Ukraine Invasion Updates

         This page collects the Critical Threats Project (CTP) and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) updates on the invasion of Ukraine. In late February 2022, CTP and ISW began publishing daily synthetic products covering key events related to renewed Russian aggression against Ukraine. These Ukraine Conflict Updates replaced the “Indicators and Thresholds for Russian Military Operations in Ukraine and/or Belarus,” which we maintained from November 12, 2021, through February 17, 2022.

This list also includes prominent warning alerts that CTP and ISW launched outside the crisis update structure. These products addressed critical inflection points as they occurred.

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• Maps on Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes
• Recent Updates
• February 2022 - July 2023 Updates
• Related Reads

Maps on Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes

This interactive map complements the static daily control-of-terrain maps that CTP and ISW produce with high-fidelity and, where possible, street level assessments of the war in Ukraine.

Click here to access the archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that produced daily by showing a dynamic frontline.

The Critical Threats Project and the Institute for the Study of War are publishing a summary of the methodology of our map for those who would like to learn more about the tradecraft for mapping conventional military operations from the open source.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          Previous versions of these static maps are available in our past publications. 

Recent Updates

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 17, 2025

Russia’s Central Bank continues efforts to maintain the facade of domestic economic stability by pursuing economic policies that will likely exacerbate Russia’s economic instability. Bloomberg reported on July 17, citing the Russian Central Bank's June 2025 monthly report, that Russia’s seasonally adjusted annual rate (SAAR) of inflation decreased to four percent in June 2025, in line with Russia’s four percent target inflation rate.[1] Bloomberg assessed the decrease in the SAAR of inflation as the first indicator that the Central Bank’s efforts to lower the inflation rate have been successful. The Russian Central Bank report cautioned that the official annual inflation rate remains at nine percent, but assessed that if the current trajectory continues, the inflation rate could hit the target of four percent sometime in 2026. The SAAR is a short-term measurement, however, and its decrease is unlikely to positively impact the Russian economy in the long term. The Russian Central Bank reported that the cost of interest-bearing instruments — financial assets that generate interest — significantly decreased in June 2025, and that investors expect an average key interest rate below 18 percent between August 2025 and October 2025. The Russian Central Bank's report claimed that a strong Russian ruble significantly contributed to the SAAR decrease. A strong ruble increases Russia’s purchasing power on the global market, which in turn decreases the ruble cost of imported goods such as machinery and technology, lowering input costs (expenses to produce goods or services) and inflationary pressure (that increases the price of goods and services over time) on firms that rely on imported components. A strengthened ruble softens the blow of Western sanctions as it makes parallel imports cheaper and keeps substitutes affordable. ISW assesses that secondary sanctions will likely further impact the Russian economy by undercutting Russian oil revenues and cheaper imports using the strengthened ruble, both of which are essential for the Kremlin's financing of its war against Ukraine. The Russian Central Bank reported two potential complicating factors in lowering the interest rate: the eventual waning of effects from earlier bouts of ruble strengthening that helped slow price growth in June 2025, and the ongoing rise in the cost of services, despite a stabilization of the exchange rate and cost of goods sensitive to credit.

Russia's unsustainably high payments to soldiers and the impacts of the resulting domestic labor shortage will likely further destabilize the Russian economy, regardless of the Kremlin's claims of economic stability. Russia’s strategy of incentivizing volunteer recruitment by offering large one-time payments to recruits and simultaneous efforts to rapidly expand its defense industrial base (DIB) since 2022 has required Russia to significantly increase payments to both sustain military recruitment and to augment the DIB’s labor force.[2] Russia has had to significantly increase the federal and regional one-time bonuses to incentivize Russians to sign military contracts rather than take other jobs, given high Russian casualty rates.[3] Competition between Russia’s DIB and civilian enterprises is raising the average salary for these positions and is raising prices in service industries writ large. These factors, coupled with labor shortages in the civilian and defense sectors, are likely contributing to the divergence between the cost of goods and services in the Central Bank’s report by limiting Russian economic growth, force generation efforts, and defense industrial production. ISW continues to assess that Russia cannot indefinitely replace its forces at the current casualty rate without an involuntary reserve mobilization, which Russian President Vladimir Putin has shown great reluctance to order, nor can it sustain increasingly high payments to recruits, which the Russian economy cannot afford.[4] Russia is effectively burning the candle at both ends by simultaneously loosening monetary policy to stimulate short-term growth, while expanding fiscal expenditure to feed the military effort. This strategy will likely adversely affect the Russian economy by weakening consumer purchasing power, devaluing the ruble in the medium- to long-term, and creating deeper macroeconomic instability.

Russian bankers are reportedly privately expressing concerns over a growing number of non-performing (late and unpaid) loans despite the Russian Central Bank's claims of economic stability. Bloomberg reported on July 17 that unspecified top executives at "some of Russia’s largest banks" have privately discussed seeking a state-funded bailout if the level of non-performing loans on their books continues to grow through 2025.[5] Bloomberg reported that it reviewed documents that indicate that three of Russia’s systemically important lenders (financial institutions whose potential failure could disrupt the broader financial system and economy) may need to recover funds lost from the non-performing loans. Bloomberg reported that non-performing loans issued by Russian banks have grown by 1.2 percent in 2025 and could rise to six or seven percent from their current rate of four percent by 2026. ISW is unable to independently verify Bloomberg's report about these unspecified large Russian banks and lenders, but has observed indications that Russian officials are growing concerned about economic stability in the wake of Russian Central Bank policy changes. Russian Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina previously downplayed the risk of systemic economic crisis, claiming that the Russian banking system has capital reserves of eight trillion rubles (about $102.5 billion).[6] Bloomberg reported that the Russian Central Bank has advised lenders to focus on restructuring credit with the borrowers and absorbing the bad loans, reflective of Russia’s risky and contradictory economic policies, rather than recognizing the full extent of sourcing loans.[7] The Russian Central Bank is therefore likely disinterested in bailing out Russian major banks - an action that could cause liquidity problems and, in the worst case, cause bank failure. Any failure of a major Russian bank would undercut Russian President Vladimir Putin’s long-standing narrative that neither the war in Ukraine nor Western sanctions are hurting the Russian economy.[8]

