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September 26, 2023
Ukraine Invasion Updates
This page collects the Critical Threats Project (CTP) and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) updates on the invasion of Ukraine. In late February 2022, CTP and ISW began publishing daily synthetic products covering key events related to renewed Russian aggression against Ukraine. These Ukraine Conflict Updates replaced the “Indicators and Thresholds for Russian Military Operations in Ukraine and/or Belarus,” which we maintained from November 12, 2021, through February 17, 2022.
This list also includes prominent warning alerts that CTP and ISW launched outside the crisis update structure. These products addressed critical inflection points as they occurred.
Follow the Critical Threats Project on Twitter, LinkedIn, and Facebook.
- Maps on Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes
- Recent Updates
- February 2022 - July 2023 Updates
- Related Reads
Maps on Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes
This interactive map complements the static daily control-of-terrain maps that CTP and ISW produce with high-fidelity and, where possible, street level assessments of the war in Ukraine.
Click here to access the archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that produced daily by showing a dynamic frontline.
The Critical Threats Project and the Institute for the Study of War are publishing a summary of the methodology of our map for those who would like to learn more about the tradecraft for mapping conventional military operations from the open source.
Previous versions of these static maps are available in our past publications.
Recent Updates
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 18, 2025
Russian forces conducted the largest single drone strike of the war against Ukraine on the night of May 17 to 18 – in disregard of US President Donald Trump's calls for Russia to stop long-range strikes against Ukraine, particularly against Kyiv Oblast.[i] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 273 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[ii] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 88 drones over eastern, northern, and central Ukraine; that 128 decoy drones were "lost in location;" and that one drone was still in Ukrainian airspace as of 0800 local time. Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strike largely targeted Kyiv Oblast and that drones struck Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Donetsk oblasts.[iii] Russian forces launched 267 drones (and three ballistic missiles) in their overnight strike series against Ukraine on the night of February 22 and 23.[iv] Russian forces have significantly intensified their nightly strikes against Ukraine over the last five months and have conducted several of the largest strikes of the entire war since January 2025. A Russian milblogger claimed that the May 17-18 record-breaking strike was effective due to Russia's use of the "Geran-3" drone (the Russian analogue to the Iranian Shahed-238), which is reportedly equipped with a turbo jet and 300-kilogram warhead.[v] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are innovating their long-range drone strike tactics in order to offset the effectiveness of Ukrainian mobile defense units and overwhelm the Ukrainian air defense umbrella.[vi]
The Kremlin continues efforts to project Russia's military strength ahead of US President Donald Trump’s scheduled phone call with Putin on May 19. Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin published on May 18 excerpts of an allegedly "new" interview with Putin, in which Putin claimed that Russia has enough manpower and materiel to bring the war in Ukraine to its "logical" conclusion with the "necessary" results for Russia.[vii] Putin reiterated long-standing Kremlin narratives about the necessity that peace negotiations address the war’s "root causes" and "protect" of Russian-speakers of Ukraine, whom Putin claimed consider Russia their "motherland." Ukrainian outlet The Kyiv Independent and Russian state media reported on May 18 that the excerpts that Zarubin published on May 18 are unaired footage from the documentary "Russia.Kremlin.Putin.25 Years" that the Kremlin published on May 4 in which Putin repeatedly promoted claims about Russia’s ability to bring the war to its "logical conclusion."[viii] The Kremlin's decision to delay publishing these clips until May 18 suggests that the Kremlin is trying to project a strong, militarily superior Russia to the West and to domestic Russian audiences ahead of Putin’s May 19 phone call with Trump. Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky recently stated that Russia is prepared to fight for "however long it takes," and Russian Security Council Secretary Dmitry Medvedev recently made thinly veiled nuclear threats in reference to what Medvedev categorized as "negotiating ultimatums."[ix]
Putin is attempting to distract from Russia's military and economic challenges with this rhetoric. Finnish President Alexander Stubb stated during an interview with UK outlet the Guardian published on May 18 that the Kremlin is falsely posturing its economy and military as strong.[x] Stubb noted that Russia has depleted its financial reserves and that the Russian interest rate is over 20 percent. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are sustaining significant battlefield losses at rates that are likely unsustainable in the medium- to long-term and that Putin has mismanaged Russia's economy, which is suffering from unsustainable war spending, growing inflation, significant labor shortages, and reductions in Russia's sovereign wealth fund.[xi] The continued depletion of Russian materiel, personnel, and economic resources at the current rate will likely present Putin with difficult decision points in 2026 or 2027.[xii]
Reported support within the Russian military and society for continuing the war until Russia achieves its original war aims and territorial demands reflects the success of the Kremlin's years-long narrative efforts to justify a protracted war effort. The New York Times (NYT) reported on May 17 that interviews with 11 Russian soldiers who are currently fighting or have fought in Ukraine demonstrate that some Russian troops are against an unconditional ceasefire and believe that Russia should keep fighting until Russian forces have seized the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts.[xiii] Russian soldiers reportedly called for Russia to continue the war until it reaches its territorial goals and not offer any concessions to Ukraine or the West so that Russia does not have to fight Ukraine again in five or 10 years and so that Russian casualties thus far in the war will not have been in vain.
The NYT noted that an unpublished mid-April 2025 poll by independent Russian opposition polling organization Chronicles found that roughly half of respondents said that they would not support a peace deal that falls short of Russian President Vladimir Putin's initial war aims of Ukrainian "denazification," demilitarization, and neutrality. Russian opposition outlet Verstka conducted a poll of 100 Russian military personnel in April 2025 in which only 18 percent said they would support a Russian withdrawal from Ukraine prior to achieving Putin's stated war goals and only about a fifth of respondents indicated that they thought the war would end in the coming months.[xiv] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin has not been preparing the Russian information space for a peace agreement in the near future and that Russian forces and society do not anticipate an imminent end to the war.[xv] The Kremlin has been engaged in a concerted effort to justify Putin's war aims as existential to the Russian state and to garner societal support for the protraction of the war until Russia achieves these goals. Kremlin officials are increasingly publicly stating that Russia is prepared to continue fighting until Ukraine accepts Russia's demands, likely because the Kremlin assesses that it has adequately prepared Russian society and the Russian military for such a scenario.[xvi]
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues efforts to negotiate a diplomatic end to the war in Ukraine. Zelensky spoke with US Vice President JD Vance and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio in Rome on May 18 and highlighted the importance of an unconditional ceasefire in Ukraine and Ukraine's willingness to engage in meaningful diplomacy.[xvii] Zelensky underscored that the Russian delegation presented unrealistic and unacceptable terms during the May 16 Ukrainian–Russian talks in Istanbul. Rubio had a call on May 17 with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, during which Rubio reiterated the Trump administration's call for an immediate ceasefire in Ukraine.[xviii] Ukraine continues to demonstrate its willingness to establish meaningful peace dialogues and commit to an unconditional ceasefire.[xix] Russia, however, continues to demonstrate that it is not interested in a ceasefire or in good faith negotiations to end the war.[xx]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian forces conducted the largest single drone strike of the war against Ukraine on the night of May 17 to 18 — in disregard of US President Donald Trump's calls for Russia to stop long-range strikes against Ukraine, particularly against Kyiv Oblast.
- The Kremlin continues efforts to project Russia's military strength ahead of US President Donald Trump’s scheduled phone call with Putin on May 19.
- Reported support within the Russian military and society for continuing the war until Russia achieves its original war aims and territorial demands reflects the success of the Kremlin's years-long narrative efforts to justify a protracted war effort.
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues efforts to negotiate a diplomatic end to the war in Ukraine.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Borova and Toretsk.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 17, 2025
The Russian delegation in Istanbul reportedly framed its demands for a final peace settlement as preconditions that Ukraine must meet before Russia will agree to a ceasefire. Most of Russia's demands are contrary to US President Donald Trump's proposed peace plan. Sources familiar with the May 16 Ukrainian–Russian talks in Istanbul reported to Bloomberg that the Russian delegation demanded that Ukraine cede all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and Crimea to Russia and that the international community recognize the four oblasts and the peninsula as Russian territory before Russia will agree to a ceasefire.[1] The Russian delegation also reportedly demanded that Ukraine adopt a neutral status, that no foreign troops be allowed on Ukrainian territory, and that Ukraine abandon its demands for war reparations from Russia. Chairperson of the Russian Federation Council's Committee on Foreign Affairs Grigory Karasin stated on May 17 that the Russian delegation maintained Russian President Vladimir Putin's June 2024 demands, including that Ukrainian forces withdraw from the entirety of the four oblasts and abandon its NATO aspirations before Russia would agree to a ceasefire and peace negotiations.[2] The United States reportedly presented Russia in April 2025 with a seven-point peace plan that offered Russia "de jure" US recognition of Russian sovereignty over occupied Crimea and "de facto" recognition of Russian control over the parts of Ukraine that Russian forces currently occupy.[3] The US proposal also reportedly included "a robust security guarantee" involving a group of European states and possibly non-European states as a likely peacekeeping force. The Russian delegation's demands in Istanbul outright reject these aspects of the US peace proposal.
ISW continues to assess that Russia's war aim remains full Ukrainian capitulation.[4] Russia is reframing its territorial demands — typically the subject of war termination negotiations — as preconditions for a ceasefire.[5] Russia is attempting to posture itself as open to negotiations but is putting forward demands that Ukraine cannot reasonably accept while offering no compromises of its own. ISW continues to assess that Putin will continue to refuse to offer compromises until Ukraine and the West are able to alter his theory of victory, which posits that Russia will win a war of attrition through indefinite creeping advances that prevent Ukraine from conducting successful, operationally significant counteroffensive operations.[6]
Russia's continued protraction of negotiations emphasizes its unwillingness to engage in good-faith negotiations for either a ceasefire or a final peace agreement. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on May 17 that Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky may meet only if the Russian and Ukrainian delegations reach unspecified agreements and underscored that all talks should be conducted behind closed doors.[7] Peskov's statements are likely intentionally vague in order to further delay progress in Russian-Ukrainian talks. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on May 17 that a source close to the Russian Presidential Administration stated the Kremlin viewed discussions between Putin and Zelensky as "out of the question" as Moscow knew that the conditions it was pushing Ukraine to accept were non-starters for Kyiv.[8] Another Verstka source close to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) similarly stated that Russian officials do not plan to discuss preparations for a Putin-Zelensky meeting. Russia has doubled down on its efforts to protract peace processes by continuing to present Ukraine with ultimatums that Ukraine cannot accept. The Verstka source close to the Presidential Administration added that Russia's demand that the Ukrainian–Russian talks occur without a mediator shows that the Kremlin seeks to demonstrate that it is capable of demanding that the United States limit the influence of Ukraine's Western partners. Peskov's comments and Verstka's report cohere with ISW's long-standing assessment that Russia remains committed to prolonging peace negotiations so as to continue making battlefield advances and to extract additional concessions from the West.[9] Ukraine has continually demonstrated its willingness to compromise and engage in good-faith negotiations in contrast.
Kremlin officials continue to signal that Russia is prepared to continue or even escalate its war against Ukraine should Ukraine and the West not agree to Russia's demands for Ukraine's surrender. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on May 17 on his English-language X account that "all enemies of Russia that issue negotiating ultimatums" should remember that peace negotiations do not always lead to the end of hostilities and that unsuccessful negotiations can even lead to a "more terrible stage of war with new weapons and participants."[10] Medvedev's statement is a thinly veiled threat of possible Russian nuclear weapons use, the introduction of Russian allied forces in the war, or even Russian attacks against Europe. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is extremely unlikely to use nuclear weapons or to attack NATO states at this time.[11] Russia has demonstrated that it will not accept any terms less than Ukraine's full capitulation and would likely view any negotiations that do not fulfill these war aims as "unsuccessful." The threat that Russia could continue its war against Ukraine and even escalate it should Russia not achieve its goals mirrors Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky's May 16 statement that Russia is ready to fight for "however long it takes."[12] Medvedev's threat is part of Russia's reflexive control campaign meant to push Ukraine and the West to accept Russia's demands for Ukrainian surrender.
Russia continues to deny the current Ukrainian government's legitimacy and is likely setting conditions to renege on any future Ukrainian–Russian peace agreement. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on May 17 that it is important for Russia to understand exactly who from the Ukrainian government will sign the documents that may result from any future Russian-Ukrainian agreement.[13] Peskov's comments are likely part of the Kremlin's long-standing narrative rejecting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's legitimacy and the legitimacy of all post-2014 Ukrainian governments.[14] This rhetorical campaign is part of efforts to set conditions for Russia to withdraw from any future peace agreements at a time of Russia's choosing and to support Russia's repeated demand that Ukraine acquiesce to regime change and the installation of a pro-Russian proxy government.[15] Any future peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine must include Russia's explicit recognition of the Ukrainian government's and the Ukrainian Constitution's legitimacy.
Key Takeaways:
- The Russian delegation in Istanbul reportedly framed its demands for a final peace settlement as preconditions that Ukraine must meet before Russia will agree to a ceasefire. Most of Russia's demands are contrary to US President Donald Trump's proposed peace plan.
- Russia's continued protraction of negotiations emphasizes its unwillingness to engage in good-faith negotiations for either a ceasefire or a final peace agreement.
- Kremlin officials continue to signal that Russia is prepared to continue or even escalate its war against Ukraine should Ukraine and the West not agree to Russia's demands for Ukraine's surrender.
- Russia continues to deny the current Ukrainian government's legitimacy and is likely setting conditions to renege on any future Ukrainian–Russian peace agreement.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Lyman, and Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, and Kurakhove.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 16, 2025
Ukrainian and Russian delegations met in Istanbul on May 16 but made little progress towards agreeing to a full ceasefire or a peace settlement to Russia's war against Ukraine. The Russian delegation reportedly formally demanded that Ukraine cede territory to which Russia has informally been laying claim, while asserting that Russia is ready to continue the war for years. Russia may again formalize previously informal territorial claims in the future as part of Russia's effort to secure full Ukrainian capitulation. Turkish, Ukrainian, and American delegations met on the morning of May 16 in Istanbul, after which Turkish, Ukrainian, and Russian delegations met.[i] Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky, the head of the Russian delegation, likely met with US State Department Director of Policy Planning Staff Michael Anton before the Ukrainian-Russian meeting.[ii] The Ukrainian delegation, including Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov, Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha, and Presidential Administration Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak, met with US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg, UK National Security Advisor Jonathan Powell, French Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Emmanuel Bonn, and German Chancellor's Advisor for Foreign and Security Policy Gunter Sautter to coordinate positions before the Ukrainian-Russian meeting.[iii] Umerov and Medinsky announced that Ukraine and Russia would exchange 1,000 prisoners of war (POWs) each in the near future.[iv] Medinsky stated that the Russian and Ukrainian delegations agreed to "write...down in detail" and present their visions for a possible future ceasefire and that bilateral negotiations will continue after this presentation.[v] Kremlin newswire TASS reported that an unspecified source stated that there was no specific date set for Russia and Ukraine to exchange their ceasefire plans.[vi]
Medinsky highlighted that Russia is prepared to continue its war in Ukraine for years to come. Medinsky claimed that those "who do not know history" say that there should be a ceasefire first, then negotiations to achieve peace.[vii] Medinsky claimed that war and negotiations should be conducted simultaneously, and Carroll reported that Medinsky stated that Russia is "ready to fight for a year, two, three – however long it takes."[viii] Medinsky reportedly referenced the Great Northern War (1700-1721) when asking "how long [is Ukraine] ready to fight?" and claimed that "Russia is prepared to fight forever."[ix] Russia state media confirmed that Medinsky spoke about the 18th-century war with Sweden during the meeting.[x]
Ukrainian diplomatic sources told various Western and Ukrainian outlets that the Russian delegation made "unrealistic" and "unacceptable" demands that went "far beyond" any demands Russia has previously discussed.[xi] The delegation reportedly repeated the Kremlin's demand that Ukrainian forces withdraw from the entirety of the illegally annexed Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts before the start of a ceasefire. The Economist foreign correspondent Oliver Carroll reported that a source stated that the Russian delegation additionally threatened to seize Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts, and Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Deputy Oleksiy Goncharenko similarly reported that the Russian delegation threatened to annex Sumy Oblast in order to create a "security zone."[xii]
The Kremlin has repeatedly publicly demanded that Ukraine cede all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts – even the territory that Russian forces currently do not occupy – but had not formally demanded that Ukraine cede all of Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts before the May 16 Istanbul meeting.[xiii] Russian officials have informally claimed all of Kharkiv Oblast as part of Russia and launched offensive operations to create buffer zones in Kharkiv and Sumy Oblasts in May 2024 and March 2025, respectively, that are likely part of Russian territorial expansion efforts, however. Kharkiv Oblast occupation governor Vitaly Ganchev claimed in early February 2025 that Kharkiv Oblast is "strategically" and politically significant for Russia and that he was "certain" that Russian forces would seize all of Kharkiv Oblast because Russia needed a "sanitary zone" to protect itself from Ukrainian shelling.[xiv] Ganchev further claimed that Kharkiv Oblast would have held a "referendum" to become the "fifth oblast to join Russia" in September 2022 had it not been for the successful Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kharkiv Oblast at that time. Russian forces launched attacks across the Sumy-Kursk Oblast border in April 2025 to create a buffer zone and possibly press further toward Sumy City in order to expand Russian territorial demands in Ukraine.[xv] Russian forces similarly launched offensive operations in May 2024 to create a buffer zone in northern Kharkiv Oblast, and Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev stated at that time that Russia's envisioned "buffer zone" should encompass all of Ukraine, suggesting that the Kremlin's concept of the buffer zone is a thinly veiled justification for Russia's intent to subsume larger portions of Ukraine.[xvi]
Russian officials have long been informally laying claim to additional territories in Ukraine beyond Sumy, Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts. Russian officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, have consistently claimed that "Novorossiya" – an invented region of Ukraine that Kremlin officials have claimed includes all southern and eastern Ukraine – is an "integral" part of Russia and that Odesa City is a "Russian" city."[xvii] Novorossiya geographically encompasses Kharkiv Oblast. Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo stated in April 2025 that the "return" of the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River to Russia is "fundamentally important" and an "absolute priority."[xviii] Saldo called for Russia to completely control the areas of the Dnipro River that pass through Kherson, Zaporizhia, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts – a call for Russia to not only gain control over parts of Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts that Russian forces do not currently occupy but to control parts of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, which Russia has not formally claimed or illegally annexed. The Kremlin may increasingly adopt this pattern of informally discussing additional Russian territorial claims and then formally introducing these claims as demands in peace negotiations in the future.
ISW has consistently assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin will not compromise in peace negotiations unless Ukraine and the West inflict significant battlefield and economic losses on Russia and force Putin to rethink his theory of victory. Putin articulated his theory of victory for his war in Ukraine in June 2024, which posits that Russia will be able to win a war of attrition against Ukraine by continuing gradual, creeping advances indefinitely and preventing Ukraine from conducting successful, operationally significant counteroffensive operations, assuming Russia’s war effort outlasts Western support for Ukraine.[xix]
ISW previously assessed that Russia faces a number of compounding materiel, defense industrial, manpower, and economic issues that threaten Russia's ability to continue the war in Ukraine in the long term.[xx] Putin is likely prioritizing dividing Ukraine's Western allies and weakening Western support to Ukraine in order to secure his desired end state in negotiations, rather than effectively addressing Russia's domestic problems. Putin’s decision to intensify offensive operations throughout Ukraine in March and April 2025 is only exacerbating these issues and underscores his commitment to pressuring Ukraine in negotiations. ISW continues to assess that increased Western – especially US – military aid and economic sanctions are necessary to enable Ukraine to inflict significant battlefield losses on Russia and force Putin to either change his theory of victory or make an economically painful and unpopular decision to implement another partial involuntary reserve call-up.
Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly approved a series of command changes in the Russian military, including a new Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on May 15 to appoint former Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces General Oleg Salyukov as Deputy Secretary of the Russian Security Council.[xxi] Kremlin-affiliated outlet Izvestia, citing an unspecified source, reported on May 15 that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) appointed Colonel General Andrei Mordvichev as Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces of the Armed Forces to replace Salyukov.[xxii] Mordvichev most recently served as the commander of both the Russian Central Grouping of Forces and Central Military District (CMD) and oversaw Russia's seizure of Avdiivka in February 2024.[xxiii] Russian milbloggers claimed that the Russian MoD also appointed Colonel General Valery Solodchuk as the new CMD commander, and Russian outlet Ura reported that a high-ranking source in Russian military circles confirmed these reports.[xxiv] Solodchuk most recently served as commander of the Kursk Grouping of Forces and led Russia's efforts to eliminate the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast.[xxv] Russian insider sources and milbloggers welcomed Mordvichev's appointment and interpreted it as a sign that the Kremlin is initiating a modernization effort to enhance Russia's ability to plan and execute operations in Ukraine and beyond.[xxvi]
The Kremlin is likely appointing Mordvichev to proliferate positional warfare tactics and operational concepts for grinding marginal advances – the main tactics Russian forces used in the Avdiivka-Pokrovsk direction – across Russia’s Ground Forces. Mordvichev’s appointment indicates that the Kremlin approves of the tactics developed under Mordvichev’s command – namely, the use of grinding, highly attritional, infantry-led assaults – and aims to institutionalize these tactics that the CMD used to advance in the Avdiivka-Pokrovsk direction since late 2023.
Mordvichev is one of the few Russian commanders to have achieved tactical penetrations of the Ukrainian line in the last two years and one of Russia’s most celebrated commanders at the moment, but these limited tactical penetrations have come at great costs.[xxvii] Russian forces suffered significant personnel and equipment losses in exchange for approximately 60 kilometers of penetration since elements of the CMD first redeployed to the Avdiivka-Pokrovsk direction in October 2023.[xxviii] Mordvichev’s appointment is likely also an effort to distill lessons learned and tactics from the CMD to the rest of the Russian military, as ISW has previously observed Russian units in the Kupyansk and Velyka Novosilka directions implementing the attritional assaults that the CMD utilized to seize Avdiivka in February 2024.[xxix]
Russian forces are continuing to expand their salient northeast of Pokrovsk and southwest of Toretsk, although it remains unclear whether the Russian military command will prioritize further advances towards Kostyantynivka or Pokrovsk during Summer 2025. Geolocated footage published on May 16 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northern Myrolyubivka (east of Pokrovsk) and seized Myrolyubivka and Mykhailivka (just west of Myrolyubivka).[xxx] Russian milbloggers claimed on May 16 that Russian forces advanced further north and southwest of Myrolyubivka and northwest of Hrodivka (east of Pokrovsk).[xxxi] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) credited elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) with seizing Myrolyubivka, and a Kremlin-affiliated milblogger insinuated that the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade is subordinated to the Central Grouping of Forces.[xxxii] The brigade was likely previously subordinated under the Southern Grouping of Forces, as the Russian military command redeployed elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade from the Kurakhove direction to reinforce offensive operations near Vozdvyzhenka (east of Pokrovsk) in January 2025.[xxxiii] ISW has not observed reports of the brigade engaged in combat since March 2025, however. Elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade and other elements of the 51st CAA appeared to culminate in Toretsk in February and March 2025, but the brigade may be reentering combat after a period of rest and reconstitution.
Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on May 16 that Ukrainian forces maintain some positions near and within Yelyzavetivka (east of Myrolyubivka) that are complicating Russian advances towards Myrnohrad (west of Yelyzavetivka and just east of Pokrovsk) and Pokrovsk.[xxxiv] Russian milbloggers also recently acknowledged that Ukrainian forces maintain positions north of Yalyzvetivka, and ISW is therefore expanding Ukrainian advances in the area, although these advances are likely not recent.[xxxv] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) and 51st CAA are attempting to advance from Malynivka toward Novoekonomichne and north of Nova Poltavka (all northeast of Pokrovsk) in order to force Ukrainian forces to withdraw from Yelyzavetivka and to envelop Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.[xxxvi]
Russian forces have recently intensified offensive operations northeast and east of Pokrovsk after largely abandoning this area in favor of advances further northeast of Pokrovsk toward Kostyantynivka and southwest of Pokrovsk toward Novopavlivka in early 2024.[xxxvii] Ukrainian officials recently reported that Russia is reinforcing its units in the Pokrovsk direction, and ISW recently observed reports that elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps [AC], Eastern Military District [EMD]) recently redeployed from the Kurakhove direction to near Malynivka.[xxxviii] These recent redeployments and the reported appointment of Valery Solodchuk as Central Military District (CMD) commander after his recent success in Kursk Oblast indicate that the Russian military command may refocus on the seizure of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad in the coming weeks and months. ISW previously assessed that Russian forces may attempt to advance along the Vozdvyzhenka-Yelyzavetivka-Myrne-Razine line to envelop Pokrovsk instead of fighting through the more urban and heavily defended settlements of Novoekonomichne and Myrnohrad closer to Pokrovsk.[xxxix] The Russian military command may redeploy forces from Kursk Oblast or additional elements of the 51st CAA to the CMD’s area of responsibility (AoR) around Pokrovsk and reintensify efforts to advance west of Pokrovsk should the Russian military command prioritize seizing Pokrovsk over pushing further toward Kostyantynivka from the southwest during Summer 2025.
The Russian military command may alternatively choose to continue prioritizing advances toward Kostyantynivka in Summer 2025. Russian forces intensified offensive operations aimed at eliminating the Ukrainian pocket southwest of Toretsk in February and March 2025, and recent Russian advances into Novoolenivka and near Zorya (both southwest of Toretsk) will likely force Ukrainian forces to withdraw from their limited positions remaining in the pocket in the near future.[xl] Mashovets stated that Russian forces are currently attempting to attack along the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway toward Stepanivka (northwest of Toretsk) and Yablunivka (west of Toretsk).[xli] Mashovets stated that elements of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division are the main force attacking between Stara Mykolaivka (southwest of Toretsk) and Nova Poltavka and that elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) are attacking in other areas southwest of Toretsk, including toward Romanivka.[xlii] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces likely intend to leverage advances southwest of Toretsk to push along the H-20 Donetsk City-Kostyantynivka highway and facilitate deeper advances northeast of Pokrovsk along the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway toward Kostyantynivka.[xliii] ISW recently observed reports that elements of the Russian 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) redeployed from western Zaporizhia Oblast to the Stara Mykolaivka area and that unspecified drone operators recently redeployed from the Kursk direction to near Kalynove (south of Stara Mykolaivka).[xliv] The Russian military command may continue to reinforce the Russian force grouping southwest of Toretsk and attempt to advance further along the H-20 Donetsk City-Kostyantynivka highway toward Oleksandro-Kalynove (west of Toretsk) in the coming weeks if they intend to prioritize offensive operations against Kostyantynivka in Summer 2025.
Russia is unlikely to have sufficient manpower, materiel, and operational planning capabilities to conduct both an envelopment of Pokrovsk and a significant offensive operation toward Kostyantynivka in the coming months. Russian advances southwest of Toretsk currently support both of these efforts, but the Russian military command will likely have to choose to prioritize one direction in the coming weeks due to near-term constraints in Russia’s manpower and materiel reserves.[xlv] Recent Ukrainian estimates suggest that Russia is recruiting enough forces to slowly grow their force grouping in Ukraine, but ISW has not observed indications that the Kremlin has generated a sufficient operational reserve to support multiple intensified operations as of this report.[xlvi]
Russian forces have thus far struggled to break out of Chasiv Yar and Toretsk, which has likely complicated Russia’s plans for an offensive against Kostyantynivka and the wider Ukrainian fortress belt. Russian forces may conduct an operational pause after they level the frontline southwest of Toretsk in order to give Russian units in Chasiv Yar and Toretsk time to make more significant advances before beginning a concerted offensive against Kostyantynivka. The recent intensification in Russian activity northeast, east, and south of Pokrovsk suggests that Russian forces may assess that Ukrainian positions in Pokrovsk are becoming increasingly vulnerable and that Russian forces should renew their efforts to envelop the town. The Russian military command may attempt to pursue the envelopment of Pokrovsk and significant advances toward Kostyantynivka simultaneously, but pursuing both operations will expedite the timeline for a likely Russian culmination and will undermine Russian forces’ ability to accomplish either goal. Russian forces also must continue to balance offensive operations near Toretsk and Pokrovsk with the manpower and materiel demands of ongoing efforts to advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, seize Kupyansk, and push toward Borova, Lyman, Sumy City and Kharkiv City.
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian and Russian delegations met in Istanbul on May 16 but made little progress towards agreeing to a full ceasefire or a peace settlement to Russia's war against Ukraine.
- Medinsky highlighted that Russia is prepared to continue its war in Ukraine for years to come.
- The Kremlin has repeatedly publicly demanded that Ukraine cede all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts – even the territory that Russian forces currently do not occupy - but had not formally demanded that Ukraine cede all of Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts before the May 16 Istanbul meeting.
- ISW has consistently assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin will not compromise in peace negotiations unless Ukraine and the West inflict significant battlefield and economic losses on Russia and force Putin to rethink his theory of victory.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly approved a series of command changes in the Russian military, including a new Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces.
- Russian forces are continuing to expand their salient northeast of Pokrovsk and southwest of Toretsk, although it remains unclear whether the Russian military command will prioritize further advances towards Kostyantynivka or Pokrovsk during Summer 2025.
- Russia is unlikely to have sufficient manpower, materiel, and operational planning capabilities to conduct both an envelopment of Pokrovsk and a significant offensive operation toward Kostyantynivka in the coming months.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka and in the Zaporizhia direction.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 15, 2025
Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's invitation to engage in bilateral negotiations in Istanbul and continues refusing to offer concessions to end the war in Ukraine. Putin spoke to media organizations on the night of May 10 to 11, following the May 10 joint US-Ukrainian-European proposal for a general ceasefire for at least 30 days beginning on May 12.[1] Putin did not agree to the joint US-Ukrainian-European proposal and instead proposed that Russia and Ukraine "resume" on May 15 the direct negotiations that he claimed Ukraine "interrupted" in 2022 in Istanbul. Zelensky and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan accepted Putin's proposal to hold bilateral negotiations in Turkey on May 15.[2] Zelensky stated that he would personally wait for Putin in Turkey and arrived in Turkey on May 15.[3] Putin assigned several Russian officials, who are notably not in Putin's innermost circle, to attend the talks in Istanbul, and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov confirmed on May 15 that Putin will not travel to Istanbul.[4] Putin's rejection of Zelensky's invitation demonstrates Putin's continued resistance to making any concessions and engaging in legitimate, good-faith negotiations at the highest level.
The Russian delegation in Istanbul does not include officials in Putin's innermost circle and is largely the same delegation that Russia sent to the Russian-Ukrainian negotiations in 2022 in Istanbul. Putin announced on the night of May 14 that Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky is leading the Russian delegation in Istanbul.[5] The delegation also includes Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin, Chief of the Russian General Staff's Main Directorate (GRU) Igor Kostykov, and Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Fomin. Medinsky similarly headed the delegation in 2022, and Fomin and Galuzin's predecessor participated in the 2022 talks.[6] Kostyukov is the only 2025 participant who did not attend the 2022 talks.
The 2025 Russian delegation also includes four experts from the Presidential Administration, GRU, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) that correspond with the four leading delegation members: Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration for State Policy in the Humanitarian Sphere Elena Podobreevskaya, Director of the Second Department of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Alexei Polishchuk, First Deputy Chief of Information of the GRU Alexander Zorin, and the Deputy Head of the Main Directorate of International Military Cooperation in the Russian MoD Viktor Shevtsov.[7]
Medinsky explicitly described the May 2025 Russian-Ukrainian negotiations in Istanbul as a continuation of the early 2022 Istanbul negotiations during which Russia issued demands that were tantamount to Ukraine's complete capitulation. Medinsky told journalists on May 15 in Istanbul that Russia considers the May 2025 negotiations a "continuation" of previous negotiations in Istanbul in April 2022, which he claimed Ukraine interrupted.[8] Medinsky is reiterating Putin's May 11 framing that the new bilateral negotiations in Istanbul would be based on the April 2022 Istanbul protocols draft agreement, which included terms that would have amounted to Ukraine's surrender and left Ukraine helpless to defend against potential future Russian aggression.[9] The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) and the New York Times (NYT) reported in March and June 2024 that they both obtained several versions of the Istanbul protocols draft agreement.[10] The draft protocols demanded that Ukraine forego its NATO membership aspirations and amend its constitution to add a neutrality provision that would ban Ukraine from joining any military alliances. The draft protocols also would have banned Ukraine from hosting foreign military personnel, trainers, or weapon systems in Ukraine. Russia demanded that it, the United States, the United Kingdom (UK), the People's Republic of China (PRC), France, and Belarus serve as security guarantors of the agreement. Russia demanded that the guarantor states “terminate international treaties and agreements incompatible with the permanent neutrality [of Ukraine]," including military aid agreements. Russia demanded that Ukraine limit its military to 85,000 soldiers, 342 tanks, and 519 artillery systems as part of the Istanbul protocols. Russia additionally demanded that Ukrainian missiles be limited to a range of 40 kilometers (25 miles), a range that would allow Russian forces to deploy critical systems and materiel close to Ukraine without fear of strikes.
Russia demanded these terms in the first and second months of its full-scale invasion when Russian troops were advancing on Kyiv City and making significant gains throughout northeastern, eastern, and southern Ukraine. Russia is now attempting to reiterate these same demands after three years of war, despite the fact that Ukrainian forces have since successfully forced Russia to withdraw from northern Ukraine, liberated significant swaths of territory in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts, and blunted the Russian rate of advance across the theater. Medinsky is purposefully attempting to frame the May 2025 talks as a continuation of the April 2022 Istanbul negotiations to portray Russia's demands for Ukraine's surrender as legitimate, despite the fact that Ukraine is now in a much stronger battlefield position on the battlefield than in April 2022 and the Russian military is much weaker than in the early months of the full-scale invasion.
Medinsky also reiterated Putin's longstanding demands that any resolution to the war must result in regime change in Ukraine and restrictions on NATO. Medinsky claimed that Russia's goal for the May 2025 Istanbul negotiations is to "establish long-term peace by eliminating the root causes" of the war.[11] Russian officials routinely demand that any peace agreement address the war's "root causes," which Russian officials define as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to expand into eastern Europe and along Russia's borders in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s, and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine.[12] Russian officials have leveraged claims that Ukraine has mistreated Russian speakers in Ukraine to justify the Kremlin's demands for regime change in Ukraine, the establishment of a pro-Russian proxy government in Kyiv, and Russia's occupation and illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory. Medinsky's attempt to frame May 2025 Istanbul negotiations as peace talks contradicts stated Ukrainian, US, and European efforts to first establish a longer-term ceasefire in Ukraine that would precede peace negotiations.[13] Medinsky's framing echoes consistent Russian rejections of this sequence of events, which Ukraine and the United States have consistently supported.[14]
Reported Kremlin instructions to Russian media explaining how to cover the Istanbul negotiations indicate that the Kremlin is preparing the Russian population for a longer war in Ukraine and is not interested in engaging in good-faith negotiations that require compromises from both sides. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on May 15 that it acquired a manual that Russian media received from the Presidential Administration's political bloc with instructions about how to cover the negotiations in Istanbul.[15] The manual reportedly instructed Russian media to explain Medinsky's participation in the Russian delegation as "logical" since he led the Russian delegation in Istanbul in 2022 and is continuing this work. A political strategist who works with the Kremlin told Meduza that Russian officials overseeing domestic policy assess that the Istanbul talks will end in "deadlock" and that the Kremlin assesses that the West will likely impose new sanctions in response to such "deadlock." The manual reportedly advises Russian media to preemptively talk about a "new package of sanctions" while claiming that new sanctions will not harm Russia's development as Russia "successfully copes with the challenges of any sanctions." Russian media should reportedly vaguely say that "negotiations are taking place on worse terms for Ukraine" than three years ago, but the manual does not explain how current battlefield realities where Russia controls much less of Ukraine are "worse terms." The Presidential Administration's claim that the May 2025 negotiations are taking place on "worse terms" for Ukraine compared to 2022 is an attempt to posture Russian military strength and battlefield successes while ignoring Ukraine's significant battlefield successes and ability to slow Russian advances in the last three years of the war. This claim also ignores significant Russian losses among elite forces and increasing reliance on poorly trained recruits. The Presidential Administration's reported framing of the negotiations demonstrates that Russia expects Ukraine to refuse the terms the Russian delegation will present in Istanbul as Ukraine would not accept terms tantamount to its surrender. Russia similarly issued ultimatums to Ukraine, the West, and NATO in 2021 before it launched its full-scale invasion in 2022 certainly knowing that NATO and Ukraine would not undergo the transformations to their core charters, constitutions, and principles required to meet the Russian demands.[16] The West rejected Russia's pre-war ultimatums, allowing Russia to establish superficial justifications for its subsequent full-scale invasion. Russia's continued insistence on its 2022 Istanbul demands in May 2025 demonstrates that Russia continues to only be interested in a full Ukrainian surrender, is unwilling to offer compromises in any good-faith negotiations, and is prepared to continue the war to achieve its goal of Ukrainian surrender.
Key Takeaways:
- Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's invitation to engage in bilateral negotiations in Istanbul and continues refusing to offer concessions to end the war in Ukraine.
- The Russian delegation in Istanbul does not include officials in Putin's innermost circle and is largely the same delegation that Russia sent to the Russian-Ukrainian negotiations in 2022 in Istanbul.
- Medinsky explicitly described the May 2025 Russian-Ukrainian negotiations in Istanbul as a continuation of the early 2022 Istanbul negotiations during which Russia issued demands that were tantamount to Ukraine's complete capitulation.
- Medinsky also reiterated Putin's longstanding demands that any resolution to the war must result in regime change in Ukraine and restrictions on NATO.
- Reported Kremlin instructions to Russian media explaining how to cover the Istanbul negotiations indicate that the Kremlin is preparing the Russian population for a longer war in Ukraine and is not interested in engaging in good-faith negotiations that require compromises from both sides.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Novopavlivka, and Velyka Novosilka.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 14, 2025
Russian officials continue to reiterate Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent call to base future negotiations with Ukraine on the early 2022 Istanbul protocols that included Russian demands for Ukraine's complete capitulation. Russian Ambassador-at-Large and former Russian occupation official, Rodion Miroshnik, claimed on May 14 that the April 2022 draft Istanbul protocols could be the basis for an agreement to end Russia's war in Ukraine.[1] Miroshnik is echoing Putin's May 11 call to "resume" the 2022 Istanbul direct negotiations in response to the May 10 joint US-Ukrainian-European proposal for a 30-day minimum general ceasefire.[2] Miroshnik noted that Russia and Ukraine could make "adjustments" to the 2022 Istanbul protocols to account for changes in the past three years, but specifically insisted that Russia's April 2022 demands that Ukraine significantly reduce its military capabilities and amend its constitution to add a neutrality provision that would ban Ukraine from joining any military alliances — including NATO — remain unchanged. Putin and Miroshnik are deliberately reiterating Russia's terms in the Istanbul protocols because the protocols included terms that would have amounted to Ukraine's surrender and left Ukraine helpless to defend against potential future Russian aggression — aims that the Kremlin continues to pursue.[3] The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) and the New York Times (NYT) reported in March and June 2024 that they both obtained several versions of the draft protocols from the April 2022 Ukrainian-Russian peace negotiations in Istanbul.[4] The draft protocols also would have banned Ukraine from hosting foreign military personnel, trainers, or weapon systems in Ukraine. Russia demanded that it, the United States, the United Kingdom (UK), the People's Republic of China (PRC), France, and Belarus serve as security guarantors of the agreement. Russia demanded that the guarantor states “terminate international treaties and agreements incompatible with the permanent neutrality [of Ukraine]," including military aid agreements. Russia demanded that Ukraine limit its military to 85,000 soldiers, 342 tanks, and 519 artillery systems as part of the Istanbul protocols. Russia additionally demanded that Ukrainian missiles be limited to a range of 40 kilometers (25 miles), a range that would allow Russian forces to deploy critical systems and materiel close to Ukraine without fear of strikes.
Russia demanded these terms in the first and second months of the full-scale invasion when Russian troops were advancing on Kyiv City and making gains throughout northeastern, eastern, and southern Ukraine. Russia is now attempting to reiterate these same demands after three years of war, despite the fact that Ukrainian forces have since successfully forced Russia to withdraw from northern Ukraine, liberated significant swaths of territory in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts, and blunted the Russian rate of advance across the theater. Miroshnik's observation that Russia and Ukraine could adjust aspects of the Istanbul protocols to reflect the changes in the war over the past three years is an attempt to frame the Kremlin as willing to negotiate, which obfuscates the fact that Russia has actually maintained its long-term goal of total Ukrainian surrender. Putin, Miroshnik, and other Russian officials continue to demand Ukraine's full surrender in an attempt to secure Russia's strategic goals by drawing out negotiations while continuing to make battlefield gains.[5]
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov also reiterated the Kremlin's demands that any resolution to the war must result in regime change in Ukraine and restrictions against the West ahead of negotiations in Istanbul. Ryabkov stated on May 13 that the upcoming Istanbul discussions would need to address the "primary sources" of the war in order to achieve a sustainable end to the war, likely alluding to Russia's continued demand that any peace agreement address the war's "root causes."[6] Ryabkov also reiterated the claim that Ukraine must continue to "denazify." Russian officials repeatedly invoke the term "denazification" to demand regime change in Ukraine and the installation of a pro-Russian proxy government in Kyiv.[7] Russian officials have defined the "root causes" of the war as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to expand into eastern Europe and along Russia's borders in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s, and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine.[8] Ryabkov's statements reflect the Kremlin's long-standing effort to achieve its pre-war demands that call for NATO to abandon its open-door policy and for the installation of a pro-Russian proxy government in Kyiv, despite recent Kremlin efforts to feign interest in good-faith negotiations.
Polling from early May 2025 indicates that the majority of Ukrainians support Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as the legitimate leader of Ukraine and are against holding elections before a final end to the war — in accordance with Ukrainian law and the Ukrainian Constitution. The Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) published a survey conducted from May 2 to 12 that showed that 74 percent of respondents trust Zelensky — an increase from 69 percent in March 2025.[9] The May 2025 KIIS poll showed that 71 percent of respondents do not support holding elections after a ceasefire, even if Ukraine receives security guarantees, and instead think that Ukraine should hold elections only after the establishment of a final peace agreement and a complete end to the war. KIIS noted that the majority of respondents in all regions of Ukraine support Zelensky and do not support holding elections until after the end of the war. The poll's majority opinion that elections should not occur until after the end of the war is in line with Ukraine's law on martial law and the Ukrainian Constitution, which stipulate that Ukraine cannot hold elections during martial law and cannot lift martial law while "the threat of attack or danger to the state independence of Ukraine and its territorial integrity" remains.[10] The Kremlin has repeatedly tried to weaponize Zelensky's alleged "illegitimacy" to reject and delay ceasefire proposals and negotiations and to set conditions to renege on any future agreements Russia may sign with Ukraine.[11] The Kremlin has also repeatedly attempted to justify its invasions of Ukraine by claiming that large portions of eastern and southern Ukraine want to join Russia.[12] The KIIS poll — the results of which were relatively consistent across all regions of Ukraine - undermines these Kremlin narratives.
Key Takeaways:
- Russian officials continue to reiterate Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent call to base future negotiations with Ukraine on the early 2022 Istanbul protocols that included Russian demands for Ukraine's complete capitulation.
- Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov also reiterated the Kremlin's demands that any resolution to the war must result in regime change in Ukraine and restrictions against the West ahead of negotiations in Istanbul.
- Polling from early May 2025 indicates that the majority of Ukrainians support Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as the legitimate leader of Ukraine and are against holding elections before a final end to the war — in accordance with Ukrainian law and the Ukrainian Constitution.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 13, 2025
The Russian military is reportedly generating enough forces to replace losses and is reinforcing the size of the Russian force grouping in Ukraine despite experiencing an increased casualty rate per square kilometer gained. Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be embracing significant losses in exchange for diminishing returns to make battlefield gains and manage perceptions about Russia’s military capabilities to pressure Ukraine in negotiations. Putin stated on May 13 that 50,000 to 60,000 people voluntarily join the Russian military per month.[1] Putin gave this figure as part of a statement claiming that Russia has a higher monthly recruitment than Ukraine and therefore may be exaggerating these recruitment figures to posture a large Russian military amid ongoing negotiations with Ukraine and the West, however. Putin did not explicitly state when Russian recruitment levels hit 50,000 to 60,000 personnel each month, but previous Ukrainian and Russian statements imply that Russia may have aimed to reach this monthly recruitment figure in 2025. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov gave recruitment figures at the end of 2024, indicating that Russia is recruiting just enough military personnel to replace its recent casualty rates.[2] Russian Security Council Secretary Dmitry Medvedev stated in late January 2025 that roughly 450,000 people signed Russian military service contracts, that an additional 40,000 people joined Russian volunteer formations in 2024, and that the Russian military aimed to "maintain this momentum."[3] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Head Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated in early March 2025 that Russia's recruitment plans for 2025 will "mostly" allow the Russian military command to replace its battlefield losses should the current tempo of offensive operations and losses continue.[4] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated in April 2024 that Russian forces are "increasing the number" of personnel in Ukraine by 8,000 to 9,000 new personnel per month through contract recruitment and that the Russian force grouping fighting against Ukraine increased from about 603,000 on January 1, 2025, to 623,000 just over three months later.[5] Syrskyi stated on May 13 that Russian forces have suffered 177,000 casualties in Ukraine since the start of 2025.[6] Syrskyi's and Putin's figures indicate that Russia may be generating enough forces to replace losses while also increasing the overall size of its force grouping in Ukraine.
Russia continues to tolerate personnel losses comparable to the casualty rate Russian forces sustained during a period of intensified advances in Fall 2024, despite a slowed rate of advance in the first four months of 2025.[7] Russian forces are likely able to generate enough forces to sustain their replacement rate and increase the size of the Russian force grouping in Ukraine by rapidly deploying low quality troops to frontline units. ISW has repeatedly observed reports that new Russian recruits only receive a month of training before deploying to Ukraine, and this limited training is likely constraining recruits' combat capabilities and the Russian military's overall capacity to successfully conduct complex operations.[8] The Russian military is currently prioritizing sending poorly-trained recruits into highly-attritional infantry assaults to make grinding advances — despite enduring a higher casualty rate per square kilometer gained — in an effort to pressure Ukraine and the West into acquiescing to Russian demands amid ongoing negotiations. Russia is also attempting to prolong negotiations to extract additional concessions from the United States and while making additional battlefield advances.
The Russian military may also be prioritizing recruitment as part of longer-term efforts to build out a post-war strategic reserve for a potential future conflict with NATO. US European Command (EUCOM) Commander and NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Christopher Cavoli informed the US Senate Armed Services Committee in April 2025 that the Russian military is reconstituting and expanding its force structure and materiel production at a faster rate than most Western analysts anticipated, despite suffering approximately 790,000 casualties since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022.[9] Cavoli stated that the Russian military command has deployed over 600,000 soldiers to the frontlines in Ukraine, which is nearly double the size of Russia's initial invasion force and is consistent with Syrskyi's report that there are 623,000 Russian military personnel in Ukraine. Putin signed a decree in September 2024 ordering the Russian military to establish a 1.5 million combat-ready force, indicating his long-term interests in increasing the size of the Russian military.[10] Cavoli's report coheres with recent indicators signaling that Russia is expanding and upgrading military bases, barracks, training grounds, warehouses, and railways near Petrozavodsk, Republic of Karelia, to support a future influx of personnel.[11] Russia is also integrating railways and roadways in the Moscow Military District (MMD) with Belarusian infrastructure. ISW has long assessed that Russia's restoration of the MMD and Leningrad Military District (LMD) is part of the Kremlin's long-term restructuring effort to prepare for a potential large-scale conventional war against NATO.
