater in recent months, having made their most significant gains on the battlefield since Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024.[6] Ukrainian counterattacks recaptured much of Kupyansk starting in November 2025, liberated over 400 square kilometers in southern Ukraine in winter and spring 2026, and most recently liberated several settlements in western Zaporizhia Oblast since late April 2026.[7] Ukrainian counterattacks in southern Ukraine have created cascading operational and strategic effects against Russia’s ongoing Spring-Summer 2026 offensive against the Fortress Belt, which has forced Russia to choose between defending against Ukrainian counterattacks or allocating manpower and resources to priority sectors.[8] Ukraine’s intensified mid-range strike campaign against Russian logistics, military equipment, and manpower since early 2026 has also degraded Russian forces’ ability to conduct offensive operations across the theater and has also likely supported recent Ukrainian advances.[9] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on May 15 in an exclusive interview with Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi that precise Ukrainian strikes, the destruction of Russian reserves, and constant pressure on Russian assault units have allowed Ukrainian forces to increasingly seize the tactical initiative and force Russian forces to react to a Ukrainian-defined operational tempo.[10] Syrskyi did not provide absolute figures but noted that the number of Ukrainian offensive actions exceeded those of Russian forces as of May 14, which may indicate Ukraine contesting the initiative at the tactical level and engaging in more active counterattacks.

Ukrainian forces are on track to meet their monthly imposed casualty targets for May 2026. Syrskyi attributed recent Ukrainian battlefield successes to a systematic Ukrainian effort to reduce Russian combat power and Russia’s ability to sustain assault operations by constantly striking Russian manpower.[11] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on May 20 that Ukrainian drones struck 19,203 Russian personnel in the first 19 days of May, according to data collected in Ukraine’s Delta battlefield management software, of which USF elements struck over 6,000.[12] Brovdi forecasted that Ukrainian drones will inflict over 34,000 Russian casualties by the end of May 2026, excluding casualties from artillery shelling, rear strikes, frontline battle losses, and other unconfirmed losses. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is struggling to recruit enough personnel to compensate for losses, and the Russian recruitment rate has dipped below its replacement rate, concluding only 70,500 military service contracts in the first quarter of 2026, below the monthly quota of 33,500 to 34,600 contracts signed.[13] Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov stated on May 5 that Ukrainian forces reached their objective of inflicting casualties greater than Russia's recruitment rate in April 2026 and set a new objective of inflicting around 50,000 Russian casualties per month.[14] Ukrainian forces will likely further expand their mid-range strike campaign and continue counterattacks in vulnerable sectors of the frontline, which will likely further inhibit Russian offensive operations.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin and the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) President Xi Jinping failed to reach an agreement on the Power of Siberia-2 pipeline and signed only comparatively minor bilateral agreements during Putin’s official visit to the PRC.
• Ukrainian forces appear to be regaining the tactical initiative in different sectors of the frontline in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in the Kupyansk direction, the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces advanced in the Sumy and Pokrovsk directions.
• Russian forces launched one ballistic missile and 154 drones toward Ukraine overnight and an additional 84 drones during the day.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 19, 2026

Russia is using unannounced strategic nuclear exercises to posture strength against Ukraine's allies and distract from mounting battlefield weaknesses. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced May 19 that the Russian Strategic Missile Forces, Northern and Pacific Fleets, Long Range Aviation Command, and some elements of the Leningrad and Central Military Districts (LMD and CMD, respectively) will conduct an exercise from May 19 to May 21 on preparing and using nuclear force in response to a threat of aggression.[i] The Russian MoD stated that several nuclear units will launch ballistic and cruise missiles at ranges within Russia. The MoD reported that the exercise will involve over 64,000 personnel and over 7,800 pieces of military equipment, including over 200 missile launchers, over 140 aircraft, 73 surface ships, and 13 submarines, including eight strategic missile submarines. The BBC’s Russian Service assessed on May 19, citing data from the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, that the exercise will likely involve the majority of Russia’s estimated roughly 320 nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers.[ii] The MoD stated that the exercise will also involve joint Russian and Belarusian operations with Russian nuclear weapons deployed in Belarus. The Belarusian MoD stated on May 18 that Russian and Belarusian forces began a joint exercise on the use of nuclear weapons.[iii] Russia did not previously announce the May 19 to 21 nuclear exercise and is conducting it significantly earlier in the year than its typical air, land, and sea nuclear exercises (informally called the Grom exercises), which Russia has conducted annually in October since 2022.[iv] Russian forces last conducted surprise nuclear exercises in Summer 2024, focused on non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons, likely to influence Western policy debates about the provision of long-range weapons to Ukraine.[v] The Kremlin is also reiterating longstanding threats against NATO to correspond with these exercises. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov claimed on May 19 that Russia and NATO are increasingly likely to engage in a direct clash with catastrophic consequences and accused NATO countries of provoking Russia in the nuclear sphere and escalating rhetoric about the Russian threat.[vi] Ryabkov claimed that Russian military planners will not ignore NATO's nuclear weapons development and claimed that Western countries have not set conditions for substantive dialogue on arms control.[vii]

Russian forces are likely conducting the surprise May 19 to 21 nuclear exercises and amplifying longstanding narratives aimed at influencing NATO decision-making and masking Russia's own weaknesses. Russian forces have so far failed to make meaningful gains in their ongoing spring-summer 2026 offensive, Ukrainian forces have contested the tactical initiative in several areas of the frontline, and Russian forces have failed to defend the Russian deep rear against increasingly devastating Ukrainian strikes.[viii] Russian officials may be accusing NATO countries of escalatory behavior coterminously with the exercise in an attempt to exercise reflexive control, a tactic that relies on shaping an adversary with targeted rhetoric and information operations in such a way that the adversary voluntarily takes actions that are advantageous to Russia, to divide Ukraine from its European partners and diminish support for Ukraine's defensive effort.[ix]

Russia is escalating its efforts to set informational conditions for possible future aggression against the Baltic states. Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) claimed on May 18 that Ukrainian forces are preparing to launch drone strikes against Russia’s rear directly from the territory of the Baltic states, particularly Latvia.[x] The SVR claimed that Ukrainian drone operators have already deployed to Latvian military bases. The SVR also heavily implied that Russia intends to strike claimed Ukrainian drone launch points, referring to the Latvian military bases, as well as Latvian decision-making centers in response to claimed Ukrainian strikes from Latvian territory. Latvian officials have repeatedly denied Russian accusations that Latvia allowed Ukraine to use their airspace or territory to launch strikes against Russia.[xi] The Kremlin often uses the SVR to spread extreme and unfounded narratives intended to destabilize other countries and justify potential Russian interference and aggression.[xii] The SVR's threat against Latvia comes amid reports that a Romanian fighter jet intercepted a Ukrainian drone over Estonian airspace on May 19 after Russian electronic warfare (EW) diverted the drone from Russian airspace.[xiii] Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Heorhii Tykhyi stated on May 19 that Russia continues to redirect Ukrainian drones into the Baltics with EW systems and apologized to Estonian and other Baltic countries for unintended incidents.[xiv] ISW previously observed reports of Ukrainian drones crashing in Baltic and Finnish territory, possibly as a result of Russian EW efforts.[xv] The SVR’s claim that Ukrainian forces as using Baltic airspace and territory to target Russia is a continuation of Russian officials’ efforts to set conditions to violate Baltic and Finnish airspace or conduct other military operations against the Baltics for allegedly allowing Ukrainian strike drones to use Baltic and Finnish airspace.[xvi]

Russian contract recruitment continues to decline as battlefield casualties rise, despite recent increases to one-time signing bonuses. Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) reported on May 18 that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) concluded 70,500 military service contracts in the first quarter of 2026, below the monthly quota of 33,500 to 34,600 contracts signed.[xvii] The SZRU reported that the Russian MoD recruited between 800 and 930 servicemembers on average per day in the first quarter of 2026, compared to an average of 1,200 in the same period in 2025. The SZRU reported that over 40 Russian federal subjects are to increase payments to recruits by 30 to 100 percent, and in some areas by 200 to 500 percent, compared to the end of 2025. Russia has increasingly resorted to alternative methods of recruiting as one-time bonuses have proven insufficient to replenish Russian battlefield casualties.[xviii] The Russian State Duma adopted a law on May 13 that forgives overdue loans for Russian servicemembers and their families for completing a year of service in the Russian forces operating in Ukraine.[xix] The SZRU noted that the number of prisoners in Russia has fallen to its lowest levels since the early 2000s - from around 465,000 at the end of 2021 to around 282,000 as of May 2026 as Russia dips into the federal penitentiary system for wartime recruitment.[xx] Russia is increasingly suffering from recruiting and manpower challenges, including recruiting shortfalls relative to casualties, the commitment of reserves, increased signing bonuses, and expanded covert mobilization efforts.[xxi] ISW has observed reports that at least 24 Russian federal subjects have increased signing bonuses between three and 68 percent since mid-February 2026, and the Russian MoD has intensified its forced covert mobilization effort to businesses and universities as of January 2026.[xxii]

The Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) reportedly trained Russian military personnel in the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 2025, underscoring how Russia and its allies are using the war in Ukraine for military learning and testing. Reuters reported on May 19, citing three European intelligence agencies and additional documents, that the PLA secretly trained about 200 Russian military personnel in military facilities, including in Beijing, Nanjing, Shijiazhuang, and Zhengzhou in late 2025, focusing on drone operations.[xxiii] Reuters cited internal Russian military reports detailing four of the trainings, which included firing mortars with reconnaissance drone support, using drones and small arms to counter enemy drones, first-person view (FPV) drone operations, and engineering, mine, and mine-clearing operations. Two of the European intelligence agencies stated that many of the Russian military personnel who trained in the PRC had a high enough ranking to be able to transmit lessons learned down the command chain. One of the European intelligence agencies reported that it has confirmed at least a "handful" of Russian military personnel who trained in China and have since deployed to operations in occupied Crimea and Zaporizhia Oblast. Reuters reported that Russia and the PRC previously concluded an agreement wherein about 200 Russian military personnel would train in the PRC, and several hundred PLA personnel would train in Russia, and that both sides agreed not to inform other countries. The PRC may intend for Russia to use PLA tactics and lessons on the battlefield to gauge the effectiveness of these tactics, doctrine, and training in contemporary battlefield conditions like those in Ukraine. The PRC may also intend to benefit from Russian military personnel training with PLA personnel. The PRC and other members of the Adversary Entente will likely continue seeking opportunities to leverage Russia's war in Ukraine as learning opportunities for their militaries and refine battlefield technologies.

Russian President Vladimir Putin arrived in China on May 19 for an official visit through May 20.[xxiv]

Key Takeaways:

• Russia is using unannounced strategic nuclear exercises to posture strength against Ukraine's allies and distract from mounting battlefield weaknesses.
• Russian forces are likely conducting the surprise May 19 to 21 nuclear exercises and amplifying longstanding narratives aimed at influencing NATO decision-making and masking Russia's own weaknesses.
• Russia is escalating its efforts to set informational conditions for possible future aggression against the Baltic states.
• Russian contract recruitment continues to decline as battlefield casualties rise, despite recent increases to one-time signing bonuses.
• The Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) reportedly trained Russian military personnel in the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 2025, underscoring how Russia and its allies are using the war in Ukraine for military learning and testing.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin arrived in China on May 19 for an official visit through May 20.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and in the Kupyansk and Hulyaipole directions.
• Russian forces launched 209 drones toward Ukraine overnight.  

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 18, 2026

Russian forces conducted a large-scale strike against Ukraine with 546 drones and missiles, including 14 ballistic missiles, on the night of May 17 to 18. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 14 Iskander-M ballistic missiles/S-400 air defense missiles from Rostov Oblast and occupied Crimea; eight Iskander-K cruise missiles from occupied Crimea; and 524 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and Italmas-type strike drones and  Parodiya decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[i] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed four Iskander-K cruise missiles and 503 drones, that 18 missiles and 16 drones struck 34 locations, and that downed debris had fallen on 11 locations as of 08:30 local time. The Ukrainian Air Force noted that the strikes primarily targeted Dnipro City and Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russian strikes against Dnipro City and Dnipropetrovsk Oblast significantly damaged civilian infrastructure and also targeted energy and residential infrastructure.[ii] Ukrainian authorities stated that Russian forces struck Odesa City, including a Chinese-owned ship that was approaching the port.[iii] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces also struck civilian and residential infrastructure in Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Kirovohrad, Kherson, Odesa and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts and injured at least 33 civilians, including three children.[iv] Russia has been launching larger numbers of ballistic missiles than usual in recent weeks, likely to take advantage of Ukrainian air defense limitations in the face of a global shortage of Patriot interceptors.[v]

 Ukraine’s new domestically produced guided glide bomb will likely allow Ukrainian forces to expand their battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign against Russian forces and assets in the near and operational rear. Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov reported on May 18 that a Ukrainian defense company developed and tested Ukraine’s first domestically produced KAB guided glide bomb, which is now ready for combat use.[vi] Fedorov reported that the glide bomb has a payload of 250 kilograms and can destroy targets tens of kilometers away from the launch location. Ukraine’s new guided glide bomb capabilities will likely allow Ukrainian forces to expand their BAI campaign against Russian targets in the near and operational rear, mirroring Russia's use of guided glide bombs to generate BAI effects by striking Ukrainian logistics.[vii] Ukrainian forces have been successfully interdicting Russian logistics at the tactical and operational levels with drones, and the guided glide bomb will allow Ukrainian forces to strike hardened targets with a larger payload.[viii] Russian forces have also used glide bombs with extended ranges to keep valuable aviation assets further from the frontline and safe from Ukrainian air defenses — a tactic Ukraine is likely to try to emulate with the guided glide bombs given Ukraine's limited aircraft stocks.[ix]

The Russian economy continues to feel the strain of the compounding effects of over four years of war coupled with Ukraine's long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure. Russian Minister of Economic Development Maxim Reshetnikov stated in an interview with Russian outlet RBK on May 18 that several factors pushed the Russian government to revise its expectations for GDP growth over the upcoming three-year period, including labor shortages and "external conditions" like ongoing sanctions against Russia and the war in the Middle East.[x] Reshetnikov also credited the changes to the structure of Russia's planned federal spending and the Russian Central Bank's key interest rate forecasts. Reshetnikov acknowledged that labor shortages are constraining the Russian economy, in contrast with Russian President Vladimir Putin's ongoing attempts to characterize Russia's low unemployment rate as a sign of economic health.[xi] Reshetnikov claimed that Russia does not expect inflation to accelerate as the economy grows, however, ignoring how labor shortages are fueling inflation.[xii] Reshetnikov also failed to acknowledge how Russia's yearslong military recruitment efforts have removed many individuals from the civilian labor market and worsened the labor shortage. Russia will likely continue to suffer from worsening labor shortages as it prioritizes replacing its losses on the battlefield with new recruits over supporting and growing its domestic economy.

Ukraine's long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure continues to exacerbate Russia's liquidity problems related to unsustainable wartime spending. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on May 18 that Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) obtained Russian documents that assess that Russia has had to significantly reduce its active oil wells, with one unspecified Russian oil company alone closing 400 wells.[xiii] Zelensky stated that Russia has reduced oil refining by at least 10 percent thus far in 2026 and that Russia struggles with restarting wells compared to other oil producing states. Zelensky stated that the SZRU data indicates that 11 Russian financial institutions are preparing to liquidate and that another eight banking institutions cannot internally resolve their accumulated problems and have to attract external resources. Zelensky noted that Russia's federal budget deficit is already almost $80 billion in the first five months of 2026. Russia has increasingly struggled with liquidity problems after having steadily depleted its sovereign wealth fund’s liquid reserves in order to fund the war and resorting to selling its physical gold reserves.[xiv] The Kremlin has enacted economically sub-optimal policies like increasing the value-added tax (VAT) in January 2026, which is already having cascading effects on the Russian economy by increasing the size of Russia‘s gray (shadow) economy and thereby increasing the costs of goods and services without generating the desired tax revenues.[xv] Ukrainian forces have significantly increased the frequency, range, and intensity of strikes against Russian oil infrastructure since March 2026, which have had outsized impacts on Russian oil exports and refining capacity, undercutting Russia's ability to profit from increased global oil price spikes.[xvi] Continued Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil infrastructure will likely continue to strain Russian revenues and prevent Russia from reaping any long-term benefits from the current surge in oil prices.

Russian sources suggested that Colonel General Alexander Lapin may become the next Russian State Duma Defense Committee chairperson. Sources in the Russian State Duma and the ruling United Russia party told Russian business newspaper Kommersant on May 14 that United Russia is considering Lapin as the next Defense Committee chairperson but emphasized that the decision is not final.[xvii] The sources stated that Lapin may run on the United Party list from the Republic of Tatarstan. Colonel General Andrei Kartapolov currently holds the chairperson position, and Kommersant's sources claimed that he may not seek reelection. Kommersant reported that a source in the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated that the MoD has often expressed "surprise" at Kartapolov's statements. Four sources close to the Russian Presidential Administration and a source close to United Russia told Russian business newspaper Vedomosti in December 2025 that United Russia will likely not nominate Karapolov for the next  Duma election as part of the Moscow Oblast group from which he was elected in 2021, but added that Kartapolov may run in another region.[xviii] Vedomosti noted that Kartapolov is a close associate of former Russian Defense Minister and current Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu.[xix] Kartapolov responded on May 18 to the reports of his possible replacement, claiming that he is planning to run for a second term in the Duma elections.[xx]

The possible replacement of Kartapolov with Lapin, if confirmed, would be a continuation of Russian President Vladimir Putin's practice of rotating high-ranking commanders into other positions despite their poor battlefield performance. Lapin served as the commander of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces at the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022; moved to be the Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground Forces in 2023; and became the commander of the Leningrad Military District (LMD) and Northern Grouping of Forces in 2024.[xxi] The Russian MoD confirmed in August 2025 that it replaced Lapin as the LMD and Northern Grouping of Forces commander with Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground Forces Colonel General Yevgeny Nikiforov.[xxii] Kommersant reported on May 14 that Lapin became an advisor to Republic of Tatarstan Head Rustam Minnikhanov after his dismissal.[xxiii] Lapin's possible move to the Duma Defense Committee would be consistent with Putin's pattern of rotating commanders with poor performance within the force or sidelining them to government-related positions.[xxiv] Kartapolov's possible removal would also be consistent with Putin's campaign to remove personnel loyal to Shoigu and to neutralize his influence within the Russian MoD.[xxv]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted a large-scale strike against Ukraine with 546 drones and missiles, including 14 ballistic missiles, on the night of May 17 to 18.
• Ukraine’s new domestically produced guided glide bomb will likely allow Ukrainian forces to expand their battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign against Russian forces and assets in the near and operational rear.
• The Russian economy continues to feel the strain of the compounding effects of over four years of war coupled with Ukraine's long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure.
• Russian sources suggested that Colonel General Alexander Lapin may become the next Russian State Duma Defense Committee chairperson.
• The possible replacement of Kartapolov with Lapin, if confirmed, would be a continuation of Russian President Vladimir Putin's practice of rotating high-ranking commanders into other positions despite their poor battlefield performance.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 17, 2026