Reports that Ukrainian forces targeted Moscow City and St. Petersburg overnight on July 16 and 17 are likely overreacting to standard Russian statements about Ukraine's longstanding deep strike campaign aimed at degrading Russia's defense industrial base (DIB). The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces downed two Ukrainian long-range Neptune missiles and 308 aircraft-type drones overnight on July 16 to 17 over Bryansk, Orlov, Belgorod, Lipetsk, Oryol, Kursk, Smolensk, Voronezh, Moscow, Kaluga, Leningrad, and Tula oblasts.[9] Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin claimed that Russian forces downed three drones flying toward Moscow City, and Leningrad Oblast Governor Alexander Drozdenko claimed that Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems downed two drones over Kirovsky Raion.[10]

Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian DIB assets in areas around Moscow and St. Petersburg, including Smolensk and Tula oblasts, may be mischaracterized as targeting St. Petersburg and Moscow Oblast, respectively, due to their geographical proximity and the direction of flight. Tula Oblast Governor Dmitry Milyaev claimed that Russian forces downed seven drones over Tula Oblast.[11] Russian opposition outlet Astra and Ukrainian Center for Combatting Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported that the Shchekinoazot United Chemical Plant in Pervomaysky, Tula Oblast, suspended operations after at least four drones struck the facility and caused a fire.[12] Kovalenko noted that the chemical plant manufactures industrial chemical products, including ammonia, methanol, and urea, that support the production of explosives, solid rocket fuel, and synthetic materials.[13] Smolensk Oblast Governor Vasily Anokhin claimed on July 17 that Russian forces downed 14 drones in Smolensk Oblast.[14] Astra reported on July 17 that a drone may have struck Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec's 720th Flight Support Equipment Repair Plant in Roslavl, Smolensk Oblast.[15] It is unlikely that Ukrainian drones struck targets in either Moscow or Leningrad oblasts, given the lack of footage and Russian and Ukrainian official reporting that ISW typically observes accompanying successful strikes against Russian DIB assets, particularly those in or near major cities such as Moscow and St Petersburg. Ukrainian drone strikes in the direction of or against Moscow and Leningrad oblasts do not represent an inflection in Ukraine's long-range strike campaign, as Ukrainian forces regularly conduct strikes against legitimate military and DIB targets in these oblasts and oblasts between the Ukrainian border and Moscow and St. Petersburg cities. Ukraine's strike campaign differs from Russia's in that Ukrainian forces chiefly target legitimate military targets and avoid incurring disproportionate civilian casualties, whereas Russian strike packages are designed to maximize damage to civilian areas. The Kremlin previously employed an informational campaign that leveraged unsubstantiated claims of Ukrainian strikes to discredit Ukraine during temporary ceasefire periods and may recycle this campaign in an attempt to influence Western policy discussions regarding support for Ukraine.[16]

Ukraine and Russia conducted another exchange of the bodies of soldiers killed in action (KIA) on July 17, in accordance with agreements reached during negotiations in Istanbul on June 2. The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War (POWs) reported that Russia released the bodies of 1,000 deceased Ukrainian soldiers and that Ukrainian authorities will examine and identify the bodies.[17] Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky stated that Ukraine released the bodies of 19 deceased Russian soldiers.[18] Kremlin newswires TASS and RIA Novosti claimed that a source close to the Russian negotiation team reported that Russia is prepared to exchange the bodies of 3,000 deceased Ukrainian soldiers in accordance with Russian President Vladimir Putin's previous statement and that the July 17 exchange is the first exchange involving these 3,000 bodies.[19] ISW has previously observed Ukrainian reports that Russian authorities included the bodies of Russian soldiers KIA in previous KIA exchanges, likely to artificially inflate the number of bodies Russia claims to return to Ukraine and undermine the efficacy of this confidence-building measure.[20]

The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada approved the appointment of former Ukrainian Minister of Economy Yulia Svyrydenko as Ukraine's new prime minister, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed former Justice Minister Olha Stefanishyna as a special representative to the United States. The Rada supported Svyrydenko's new Cabinet of Ministers on July 17, including former Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal as defense minister; former Digital Transformation Minister Mykhailo Fedorov as first deputy prime minister; former Deputy Minister of Economics Tara Kachka as the deputy prime minister for European integration; former Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko as the justice minister; former Environmental Protection and Natural Resources Minister Svitlana Hrynchuk as the energy minister, and former First Deputy Minister of Economy Oleksiy Sobolev as the minister of economy.[21] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha and Internal Affairs Minister Ihor Klymenko remain in their positions. Zelensky appointed Stefanishyna as the Ukrainian presidential special representative for the development of cooperation with the United States.[22]

 Key Takeaways:

• Russia’s Central Bank continues to posture Russian economic stability and growth to maintain the facade of economic stability by pursuing economic policies that will likely exacerbate Russia’s economic instability.
• Russia's unsustainably high payments to soldiers and impacts of the resulting domestic labor shortage will likely further destabilize the Russian economy, regardless of the Kremlin's efforts to posture stability.
• Russian bankers are reportedly privately expressing concerns over a growing number of non-performing loans despite the Russian Central Bank's claims of economic stability.
• Reports that Ukrainian forces targeted Moscow City and St. Petersburg overnight on July 16 and 17 are likely overreacting to standard Russian statements about Ukraine's longstanding deep strike campaign aimed at degrading Russia's defense industrial base (DIB).
• Ukraine and Russia conducted another exchange of the bodies of soldiers killed in action (KIA) on July 17, in accordance with agreements reached during negotiations in Istanbul on June 2.
• The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada approved the appointment of former Ukrainian Minister of Economy Yulia Svyrydenko as Ukraine's new prime minister, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed former Justice Minister Olha Stefanishyna as a special representative to the United States.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Borova.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 16, 2025

The Kremlin is recycling several longstanding informational narratives, including nuclear threats, in a renewed effort to break the United States away from Ukraine and the NATO alliance. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov reaffirmed on July 16 that all provisions of Russia's nuclear doctrine, including the responsibility of nuclear countries to not "incite" non-nuclear states, remain in effect and that nuclear states must "answer" for "inciting" non-nuclear states.[1] Russia updated its nuclear doctrine in Fall 2024 to include a clause stipulating that Russia will consider aggression against it by a non-nuclear state with the support or participation of a nuclear power as a joint attack on Russia, likely in an effort to deter Western support for Ukraine during critical Western policy discussions in late 2024.[2] Peskov claimed that "Europeans maintain a rabid militaristic attitude towards Moscow" in response to a question regarding the US President Donald Trump-led effort to provide increased military aid to Ukraine via NATO member states.[3] Peskov also called on the international community to pressure Ukraine into bilateral negotiations with Russia ­­­­­­­­­­— a reversal of Western calls to pressure Russia into meaningful bilateral negotiations to end the war — likely to falsely portray Russia as willing to negotiate while undermining Ukraine's credibility.[4] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on July 15 that Russia's war in Ukraine is aimed at eliminating "the threats that NATO has created" on Russia's borders.[5] The Kremlin is employing the same rhetorical lines that it has continuously used throughout the war to deter Western support for Ukraine, but has shifted its objective from preventing new support for Ukraine to reversing recent support and breaking the United States away from its transatlantic allies, likely in response to President Trump‘s recent demonstration of the United States' reinvigorated commitment to arming Ukraine and supporting NATO. Trump reaffirmed in late June 2025 that the United States will uphold NATO's Article 5 collective defense clause and recently demanded that Russia agree to a ceasefire agreement by September 2 or risk stringent US secondary tariffs.[6] The Kremlin is prioritizing informational campaigns aimed at undermining NATO unity and stoking discontent between the United States and its European allies in order to degrade Ukraine's defense capabilities and achieve its longstanding war aims that amount to Ukraine's capitulation.

Western officials provided additional details about the new US-led effort to arm Ukraine. US President Donald Trump responded on July 15 to a question about when the first Patriot air defense systems will arrive in Ukraine as part of this effort.[7] Trump stated that the US Patriot missile systems are “already being shipped” to Ukraine from Germany and that NATO member states will pay for “everything,” referring to future US military deliveries to Ukraine. Unspecified US officials told the New York Times (NYT) on July 15 that nearly all weapons that NATO member states are expected to purchase for Ukraine from the United States — including Patriot air defense systems, unspecified missiles, and ammunition —  are ”immediately available” to send to Ukraine.[8] An unnamed NATO representative told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne that the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) fund will coordinate NATO purchases of US weapons for Ukraine.[9] The representative also stated that Germany, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Finland have confirmed participation in this US-led effort, in addition to these states' existing commitments to the NSATU fund, the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein format), and various bilateral and multilateral agreements with Ukraine.

Russian forces conducted a large series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on July 15 to 16, heavily targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile from occupied Crimea and 400 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk and Kursk cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea on the night of July 15 and 16.[10] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 198 Shahed-type drones and that 145 decoy drones were "lost" or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that the Russian strike package largely targeted Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; Kharkiv Oblast; and Vinnytsia City, Vinnystia Oblast, and Ukrainian officials reported that the strikes also damaged civilian, industrial, and energy infrastructure in Mykolaiv and Odesa oblasts.[11] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that the Russian strikes mainly damaged energy infrastructure and that authorities were working to restore power to Kryvyi Rih.[12] Dnipropetrovsk Oblast officials and Ukraine's Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile each against both Kryvyi Rih and Odesa Oblast.[13] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces only launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile overnight, and Odesa Oblast officials did not report a ballistic missile strike in the oblast, so it is unclear whether Russian forces launched two ballistic missiles overnight.[14] Ukrainian Center for Combatting Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported that Russian forces continue targeting Ukrainian cities with large drone swarms.[15]

The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada (parliament) accepted the resignation of Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal on July 16, dissolving the current Ukrainian government. Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Deputy Oleksiy Honcharenko reported that the Verkhovna Rada will vote on the composition of the new government on July 17.[16] Zelensky announced that he nominated Shmyhal to be the new Ukrainian defense minister and subordinated the Ministry of Strategic Industries to the Ministry of Defense (MoD).[17]

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin is recycling several longstanding informational narratives, including nuclear threats, in a renewed effort to break the United States away from Ukraine and the NATO alliance.
• Western officials provided additional details about the new US-led effort to arm Ukraine.
• Russian forces conducted a large series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on July 15 to 16, heavily targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure.
• The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada (parliament) accepted the resignation of Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal on July 16, dissolving the current Ukrainian government.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and near Borova, Lyman, and Novopavlivka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 15, 2025