The Russian military command appears to be establishing a tactical doctrine and force structure for motorcycle and civilian vehicles units in frontal assaults, underscoring the Russian military's efforts to offset Ukraine’s drone advantages and achieve maneuver in modern ground warfare. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on May 13 that the Russian military command has developed a series of standards in equipping frontline units with motorcycles, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and Chinese- and Russian-made buggies.[12] Mashovets stated that Russia is working to equip every battalion with up to 30 motorcycles, up to 20 ATVs, and up to six buggies; every platoon with up to nine motorcycles, up to 20 ATVs, and up to six buggies; and every "Storm V" penal recruit assault company with up to 15 motorcycles, up to 20 ATVs, and up to three buggies. Mashovets noted that the Russian military command is struggling to source enough motorcycles to equip every unit to the standard level and that equipment rates between frontline units vary considerably as a result. Mashovets stated that the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army (CAA) (formerly the 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) had up to 1,125 motorcycles, up to 975 ATVs, and 210-215 buggies as of end of April and beginning of May 2025 and noted that other Russian CAAs have varying equipment allocations depending on the number of assault companies and platoons within the CAA. Ukrainian and Russian sources previously suggested that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is working to formalize Russian motorcycle usage, and the appearance of a defined doctrinal organization and allocation for motorcycle units within the Russian military is consistent with this effort.[13]
Russian forces currently appear to be utilizing motorcycles in tandem with armored vehicles, although Russian units may begin conducting assaults exclusively with motorcycles in the future. Mashovets stated that Russian units currently prefer to use motorcycles in tandem with infantry and armored vehicles.[14] The Russian military appears to be undergoing a transition period and moving towards regularly conducting assaults exclusively on motorcycles, although Russian forces may also continue to conduct these combined assaults if Russian commanders assess that motorcycle assaults are less successful. The Russian military may also continue to rely on combined assaults if the Russian MoD cannot improve its abilities to supply Russian units with motorcycles; however, as Mashovets noted that Russian servicemembers are continuing to rely on volunteer organizations to supply some units with motorcycles.[15] ISW previously noted that Russian motorcycle usage is a response to Ukrainian drone innovations and an attempt to offset the significant armored vehicle losses that Russian forces sustained in 2024 and possibly conserve some tanks and armored vehicles for future use.[16] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will likely increasingly depend on motorcycles and other quicker, unarmored vehicles, as slower-moving vehicles have become a hazard on the more transparent battlefield of Ukraine.[17] The Russian military will likely retain its lessons learned in Ukraine beyond the war in Ukraine.
Ukrainian officials recently clarified that a September 2022 presidential decree does not preclude Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky from negotiating with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Zelensky signed a decree on September 30, 2022, prohibiting Ukrainian negotiations with Putin.[18] Zelensky told journalists during a press briefing on May 13 that Russian officials are misrepresenting the decree as an obstacle to negotiations as the decree is intended to prevent Ukrainian persons besides Zelensky from negotiating with Putin on Ukraine’s behalf, rather than restricting Zelensky from exercising his “[constitutional] rights and duties,” as Ukraine’s head negotiator.[19] Chairperson of Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada Foreign Affairs Committee Oleksandr Merezhko reiterated this point to Ukrainian English-language news outlet Kyiv Independent on May 13 and stated that Ukraine’s Constitution "clearly" specifies Zelensky as Ukraine’s chief negotiator and noted that Zelensky’s constitutional powers allow him to override past decrees.[20] Ukrainian Presidential Advisor Mykhailo Podolyak stated on May 13 that Zelensky will only negotiate with Putin in Istanbul, as lower-level officials from either country would lack the authority to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine.[21] Russian officials routinely cite this decree as an "obstacle" to negotiations despite ongoing Ukrainian outreach to Russia to engage in good-faith negotiations.[22]
Key Takeaways:
- The Russian military is reportedly generating enough forces to replace losses and is reinforcing the size of the Russian force grouping in Ukraine despite experiencing an increased casualty rate per square kilometer gained. Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be embracing significant losses in exchange for diminishing returns to make battlefield gains and manage perceptions about Russia’s military capabilities to pressure Ukraine in negotiations.
- The Russian military may also be prioritizing recruitment as part of longer-term efforts to build out a post-war strategic reserve for a potential future conflict with NATO.
- Ukrainian officials recently clarified that a September 2022 presidential decree does not preclude Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky from negotiating with Russian President Vladimir Putin.
- The Russian military command appears to be establishing a tactical doctrine and force structure for motorcycle and civilian vehicles units in frontal assaults, underscoring the Russian military's efforts to offset Ukraine’s drone advantages and achieve maneuver in modern ground warfare.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Lyman, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 12, 2025
Russian officials appear to be setting conditions for Russian President Vladimir Putin to reject Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's invitation to meet on May 15 in Istanbul for bilateral ceasefire negotiations. Russian Federation Council Deputy Speaker Konstantin Kosachev responded to Zelensky on May 12 and claimed that Zelensky’s invitation is "pure spectacle” and “comedy.”[1] Kosachev claimed that high-level meetings are not organized in “such a difficult situation” and accused Zelensky of trying to blame Russia for what he claimed was Ukraine's disinterest in negotiations. Russian Ambassador-at-Large Rodion Miroshnik questioned the intentions behind Zelensky's invitation to Putin to meet in Istanbul.[2] Russian State Duma Committee on International Affairs Deputy Chairperson Alexei Chepa expressed doubt on May 12 that Putin will travel to Istanbul to meet with Zelensky.[3] Chepa insinuated that Russia cannot trust Ukraine in any negotiations because Ukraine has violated previous agreements and unilaterally imposed Russian ceasefires. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed on May 12 that Zelensky is trying to co-opt the ongoing discussion around negotiations by inviting Putin to Istanbul and making Putin seem intransigent if he does not attend.[4] Kremlin-level officials have not formally responded to Zelensky's invitation as of this report, although statements from lower-level Russian officials indicate that Putin will likely not travel to Istanbul and meet with Zelensky.
Putin has engaged in significant rhetorical efforts to prepare the Russian public for a long-term war effort — and not a near-term peace agreement — including by promoting the false narrative that Zelensky and the Ukrainian government are illegitimate.[5] Putin and Russian officials often use this narrative to justify Russia’s refusal to engage in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine and to further Russia's strategic war goal of establishing a pro-Russian puppet government in Kyiv. Putin may assess that the Kremlin would need to adjust or completely retract this narrative in order to rhetorically prepare the Russian public for direct negotiations with Zelensky before such meetings. Putin notably referred to the "Kyiv authorities" rather than Zelensky or the Ukrainian government in his invitation to negotiate in Istanbul.[6] Senior Kremlin officials most recently reiterated this false narrative in late April, and Russian media continues to reiterate this narrative in publications as of May 12.[7] ISW has not observed any indications that the Kremlin will alter or abandon this rhetoric. Putin may instead choose to let this narrative lie dormant for now and intensify this rhetoric should Russia and Ukraine sign a peace agreement in order to set conditions for Russia to justify reneging on any future peace agreement and relaunching the war at the time of Russia's choosing. Any long-term peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine must include Russia's explicit recognition of the legitimacy of the Ukrainian president, government, and the Ukrainian Constitution.
Russia has reportedly deployed a largely ceremonial regiment of the Federal Security Service (FSB) to the frontline in Donetsk Oblast, likely in an effort to generate fear of more rapid future Russian advances. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction reported on May 12 that elements of the elite Russian FSB Presidential Regiment are reinforcing Russian forces attempting to seize Chasiv Yar.[8] This regiment reports directly to Russian President Vladimir Putin and is primarily responsible for fulfilling honor guard duties at state functions and guarding Russian officials, the Kremlin, and the Eternal Flame at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier near the Kremlin Wall.[9] ISW has not previously observed the regiment operating in Ukraine. Russian state media reported in 2014 and 2016 that the unit is approximately the size of a motorized rifle brigade and is composed of conscripts and contract soldiers.[10] Putin and other Russian officials have repeatedly promised the Russian population that conscripts, whose military service is mandated by Russian law, will not be deployed to fight in Ukraine after utilizing conscripts in combat operations during the initial months of the war.[11]
Russian state media reporting suggests that elements of the Presidential Regiment likely lack the training and combat experience necessary to successfully reinforce Russian operations near Chasiv Yar and the longer-term Russian effort to seize the Ukrainian fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast. The Russian military command’s decision to deploy the Presidential Regiment to fight in Ukraine is likely part of a larger Russian effort to intimidate Ukraine and the West through intensified battlefield activity and portray Russian forces as elite and fully capable of achieving significant successes in Ukraine in the near future. The Russian military command may also be trying to feed any manpower available into the Chasiv Yar area due to its apparent effort to prioritize offensive operations against Kostyantynivka in recent months.[12] Russian forces are currently prioritizing quickly replenishing frontline units with new recruits to maintain the battlefield initiative in Ukraine over building up a pool of well-trained operational reserves, which is in turn hindering Russian forces' ability to conduct sophisticated operations and penetrate Ukrainian defenses.[13] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces lack the capacity to make significant battlefield advances in the near future, however, and that Russian officials are leveraging Russia's retention of the battlefield initiative to strengthen their negotiating position.[14]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian officials appear to be setting conditions for Russian President Vladimir Putin to reject Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's invitation to meet on May 15 in Istanbul for bilateral ceasefire negotiations.
- Russia has reportedly deployed a largely ceremonial regiment of the Federal Security Service (FSB) to the frontline in Donetsk Oblast, likely in an effort to generate fear of more rapid future Russian advances.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction. Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka directions.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 11, 2025
Russian President Vladimir Putin called for Russia and Ukraine to resume bilateral negotiations based on the early 2022 Istanbul protocols that include Russian demands amounting to full Ukrainian surrender. Any agreement based on those protocols would be a capitulation document. Putin spoke to media organizations on the night of May 10 to 11, following the joint US-Ukrainian-European proposal for a general ceasefire at least 30 days long beginning on May 12.[1] Putin did not agree to the joint US-Ukrainian-European proposal and instead proposed that Russia and Ukraine "resume" the direct negotiations that he claimed "[Ukraine] interrupted" in 2022 on May 15.[2] Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov stated that Russia will soon announce its delegation to the resumed negotiations in Istanbul and that such negotiations should account for "developments of the 2022 talks."[3]
Putin and Ushakov are referring to Russia's April 2022 Istanbul protocols draft agreement, which included terms that would have amounted to Ukraine's surrender and left Ukraine helpless to defend against potential future Russian aggression.[4] The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) and the New York Times (NYT) reported in March and June 2024 that both publications obtained several versions of the draft protocols from the April 2022 Ukrainian-Russian peace negotiations in Istanbul.[5] The draft protocols demanded that Ukraine forego its NATO membership aspirations and amend its constitution to add a neutrality provision that would ban Ukraine from joining any military alliances, concluding military agreements, or hosting foreign military personnel, trainers, or weapon systems in Ukraine. Russia also demanded that it, the United States, the United Kingdom (UK), the People's Republic of China (PRC), France, and Belarus serve as security guarantors of the agreement. Russia demanded that the guarantor states “terminate international treaties and agreements incompatible with the permanent neutrality [of Ukraine]," including military aid agreements. Russia demanded to limit the Ukrainian military to 85,000 soldiers, 342 tanks, and 519 artillery systems as part of the Istanbul protocols. Russia additionally demanded that Ukrainian missiles be limited to a range of 40 kilometers (25 miles), a range that would allow Russian forces to deploy critical systems and materiel close to Ukraine without fear of strikes.
Russia insisted on these terms in the first and second months of the war when Russian troops were advancing on Kyiv City and throughout northeastern, eastern, and southern Ukraine. Russia is now attempting to reiterate these same demands after three years of war, despite the fact that Ukrainian forces have since successfully forced Russia to withdraw from northern Ukraine, liberated significant swaths of territory in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts, and blunted the Russian rate of advance across the theater. Putin is rejecting the joint US-Ukrainian-European proposal for a general ceasefire and instead continues to demand Ukrainian surrender in an attempt to secure his strategic goals by drawing out negotiations while continuing to make battlefield gains.
Putin also continues to demand that any negotiations address Russia's perceived "root causes" of the war in Ukraine. Putin stated during the press conference that the purpose of renewed bilateral Russian-Ukrainian negotiations would be to "eliminate the root causes" of the war in Ukraine.[6] Putin suggested that Russia and Ukraine could pursue a ceasefire as part of these renewed negotiations, but claimed that a "real truce" should not enable the "rearmament" and "replenishment" of the Ukrainian military. The Kremlin has repeatedly claimed that Russia must eliminate the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine, which Russian officials have defined as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to expand into Eastern Europe and along Russia's borders in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s, and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine.[7] Kremlin officials recently claimed that any ceasefire agreement should limit Ukraine's ability to mobilize and train new troops and receive Western military aid, while failing to offer similar concessions for Russia to limit its own force generation and defense production efforts.[8] Calls for the elimination of these alleged "root causes" and limitations on Ukraine's force generation capabilities are in line with Putin's demands for Ukrainian neutrality, as well as Putin's pre-war demand that would have required NATO to roll back to its pre-1997 borders.[9]
Putin is attempting to manipulate ongoing discussions about a ceasefire and future peace in Ukraine, likely in an effort to undermine Ukrainian-US-European unity around a comprehensive 30-day ceasefire in Ukraine. Kremlin officials have recently intensified their engagement with Western media in an effort to message directly to the Trump administration and American public and portray Russia's terms for Ukraine's surrender as reasonable.[10] Putin's May 11 press conference and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov's recent interviews with Western media are part of an attempt to inject Kremlin narratives into the Western information space aimed at convincing the West that Russia is able to conquer all of Ukraine militarily and scaring Ukraine and the West into conceding to Russia's demands.[11] Putin's rhetorical posturing is an attempt to conceal limitations in the Russian military's capabilities and distract from Russia's failure to make any significant progress on the battlefield over the last two years. Putin and other Kremlin officials firmly maintain their war aims that amount to Ukraine's full capitulation and have thus far refused to consider any peace deal that does not concede to all of Russia's demands.[12] The Kremlin is falsely portraying itself as willing to engage in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine while continuing to attack frontline Ukrainian positions and setting conditions for further military aggression against Ukraine and NATO in the coming years.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan accepted Russian President Vladimir Putin's proposal to hold bilateral negotiations in Turkey on May 15. Zelensky stated that he will personally wait for Putin in Turkey and that Ukraine is waiting for Russia to agree to the US-Ukrainian-European general ceasefire proposal.[13] Putin discussed renewing the 2022 Istanbul negotiations in a call with Erdogan on May 11, and Erdogan expressed support for resuming talks.[14] Erdogan noted during his call with Putin that a comprehensive ceasefire would "create the necessary environment" for peace talks.[15] European officials largely called on Putin to agree to a comprehensive ceasefire agreement before beginning bilateral peace negotiations with Ukraine.[16]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian President Vladimir Putin called for Russia and Ukraine to resume bilateral negotiations based on the early 2022 Istanbul protocols that include Russian demands amounting to full Ukrainian surrender. Any agreement based on those protocols would be a capitulation document.
- Putin also continues to demand that any negotiations address Russia's perceived "root causes" of the war in Ukraine.
- Putin is attempting to manipulate ongoing discussions about a ceasefire and future peace in Ukraine, likely in an effort to undermine Ukrainian-US-European unity around a comprehensive 30-day ceasefire in Ukraine.
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan accepted Russian President Vladimir Putin's proposal to hold bilateral negotiations in Turkey on May 15.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced in the northern Kharkiv and Novopavlivka directions.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 10, 2025
[Note: The Ukrainian General Staff's 2200 May 9 SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from 0000 to 2200 on May 9. The Ukrainian General Staff's 0800 May 10 SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from 0800 on May 0 to 0800 on May 10. The Ukrainian General Staff's 1600 May 10 SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from 0000 to 1600 on May 10. Any reports of Russian ground activity in these SITREPs are implicit accusations that Russian forces violated Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire.]
Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov rejected another US-Ukrainian general ceasefire proposal on May 10 amid continued Russian demands that any future ceasefire include conditions that support Russia's long-term goal of gaining control of all of Ukraine and would allow Russia to resume offensive operations from a more advantageous position at a time of its choosing. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced following the Coalition of the Willing meeting in Kyiv on May 10 that he, European officials, and US President Donald Trump are proposing a general ceasefire at least 30 days long beginning on May 12.[i] Zelensky called on Russian officials to respond to the proposal and stated that Europe and the United States should impose additional sanctions on Russia's energy and banking sectors if Russia fails to agree to the ceasefire proposal. Peskov responded by claiming that Ukraine has not responded to Russian President Vladimir Putin's previous ceasefire proposals and that pressuring Russia is "useless."[ii] Peskov claimed during an interview with ABC News published on May 10 that Putin supported the idea of a ceasefire but has "questions" about how a ceasefire will account for recent and possible future Russian advances in Ukraine, Ukrainian mobilization, and Western military assistance to Ukraine.[iii] Peskov reiterated Putin's previous demands for the West to stop all military aid to Ukraine and force Ukraine to stop mobilizing and training servicemembers as a condition of a ceasefire. Putin criticized the initial March 13 US-Ukrainian general ceasefire proposal and insinuated that any ceasefire agreement should limit Ukraine's ability to mobilize and train new troops and receive military aid.[iv]
Putin, Peskov, and other Russian officials have not yet offered any comparable concessions, such as stopping Russia's own force generation and defense industrial efforts, as part of a ceasefire agreement. Russian officials appear to be trying to define the conditions of any and all ceasefires in a way that facilitates further Russian battlefield gains in the short term and supports Russia's ability to attack Ukraine again in the future. Peskov also claimed that Ukraine is trying to leverage ceasefire proposals to "escape from negotiations," questioning Trump's stated objective of using a general ceasefire as a building block to precede peace negotiations.[v]
The UK and French-led Coalition of the Willing expressed support for the US-Ukrainian proposal of a general ceasefire of 30 days or more on May 10. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with the Coalition of the Willing during a semi-virtual summit on May 10, consisting of officials from Lithuania, Romania, Finland, Belgium, Bulgaria, Greece, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Italy, Canada, Latvia, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Sweden, Australia, Croatia, Iceland, Spain, Portugal, Turkey, the European Commission, and the European Council.[vi] Zelensky welcomed French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk in Kyiv for the summit.[vii] The Coalition of the Willing and NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte expressed support for the US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal.[viii] Macron stated that the coalition is working on a proposal to deploy a military contingent to Ukraine and that the coalition will hold a series of meetings in the coming weeks.[ix] NBC News reported that Ukraine, the United States, and European partners formulated a term sheet with a list of conditions for Russia to consider.[x] The document, according to an unspecified Western official, contains 22 proposals, including the 30-day general ceasefire. Reuters reported on May 9 that a French diplomatic source stated that US and European partners are finalizing the 30-day ceasefire proposal and new sanction packages if Russia refuses the proposal.[xi]
Iran will reportedly deliver short-range ballistic missile launchers to Russia for use in Ukraine. Reuters reported on May 10, citing two Western security officials and a regional official, that Iran is preparing to provide Russia with an unspecified number of Fath-360 launchers in the near future.[xii] The officials stated that Russia likely intends to use these launchers with the short-range ballistic missiles that Iran provided to Russia in Fall 2024. A Ukrainian military source told The Times in September 2024 that Iran provided over 200 Fath-360 ballistic missiles to Russia.[xiii] US European Command (EUCOM) Commander and NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Christopher Cavoli stated in April 2024 that Iran has provided over 400 short-range ballistic missiles and "hundreds of thousands" of artillery shells to Russia.[xiv] ISW has not observed reports of the Russian military launching Iranian-provided missiles against Ukraine, however. Iran began providing Russia with Shahed drones in Fall 2022, and Russia began producing and using its own Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 analogues (which Russia calls Geran-1 and Geran-2, respectively) with imported Iranian components and using Iranian production licenses as early as summer 2023.[xv] Russia continues to deepen military cooperation with Iran, North Korea, and the People's Republic of China (PRC), and Russia's use of Iranian missiles against Ukraine would mark a significant intensification of Russian-Iranian relations.[xvi]
The United States Embassy in Kyiv issued a statement on May 9 warning of a significant Russian air strike against Ukraine over the next several days -- potentially involving Oreshnik medium-range ballistic missiles.[xvii] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported on May 10 that the Russian government plans to close the airspace over Volgograd and Saratov oblasts near the Kapustin Yar missile launch site in Astrakhan Oblast, where Russian forces reportedly store Oreshnik missiles, from 0600 May 12 to 1600 May 13 Moscow time.[xviii] Russian milbloggers asserted that the airspace closure is typical for combat and test launches of ballistic missiles and claimed that the closure suggests Russia might conduct an Oreshnik strike on Kyiv City.[xix]
US and Western military support remains vital to Ukraine's ability to defend itself against Russian aggression. Deputy Head of the Verkhovna Rada's Committee on National Security, Defense and Intelligence, Yehor Chernev, told The New York Times (NYT) in a May 10 article that Ukraine is "running low" on long-range missiles, artillery, and ballistic missile defense systems.[xx] An unspecified congressional official told the NYT that the United States recently approved Germany’s transfer of 125 long-range artillery rockets and 100 Patriot air defense missiles to Ukraine. A Western intelligence official stated that the Ukrainian military has improved its ability to "ration" Patriot air defense missiles by using cheaper interceptors to target smaller threats. Patriot air defense systems are essential to maintaining Ukraine's air defense umbrella, as Soviet-era and other Western-provided air defense systems are unable to intercept Russian ballistic missiles.
Key Takeaways:
- Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov rejected another US-Ukrainian general ceasefire proposal on May 10 amid continued Russian demands that any future ceasefire include conditions that support Russia's long-term goal of gaining control of all of Ukraine and would allow Russia to resume offensive operations from a more advantageous position at a time of its choosing.
- The UK and French-led Coalition of the Willing expressed support for the US-Ukrainian proposal of a general ceasefire of 30 days or more on May 10.
- Iran will reportedly deliver short-range ballistic missile launchers to Russia for use in Ukraine.
- The United States Embassy in Kyiv issued a statement on May 9 warning of a significant Russian air strike against Ukraine over the next several days -- potentially involving Oreshnik medium-range ballistic missiles.
- US and Western military support remains vital to Ukraine's ability to defend itself against Russian aggression.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast, and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 9, 2025
[Note: The Ukrainian General Staff's 2200 May 8 SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from 0000 to 2200 on May 8. The Ukrainian General Staff's 0800 May 9 SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from 0800 on May 8 to 0800 on May 9. The Ukrainian General Staff's 1600 May 9 SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from 0000 to 1600 on May 9. Any reports of Russian ground activity in these SITREPs are implicit accusations that Russian forces violated Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire.]
Click here to read ISW's in-depth coverage of Russia's May 9 Victory Day holiday.