Ukrainian forces struck several Russian defense industrial plants and oil infrastructure objects in Moscow City and Oblast overnight on May 16 to 17 following Russia's intensified strike series against Ukraine on May 13 and 14. The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reported on May 17 that Ukrainian forces struck the Angstrem Semiconductor Plant, which produces microelectronics for high precision weapons, at the Elma Technopark in Zelenograd (northwest of Moscow City), and a geolocated image published on May 17 shows a smoke plume at the plant.[1] A Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) unit reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Elma Technopark in Zelenograd, and Russian opposition outlet Astra posted footage of a fire at the Elma Technopark after the strike.[2] It is unclear if Ukrainian forces struck more than one object at the Elma Technopark. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 17 that Ukrainian forces also struck the Solnechnogorsk oil pumping station, which pumps, stores, and ships large volumes of fuel for Russian forces, near Durykino (northwest of Moscow City), and geolocated footage shows a large fire at the station.[3] The SBU reported on May 17 that Ukrainian forces struck the Moscow Oil Refinery in Kapotnya Raion, Moscow City, and geolocated footage shows a smoke plume at the refinery after an audible explosion.[4] Moscow City Mayor Sergei Sobyanin acknowledged on May 17 that Ukrainian forces struck the Moscow Oil Refinery but claimed that the strike did not disrupt the refinery’s operations and that Ukrainian forces only hit the refinery’s checkpoint.[5] The SBU reported on May 17 that Ukrainian forces also struck the Volodarsk oil pumping station (southeast of Moscow City).[6] Moscow Oblast Governor Andrei Vorobyov acknowledged on May 17 that Ukrainian drones hit several infrastructure facilities and that drone strikes and debris also damaged residential areas.[7]  Sobyanin claimed that Russian forces downed over 120 drones over Moscow City on May 16 and 17.[8] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces used several Ukrainian-developed drones, including the RS-1, FP-1 and BARS-SM  drones during the May 16 to 17 strikes on Moscow Oblast.[9] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on May 17 that Ukrainian forces struck targets in Moscow Oblast in response to Russian strikes on Ukrainian cities.[10]

Astra reported on May 17 that a fire broke out at a runway at Sheremetyevo International Airport (north of Moscow City) after airport authorities claimed that drone wreckage hit the runway.[11] The Russian Transportation Ministry announced temporary airspace restrictions and the diversion of 51 flights on the night of May 16 to 17 and stated that two thirds of flights from Moscow airports were delayed for over two hours.[12]

Ukraine’s May 16 to 17 strike series proved that Russia is unable to effectively defend the Russian capital, a weakness that generated significant frustration in the Russian ultranationalist information space. The Kremlin’s response to the strikes thus far has been muted and likely aimed at downplaying the impact of the strikes, in contrast to the harsh milblogger responses. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova criticized the Ukrainian strikes for their purported impact against civilians, omitting the several successful strikes against Russian defense industrial plants and oil infrastructure objects.[13] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded to a media question about the use of "powerful bombs" by a "nuclear power state"  after the Ukrainian strikes against Moscow City and Oblast, stating that Russia still ”cannot be threatened as a nuclear power and its very existence cannot be threatened.”[14] Peskov's statement appears to hand-wave the severity of the strikes in an attempt to manage public expectations about how the Kremlin will respond. Independent Russian media outlet Agentstvo reported on May 17 that Russian state media TV channels, including Perviy Kanal, Rossiya-1, and NTV, devoted only about one minute to Ukraine’s strikes against Moscow, only focusing briefly on the response to civilian implications.[15] Agenstvo noted that the channels reported that Russia had already conducted vague "retaliatory strikes" against Ukraine, though the nature of this claimed retaliation is unclear. Russian ultranationalist milbloggers responded to the Ukrainian strikes against Moscow on May 17 by noting ineffective Russian air defenses, particularly in Moscow Oblast, and complained about Ukraine's increasing strike capabilities.[16] The milbloggers called for Russia to establish a multi-echeloned and unified air defense network aimed at countering drones over a broad area of land around Moscow City as well as an early-warning system, noting that Ukrainian forces are expanding the scale and intensity of their long-range strikes and straining Russia’s air defenses.[17] Some Russian milbloggers called for Russia to conduct retaliatory strikes, including with tactical nuclear weapons, and criticized Peskov and Zakharova's responses as inadequate.[18] One milblogger criticized Russian shutdowns of mobile internet as ineffective in actually mitigating Ukrainian strikes.[19] Russian milbloggers have repeatedly highlighted failures in Russia’s air defenses and called for retaliation as the Kremlin has consistently failed to protect or strengthen Russia’s rear area air defenses.[20]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces struck several Russian defense industrial plants and oil infrastructure objects in Moscow City and Oblast overnight on May 16 to 17 following Russia's intensified strike series against Ukraine on May 13 and 14.
• Ukraine’s May 16 to 17 strike series proved that Russia continues to be unable to effectively defend the Russian capital, a weakness that generated significant frustration in the Russian ultranationalist information space.
• Russian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian warships in the Caspian Sea overnight on May 16 to 17. Russian forces launched 278 drones against Ukraine.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 16, 2026

The seniormost Russian military command presented a highly inaccurate assessment of the battlefield situation for the fifth consecutive month, absurdly claiming that Russian forces are advancing west of Kupyansk, which they have not, in fact, taken. Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov met with the Russian Western Grouping of Forces on May 16 and made a series of false claims about the situation in the Kupyansk, , and Lyman directions.[1] Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces are advancing west of Kupyansk toward Shevchenkove, a statement inaccurately implying that Russian forces have seized Kupyansk and hold positions further west of the town. Gerasimov also claimed that Russian forces entered Velyka Shapkivka (northwest of Kupyansk), seized all of Borova (south of Kupyansk) and Kutkivka (north of Kupyansk); and seized about 50 percent of Shyikivka (southeast of Borova) and 85 percent of Lyman. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces do not hold consolidated positions within Kupyansk and that only a few Russian infiltrators remain in the town. ISW has not observed evidence to assess that Russian forces hold positions within Velyka Shapkivka, Shyikivka, Kutkivka, or Lyman, and has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have only infiltrated within about 14.2 percent of Kupyansk, 6.5 percent of Kutkivka, and 0.06 percent of Lyman. ISW currently assesses that Russian forces are at closest about two kilometers from Shyikivka and about four kilometers from Velyka Shapkivka.

Gerasimov identified Russia's next operational objective after the seizure of Kupyansk as Shevchenkove, but Russian forces are not close to seizing Kupyansk, which they would have to do before advancing along the H-20 highway toward Shevchenkove. There are multiple settlements named Shevchenkove in Kharkiv Oblast, but Gerasimov is likely referring to the Shevchenkove about 28 kilometers west of Kupyansk at the intersection of the H-20 Kupyansk-Chuhuiv-Kharkiv City and T-2110 Shevchenkove-Balakliya road, which also intersects with the M-03 Kharkiv City-Izyum highway and P-78 Kharkiv City-Balakliya-Borova highway to the south of the H-20. The Russian military command likely intends to threaten these Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOC) to support Russian efforts to advance in the Borova and Lyman directions as well as to advance on Kharkiv City from the east. Russian forces' ability to advance on and eventually seize Shevchenkove requires first seizing Kupyansk, however, and Russia has proven unable or unwilling to dedicate the necessary forces and means to repelling Ukrainian counterattacks and conducting offensive operations at a large enough scale to make tactically- and operationally-significant advances near, within, and beyond Kupyansk Gerasimov and other senior Russian officials have repeatedly made aggrandized claims of Russian advances on the frontline as part of a cognitive warfare effort based upon the false premise that Russian forces are advancing simultaneously across the theater and that Ukrainian defensive lines are imminently collapsing. Ukrainian defensive lines are holding against Russia's Spring-Summer 2026 offensive, and Ukrainian forces contesting the tactical initiative in several areas of the frontline, however, including in the Kupyansk direction.[3]

Gerasimov's claimed advances west of Kupyansk and along the Kupyansk-Borova-Lyman line are egregious even in comparison to the most expansive Russian ultranationalist claims in the area. Russian milbloggers have not claimed that Russian forces hold a significant presence within Kupyansk following Ukrainian counterattacks, and the ultranationalist community has actively criticized Gerasimov's previous claims of seizing most and then all of Kupyansk when Ukrainian forces had actually liberated much of th.[4] Russian milbloggers certainly have not claimed that Russian forces have entered Kutkivka, Shyikivka, or Velyka Shapkivka. Russian milbloggers have claimed that Russian forces have advanced in about 14 percent of Kupyansk and 4.6 percent of Lyman. One Russian milblogger responded to Gerasimov's May 16 claims over Borova in particular, claiming that not a single Russian milblogger who produces maps of the battlefield is claiming that Russian forces have even entered Borova, much less seized the whole town.[5] The milblogger sarcastically claimed that the Russian military command will soon falsely claim to have seized Kharkiv City given how it failed to react to the poor situation near Kupyansk. The Russian ultranationalist information space has repeatedly criticized Gerasimov, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and other senior Russian military commanders for making these aggrandized claims in what the milbloggers call "beautiful reports," which present unsubstantiated Russian advances to higher-ups from which the military command then makes operational plans and objectives for Russian forces on t.[6] These "beautiful reports" now appear to have persuaded the Russian military command that it is pursuing the operational objective of seizing Shevchenkove that Russian forces cannot yet undertake, as they are still far from achieving their current operational objective of seizing Kupyansk. These.

Russian milbloggers continue to warn that Ukrainian counterattacks and false reports of advances in other areas of the frontline are creating difficult situations to which the Russian military command cannot adequately respond. Russian milbloggers warned on May 15 and 16 that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking northwest of Orikhiv in Stepnohirsk, west of Orikhiv near Stepove, southwest of Orikhiv toward Pyatykhatky, and southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka.[7] The milbloggers broadly described the situation as "tense" or "difficult" for Russian forces, particularly northwest and west of Orikhiv. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces do not hold positions in Novodanylivka (south of Orikhiv) and that Ukrainian forces hold positions in Mala Tokmachka.[8] The milblogger claimed that the delta between the Russian military's claimed advances in the area and the actual frontline is preventing Russian commanders from forming a clear assessment of the situation.

The Kremlin continues to expand its efforts in Transnistria — the pro-Russian breakaway region of Moldova — to deepen Russian influence in the region. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on May 15 simplifying the procedure for Transnistria residents to acquire Russian citizenship decree allows foreign citizens and stateless persons over the age of 18 residing in Transnistria to obtain Russian citizenship without meeting the standard requirements of five years’ residence in Russia after acquiring a residency permit, or passing exams on Russian language proficiency, history, and basic legislation. Putin has lifted these requirements for citizens of other countries as part of Russian passportization campaigns in former Soviet republics, including Ukraine — where Russia has encouraged the acquisition of Russian citizenship nationwide and forcibly conducted passportization in occupied areas — as well as in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and the Russian-occupied separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in.[10] Putin signed this decree soon after the Russian State Duma passed on May 13 a bill that grants Putin authority for extraterritorial military operations to protect Russian citizens abroad[11] The Kremlin has repeatedly claimed that foreign states oppress Russian speakers and ethnic Russians — including in Moldova, the Baltic states, and Ukraine, where it used these claims as part of its justification for the full-scale invasion in 2022.[12] The Kremlin continues to set conditions in Moldova to exert leverage and meddle in regional affairs by asserting a right to protect Russian speakers and ethnic Russians abroad. Fifty-nine percent of residents in Transnistria reportedly already hold Russian citizenship as of February 2024, however, so it remains unclear how much additional influence the Kremlin may gain through these efforts.[13]

Key Takeaways:

• The seniormost Russian military command presented a highly inaccurate assessment of the battlefield situation for the fifth consecutive month, absurdly claiming that Russian forces are advancing west of Kupyansk, which they have not, in fact, taken.
• Gerasimov's claimed advances west of Kupyansk and along the Kupyansk-Borova-Lyman line are egregious even in comparison to the most expansive Russian ultranationalist claims in the area.
• These aggrandized claims of fictional advances along with milblogger complaints may indicate that the highest echelon of the Russian military command is either unaware of or unwilling to admit the realities of the battlefield even to itself, and is therefore allowing its own falsehoods to influence Russian operational and strategic planning.
• Russian milbloggers continue to warn that Ukrainian counterattacks and false reports of advances in other areas of the frontline are creating difficult situations to which the Russian military command cannot adequately respond.
• The Kremlin continues to expand its passportization efforts in Transnistria - the pro-Russian breakaway region of Moldova — to deepen Russian influence in the region.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian defense industrial infrastructure in Stavropol Krai. Russian forces launched 294 drones toward Ukraine overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 14, 2026

Russian forces have conducted two days of nearly continuous strikes against Ukraine with over 1,600 total long-range drones and missiles that heavily targeted Kyiv City and resulted in high civilian casualties.[1] Russian forces launched a strike package totaling 892 drones and missiles against Ukraine from 1800 on May 12 to 1830 on May 13.[2] The Ukrainian Air Force subsequently reported that Russian forces launched 731 drones and missiles from 1800 local time on May 13 to the morning of May 14.[3] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched three Kinzhal Kh-47 aeroballistic missiles, 18 Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles, and 35 Kh-101 cruise missiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 675 strike drones, decoy drones, and Banderol drone-based cruise missiles.[4] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 29 Kh-101s, 12 Iskander-M/S-400s, and 652 drones. Ukrainian Air Forces Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that Russian forces largely concentrated the strikes against Kyiv City in an effort to overwhelm Ukraine's air defenses.[5] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes since the evening of May 13 damaged at least 20 locations in Kyiv City alone, and that a Russian ballistic missile strike collapsed a nine-story residential building in the capital, killing at least 12 people, including a 12-year-old child, and injuring at least 57.[6] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes also damaged port infrastructure in Odesa Oblast, energy infrastructure in Khmelnytskyi and Chernihiv oblasts, and residential areas in Kharkiv City.[7] Russian strikes injured at least 28 in Kharkiv Oblast and at least two in Odesa Oblast.[8] Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) warned on the evening of May 13 that Russian forces intended to launch missiles against Ukraine that evening following earlier efforts to exhaust Ukraine's air defenses.[9] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Ukrainian forces downed about 94 percent of the Russian drones and 73 percent of the missiles from the evening of May 12 to the morning of May 14 despite this effort to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses.[10]

The large-scale strike against Kyiv City did not violate the Russian-Ukrainian Victory Day ceasefire but nonetheless demonstrates that Russia is a bad faith negotiator. The Kremlin made multiple threats to launch a concentrated strike at decision-making centers in Kyiv City if Ukrainian forces conducted strikes against Russia's Victory Day celebrations in Moscow City on May 9.[11] Some Russian officials called for Russia to use ballistic missiles, including the Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), against Kyiv City.[12] Zelensky agreed to a ceasefire between May 9 and 11 and signed a decree on May 8 stipulating that Ukraine would not strike Moscow's Red Square for the duration of the parade.[13] Ukraine did not strike Moscow during the ceasefire as agreed. Russian forces did not strike the decision-making centers in Kyiv City or use Oreshniks as Kremlin officials had threatened, but Russia's latest massive strikes against Kyiv City illustrate Russia's bad-faith understanding of compliance.

The Kremlin continues to replace border oblast governors, likely to scapegoat regional officials for broader border security failures. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed two decrees on May 13 stating that Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov and Bryansk Oblast Governor Alexander Bogomaz both resigned from their posts at their "own requests."[14] Putin appointed Irkutsk Oblast Deputy Governor Major General Alexander Shuvayev as acting Belgorod Oblast governor and former Chelyabinsk Oblast Deputy Governor and occupation Chairperson of the Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) Government Yegor Kovalchuk as acting Bryansk Oblast governor. ISW first observed reports in early April 2026 that the Kremlin was considering replacing Gladkov with Shuvayev, who is a graduate of the “Time of Heroes” program that seeks to install veterans of the war in Ukraine in various government positions.[15] Russian opposition source Meduza, citing a source close to the Russian Presidential Administration, noted that the Russian political bloc wanted the new Belgorod Oblast governor to have more experience in civilian administration, but ultimately settled on Shuvayev.[16]

The replacement of Gladkov and Bogomaz comes after a series of dismissals and arrests of other border oblast officials. The Kremlin has persecuted and scapegoated former officials of Kursk, Belgorod, and Bryansk oblasts for the Kremlin’s own failures to adequately respond to Ukraine's 2024 Kursk Oblast incursion and Ukrainian cross-border raids in 2023 and 2024.[17] The Kremlin replaced former Kursk Oblast governors Roman Staravoit and Alexei Smirnov in May and December 2024, respectively.[18] The replacement of Gladkov and Bogomaz marks leadership changes in all three Russian oblasts bordering northern Ukraine since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.[19] Residents of Belgorod and Bryansk oblasts have routinely complained about Russian authorities' insufficient efforts to protect the regions from, and respond to, the consequences of Ukrainian strikes.[20] The Kremlin may also be attempting to deflect dissatisfaction in border areas away from Putin and the ruling United Russia party ahead of the September 2026 State Duma elections. Gladkov has also been outwardly critical of the impacts of the mobile internet and Telegram shutdowns in the Belgorod Oblast border area, and the Kremlin may have replaced Gladkov with someone the Kremlin deems more loyal.[21]

Shuvayev, who has been in command of units that have reportedly committed war crimes in Ukraine, is part of the new "elite" Putin is forming in the Russian government through the "Time of Heroes" program. Shuvayev previously commanded the 4th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd LNR Army Corps ]AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) from February 2022 to August 2022, during the battles for Severodonetsk and Lysychansk (Luhansk Oblast) and then commanded the 1st Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) during the seizure of Avdiivka, Donetsk Oblast.[22] The 1st Motorized Rifle Brigade has committed numerous war crimes, including executing Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs), in and around Avdiivka under Shuvayev's command.[23] The Kremlin has been engaged in a concerted effort to appoint veterans of the war in Ukraine who have passed through the "Time of Heroes" program to local, municipal, regional, and federal positions in order to reintegrate servicemen into Russian society and to bolster civil-military relations and support for the war.[24] The Kremlin's decision to replace Gladkov with Shuvayev is likely part of its long-term effort to militarize the Russian government with loyalists and pro-war veterans.