Kremlin officials dismissed US President Donald Trump's demand that Russia agree to a ceasefire agreement in Ukraine within 50 days while promoting claims that Russia can withstand economic pressure and remains committed to achieving its war aims. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov told Kremlin newswire TASS on July 15 that Russia views any attempt to make demands of Russia, "especially ultimatums," as "unacceptable."[1] Ryabkov noted that Russia is ready to negotiate and prefers a diplomatic solution to its war in Ukraine, but will continue to pursue its war aims militarily if the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) do not take Russia's demands seriously. Ryabkov stated that Russia's position is "unshakable." Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov echoed Ryabkov's statements, claiming that Russia is ready to participate in a third round of Ukraine-Russia bilateral negotiations but blamed Ukraine for the lack of progress towards the next round of talks.[2] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev posted on his English-language X (formerly Twitter) account, claiming that "Russia didn't care" about Trump's "ultimatum."[3] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov expressed confidence that Russia will be able to cope with US tariffs, as Russia is already "coping" with prior sanctions.[4] A Just Russia Party Leader and Duma Deputy, Sergei Mironov, claimed that potential tariffs will not affect the course or goals of Russia's war in Ukraine.[5] Russian President Vladimir Putin has yet to officially respond to Trump and is likely attempting to identify which narratives could convince Trump not to follow through with secondary tariffs in early September 2025.

Russian President Vladimir Putin's theory of victory continues to drive his unwillingness to compromise on his pre-war demand for Ukraine's capitulation. Reuters, citing three unspecified sources close to the Kremlin, reported on July 15 that Putin intends to continue the war in Ukraine until the West concedes to his demands, is unfazed by US President Donald Trump's threats of secondary tariffs, and may expand his territorial demands as Russian forces continue their advances on the battlefield.[6] Reuters' sources noted that Putin is resolved to continue his war, as he believes Russia can endure any further economic hardship that the West imposes. One source told Reuters that Putin believes that none of Russia's diplomatic engagements thus far have included detailed discussions on a peace plan for Ukraine, so Putin "will continue until he gets what he wants." The sources told Reuters that Putin's demands for a potential settlement are the same as his demands from 2021 and at the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022 - demands that the Kremlin has repeatedly cited throughout over three years of war.[7] ISW continues to assess that Putin holds a theory of victory that posits that Russia can achieve its war aims by continuing to make creeping gains on the battlefield indefinitely and outlasting Western support for Ukraine and Ukraine's ability to defend itself.[8] Western economic pressure, combined with sustained Western military support to Ukraine, is necessary to enable Ukrainian forces to inflict battlefield losses on Russia to force Putin to reassess his calculation and engage substantively in peace negotiations to end the war.[9]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced new appointments within the Ukrainian government. On July 14, Zelensky announced that he nominated current Economic Minister Yulia Svyrydenko as prime minister and noted that Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal's robust experience would be well suited for the role of defense minister.[10] Shmyhal later resigned from his position as prime minister on July 15.[11] Zelensky has yet to formalize these reassignments with an official decree as of this writing.

 Key Takeaways:

• Kremlin officials dismissed US President Donald Trump's demand that Russia agree to a ceasefire agreement in Ukraine within 50 days while promoting claims that Russia can withstand economic pressure and remains committed to achieving its war aims.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin's theory of victory continues to drive his unwillingness to compromise on his pre-war demand for Ukraine's capitulation.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced new appointments within the Ukrainian government.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Borova, and Toretsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 14, 2025

US President Donald Trump announced large-scale and rapid military aid supplies to Ukraine via the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and possible future secondary tariffs against Russia. Trump stated on July 14 during a meeting with NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte that the United States will impose "severe" 100 percent secondary tariffs on Russia's trade partners if there is no peace settlement to end Russia's war in Ukraine within 50 days.[i] Trump also announced that the United States will send "billions of dollars' worth" of military equipment and weapons to NATO, that NATO will pay for the US weapons, and that NATO will "quickly distribute" these weapons to Ukrainian forces. Rutte stated that NATO will supply Ukraine with "massive" amounts of military equipment, including air defenses, missiles, and ammunition. Trump answered a question about whether the United States was providing Patriot air defense batteries or just missiles, stating that the United States will send "everything…a full complement with the batteries." Trump stated that some Patriot systems will arrive in Ukraine "within days" as unspecified NATO states give Ukraine their own Patriot systems, after which the United States will replace those systems. Trump stated that an unspecified state has "17 Patriots ready to be shipped" and that a "big portion of the 17 will go to the war zone" in Ukraine "very quickly." It is unclear if Trump was referring to 17 Patriot launchers or batteries.

Trump is acting upon the reality that successful US efforts to bring Russian President Vladimir Putin to the negotiating table require that economic instruments be coupled with Western military support to allow Ukraine to increase pressure on Russia on the battlefield. Trump stated that the Russian economy is doing "very poorly" and that Russia is using its assets for war, not trade.[ii] Trump stated that Russia is wasting money and people on its war. Rutte stated that Russian forces have suffered 100,000 deaths since January 1, 2025. ISW continues to assess that Russia's battlefield losses are the key driver of Russia's economic woes as Russia suffers from the consequences of increased and unsustainable war spending, growing inflation, significant labor shortages, and reductions in Russia's sovereign wealth fund.[iii] Increased pressure on Russian forces on the battlefield would risk Putin's efforts to balance butter and guns and could force Putin to face hard choices sooner than he would like. Forcing Putin either to make unpopular decisions or to face a scenario in which Russia cannot continue the war at the current tempo could bring Putin to the negotiating table, ready to offer concessions to end the war on terms acceptable to Ukraine and the United States.