US President Donald Trump explicitly called for a longer-term ceasefire in Ukraine that would precede peace negotiations — a sequence that Ukraine has consistently supported and that Russia has consistently rejected. Trump stated on May 8 that the United States calls for a 30-day unconditional ceasefire that “must ultimately build toward a peace agreement.”[1] Trump noted that he is committed to securing a Ukrainian-Russian peace with the Europeans. US Vice President JD Vance stated on May 8 that Russia asked for “too much” because Russia perceives that it is winning the war on the battlefield.[2] Vance stated that Russia cannot expect Ukraine to cede territory to Russia that Russian forces have not seized — in reference to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s demand that Ukraine cede territory in eastern and southern Ukraine that Russian forces do not currently occupy.[3] Vance reiterated that the United States wants Ukraine to remain a sovereign country. US President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on May 9 that he is working together with European states to achieve a ceasefire at least 30 days long.[4] Zelensky reported that his May 8 phone call with Trump demonstrated that the United States, Ukraine, and Europe are “on the same page” about the necessity of a full ceasefire. The Kremlin has consistently rejected Ukrainian and American proposals for 30-day ceasefires while blaming Ukraine for the lack of progress towards peace negotiations.[5]
Ukrainian resistance with Western support has prevented Russian forces from seizing any of their self-identified objectives in Ukraine over the past year, depriving Russian President Vladimir Putin of significant battlefield successes to celebrate on Victory Day. Putin did not discuss the battlefield situation in Ukraine during Russia’s Victory Day celebrations in Moscow on May 8 and 9 but claimed that all of Russia supports Russian servicemembers fighting in Ukraine.[6] Russian forces have not seized any significant towns in Ukraine since the seizure of Avdiivka in February 2024, and the only mid-sized settlement that Russian forces have seized in Ukraine since December 2024 is Velyka Novosilka (pre-war population of 5,000).[7] Ukrainian sources previously reported that Russian forces were trying to seize Pokrovsk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and the remaining area of Luhansk Oblast and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast by Victory Day on May 9.[8] Russian forces did not accomplish any of those objectives, and have in fact been trying to seize Pokrovsk, Chasiv Yar, and Toretsk for roughly a year.[9]
Ukrainian long-range strikes and improved integration of tactical drone operations with defensive operations and counterattacks — all enabled by Western military support — have slowed, and in some places stalled, Russian offensive operations in Ukraine. Ukraine’s successful integration of Ukrainian drone innovators and operators with ground forces appears to have stalled Russia’s offensive against Pokrovsk and Toretsk in 2024 and early 2025.[10] Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russian ammunition depots, defense industry facilities, and oil and gas infrastructure have at times compromised Russia’s ability to supply frontline units and have compounded the rising costs of Russia’s war against Ukraine.[11] Ukrainian forces have also intentionally exacerbated other Russian vulnerabilities over the last year, including exacerbating Russia’s shortage of operational reserves by launching the incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024 and forcing the Russian military to redeploy troops from other frontline areas to defend against the incursion.[12]
The only recent military operation that Putin featured on Victory Day was the repulsion of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast. Putin thanked and highlighted North Korean troops at the Victory Day parade on May 9, and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov noted that high-ranking North Korean commanders who participated in recapturing Kursk Oblast attended the parade.[13] Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov declared that Russian forces pushed all Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast on April 26, after almost nine months of Russian operations to push Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast.[14] Russian officials have repeatedly platformed the recapture of Kursk Oblast as a significant military achievement, and ISW previously forecasted that Russian officials would highlight the Kursk operation as part of the Victory Day celebrations.[15] Russian officials’ praise of the Kursk operation ignores the fact that Putin reportedly initially tasked Russian forces with retaking Kursk Oblast by mid-October 2024 and Putin’s continued willingness to extend this timeline throughout Fall 2024 and Winter 2024-2025, prioritizing offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast over retaking Russian territory.[16] Russian officials are also ignoring recent Ukrainian attacks and advances into Tetkino, Kursk Oblast.[17]
Russian officials highlighted technological adaptations and innovations that Russian forces have integrated in Ukraine over the last three years during national and regional Victory Day celebrations. Russian state media posted footage on May 9 showing Russian forces displaying Orlan-10, Orlan-30, and Zala reconnaissance drones; Lancet-51 and Lancer-52 loitering munitions; and Geran and Garpiya long-range strikes drones during the Victory Day parade in Moscow City.[18] Russia state news outlet RIA Novosti posted footage showing Russian forces riding in Chinese-made all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) and Russian-made buggies during a Victory Day parade in Khabarovsk City, Khabarovsk Krai.[19] Russian media also posted footage of Russian forces showcasing tanks equipped with counter drone netting at a Victory Day parade in Yekaterinburg, Sverdlovsk Oblast.[20] Russia’s use of counter drone netting, ATVs, buggies, and motorcycles are all tactical adaptations in response to Ukrainian drone operations. Russian forces have increasingly leveraged reconnaissance and strike drones to destroy frontline Ukrainian positions and damage Ukrainian cities throughout the war in Ukraine. Russian officials appear to be highlighting these weapons, vehicles, and counter-drone adaptations to the Russian public to frame these innovations as a form of “victory” in Ukraine. Russian officials’ willingness to highlight these adaptions during Victory Day parades suggests that the Russian military intends to preserve these adaptions in future military operations rather than reverting to pre-2022 forms of combat.
The Kremlin seized on Russia’s May 9 Victory Day celebrations to posture itself as having broad international support three years into its invasion of Ukraine and especially highlighted Russia’s growing partnerships with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and North Korea. The Kremlin indicated that heads of state and senior representatives of at least 30 states, the heads of the Palestinian Authority and Kremlin-backed separatist region of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the heads of several international organizations — including the Russia-dominated Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) — travelled to Russia for the Victory Day parade and subsequent events on May 9.[21] The Kremlin reported that 55 military units and over 11,500 military personnel in total participated in the parade in Moscow, including military personnel from Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Egypt, the PRC, Laos, Mongolia, and Myanmar.[22]
Russian officials specifically praised the PRC and North Korea for their support, including of the war in Ukraine. Putin gave a speech at the parade in Moscow highlighting the contribution of the “courageous people of China” in Russia’s victory in the Second World War, and Putin sat next to PRC President Xi Jinping at the Victory Day parade.[23] Putin and Xi issued a joint statement on May 8 that referenced Putin’s original war aims in Ukraine and called for the resolution of the war in Ukraine to eliminate the “root causes” of the war — a long-standing Russian talking point and demand for the installation of a pro-Russian government in Ukraine.[24] ISW noted that this joint statement was a notable inflection in PRC rhetoric. Putin expressed well-wishes to North Korean soldiers and hugged a North Korean military veteran at the parade, and Russian state media highlighted this gesture.[25] North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un, his daughter Kim Ju-ae, and several North Korean officials visited the Russian embassy in Pyongyang to commemorate the May 9 Victory Day holiday.[26] Russia is likely attempting to emphasize its deepening relationships with the PRC and North Korea in particular to posture itself as possessing broad international support, including for its war in Ukraine, to a domestic Russian audience and the wider international community.
Putin used the Victory Day holiday to promote the development of a civic Russian identity at odds with Russian ultranationalist efforts to promote ethno-religious nationalism predicated on a Russian state mainly led by and comprised of ethnic Russians. Putin claimed on May 8 at a dinner with foreign delegations in Moscow that May 9 is a “sacred date” for the “multinational people” of Russia.[27] Putin also claimed on May 9 in a speech at the Victory Day parade that the Soviet Union’s “truly iron unity” prevented Nazi Germany from seizing the country.[28] Putin claimed that Russia defends the honor of all Red Army soldiers from different nationalities and that all of the republics in the Soviet Union bore a common burden in the Second World War. Putin additionally said that Central Asia and the South Caucasus made “enormous” contributions in the Second World War. Putin’s efforts to highlight Russia’s and post-Soviet countries’ diverse population as equal contributors to the Soviet war effort are part of an effort to promote an informal state ideology that supports a civic Russian identity and a multiethnic and religiously diverse population. Putin routinely attempts to posture Russia as an ethnically diverse and harmonious country in an attempt to balance among Russian ultranationalist demands for restrictions against migrants and assimilation of ethnic minorities.[29] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is trying to leverage migrants to offset labor shortages while also disproportionately targeting migrants and ethnic minorities in Russian military recruitment efforts.[30] Putin’s choice to promote multiculturalism at Russia’s largest national holiday demonstrates that Putin continues to support an informal state ideology that supports Russian civic nationalism. This manifestation of Russian nationalism is notably at odds with Russian ultranationalists’ attempts to create an ideology predicated on a Russian state mainly led by and comprised of ethnic Russians that defends and platforms Russian Orthodoxy.[31] Putin will likely continue to struggle to balance Russia’s need to leverage migrants to offset labor shortages and long-term demographic decline with placating the increasingly influential pro-war Russian ultranationalist community.
Delegations from 35 countries and the Council of Europe visited Lviv City on May 9 in celebration of Europe Day in Ukraine.[32] Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal stated that the delegations would hold a meetings of EU foreign ministers and the Core Group on the Establishment of a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine.[33] The Core Group announced on May 9 the creation of a special tribunal within the Council of Europe to investigate and prosecute Russian officials for the crime of aggression against Ukraine.[34]
Ukraine’s European allies continue to support the Ukrainian military and defense industrial base (DIB). The EU, Denmark, France, and Italy agreed on May 9 to transfer one billion euros (roughly $1.1 billion) from proceeds from frozen Russian assets to the European Peace Fund to purchase weapons from the Ukrainian DIB for the Ukrainian military.[35] Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal announced that the EU also allocated 600 million euros-worth (roughly $675 million) of artillery and ammunition to Ukraine and more than 200 million euros (roughly $225 million) to strengthen Ukrainian air defenses.[36] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha noted on May 9 that the EU has committed to supply Ukraine with over 1.35 million artillery shells in 2025.[37]
Key Takeaways:
- US President Donald Trump explicitly called for a longer-term ceasefire in Ukraine that would precede peace negotiations — a sequence that Ukraine has consistently supported and that Russia has consistently rejected.
- Ukrainian resistance with Western support has prevented Russian forces from seizing any of their self-identified objectives in Ukraine over the past year, depriving Russian President Vladimir Putin of significant battlefield successes to celebrate on Victory Day.
- The only recent military operation that Putin featured on Victory Day was the repulsion of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast.
- Russian officials highlighted technological adaptations and innovations that Russian forces have integrated in Ukraine over the last three years during national and regional Victory Day celebrations.
- The Kremlin seized on Russia’s May 9 Victory Day celebrations to posture itself as having broad international support three years into its invasion of Ukraine and especially highlighted Russia’s growing partnerships with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and North Korea.
- Putin used the Victory Day holiday to promote the development of a civic Russian identity at odds with Russian ultranationalist efforts to promote ethno-religious nationalism predicated on a Russian state mainly led by and comprised of ethnic Russians.
- Delegations from 35 countries and the Council of Europe visited Lviv City on May 9 in celebration of Europe Day in Ukraine.
- Ukraine’s European allies continue to support the Ukrainian military and defense industrial base (DIB).
- Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka directions and in Zaporizhia Oblast, and Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 8, 2025
[Note: The Ukrainian General Staff's 1600 May 8 SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from 0000 to 1600 on May 8, and any reports of Russian ground activity in this SITREP are by default an accusation that Russian forces violated Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire. The Ukrainian General Staff's 0800 May 8 SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from 0800 on May 7 to 0800 on May 8. ISW is unable to assess whether Russian attacks reported in the 0800 SITREP occurred after the start of Russia's ceasefire at 0000 Moscow time on May 8. The Ukrainian General Staff's 2200 May 7 SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from 0000 to 2200 on May 7 before Russia's implementation of its unliteral ceasefire on May 8.]
The Kremlin continues to seize on the Russian mythos of the Second World War ahead of Russia's May 9 Victory Day holiday to set informational conditions to justify a prolonged war in Ukraine and future aggression against NATO to Russian society. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov published an article on May 8 in which he argued that Russia's war in Ukraine will go down in history as a feat of courage and significance equal to the victory of the Soviet military and people during the Second World War.[i] Belousov claimed that Russia's war in Ukraine is a continuation of the "glorious traditions" of Soviet bravery and heroism and of the Soviet people's enthusiasm for enlisting and otherwise supporting the war effort. Belousov claimed that Russia's victory in Ukraine is "inevitable." Belousov said that domestic unity is a necessity for Russia's victory in Ukraine just as the Soviet Union's "moral and spiritual unity" was a critical factor for its victory in the Second World War. Russian state media highlighted Belousov's statements comparing the Second World War to Russia's war in Ukraine in their coverage of his 10-page essay, indicating that the Kremlin is trying to message to the domestic audience that Russia will achieve its goals in its war in Ukraine as long as Russian society remains unified and supportive.[ii] Kremlin officials have recently seized on the mythos of the Second World War to form the basis of a new pseudo-state ideology that will span across generations and that the Kremlin intends to use to justify potential future aggression against the West.[iii]
Belousov reiterated the Kremlin's oft-repeated fallacious narrative that Russia had no choice but to launch its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 because the situation was "life or death." Belousov claimed that Ukraine is a conduit for the collective West's "crusade" against Russia, which Belousov claimed is a manifestation of "eternal Russophobia" and intended to eradicate Russian statehood. Belousov quoted Russian President Vladimir Putin's speech from February 24, 2022, announcing the full-scale invasion.[iv] Belousov amplified Putin's accusations that the United States and its Western allies had a policy of "containment" against Russia and created a situation in which Russia had to launch the full-scale invasion of Ukraine to defend Russia's interests.[v] The Kremlin is attempting to link Putin's anti-Western claims to the mythos of the Second World War in order to heighten the existential threat against Russia that the Kremlin claims Russia is currently facing. It is also reconstructing the Soviet-era narrative that the West is conspiring to destroy Russia (in place of the Soviet Union) and that the conflict will be unending.
Belousov explicitly identified large-scale Russian military reforms as preparations for a future conflict with NATO as Russian Security Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev threatened European countries that support Ukraine.[vi] Belousov stated in his May 8 essay that Russia has reformed and augmented its military specifically in response to NATO expansion and military build-up (undertaken only well after the Russian 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine), including by reorganizing Russia's Western Military District (WMD) into the Moscow and Leningrad military districts (MMD and LMD); re-opening two former military academies and establishing a new third military academy; and fully forming, staffing, and equipping two combined arms armies, a river flotilla, a mixed aviation corps, and 50 other formations and units.[vii] ISW has long assessed that Russian military restructuring efforts, including reforms of the LMD and MMD, are part of future preparations for war against NATO.[viii]
Medvedev threatened that European countries must "remember" the "crushing defeat of Nazi Germany" when supporting Ukraine.[ix] Medvedev notably made his threat on his English-language X account, indicating that Medvedev intended this threat for international audiences.[x] Other senior Russian officials have also intensified accusations against European states for supporting "Naziism" in recent days.[xi] Medvedev's threat and Russian claims of European "Nazism" are part of the Kremlin's ongoing reflexive control campaign that aims to push European countries into refraining from providing further assistance to Ukraine.[xii] Kremlin officials have also recently framed European efforts to shoulder more of their own defense requirements (in line with US President Donald Trump's efforts) as threatening to Russia, and the Kremlin's reflexive control campaign likely also aims to prevent European states from building up their defenses. Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service Head Vice Admiral Peter Reesink warned in an interview with Politico published on May 8 that Russia's most threatening behavior is its military buildup and moving military assets towards Russia's borders with Finland and the Baltic states.[xiii] Reesink stated that Russia appears to be producing more artillery than the Russian military needs for its war in Ukraine when taking account of the assistance Russia is receiving from its allies. Reuters published an investigation on May 8 revealing that Russia has been constructing a significant new production line for explosives at the Biysk Oleum Plant in Siberia that is planned to produce 6,000 metric tons of explosives annually.[xiv] Reuters noted that this would be enough explosive to manufacture 1.28 million 152mm artillery rounds and that Russia produced nearly two million 122mm and 152mm artillery rounds in 2024, suggesting that this new production line could expand Russia's artillery shell production capacity by over 50 percent when completed.
Russia claimed to have implemented its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire on May 8 and accused Ukraine of ceasefire violations even though Ukraine did not officially and publicly agree to Russia's ceasefire. Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire and accusations of violations continue to demonstrate the necessity that any ceasefire or peace agreement be formally agreed to in advance by all parties and include robust monitoring mechanisms. Russian President Vladimir Putin announced on April 28 Russia's ceasefire starting at midnight on the night of May 7 to 8 and ending at midnight on the night of May 10 to 11 in honor of Victory Day on May 9.[xv] Russia's Victory Day celebrates the Soviet Union's contributions to defeating Nazi Germany during the Second World War while minimizing the role of the United States. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces completely ceased combat operations and remained at their current positions at midnight Moscow time on May 8 in accordance with Russian President Vladimir Putin's unilateral ceasefire.[xvi] The Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian forces did not stop combat operations "despite the announcement of the ceasefire." Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha stated on May 8 that Russian forces continued to attack across the entire frontline.[xvii] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated that Russian forces shelled Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts after the start of the ceasefire.[xviii] Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported that servicemembers from three Ukrainian units operating in the Pokrovsk direction and in southern Ukraine confirmed that they received instructions to open fire only in response to Russian combat operations.[xix]
Ukrainian officials continue to highlight Ukraine's willingness to implement US President Donald Trump's desired 30-day ceasefire to precede peace talks. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that he spoke with Trump on May 8 about the concrete steps needed to achieve peace.[xx] Zelensky reiterated to Trump that Ukraine is ready for an immediate 30-day ceasefire and for talks "in any format." Zelensky reported that Trump supported a 30-day ceasefire. Ukrainian Presidential Administration Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak stated that Ukraine can only start peace negotiations after the implementation of an unconditional 30-day ceasefire and that the United States and Ukraine's European partners agree with this timeline.[xxi] Yermak noted that Russia and Ukraine can agree on a format for peace negotiations and appoint delegations after a longer-term ceasefire is in place.
The Kremlin is attempting to exploit its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire to blame Ukraine for the lack of progress toward a longer-term ceasefire and peace negotiations despite Russia's continued rejection of such a longer-term ceasefire. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on May 7 that Ukraine does not want to seriously discuss a long-term ceasefire.[xxii] Zakharova claimed that Russia's support for the previous US- and Ukrainian-proposed 30-day moratorium on strikes against energy infrastructure and Russia's unilateral Easter truce shows that Russia has never been against a ceasefire, even though the Kremlin has continued to protract and delay meaningful negotiations to establish a comprehensive ceasefire.[xxiii] Zakharova accused Ukraine of repeatedly violating the strikes and Easter ceasefires and claimed that there could be progress toward a long-term ceasefire should Ukraine observe shorter-term ceasefires. Zakharova repeated recent Kremlin narratives that Ukraine cannot control its own military and Putin's rejection of previous US and Ukrainian 30-day ceasefire proposals on the grounds that there are "nuances" about enforcement mechanisms and weapons provisions to Ukraine that the parties would need to work out prior to implementation.[xxiv] Russia previously accused Ukraine of violating the strikes and Easter ceasefires while rarely offering evidence supporting these accusations, and Russian officials will likely do the same during the unilateral Victory Day ceasefire in order to distract from Russia's continued intransigence in negotiations about Ukraine.[xxv]
Russian President Vladimir Putin and People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping conducted a series of bilateral engagements in Moscow on May 8, showcasing deeper Russian–Chinese cooperation and alignment.[xxvi] These engagements mark the third official meeting in 2025 between Putin and Xi. Putin and Xi signed a package of bilateral intergovernmental and interdepartmental cooperation documents and issued a joint statement on May 8.[xxvii] Xi travelled to Russia to attend Russia's Victory Day celebrations on May 9. Putin and Xi discussed the roles that China and the Soviet Union played in the Second World War, emphasized the importance of their countries' contributions to the defeat of fascism, highlighted significant Chinese and Soviet losses in the war, and claimed that China and the Soviet Union were the "main theaters" in the war.[xxviii] Russian officials repeatedly use the mythos of the Soviet Union's sacrifice during the Second World War to persuade the Russian population that their increasing social and economic sacrifices for the Russian war effort in Ukraine can lead to victory.[xxix] Russian officials are likely overemphasizing World War II mythos to bolster support for Russia's war effort in Ukraine in part due to Russia's inability to showcase battlefield successes for Victory Day 2025.
The joint Russian–Chinese statement on May 8 referenced Putin's original aims in launching his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in an attempt to lend international support and legitimacy to Russia's goals and attempted justifications for the war. The Russian–Chinese joint statement asserted that Russia and the PRC are "convinced" that a long-term and sustainable settlement in the war in Ukraine requires the elimination of the "root causes" of the war.[xxx] The joint statement claimed that Russia and the PRC will work to counter attempts to "rehabilitate" Nazism and the rise of militarism that contribute to discrimination and intolerance. The joint statement noted that Russia "positively evaluates" the PRC's position on the war in Ukraine and that Russia welcomes the PRC's desire to play a role in the political and diplomatic efforts towards settling the war. The PRC and Brazil — two members of BRICS — have notably put forth peace proposals for the war in Ukraine that heavily favored Russia.[xxxi] The Kremlin has repeatedly claimed that Russia must eliminate the "root causes" of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which Russian officials have defined as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to expand into eastern Europe and along Russia's borders in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s, and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine.[xxxii] Putin named Ukraine's "demilitarization" and "denazification" as Russia's main goals when he launched his full-scale invasion in February 2022, and Russian officials have consistently used these terms to call for the removal of the current legitimate Ukrainian government, the installation of a pro-Russian proxy government in Kyiv, and the reduction of Ukraine's military such that Ukraine is unable to defend itself in the future.[xxxiii] Russia has attempted to exploit diplomatic meetings with PRC and Iranian officials in recent months to publicly reiterate these original war aims and posture Russia's allies as supportive in these efforts.[xxxiv] The PRC has previously publicly attributed talk of Russia's alleged need to eliminate the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine only to Kremlin officials — not PRC officials.[xxxv] The May 8 joint Russian–Chinese statement declaring that "the parties" are "convinced" of the need to eliminate the "root causes" of the war is a notable inflection in PRC rhetoric.
The joint Russian–Chinese statement supported Putin's proposed Eurasian security architecture and Russia's ongoing efforts to create a Russia-dominated alternative, anti-Western bloc. Russia and the PRC reiterated their mutual interest in establishing a multipolar world order in which the UN plays a central role.[xxxvi] Xi further claimed that both Russia and the PRC bear a special responsibility as permanent members of the UNSC and great powers to oversee the creation of a new multipolar world.[xxxvii] The joint statement underscored both parties' commitment to the creation of a Eurasian security architecture - a reference to the architecture that Putin first proposed in June 2024 with Xi's support.[xxxviii] The joint statement highlighted the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and BRICS - organizations that Kremlin officials have previously labelled as the foundation of Putin's proposed Eurasian security architecture.[xxxix] The joint statement paradoxically called for an end to confrontational bloc mentality and specifically cited NATO expansion as an example of such bloc mentality. The statement noted that Russia and the PRC find the construction of military blocs that are anti-Russian and anti-Chinese in nature unacceptable. The statement emphasized the need to eliminate the "root causes" of interstate conflicts before the creation of a Eurasian security architecture - the first time Russian officials have publicly linked their calls for the elimination of "root causes" with Putin's proposed Eurasian security architecture. ISW continues to assess that Russia has been building a web of overlapping coalitions and partnerships, including within the CSTO, CIS, ASEAN, BRICS, and SCO, to offset the limits of Russian state power and that Putin's Eurasian security architecture proposal is part of Russian efforts to create an alternative Russian-led bloc to further Putin's goals of destroying NATO and weaking the West and its allies.[xl]
The United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine’s (UN HRMMU) reported that Ukrainian civilian casualties have significantly increased between 2024 and 2025. The UN HRMMU reported that Ukrainian civilian casualties increased 23 percent between March 2025 and April 2025 and increased by 84 percent between April 2024 and April 2025.[xli] The UN HRMMU reported that at least 209 civilians were killed and 1,146 civilians were injured in the war in April 2025. The UN HRMMU reported that 97 percent of these civilian casualties were in unoccupied Ukraine and that April 2025 had the highest number of civilian casualties since September 2024. The HRMMU reported that almost half of these casualties were due to missile and loitering munition strikes and noted several Russian drone and missile strikes in urban areas of Kryvyi Rih and Sumy, Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, Kyiv, and Kharkiv cities in April 2025. The UN HRMMU reported that short-range drone strikes accounted for 23 percent of civilian casualties, most of which were in Kherson Oblast. The UN HRMMU noted that a drone strike against a civilian bus in Marhanets, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (on the east [right] bank of the Dnipro River immediately across from the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant) significantly contributed to these casualties.