The Kremlin is increasing its efforts to censor reactions to Ukrainian strikes against Moscow City, suggesting that it is growing concerned about its inability to protect the Russian rear. The Moscow City Anti-Terrorist Commission adopted a regulation on May 12 prohibiting government authorities, media organizations, emergency services, and citizens from disseminating information about strikes prior to official publications from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) or from official Moscow Mayor and Government sources.[25] The new Moscow City regulation is consistent with the Kremlin's ongoing censorship campaign aimed at restricting the spread of evidence of successful Ukrainian strikes.[26] The new regulation is an implicit acknowledgement that the Kremlin expects Ukrainian strikes on Moscow City to not only continue but to also result in successful hits and damage to infrastructure that the Kremlin wants to conceal. Recent Ukrainian strikes against western Russia have demonstrated Russia’s inability to reliably defend its rear against drone and missile strikes, a reality that the Kremlin is trying to cover up by censoring the information space.[27]

Russian commanders continue to order Russian soldiers to commit war crimes in Ukraine. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian infiltrators desecrated and then publicly displayed the bodies of two Ukrainian servicemembers who were killed in action (KIA) in the Hulyaipole direction on May 14.[28] The Ukrainian officials stated that radio intercepts indicate that the commander of the Russian unit directly ordered the act and that the Russian soldiers expressed readiness to carry out the order. Russian infiltrators conducting such atrocities are more broadly indicative of Russian war fighting tactics that integrate war crimes and intentional harm into their operational template.[29] ISW has long assessed that the Russian military command is endorsing and sometimes ordering such war crimes on the battlefield.[30]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces have conducted two days of nearly continuous strikes against Ukraine with over 1,600 total long-range drones and missiles that heavily targeted Kyiv City and resulted in high civilian casualties.
• The large-scale strike against Kyiv City did not violate the Russian-Ukrainian Victory Day ceasefire but nonetheless demonstrates that Russia is a bad faith negotiator.
• The Kremlin continues to replace border oblast governors, likely to scapegoat regional officials for broader border security failures.
• Shuvayev, who has been in command of units that have reportedly committed war crimes in Ukraine, is part of the new "elite" Putin is forming in the Russian government through the "Time of Heroes" program.
• The Kremlin is increasing its efforts to censor reactions to Ukrainian strikes against Moscow City, suggesting that it is growing concerned about its inability to protect the Russian rear.
• Russian commanders continue to order Russian soldiers to commit war crimes in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 13, 2026

The Kremlin is doubling down on its demand that Ukraine withdraw from all of Donbas as a precondition for the resumption of negotiations. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on May 13 that Ukrainian forces must cease fire and withdraw from Russian-claimed Ukrainian oblasts (likely referring to Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, which Russia illegally annexed in 2022) as a precondition for further negotiations to end the war.[i] Russian officials have demanded that Ukraine withdraw from Donetsk Oblast in recent weeks as a precondition for negotiations, and Peskov's statement indicates that the Kremlin is officially insisting that Ukraine cede important territory that its forces are currently holding against Russian efforts to seize them before negotiations can begin again.[ii] Anonymous sources familiar with the matter told the Financial Times (FT) on May 13 that Russian President Vladimir Putin plans to impose additional territorial demands in any future ceasefire agreement.[iii] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated May 13 that, despite recent Russian dialogue with the United States, “nothing is happening” in negotiations.[iv]

Russia’s exaggerated territorial ambitions and aggressive territorial demands run completely counter to battlefield reality. Anonymous sources in contact with Putin and additional sources familiar with the matter as well as a Ukrainian intelligence assessment shared with FT indicate that senior Russian commanders have convinced Putin that Russian forces could seize all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts by Fall 2026.[v] ISW is no longer prepared to forecast when Russian forces might seize Donetsk, including the Fortress Belt, since the slowing rate of Russian advances and the challenging nature of the Ukrainian-held terrain in Donetsk makes it unclear that Russia is capable of seizing the territory at all.[vi] ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have only advanced 349.89 square kilometers in Donetsk Oblast since the start of 2026, an advance rate of 2.63 square kilometers per day. Strong Ukrainian fortifications, the area’s challenging human and physical geography, and Ukrainian counterattacks and mid-range strike campaign that are already inhibiting Russian offensive operations across the theater make the prospects for a Russian seizure of the rest of Donetsk dim.[vii] Russian forces first infiltrated into Kostyantynivka (the Fortress Belt's southernmost city) in October 2025 and have failed to make any significant tactical gains in the city over the last six months.[viii] Ukrainian counterattacks in southern Ukraine since early 2026 have also forced Russia to choose between defending against Ukrainian counterattacks and allocating manpower and resources to priority sectors of the frontline, including the Fortress Belt.[ix] Ukraine’s recent successes are accomplishing tactical, operational, and strategic battlespace effects that undermine Putin's narrative that the Ukrainian frontlines are on the verge of collapse.[x] Two people involved in back-channel negotiations over ending the war told the FT that Putin’s ambitions are still to control all the Ukrainian territory between Russia and the Dnipro River, and possibly farther into Kyiv City and the port of Odesa, despite Russia's stalling offensive.[xi] Putin’s thinking thus appears to be further and further removed from battlefield realities, likely resulting in the issuance of orders to the Russian military to make gains that it is not capable of making.

US President Donald Trump said that he has not agreed with Putin that Russia should acquire all of Donetsk and Luhansk. Trump confirmed on May 13 that he had no understanding with Putin that Russia should gain control over the entirety of the Donbas in response to a journalist’s inquiry.[xii]

Russian courts are increasingly leveraging corruption charges as a pretext to nationalize Russia’s largest corporations, likely setting conditions for the broader nationalization of private assets to support state revenues. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on May 12 that Russia's Prosecutor General nationalized Rusagro, Russian billionaire Vadim Moshkovich’s most valuable asset and Russia’s largest agricultural holding, on May 5, 2026.[xiii] Russian authorities arrested Moshkovich on fraud charges in March 2025. Russian independent outlet The Bell co-founder Pyotr Mironenko reported on May 12 that Russia's nationalization of Rusagro illustrates the Kremlin's increasingly forceful efforts to nationalize assets of Russia’s richest individuals and corporations.[xiv]  The Russian Deputy Prosecutor General’s Office reported that the court nationalized Rusagro on the basis that Moshkovich continued to manage the company while he was a senator in the Russian Federation Council, despite the fact that he stepped down from executive roles in his companies.[xv] Mironenko noted that the Prosecutor General has begun filing numerous anti-corruption lawsuits that establish grounds to nationalize assets of businesspeople who have held parliamentary seats.[xvi] Mironenko noted that these cases establish precedents to nationalize the assets of five of the 30 richest Russians, who currently hold or previously held government positions or parliamentary seats. Mironenko reported that the court did not release Moshkovich in exchange for Rusagro‘s nationalization, which differs from previous unspecified cases. Putin held a closed meeting on March 26, 2026, where he pressured Russia’s top businessmen to provide contributions to Russia’s federal budget, in what ISW assessed was conditions-setting to nationalize their assets to support the war effort.[xvii] Russian authorities' seizure of Rusargo indicates that the Kremlin is expanding the grounds for nationalization, placing the assets of Russia’s wealthiest individuals at risk. The court’s refusal to release Moshkovich indicates that the Kremlin may be resorting to increasingly forceful measures to prevent Russia's elite from forming an organized block that can resist Putin’s war policies.

Russian demands for cash reached an all-time high over Victory Day weekend, demonstrating rising societal fears over internet restrictions and tax policy. Russian outlet RBK reported on May 13, citing its own calculations based on Bank of Russia data, that the amount of cash in circulation in Russia increased by 210.5 billion rubles (roughly $2.84 billion) between April 30 and May 11 - over the Victory Day holiday - the highest increase ever recorded since the Bank of Russia started collecting data in 2011.[xviii] RBK noted that this figure is a fivefold year-over-year increase compared to the 41.2-billion-ruble (roughly $555,000) figure from the same period in 2025 and exceeds the previous record high of 133.5 billion rubles (roughly $1.8 billion) in 2020. Raiffeisenbank-Russia Chief Economist Stanislav Murashov told RBK that the increase in bank withdrawals was a consequence of internet restrictions starting on May 5 in advance of the Victory Day holiday - the first time ISW has observed a Russian business source link the internet shutdowns to increased cash demand. Russian businesses and consumers have been increasingly using cash payments due to recent Russian tax laws intended to replenish the Russian federal budget.[xix]  The increasing demand for cash in Russian society indicates rising societal fears over internet restrictions that prevent bank card transactions amidst increasing state surveillance and fiscal policy that incentivizes Russians to use cash more often to evade rising taxes.[xx] The shift to cash payments could increase the size of Russia's grey economy, however, which could worsen the economic situation further by increasing the costs and goods of services without generating the desired tax revenues.[xxi]

Ukrainian forces continue to increase the range and frequency of their long-range drones strikes against Russian oil infrastructure, exploiting overstretched Russian air defenses. Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against targets throughout Russia, ranging up to 1,500 kilometers from the international border, on the night of May 12 to 13.[xxii] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 13 that Ukrainian forces struck the Tamanneftgaz oil terminal in Volna, Krasnodar Krai, causing fires at the facility.[xxiii] The Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) noted that Ukrainian forces struck the loading pier of the Tamanneftgaz oil terminal and the port of Taman — more than 300 kilometers from the frontline.[xxiv] NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data for May 13 shows a heat anomaly near Volna. Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi noted that  Tamanneftgaz is one of the key Russian oil terminals on the Black Sea coast and facilitates Russian maritime oil exports, and the port of Taman additionally supports Russian liquified natural gas (LNG), coal, and sulfur exports.[xxv] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the AVT primary oil processing facility at Yaroslavl Oil Refinery in Yaroslavl City (roughly 750 kilometers from the international border) and infrastructure at the Astrakhansky gas processing plant in Astrakhan Oblast (roughly 645 kilometers from the international border), causing fires at both facilities.[xxvi] Yaroslavl Oblast Governor Mikhail Evraev acknowledged that drone debris struck an industrial facility in Yaroslavl City.[xxvii] Astrakhan Oblast Governor Igor Babushkin acknowledged that drone debris struck the Astrakhan gas processing plant and caused a fire.[xxviii] Presidential Commissioner for Sanctions Policy of Ukraine Vladyslav Vlasyuk reported, and geolocated footage confirms, that Ukrainian forces also struck the Nurlino Linear Dispatch and Pumping Station in Ufa, Bashkortostan Republic, 1,500 kilometers from the international border.[xxix] Vlasyuk stated that the station turns over 30 million tons of oil annually and pumps oil from Siberia, Orenburg Oblast, and Kazakhstan. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed on May 12 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian gas infrastructure facility in Orenburg Oblast on the night of May 11 to 12, over 1,500 kilometers from the international border.[xxx]

Continued long-range Ukrainian strikes deep into the Russian rear continue to demonstrate Russia's inability to reliably defend its critical infrastructure. Ukrainian forces have been steadily increasing the range, volume, and intensity of their long-range strike campaigns against Russian oil infrastructure and military assets in Russia and occupied Ukraine’s territories since mid-March 2026. ISW has observed evidence that Ukrainian forces have conducted at least 27 long-range strikes against Russia since May 1. Ukrainian forces have heavily targeted port and oil infrastructure across a massive surface area extending across Moscow and Chelyabinsk cities (approximately 455 and 1,600 kilometers from the international border, respectively); Yekaterinburg, Sverdlovsk Oblast (approximately 1,600 kilometers from the international border); Primorsk and Ust-Luga, Leningrad Oblast (approximately 930 and 860 kilometers from the international border, respectively); and Tuapse and Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai (approximately 235 and 110 kilometers from the international border, respectively).[xxxi] Ukrainian forces will likely continue to intensify and scale their long-range strike campaign.

Russian forces conducted large-scale drone strikes overnight on May 12 and throughout the day on May 13, killing at least six people. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on the morning of May 13 that Russian forces launched 139 drones against Ukraine from 1800 local time on May 12 to 0800 on May 13 and another 753 drones from 0800 to 1830 local time on May 13.[xxxii] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defenses downed 821 drones, that 56 drones struck at least 13 locations, and that debris fell on 26 locations. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian drones flew into Ukraine from Belarus and Moldova. Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) advisor on defense technology and drone and electronic warfare (EW) expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov noted that Russian forces flew Shahed drones five to 10 kilometers along the Belarus-Ukraine border, but that the drones did not enter Belarusian airspace.[xxxiii] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russian forces launched the strike series in waves, killing at least six civilians, particularly targeting western Ukrainian oblasts, including Transcarpathia, Lviv, Volyn, Ivano-Frankivsk, Rivne, Vinnytsia, Chernivtsi, Khmelnytskyi, and Zhytomyr oblasts.[xxxiv] Zelensky stated that Russian strikes killed at least six people and injured dozens. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, energy, and civilian infrastructure in Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kherson, Odesa, Vinnytsia, Volyn, and Rivne oblasts.[xxxv] Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that Russian forces had only launched drones against Ukraine as of 1846 local time on May 13, but that Russian forces likely plan to use missiles later into the evening of May 13 after having already exhausted Ukrainian air defenses.[xxxvi] The Ukrainian Air Force announced missile threats to all of Ukraine as of 1900 local time.[xxxvii] Russia's new strike tactic of launching drones over an extended period of time allows Russia to threaten more areas of Ukraine for longer periods of time and disproportionately affect civilian areas.[xxxviii] Russia likely exploited the May 9 to 11 Victory Day ceasefire to set conditions and prepare to be able to launch a massive strike series of this size.

 The Russian State Duma passed a bill granting the Russian president powers for extraterritorial military operations to protect Russian citizens abroad, previously introduced on March 10. The Russian State Duma unanimously adopted on May 13 a bill that allows the Russian president to use Russian military forces to protect Russian citizens abroad in the event of their arrest, detention, criminal prosecution, or other legal proceedings in foreign courts.[xxxix] The Russian government submitted the initial bill to the Russian State Duma on March 10.[xl] This legislation sets informational and legal conditions for Russia to justify future military activity abroad under the pretext of protecting Russian citizens once Putin personally signs the bill. The Kremlin has repeatedly claimed that foreign states allegedly oppress Russian speakers and ethnic Russians, including in Moldova, the Baltic States, and Ukraine, to justify Russia’s military interventions, and has made similar claims about the Baltic states persecuting Russian speakers and ethnic Russians.[xli]

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin is doubling down on its demand that Ukraine withdraw from all of Donbas as a precondition for the resumption of negotiations.
• Russia’s exaggerated territorial ambitions and aggressive territorial demands run completely counter to battlefield reality.
• US President Donald Trump said that he has not agreed with Putin that Russia should acquire all of Donetsk and Luhansk.
• Russian courts are increasingly leveraging corruption charges as a pretext to nationalize Russia’s largest corporations, likely setting conditions for the broader nationalization of private assets to support state revenues.
• Russian demands for cash reached an all-time high over Victory Day weekend, demonstrating rising societal fears over internet restrictions and tax policy.
• Ukrainian forces continue to increase the range and frequency of their long-range drones strikes against Russian oil infrastructure, exploiting overstretched Russian air defenses.
• Russian forces conducted large-scale drone strikes overnight on May 12 and throughout the day on May 13, killing at least six people.
• The Russian State Duma passed a bill granting the Russian president powers for extraterritorial military operations to protect Russian citizens abroad, previously introduced on March 10.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk, Oleksandrivka, and Hulyaipole directions and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 12, 2026

Russian President Vladimir Putin is leaning on nuclear saber-rattling to project military strength after Russia’s apparent failure to ensure full security for the May 9 Victory Day parade without asking Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky for a ceasefire. Putin claimed on May 12 that Russian forces successfully tested the RS-28 Sarmat super-heavy intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), also referred to as the SS-X-29 or SS-X-30 in NATO classification.[i] Putin lauded the claimed range and payload of the Sarmat and highlighted Russia's efforts to develop additional nuclear-capable weapons, including the Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), the Poseidon unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV), and the Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile — all of which Russia has either tested or fielded since the start of the full-scale invasion.[ii] Putin claimed that Russia plans to deploy the first Sarmat missiles to combat duty with the 62nd Missile Division (33rd Missile Army, Strategic Missile Forces) in Krasnoyarsk Krai by the end of 2026. Putin and other Russian military officials stated in December 2021, June 2022, and then June 2023 that Russian forces would deploy Sarmats in the near future, all ahead of a likely failed Sarmat test launch in November 2024.[iii] Putin's rhetoric about the March 2026 Sarmat ICBM test launch mirrors his rhetoric about the initial tests of the Oreshnik IRBM, though Putin's posturing with the Sarmat is intended to disguise his weakness made visible by the need to ask Ukraine to commit not to strike the May 9 Russian Victory Day parade.[iv] Ukrainian deep rear strikes revealed Russia's weakness and inability to reliably defend its deep-rear areas, including its capital, from these strikes, and Russia held a deeply scaled-down parade as a result.[v] Putin likely intends for his Sarmat test launch and rhetoric to disguise the fact that it was Ukraine, not Russia, whose actions guaranteed the safety of the Victory Day parade in Moscow.

Putin's posturing with the Sarmat ICBMs also likely aims to distract from Russia's worsening performance on the battlefield, particularly during the Russian spring-summer 2026 offensive. Putin and senior Russian military officials have intensified their exaggerations of Russian battlefield successes throughout 2026, but the Russian rate of advance has declined monthly since October 2025 as Ukrainian forces escalated their mid-range strike campaign and imposed additional costs on Russian efforts to advance.[vi] These costs have grown so great that Russian forces actually suffered a net loss of territory in the theater in April 2026 for the first time since Ukraine's 2024 incursion into Kursk Oblast, and the Russian recruitment rate dipped below its replacement rate for the first time in the war in January 2026.[vii] Russian forces began their spring-summer 2026 offensive against Ukraine's Fortress Belt in mid-March 2026, but this effort has failed to yield operationally-significant advances.[viii] Ukrainian counterattacks recaptured much of Kupyansk starting in November 2025, liberated over 400 square kilometers in southern Ukraine in winter and spring 2026, and most recently liberated several settlements in western Zaporizhia Oblast in late April 2026.[ix] Ukrainian forces have forced Russia to choose between defending against Ukrainian counterattacks and allocating manpower and resources to priority sectors of the frontline — a choice that is embarrassing for Putin, whose theory of victory is dependent upon the facade that Russian forces are advancing simultaneously across the theater and are close to collapsing Ukrainian lines.[x] Not only are Ukrainian defensive lines holding, but Ukrainian forces have managed to contest the tactical initiative in several areas of the frontline even as Russia continues to lose disproportionate amounts of manpower to achieve minimal gains.

Open-source reporting confirmed the first death of a Russian university student recruited into the Russian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) in combat, potentially in an assault unit. The BBC Russian Service reported on May 12 that it confirmed the death of Russian university student Valery Averin, who signed a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) in early January 2026 to serve in the Russian USF.[xi] The BBC Russian Service reported that Averin completed drone operator training on March 24 and contacted his mother for the last time on April 2, and was killed in action by April 8, only two weeks after completing his training. Averin’s mother told the BBC Russian Service that Russian forces "threw him [Averin] into an assault, right into the meat grinder" and that a Ukrainian "mortar strike" killed Averin. The local Kyakhta Raion Administration in the Republic of Buryatia claimed on April 24 that Averin died "near Luhansk," likely referring to the frontline near or in occupied Luhansk Oblast.[xii] Averin’s mother told the BBC Russian Service that she heard of at least one other university recruit who died, but the BBC Russian Service could not independently verify any combat deaths of other university students recruited in the MoD's USF recruitment drive. The BBC Russian Service suggested that Averin may have served in the Russian 147th Engineer-Sapper Regiment (likely of the 36th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]), which is based near Averin's university in the Republic of Buryatia.[xiii] The Russian MoD launched its USF recruitment campaign of Russian university students by January 2026 as part of its forced covert mobilization effort amid declining recruitment rates and rising casualty rates.[xiv] Russian milbloggers previously criticized the ineffectiveness of the recruitment campaign for the USF due to extensive reporting and worry that the Russian military command would transfer these students from their USF units to assault units.[xv]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin is leaning on nuclear saber-rattling to project military strength after Russia’s apparent failure to ensure full security for the May 9 Victory Day parade without asking Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky for a ceasefire.
• Putin's posturing with the Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) also likely aims to distract from Russia's worsening performance on the battlefield, particularly during the Russian spring-summer 2026 offensive.
• Open-source reporting confirmed the first death of a Russian university student recruited into the Russian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) in combat, potentially in an assault unit.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
• Russian forces launched 216 drones toward Ukraine overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 11, 2026

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued limited offensive operations throughout the theater on the final day of the May 9 to 11 ceasefire. Russian and Ukrainian officials accused the other side of violating the ceasefire with artillery, air, and drone strikes and limited ground operations across the theater on May 11.[1] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported that Russian forces did not conduct long-range strikes against Ukraine overnight on May 10 to 11.[2] Observed NASA Fire Information for Resources Management System (FIRMS) data signatures from May 11 indicate that hostilities continued to decrease on May 11 but did not cease. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces used the ceasefire to pull forward reserves, accumulate personnel, and continue artillery and first-person view (FPV) strikes.[3] The spokesperson reported that Russian forces increased strikes with Molniya fixed-wing drones during the ceasefire compared to before the ceasefire, and speculated that Russian forces may have stockpiled Molniya drones ahead of the ceasefire for this purpose.[4] The prevalence of mutual accusations and continued localized kinetic combat activity throughout the final day of the ceasefire continues to highlight the fact that ceasefires without explicit enforcement mechanisms, credible monitoring, and defined dispute resolution processes are unlikely to hold.