Trump noted that Russia has been delaying negotiations to end the war and that the recent intensification of Russia's overnight drone and missile strikes demonstrates that Russia is not interested in peace – in line with ISW's longstanding assessment of Kremlin intentions. Trump stated that he is "disappointed" in Putin and that Trump has thought that a peace settlement was close "about four times."[iv] Trump noted that Russian strikes are hitting residences in Ukrainian cities and that it will take Ukraine "years" to rebuild its damaged energy infrastructure. Trump stated that Russian strikes against Ukrainian cities show that Russia's "talk does not mean anything" and that the United States needs to see actions and results, not just "talk." Rutte added that the recent intensification of Russia's overnight drone and missile strikes is not aimed at pursuing military goals but trying to create panic in Ukraine. ISW has repeatedly assessed in recent months that the Kremlin was pursuing various methods as part of wider efforts to delay the negotiation process and prolong the war in order to secure additional territorial gains on the battlefield.[v]

Trump said that European security benefits US interests and noted that Europe is committed to helping Ukraine defend itself. Trump stated that "having a strong Europe is a very good thing" and that Europe thinks supporting Ukraine is important.[vi] Rutte stated that Trump's July 14 announcements are building on the June 2025 NATO summit in The Hague, in which NATO decided to "keep Ukraine strong" and increase Europe's defense industrial production. The joint declaration from the NATO summit highlighted that Ukraine's security contributes to NATO's security.[vii] Axios on July 13 cited a source stating that Trump told French President Emmanuel Macron following the call that Putin "wants to take all of [Ukraine]."[viii] ISW continues to assess that a Russian victory in the war that results in the conquest of all of Ukraine would bring combat experienced Russian forces up to NATO's borders from the Black Sea to the Arctic Ocean such that the United States would need to move large numbers of US forces and commit a significant proportion of its fleet of stealth aircraft to Europe.[ix]

Additional US military aid to Ukrainian forces will arrive at a dynamic, not static, frontline characterized by ongoing Russian offensive operations aimed at achieving slow maneuver and by Ukrainian counterattacks in key frontline areas. Russian forces intensified offensive operations throughout the theater in February and March 2025 and have maintained pressure along the entire frontline over the last six months. Russian forces have established or are actively establishing at least eight salients that Russian forces could leverage in mutually reinforcing tactical- and operational-level envelopments along the frontline. Recent Russian attacks in the Velykyi Burluk direction indicate that the Russian military command intends to create a salient from which Russian forces can threaten Ukrainian forces in the rear of the Vovchansk and northern Kupyansk directions.[x] Russian forces have also developed salients aimed at forcing Ukrainian troops to withdraw from frontline towns and settlements under threat of envelopment in the Kupyansk, Borova, Lyman, Siversk, Kostyantynivka, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka directions over the last year. ISW assessed in late January 2025 that Russian forces were developing and disseminating a doctrinal method of advance throughout the theater that aims to conduct slow envelopments of frontline settlements at a scale that is reasonable for Russian forces to conclude before culminating, and Russian patterns of advance over the last six months are consistent with this assessment.[xi] The Russian military command's apparent decision to bypass the Ukrainian fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast and attempts at a multi-year operation to envelop the southern half of the fortress belt further underscores Russia's commitment to this new doctrinal method.[xii]

Russian forces' ability to advance deep enough into Ukraine's defenses to establish these salients indicates that the Russian military command has improved its ability to seize on opportunities to advance, but the rate of Russian advances has not increased beyond foot pace. The Russian military command appears to have improved its ability and increased its willingness to plan and conduct multi-year operational-level efforts. Russian forces have been pursuing the envelopment of Kupyansk since at least January 2024, although Russian forces did not make notable advances towards this goal until July 2024.[xiii] Russian forces have thus been pursuing the envelopment of Kupyansk for at least 18 months and have advanced roughly 454 square kilometers since July 1, 2024 (roughly 1.2 square kilometers per day over the last year). Russian forces have also aimed to push Ukrainian forces from the east (left) bank of the Oskil River in the Borova and Lyman directions since late 2023 or early 2024 and only began making significant advances north of Lyman in early January 2025.[xiv] Russian forces have advanced roughly 15 to 17 kilometers west of the Zherebets River over the last six months as part of efforts to establish the Russian salient north of Lyman. Russian forces renewed offensive operations in the Toretsk area in mid-June 2024 and have focused on expanding their salient south and southwest of Kostyantynivka over the last nine months. Russian efforts south and southwest of Kostyantynivka also reinforce and have coincided with the ongoing Russian effort to envelop Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. Russian forces have advanced roughly 617 square kilometers in the Kostyantynivka direction and roughly 1,394 square kilometers in the Pokrovsk direction since November 1, 2024 - an average of 2.4 square kilometers and 5.5 square kilometers per day for the last nine months, respectively. The renewed Russian offensive in Toretsk in June 2024 also coincided with intensified Russian mechanized activity and armor usage throughout western Donetsk Oblast in summer and fall 2024. Russian forces have since leveraged several envelopments to seize Vuhledar, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka and are currently establishing the southern and eastern flanks of a future Russian effort to envelop Novopavlivka. Russian forces have advanced roughly 1,057 square kilometers in western Donetsk Oblast since January 2, 2025, or an average of 5.5 square kilometers per day for the last seven months.          