The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada ratified the US–Ukrainian bilateral economic partnership agreement on May 8.[xlii] The United States and Ukraine signed the bilateral economic partnership agreement on April 30.[xliii]
Key Takeaways:
- The Kremlin continues to seize on the Russian mythos of the Second World War ahead of Russia's May 9 Victory Day holiday to set informational conditions to justify a prolonged war in Ukraine and future aggression against NATO to Russian society.
- Belousov explicitly identified large-scale Russian military reforms as preparations for a future conflict with NATO as Russian Security Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev threatened European countries that support Ukraine.
- Russia claimed to have implemented its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire on May 8 and accused Ukraine of ceasefire violations even though Ukraine did not officially and publicly agree to Russia's ceasefire. Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire and accusations of violations continue to demonstrate the necessity that any ceasefire or peace agreement be formally agreed to in advance by all parties and include robust monitoring mechanisms.
- Ukrainian officials continue to highlight Ukraine's willingness to implement US President Donald Trump's desired 30-day ceasefire to precede peace talks.
- The Kremlin is attempting to exploit its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire to blame Ukraine for the lack of progress toward a longer-term ceasefire and peace negotiations despite Russia's continued rejection of such a longer-term ceasefire.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin and People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping conducted a series of bilateral engagements in Moscow on May 8, showcasing deeper Russian–Chinese cooperation and alignment.
- The joint Russian–Chinese statement on May 8 referenced Putin's original aims in launching his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in an attempt to lend international support and legitimacy to Russia's goals and attempted justifications for the war.
- The joint Russian–Chinese statement supported Putin's proposed Eurasian security architecture and Russia's ongoing efforts to create a Russia-dominated alternative, anti-Western bloc.
- The United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine’s (UN HRMMU) reported that Ukrainian civilian casualties have significantly increased between 2024 and 2025.
- The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada ratified the US-Ukrainian bilateral economic partnership agreement on May 8.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk and Sumy oblasts and near Kupyansk, Borova, Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 7, 2025
US officials acknowledged Russia's continued intransigence toward any ceasefire agreement in Ukraine while reiterating that Ukraine remains committed to US President Donald Trump's proposed comprehensive 30-day ceasefire. US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg stated on May 6 that Russian President Vladimir Putin's refusal to agree to a 30-day ceasefire is the main impediment to establishing peace in Ukraine and that Russia will be hurt if the parties do not agree to a comprehensive ceasefire, as "Russia is not winning the war."[1] Kellogg noted Russia's failure to secure positions on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast, its inability to reach Kyiv and Odesa cities, and Russian forces' high attrition rates — all in line with ISW's assessment that Russia's battlefield situation has deteriorated since 2022.[2] US Vice President JD Vance stated on May 7 that Russia is "asking for a certain set of requirements" and "concessions in order to end the conflict," but that the United States thinks that Russia is "asking for too much."[3]
Kellogg reiterated that Ukraine has agreed to a renewable comprehensive sea, air, and land ceasefire for a minimum of 30 days and that Ukraine is willing to immediately sign the agreement.[4] Kellogg stated that Ukraine is prepared to accept a "ceasefire in place" that will require both Russia and Ukraine to withdraw 15 kilometers from the current frontline in order to establish a 30-kilometer demilitarized zone that could fall under an unspecified monitoring mechanism. Kellogg stated that members of the UK- and French-led Coalition of the Willing are willing to deploy a "ceasefire force" west of the Dnipro River that will patrol and reinforce the comprehensive ceasefire. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded to Kellogg's statement on May 7, claiming that Russia has not received any Ukrainian proposals to establish a demilitarized zone.[5]
Russia is likely attempting to prolong and delay discussions about a comprehensive ceasefire to obfuscate its continued rejection of the United States' ceasefire proposals. ISW continues to assess that Russia likely remains opposed to any sort of enforcement or monitoring mechanisms, as Russia would likely weaponize the absence of such mechanisms to flood the information space with unsubstantiated claims of Ukrainian ceasefire violations, as it has done before.[6] The Kremlin has also repeatedly outright rejected the prospect of European peacekeepers in Ukraine, claiming that such deployments would be unacceptable for Russia.[7] Russia remains committed to its long-standing effort to prolong peace negotiations in order to make battlefield gains and attempt to secure additional concessions from the United States.[8]
Ukrainian forces likely recently advanced across the international border into southern Tetkino, Kursk Oblast, amid continued limited Ukrainian attacks in the area. Geolocated footage published on May 6 shows Russian forces conducting an airstrike against a building in southern Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo), indicating that Ukrainian forces likely seized positions in Tetkino.[9] Russian milbloggers claimed on May 6 that Ukrainian forces seized up to two streets in southern Tetkino and continued to claim on May 7 that Ukrainian forces maintain positions within the settlement.[10] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces, including elements of the 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division), pushed Ukrainian forces out of Tetkino, however.[11] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled limited Ukrainian mechanized assaults against Tetkino and Novyi Put (east of Tetkino along the international border) on May 7 and that Ukrainian forces continue efforts to use mine-clearing equipment to create paths through Russian minefields in the area.[12] One milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces seized Novyi Put, but other milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian assaults in the area.[13] ISW has not observed geolocated footage indicating that Ukrainian forces have entered Novyi Put. Elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division are reportedly operating near Tetkino.[14]
Ukrainian forces conducted long-range drone strikes against defense industrial facilities and airbases in Russia overnight on May 6 and 7. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, who often reports on successful Ukrainian strikes against Russian territory, reported on May 7 that Ukrainian forces struck and seriously damaged the Fiber Optic Systems plant in Saransk, Republic of Mordovia.[15] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Ukrainian forces struck the plant.[16] The Fiber Optic Systems plant is the only plant in Russia that produces fiber optic cables, which Russian forces are increasingly relying on for the operation of fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drones on the battlefield in Ukraine.[17] Ukraine notably struck the same plant on April 5.[18] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that Ukrainian strikes on May 7 caused a second fire near the Fiber Optic Systems plant, likely at the Saranskkabel machine-building enterprise.[19] Kovalenko also reported that Ukrainian forces struck Russian defense enterprises in Tula City, including the Instrument-Making Design Bureau, which produces anti-tank systems, small arms, and combat modules, and the Scientific-Production Association (SPLAV), which produces Grad, Uragan, and Smerch multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS).[20] Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported that its sources in the Ukrainian special services stated that Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) conducted drone strikes that hit the SPLAV plant and the Bazalt weapons and ammunition plant in Krasnoarmeysk, Moscow Oblast.[21] Geolocated footage published on May 7 shows smoke near the Fiber Optic Systems and SPLAV plants.[22]
Kovalenko further reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Shaykovka Airbase in Kaluga Oblast, where Russia bases and stores Tu-22M3 strategic bombers and Kh-22 cruise missiles, and the Kubinka Airbase in Moscow Oblast, where Su-27 and MiG-29 fighter jets are based.[23] Russian milbloggers, including a source reportedly affiliated with the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS), also reported that Ukrainian forces struck Kubinka Airbase.[24] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian air defenses shot down at least nine drones over Kaluga Oblast, at least six drones over Tula Oblast, and at least two drones over Moscow Oblast.[25]
Russian authorities will likely test their ability to completely disconnect large areas of Russia from the internet on May 9 under the guise of protecting Russian Victory Day celebrations. Officials in the republics of Chuvashia and Tatarstan and in Voronezh and Tver oblasts warned on May 7 that authorities may restrict mobile network usage to "ensure security" on May 9.[26] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov warned on May 7 that Moscow City and Oblast authorities may place "limitations" on mobile internet operation during Victory Day celebrations "for obvious reasons" and stated that Russians "must treat this with absolute understanding."[27] Several Russian banks and internet giant Yandex warned that the disconnection will likely affect Russians' access to banking, taxi, courier, and public transportation services, particularly in Moscow City and Oblast.[28] Russian authorities have been periodically testing their Sovereign Internet system, which allows Russia to completely disconnect itself from the global internet and increasingly censor Russians' ability to communicate and access information.[29] Reports of significant Russian internet outages have increased in the first months of 2025, and Russian authorities likely seek to take advantage of the May 9 holiday to conduct a widespread test of the Sovereign Internet system without encountering significant opposition from Russians.[30] The Kremlin also likely seeks to prevent Russians from circulating imagery and footage of damage and fires from any possible Ukrainian long-range strikes on May 9 to avoid shattering the facade that Russia's victory in Ukraine is near on Victory Day itself — even though Russia has no significant battlefield successes to flaunt for the 2025 holiday.[31]
Russian authorities have already tested the ability to temporarily disconnect from the internet during recent Ukrainian long-range drone strikes against Russia and likely intend to informationally link these planned May 9 disconnections to actual Ukrainian drone strikes as part of efforts to mitigate any opposition to the disconnection ahead of May 9. Russian media reported that over 30 Russian cities, including in Yaroslavl, Tver, Moscow, Nizhny Novgorod, Tula, Leningrad, Kaluga, and Kursk oblasts, experienced difficulties connecting to the internet during the Ukrainian drone strikes on May 7 and that all of Saransk and several other settlements in the Republic of Mordovia were completely disconnected from the internet.[32] Moscow City residents have been complaining about widespread mobile internet outages since May 5, which Russian authorities have explained as preparations for the May 9 Victory Day celebrations.[33] A Russian Telegram source claimed on April 25 that Russian authorities shut down mobile internet access in occupied Crimea due to Ukrainian drone strikes and alleged that the measure was ineffective, only causing issues for Russian authorities who rely on the internet for communications.[34] Russian authorities will likely continue disconnecting large areas of Russia from mobile internet networks during Ukrainian long-range strikes to continue testing the Sovereign Internet system and, secondarily, prevent Russians from immediately circulating reports, imagery, and footage of the results of these Ukrainian strikes.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro signed the Russia-Venezuela Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Agreement on May 7.[35] The agreement addresses enhanced defense cooperation and coordination; the "legacy and falsification" of colonialism; arms control and non-proliferation, including in space; organized crime and internationally sponsored terrorism; international information security and the regulation of the information space; and energy and economic cooperation. The agreement notably includes a provision for the development of military-technical cooperation between Russia and Venezuela. This strategic partnership agreement coheres with Russian efforts to strengthen relations with Venezuela over the past several years, in large part to contest US influence in the Western hemisphere and to paint Russia as a competitive and capable world power.[36] Russia and Venezuela previously signed 17 agreements, including eight strategic-level agreements, in November 2024 that include intelligence sharing, counterespionage, drone use, and petroleum technologies.[37] Maduro is in Moscow for the May 9 Victory Day celebrations, and Russia is likely attempting to showcase its allies, partners, and diplomatic successes to international audiences.[38]
Ukrainian and European officials continue to report on Russian executions of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in violation of international law and Russia's use of chemical weapons in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to which Russia is a signatory. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Current Time outlet reported on May 6 that the European Council prepared a new sanctions package against the Russian Radiological, Chemical, and Biological Defense Troops, 27th Scientific Center, and 33rd Scientific Research and Testing Institute.[39] The sanctions package will reportedly reference November 2024 and February 2025 reports from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) detailing how Russian forces used chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile (CS) gas — a type of riot control agent (RCA) banned under the CWC — near Marivka and Ilinka, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (on the west [right] bank of the Dnipro River across from Enerhodar and the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant [ZNPP]) in 2024. The OCPW found traces of CS gas in soil and water tests following Russian strikes, which explains its presence in areas beyond the current frontline. The Donetsk Oblast Prosecutor's Office reported on May 6 that Russian forces executed three surrendering Ukrainian POWs on May 3 near Novopil (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[40] ISW continues to observe a sharp increase in credible reports and footage of Russian forces executing Ukrainian POWs throughout 2024 and 2025 and to assess that Russian military commanders are either complicit in, or directly enabling, their subordinates to conduct these executions in violation of international law.[41]
Russian President Vladimir Putin appeared to reject Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov’s recent request to resign from his post. Putin and Kadyrov met on May 7 to discuss socioeconomic issues in the Chechen Republic.[42] Kadyrov ended the meeting by thanking Putin for his positive assessment of Chechen force generation efforts and Chechen forces' participation in Russia’s war in Ukraine. Kadyrov stated that "we will not let [Putin] down," to which Putin replied, "I have no doubt," suggesting that Putin expects Kadyrov to continue leading the republic. Kadyrov expressed his desire to resign from his post on May 5 in an interview with Chechnya Segodnya, but noted on May 6 that only Putin can authorize this decision.[43]
Key Takeaways:
- US officials acknowledged Russia's continued intransigence toward any ceasefire agreement in Ukraine while reiterating that Ukraine remains committed to US President Donald Trump's proposed comprehensive 30-day ceasefire.
- Ukrainian forces likely recently advanced across the international border into southern Tetkino, Kursk Oblast, amid continued limited Ukrainian attacks in the area.
- Ukrainian forces conducted long-range drone strikes against defense industrial facilities and airbases in Russia overnight on May 6 and 7.
- Russian authorities will likely test their ability to completely disconnect large areas of Russia from the internet on May 9 under the guise of protecting Russian Victory Day celebrations.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin and Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro signed the Russia-Venezuela Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Agreement on May 7.
- Ukrainian and European officials continue to report on Russian executions of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in violation of international law and Russia's use of chemical weapons in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to which Russia is a signatory.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin appeared to reject Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov’s recent request to resign from his post.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Novopavlivka, and Velyka Novosilka.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 6, 2025
Ukrainian forces continued limited attacks across the international border near Tetkino and Novyi Put, Kursk Oblast. Russian milbloggers claimed on May 6 that Russian forces repelled the Ukrainian attacks near Novyi Put and Volfino (southwest of Glushkovo) and that fighting continued near the railway station in southern Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo).[1] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces seized up to two streets in southwestern Tetkino, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[2] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade, 217th VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division), and 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are defending near Tetkino.[3]
Ukrainian forces also continued drone, air, and artillery strikes aimed at isolating Russian units in and near Tetkino. Geolocated footage published on May 6 shows Ukrainian forces conducting a Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) guided munition strike on a Russian position in southwestern Tetkino, indicating that Russian forces maintain positions near the Tetkino Railway Station.[4] Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Ukrainian forces are conducting drone and artillery strikes against Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to isolate Russian units near Tetkino.[5] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian drones have interdicted and maintained fire control over an unspecified section of the 38K-040 Tetkino-Karyzh highway.[6] Russian milbloggers claimed on May 5 that Ukrainian forces destroyed a bridge over the Seim River between Zvannoye (northwest of Glushkovo) and Tetkino.[7]
Kremlin officials are continuing to leverage the mythos of the Soviet Union's role in the Second World War to form the basis of a new state ideology that will span generations and that Russia intends to leverage to justify a future military conflict against the West. Russian Security Council Secretary and former Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu published an op-ed in the official Russian government newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta on May 6, arguing that military and political unity against a common enemy is Russia's only path to a strong and victorious future.[8] Shoigu repeatedly juxtaposed the Red Army's defeat of Nazi Germany in the Second World War (referred to as the Great Patriotic War in Russia) with Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Shoigu extolled the Soviet State Defense Committee's (an executive governing body established following Nazi Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union) "strictly centralized framework" that ensured effective coordination and implementation of orders on the frontline and the home front. Shoigu stated that Russian public consciousness experienced a national identity crisis following the fall of the Soviet Union and underscored the importance of preserving and strengthening traditional Russian spiritual and moral values to resolve this crisis and form an unofficial Russian state ideology (the Russian constitution forbids the adoption of a formal state ideology).[9] Shoigu reiterated Russian narratives designed to justify Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and accused the collective West of preparing for a direct military conflict with Russia and seeking to inflict a strategic defeat on Russia.
The Kremlin appears to be consolidating around an informal state ideology predicated on perpetuating the belief that the West is determined to encircle and defeat Russia. The Kremlin is leveraging government-wide initiatives to place veterans of the war in Ukraine in positions of power in Russia and long-term rhetorical campaigns to disseminate the belief that the world is divided into two groups (the West and the Russian-led "multipolar world") seeking to destroy one another — mirroring the Soviet Union's framing of geopolitics as an existential conflict between communism and capitalism.[10] Russia's evolving informal state ideology includes aspects of the Soviet Union's ideology, such as a strong centralized government and a unified perception of the state enemy, but lacks the greater justification for why Russia must destroy its enemies.[11] The Kremlin is attempting to unify Russian society, particularly elites, under this world view in order to ensure that any successor to Russian President Vladimir Putin will embody similarly aggressive and dangerous ideals that perpetuate eternal conflict with the West and NATO.
Putin's envisioned informal state ideology is somewhat at odds with that being developed by Russian ultranationalists — one of Putin's key constituencies. Putin is promoting an informal state ideology that supports a civic Russian identity and a multiethnic and religiously diverse population.[12] Russian ultranationalists, whose perspective is often voiced most clearly by Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin, appear more interested in an ideology predicated on a Russian state mainly led by and comprised of ethnic Russians that defends and platforms Russian Orthodoxy.[13] Putin is likely resistant to such an ideology as it risks fragmenting Russia's multiethnic and religiously-diverse population and could pose a threat to regime stability. Russian officials are struggling to balance placating the increasingly influential ultranationalist community with offsetting critical economic issues and labor shortages with migrant labor, and the war in Ukraine and a possible future conflict with the West will only exacerbate these issues.[14]
Shoigu also underscored the importance of the Kremlin's development of military-patriotic education programs — such as the Volunteer Society for Assistance to the Army, Aviation, and Navy of Russia (DOSAAF), Yunarmiya, and the Russian Military Historical Society — and noted that they are designed to prepare Russian citizens for military service.[15] ISW has long reported on the Kremlin's efforts to centralize control over and expand multi-generational youth programs as part of Russia's long-term force generation efforts and multi-pronged efforts to militarize Russian society.[16] The Kremlin may intend to leverage these military-patriotic education programs to workshop a future state ideology and socialize Russian citizens to this ideology from a young age.
Russian officials also appear to be leveraging the story of the Second World War (referred to as the Great Patriotic War in Russia) to dismiss Russia's early failures in the war in Ukraine and present the false image that Russian victory in Ukraine is as inevitable as the Soviet triumph over Germany became at the end of World War II. Shoigu noted in the May 6 article that the Soviet Union made "mistakes" when planning for a war with Nazi Germany, including failing to properly equip and manage Soviet troops, and suffered from poor strategic planning and ineffective military doctrine.[17] Shoigu claimed that Nazi Germany was able to exploit these mistakes to make significant advances early in the war (to the gates of Moscow, in fact), but that the Soviet Union was able to improve its capabilities and mobilize society to support an eventual victory. Shoigu's article notably ignores the role that the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact, which Joseph Stalin used to seize the Baltic States and part of Poland while Adolf Hitler invaded the rest of Poland in 1939, played in Stalin's unwillingness to prepare for war with Nazi Germany. Shoigu's comments are likely an attempt to use references to the Second World War to tacitly acknowledge the Russian military's shortcomings at the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, for which Shoigu was to a considerable extent responsible as Defense Minister. Shoigu's retelling of the Second World War mirrors Russia's unpreparedness for a long war at the start of the full-scale invasion and significant setbacks in 2022 when Ukraine forced the Russian military to withdraw from around Kyiv and from northern Ukraine and liberated significant swathes of territory in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts. Shoigu is also attempting to draw parallels to the Second World War to frame the Russian military as having secured the permanent initiative on the battlefield and portray a Russian victory in Ukraine as inevitable to both the international community and the domestic Russian populace. Shoigu is likely attempting to draw on the mythos of the Second World War to signal to domestic audiences that Russian victory is near and requires united societal support, even though Russia has no significant battlefield successes to flaunt on Victory Day 2025.
Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov expressed his desire to resign from his post but acknowledged that only Russian President Vladimir Putin can approve this request. Kadyrov has helped stabilize interethnic tensions in the North Caucasus, and leaving his post without a suitable successor could threaten the stability of Putin's regime. Kadyrov told Chechen news outlet Chechnya Segodnya on May 5, in response to rumors of his resignation, that he asked to be "relieved" from his post as Chechen Republic head and hopes that his request "will be supported" but that unspecified others "will have their own initiatives, their own vision."[18] Kadyrov stated on his Telegram channel on May 6 that "many" misunderstood his May 5 statement and clarified that only Putin can decide whether Kadyrov can leave his post and that Kadyrov can only ask to leave or offer his resignation.[19] Kadyrov emphasized that he is a "team man" and will follow Putin's orders, implying that he will retain his post if that is what Putin decides.[20] It is currently unclear how serious Kadyrov is about this request, as Kadyrov has periodically expressed his desire to resign as Chechen Republic head since 2016 and has consistently walked back these statements.[21]
Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported on March 27, citing a source in the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), that Kadyrov's relations with Putin have deteriorated in recent months as Putin was displeased with Kadyrov's "frequent and uncoordinated negotiations" with monarchies in Middle Eastern countries.[22] One source told investigative outlet Novaya Gazeta that Kadyrov helped Putin negotiate with Qatar about the fate of Russian military bases in Syria and that Kadyrov "carried out even more delicate orders from the Kremlin" in the Middle East, however.[23] Kadyrov has acted as a stabilizer within the Chechen Republic and elsewhere in the North Caucasus during particularly tense moments since the early 2000s, particularly moments that could pose threats to the stability of Putin's regime.[24] Kadyrov's death or departure from office, should it occur during or immediately after the war in Ukraine, could leave Putin's interests in the North Caucasus unguarded unless Kadyrov and Putin appoint a suitable successor.
It remains unclear who might succeed Kadyrov in the event of his resignation or death. Novaya Gazeta reported on May 5, citing a Russian Telegram channel and several other sources familiar with the matter, that Kadyrov has "changed priorities" and spent a lot of time receiving health treatment and largely delegated his external engagements since February 2025.[25] Novaya Gazeta reported that Kadyrov's daughter and former Chechen Deputy Prime Minister and Culture Minister Aishat Kadyrova suddenly resigned in early February 2025 and that sources in the Chechen government reported that Kadyrov's other two daughters, Khutmat and Khadizhat Kadyrova, also stopped working in civil service positions at the same time. Novaya Gazeta reported that Aishat Kadyrova travelled to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in late February 2025 to identify investment opportunities for the Kadyrov family in the wake of Kadyrov's reportedly declining health.