Recent reports of Ukrainian drones operating near occupied Mariupol as part of battlefield air interdiction (BAI) efforts targeting Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in occupied Donetsk Oblast and Crimea are raising significant concerns among Russian milbloggers. Russian milbloggers expressed concern on May 10 in response to recent Ukrainian footage of Ukrainian Hornet drones freely operating over the T-0509 Mariupol-Donetsk City highway (also called the H-10 highway) near occupied Mariupol, targeting Russian tanker trucks and other military transport vehicles.[5] One of the milbloggers expressed serious concern that the situation along GLOCs near Mariupol is beginning to resemble conditions along the M-30 Horlivka-Panteleymonivka-Yasynuvata-Donetsk City highway, where the milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces have paralyzed Russian logistics and civilian traffic by using drones.[6] The milblogger claimed that the M-30 highway was safer in 2024 to 2025, despite being closer to the frontline, compared to 2026, when the M-30 at its closest is 35 kilometers from the frontline, due to the increased range of Ukrainian drones. The milblogger claimed that Russian electronic warfare (EW) can only jam Ukrainian Hornet drones if they do not use Starlink or do not have time to auto-lock onto the target. The milblogger expressed concern that Ukrainian forces may be able to fully automate Hornet drones within the next six to 12 months (about December 2026 to March 2027).[7] Another milblogger echoed these concerns, expressing worry that Ukrainian Starlink-enabled drones with a range of up to 200 kilometers are reaching the M-14 Mariupol-Berdyansk-Melitopol-Henichesk highway, a key Russian GLOC along the Sea of Azov coast to occupied Crimea.[8] The Ukrainian 1st Azov National Guard Corps published footage on May 8 of Ukrainian drones reconnoitering and interdicting Russian GLOCs through Mariupol, demonstrating Ukraine's increased capacity to strike moving targets further into Russia's operational rear areas as part of an intensifying BAI campaign.[9] Ukraine's ability to strike moving targets in areas previously considered relatively risk free for Russian forces will likely achieve partial BAI effects and appears to be a point of increasing neuralgia in the Russian ultranationalist information space.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian and Ukrainian forces continued limited offensive operations throughout the theater on the final day of the May 9 to 11 ceasefire.
• Recent reports of Ukrainian drones operating near occupied Mariupol as part of battlefield air interdiction (BAI) efforts targeting Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in occupied Donetsk Oblast and Crimea are raising significant concerns among Russian milbloggers.
• Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.
• Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces conducted long-range strikes on May 10 to 11.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 10, 2026

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued limited offensive operations across the theater throughout the second day of the May 9–11 ceasefire. Both Ukrainian and Russian officials issued competing accusations that the other side violated the ceasefire on May 10. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Russian forces continued assaults in key directions and conducted artillery and drone strikes.[1] Zelensky stated that Russian forces conducted more than 150 ground assaults, 100 artillery strikes, and almost 10,000 drone strikes between May 9 and 10. Zelensky noted that Russian forces did not conduct any large missile packages, however, and the Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched only 27 Shahed, Gerbera, Italmas, and Parodiya drones between 0000 and 0800 local time on May 10, all of which Ukrainian forces downed.[2] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) similarly accused Ukraine on May 10 of violating the ceasefire by conducting eight ground assaults; 676 artillery, MLRS, and mortar strikes; and 6,331 drone strikes.[3] Observed National Aeronautics and Space Administration Fire Information for Resource Management System (NASA FIRMS) signatures from May 10 indicate that hostilities further decreased on May 10, but that activity did not cease. Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that the overall operational tempo across certain areas of the frontline continued to decrease on May 10 despite persistent tactical combat missions that violated the ceasefire.[4] The prevalence of mutual accusations and continued localized activity throughout the second day of the ceasefire highlights the fact that ceasefires without explicit enforcement mechanisms, credible monitoring, and defined dispute resolution processes are unlikely to hold.

Russian President Vladimir Putin vaguely suggested that the war in Ukraine could end soon, despite offering no indication that Russia intends to end the war. Putin responded to a question during a press conference on May 9 about claimed Western involvement in recent Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russia, claiming that this "matter is coming to an end" after reiterating the Kremlin's false justifications for its war in Ukraine.[5]  Russian state media presented Putin's statement as if he had stated that the war in Ukraine "is nearing an end," despite Putin providing no indication that he intends to end Russia’s war in Ukraine.[6] Putin notably claimed during the press conference that he intended to allow Russian forces to "focus on the final defeat of Ukraine” by excluding Russian military equipment from the Victory Day Parade, signaling that Russia remains committed to its maximalist goals for the Ukrainian government's capitulation. Putin reiterated his previous demand that any bilateral meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky take place in Moscow City and implied that he would not meet with Zelensky abroad for peace negotiations. The Kremlin has routinely signaled its unwillingness to have an immediate bilateral meeting with Zelensky to end the war in Ukraine.[7] The Kremlin is likely playing to its domestic audience, who are increasingly feeling the effects of over four years of war and Russia's inability to repel Ukrainian long-range strikes.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky refuted Russian claims that Ukraine is sabotaging the planned prisoner of war (POW) exchange as part of the three-day Victory Day ceasefire. Putin accused Ukraine on May 9 of sabotaging the 1,000 for 1,000 POW exchanges as part of the Victory Day ceasefire, claiming that Russia had not heard anything from Ukraine on the topic.[8] Zelensky stated on May 10 that Ukraine is fully committed to the POW exchange and had already given Russia its lists detailing the 1,000 POWs that Ukraine would return to Russia in the exchange and added that the United States is acting as a guarantor in the exchange.[9]

Russia appears to be increasing the sophistication of its cognitive warfare effort that uses flag raisings to achieve informational impacts. ISW has increasingly observed footage created using artificial intelligence purportedly showing Russian forces raising flags in several sectors of the frontline in recent days.[10] Russian forces shifted to infiltration tactics in Summer 2025 and have since then increasingly relied on footage showing Russian flag raising to claim advances in areas where Russian forces had conducted small group infiltrations but did not establish enduring positions.[11] Russia has been increasing the sophistication of these videos over the last several months, beginning to produce more complex, higher-production edited montages throughout numerous locations in Winter 2025 compared to previous shorter one-off videos.[12] The increased sophistication and use of artificial intelligence in these videos suggest that the Kremlin is engaging in a coordinated campaign to support the higher Russian military command’s informational efforts. Russian sources notably released much of the AI footage in the days leading up to Victory Day on May 9, possibly to compensate for Russian forces failing to meet deadlines for advances ahead of May 9. The Kremlin continues to engage in a systematic cognitive warfare effort to aggrandize Russian advances through exaggerated claims of gains and flag raising infiltration missions in an attempt to portray them as a sweeping, broad-front advance to falsely portray the frontline as collapsing across the theater, contrary to all available evidence.[13]

The Kremlin and the Russian military command continue to coerce and punish pro-war information space figures critical of Russian political and military leadership as part of a wider effort to consolidate control over the information space. The Russian milblogger Telegram channel Thirteenth claimed on May 8 that the command of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) sent its main administrator Yegor Guzenko, who served with the unit in lieu of jail time, to an unspecified assault unit on the frontlines on or around April 27 and that Guzenko has not made contact since.[14] Thirteenth noted that Guzenko suffered a double leg fracture on March 1 from which he had not recovered and that Guzenko would very likely die on this combat mission.[15] Guzenko and the Thirteenth channel have been critical of the Kremlin throughout the war, and notably criticized Russian President Vladimir Putin, particularly for his conduct of the war in Ukraine, and Russian internet restrictions in a series of Telegram posts on April 24, three days before Guzenko's assignment to the assault unit.[16] Russian authorities arrested Guzenko on October 5, 2024, on felony charges for assaulting a police officer, following his continuous heavy criticism of the Russian MoD and the Kremlin.[17] The Russian ultranationalist Telegram channel Voevoda Veshaet claimed on May 8 that Russian officials arrested its administrator and former Russian combat helicopter pilot, Alexey Zemtsov and that Zemtsov is in pre-trial detention on charges unrelated to his military service.[18] Voevoda Veshaet noted that Zemstov is ready to go fight in Ukraine as part of a Storm V assault company.  Zemtsov published on April 15 video alleging that he faced censorship from the Russian military command and accusations of discrediting the Russian military for complaining about the kit he received after transferring to an assault unit.[19] The Kremlin has recently intensified efforts to consolidate control over the Russian information space.[20]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian and Ukrainian forces continued limited offensive operations across the theater throughout the second day of the May 9–11 ceasefire.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin vaguely suggested that the war in Ukraine could end soon, despite offering no indication that Russia intends to end the war.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky refuted Russian claims that Ukraine is sabotaging the planned prisoner of war (POW) exchange as part of the three-day Victory Day ceasefire.
• Russia appears to be increasing the sophistication of its cognitive warfare effort that uses flag raisings to achieve informational impacts.
• The Kremlin and the Russian military command continue to coerce and punish pro-war information space figures critical of Russian political and military leadership as part of a wider effort to consolidate control over the information space.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Borova and Slovyansk directions, the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 9, 2026

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued limited offensive operations across the theater throughout the first day of the May 9 - 11 ceasefire. Both Ukrainian and Russian officials issued competing accusations that the other side violated the ceasefire on May 9.[i] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 9 that there were 51 combat engagements after the ceasefire went into effect.[ii] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck residential infrastructure in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts during the day on May 9.[iii] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) accused Ukraine of violating the ceasefire 8,970 times, including launching 12 ground attacks, 1,173 artillery, MLRS, and mortar strikes, and 7,151 drone strikes.[iv] The Ukrainian Air Force reported on May 9 that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M missile and 43 Shahed, Gerbera, Italmas, and Parodyia drones against Ukraine after 1800 on May 8, but it is unclear whether these strikes took place before or after the ceasefire went into effect at midnight on May 9.[v] Observed National Aeronautics and Space Administration Fire Information for Resource Management System (NASA FIRMS) signatures from May 8 and 9 and Ukrainian and Russian reporting indicate that there was a reduction in hostilities across the theater, particularly in northern Ukraine, but not a cessation of hostilities.[vi] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that the overall operational tempo across certain areas of the frontline decreased despite persistent tactical combat missions that violated the ceasefire.[vii]  

The ceasefire notably lacked well-defined terms and the only publicly available details of the ceasefire’s terms offered by Ukrainian President Volodmyr Zelensky stated that Ukraine would not strike Moscow’s Red Square during the Kremlin's Victory Day parade – a condition Ukraine adhered to.[viii] The prevalence of mutual accusations and continued localized activity from the early hours of the ceasefire highlights the fact that ceasefires without explicit enforcement mechanisms, credible monitoring, and defined dispute resolution processes are unlikely to hold.[ix] Any durable cessation of hostilities will require both sides to establish clear terms, implement third-party monitoring systems, and withdraw forces from the line of contact to reduce the risk of violations and escalation.[x]

Russian forces used the ceasefire to conduct rotations, reinforcements, redeployments, and logistics throughout the theater, likely to support imminent future offensive operations. Ukrainian military sources reported on May 9 that Russian forces used the ceasefire for regrouping, rotations, logistics, and position fortification in the Kupyansk, Lyman, and Slovyansk directions and in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[xi] The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on May 9 that Ukrainian forces observed redeployed elements of the 90th Tank Division (41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[xii] ISW first observed reports on May 4 that the 90th Tank Division had redeployed from the Oleksandrivka and Novopavlivka directions, and the reduction of tempo on May 9 may have supported the division’s redeployment.[xiii] The 7th Corps noted that the Russian military command has recently begun establishing command posts in Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) to support Russian attacks toward Rodynske (north of Myrnohrad).[xiv] A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on May 9 that the ceasefire is allowing Russian forces to advance and consolidate positions northwest of Lyman in areas where Ukrainian drone activity has previously prevented Russian forces from fortifying these positions.[xv] Russian forces have repeatedly used ceasefires to regroup, conduct rotations, and improve logistics along the frontline.[xvi] Russian forces will likely continue to take advantage of any reduction in operational tempo on May 10 and 11 to further regroup and reinforce positions as to resume reinvigorated offensive operations once the ceasefire period ends.

Russia and Ukraine have not yet conducted the reportedly agreed to prisoner-of-war (POW) swap of 1,000 prisoners each as of May 9. US President Donald Trump, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, and Kremlin Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov announced on May 8 that Ukraine and Russia agreed to the exchange of 1,000 POWs from each side as part of the planned three-day ceasefire. [xvii] Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported that a source in the Ukrainian Presidential Administration stated that reports that the Kremlin backed out of the POW swap are untrue and that work on facilitating the exchange is still ongoing as of May 9.[xviii]

Ukrainian defense successes on the battlefield have prevented Russian forces from making significant advances across the theater, depriving Russian President Vladimir Putin of any significant operational successes to celebrate on Victory Day. Putin did not discuss the battlefield situation in Ukraine during Russia's Victory Day celebrations on May 9 and instead simply claimed that Russia's victory is inevitable.[xix] Russian forces have failed to make any operationally significant advances in the last year. Russian forces managed to seize Toretsk in August 2025 after a 14-month campaign, Siversk in a 41-month campaign, and Pokrovsk in January 2026 after a two-year campaign, all of which resulted in high Russian casualties and equipment losses.[xx] Russian forces were unable to capitalize on the seizures of any of these towns to make further operationally significant advances. Russian forces have thus far made minimal progress in their ongoing Spring-Summer 2026 offensive against Ukraine's Fortress Belt. Russian forces first infiltrated into Kostyantynivka (the Fortress Belt's southernmost city) in October 2025 and have since failed to make operationally significant gains over the last six months.[xxi] Ukrainian forces have, by contrast, made their most significant gains on the battlefield in Winter and Spring 2026 since Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024, notably retaking more territory than Russian forces gained in April 2026.[xxii] Ukrainian forces liberated large portions of Kupyansk in November 2025, liberated over 400 square kilometers in southern Ukraine after a series of counterattacks in Winter and Spring 2026, and most recently liberated several settlements in western Zaporizhia Oblast in late April 2026.[xxiii] Ukrainian counterattacks in southern Ukraine have created cascading operational and strategic effects against Russian forces in their ongoing Spring-Summer 2026 offensive against the Fortress Belt, which has forced Russia to choose between defending against Ukrainian counterattacks or allocating manpower and resources to priority sectors of the frontline.[xxiv] Ukraine's intensified mid-range strike campaign against Russian logistics, military equipment, and manpower since early 2026 has also degraded Russian forces' ability to conduct offensive operations across the theater.[xxv] Ukrainian forces have intentionally exacerbated other Russian vulnerabilities over the last year, including through the February 2026 block on Russia's use of Starlink terminals in Ukraine and through Ukraine's operational long-range strike campaign against Russian military and oil infrastructure deep in the Russian rear, which significantly disrupted Russian communications on the frontline and drone operations as well as Russia's oil and gas profits.[xxvi]

Russia's war in Ukraine forced Putin to hold his Victory Day parade on a much smaller scale than in previous years, as Putin cannot reliably defend deep rear areas, including the capital, from Ukrainian drones. The Kremlin held its 2026 Victory Day parade in Moscow City on May 9 in a significantly truncated format, with the parade lasting only 45 minutes, featuring no tanks or other military equipment for the first time since 2007, and hosting only 10 foreign leaders as compared to over 20 in 2025.[xxvii] The parade also notably featured the first-ever participation of North Korean soldiers, who were instrumental in repelling Ukraine's Kursk incursion in Winter and Spring 2025.[xxviii] Russian authorities also revoked foreign media outlets' previously-approved accreditation to attend the parade on May 8, citing the current operational situation, likely referring to the threat of Ukrainian drone strikes.[xxix] Russian sources also claimed that the Kremlin would be airing the parade on a time delay and had prepared content in the event that Ukrainian forces struck the parade.[xxx] Ukrainian forces have steadily increased the range, volume, and intensity of their long-range strike campaign, targeting several major Russian cities, including Moscow and Chelyabinsk, in recent weeks - areas where Putin previously felt safe and comfortable hosting large gatherings.[xxxi] The Kremlin has largely failed to defend against Ukrainian strikes in recent weeks, despite the Kremlin moving air defense assets, and resorted to escalating threats in the days leading up to the parade.[xxxii] The Kremlin's truncated format for such events, that the Kremlin has historically capitalized on, reflects the increasing strain that over four years of war is having on Russia.[xxxiii]

Putin's insistence on holding the Victory Day parade despite the threat of Ukrainian strikes reflects Putin's refusal to accept the realities of the current battlespace. The Kremlin launched increasing threats against Ukraine in the days leading up to Victory Day, including implied threats to launch a high volume of ballistic missiles against Kyiv City if Ukraine conducted strikes that "disrupted" the Victory Day parade in the Red Square.[xxxiv] Putin's demands for a ceasefire for the parade was a deliberate attempt to project a sense of power and control in Russia, while seeking to avoid the embarrassment of potential Ukrainian strikes during such celebrations. Victory Day is Russia’s principal patriotic holiday that commemorates the Soviet Union’s contributions to victory over Nazi Germany in the Second World War (known in Russia as the Great Patriotic War), and Putin's insistence on holding the parade despite the risk of escalation underscores Putin's desperateness to restore Russia to the perceived greatness of the Soviet Union.

Putin used Victory Day to position the war in Ukraine as this generation of Russians' equivalent to the Soviet Union's role in World War II. Putin used his Victory Day speech to reinforce longstanding attempts to posture Russia as the heir of the Soviet Union’s “superpower” status and to position himself as Stalin's successor within that historical lineage.[xxxv] Putin claimed that Soviet successes in the Great Patriotic War inspire the soldiers carrying out Russia's war in Ukraine today and the moral strength, courage and valor, and ability to endure and overcome are the key to Russia's success on the battlefield.[xxxvi] Putin emphasized how Russia's unity is what makes it strong and that the front and rear need to band together to support the war. Putin has long tried to construct false historical parallels between the war in Ukraine with the Soviet Great Patriotic War to rally Russian society behind the war.[xxxvii] Putin's emphasis on how the people of the Soviet Union had to endure hardships for a greater cause, demonstrates how Putin is aware of the growing costs that the domestic Russian populace is feeling as a result of the war as casualties approach one percent of Russia’s total population, Russians increasingly bear the financial cost of the war, and the Kremlin intensifies its censorship and mobile data restrictions. Putin is trying to convince Russians to accept these ever-increasing costs as necessary for defeating a greater evil.