ISW previously assessed that Russian forces have advanced at a rate of roughly 14 to 15 square kilometers per day over the past six months, indicating that Russian gains are spread across the frontline and not concentrated in a single frontline area.[xv] Russian forces have largely relied on infantry to advance in Ukraine since Russia's initial push at the start of its full-scale invasion, and Russian forces have failed to restore their ability to conduct the kind of mechanized maneuver that would enable more rapid Russian gains. Three and a half years of war have only further degraded Russia's ability to conduct armored assaults, due in part to significant Russian armored vehicle losses in 2023 and early 2024 and the loss of the more elite, well-trained servicemembers that comprised Russia's pre-war professional military cadre. Russian forces have thus far been able to offset the personnel losses they incur during these advances, although high Russian casualty rates are perpetuating a cycle of loss that further incentivizes Russia to rely on poorly trained and equipped infantry to make advances. This cycle, in turn, is limiting Russia's rate of advance in Ukraine.

Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast near Hulyaipole – the first tactically significant activity in this area of the frontline since the Summer 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive. Geolocated footage published on July 14 indicates that elements of the Russian 1466th Motorized Rifle Regiment and the 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (both subordinated to the 127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) recently seized Malynivka (west of Hulyaipole).[xvi] Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov and a Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) also participated in the seizure.[xvii] Russian forces intensified activity in the Hulyaipole direction in early May 2025 and advanced into Malynivka in late June.[xviii]

The Russian military command likely intends to seize on recent advances in western Donetsk Oblast in order to advance westward into Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia oblasts. Russian forces made a series of tactically significant advances along the H-15 Kurakhove-Zaporizhzhia City highway in mid-June 2025, especially southeast of Novopavlivka near Bahatyr and Odradne and south of Novopavlivka near Komar.[xix] Russian forces have gradually advanced further west from Bahatyr and north from Komar over the last month and advanced roughly 20 kilometers from Bahatyr to Novokhatske (southwest of Novopavlivka) between June 14 and July 14, or about 670 meters a day on average in the past month.[xx] Geolocated evidence indicates that Russian forces have made marginal advances into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast in the direction of Novopavlivka, but Russian forces have mainly concentrated their advances westward toward Velykomykhailivka and Havrylivka (both southwest of Novopavlivka).[xxi] The Russian military command also recently redeployed elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) and the "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies from the Kursk direction to western Donetsk Oblast, indicating that the Russian military command is taking some steps to reinforce the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces, possibly ahead of a future push into southern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[xxii] The Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces currently oversees the frontline from the Novopavlivka through the eastern Zaporizhia direction and would likely command the forces involved in a Russian offensive into southern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.

Russian forces may leverage advances in western Donetsk Oblast to launch an offensive operation toward Pokrovske, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, in pursuit of Russia's long-standing desire to seize Zaporizhzhia City. Russian forces have established a wide and mostly level frontline in the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk-Zaporizhia oblast border area that spans from Malynivka (east of Hulyaipole) to Zelenyi Hai (southwest of Novopavlivka) from which Russian forces could attack toward Hulyaipole, Velykomykhailivka, and Havrylivka. The Russian military command may intend to attack westward through Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia oblasts if Russian commanders assess that most of Ukraine's frontline defensive fortifications are oriented east to west against attacks from the south, rather than north to south against attacks from the east. Russian forces may attempt to leverage the H-15 Kurakhove-Zaporizhzhia City highway to make rapid advances and establish convenient supply routes from occupied Donetsk City. Russian forces advancing westward from Zelenyi Hai will have to ford several rivers, including the Haichur, Solona, Verkhnya Tersa, and Vovcha rivers.[xxiii] Russian forces will also need to cross the T-0408 Preobrazhenka-Novomykolaivka and T-0401 Pokrovske-Hulyaipole highways and seize several towns whose pre-war populations are comparable to that of Chasiv Yar, which Russian forces have still yet to seize despite ongoing offensive efforts since May 2024.[xxiv] Russian forces are extremely unlikely to advance rapidly across the roughly 150 kilometers from their current positions in Novokhatske to Zaporizhzhia City given the current rate of Russian advances, and Russian forces would likely have to engage in a multi-year-long offensive effort to advance to Zaporizhzhia City from the west. Russian forces will likely also attempt to advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City from Kamyanske (roughly 35 kilometers south of Zaporizhzhia City) but will likely face significant Ukrainian defenses. Russian forces will also likely struggle to seize Zaporizhzhia City due to the city’s size and near certainty that Ukrainian forces will seriously defend the regional capital. Russian forces have not taken a city this size since the initial push at the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in early 2022. This assessment provides one possible avenue the Russian military command may take to achieve its reported objective to seize significant areas of southern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and the remainder of Zaporizhia Oblast in 2026.[xxv]

Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in key areas of the front to slow Russian advances and are inflicting significant costs on the Russian military, however. Ukrainian forces conducted a series of limited counterattacks into advancing Russian forces in the Kostyantynivka and Pokrovsk directions in February and March 2025, which forced Russian units to regroup and slowed Russian advances in these areas.[xxvi] Ongoing successful Ukrainian counterattacks and defensive operations in the Kostyantynivka and Pokrovsk directions appear to have forced the Russian military command to reevaluate its plan for attacking Kostyantynivka, prompting the recent prioritizing of Russian advances that bypass the Ukrainian fortress belt from the southwest. Ukrainian forces are also successfully counterattacking in the Kupyansk, Lyman, and Siversk directions and have retaken limited positions in these directions in recent days.[xxvii] Ukrainian forces reportedly enveloped some Russian positions in northern Sumy Oblast because of recent counterattacks.[xxviii]

Ukraine's drone-based defense remains a key feature of Ukraine's ability to constrain Russian advances. Ukrainian drone operators have created a 15-to-20 kilometer kill zone along the frontline that is currently helping prevent rapid Russian advances and inflicting significant manpower and materiel losses on Russia. The Economist recently assessed that Russia has suffered between 900,000 and 1.3 million personnel casualties since February 24, 2022, including between 190,000 and 350,000 killed-in-action (KIA), and Ukrainian drone operators have inflicted a significant number of these losses.[xxix] Russian adaptations aimed at countering Ukrainian drones, including intensified usage of motorcycles, are likely also contributing to increased KIA to wounded-in-action (WIA) ratios in Russian units, as Russian forces attacking on motorcycles are poorly protected from drones.[xxx] Ukrainian counterattacks and drone operators have thus far succeeded in keeping Russian advances to a slow crawl, although the Kremlin thus far appears willing to accept these high costs for further gains.