Novaya Gazeta reported that only two of Kadyrov's 14 children "play a significant role" in Kadyrov's future plans: 26-year-old Aishat Kadyrova and 17-year-old Adam Kadyrov.[26] A Novaya Gazeta source reported that Kadyrov would not have "had the headache of appointing a successor" if "Aishat [Kadyrova] had been born a man," given Aishat's success in political and business roles. Novaya Gazeta reported that Kadyrov has positioned Adam Kadyrov as his obvious successor, including by instructing Chechen officials to treat Adam as Kadyrov's main heir. ISW has previously observed reports of Kadyrov giving favorable appointments to Adam, arranging meetings between Adam and Putin, and appearing to prefer him as heir over his elder son, Akhmat Kadyrov.[27] Adam Kadyrov famously stoked interethnic tensions after footage emerged in September 2023 of Adam beating a detained man accused of burning a Quran, an act which Ramzan Kadyrov praised and subsequently rewarded.[28]
Ukraine and Russia conducted a 205-for-205 prisoner of war (POW) exchange on May 6. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on May 6 that Ukrainian authorities returned 205 Ukrainian POWs, comprising members of almost all branches of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.[29] Zelensky thanked the United Arab Emirates for mediating the POW exchange with Russia. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) also reported on May 6 that Russia and Ukraine conducted a 205-for-205 POW exchange.[30]
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian forces continued limited attacks across the international border near Tetkino and Novyi Put, Kursk Oblast.
- Ukrainian forces also continued drone, air, and artillery strikes aimed at isolating Russian units in and near Tetkino.
- Kremlin officials are continuing to leverage the mythos of the Soviet Union's role in the Second World War to form the basis of a new state ideology that will span generations and that Russia intends to leverage to justify a future military conflict against the West.
- The Kremlin appears to be consolidating around an informal state ideology predicated on perpetuating the belief that the West is determined to encircle and defeat Russia.
- Russian officials also appear to be leveraging the story of the Second World War (referred to as the Great Patriotic War in Russia) to dismiss Russia's early failures in the war in Ukraine and present the false image that Russian victory in Ukraine is as inevitable as the Soviet triumph over Germany became at the end of World War II.
- Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov expressed his desire to resign from his post but acknowledged that only Russian President Vladimir Putin can approve this request. Kadyrov has helped stabilize interethnic tensions in the North Caucasus, and leaving his post without a suitable successor could threaten the stability of Putin's regime.
- It remains unclear who might succeed Kadyrov in the event of his resignation or death.
- Ukraine and Russia conducted a 205-for-205 prisoner of war (POW) exchange on May 6.
- Russian forces advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, Novopavlivka, and Velyka Novosilka.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 5, 2025
Russian sources claimed on May 5 that Ukrainian forces conducted a series of limited attacks across the Russia-Ukraine international border near Tetkino, Kursk Oblast. Russian sources claimed on May 5 that Ukrainian forces attacked across the Russia-Ukraine international border near Tetkino and Popova-Lezhachi (far west of Sudzha and southwest of Glushkovo) and Novyi Put (east of Tetkino) on the evening of May 4 and morning of May 5.[1] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces used mine clearing equipment to create a path through Russian minefields along the border, but that Ukrainian forces have not made significant advances in the area thus far.[2] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian and Russian forces engaged in a small arms clash near the Tetkino Railway Station in southern Tetkino and that Ukrainian forces later withdrew back into Sumy Oblast.[3] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces have not seized Tetkino or broken through Russia's defenses near Novyi Put.[4] Russian sources claimed that elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, likely referring to the 5th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment, other Russian military personnel, and Russian border guards are defending against the Ukrainian attacks.[5]
Ukrainian forces are attempting to isolate Russian units near Tetkino and throughout Glushkovsky Raion. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 4 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian reconnaissance and strike drone command post near Tetkino and killed up to 20 Russian servicemembers.[6] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated that Russian forces have been training drone operators at a school in Tetkino since 2022.[7] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces intensified drone strikes and artillery fire against Tetkino in the night of May 4 before attacking toward the settlement.[8] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces destroyed a bridge over the Seim River between Zvannoye (northwest of Glushkovo) and Tetkino.[9] Other Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are also using drones to interdict Russian logistics in the area.[10]
The Russian military command reportedly recently redeployed elements of the 68th Army Corps and 58th Combined Arms Army to the Toretsk direction from the Kurakhove and western Zaporizhia directions. Geolocated footage published on May 5 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in eastern and southern Myrne (southwest of Toretsk) during a platoon-sized mechanized assault.[11] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps [AC], Eastern Military District [EMD]) participated in the advance and were attacking in the direction of Malynivka (just west of Myrne).[12] ISW first observed reports that elements of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade redeployed to the Toretsk direction in late March 2025 after operating in the Vuhledar and Kurakhove directions.[13] Elements of the brigade may be currently deployed across several sectors of the front. A Russian milblogger claimed on May 4 that elements of the Russian 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are attacking in Stara Mykolaivka and Oleksandropil and conducting clearing operations near Kalynove (all southwest of Toretsk). Elements of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division have been operating in the Zaporizhia direction since at least Summer 2023 during the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the area.[14] ISW observed reports that elements of the division were operating in the Zaporizhia direction as of May 4, and the division is likely currently split between the Zaporizhia and Toretsk directions.[15] The Russian military command previously reinforced offensive operations southwest of Toretsk with elements of the 150th and 20th motorized rifle divisions (both part of the 8th CAA, SMD) in early 2025, and the repeated reinforcing of this effort from three different sectors of the frontline indicates that the Russian military command views this as a priority frontline sector.[16]
A Russian milblogger speculated on May 4 that Russian attacks near Nova Poltavka (northwest of Myrne and northeast of Kalynove) are part of long-term Russian efforts to advance toward Myrnohrad (just east of Pokrovsk) and envelop Myrnohrad and Pokrovsk from the east and west.[17] Russian forces re-intensified offensive operations in mid-March 2025 aimed at enveloping Pokrovsk and seizing Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad but have not made significant advances in the area since late Fall 2024 due to localized Ukrainian counterattacks and drone operations.[18] Russian forces appeared to shift their focus toward the Novopavlivka direction in an attempt to reach the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border in recent months.[19] Russian forces have not been able to advance the remaining three kilometers to the border in the past month, however, and may be pursuing opportunistic advances in other areas, such as near Nova Poltavka.[20] Russian forces may attempt to leverage recent redeployments to Toretsk and eastern Pokrovsk directions as part of a mutually reinforcing effort aimed at eliminating the Ukrainian pocket southwest of Toretsk to facilitate advances toward Kostyantynivka from the south and enveloping Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.[21]
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Czech President Petr Pavel announced on May 4 that Czechia will work with Ukraine to establish a school to train Ukrainian pilots on F-16 fighter jets outside of Ukraine.[22] Pavel added that Czechia and members of the French- and British-led Coalition of the Willing will train Ukrainian pilots. The US Department of State announced on May 4 that it approved $310.5 million for F-16 training, equipment, and support services for Ukraine.[23] Zelensky stated that the Czech Ammunition Initiative could deliver 1.8 million artillery shells to Ukraine in 2025 and that Ukraine is expecting its allies to deliver three million artillery shells in total this year.[24] Czech Defense Minister Jana Černochová stated in April 2025 that the Czech initiative had secured funding for artillery deliveries to Ukraine through Fall 2025.[25]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian sources claimed on May 5 that Ukrainian forces conducted a series of limited attacks across the Russia-Ukraine international border near Tetkino, Kursk Oblast.
- The Russian military command reportedly recently redeployed elements of the 68th Army Corps and 58th Combined Arms Army to the Toretsk direction from the Kurakhove and western Zaporizhia directions.
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Czech President Petr Pavel announced on May 4 that Czechia will work with Ukraine to establish a school to train Ukrainian pilots on F-16 fighter jets outside of Ukraine.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Siversk, Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 4, 2025
Russian President Vladimir Putin indicated that Russia maintains the initial objectives of its war in Ukraine, which are tantamount to Ukraine's surrender, despite ongoing negotiations with the United States. Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin published a documentary on Russian state TV channel Rossiya 1 about Putin on May 4, in which Putin claimed that Russia has enough manpower and materiel to bring the war in Ukraine to its "logical conclusion with the result that Russia needs."[1] Putin also claimed that Russian reconciliation with the Ukrainian part of the Russian people is "inevitable." Putin has repeatedly claimed that the Ukrainian people are simply a subset of Russians rather than a distinctly separate nation to justify Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the occupation of Ukrainian territory and people.[2] Russian state media notably highlighted that Putin has previously made the false claim that Russians and Ukrainians are one people.[3] Putin’s statements indicate that Russia continues to assess that it can achieve its original objectives of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which include demilitarizing Ukraine, installing a pro-Russian government in Ukraine, forcing Ukraine to abandon its aspirations to join NATO and other security blocs, and forcing Ukraine to make massive territorial concessions to Russia, including parts of Ukraine that Russia does not currently occupy.[4] These demands amount to Ukraine’s full capitulation. Russia will likely continue efforts to achieve these goals through military and diplomatic means, as Russian officials continue attempts to leverage battlefield gains to strengthen their negotiating position.
Putin highlighted domestic support for the war and promoted the ideal of sacrifice on the frontline and the home front, likely in an effort to prepare Russian society for a longer war in Ukraine and potential future confrontations with the West. Putin told Zarubin that Russian society reacted positively to the invasion of Ukraine and that each citizen realized that "he is the state" and Russia's survival depends on each individual.[5] Putin stated that Russia is a country of "moral and ethical values" and that the basis of the Russian conscience is "the family, the state, and the future of Russia."[6] Putin is notably attempting to frame the Russian public's support for the war through shared values despite the Kremlin's reliance on financial incentives to recruit the majority of its military personnel and to maintain its war effort.[7] Putin accused the West once again of "deceiving" Russia following the 2015 Minsk agreements, likely in an effort to convince the Russian domestic audience that Russia cannot negotiate with the West and needs to continue the war.[8]
Putin's statements throughout the documentary indicate that Putin likely does not intend to slow offensive operations or transition to defensive operations in Ukraine and instead is attempting to ideologically prepare domestic Russian society for a long war. ISW has previously assessed that Russian officials are setting conditions to maintain a long war and to justify future aggression against Ukraine and NATO.[9] Russian officials have also consistently intensified efforts to militarize Russian society since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, further indicating that Russia is preparing for a protracted conflict. Russian officials are engaged in long-term efforts to consolidate control over Russia’s veteran civil society and elevate a cadre of loyal veterans to positions in Russia's regional and federal government.[10] Putin officially declared 2025 the "Year of the Defender of the Fatherland," following the launch of myriad militaristic initiatives in 2023 and 2024 to provide veterans with social and financial support and reinforce the Russian state narrative that veterans are the new "elite" class[11] Russia is also investing heavily in military-patriotic education for Russia’s youth, demonstrating the Kremlin's interest in creating a new generation of militarized, loyal citizens in the medium to long term[12]
Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov provided new details on May 4 about the report that Ukrainian forces shot down a Russian fixed-wing aircraft with a surface-to-air missile (SAM) attached to a naval drone on May 2. Budanov reported that Ukrainian forces shot down two Russian Su-30 fighter jets over the Black Sea with AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles fired from Magura-7 naval drones.[13]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian President Vladimir Putin indicated that Russia maintains its initial objectives of its war in Ukraine, which are tantamount to Ukraine's surrender, despite ongoing negotiations with the United States.
- Putin highlighted domestic support for the war and promoted the ideal of sacrifice on the frontline and the home front, likely in an effort to prepare Russian society for a longer war in Ukraine and potential future confrontations with the West.
- Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov provided new details on May 4 about the report that Ukrainian forces shot down a Russian fixed-wing aircraft with a surface-to-air missile (SAM) attached to a naval drone on May 2.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk and Toretsk.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 3, 2025
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky denied that Ukraine would concede to the vague terms of Russian President Vladimir Putin's unilateral May 8-11 Victory Day ceasefire proposal. Zelensky referred to Putin's May 8-11 Victory Day ceasefire demand as a "theatrical production" that does not appear to be serious and is designed to create a sense of comfort and safety for participants of Russia's Victory Day celebration.[1] Zelensky once again articulated Ukraine's willingness to extend a short-term ceasefire to 30 days and stated that an effective ceasefire requires high-quality monitoring mechanisms. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated that any joint ceasefire should be comprehensive and last for at least 30 days with the possibility for renewal.[2] Kovalenko noted that shorter ceasefires with vague terms and a lack of monitoring mechanisms afford Russian forces the opportunity to seize on tactical pauses to better prepare ahead of a future summer offensive in Ukraine. Victory Day is Russia's principal patriotic holiday that commemorates the Soviet Union's contributions to victory over Nazi Germany in the Second World War (known in Russia as the Great Patriotic War), and Russia celebrates Victory Day on May 9. Putin first announced on April 28 Russia's intention to implement a Victory Day ceasefire between midnight on the night of May 7 to 8 and midnight on the night of May 10 to 11.[3] Putin's decision to unilaterally impose a fleeting ceasefire during Russia's Victory Day celebration is a deliberate attempt to project a sense of power and control in Russia to both domestic and international audiences. Putin likely also seeks to avoid the embarrassment of Ukrainian strikes during these celebrations by imposing such an agreement.
Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that the purpose of Russia's unilateral Easter and Victory Day ceasefires is to "test" Ukraine's readiness to pursue paths towards a sustainable peace.[4] Peskov claimed that Russia will wait for "final," unambiguous statements from Ukraine and will look for Ukrainian actions aimed at de-escalating the war during the holiday. Ukraine and the United States have previously proposed a 30-day general ceasefire to Russia, but Russian officials continue to ignore or outright reject these general ceasefire proposals.[5] Ukraine has also repeatedly called for longer ceasefires so as to pave the way for negotiations toward a durable peace settlement — which is in line with US President Donald Trump's efforts to leverage a ceasefire as the foundation for a lasting peace agreement in Ukraine.[6] Russia is very likely to continue its pattern of leveraging short-term ceasefires to flood the information space with unsubstantiated claims of Ukrainian ceasefire violations in an effort to discredit Ukraine and to create tactical or operational pauses to conduct troop rotations, resupply units, and prepare for future offensive operations, as evidenced by the Easter and long-range energy infrastructure strikes ceasefires.[7] Russia's continued rejection of Ukrainian and US ceasefire proposals of any reasonable length with necessary monitoring mechanisms showcases Russia's disinterest in peace in Ukraine in the near term.
The Trump administration appears to have finalized its first military equipment sale to Ukraine. The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) announced on May 2 that the US State Department approved and notified the US Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale (FMS) of equipment and maintenance services for Ukraine’s F-16s worth an estimated $310.5 million.[8] The DSCA reported that the sale will include aircraft modifications and upgrades; personnel training related to operation, maintenance, and sustainment support; spare parts, consumables, and accessories; repair and return support; ground handling equipment; classified and unclassified software delivery and support; classified and unclassified publications and technical documents; studies and surveys; and US Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services.
Ukrainian forces shot down a Russian fixed-wing aircraft with a surface-to-air missile (SAM) attached to a naval drone for the first time on May 3. Ukrainian forces launched an aerial drone, a naval drone, and missile strike against Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, and surrounding areas on May 3.[9] The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) confirmed that Ukrainian forces used a SAM fired from a Magura naval drone to down a Russian Su-30 fighter jet over the Black Sea near Novorossiysk.[10] Ukrainian forces used missiles attached to a Magura naval drone to shoot down a Russian Mi-8 helicopter in December 2024, but this is the first time that Ukrainian forces have downed a fixed-wing aircraft using this tactic.[11]
Russian milbloggers responded to the May 3 strike, claiming that Russia is lagging behind Ukraine on naval drone development and complaining that Russia has previously lost aircraft over the Black Sea due to Ukrainian drone dominance.[12] The milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have the means to combat Ukrainian naval drones and protect Russian aircraft from missile strikes, but that Russian leadership is unwilling to prioritize Russian drone development and innovation. The milbloggers called for Russian coastal defense units and drone operators in the Black Sea to integrate lessons learned from Russian infantry fighting in Ukraine in order to integrate first-person view (FPV) drones with aerial reconnaissance.
Senior Kremlin officials continue to set informational conditions that could support military operations against Lithuania (and other NATO states) by advancing narratives that deny the sovereignty of Lithuania and other former Soviet states. Independent Russian media outlets Meduza and Agentstvo reported on May 2 that Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov authored the foreword of a new book titled "History of Lithuania," which the "Foreign Relations" publishing arm of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) published in March 2025.[13] Lavrov‘s foreword claimed that the national policies of Baltic countries, including modern Lithuania, leverage "falsified” historical narratives to "stimulate" Russophobic and anti-Russian sentiments in their domestic audiences.[14] Lavrov claimed that the book seeks to analyze the development of the "lands that were associated with Lithuania at different times." Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys stated that the book is a Russian propaganda tool designed to provide the Kremlin with scholarly literature to support its denial of neighboring countries’ statehoods and histories separate from that of Russia.[15] Kremlin officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, have recently intensified their threats against Europe — particularly the Baltic States — due to Europe's alleged "Russophobia."[16] Kremlin officials have also indicated that Russia views independent states that were once part of the Russian Empire and Soviet Union as part of modern-day Russia.[17]
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky denied that Ukraine would concede to the vague terms of Russian President Vladimir Putin's unilateral May 8-11 Victory Day ceasefire proposal.
- The Trump administration appears to have finalized its first military equipment sale to Ukraine.
- Ukrainian forces shot down a Russian fixed-wing aircraft with a surface-to-air missile (SAM) attached to a naval drone for the first time on May 3.
- Senior Kremlin officials continue to set informational conditions that could support military operations against Lithuania (and other NATO states) by advancing narratives that deny the sovereignty of Lithuania and other former Soviet states.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Siversk, Novopavlivka, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 2, 2025
Russian gains along the frontline have slowed over the last four months, but Russia continues to tolerate personnel losses comparable to the casualty rate Russian forces sustained during a period of intensified advances between September and December 2024. ISW assesses that Russian forces gained a total of 1,627 square kilometers in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast in January, February, March, and April 2025, and daily Russian casualty reports from the Ukrainian General Staff indicate that Russian forces suffered 160,600 casualties during the last four months for an average of 99 casualties for every square kilometer taken over the last four months. ISW assesses that Russian forces seized an estimated 496 square kilometers in January 2025; an estimated 313 square kilometers in February 2025; an estimated 601 square kilometers in March 2025; and an estimated 217 square kilometers in April 2025. Ukrainian General Staff reports indicate that Russian forces lost an estimated 48,060 casualties in January 2025, 35,300 casualties in February 2025, 40,670 casualties in March 2025, and 36,570 casualties in April 2025.[1] Russian advances significantly increased in March 2025 due to the elimination of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast, coinciding with the temporary cessation of US intelligence sharing with Ukraine, although Russian advances on average decreased between January, February, and April 2025. Russian gains have also slowed as Russian forces come up against more well-defended Ukrainian positions in and around larger towns such as Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk over the last four months.
Russian forces are currently sustaining a higher casualty rate per square kilometer gained than in Fall 2024. Russian forces gained an estimated 2,949 square kilometers at the cost of 174,935 casualties between September and December 2024 — an average of 59 casualties per square kilometer taken.[2] Russian casualty rates consistently increased throughout September, October, November, and December 2024 and peaked at an estimated 49,135 total monthly casualties in December 2024.[3] Monthly Russian rates of advance plateaued at 839 square kilometers in November 2024, however, and began to slow in December 2024 to an assessed 593 square kilometers and have continued to slow in 2025 (with the exception of the elimination of the Kursk salient). Russian gains have been 45 percent slower between January and April 2025 than in the period between September and December 2024, although Russian casualty rates have only decreased by 10 percent in that interval. The Russian military command thus appears to be tolerating similar personnel loss rates despite a significant decrease in the rate of territorial gains.
Russia has thus far sustained these casualties and the current tempo of offensive operations by rapidly deploying low quality troops to frontline units, although the reliance on such troops is also hindering Russia's ability to conduct complex operations and make rapid advances in Ukraine. ISW has not observed a notable decrease in the tempo of Russian offensive operations along the frontline in recent months, despite the slowing rates of advance, suggesting that Russia is generating enough forces to sustain these casualties without having to deprioritize any frontline area. ISW has repeatedly observed reports that new Russian recruits only receive a month of training before deploying to Ukraine, and this limited training is likely constraining recruits' combat capabilities and the Russian military's overall capacity to successfully conduct complex operations.[4] The Russian military command is currently prioritizing funneling poorly trained recruits into highly attritional infantry assaults to offset personnel losses in Ukraine while sustaining the current tempo of operations, possibly at the expense of Russia's long-term warfighting capabilities.[5] The Russian military does not have a reserve pool of well-trained troops who are not currently engaged in combat in Ukraine and can rapidly deploy along the frontline, and the Russian military command's decision to funnel poorly trained troops to the frontline in Ukraine is undermining Russia's ability to create a pool of such forces.[6]
Russian President Vladimir Putin's commitment to maintaining the tempo of offensive operations despite diminishing returns underscores Putin's ongoing efforts to leverage further battlefield gains to generate pressure on Ukraine in ceasefire and peace negotiations or otherwise to force Ukraine's collapse. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is attempting to prolong negotiations to extract additional concessions from the United States and Ukraine and make additional battlefield gains.[7] Russian forces intensified offensive operations throughout the frontline in February and March 2025, including a limited offensive operation into northern Sumy Oblast, as part of an ongoing Russian effort to slowly degrade frontline Ukrainian positions and make opportunistic tactical advances. Putin may intend to leverage any gains over the last four months and in the near future to extract further Ukrainian and Western concessions during future peace negotiations. It remains unclear if Russia will maintain sufficient force generation rates to sustain offensive operations in Ukraine indefinitely, however, due to the rising economic cost of social benefits and one-time payments for Russian servicemembers.[8] ISW previously noted that Russia's ongoing and forecasted economic struggles are closely tied to Russian losses on the battlefield and that it is not possible for the United States or the wider West to exert maximum pressure on Russia with economic tools alone.[9] The United States can better leverage Russian vulnerabilities and achieve a stronger negotiating position and more durable resolution to the war in Ukraine by forcing Putin to rethink his negotiation and battlefield strategies and empowering Ukrainian forces to continue inflicting significant manpower and materiel losses on Russia.
Western intelligence reportedly suggests that Putin may begin prioritizing short-term goals such as consolidating Russia's gains in Ukraine and Russia's immediate economic viability over seizing more territory, but Putin's demonstrated commitment to maintaining the tempo of Russian offensive operations in Ukraine despite continuing high casualty rates is a counter-indicator to this reported assessment. CNN reported on May 1 that new intelligence reviewed by US and Western officials suggests that Putin may be pivoting his immediate focus to shorter-term objectives of cementing Russian control over occupied Ukrainian territory and boosting Russia's economy.[10] CNN reported that Putin may be concerned by the Trump administration's threats to apply more sanctions on the struggling Russian economy. An unnamed official told CNN that Putin's willingness to settle for more limited objectives in Ukraine depends on whether Putin can portray Russia's gains in Ukraine as an acceptable victory domestically. The source insinuated that Putin likely remains committed to revisiting his longer-term goals of subjugating all of Ukraine and undermining NATO after taking a "significant pause," however.
ISW has observed a variety of indicators suggesting that Putin is not reconsidering his short-term objectives in Ukraine, however. Russian forces have increased the intensity of offensive operations throughout the theater, particularly redoubling efforts to advance deeper in the Lyman, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka directions and launching a limited offensive operation in Sumy Oblast.[11] Russian forces are rapidly integrating tactical innovations to optimize timely gains in response to Ukrainian drone operators, including integrating motorcycles into offensive operations in Ukraine.[12] The Kremlin is also leveraging legal, financial, and socioeconomic measures to increase Russia's force generation capabilities and boost Russia's drone production capabilities to support the war in Ukraine.[13]
A future slowing of Russian offensive operations and/or transition to defensive operations in all or part of the theater would be indicators that Putin is shifting his short-term goals from seizing more territory to consolidating previously held territory. Putin could choose to pivot toward shorter-term objectives on account of mounting economic and manpower constraints that are increasingly hindering Russia's ability to perpetuate its war in Ukraine.[14] Russian forces could slow the tempo of offensive operations and work to implement policies and tactics to mitigate casualties if Putin issues an order to prioritize consolidating Russia's hold over occupied Ukraine instead of making further gains. Russian forces would likely shift to defensive operations with the aim of fortifying and consolidating current positions on the frontline, largely in an effort to safeguard battlefield gains and preserve increasingly limited manpower and materiel reserves, in response to such an order. Russian forces could begin constructing fortifications near frontline positions in response to such an order. ISW would observe such indicators and will continue to monitor Russian and Ukrainian reporting for these indicators.