Russian forces continue to suffer increasing casualty rates. Russian opposition outlets Meduza and Mediazona reported on May 9 that data from the Russian Register of Inheritance Cases (RND), Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat), Russian court records, and a list of deceased servicemembers indicate that at least 352,000 Russian servicemembers have died since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022 through the end of 2025.[xxxviii] Meduza and Mediazona's updated casualty numbers include servicemembers missing and presumed dead for the first time. Russian courts have declared around 90,000 servicemembers missing and presumed dead through July 2025. The actual number of Russian servicemembers killed in action (KIA) is likely much higher, as Meduza and Mediazona’s figure is very likely a conservative estimate due to reporting limitations. Total Russian casualties (killed and seriously wounded) are reportedly 1.3 million as of February 2026.[xxxix]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian and Ukrainian forces continued limited offensive operations across the theater throughout the first day of the May 9 – 11 ceasefire.
• Russian forces used the ceasefire to conduct rotations, reinforcements, redeployments, and logistics throughout the theater, likely to support imminent future offensive operations.
• Russia and Ukraine have not yet conducted the reportedly agreed to prisoner-of-war (POW) swap of 1,000 prisoners each as of May 9.
• Ukrainian defense successes on the battlefield have prevented Russian forces from making significant advances across the theater, depriving Russian President Vladimir Putin of any significant operational successes to celebrate on Victory Day.
• Russia's war in Ukraine forced Putin to hold his Victory Day parade on a much smaller scale than in previous years, as Putin cannot reliably defend deep rear areas, including the capital, from Ukrainian drones.
• Putin's insistence on holding the Victory Day parade despite the threat of Ukrainian strikes reflects Putin's refusal to accept the realities of the current battlespace.
• Putin used Victory Day to position the war in Ukraine as this generation of Russians' equivalent to the Soviet Union's role in World War II.
• Russian forces continue to suffer increasing casualty rates.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and in the Borova direction.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 8, 2026

Ukrainian forces are reconnoitering and interdicting Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in and near occupied Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast (about 105 kilometers from the frontline), demonstrating increased capabilities as part of Ukraine’s intensifying mid-range strike campaign. The Ukrainian 1st Azov National Guard Corps reported on May 8 that it struck Russian military targets near occupied Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast (roughly 105 kilometers from the frontline) and is interdicting Russian logistics at depths of up to 160 kilometers from drone operator positions.[i] Geolocated footage published on May 6 and 8, including from the 1st Azov Corps, confirms that Ukrainian forces flew drones and struck a truck along the T-0509 Mariupol-Donetsk City highway (also called the H-20 highway) at a point approximately 95 kilometers from the frontline.[ii] Additional geolocated footage from the 1st Azov Corps shows Ukrainian drones operating at points along the T-0509 highway about 95 to 104 kilometers from the frontline and within Mariupol itself along the M-14 Mariupol-Berdyansk-Melitopol highway.[iii] The T-0509 supplies Russian forces operating along the frontline north of Mariupol and further northeast, supporting the ongoing Russian offensive against Ukraine’s Fortress Belt.[iv] The M-14 highway extends west into occupied Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts and supports Russian logistics to the Orikhiv direction and east (left) bank of the Dnipro River. Ukraine's ability to conduct drone strikes against moving targets over 100 kilometers from the frontline, in areas where Russian forces previously were able to conduct logistics relatively risk free, will likely achieve partial effects of battlefield air interdiction (BAI) that degrade Russian forces' ability to conduct future offensive operations, or defend against Ukrainian counterattacks. Ukrainian forces have been intensifying their mid-range strike campaign against Russian GLOCs and military assets in occupied Ukraine since late December 2025 and have markedly increased the intensity and frequency of such strikes since March 2026, and will likely continue to do so.[v] Intensified and sustained Ukrainian BAI efforts at operational depth may support future Ukrainian counterattacks that, such as the Ukrainian counterattacks that liberated large portions of Kupyansk in November 2025 and over 400 square kilometers in southern Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts in early 2026.

Russian forces likely do not maintain positions in Kupyansk after struggling for months to support a small and isolated group of servicemembers that infiltrated into the city. A Russian milblogger reported on May 7 that a group of roughly 20 Russian soldiers who had reportedly remained encircled in the Kupyansk City Hospital since December 2025 fought “their last battle” and “held their positions until the very end” after a Ukrainian airstrike destroyed the hospital and killed most of the surviving personnel, implying that Russian forces no longer hold positions in central Kupyansk.[vi] Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on March 28 that Ukrainian forces identified only six active Russian call signs in Kupyansk representing roughly 12 to 18 Russian personnel in the city center.[vii] Trehubov later stated on April 21 that roughly 10 Russian call signs remained active in Kupyansk.[viii] Several Russian sources reported that fighting in Kupyansk continues in the town's northwestern parts as of May 8, suggesting no active combat in the city center. The Russian infiltration zone depicted on ISW's map likely overestimates the current true extent of Russian presence in central Kupyansk.[ix] These reports indicate that Ukrainian forces likely eliminated any enduring Russian positions in the Kupyansk city center. ISW has not observed granular evidence to adjust our control of terrain in central Kupyansk beyond the Central District Hospital as of May 8, however. ISW will continue collecting and verifying data and will update its control of terrain assessment as the evidence permits.

Ukraine and Russia agreed to a three-day ceasefire from May 9 to 11 for the May 9 Victory Day parade and a prisoner of war exchange. US President Donald Trump, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, and Kremlin Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov announced on May 8 that Ukraine and Russia are instituting a three-day ceasefire and an exchange of 1,000 prisoners-of-war (POWs) from each side.[x] Zelensky noted that Ukraine has "clearly communicated" to Russia the "principle of symmetry" in Ukraine's actions.[xi] Zelensky signed a decree on May 8 specifically "to allow" Russia to hold its May 9 Victory Day parade in Moscow, stipulating that Ukraine will not strike Moscow's Red Square for the parade's duration, starting at 1000 local time on May 9.[xii]

Russia continued to threaten retaliatory strikes against Kyiv City ahead of the May 9 to 11 ceasefire announcement. The Russian MoD claimed on May 8 that Ukrainian forces continued launching drones and conducting artillery missions after the unilaterally-declared Russian ceasefire went into effect and that Russian forces launched retaliatory strikes against Ukrainian military targets.[xiii] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated on May 8 recent Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) threats to strike buildings that contain decision-making centers in Kyiv City if Ukraine strikes Moscow during the May 9 Victory Day parade, stating that Russia will show "no mercy" if Ukraine tries to disrupt the Victory Day holiday.[xiv] Some Russian officials recently invoked a threat that Russian forces may use Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) in retaliatory strikes against Kyiv City.[xv] The use of Oreshnik IRBMs against a Ukrainian population center would not be a novel escalation, however. Russia used Oreshniks against Dnipro City in November 2024 and Lviv City in early 2026.[xvi] Russia has similarly conducted numerous strikes against Kyiv, including against decision-making centers before. The Kremlin’s warnings may be alluding to a more intense strike package that contains a high number of ballistic missiles, possibly including Oreshnik missiles. Russia has never before launched a high volume of ballistic missiles concentrated at decision-making centers in Kyiv City, which would be a novel escalation from the Kremlin.

The Russian MoD announced on May 7 the terms of the Kremlin's then-unilateral ceasefire from midnight local time on the morning of May 8 to midnight on the morning of May 10, and claimed on the morning of May 8 to have launched retaliatory strikes in response to alleged Ukrainian violations of this ceasefire.[xvii] Russian authorities issued these statements before the US-Ukrainian-Russian announcements of the May 9 to 12 ceasefire agreement. The Kremlin’s escalating threats leading up to the May 9 Victory Day are likely intended to obfuscate Russia's weakness and its inability to reliably defend large portions of Russia’s airspace from Ukrainian deep rear strikes. Russian threats to use Oreshniks are likely an attempt to scare Ukraine and the West into capitulating to Russia's longstanding political demands.

A senior Kremlin official explicitly stated that the Kremlin demands that Ukrainian forces withdraw from the remainder of Donetsk Oblast as a precondition for a ceasefire — a battlefield objective that Russian forces have thus far failed to achieve. Russian Presidential Aide Yuri Ushakov, a senior Kremlin official who regularly comments on the status of negotiations involving Ukraine in an official capacity, claimed on May 7 that another round of trilateral US-Ukrainian-Russian negotiations currently makes no sense as Ukraine must take "one serious step" of withdrawing from unoccupied Donetsk Oblast before Russia will agree to cease hostilities and continue peace negotiations.[xviii] The Kremlin reportedly has long held a demand over unoccupied Donbas as a precondition for enacting a ceasefire or reaching a peace settlement in Ukraine.[xix] Ceding the remainder of unoccupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts would grant Russia control over Ukraine's Fortress Belt, a series of fortified cities that have served as the backbone of Ukraine's defense in the area since 2014.[xx] This Kremlin demand notably does not guarantee that Ukraine and Russia will conclude a peace agreement, so the Kremlin is effectively demanding territory from which it can launch a renewed offensive against less prepared Ukrainian positions at a time of its choosing during the negotiations process.

Russian forces are performing worse on the battlefield in Spring 2026 than when the Kremlin emphasized its demand for Donetsk Oblast in 2025. Russian President Vladimir Putin and other senior Kremlin officials began intensifying their demands for Ukraine to surrender territory that Russia does not control, especially the remainder of unoccupied Donetsk Oblast, in early 2025, when the battlefield was more favorable to Russian forces than in Spring 2026.[xxi] Ukrainian forces have been increasing the economic, human, and material costs of Russia's war since then. Ukrainian forces have been steadily increasing the range, volume, and intensity of their long-range strike campaigns against Russian oil infrastructure and military assets to exploit the Kremlin’s inability to defend against Ukrainian strikes.[xxii] Ukrainian forces have significantly intensified their mid-range strike campaign against Russian logistics, military equipment, and manpower in early 2026, degrading Russia's ability to conduct offensive operations. Russian advances across the theater stalled to an average of 2.9 square kilometers per day in the first four months of 2026, and Russian forces suffered a net loss of territory in April 2026.[xxiii] Russian forces are simultaneously struggling with an increasing casualty rate that has recently exceeded Russia’s recruitment rate in late 2025 and into early 2026.[xxiv] ISW has previously assessed that the Kremlin is trying to create a false sense of political urgency among its negotiating partners by trying to force Ukraine to cede the unoccupied part of Donbas, which Russian forces have been unable to take on the battlefield.[xxv] Ushakov is likely now attempting to justify the Kremlin's refusal to participate in negotiations that do not acquiesce to the Kremlin's long-held demands even though Russia’s stagnating battlefield performance is placing the Kremlin in a worse position to extract major political concessions. Ukrainian forces can and will continue to impose higher costs on Russian forces conducting offensive operations in Ukraine, particularly against the Fortress Belt as part of the ongoing Spring-Summer 2026 offensive that has failed to yield operationally-significant gains so far.[xxvi]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces are reconnoitering and interdicting Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in and near occupied Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast (about 105 kilometers from the frontline), demonstrating increased capabilities as part of Ukraine’s intensifying mid-range strike campaign.
• Russian forces likely do not maintain positions in Kupyansk after struggling for months to support a small and isolated group of servicemembers that infiltrated into the city.
• Ukraine and Russia agreed to a three-day ceasefire from May 9 to 11 for the May 9 Victory Day parade and a prisoner of war exchange.
• Russia continued to threaten retaliatory strikes against Kyiv City ahead of the May 9 to 11 ceasefire announcement.
• A senior Kremlin official explicitly stated that the Kremlin demands that Ukrainian forces withdraw from the remainder of Donetsk Oblast as a precondition for a ceasefire – a battlefield objective that Russian forces have thus far failed to achieve.
• Russian forces are performing worse on the battlefield in Spring 2026 than when the Kremlin emphasized its demand for Donetsk Oblast in 2025.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction and in the Hulyaipole direction.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian defense, oil, and transportation infrastructure. Russian forces launched 67 drones toward Ukraine overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 7, 2026

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced the terms for Russia's unilaterally-declared May 9 Victory Day ceasefire. The Russian MoD stated on May 7 that Russia will unilaterally enact a Victory Day ceasefire starting at midnight local time on May 8 to midnight on the morning of May 10.[1] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces will completely cease hostilities, including on the ground, frontline drone and artillery strikes, and long-range drone and missile strikes. The Russian MoD called on Ukraine to "follow this example" and reiterated its warning that Russian forces will launch a "massive" missile strike against Kyiv City if Ukraine does not comply with the ceasefire either on the battlefield or in strikes against Russian and occupied regions. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on May 7 that Russia responded to Ukraine's May 5 to 6 unilateral ceasefire with additional strikes and new threats[2] Zelensky stated that Russia "wants Ukraine's permission" to "safely take to Red Square for one hour once a year" for the Victory Day parade before returning to its war against Ukraine.  Russia will likely use its unilaterally imposed ceasefire to justify threats of or actual escalation against Ukraine.

Russia is issuing increasingly dramatic threats of escalation against Ukraine in the lead up to the unilaterally-declared Victory Day ceasefire. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on May 7 that Russia will take "appropriate steps" if Ukraine conducts strikes against Russia to "disrupt" the May 9 Victory Day celebrations, including strikes against decision-making centers in Kyiv City.[3] Zakharova and the Russian MoD reiterated the Russian MoD's May 4 call for Ukrainian civilians and personnel of foreign diplomatic missions to leave Kyiv City immediately.[4] Zakharova claimed that the Russian MFA sent this warning to all foreign diplomatic missions and international organization representative offices due to the possibility of a Russian retaliatory strike against the city.[5] Russian State Duma deputies, who often act as bullhorns for the Kremlin's rhetorical lines, claimed that Russian forces may use Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) in the retaliatory strikes against Kyiv City and that these statements are Russia's "last warning to Brussels."[6] European Commission Spokesperson Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Anouar El-Anouni stated on May 7 that the EU will not change its presence in Kyiv City and noted that Russian strikes have already damaged several diplomatic missions in Kyiv City, including the EU's mission to Ukraine.[7] El-Anouni stated that Russia is again attempting to shift the blame for its war onto Ukraine and that Russia is only escalating its war instead of showing a serious intent to make peace.

The Kremlin is likely attempting to establish that it can depopulate Kyiv City and control the decision-making of Ukraine's partners with threats of escalating the war, even as Russian President Vladimir Putin likely seeks to disguise the weakness that Ukrainian deep-rear strikes against Russia have exposed. ISW continues to assess that Russia's threat to retaliate against Ukraine for allegedly planning strikes against Moscow for Victory Day celebrations reflects Putin's recognition that he cannot reliably defend his capital or other deep-rear areas from Ukrainian strikes.[8] The Kremlin's escalating threats leading up to the May 9 Victory Day likely intend to obfuscate this weakness by threatening or demonstrating a show of force against Ukraine and its allies, including with the Duma deputies' invocation of the Oreshnik. The Kremlin has periodically launched or otherwise invoked the threat of its Oreshnik IRBMs in order to unsuccessfully compel Ukraine to capitulate at key points in the war and has also used the deployments of Oreshniks to Belarus to threaten Europe.[9] Russia has conducted failed efforts to compel Ukrainians to leave Kyiv City through cognitive warfare efforts falsely portraying Russian forces as able to make a rapid drive on Kyiv City and through intense drone and missile strikes against Ukrainian energy facilities in Winter 2025-2026.[10] Russia is likely attempting to continue its cognitive warfare effort in part by issuing escalating threats against Ukraine and its partners.

Russian milbloggers criticized Russian threats to strike central Kyiv City and questioned the Kremlin's willingness to carry out such a strike at all. Russian milbloggers criticized the MFA's threats, claiming that Russian forces should have struck Ukrainian decision-making centers earlier in the war if they have the capability to do so.[11] One milblogger questioned why Russia does not similarly respond to daily Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil infrastructure and cities.[12] Another milblogger claimed that the Kremlin must follow through on its threats in order for them to be convincing.[13] Another milblogger associated with the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) claimed that a Russian strike on central Kyiv City would need to be a systematic and well-planned campaign, not a "vague" one-off strike.[14] The milblogger claimed that Russia would have to launch a large package of drones and missiles, including Oreshniks, to have the desired media effect. The milblogger claimed that a large-scale strike against central Kyiv City would "waste" Russian options for leverage to compel Ukraine to surrender to Russia, leaving only Russian strikes against Ukraine's military or the use of nuclear weapons.

The Kremlin continues to set informational conditions to justify possible future air defense activity against NATO airspace. The Latvian National Armed Forces reported on May 7 that several drones entered Latvian airspace from Russia and two drones crashed in Latvian territory.[15] Latvian Defense Minister Andris Spruds stated on May 7 that preliminary information suggests these drones were Ukrainian drones directed at targets in Russia but emphasized that Ukraine has every right to defend itself and to strike legitimate targets on Russian territory.[16] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on May 7 that the Russian forces detected six drones, two French Rafale fighter jets, and two F-16 fighter jets in Latvian airspace at 0400 local time on May 7, that five drones disappeared near Rezekne in eastern Latvia, and that Russian forces downed the sixth drone in Russian airspace near Likhachevo, Pskov Oblast at 0441 local time.[17] The Russian MoD’s regular report on Russian air defense activity overnight did not claim that Russian air defense shot down Ukrainian drones over Pskov Oblast but did claim to have shot down drones other Russian regions that Ukrainian drones could plausibly have flown through en route to Russian Baltic Sea ports from Ukrainian territory, including Bryansk, Kaluga, Smolensk, Tver, and Novgorod oblasts.[18] The MoD’s attempt to portray Ukrainian forces as using Baltic airspace to target Russia is a continuation of Russian officials’ efforts to set conditions to violate Baltic and Finnish airspace for allegedly allowing Ukrainian strike drones to use Baltic and Finnish airspace.[19]

Internal Russian Presidential Administration documents suggest that Russia remains unwilling to meaningfully compromise on an end-state to the war in Ukraine. Russian investigative outlet Dossier Center published on May 7 presentation slides titled “After Victory,” which employees of Russian Presidential Administration Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko reportedly created to outline the “most plausible scenario” for the end of the war in Ukraine and ways to “sell” a peace agreement to the Russian population.[20] Dossier Center reported that Kremlin employees began working on the presentation as early as February 2026. A source close to the Presidential Administration told Dossier Center that the Presidential Administration created the presentation due to the Kremlin‘s worry about poor Russian battlefield performance and the effect of the war on the Russian economy. The presentation’s “most plausible scenario” reportedly envisioned the United States signing two separate peace agreements with Russia and Ukraine in which Russia would gain control over Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, withdraw from Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts, and freeze the frontline in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts. The scenario foresees that the United States will lift sanctions against Russia, that European sanctions will remain in place, that Ukraine would have a neutral status and serve as a "buffer zone" between Russia and the West, that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky would remain president, and that Russia would achieve only the “symbolic and restrained denazification” of Ukraine. The presentation noted that continuing the war in Ukraine would be risky as it would require Russia to transfer its entire economy to a full wartime footing and conduct a general mobilization and would further damage Russia's demographic problems due to high losses. The presentation acknowledged that parts of Russia's ultranationalist community, including milbloggers, will most likely oppose this peace scenario but that Russian authorities would threaten the milbloggers with discrediting Russian forces and would strengthen the voices of moderates in the media space to counter them. The slides also discussed rhetorical frameworks for explaining the peace agreement to the Russian population, including narratives that Russia prevented a humanitarian catastrophe in Donbas, that Russia achieved maximum results without a general mobilization, that Putin thwarted Western efforts to expand and prolong the conflict, and that Putin knows what is best for Russia.