Forcing Putin to abandon his current theory of victory and agree to end the war on reasonable terms requires Ukrainian forces to stop Russian advances and begin to retake operationally significant areas. Western aid provided in support of this effort is essential to hastening an end to the war. Ukrainian forces have been successful in holding Russian advances along the frontline to a foot pace while inflicting significant casualties on Russian forces. Putin has demonstrated throughout the past year, however, that he believes in a theory of victory that posits that indefinite Russian gains – no matter how slow or how costly – will allow Russia to achieve his goals in Ukraine.[xxxi] Putin's theory assumes that the Russia can outlast and overcome Western military assistance to Ukraine and that Ukrainian forces will be unable to liberate any significant territory that Russian forces seize. Putin is operating under the assumption that Ukraine will not be able to acquire and sustain the manpower and materiel required to prevent creeping but indefinite Russian advances or to contest the initiative and conduct counteroffensive operations at some scale to liberate territory. Western military aid to Ukraine's ground forces is required to enable Ukrainian forces to stop Russian advances and then push Russian forces back in critical areas. Such successes will invalidate Putin's assumptions that Russian forces can continue gradual advances indefinitely and that Russian forces will be able to hold any territory they seize. Only significant Ukrainian battlefield gains will prompt changes in his calculus and force Putin to discard his efforts to prolong the war, come to the negotiating table, and agree to a peace settlement on acceptable terms to bring about Trump's desired just and lasting end to the war.

Timely and reliable Western military assistance to Ukraine coupled with increased economic pressure is necessary to bring about an end of the war on terms satisfactory for the United States, Europe, and Ukraine. Well-provisioned Ukrainian forces have previously demonstrated their ability to prevent Russian forces from making even marginal gains and to retake significant territory despite Russian manpower and materiel advantages.[xxxii] Western military aid to Ukraine will enable Ukrainian forces to maintain, if not increase, their ability to inflict the significant materiel and personnel losses on the battlefield that are straining Russia's economy. Western provisions of air defense systems to Ukraine will protect Ukraine's people and enable Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) to flourish and increasingly meet Ukraine's long-term national security needs. Ukraine's DIB has proven critical for maintaining Ukraine's drone-based defenses that are limiting Russian forces to creeping advances at high costs, and the West will continue to benefit from Ukrainian innovations and industrial capacity in the long-term. Economic pressure, in the form of both Western sanctions and enduring labor shortages and demographic issues brought on by losses in Ukraine, will further strain the Russian economy and reduce the funds available to Moscow for its protracted war effort.

Putin remains committed to his original war aims over 1,200 days into his full-scale invasion and is trying to avoid making concessions at any cost, including those that would risk the long-term security of the Russian state and the stability of Putin's regime.[xxxiii] Putin is deliberately protracting the war in Ukraine, believing that time is on Russia's side. Putin has chosen not to enact socially unpopular policies that would boost Russia's war effort in a sustainable way and continues to bet that the West will abandon Ukraine long before he must. The Trump administration has set the stage to seize on this critical moment, via both military aid to Ukraine and expanded economic pressure on Russia, to exploit Russia's weaknesses and negotiate a deal that maximizes US, European, and Ukrainian interests.

Key Takeaways:

• US President Donald Trump announced largescale and rapid military aid supplies to Ukraine via NATO and possible future secondary tariffs against Russia.
• Trump is acting upon the reality that successful US efforts to bring Russian President Vladimir Putin to the negotiating table require that economic instruments be coupled with Western military support to allow Ukraine to increase pressure on Russia on the battlefield.
• Trump noted that Russia has been delaying negotiations to end the war and that the recent intensification of Russia's overnight drone and missile strikes demonstrates that Russia is not interested in peace – in line with ISW's longstanding assessment of Kremlin intentions.
• Trump said that European security benefits US interests and noted that Europe is committed to helping Ukraine defend itself.
• Additional US military aid to Ukrainian forces will arrive at a dynamic, not static, frontline characterized by ongoing Russian offensive operations aimed at achieving slow maneuver and by Ukrainian counterattacks in key frontline areas.
• Russian forces' ability to advance deep enough into Ukraine's defenses to establish these salients indicates that the Russian military command has improved its ability to seize on opportunities to advance, but the rate of Russian advances has not increased beyond foot pace.
• Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast near Hulyaipole – the first tactically significant activity in this area of the frontline since the Summer 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive.
• The Russian military command likely intends to seize on recent advances in western Donetsk Oblast in order to advance westward into Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia oblasts.
• Russian forces may leverage advances in western Donetsk Oblast to launch an offensive operation toward Pokrovske, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, in pursuit of Russia's long-standing desire to seize Zaporizhzhia City.
• Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in key areas of the front to slow Russian advances and are inflicting significant costs on the Russian military, however.
• Forcing Putin to abandon his current theory of victory and agree to end the war on reasonable terms requires Ukrainian forces to stop Russian advances and begin to retake operationally significant areas. Western aid provided in support of this effort is essential to hastening an end to the war.
• Timely and reliable Western military assistance to Ukraine coupled with increased economic pressure is necessary to bring about an end of the war on terms satisfactory for the United States, Europe, and Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Lyman and Novopavlivka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy and Zaporizhia oblasts and near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Hulyaipole.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 13, 2025