ISW continues to assess that Russian President Vladimir Putin remains committed to his long-term military objectives of seizing all of Ukraine and undermining NATO. Senior US officials reportedly remain skeptical that Putin has eased his intransigence regarding a peace agreement and told CNN that Russia may resume the war and try to seize more Ukrainian territory even after agreeing to a US peace proposal.[15] CNN reported that unspecified officials maintain the belief that Russia will retain its aims of seizing the maximal amount of Ukrainian territory even if Putin signs a peace agreement. Ongoing Russian efforts to seize Lyman and Pokrovsk and advance north of Toretsk toward the southernmost point of Ukraine's fortress belt in Kostyantynivka indicate that Putin maintains his long-standing goals of seizing the remainder of Donetsk Oblast.[16] The Russian government's efforts to expand Russia's force generation capabilities in the short- and long-term and Russia's ongoing military restructuring efforts suggest that Russia is not only responding to a drawn-out conflict in Ukraine but also preparing for a future conflict on Russia's western borders.[17] The Russian government also continues to prioritize long-term investment in Russia's domestic industrial base (DIB), despite the significant economic cost of this wartime economy to Russia’s population.[18] These factors indicate that Putin is not abandoning his territorial ambitions in Ukraine but is in fact preparing for a long war of attrition against Ukraine and likely the collective West.
Russian officials are also continuing to condition Russian society to support a long-term war effort in Ukraine and against NATO. Russian officials, including Putin, have consistently leveraged false claims about the war in Ukraine to make maximalist territorial demands, including that Ukraine give up "Novorossiya" — an invented region of Ukraine that Kremlin officials have claimed includes all of southern and eastern Ukraine and is an "integral" part of Russia that Ukraine must concede for Russia to end the war.[19] Putin invoked the term "Novorossiya" as recently as April 21, indicating that the Kremlin has not abandoned this territorial objective.[20] Russian state media previously cautioned Russian domestic audiences in March 2025 against expecting "big agreements" from recent peace negotiations between Putin and US President Donald Trump.[21] A Verstka poll of 100 Russian military personnel published on April 29 indicates that only 18% of career Russian military personnel and officers, most of whom have been fighting in Ukraine for over two years, would support a Russian withdrawal from Ukraine prior to achieving Putin's stated goals (likely referring to the demilitarization and "denazification" of Ukraine).[22] Only about a fifth of surveyed Russian military personnel and civilians indicated that they believe the war will end in the coming months. Verstka’s polling indicates that the Kremlin is not preparing the Russian information space for a peace agreement in the near future and that Russian forces and society do not anticipate an imminent end to the war. This pattern of Kremlin informational activity and the resonance it has achieved in Russian society will make it much harder for Putin to present any long-term ceasefire, let alone peace agreement, that falls far short of his stated aims as any kind of victory to his domestic audience.
Statements by US officials suggest that the Trump administration is considering stepping back from intensified mediation efforts to end the war in Ukraine. US Vice President JD Vance told Fox News on May 1 that the war in Ukraine will not end "any time soon" and that it is "up to the Russians and Ukrainians now that each side knows what the other’s terms are for peace."[23] US Secretary of State and Acting National Security Advisor Marco Rubio told Fox News on May 1 that US President Donald Trump will need to prioritize other issues if Ukrainian and Russian negotiating positions remain too far apart for reconciliation but that the United States will continue "helping" wherever possible.[24] US Department of State Spokesperson Tammy Bruce echoed Rubio’s statements during a press briefing on May 1 and noted that the matter of resolving the conflict in Ukraine is "now“ between Russia and Ukraine, as the United States is changing its "style" and "methodology" and will no longer "fly around the world at the drop of a hat" to mediate negotiations."[25] Bruce reiterated that the United States is "still committed" to a lasting peace in Ukraine
The US Department of State submitted a proposed license for defense exports to Ukraine to the US Congress on April 29.[26] The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is considering the proposal.
Key Takeaways:
- Russian gains along the frontline have slowed over the last four months, but Russia continues to tolerate personnel losses comparable to the casualty rate Russian forces sustained during a period of intensified advances between September and December 2024.
- Russian forces are currently sustaining a higher casualty rate per square kilometer gained than in Fall 2024.
- Russia has thus far sustained these casualties and the current tempo of offensive operations by rapidly deploying low quality troops to frontline units, although the reliance on such troops is also hindering Russia's ability to conduct complex operations and make rapid advances in Ukraine.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin's commitment to maintaining the tempo of offensive operations despite diminishing returns underscores Putin's ongoing efforts to leverage further battlefield gains to generate pressure on Ukraine in ceasefire and peace negotiations or otherwise to force Ukraine's collapse.
- Western intelligence reportedly suggests that Putin may begin prioritizing short-term goals such as consolidating Russia's gains in Ukraine and Russia's immediate economic viability over seizing more territory, but Putin's demonstrated commitment to maintaining the tempo of Russian offensive operations in Ukraine despite continuing high casualty rates is a counter-indicator to this reported assessment.
- A future slowing of Russian offensive operations and/or transition to defensive operations in all or part of the theater would be indicators that Putin is shifting his short-term goals from seizing more territory to consolidating previously held territory.
- ISW continues to assess that Russian President Vladimir Putin remains committed to his long-term military objectives of seizing all of Ukraine and undermining NATO.
- Statements by US officials suggest that the Trump administration is considering stepping back from intensified mediation efforts to end the war in Ukraine.
- The US Department of State submitted a proposed license for defense exports to Ukraine to the US Congress on April 29.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 1, 2025
The United States and Ukraine published additional information about their April 30 bilateral economic partnership agreement.[i] The Trump administration and the Ukrainian government published the joint text of the US-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund on May 1 and reported that the agreement is a "fully collaborative partnership" that will fund Ukraine's long-term reconstruction and modernization. The agreement establishes a joint fund that the United States and Ukraine will equally pay into to fund development, infrastructure, and natural resource extraction projects in Ukraine. Ukrainian officials noted that Ukraine will retain full control over "subsoil, infrastructure, and natural resources" and the right to determine the terms of use for Ukraine's natural resources.[ii] Ukrainian officials stated that United States can make monetary contributions or supply additional military assistance to Ukraine as part of the fund, and that Ukraine will allocate 50 percent of its state budget revenues from rent payments, license fees, and other revenue from national resource extraction projects to the fund.[iii] The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada must ratify the agreement, and it appears that the United States and Ukraine will also have to sign a series of more technical agreements that will define the terms of the investments and projects in the future.[iv]
The Trump administration noted that the agreement signals US commitment to "Ukraine's long-term success" and noted that the United States and Ukraine will not allow any person, company, or state that supplied the Russian war effort to benefit from the reconstruction of Ukraine.[v] US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent also noted during an interview on Fox News on May 1 that the agreement is a "strong signal" to Russian officials that there "is no daylight" between the United States and Ukraine.[vi] Ukraine's participation in this agreement underscores Ukraine's continued willingness to make compromises in pursuit of a long-term, sustainable resolution of the war in Ukraine despite consistent Russian disinterest in US and Ukrainian peace proposals.
US Special Envoy to Ukraine Keith Kellogg recently reaffirmed that Ukrainian officials remain committed to resolving the war in Ukraine, despite ongoing Russian refusals to accept US President Donald Trump’s repeated proposals for a general ceasefire in pursuit of lasting peace in Ukraine. Kellogg told Fox News on April 29 that Ukrainian representatives repeatedly demonstrated their willingness to negotiate during talks with senior US and European officials in London on April 23, and it is now "up to [Russian President] Vladimir Putin" to achieve a peaceful resolution to the war.[vii] Kellogg stated that Ukrainian representatives in London agreed to 22 "concrete" terms including a "permanent, comprehensive" ceasefire, for which US President Donald Trump has long advocated. Kellogg also stated that US officials previously presented Putin with a roadmap for ending the war in Ukraine and that Putin should directly engage with the US proposal if he "really" wants to end the war. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed in an interview with Brazilian newspaper O Globo published on April 28 that "the ball is not in [Russia’s] court" in terms of ceasefire negotiations because Ukrainian officials have not shown "readiness" for peace negotiations.[viii] Lavrov’s statements indicate that Russian officials are uninterested in serious peace negotiations to end the war and are prolonging negotiations to facilitate battlefield gains. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is attempting to hold ceasefire negotiations hostage in order to extract additional concessions from Ukraine and the United States by falsely shifting the blame onto Ukraine for stalling negotiations to end the war.[ix]
Russia continues to reject US and European proposals to deploy Western peacekeeping forces to Ukraine and calls for Russia to make territorial concessions in pursuit of a lasting peace in Ukraine, signaling the Kremlin's unyielding negotiating position. Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu stated on April 30 during a BRICS foreign ministers' summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil that Russia will consider Western peacekeeping contingents in Ukraine as legitimate military targets and that such contingents are unacceptable.[x] Shoigu added that Russia has observed signs that the West is planning to introduce "pseudo-peacekeepers" into Ukraine, and another Russian official recently insinuated that Russia would not accept the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) as a monitoring mechanism for a ceasefire or permanent peace.[xi] Russian officials have repeatedly rejected Western overtures to implement any sort of monitoring mechanisms in Ukraine, weaponizing unclear and unilateral Russian ceasefire terms to blame Ukraine ceasefire violations.[xii] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) stated on May 1 that Russia will "take all necessary measures" to prevent Ukraine and its Western allies from restoring Ukraine to its 1991 internationally recognized borders.[xiii] Putin and other Russian officials have repeatedly demanded that Ukraine acquiesce to territorial concessions while Russia remains steadfast in its refusal to offer any concessions of its own.[xiv]
Key Takeaways:
- The United States and Ukraine published additional information about their April 30 bilateral economic partnership agreement.
- US Special Envoy to Ukraine Keith Kellogg recently reaffirmed that Ukrainian officials remain committed to resolving the war in Ukraine, despite ongoing Russian refusals to accept US President Donald Trump’s repeated proposals for a general ceasefire in pursuit of lasting peace in Ukraine.
- Russia continues to reject US and European proposals to deploy Western peacekeeping forces to Ukraine and calls for Russia to make territorial concessions in pursuit of a lasting peace in Ukraine, signaling the Kremlin's unyielding negotiating position.
- Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Lyman, Siversk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 30, 2025
The United States and Ukraine signed a bilateral economic partnership agreement on April 30. The US Department of the Treasury announced the agreement, which created the United States-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund that aims to accelerate Ukraine's economic recovery.[1] The precise terms of the agreement are unspecified as of this publication. US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent reiterated that the United States remains committed to peace and prosperity in a free Ukraine and noted that "no state or person who financed or supplied the Russian war machine" will be allowed to benefit from Ukraine's reconstruction.[2] Bessent also stated that the agreement signals to Russia that the Trump administration is “committed to a peace process centered on a free, sovereign, and prosperous Ukraine over the long term.” The BBC Russian Service reported that the agreement includes language that future US military aid to Ukraine could be labeled as US “investment” in Ukraine, though these details remain unconfirmed as of this report.[3]
Russian officials continue to demand full Ukrainian capitulation as the sole basis on which Russia is willing to accept a future peace agreement. Bloomberg reported on April 29, citing three sources in Moscow familiar with the matter, that Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff's proposal to freeze the war on the current frontlines during their April 17 meeting in Moscow and instead insisted that Russia gain all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts as part of any peace agreement.[4] Bloomberg's report is consistent with Kremlin officials' repeated public demands that any future peace deal must satisfy all of Russia's war goals, including the cession of all of Crimea and Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts to Russia.[5] Kremlin officials have continued to reiterate their refusal to make any territorial concessions even after recent reports of the US seven-point peace plan that offered Russia "de jure" US recognition of Russian sovereignty over occupied Crimea and "de facto" recognition of Russian control over the rest of occupied Ukraine — the plan that Witkoff reportedly presented to Putin on April 17.[6]
Senior Russian officials continue to demand that any end to Russia's war in Ukraine must also accomplish all of Putin's original war aims. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov reiterated on April 30 that Putin's main goal remains the achievement of the original goals of his full-scale invasion of Ukraine — Ukrainian demilitarization, neutrality, and regime change with the installation of a pro-Kremlin puppet government.[7] Russian Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN) Vasily Nebenzya similarly stated on April 29 that Russia is committed to finding long-term solutions to eliminate the "root causes" of Russia's war in Ukraine."[8] Russian officials have repeatedly defined these "root causes" as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to expand into eastern Europe and along Russia's borders in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s Ukraine and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine.[9] Calls for the elimination of these alleged "root causes" are in line with Putin's demands for Ukrainian regime change and neutrality as well as Putin's pre-war demand that would have required NATO to roll back to its pre-1997 borders.[10]
Russian officials continue to set conditions to manipulate any future ceasefires and renege on any future Russian-Ukrainian agreements at a time of Russia's choosing. Peskov claimed that Russia must conclude a peace agreement with Ukraine rather than with the United States, and Nebenzya claimed that Russia is willing to hold direct talks with Ukrainian officials "without preconditions" despite alleged issues with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's legitimacy.[11] Putin and other Russian officials have similarly claimed that the current Ukrainian government is illegitimate because Ukraine did not hold presidential elections in 2024 (in accordance with its constitution and law).[12] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is setting conditions to renege on any future agreement it signs with Ukraine on the grounds that the Ukrainian government was not legitimate.[13] Any long-term peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine must include Russia's explicit recognition of the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government and the Ukrainian Constitution. These intransigent Russian demands run contrary to both the US-proposed seven-point peace plan and US President Donald Trump's stated goal of ensuring a lasting peace in Ukraine.[14]
Peskov overinflated Russia's current military strength and battlefield victories thus far in the war in an attempt to justify Russia's continued unwillingness to make territorial concessions. Peskov claimed that the situation on the ground in Ukraine is different from what it was in March 2022 and that it is "impossible" not to recognize this situation "de facto or de jure."[15] Peskov vaguely referenced the March 2022 Russian-Ukrainian negotiations in Istanbul (that resulted in a draft agreement that would have effectively disarmed Ukraine, banned Ukraine from receiving any foreign weapons, and forced Ukraine to commit never to participate in military blocs) and blamed the West and Ukraine for dismantling these 2022 negotiations.[16] Peskov is attempting to create the impression that Russia is in a stronger position today than it was in March 2022. Peskov is also signaling that Russia will not make any territorial concessions, amid reports that a recent US war termination plan proposal included "de jure" US recognition of Russian control over Crimea and "de facto" recognition of Russian control over occupied Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts.[17]
Peskov's assessment that the battlefield situation has changed between March 2022 and now is correct, but because Russia's battlefield situation has deteriorated since the initial days of the invasion, rather than improved as Peskov falsely suggested. Russian forces were on Kyiv’s outskirts and seized Kherson City in March 2022. Since then, Ukrainian counteroffensives pushed Russian forces away from Kyiv City and other areas in northern Ukraine in March-April 2022; liberated a significant portion of Kharkiv Oblast and pushed Russian forces away from Kharkiv City in September-October 2022; and completely pushed Russian forces from west (right) bank Kherson Oblast and liberated Kherson City in November 2022.[18] Russian forces advanced more than 1,000 square kilometers per day on average in March 2022 — significantly faster and deeper than the Russian rate of advance in Winter 2024, when Russian forces were advancing at a relatively faster tempo than the months of positional warfare that characterized most of 2023 and early 2024.[19] Ukrainian forces have been able to use Western military aid and increased Ukrainian defense industrial production capabilities to limit Russian forces to incremental, gradual advances at the cost of high personnel and equipment losses.[20]
Russian officials continue to call for the cessation of Western aid to Ukraine as part of efforts to reintensify offensive operations when Ukraine's defense capabilities are weakened. Nebenzya claimed that Europe is issuing "empty declarations and calls for a truce" in Ukraine but that Russia expects the West to give "clear and specific signals" that it "really want[s] to help find a long-term solution" to the war in Ukraine.[21] Nebenzya claimed that one of the main "signals" the West could give is to stop arms supplies to Ukraine. Putin made similar demands about Western military aid when he rejected the US- and Ukrainian-proposed 30-day ceasefire on March 13, questioning whether Ukrainian forces would be able to continue to receive military aid from their partners and allies during such a ceasefire.[22] Nebenzya's April 30 renewal of Putin's demand is part of the Kremlin's wider reflexive control campaign that aims to push the West to make decisions that are in Russia's favor. The cessation of Western military aid to Ukraine would not only further the longstanding Russian demand for Ukraine's demilitarization, such that Ukraine can no longer defend itself, but would also encourage Russia to continue and even expand offensive operations to take advantage of Ukrainian weaknesses — as Russia has done before. Russia most notably used the months’ long US delay to approve additional security assistance to Ukraine in late 2023 and early 2024, and subsequent Ukrainian material constraints to intensify offensive operations and expand their goals to attempt operationally significant breakthroughs.[23] Russian forces are still engaged in some of the offensive efforts that gained momentum in late 2023 and early 2024 due to lapses in US security assistance to Ukraine.
Senior Russian officials continue to claim that Russia is open to diplomacy to end the war while rejecting US and Ukrainian ceasefire proposals that would allow for formal peace negotiations to begin. US Department of State Spokesperson Tammy Bruce stated on April 29 that the United States wants to see a "complete, full, durable" 30-day ceasefire in Ukraine and not just a "three-day moment" to "celebrate something."[24] US Special Envoy to Ukraine Keith Kellogg similarly stated on April 29 that Trump wants to see a comprehensive 30-day land, sea, and air ceasefire that can be extended and described Russia's May 8-11 proposed ceasefire as "absurd."[25]
Nebenzya and Peskov claimed on April 29 and 30 that Russia prefers "diplomatic" and "peaceful" methods to achieve all of its goals in the war.[26] Peskov, however, reiterated Putin's rejection of recent US- and Ukrainian-proposed ceasefires that would pave the way for diplomatic talks on how to end the war. Peskov claimed that Putin supports a longer-term ceasefire but "questions" the "nuances" that the parties must resolve before Russia can agree to this ceasefire.[27] Peskov claimed that the United States wants a "quick success" in Ukraine but that the process is "too complicated."[28] Peskov referenced Putin's March 13 rejection of the first US- and Ukrainian-proposed full 30-day ceasefire, about which Putin claimed there are questions that "require painstaking research from both sides."[29] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is attempting to prolong negotiations to extract additional concessions from the United States and Ukraine and make additional battlefield gains.[30]
Russian state-owned and pro-Kremlin media appear to be attempting to portray Russia as willing to negotiate. Russian state media broadly reported on April 30 that the state nuclear energy corporation Rosatom CEO Alexei Likhachev stated that Russia is "ready to discuss" a possible US presence at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), which Russian forces currently occupy.[31] Likhachev's statement is in reference to the reported US seven-point peace proposal that stipulates that Ukraine would reacquire the ZNPP and that the plant would function under US operation.[32] A Russian official agreeing to negotiate on this point would represent a major inflection, as Russia has rejected Ukrainian or US operation of the ZNPP previously. Rosatom's press service issued a correction on April 30, however, reporting that Likhachev stated that Rosatom is ready to discuss cooperation with the United States regarding the operation of the ZNPP "on the condition that a political decision is made by the Russian leadership."[33] Rosatom noted that some unspecified Russian news agencies initially incorrectly quoted Likhachev.[34] Many of the Russian state media outlets are still showing the earlier headlines mischaracterizing Likhachev's quote as of this publication, despite Rosatom's clarification.[35] Russia is currently very unlikely to cede the ZNPP to Ukraine, given the Kremlin's continued insistence on achieving all its war goals and continued demonstration of its unwillingness to offer territorial concessions.
Russian officials continue to falsely portray European efforts to increase their own defense capabilities — in line with US President Donald Trump's objective to have Europe shoulder more of the burden for collective security — as a threat to Russian national security, likely to support Russian efforts to justify future Russian aggression against NATO. Russian authorities organized the third Anti-Fascist Conference on April 30, which included military representatives from Belarus, North Korea, and Vietnam.[36] Russian Deputy Defense Minister Colonel General Viktor Goremykin claimed that Western states have supported the Ukrainian government in implementing Ukraine's alleged "Russophobic" policies, claiming that these policies are direct threats to Russia's security. Goremykin also claimed that the European Union's (EU) five-year rearmament defense plan is unacceptable to Russia, and that Russia will take "all necessary" measures to protect its security. Belarusian Defense Minister General Viktor Khrenin also warned that European rearmament efforts threaten global peace and claimed that some European countries, particularly the Baltic States, promote Russophobia in their state policies.[37] Kremlin officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, have recently intensified their threats against Europe — particularly the Baltic States — due to Europe's alleged "Russophobia" and aggressive military buildup.[38]
North Korea and Russia continue to enhance bilateral cooperation, particularly in the military and labor spheres. Reuters reported on April 30, citing South Korean intelligence, that roughly 600 North Korean troops have died in Russia out of a total deployment of 15,000 since November 2024 and that North Korean forces have suffered approximately 4,700 casualties in Russia's war against Ukraine to date.[39] Reuters also noted that North Korean battlefield experience in Russia's Kursk Oblast over the past six months has improved North Koreans' combat capabilities, particularly in drone usage, and that Russia has provided North Korea with technical assistance on spy satellites, drones, and anti-air missiles in return for its military support. Reuters also reported that South Korean intelligence suggests that North Korea has sent approximately 15,000 workers to Russia, in violation of United Nations (UN) sanctions that prohibit the export of North Korean labor to third countries. US State Department Spokesperson Tammy Bruce stated on April 29 that North Korea is derailing efforts to achieve peace between Russia and Ukraine and that Russia's military assistance and training of North Korean troops directly violates the UN Security Council Resolutions 1718, 1874, and 2270, all of which broadly prohibit North Korea from receiving or providing military training or assistance to other countries.[40] Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin stated on April 30 that Russia and North Korea are constructing a bridge to enhance bilateral relations.[41] Russian opposition outlet Meduza added that Russia and North Korea will complete its construction in 1.5 years (approximately in late 2026) and that the bridge will support vehicle traffic between the two countries.[42] Russia and North Korea will likely use the bridge for materiel transportation as the two states strengthen their cooperation.
Ukrainian sources continue to report on cases of Russian commanders ordering their subordinates to execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in violation of international law. Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reported on April 30 that the deputy commander of the Russian 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) and company commander of the "Storm" Detachment in the 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division) ordered their subordinates to execute a Ukrainian POW and then desecrate his body near Staromayorske (south of Velyka Novosilka) in June 2024.[43] ISW has observed and reported on numerous instances of Russian servicemembers executing Ukrainian POWs along the frontline in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast and continues to assess that this is a systemic trend in the Russian military and that Russian commanders are either complicit in or directly enabling their subordinates to conduct such atrocities.[44]
Key Takeaways:
- The United States and Ukraine signed a bilateral economic partnership agreement on April 30.
- Russian officials continue to demand full Ukrainian capitulation as the sole basis on which Russia is willing to accept a future peace agreement.
- Peskov overinflated Russia's current military strength and battlefield victories thus far in the war in an attempt to justify Russia's continued unwillingness to make territorial concessions.
- Russian officials continue to call for the cessation of Western aid to Ukraine as part of efforts to reintensify offensive operations when Ukraine's defense capabilities are weakened.