The Russian Presidential Administration may have leaked the slides as part of a cognitive warfare effort intended to portray Russia as willing to make compromises to end the war in Ukraine. The slides are not part of the official Russian position on negotiations, but the presented scenario for the end of the war is similar to what the Kremlin has framed as acceptable in recent months.[21] Leaking the presentation slides may have been intentional in order to demonstrate Russia’s alleged willingness to cede territory in exchange for Ukraine handing over the rest of Donetsk Oblast. The Presidential Administration is falsely presenting this war termination scenario as a major Russian concession, however, as Russian forces are unlikely to seize the rest of Donetsk Oblast militarily in the near- to medium- term, if at all.[22]

Key Takeaways:

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced the terms for Russia's unilaterally-declared May 9 Victory Day ceasefire.
• Russia is issuing increasingly dramatic threats of escalation against Ukraine in the lead up to the unilaterally-declared Victory Day ceasefire.
• The Kremlin is likely attempting to establish that it can depopulate Kyiv City and control the decision-making of Ukraine's partners with threats of escalating the war, even as Russian President Vladimir Putin likely seeks to disguise the weakness that Ukrainian deep-rear strikes against Russia have exposed.
• The Kremlin continues to set informational conditions to justify possible future air defense activity against NATO airspace.
• Internal Russian Presidential Administration documents suggest that Russia remains unwilling to meaningfully compromise on an end-state to the war in Ukraine.
• Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces advanced.
• Russian forces launched 102 drones toward Ukraine overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 5, 2026

Continued long-range Ukrainian strikes against cities deep in the Russian rear demonstrate Russia’s inability to reliably defend the major cities and infrastructure facilities of European Russia against drone and missile strikes. The Ukrainian General Staff, Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), and Unmanned Systems Forces reported on May 5 that Ukrainian forces struck the Russian Kirishinefteorgsintez Oil Refinery near Kirishi, Leningrad Oblast, and the Russian VNIIR-Progress plant near Cheboksary, Republic of Chuvashia, overnight.[i] The VNIIR-Progress plant produces receivers and antennas for Russia's Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS), Global Positioning System (GPS), and Galileo systems, and Kometa electronic warfare (EW) resistant navigation components, which Russia uses in a variety of long-range drones and missiles.[ii] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukrainian forces used F-5 Flamingo missiles launched at a distance of over 1,500 kilometers to struck the VNIIR-Progress plants.[iii] Geolocated footage shows six Ukrainian Flamingo missiles and an An-196 ”Lyutyi” drone striking the plant.[iv] Cheboksary is only 300 kilometers from the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (ASEZ), a major Russian industrial and production zone in the Tatarstan Republic where Russia produces many of the long-range Shahed-type drones it launches at Ukraine.[v] NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data for May 5 shows heat anomalies near the Kirishi Oil Refinery.[vi] Leningrad Oblast Governor Aleksandr Drozdenko confirmed that a fire broke out in Kirishi.[vii] Reuters reported that the Kirishi Oil Refinery halted operations after the Ukrainian drone strike damaged three of the four crude distillation units and several secondary units.[viii] The Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) reported that the Kirishinefteorgsintez oil refinery has an annual refining capacity of 20 to 21 million tons of oil per year and is one of the three largest oil refineries in Russia.[ix]

Ukrainian strikes are inflicting significant damage across a wide array of Russian cities. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 5 that Ukrainian strikes against the Tuapse Oil Refinery in Krasnodar Krai in April 2026 and on May 1 caused over $300 million worth of damage to the refinery and the Tuapse port infrastructure.[x] Satellite imagery published on May 5 shows two damaged workshops at the Sverdlov Plant, a key Russian explosives components manufacturer, in Dzerzhinsk, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, following a Ukrainian strike on April 30.[xi] Ukrainian forces have increased their long-range strike campaign in the past several weeks, targeting several major Russian cities, including Moscow and Chelyabinsk cities; Yekaterinburg, Sverdlovsk Oblast; Primorsk and Ust-Luga, Leningrad Oblast; and Tuapse and Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai.[xii]

Russia's threat to retaliate against Ukraine for allegedly planned strikes against Moscow during Victory Day reflects Russian President Vladimir Putin's recognition that he cannot reliably defend these deep rear areas, including his capital, from Ukrainian strikes. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) declared on May 4 that it will observe a “Victory Day” ceasefire from May 8 to 9 on unilateral instructions from Putin.[xiv] The MoD published its May 4 statement roughly an hour before Zelensky offered Russia a ceasefire beginning on the night of May 5 to 6, and the Kremlin has not acknowledged Zelensky's statement. The MoD falsely accused Zelensky of threatening to strike Moscow on May 9 during remarks to the European Political Community summit in Yerevan, Armenia, and the MoD threatened to launch ”a massive retaliatory missile strike on the center of Kyiv." Zelensky stated at the European Political Community summit that “Russia has announced a May 9 parade in Moscow...and they fear drones may pass over Red Square.”[xv] Russian and other media sources portrayed Zelensky as saying that Ukraine may strike the May 9 Victory Day parade, but some sources have observed that this is a mischaracterization of his statement.[xvi] ISW has not observed evidence of Zelensky making another statement at the European Political Community that would align with the MoD’s accusation.

Putin's insistence on holding the May 9 Victory Day parade reflects his refusal to accept the reality that Ukraine has brought Putin's war back to Russia. Ukrainian strikes continue to increasingly impact other areas deep within Russia. The Russian Federal Air Transport Agency (Rosaviatsiya) simultaneously closed airports in 15 Russian cities on May 5 and introduced restrictions at all four Moscow City airports.[xvii] The Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug Governor Ruslan Kukharuk announced an airstrike alert for the okrug on May 5 -- the first for the okrug after almost four years of war.[xviii] Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug is over 2,000 kilometers from the international border with Ukraine. ISW has observed no evidence that Ukrainian forces attempted to strike targets in Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug.

Russians are increasingly feeling the strain of the war effort after over four years of fighting as casualties approach one percent of Russia's total population, Russians increasingly bear the financial cost of the war, and the Kremlin intensifies its censorship and mobile data restrictions.[xix] Russian ultranationalist milbloggers, a component of Putin's main constituency of Russian ultranationalists, are increasingly criticizing the Kremlin and even Putin himself for failing to recognize this reality.[xx] A Russian milblogger criticized the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) for making its May 4 threat against Kyiv not due to Ukraine's deep strike campaign against Russian military, defense industrial, and oil infrastructure but rather for the alleged threat against the May 9 Victory Day parade, accusing the MoD of prioritizing "vanity."[xxi] The milblogger went on to claim that the Kremlin elected not to include military equipment in the Victory Day parade – the first such instance since 2007 — because the open-air storage lot where the Russian MoD always parks the equipment for the parade would be vulnerable to Ukrainian strikes.[xxii] Another milblogger called for Russia to better allocate its air defense assets and form regional air defense volunteer units amid Ukraine's escalating strike campaign.[xxiii] Ukraine's intensified strike campaign has exploited the large attack surface of Russia's deep rear and the wide footprint of Russia infrastructure, particularly defense industrial and oil infrastructure, forcing the Kremlin to make difficult decisions about how to allocate air defense assets. The Kremlin has largely failed to defend against Ukrainian strikes in recent weeks, however, suggesting that existing Russian mitigation efforts are insufficient to address the problems provoking ire in the Russian information space.[xxiv] Putin is refusing to accept the reality of increasing Ukrainian strikes against major Russian cities in the deep rear, and Russians are increasingly bearing the costs of his war as a result.

Russian forces conducted combined drone and missile strikes during the day on May 4 and overnight on May 4 to 5, killing at least seven civilians and injuring at least 35. The Ukrainian Air force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile and 88 Shahed, Gerbera, Italmas, and other types of strike drones at Ukraine from 0830 to 1830 local time on May 4 and an additional 11 Iskander-Ms and 164 Shahed, Gerbera, Italmas, and other drones that night.[xxv] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defenses downed one missile and 219 drones during the day and overnight, that nine missiles and 28 drones struck at least 14 locations, and that debris fell on 10 locations as of 0900 local time. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russian strikes primarily targeted Ukrainian energy infrastructure in Poltava, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia and Kyiv oblasts.[xxvi] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes killed one person and injured four in Kharkiv Oblast; injured three people in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; and killed at least four and injured at least 12 in Zaporizhia Oblast.[xxvii]

Russian forces conducted a double-tap missile strike against first responders in Poltava Oblast, killing two and injuring at least 23. The Ukrainian State Emergency Services (DSNS) reported on May 5 that Russian forces conducted a double-tap missile strike against a gas production facility in Poltava Oblast, using four missiles — likely Iskander-M ballistic missiles — as part of a simultaneous second strike against first responders who were responding to the initial Russian strike.[xxviii] Zelensky stated that the Russian missile strikes in Poltava Oblast killed at least four people in total and injured "dozens."[xxix]

The May 4 and 5 Russian strike series inflicted significant casualties despite the relatively small number of drones and missiles in the package, as Russia continues innovating its strike tactics to inflict maximum damage in ways that disproportionately impact civilians. Russian forces used an unusually large number of ballistic missiles relative to the size of the overall strike package, likely to take advantage of global shortages of Patriot interceptors to inflict maximum damage. Russian forces launched long-range drones – which Ukrainian forces typically intercept at high rates – to exhaust Ukraine’s air defenses before and during strikes with ballistic missiles, which Ukrainian forces can only intercept with Western-provided systems such as Patriots.[xxx] Russian forces leveraged their new tactic of conducting strikes throughout the day and overnight to exhaust and stretch Ukrainian air defenses. Russia is increasing the frequency of combined missile and drone strikes to destroy Ukrainian infrastructure and shape the battlefield for the Russian Spring-Summer 2026 offensive.[xxxi]

Key Takeaways:

• Continued long-range Ukrainian strikes against cities in deep in the Russian rear demonstrate Russia’s inability to reliably defend the major cities and infrastructure facilities of European Russia against drone and missile strikes.
• Ukrainian strikes are inflicting significant damage across a wide array of Russian cities.
• Russia's threat to retaliate against Ukraine for allegedly planned strikes against Moscow during Victory Day reflects Russian President Vladimir Putin's recognition that he cannot reliably defend these deep rear areas, including his capital, from Ukrainian strikes.
• Putin's insistence on holding the May 9 Victory Day parade reflects his refusal to accept the reality that Ukraine has brought Putin's war back to Russia.
• Russian forces conducted combined drone and missile strikes during the day on May 4 and overnight on May 4 to 5, killed at least seven civilians and injured at least 35.
• Russian forces conducted a double-tap missile strike against first responders in Poltava Oblast, killing two and injuring at least 23.
• The May 4 and 5 Russian strike series inflicted significant casualties despite the relatively small number of drones and missiles in the package as Russia continues innovating its strike tactics to inflict maximum damage in ways that disproportionately impact civilians.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 4, 2026

A leaked European intelligence report highlights Russian President Vladimir Putin's increasing concern over his personal safety and the safety of his senior officials. Western and Russian opposition sources reported on May 4, citing the intelligence report, that Russian security forces have increased security measures as Putin fears possible assassination attempts, including targeted drone strikes.[1] The intelligence report noted that Putin spends most of his time in underground bunkers in Krasnodar Krai and has stopped going to his residences in Moscow Oblast and Valdai, Novgorod Oblast. The intelligence report also cited sources in Russia familiar with Putin as stating that the recent internet shutdowns in Moscow City were at least partially related to Putin’s security and anti-drone protection.[2] The intelligence report stated that Putin amended Federal Protective Service (FSO) regulations to provide security to 10 high-ranking generals after a December 2025 meeting of security officials in which the officials shifted blame onto each other for the December 22 assassination of Lieutenant General Fanil Sarvarov, the chief of the Russian General Staff's Operational Training Department, in Moscow City.[3]

ISW has observed corroborating evidence of enhanced security measures for Putin and high-ranking Russian officials. There have been numerous assassinations and assassination attempts against high-ranking Russian officials throughout the war, some of which have been credited to Ukraine, that could be pushing Putin to worry about his safety and the safety of other senior officials.[4] ISW has also observed reports between May 2023 and December 2025 of Russian authorities moving an increased number of short and medium-range air defense systems, including Pantsir-S1 and S-400 systems, near Putin’s Valdai and Moscow City residences.[5]  Ukraine has also been increasing the range, intensity, and frequency of its long-range drone strike campaign, including a drone strike against Moscow City on May 4 that damaged the Mosfilm Tower.[6]  

ISW has not observed independent evidence to support other aspects of the leaked intelligence report about Putin's fears of a coup attempt in Russia. The European intelligence report portrayed former Russian Defense Minister and current Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu as "associated with the risk of a coup."[7] CNN, which obtained the intelligence report, noted that it does not provide evidence to support these claims.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) appointed Colonel General Alexander Chayko to the position of commander-in-chief of the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) after recent domestic criticisms of Russian air defense and air campaign failures. A source close to the Russian MoD told Russian outlet RBK on May 4 that the Russian MoD appointed Chayko commander-in-chief of the VKS, replacing General Viktor Afzalov.[8] Chayko served as the chief of staff of the Russian Force Grouping in Syria from 2015 to 2017 and served as overall commander of the Russian Force Grouping in Syria from September 2019 to November 2020, February to June 2021, and September to December 2022.[9] Chayko was one of the commanders responsible for Russian strikes targeting Syrian civilians and critical infrastructure throughout the Russian intervention in the Syria Civil War in 2015.[10] Chayko subsequently served as commander of the Eastern Military District (EMD) between February 24, 2022 and May 26, 2022, and oversaw Russian efforts to encircle Kyiv City.[11] Chayko also commanded Russian forces responsible for widespread violence against civilians in Kyiv Oblast, including in Bucha.[12] The Russian MoD again appointed Chayko as the commander of the Russian Force Grouping in Syria in December 2024 during the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime.[13] Russian business newspaper Kommersant recently reported that Chayko then became the deputy chief of the General Staff at an unspecified time.[14] Chayko's latest appointment as commander-in-chief of the VKS comes amidst recent Russian milblogger criticism of VKS failures, including poor targeting practices and aircraft and maintenance personnel shortages.[15] Russian milbloggers have also long criticized Russian air defenses for failing to prevent Ukrainian long-range drone strikes against Russia.[16] Chayko was the first military district commander whom Putin removed from his post at the start of the full-scale invasion, and his latest appointment is consistent with Putin’s pattern of rotating commanders with poor performance rather than outright dismissing them.[17]

Russian forces first infiltrated into the outskirts of Kostyantynivka in late October 2025 but have yet to achieve meaningful operational progress in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Western media sources recently reported that fighting has reached the outskirts of the city.[18] ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have infiltrated in 10.14 percent of Kostyantynivka and advanced in only 0.7 percent of its eastern outskirts. Russian forces first infiltrated the eastern outskirts of Kostyantynivka on October 24, 2025, and have failed to make even tactically significant gains in the subsequent six months despite numerous exaggerated claims from senior Russian officials about alleged Russian successes in the city.[19] Russian milbloggers have offered criticism of these exaggerated claims and noted the slow tempo of Russian progress in Kostyantynivka.[20] Russian forces also conducted two mechanized assaults near Chasiv Yar (northeast of Kostyantynivka) in April 2026 that did not result in tactically significant gains.[21]

ISW continues to assess that Russia's priority objective is to seize the Fortress Belt, including Kostyantynivka, but the Russian military command appears to be choosing to reinforce the Pokrovsk direction instead.[22] The deputy commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on May 4 that the Russian military command has redeployed elements of the 90th Tank Division (41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]), including of its 6th and 239th tank regiments, 228th and 429th motorized rifle regiments, and 30th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion, to Pokrovsk.[23] The deputy commander added that the Russian military command plans to also redeploy the 90th Tank Division’s 80th Tank Regiment and an unspecified motorized rifle brigade to the Pokrovsk direction and that the estimated strength of the redeployed forces is up to 3,000 servicemembers. ISW has observed elements of the 90th Tank Division operating in the Novopavlivka direction since early 2025 and in the Oleksandrivka direction since late 2025.[24] The Russian military command previously redeployed elements of the Russian 68th Army Corps (Eastern Military District [EMD]) from near Pokrovsk and Dobropillya to the Hulyaipole direction in early March 2026, likely to reorient all EMD elements in the Eastern Grouping of Forces' area of responsibility (AoR).[25] The redeployment of the 90th Tank Division may be an attempt to reorient CMD elements into the Central Grouping of Forces' AoR after the redeployment of the 68th AC.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky declared a unilateral ceasefire on the night of May 5 to 6 in response to Russian rhetoric regarding a May 9 "Victory Day" ceasefire, urging Russian forces to reciprocate.[26] Zelensky stated on May 4 that Ukraine has not received an official Russian appeal about a Victory Day ceasefire but will unilaterally enact a ceasefire starting at midnight on the night of May 5 to 6. Zelensky stated that Ukraine will maintain the ceasefire if Russia reciprocates it. Russian Presidential Aide Yuri Ushakov claimed on April 29 that Russian President Vladimir Putin used a phone call with US President Donald Trump to call for a short-term ceasefire for the May 9 Victory Day holiday, which celebrates the Soviet Union’s role in the victory over Germany in the Second World War.[27] 

Swedish authorities seized a Russian shadow fleet oil tanker on May 3. The Swedish Police Authority and Swedish Coast Guard boarded the Jin Hui oil tanker southwest of Trelleborg, Sweden, on May 3.[28] Swedish officials identified the ship as part of the Russian shadow fleet.[29] Automatic identification systems (AIS) data from the Starboard Maritime Intelligence ship-tracking platform indicates that the Jin Hui was sailing under a Syrian flag and was in the port of Limas, Turkey, from April 11 to 16 before sailing toward the Baltic Sea. A spokesperson for the Swedish Coast Guard stated on May 4 that Swedish authorities initiated a criminal investigation into the lack of the ship’s seaworthiness.[30] The Jin Hui is on the European Union's (EU), the United Kingdom's (UK), and Ukraine's sanctions lists.[31] ISW has previously assessed that Russia’s ability to sell oil is partially a function of its ability to transport it, and continued European efforts against the Russian shadow fleet will degrade Russia’s ability to transport oil.[32] European states, and Sweden in particular, have been increasingly seizing Russian shadow fleet tankers in recent months.[33]

Key Takeaways:

• A leaked European intelligence report highlights Russian President Vladimir Putin's increasing concern over his personal safety and the safety of his senior officials.
• ISW has not observed independent evidence to support other aspects of the leaked intelligence report about Putin's fears of a coup attempt in Russia.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) appointed Colonel General Alexander Chayko to the position of commander-in-chief of the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) after recent domestic criticisms of Russian air defense and air campaign failures.
• Russian forces first infiltrated into the outskirts of Kostyantynivka in late October 2025 but have yet to achieve meaningful operational progress in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky declared a unilateral ceasefire on the night of May 5 to 6 in response to Russian rhetoric regarding a May 9 "Victory Day" ceasefire, urging Russian forces to reciprocate.
• Swedish authorities seized a Russian shadow fleet oil tanker on May 3.
• Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces made confirmed advances on the frontline.
• Russian forces launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles, five Kh-59/69 cruise missiles, and 234 drones toward Ukraine during the day on May 3, and 155 drones overnight.

Ukrainian forces continue their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and oil infrastructure, exploiting vulnerabilities in Russian air defenses. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on May 3 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Karakurt-class small missile ship, a Russian patrol boat, and a Russian shadow fleet oil tanker near the port of Primorsk, Leningrad Oblast, and that the strikes also significantly damaged the oil loading infrastructure at the port.[1] The Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) noted that the Karakurt-class small missile ship was equipped with an unspecified launcher (presumably a Kalibr cruise missile launcher) and eight Kalibr cruise missiles with a range of up to 2,000 kilometers and a sea-based Pantsir-M naval air defense system at the time of the Ukrainian strike.[2] NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data for May 3 shows heat anomalies at the port of Primorsk.[3] Leningrad Oblast Governor Aleksandr Drozdenko claimed on May 3 that Russian air defenses downed over 60 Ukrainian drones on the night of May 2 to 3 and acknowledged that Ukrainian drones caused fires near the port of Primorsk.[4] Zelensky reported on May 3 that Ukrainian forces also struck two Russian shadow fleet ships at the entrance to the port of Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, with unmanned surface vessels (USVs).[5] Satellite imagery captured on May 3 indicates that Ukraine's April 28 to 29 and April 30 to May 1 strikes against the Transeft Perm Linear Production Dispatch Station, Perm Krai, burned roughly 70 percent of the station, destroyed all the tanks with a 50,000 cubic meter capacity, and halted operations at the station for an unspecified time period.[6] Ukrainian forces have been steadily increasing the range, volume, and intensity of their long-range strike campaigns against Russian oil infrastructure and military assets in Russia and occupied Ukraine’s territories since mid-March 2026, heavily targeting port and oil infrastructure in Leningrad Oblast and Krasnodar Krai.[7] Ukrainian forces are using Ukraine’s intensified domestic air and naval drone production to intensify strikes against Russia.[8] Ukrainian forces are exploiting the large attack surface of Russia’s deep rear and the wide footprint of Russian oil infrastructure and military assets.[9] Continued Ukrainian drone strikes are degrading Russia’s ability to store and transport oil and are impacting Russian oil export revenues, which may partially offset the elevated Russian revenues from global spikes in oil prices.[10]

Russia’s additional revenues from rising oil prices are likely insufficient to fundamentally change the course of Russia’s growing economic issues. Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov told Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin on May 3 that the Russian federal budget expects to receive an additional 200 billion rubles in revenue due to rising oil prices over an unspecified period, but that Russia's income revenue and expenditures over the past two months (since about March 2026) have remained at similar levels.[11] Russian military recruiters notably increased sign-up bonuses for contract soldiers in mid-February 2026 after previously decreasing sign-up bonuses in 2025.[12] The Associated Press (AP) reported on May 2 that the economic impact of Ukraine’s intensifying long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure in the Russian rear remains unclear, as rising oil prices driven by the Iran war and the easing of US sanctions may help the Kremlin replenish revenues.[13] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky recently stated that Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil infrastructure have caused Russia to lose at least $7 billion in revenue since the start of 2026, and that Ukrainian strikes have left several of Russia’s key oil ports, such as Ust-Luga and Primorsk in Leningrad Oblast, operating below capacity.[14] The International Energy Agency's (IEA) April 14 Oil Market Report found that Russian crude and oil product exports rose by 320,000 barrels per day month-on-month, hitting 7.1 million in March 2026 and almost doubling Russian oil export revenues to $19 billion from $9.7 billion due to the rising prices.[15] The IEA noted that it remains unclear whether Ukraine’s strikes in April 2026 will disrupt this trend.

Senior Russian bankers continue to express worries over economic issues that will continue to mature throughout the 2026 fiscal year, despite increased Russian oil revenues. Sberbank CFO and Management Board Deputy Chair Taras Skvortsov stated on April 29 that Russia expects the ruble to weaken in the second half of 2026 with forecasted exchange rates of 80 to 90 rubles per $1 US dollar compared to current exchange rates at around 75 rubles per $1 US dollar.[16] Skvortsov noted that the ruble will likely weaken more in the fourth quarter than in the third quarter. Skvortsov stated that new Russian tax laws intended to replenish the budget have led Russian businesses and consumers to use cash payments more often, which Skvortsov warned could worsen the economic situation in Russia by increasing the size of Russia‘s grey economy, which increases the costs of goods and services without generating desired tax revenues.[17] The Kremlin has enacted a series of economically sub-optimal policies, such as increasing the value-added tax (VAT) and lowering the key interest rate despite high Russian inflation, while also steadily depleting its sovereign wealth fund’s liquid reserves to buttress federal budget deficits from unsustainably high defense spending, which Russia's economy will struggle to overcome despite temporary cash influxes from global oil price spikes.[18]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces continue their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and oil infrastructure, exploiting vulnerabilities in Russian air defenses.
• Russia’s additional revenues from rising oil prices are likely insufficient to fundamentally change the course of Russia’s growing economic issues.
• Senior Russian bankers continue to express worries over economic issues that will continue to mature throughout the 2026 fiscal year, despite increased Russian oil revenues.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced northwest of Orikhiv.
• Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile and 268 long-range drones against Ukraine overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 2, 2026

Russian forces in April 2026 suffered a net loss of territory controlled in the Ukrainian theater for the first time since Ukraine's August 2024 incursion into Kursk Oblast. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces lost control of 116 square kilometers in April 2026, not counting areas into which Russian troops may have infiltrated. The Russian rate of advance across the battlefield has been steadily declining since November 2025 as continued Ukrainian ground counterattacks, Ukrainian mid-range strikes, the February 2026 block on Russia's use of Starlink terminals in Ukraine, and the Kremlin's throttling of Telegram have exacerbated existing problems within the Russian military.

The relative decline in the rate of Russian advances may be related in part to annual seasonal patterns. Weather data indicates that average temperatures in eastern Ukraine were about three degrees Fahrenheit colder in Winter 2025 to 2026 (December to February) than in Winter 2024 to 2025, and that Winter 2025 to 2026 was significantly wetter than Winter 2024 to 2025.[1] ISW has previously observed relative declines in the rate of Russian advances during March and April due to seasonal weather effects, namely the muddy rasputitsa season, the period in which melting frozen winter ground and spring rains degrade conditions for mechanized movement.[2] Russian forces have previously increased their advances in May and June as ground dries, and it remains to be seen whether such trends will repeat in 2026.[3] ISW has observed less commentary in 2026 than in previous years regarding the effects of weather conditions on Russian advances, however.

The rate of Russian advances has slowed in 2026 compared to 2025, but the changing character of the war, particularly Russia's increased use of infiltration tactics over the course of 2025, makes year-on-year comparisons difficult. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces seized 1,443.35 square kilometers in the past six months (November 2025 to April 2026) compared with 2,368.38 square kilometers seized during the same time period in 2024-2025. Russian forces seized an average of 2.9 square kilometers per day in the first four months of 2026 compared to 9.76 square kilometers per day in the first four months of 2025. Russian forces have been increasingly using infiltration tactics since Fall 2025, however, and ISW created its assessed Russian infiltration layer to depict these infiltration areas as distinct from areas in which Russian forces have advanced and seized territory. Comparisons of Russian gains this year with those of previous years when infiltration tactics were rarer thus are not straightforward, as Russian forces exert a significantly lower degree of control over infiltration areas than they do over seized areas.

The Kremlin uses Russian infiltration tactics in part to exaggerate Russian control of terrain. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces seized or infiltrated into a net of 28.28 square kilometers in April 2026 and a total of 1716.42 square kilometers from November 2025 to April 2026. Russian forces seized only 1443.35 square kilometers in the same time period, however. Russian forces have been using infiltration tactics in part to create the perception of continuous Russian advances across the front and to support Kremlin cognitive warfare efforts to exaggerate Russian successes. Russian forces, however, do not control these infiltration areas, which are often collocated among Ukrainian positions in contested "gray zones."

ISW's mapping methodology for infiltration areas is more generous to Russian forces than ISW’s methodology for mapping Russian advances or controlled terrain, moreover. ISW’s methodology requires a lower evidentiary threshold for expanding the assessed Russian infiltration layer than the evidentiary threshold needed to subsequently recode these Russian infiltration areas as Ukrainian-held. It will often be the case, for example, that Russian forces lost the positions they gained during an initial infiltration mission but that ISW did not observe evidence to support an assessment that Ukrainian forces regained this position. The evidence that a Russian infiltration mission has occurred, such as video of a Ukrainian strike against a small group of Russian infiltrators, can also be evidence that the infiltration failed if all the infiltrators were eliminated. ISW will still code the area as infiltrated in the absence of evidence that Ukrainian forces reoccupied the ground.

ISW has reviewed and refined its mapping data and methodology, identifying and rectifying some data artifacts that did not affect the visible map geometry but did affect some calculations of area. These changes have not affected ISW's previously assessed trendlines of the Russian rate of advance. ISW is now assessing monthly advances using the last day of the previous month to the last day of the month in question (e.g. comparing data from December 31 to that from January 31 in order to calculate Russian advances in January). ISW previously calculated Russia's monthly rate of advance using data from the first day of the month in the question to the first day of the next month (e.g. comparing data from January 1 to that from February 1 in order to calculate Russian advances in January, which inappropriately included Russian advances from February 1 in the January calculation). ISW has also removed backend data artifacts in our mapping layer data that created errors in some of our area calculations. These errors did not affect the geometry of the layer shapes or the maps themselves. We apologize for these errors.

Russian milbloggers identified problems with the Russian air campaign and assessed that Russian forces may not be able to take advantage of reported increased bombing capabilities. A Russian milblogger published a photograph on May 1 showing the wing and fuselage of an Su-34 fighter-bomber with two glide bombs equipped with unified planning and correction modules (UMPKs) on the wing and two universal joint glide munitions (UMPBs) under the fuselage.[4] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces started equipping the aircraft with a mix of both bombs. The milblogger also published footage on May 1 of an Su-34 dropping at least four glide bombs with UMPKs and one UMPB bomb.[5] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are now able to launch up to six glide bombs per Su-34 sortie.[6] A Russian milblogger associated with the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) claimed that Russian forces could potentially increase the number of glide bomb strikes from 10,000 a month to 15,000-16,000 a month.[7] The milblogger claimed, however, that Russian forces may be unable to do so as there is an insufficient number of aircraft and maintenance personnel. The milblogger claimed that many Russian pilots have graduated from schools but that an insufficient number of training aircraft and support personnel are limiting their further training. The milblogger also claimed that Russian authorities have mismanaged the deployment of maintenance personnel including by sending engineers to infantry units and using them to guard airfields. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger argued that Russian forces will struggle to take advantage of this additional bombing capability because they are not effectively prioritizing strikes and are wasting munitions on lower-value targets such as basements housing single infantrymen.[8] The milblogger complained that Russian forces are also frequently switching target sets without accomplishing their initial objectives.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces in April 2026 suffered a net loss of territory controlled in the Ukrainian theater for the first time since Ukraine's August 2024 incursion into Kursk Oblast.
• The relative decline in the rate of Russian advances may be related in part to annual seasonal patterns.
• The rate of Russian advances has slowed in 2026 compared to 2025, but the changing character of the war, particularly Russia's increased use of infiltration tactics over the course of 2025, makes year-on-year comparisons difficult.
• The Kremlin uses Russian infiltration tactics in part to exaggerate Russian control of terrain.
• ISW has reviewed and refined its mapping data and methodology, identifying and rectifying some data artifacts that did not affect the visible map geometry but did affect some calculations of area. These changes have not affected ISW's previously assessed trendlines of the Russian rate of advance.
• Russian milbloggers identified problems with the Russian air campaign and assessed that Russian forces may not be able to take advantage of reported increased bombing capabilities.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
• Ukrainian forces likely struck a Russian air defense system during their April 30 to May 1 overnight strike against Krasnodar Krai.
• Russian forces launched 163 drones toward Ukraine overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 1, 2026

Ukrainian forces struck Russian oil infrastructure in Krasnodar and Perm krais and Orenburg Oblast between April 29 and May 1, including a strike against the Tuapse Oil Refinery for the fourth time since April 1. The Ukrainian General Staff and Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) officials reported on May 1 that Ukrainian drones struck the Tuapse Oil Refinery in Krasnodar Krai overnight on April 30 to May 1 after previously striking the refinery on the nights of April 15 to 16, 19 to 20, and 27 to 28.[i] The Ukrainian USF reported that they are still conducting the battle damage assessment (BDA) for the strike, but that the previous Ukrainian strikes on Tupase Oil Refinery destroyed at least 24 tanks, damaged at least four more, forced the plant to suspend operations, and caused several fires that took days to extinguish.[ii] Satellite imagery and geolocated footage published on May 1 show fires burning at the refinery.[iii] The Krasnodar Krai Operational Headquarters acknowledged that Ukrainian drone strikes caused a fire at the port of Tuapse on May 1.[iv] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 1 that Ukrainian forces also struck the Permsky Oil Refinery in Perm Krai on the night of April 30 to May 1, causing a fire and damaging the AVT-4 primary oil refining unit.[v] The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed on April 30 that Ukrainian forces also struck the Orsknefteorgsintez Oil Refinery in Orenburg Oblast on April 29, causing a fire.[vi]

The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed that Ukrainian forces recently struck several Russian aircraft up to 1,676 kilometers from the international border. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 1 that Ukrainian forces struck several Russian Su-57 fighter jets and Su-34 fighter-bombers at the Shagol Airfield in Chelyabinsk Oblast, approximately 1,676 kilometers from the international border, on April 25.[vii] Satellite footage posted on May 1 confirms that the April 25 strikes damaged multiple planes at the Shagol Airfield.[viii] Ukrainian forces also struck Mi-28 and Mi-17 helicopters at an airfield near Babky, Voronezh Oblast (roughly 150 kilometers from the frontline) on April 29 or overnight on April 29 to 30.[ix]

Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil infrastructure degraded the average output of Russian oil refineries to their lowest level since December 2009. Bloomberg reported on April 30 that data from analytics firm OilX indicates that the average output of a Russian oil refinery dropped to an average of 4.69 million barrels a day, the lowest daily processing average since December 2009.[x] Ukrainian forces have notably been escalating their strike campaign against Russian oil assets in March and April 2026.[xi]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces struck Russian oil infrastructure in Krasnodar and Perm krais and Orenburg Oblast between April 29 and May 1, including a strike against the Tuapse Oil Refinery for the fourth time since April 1.
• The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed that Ukrainian forces recently struck several Russian aircraft up to 1,676 kilometers from the international border.
• Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil infrastructure degraded the average output of Russian oil refineries to their lowest level since December 2009.
• Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances on the frontline.
• Russian forces launched 409 drones toward Ukraine overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 30, 2026

Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev emphasized Russia's commitment to its war aims in Ukraine and claimed that Russia is in an existential conflict with the West immediately after Trump's call with Russian President Vladimir Putin on April 29.[i] Medvedev gave a speech at the Znanie Pervye (Education First) federal educational marathon on April 30 in which he labeled the United States as Russia’s main geopolitical rival and stated that Russia is in a conflict with the West that is "a question of existence" and will not end "within a generation."[ii] Medvedev claimed that Russia's victory in the war in Ukraine will bring stability to Russia and allow Russia to address its economic, demographic, and social issues.[iii] Medvedev also rejected the ability of the United States to mediate peace negotiations between Ukraine and Russia.[iv] Medvedev has frequently made outlandish statements that represent a more extreme view than the Kremlin itself is willing to publicly portray, and his articulation of these statements a day after a Putin-Trump phone call is likely intended to make Putin’s false claims about the battlefield situation and the supposed inevitability of a Russian victory appear rational in comparison to Western policymakers.[v] Medvedev's statements are likely also intended to reinforce to Russians the Kremlin's justifications for continuing its war in Ukraine, namely that the United States is an adversary and that Russia is engaged in an existential war against the West, and to reassure the Russian population that Russia is and will continue to achieve all of its war aims.[vi] Other, more relatively moderate Kremlin officials also continue to reiterate Russia's commitment to its war aims. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has continually stressed the need to address the so-called “root causes” of the war in Ukraine, the Kremlin's shorthand to reiterate its maximalist demands for any peace agreement in Ukraine, as a precondition to a long-term peace agreement several times in April 2026, including on April 30.[vii]

The United States released a previously-authorized $400 million in funds for Ukraine. US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth announced on April 29 that the Department of Defense released the $400 million in funds that Congress previously allocated to Ukraine in 2025 through the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI), in which the United States purchases weapons for Ukraine from US defense firms.[viii]

Ukraine has received its first mobile F-16 fighter jet flight simulators. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense announced on April 30 that Ukrainian forces received the first mobile F-16 flight simulators, which have been adapted for Ukraine’s operating conditions, including Ukraine’s geography.[ix] Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov reported on April 30 that Ukrainian forces will be able to rapidly deploy mobile simulators, shortening the gap between training and combat use and improving air target interception during Russia’s constant missile strikes.[x] Ukraine continues to strengthen its air defense capabilities as it expands joint production and defense industrial cooperation with Western partners.[xi]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev emphasized Russia's commitment to its war aims in Ukraine and claimed that Russia is in an existential conflict with the West immediately after Trump's call with Russian President Vladimir Putin on April 29.
• The United States released a previously-authorized $400 million in funds for Ukraine.
• Ukraine has received its first mobile F-16 fighter jet flight simulators.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk and Kostyantynivka directions.
• Russian forces launched 206 drones toward Ukraine overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 29, 2026

Ukrainian forces are engaged in an operational long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure and military assets, exploiting overstretched Russian air defenses. Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against targets throughout Russia, ranging up to 1,400 kilometers from the international border, on the night of April 28 to 29.[1] Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) reported on April 29 that Ukrainian forces struck the Transeft Perm Linear Production Dispatch Station, Perm Oblast, causing fires to almost all oil storage tanks at the station.[2] The SBU reported that the station is a strategic hub for Russia's oil pipeline system and distributes oil in all four directions, including to the Perm Oil Refinery. Geolocated footage published on April 29 shows fires at the dispatch station.[3] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Ukrainian Navy also struck the sanctioned Marquise oil tanker using unmanned service vehicles (USVs) 210 kilometers southeast of Tuapse, Krasnodar Krai, in the Black Sea.[4] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Marquise was flying under the Cameroonian flag, has a carrying capacity of over 37,000 tons, and was traveling without cargo — likely waiting for loading at sea from another vessel. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi posted geolocated footage and reported that Ukrainian forces struck two Russian Mi-28 and two Mi-17 helicopters refueling at a field landing site in Voronezh Oblast, 150 kilometers from the frontline.[5] Geolocated footage published on April 28 indicates that Ukrainian forces likely also conducted strikes targeting the Orsk Oil Refinery in Orenburg Oblast (roughly 1,300 kilometers from the international border).[6]