- Senior Russian officials continue claim that Russia is open to diplomacy to end the war while rejecting US and Ukrainian ceasefire proposals that would allow for formal peace negotiations to begin.
- Russian officials continue to falsely portray European efforts to increase their own defense capabilities – in line with US President Donald Trump's objective to have Europe shoulder more of the burden for collective security - as a threat to Russian national security, likely to support Russian efforts to justify future Russian aggression against NATO.
- North Korea and Russia continue to enhance bilateral cooperation, particularly in the military and labor spheres.
- Ukrainian sources continue to report on cases of Russian commanders ordering their subordinates to execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in violation of international law.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman and Toretsk.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 29, 2025
Russian Security Council Secretary Dmitry Medvedev stated on April 29 that Russia's war in Ukraine must end in Russian "victory" and the "destruction" of the current Ukrainian government.[1] Senior Kremlin officials continue to signal that Russia has greater territorial ambitions than just the occupied areas of Ukraine, particularly in areas bordering the Black Sea. Russian Presidential Aide and former Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev claimed in an interview with Kremlin newswire TASS published on April 29 that Ukrainian civilians, particularly those living in the Black Sea region, must "determine their own future."[2] Patrushev specifically noted that Odesa City spent over two centuries as the Russian Empire's and Soviet Union's outpost in the Black Sea and claimed that Odesa City residents have "nothing in common" with the current Ukrainian government. These statements are a reference to Russian President Vladimir Putin's 2023 claim that Ukrainians living in the Black Sea region have nothing "to do with Ukraine" and that Odesa is a "Russian city" and follows Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's April 14, 2025 claim that the Ukrainian government "does not represent" residents of Odesa City and other Ukrainian territories.[3] Patrushev claimed that Russia "respects the will of the [Ukrainian] people" and attempted to justify Russia's illegal annexation of occupied Crimea, Donbas, and "Novorossiya" — an invented region in Ukraine which the Kremlin has claimed includes all of eastern and southern Ukraine and is an "integral" part of Russia.[4] Medvedev also claimed that the current Ukrainian government does not speak for the Ukrainian people.[5] Medvedev's and Patrushev’s statements reference the longstanding Kremlin demand for regime change in Ukraine with the installation of a pro-Russian puppet government that could struggle to oppose or even support the Kremlin's goal to occupy more territory in Ukraine at a later time of the Kremlin's choosing.[6]
Senior Russian officials reiterated the longstanding, false Russian narrative that the Ukrainian government is illegitimate, likely in order to set conditions to manipulate ceasefire negotiations and renege on any future Russian-Ukrainian agreements at a time of Russia's choosing. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on April 29 that the "illegitimacy" of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's presidency would create legal difficulties in direct peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, but that Russia is more interested in starting negotiations and "everything else is secondary."[7] Peskov claimed on April 24 that Russia would restart its war should "people...question the legitimacy" of Zelensky and stated that Russia has "no confidence" in the Ukrainian government.[8] Putin and other senior Russian officials have repeatedly claimed that all Ukrainian governments since 2014 are "illegitimate" and that Russia would not view any agreements concluded with the current Ukrainian government as binding.[9] Putin and other Russian officials have similarly claimed that Zelensky is illegitimate because Ukraine did not hold presidential elections in 2024, and have additionally alleged that all Ukrainian civil authorities are therefore illegitimate since the president appoints regional officials.[10] The Ukrainian Constitution explicitly prohibits elections during periods of martial law and invasion by a hostile country, however.[11] The Kremlin is deliberately coupling its purported interest in Russian-Ukrainian peace negotiations with its false narrative of Zelensky's illegitimacy in order to set conditions for Russia to claim that any future peace settlement that Russia signs with Zelensky is illegitimate, to renege on the agreement, and relaunch the invasion at the time of Russia's choosing. Any long-term peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine must include Russia's explicit recognition of the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government and the Ukrainian Constitution.
Russian officials are setting conditions to baselessly accuse Ukraine of violating Russia's unilateral May 8 to 11 ceasefire, as the Kremlin has done during previous ceasefires, while rejecting Ukraine's proposal for a 30-day ceasefire. Lavrov claimed on April 29 that the May 8 to 11 ceasefire will be the "beginning of direct negotiations, without preconditions," but stated that Russia considers the US- and Ukrainian-proposed 30-day ceasefire to be a "precondition."[12] Lavrov reiterated Putin's rejection of the US- and Ukrainian-proposed longer-term ceasefires, claiming that Russia cannot accept any longer-term ceasefire since such ceasefires require extensive monitoring measures. Lavrov stated that Russia does not think "honest" monitoring is possible during a 30-day ceasefire in Ukraine. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on April 29 that the Ukrainian government does not have full control over all Ukrainian military units and will be unable to guarantee that Ukrainian forces adhere to the May 8 to 11 ceasefire.[13] Putin similarly declared a unilateral Easter ceasefire in mid-April 2025, and Russia has consistently accused Ukraine of violating previous ceasefires while rarely offering evidence supporting these accusations.[14] Ukraine - unlike Russia - supports US President Donald Trump's proposals for a 30-day temporary ceasefire or more permanent ceasefires.[15] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is leveraging unilateral ceasefires to achieve informational and battlefield advantages in Ukraine and to maintain the illusion that Russia is interested in meaningful peace negotiations.[16]
Kremlin officials within Putin's inner circle continue to threaten NATO as Putin himself refrains from doing so — likely as part of Kremlin efforts to justify future Russian aggression against NATO to the Russian population. Medvedev claimed that the West is attempting to use a principle of "peace through force" to harm Russia, but that Russia's only possible response to this principle is "peace through fear."[17] Medvedev claimed that other approaches do not work but that "fear still works." Medvedev claimed that the leaders in the European Union (EU) are "Russophobic" and that Russia's relations with Europe have "passed the point of no return."[18] Medvedev attempted to argue that allegations that Russia is trying to attack Europe are "nonsense."[19] Patrushev claimed that parts of Europe, including France and Germany, are "flirting with the Nazis" and "deploying the military machine against Russia."[20] Patrushev claimed that the United Kingdom (UK), the EU, and NATO leaders are threatening Russia and criticized NATO for holding large-scale exercises on its eastern flank, claiming that these exercises are practicing offensive actions against Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke on April 29 at the "Great Heritage — Common Future" forum dedicated to the 80th anniversary of the end of the Second World War and claimed that Russia must prevent the revival of Nazism and the spread of destructive ideologies, including Russophobia and national or religious intolerance.[21] Putin's statements paralleled those of Medvedev and Patrushev, but were more tempered as Putin did not criticize or threaten Europe. Kremlin officials, including those within Putin's inner circle, have recently threatened European states, including NATO member states, and are setting conditions to justify potential future Russian aggression against Europe.[22]
Putin promoted his previously proposed Eurasian security architecture on April 29 as part of Russian efforts to create an alternative Russian-led bloc that furthers Putin's goals of destroying NATO and weakening the West and its allies. Putin claimed that the world must create a new security architecture, particularly in Eurasia.[23] Putin claimed that the basis of this Eurasian security architecture could be already existing organizations, such as the Union State of Russia and Belarus, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), BRICS, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Patrushev similarly claimed in the April 29 TASS interview that the "Western-centric world" is no longer useful and that the popularity of BRICS and the SCO is growing.[24] Putin first proposed an alternative Eurasian and world security system in June 2024, reportedly with the support of People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping.[25] The organizations that Putin listed as the possible foundation of his proposed Eurasian security architecture are mostly Russian- or PRC-dominated and are meant as alternatives to the United Nations (UN) or US-led alliances. Putin's renewed calls for the creation of a Eurasian security architecture notably come as Russian and North Korean officials abruptly started to publicly acknowledge their military cooperation in Russia's war in Ukraine.[26] ISW continues to assess that Russia has been building a web of overlapping coalitions and partnerships, including within the CSTO, CIS, ASEAN, BRICS, and SCO, to offset the limits of Russian state power.[27] These efforts aim to make Russia's geopolitical clout more resilient and to expand the space in which Russia can spread narratives and create perceptions.
Key Takeaways:
- Russian Security Council Secretary Dmitry Medvedev stated on April 29 that Russia's war in Ukraine must end in Russian "victory" and the "destruction" of the current Ukrainian government. Senior Kremlin officials continue to signal that Russia has greater territorial ambitions than just the occupied areas of Ukraine, particularly in areas bordering the Black Sea.
- Senior Russian officials reiterated the longstanding, false Russian narrative that the Ukrainian government is illegitimate, likely in order to set conditions to manipulate ceasefire negotiations and renege on any future Russian-Ukrainian agreements at a time of Russia's choosing.
- Russian officials are setting conditions to baselessly accuse Ukraine of violating Russia's unilateral May 8 to 11 ceasefire, as the Kremlin has done during previous ceasefires, while rejecting Ukraine's proposal for a 30-day ceasefire.
- Kremlin officials within Putin's inner circle continue to threaten NATO as Putin himself refrains from doing so — likely as part of Kremlin efforts to justify future Russian aggression against NATO to the Russian population.
- Putin promoted his previously proposed Eurasian security architecture on April 29 as part of Russian efforts to create an alternative Russian-led bloc that furthers Putin's goals of destroying NATO and weakening the West and its allies.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in Belgorod and Sumy oblasts and near Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 28, 2025
Russian President Vladimir Putin announced another unilateral ceasefire in Ukraine, this time in honor of a major Soviet and Russian military holiday, while continuing to reject the March 2025 US-Ukrainian 30-day general ceasefire proposal. Putin continues to refuse any ceasefire other than on terms that advantage his war effort. The Kremlin announced on April 28 that Putin declared a ceasefire in honor of Victory Day on May 9 – when Russia celebrates the Soviet Union's contributions to defeating Nazi Germany during the Second World War (while minimizing the role played by the United States) – between midnight on the night of May 7 to 8 and midnight on the night of May 10 to 11.[1] The Kremlin stated that Russian forces will respond to any Ukrainian ceasefire violations. The Kremlin claimed that the Victory Day ceasefire demonstrates Russia's supposed readiness for peace negotiations without preconditions to eliminate the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that Russia is exchanging information with the United States about the Victory Day ceasefire and characterized the unilateral ceasefire as a "manifestation" of Russia's goodwill.[2] The Kremlin is preparing to welcome a significant number of foreign dignitaries, including from former Soviet, Latin American, Asian, and African countries, for Russia's Victory Day celebration, and Putin likely seeks to avoid the embarrassment of Ukrainian strikes during these celebrations.[3]
Putin previously declared a unilateral ceasefire in honor of Easter in mid-April 2025, but Russian and Ukrainian sources repeatedly accused each other of violating the ceasefire throughout the theater in Ukraine.[4] Russia also repeatedly accused Ukraine of violating the 30-day moratorium on energy infrastructure strikes but rarely offered evidence of these alleged violations.[5] ISW previously noted that the energy strikes ceasefire and Easter ceasefire underscored the need for the details of any future ceasefire or peace agreement to be publicly available, formally agreed to in advance by all parties, and to include robust monitoring mechanisms.[6] Putin's proposed Victory Day ceasefire does not include any additional monitoring mechanisms, and Russian sources will likely leverage the lack of such mechanisms to again flood the information space with unsubstantiated claims of Ukrainian ceasefire violations. Russian officials appear disinterested in establishing meaningful monitoring mechanisms or a general public basis for these ceasefires, likely because Russia benefits from weaponizing the vague and unclear conditions of the ceasefires against Ukraine.
Putin is leveraging unilateral ceasefires to achieve informational and battlefield advantages in Ukraine, counter to US President Donald Trump's goal of using a general ceasefire as a stepping stone towards an enduring and sustainable peace agreement in Ukraine. Putin appears to be opportunistically declaring ceasefires during major religious and military holidays in order to force Ukraine to accept the ceasefire or risk appearing intransigent to the West. Unilaterally declaring ceasefires also allows Putin to distract attention from his rejection of the March 2025 US-Ukrainian 30-day general ceasefire proposal and to maintain the illusion that he is interested in peace negotiations while keeping full control over the conditions and timing of any ceasefire agreements. Russian forces seized on the Easter ceasefire to shell and conduct reconnaissance of frontline Ukrainian positions and damaged vehicles along the frontline in preparation for future Russian assaults, and Russian forces will likely use the Victory Day ceasefire for similar preparatory efforts.[7] Putin likely views the Victory Day ceasefire as a chance for Russian forces to rest ahead of future frontline activity in Ukraine and as a way to ensure that Ukraine does not conduct any significant long-range strikes against Russia during Victory Day celebrations. Putin likely does not view the Victory Day ceasefire as a serious step towards lasting peace in Ukraine.
Ukraine, in contrast to Russia, continues to demonstrate its support for Trump's desired full, permanent ceasefire. White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt stated on April 28 that Trump has made it clear that he wants a permanent ceasefire first (presumably before negotiations for a final end to the Russian invasion).[8] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky noted on April 28 that Ukraine supported the US proposal for a full ceasefire, proposed a ceasefire on strikes against civilian infrastructure, and proposed extending the Easter truce – all proposals that Russia has rejected.[9] Zelensky stated that there is no reason to wait for May 8 to start the temporary ceasefire and called for an immediate, full, and unconditional ceasefire for at least 30 days, as this is the "foundation that could lead to real diplomacy." Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha similarly called for an immediate ceasefire and questioned why Putin was "waiting" for May 8.[10] Sybiha reiterated Ukraine's support for a "long" and complete ceasefire.
Ukrainian and European representatives reportedly recently presented the United States with a proposal to end the war that called for a full, unconditional air, sea, and land ceasefire – in line with Trump's continued calls for a full ceasefire.[11] Putin's continued efforts to obfuscate his previous rejections of US and Ukrainian ceasefire proposals run counter to Trump's stated approach of first establishing a ceasefire and then negotiating a broader peace agreement, and to Trump's goal of achieving a lasting peace in Ukraine.[12]
The Kremlin continues attempts to hold legitimate ceasefire negotiations hostage in order to secure additional concessions from Ukraine and the United States. The Russian Foreign Ministry (MFA) published a readout of an April 27 phone call between Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio that claimed that Lavrov and Rubio emphasized establishing "prerequisites for starting negotiations" toward a peaceful resolution to the war in Ukraine.[13] The US State Department's readout of the call notably did not mention discussions of "prerequisites" to negotiations, and the Russian MFA statement notably contradicts the Kremlin's April 28 claim that the Victory Day ceasefire demonstrates Russia's supposed readiness for peace negotiations without preconditions.[14]
Putin, Lavrov, and other senior Russian officials have consistently demanded since June 2024 that Ukraine withdraw from Ukrainian-controlled territory in Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and that Ukraine must officially abandon its goal of joining NATO (by amending its constitution in which that goal is enshrined) before Russia can agree to a future ceasefire and peace negotiations.[15] Putin stated in June 2024 that Russia is prepared to begin negotiations with Ukraine as soon as Ukraine agrees to withdraw from the entirety of the four oblasts. The Kremlin is insisting on significant Ukrainian territorial and political concessions as prerequisites to negotiations in an effort to begin negotiations from the strongest position and achieve longstanding Russian goals in Ukraine through diplomatic means that it is unable to secure on the battlefield.
Lavrov reiterated on April 28 Russia's longstanding demands for Ukraine's surrender and concessions from the West, as Russia continues to offer no concessions of its own. Russian officials, including Putin, have repeated Russia's longstanding demands that any resolution to the war in Ukraine must include Ukrainian regime change, demilitarization, abandonment of aspirations to join NATO or any security bloc, and the cession of territory to Russia.[16] Lavrov reiterated these demands in an interview with Brazilian outlet O Globo published on April 28 and claimed that any resolution of the war must address the war's "root causes."[17] Lavrov and other Russian officials have repeatedly defined the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to expand into eastern Europe and along Russia's borders in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine.[18] Russian officials have leveraged claims that Ukraine has mistreated Russian speakers to justify Russia's invasions, occupation, and illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory since 2014.
Lavrov additionally demanded during the April 28 interview that the international community recognize Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and Crimea as part of Russia and that the West return frozen Russian assets.[19] Lavrov also demanded that the West provide Russia with "security guarantees" against supposed threats from NATO and the EU. Lavrov's statements mirror Putin's December 2021 demands that NATO commit to not accepting Ukraine or any other countries as new members; that the United States commit to upholding the ban on NATO enlargement; that NATO not deploy any military forces to states that became NATO members after May 1997; that NATO refrain from military activity in Ukraine, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia; that NATO states refrain from deploying intermediate-range missiles in areas from which they could reach Russia; and that the United States refrain from deploying intermediate-range missiles in Europe or nuclear missiles outside of US territory.[20] Putin's December 2021 demands notably extend beyond Ukraine and aim to roll back NATO. The Kremlin likely seeks to intensify these demands amid ongoing negotiations with the United States to manipulate Western leaders into acquiescing to Putin's demands. These demands would weaken NATO under the guise of terms of a peace negotiation to end the Russian invasion of Ukraine and allow Russia to set conditions to strengthen its position for future aggression against Ukraine and NATO.
Russian and North Korean officials touted the success of their joint military operations in Kursk Oblast in order to highlight the international community's inability to deter Russian efforts to involve its allies directly in Russia's war against Ukraine, as the Kremlin pledged to offer North Korea reciprocal active military support. Russian President Vladimir Putin announced on April 28 that the Russian military recently achieved its objective of pushing Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast and thanked North Korean forces for their active participation in these efforts.[21] Putin personally thanked North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un and reiterated that Russia and North Korea acted in accordance with the December 2024 bilateral Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.[22] Putin also claimed that North Korea’s involvement in Russia's war against Ukraine did not violate international law. Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov also recently acknowledged North Korea's participation in retaking Kursk Oblast.[23] Russian officials have previously refused to acknowledge North Korean soldiers operating in Kursk Oblast and attempted to disguise North Korean soldiers as Russian forces from the Republic of Buryatia.[24] The Kremlin's abrupt rhetorical shift suggests that Russia is no longer concerned about the possibility of Western retaliation for involving North Korean forces directly in its war against Ukraine.
Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on April 28 that North Korea's participation in operations in Kursk Oblast demonstrates the effectiveness of the Russian-North Korean Strategic Partnership Treaty and affirms that Russia is “absolutely” prepared to provide North Korea with reciprocal military assistance in the future.[25] The North Korean Central Military Commission stated on April 28 that Kim ordered the deployment of North Korean troops to Kursk Oblast in accordance with the partnership agreement and that the "sacred mission" in Kursk Oblast solidified the "friendship and solidarity" between Russians and North Koreans.[26] The United States and the wider West largely failed to meaningfully respond to Russia's growing military cooperation with Iran, North Korea, and the People's Republic of China (PRC). Former US President Joe Biden’s decision to ease restrictions on Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory using US-provided long-range missile systems in November 2024, formally cast as a response to the introduction of North Korean forces into the war, did not significantly impact the Kremlin's calculus in expanding its military cooperation with North Korea or Russia's wider military planning in Kursk Oblast and elsewhere in Russia and occupied Ukraine.[27]
Russian milbloggers reacted triumphantly to official announcements of Russian and North Korean forces concluding operations in Kursk Oblast. A Russian milblogger claimed on April 28 that North Korea's and Russia’s announcements provide a general deterrent to future Ukrainian and Western operations on Russian territory.[28] Some milbloggers also advocated for Russia to expand military, economic, and labor collaboration with North Korea, including in the event of future military aggression against North Korea.[29] Other milbloggers emphasized the bravery of North Korea’s forces and claimed that North Korea and its people have shown themselves to be better allies than many Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) states.[30]
Russian officials and milbloggers are likely leveraging Russia's recent operational and diplomatic successes in Kursk Oblast to prepare the information space for Victory Day celebrations on May 9, which a number of international partners will attend. The Kremlin likely plans to highlight Russian successes in Kursk Oblast during the May 9 celebrations, as Russian forces have not been able to achieve significant battlefield successes in Ukraine in the past year.
Russia is reportedly expanding its military infrastructure along its border with Finland and stockpiling new tanks, likely in preparation for future aggression against NATO. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on April 27, citing Western military and intelligence officials, that Russia is expanding military bases near Petrozavodsk, Republic of Karelia, and upgrading railway lines and other infrastructure along Russia's western border with NATO.[31] WSJ reported that the Kremlin plans to create a new army headquarters near Petrozavodsk in the next several years and that Russia is integrating roadways and railways in the Moscow Military District (MMD) with infrastructure in Belarus. Sources stated that Russia intends to form new divisions on the basis of existing brigades in the Leningrad Military District (LMD) in the coming years and that Russia is constructing new barracks and training grounds and upgrading warehouses and railways near Petrozavodsk to accommodate the future influx of personnel. A senior Finnish military official stated that Russia is sending "almost none" of its newly produced tanks to the frontline in Ukraine but is stockpiling the tanks for "later use." ISW previously assessed that Russia's restoration of the MMD and LMD is part of a long-term restructuring effort to prepare for a potential future large-scale conventional war against NATO.[32]
Russian authorities are also preparing to update Russia's National Security Strategy, likely to reflect Russian President Vladimir Putin's greater territorial ambitions in Europe and ongoing efforts to justify future aggression against NATO. Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu claimed during an interview with Kremlin newswire TASS published on April 24 that Russia is preparing to update its National Security Strategy to account for the new problems and threats that Russia is facing.[33] Shoigu claimed that Russia's updated National Security Strategy must account for the "crisis" of European security, the formation of a new global order, and the challenges that the changing world presents to Russia. Shoigu stated that Russia's National Security Strategy defines Russia's "long-term, strategic goals" and the "main instruments" for achieving these goals. Russia updates its National Security Strategy every five years, and last updated the strategy in 2021.[34]
Czech Defense Minister Jana Černochová announced on April 27 that the Czech Ammunition Initiative will have delivered another 400,000 rounds of large-caliber artillery ammunition to Ukraine by April 30.[35] Černochová also announced that the initiative secured funding for further artillery deliveries to Ukraine through Fall 2025. Czech Foreign Minister Jan Lipavský stated that Canada, Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands previously provided funds to the initiative. Lipavský reported that Czechia aims to supply Ukraine with 125,000 rounds of ammunition per month in 2025, but will deliver as much ammunition as possible.
Key Takeaways:
- Russian President Vladimir Putin announced another unilateral ceasefire in Ukraine – this time in honor of a major Soviet and Russian military holiday, while continuing to reject the March 2025 US-Ukrainian 30-day general ceasefire proposal. Putin continues to refuse any ceasefire other than on terms that advantage his war effort.
- Putin is leveraging unilateral ceasefires to achieve informational and battlefield advantages in Ukraine, counter to US President Donald Trump's goal of using a general ceasefire as a stepping stone towards an enduring and sustainable peace agreement in Ukraine.
- Ukraine – in contrast to Russia – continues to demonstrate its support for Trump's desired full, permanent ceasefire.
- The Kremlin continues attempts to hold legitimate ceasefire negotiations hostage in order to secure additional concessions from Ukraine and the United States.
- Lavrov reiterated on April 28 Russia's longstanding demands for Ukraine's surrender and concessions from the West, as Russia continues to offer no concessions of its own.
- Russian and North Korean officials touted the success of their joint military operations in Kursk Oblast in order to highlight the international community's inability to deter Russian efforts to involve its allies directly in Russia's war against Ukraine, as the Kremlin pledged to offer North Korea reciprocal active military support.
- Russia is reportedly expanding its military infrastructure along its border with Finland and stockpiling new tanks, likely in preparation for future aggression against NATO.
- Czech Defense Minister Jana Černochová announced on April 27 that the Czech Ammunition Initiative will have delivered another 400,000 rounds of large-caliber artillery ammunition to Ukraine by April 30.
- Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Kupyansk, Siversk, Toretsk, and Novopavlivka.
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