ISW has observed geolocated evidence that Ukrainian forces conducted at least 18 strikes against Russian oil infrastructure and at least 41 strikes against Russian military assets in at least 19 Russian federal subjects in April 2026. Ukrainian forces have been steadily increasing the range, volume, and intensity of their long-range strike campaigns against Russian oil infrastructure and military assets in Russia and occupied Ukraine’s territories since March 2026.[7] Ukrainian forces are exploiting the large attack surface of Russia's deep rear and overstretched Russian oil infrastructure and military assets, supported by increased Ukrainian domestic drone production.[8] Ukrainian long-range strikes also continue to have outsized impacts on Russian oil exports, with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stating on April 29 that Ukrainian strikes have left the port of Primorsk, Leningrad Oblast, operating at 13 percent below capacity; port of Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, at 38 percent below capacity; and port of Ust-Luga, Leningrad Oblast, at 43 percent below capacity.[9]

Russian President Vladimir Putin used his April 29 phone call with US President Donald Trump to reiterate his commitment to his original war aims and promote his cognitive warfare effort falsely portraying Ukraine's defenses as collapsing and Russian victory in Ukraine as inevitable. Ukraine has largely stymied Russian advances across the frontline, blunting the Russian Spring-Summer 2026 offensive thus far.[10] Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov claimed on April 29 that the Trump-Putin call lasted for 1.5 hours and that Putin briefed Trump on the current state of the war in Ukraine, claiming that Russia holds the strategic initiative and is "pushing back" Ukrainian positions and that Russia will achieve its war goals "in any case" but would prefer to achieve these goals diplomatically.[11] Putin and other Kremlin officials have consistently attempted to portray Ukraine as the intransigent party in peace negotiations for refusing to capitulate to Putin's demands, despite Russia's failure to offer meaningful concessions in return, and Putin again reiterated this point to Trump on April 29.[12] Putin again asserted that Russia is performing well on the battlefield in order to justify his demand for Ukrainian capitulation. The premise of Putin’s claim remains false, however. Ukrainian forces continue to deny Russian significant advances in several sectors of the frontline, including in Russia's priority objective of Donetsk Oblast, and are imposing increasing costs and casualties on Russian forces for these continued offensive operations.[13] Ukraine has conducted significant counterattacks in southern Ukraine since January 2026 that has generated operational-level effects across the theater.[14] Russians are increasingly feeling the costs of the war as Russia's economy continues to face significant challenges, casualties continue to mount, and the recruitment becomes more difficult.[15] The Kremlin is very likely attempting to mitigate some of these costs by attempting to convince Trump and the West to push Ukraine to capitulate in a way that Russia's full-scale invasion has failed to and is obfuscating its own military and economic failures as part of this effort.

Putin also proposed to Trump a short-term ceasefire for Russia's May 9 Victory Day holiday, which celebrates the Soviet Union's role in the victory over Germany in the Second World War.[16] Putin has unilaterally announced numerous ceasefires on the battlefield, including for Victory Day in 2025 and most recently for Orthodox Easter on April 11 to 12.[17] These unilateral ceasefires heavily favor Russia, as the Kremlin has used them to accuse Ukraine of ceasefire violations and to stockpile long-range drones and missiles for large, devastating strikes that disproportionately affect civilians and inflict high civilian casualties.[18] Russia notably stockpiled weapons for two large strike series within 48 hours of the cessation of the Orthodox Easter ceasefire.[19]

The Kremlin also reportedly used the Trump-Putin call to scold Trump for US-Israeli operations against Iran. Ushakov claimed that Putin expressed support for the ceasefire extension in the Middle East but that Putin also warned Trump of "inevitable, extremely dire consequences" for Iran, the Middle East, and world if the US and Israel "resort to force again."[20] Putin also reportedly told Trump that a ground operation in Iran is "completely unacceptable and dangerous." Ushakov's readout of the April 29 Trump-Putin notably highlighted the situation in the Middle East before the war in Ukraine. Russia has continuously supported Iranian strikes against US military assets in the Middle East, reportedly including by providing Iran with satellite imagery to assist Iranian strikes against US forces, and all while Russia has continued to self-define the United States as one of its primary geopolitical adversaries.[21]

Russia's war in Ukraine is forcing the Kremlin to once again downgrade the festivities for its annual May 9 Victory Day parade, an event that Putin has historically used to posture Russian military power and victory in Ukraine. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated on April 29 that the 2026 Victory Day parade in Moscow City will not include military equipment, the participation of students from the Suvorov and Nakhimov military schools in a parade, or the participation of personnel of the Russian cadet corps in a parade due to the "current operational situation."[22] This announcement signals that 2026 will be the first year since 2007 that the annual parade will not feature Russian military equipment.[23] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov described the 2026 Victory Day Parade as occurring in a "truncated format" to minimize the danger from potential Ukrainian strikes, which Peskov referred to as "terrorist attacks."[24] These statements support April 27 reports that the Kremlin decided against including military equipment in the parade, is downgrading the number of guests from several thousand to a few hundred, and is limiting the parade itself to a 40-minute duration.[25] Russian milbloggers and opposition sources have reported that the Kremlin has not begun rehearsals for the parade despite being within the two-week window in which Russia normally conducts rehearsals.[26] BBC's Russian Service noted that while at least 40 Russian cities plan to hold their normal Victory Day parades, at least 10 more cities and eight Russian federal subjects plan to scale back or cancel either their parades or other Victory Day celebrations, such as fireworks or the Immortal Regiment march, which memorializes Russia's war dead from World War II.[27] The BBC reported, citing a source from Russian state telecommunications operator Rostelecom and a source close to other Russian telecommunications operators, that the Kremlin plans to restrict mobile communications in Moscow City and the Moscow Ring Road on May 5, 7, and 9 in connection with the Victory Day parade.[28] Russian ultranationalist milbloggers thus far have made statements in support of scaling back the 2026 Victory Day parade, noting concerns of potential drone strikes launched from within Russia as well as from Ukraine.[29]

The Kremlin held relatively truncated Victory Day parades in 2023 and 2024 but notably used the 2025 Victory Day parade in an effort to posture Russia's strength and global power status and to portray Putin as a respected world leader.[30] The 2025 Victory Day parade was also an attempt to conceal the degree of Russia's military failures in Ukraine, including the failure to make any operationally-significant advances outside of Kursk Oblast and Russia's unsustainably high casualties — failures the Kremlin has largely repeated going into the 2026 Victory Day celebrations.[31] The Kremlin will likely seek to use the 2026 Victory Day parade in Moscow City to portray Putin as an effective wartime leader and to promote the cognitive warfare effort that Russian forces are achieving victory across the entire frontline, particularly as Putin and the Kremlin have faced increasing criticism and domestic discontent since early 2026.[32]

The Kremlin is likely using the threat of "terrorist activity" to cloak voter suppression and illegal activities in occupied Ukraine ahead of the September 2026 elections. Putin stated on April 28 that Russia is facing growing "terrorist threats" ahead of the September 2026 elections and that Ukraine and its supports have resorted to these "terrorist methods" because they cannot stop Russian forces' advances on the battlefield.[33] Kremlin have longed referred to Ukrainian strikes against legitimate military targets in Russia as "terrorist attacks."[34] Putin stated that Russia must pay close attention to election security in occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and that those who deny "Donbas and Novorossiya's historical right" to be a part of Russia will try to hinder elections as they have done before.[35] Novorossiya notably includes not only Crimea and the four oblasts that Russia has illegally declared as annexed, but also Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts.[36] The Kremlin has conducted numerous illegal referendums and elections in occupied Ukraine under intense Russian military presence and in clear violation of internation law.[37] The Kremlin deployed 10,000 Rosgvardia personnel to occupied Ukraine to monitor and likely coerce voting results during the 2024 Presidential elections.[38] The Kremlin is likely evoking claims of "terrorist activity" to set conditions and justify future Russian military presence and coercive practices during the September 2026 elections.

Ukraine's domestic defense industrial base (DIB) and production capabilities continues to support allies. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on April 28 that some areas of the Ukrainian DIB have achieved a 50 percent surplus, which will allow Ukraine to export defense products to allies, including in the Middle East and Europe.[39] The EU Commission announced on April 29 that it launched a new stage of the EU BraveTech initiative — a platform for testing military technology in battlefield conditions in Ukraine that allows European DIB firms to accelerate the movement of innovations to Ukraine.[40] The EU Commission reported that the program possesses a budget of 35 million euros (roughly $40.9 million), and that the first selections for the program will take place in June 2026, with innovations reaching the battlefield by Fall 2026.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces are engaged in an operational long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure and military assets, exploiting overstretched Russian air defenses.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin used his April 29 phone call with US President Donald Trump to reiterate his commitment to his original war aims and promote his cognitive warfare effort falsely portraying Ukraine's defenses as collapsing and Russian victory in Ukraine as inevitable. Ukraine has largely stymied Russian advances across the frontline, blunting the Russian Spring-Summer 2026 offensive thus far.
• The Kremlin also reportedly used the Trump-Putin call to scold Trump for US-Israeli operations against Iran.
• Russia's war in Ukraine is forcing the Kremlin to once again downgrade the festivities for its annual May 9 Victory Day parade, an event that Putin has historically used to posture Russian military power and victory in Ukraine.
• The Kremlin is likely using the threat of "terrorist activity" to cloak voter suppression and illegal activities in occupied Ukraine ahead of the September 2026 elections.
• Ukraine's domestic defense industrial base (DIB) and production capabilities continues to support allies.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, western Zaporizhia Oblast, and in the Pokrovsk, Oleksandrivka, and Hulyaipole directions.
• Russian forces launched 171 drones against Ukraine.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 28, 2026

Ukrainian forces struck the Tuapse Oil Refinery overnight on April 27 to 28 — the third strike against the refinery in April so far. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against the Tuapse Oil Refinery in Krasnodar Krai overnight, causing a fire.[1]  The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Ukraine is still conducting the battle damage assessment (BDA) for the strike. Geolocated satellite footage published on April 28 shows multiple fires and smoke plumes at the Tuapse Oil depot and Refinery.[2] A Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) project assessed that the Ukrainian April 27 to 28 strikes damaged at least four oil storage tanks at the Tuapse refinery.[3] NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data for April 28 shows heat anomalies in the northern part of the Tuapse oil refinery, and the BBC Russian Service reported that the previous Ukrainian strikes had not affected this part of the refinery.[4] Krasnodar Krai authorities claimed that fallen drone debris caused the fire at the refinery.[5] Ukrainian forces struck the Tuapse Oil Refinery on the nights of April 15 to 16 and April 19 to 20, and Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) reported that these two Ukrainian strikes destroyed 24 oil storage tanks and damaged four additional tanks.[6] Russian opposition outlet Astra noted that the Tuapse Oil Refinery had suspended operations at its only refining unit, which has an annual refining capacity of 12 million tons per year, following the April 19 to 20 strikes.[7] Ukrainian forces have been conducting a larger strike campaign against Russian military, oil, and port infrastructure in Krasnodar Krai in April 2026, including against the Sheskharis oil terminal and an Admiral Grigorovich-class frigate near the port of Novorossiysk on April 5 to 6, the oil pumping station in Krymsk on April 8 to 9 and April 10 to 11, the Naftoexport port and oil depot in Tuapse on April 15 to 16, the oil pumping station in Tikhoretsk on April 17 to 18, and the seaport in Yeysk on April 18 to 19.[8]

The April 27 to 28 strikes compelled the Kremlin to acknowledge the impacts of the Ukrainian strikes against the Tuapse Oil Refinery. Krasnodar Krai authorities declared a state of emergency in Tuapse Municipal Okrug as a result of the Ukrainian strikes on April 27 to 28 and noted that the strike also caused an oil spill.[9] Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Russian Civil Defense, Emergencies, and Disaster Relief Minister Alexander Kurenkov in response to the strikes on April 28 and instructed Kurenkov to travel to Tuapse to oversee the Russian response.[10] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov acknowledged the Tuapse strike but stated that all details about the struck objects are classified.[11] Peskov criticized Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil infrastructure as further destabilizing global energy markets.[12] The Kremlin does not usually respond to Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil infrastructure, but the impact of Ukraine's strikes was apparently so significant that it prompted personal responses from Putin and Peskov on April 28. Ukraine has been escalating its strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure as Russia has sought to exploit a global energy crisis to augment profits from its energy exports to fund its war in Ukraine.[13] Ukrainian forces will likely continue to exploit the large attack surface of Russia’s deep rear and overstretched Russian air defenses to launch more frequent and larger strikes against Russian oil infrastructure and military assets, supported by increased Ukrainian domestic drone production.[14]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces struck the Tuapse Oil Refinery overnight on April 27 to 28, the third strike against the refinery in April so far.
• The April 27 to 28 strikes compelled the Kremlin to acknowledge the impacts of the Ukrainian strikes against the Tuapse Oil Refinery.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kharkiv and Orikhiv directions.
• Russian forces launched 123 drones toward Ukraine overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 27, 2026

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) issued a response to concerns about its ongoing issues with Russia's Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) recruitment drive, which has reportedly attempted to fill recruitment quotas using Russian university students. The Russian MoD held a joint meeting with the Russian Ministry of Science, Ministry of Science and Higher Education, and heads of Russian universities and educational associations on April 27 on the "principles and conditions" for recruiting Russian students to the USF and rejected reports that Russian universities have been expelling students en masse in order to then coerce the students into signing USF contracts with the MoD.[1] Russian Deputy Defense Minister and MoD Main Military-Political Directorate Head Army General Viktor Goremykin claimed during the meeting that Russian military service contracts with the MoD are for terms of one to three years at the choice of the signer, and that all Russian students who sign contracts with the USF do so for one-year terms.[2] Goremykin claimed that Russia does not intend to force any students to sign contracts with the MoD and emphasized the importance that all students sign contracts voluntarily. The Russian MoD stated that the MoD regulations forbid transferring USF personnel to units in other services without the servicemember's permission and that the Russian military command must dismiss servicemembers when their contract terms expire.[3] The MoD stated that Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov will issue guidance by the end of April 2026 to hold Russian military commanders "personally responsible" for ensuring that commanders do not transfer USF personnel to units in other services without the permission of the servicemember. Russian Deputy Science and Higher Education Minister Dmitry Afanasyev claimed during the meeting that the MoD only received six complaints that recruiters had coerced students into signing contracts with the MoD and found each instance unfounded, and Goremykin claimed that 93 percent of surveyed students trust the Russian MoD to comply with the terms of their contracts.[4]

The MoD is likely attempting to mitigate concern around its recruitment campaign of Russian university students that it launched in December 2025-January 2026 to ensure it is still able to recruit military personnel from students.[5] Russia's overall recruitment rates are stressed by rising casualty rates, and Russian students likely fear signing a contract only for the Russian military command to transfer them from a USF unit to high-casualty assault units. Russian Minister of Science and Higher Education Valery Falkov reportedly directed large universities in early 2026 to ensure that at least two percent of students sign contracts with the MoD.[6] Russian milbloggers criticized the ineffectiveness of the MoD's recruitment campaign for the USF as of late March 2026 due to the worry that students will be transferred from their USF units to assault units.[7]

Senior Russian officials continue to reiterate Russia’s territorial goals in Ukraine beyond demands for Ukraine’s withdrawal from Donetsk Oblast. Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin claimed to Kremlin newswire TASS on April 27 that Russia must establish a “buffer zone” in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast to ensure the security of occupied Velyka Novosilvka Raion, Donetsk Oblast, and to completely seize the remainder of unoccupied  Zaporizhia Oblast.[8] ISW has long assessed that Russia maintains its territorial objectives beyond the remainder of unoccupied Donetsk Oblast, and Pushilin's statement contradicts the Kremlin’s attempts to portray the only unresolved issue in peace negotiations as Ukraine's refusal to cede unoccupied Donetsk Oblast to Russia.[9]

An Iranian delegation led by Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi emphasized the importance of Russian-Iranian strategic relations in a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg on April 27.[10] This meeting notably occurs as Iran prepares for a potential resumption of conflict with the United States and Israel. Russia has supported Iranian strikes in the Middle East throughout the war, such as by providing Iran with satellite imagery of US, Gulf, and Turkish military assets in the Middle East.[11]

Key Takeaways:

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) issued a response to concerns about its ongoing issues with Russia's Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) recruitment drive, which has reportedly attempted to fill recruitment quotas using Russian university students.
• Senior Russian officials continue to reiterate Russia’s territorial goals in Ukraine beyond demands for Ukraine’s withdrawal from Donetsk Oblast.
• An Iranian delegation led by Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi emphasized the importance of Russian-Iranian strategic relations in a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg on April 27.
• Neither Russian or Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances on the frontline.
• Russian forces launched 94 drones toward Ukraine overnight.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 26, 2026

Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign continues to exploit overstretched Russian air defenses to damage oil infrastructure and military assets in Russia and occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 26 that Ukrainian forces struck the Yaroslavl Oil Refinery in Yaroslavl City, Yaroslavl Oblast, on the night of April 25 to 26, causing a fire at the facility.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the refinery has a processing capacity of about 15 million tons of oil per year and produces gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel. Geolocated footage published on April 26 shows fires at the refinery, and a Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) source assessed that Ukrainian forces may have struck the ELOU-AT-4 installation, a key unit for raw materials primary processing.[2] ISW has observed geolocated evidence that Ukrainian forces conducted at least 10 strikes against Russian oil and gas infrastructure across Russia in the last two weeks (since roughly April 12). Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) reported on April 26 that Ukrainian forces also struck Russia’s naval base and Belbek Airfield in occupied Sevastopol on the night of April 25 to 26, damaging the Yamal Ropucha-class project 775 and Filchenkov Tapir-class project 1171 large landing ships (both of the Black Sea Fleet [BSF]); the Ivan Khurs Yury Ivanov–class reconnaissance ship; the Lukomka BSF Training Center; a Russian Air Defense Forces radio technical intelligence headquarters; a MR-10M1 Mys-M1 coastal radar station; a MiG-31 interceptor aircraft; and Belbek Airfield's maintenance section.[3] Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhaev acknowledged the Ukrainian strikes and claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted one of the largest strike campaigns on Sevastopol, launching at least 71 drones overnight.[4] Ukrainian forces have been steadily increasing the range, volume, and intensity of their long-range strike campaigns against Russian oil infrastructure and military assets in Russia and occupied Ukraine’s territories since March 2026, including a recent strike in Chelyabinsk on April 25 over 1,800 kilometers from the international border.[5] Ukrainian forces will likely continue to exploit the large attack surface area of Russia’s deep rear and overstretched Russian air defenses to launch more frequent and larger strikes against Russian oil infrastructure and military assets, supported by increased Ukrainian domestic drone production.[6]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign continues to exploit overstretched Russian air defenses to damage oil infrastructure and military assets in Russia and occupied Crimea.
• Russian forces recently advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction.
• Russian forces launched 144 drones toward Ukraine overnight.