A German official confirmed that Germany is interested in purchasing Patriot air defense systems from the United States on behalf of Ukraine. The head of the German Ministry of Defense's Planning and Command Staff, Major General Christian Freuding, announced on July 12 that German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius and US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth spoke several weeks ago about Germany's desire to purchase two Patriot air defense systems.[i] Freuding stated that US President Donald Trump and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz also spoke about the potential purchase in recent days and that Pistorius will travel to Washington, D.C. on July 14 for additional discussions. Freuding stated that Germany has opened a Patriot interceptor production line and that Germany will produce the first European-made Patriot interceptors in late 2026 or early 2027. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on July 10 announced Germany's willingness to purchase two Patriot air defense systems on Ukraine's behalf.[ii]

 Recent satellite imagery suggests that Russia is constructing protective structures at some of its air bases following Ukraine's Operation Spider Web on June 1. Ukraine-based open-source intelligence organization Frontelligence Insight reported that satellite imagery collected on July 7 shows that Russian forces have constructed roughly 10 reinforced bunkers with soil coverings, 12 concrete bunker-type structures without soil coverings, and eight hangar-style buildings on the aprons at Khalino Air Base in Kursk Oblast.[iii] Planet Labs satellite imagery collected on June 27 of Khalino Air Base also shows reinforced hangars, supporting Frontelligence's assessment. Frontelligence reported that satellite imagery collected on July 9 shows that Russian forces have constructed two concrete bunker-style structures at Saky Air Base in occupied Crimea, and Planet Labs satellite imagery collected on July 7 also shows concrete aircraft shelters.[iv] Frontelligence reported that satellite imagery collected on July 9 shows no construction efforts at Dzhankoi Air Base in occupied Crimea, however. Frontelligence reported that recent satellite imagery shows bomber wreckage still present at Belaya Air Base in Irkutsk Oblast and Olenya Air Base in Murmansk Oblast – two of the air bases that Ukrainian forces struck during Operation Spider Web. Russian officials and milbloggers have blamed Russian leadership for failing to defend Russian military infrastructure from Ukrainian drone strikes throughout Russia's full-scale invasion.[v] Russia may be starting to construct protective structures at its air bases after three years of war in response to Operation Spider Web.

Key Takeaways:

• A German official confirmed that Germany is interested in purchasing Patriot air defense systems from the United States on behalf of Ukraine.
• Recent satellite imagery suggests that Russia is constructing protective structures at some of its air bases following Ukraine's Operation Spider Web on June 1.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and Novopavlivka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 12, 2025

Russia launched another large-scale drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of July 11 to 12 — the third combined strike with over 500 drones and missiles in July alone. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 339 Shahed-type drones and 258 decoy drones (597 drones total) from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Millerovo, Rostov Oblast.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 26 Kh-101 cruise missiles from the airspace over Saratov Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 319 Shahed-type drones and 25 Kh-101 cruise missiles and that 258 drones were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged critical electrical networks and administrative and civilian infrastructure in Chernivtsi, Cherkasy, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Lviv, Sumy, and Volyn oblasts.[2] Ukraine’s State Emergency Service reported that Russian strikes killed two civilians in Chernivtsi City and injured 14.[3] Kyiv Oblast Military Administration Head Mykola Kalashnyk reported that Ukraine’s Clean Sky program, which uses interceptor drones to defend Kyiv Oblast against nightly Russian long-range drone strikes, downed over 50 drones during Russia’s overnight strike.[4] ISW continues to assess that Russia's ongoing large-scale strikes are intended to degrade Ukrainian and Western morale and underscore Ukraine's need for continued Western support for Ukraine's interceptor drone program and for the continued supply of Western air defense systems, especially US-provided Patriot systems.[5]

Russian forces recently advanced from the international border toward Velykyi Burluk in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast — likely in an effort to connect Russian operations near Vovchansk with those near Dvorichna, possibly to facilitate Russian efforts to establish a buffer zone along the international border. Geolocated footage published on July 12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Milove (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[6] Elements of the Russian 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and the 72nd Motorized Rifle Division (44th Army Corps [AC], LMD) first advanced into central Milove in early July 2025.[7] Elements of the 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment defended against limited Ukrainian attacks into northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast in March and April 2025, and elements of the 72nd Motorized Rifle Division participated in retaking Kursk Oblast and attacking into northern Sumy Oblast in Spring and early Summer 2025.[8] Some elements of the 72nd Motorized Rifle Division are reportedly continuing to operate in northern Sumy Oblast, although the Russian military command appears to have recently redeployed other elements of the division and the 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment to the Velykyi Burluk direction.[9]

This area of the international border between the Vovchansk and Kupyansk direction has been largely inactive over the last two years of the war, and the redeployment of elements of a regiment and a division to the area indicates that the Russian military command may be preparing to launch a more concerted offensive operation in this area. Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Shamshyn stated on July 8 that Russian forces have intensified their attacks near Milove and are leveraging artillery and drone support to strike Ukrainian positions in the area.[10] Russian milbloggers claimed on July 12 that Russian forces are shelling Khatnie (southwest of Milove) and Velykyi Burluk in order to facilitate further advances toward Khatnie and Ambarne (south of Milove).[11] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces are also attacking near Chuhunivka (northwest of Milove).[12] Russian and Ukrainian sources previously suggested in January 2025 that Russian forces intended to advance to Velykyi Burluk from the northwest near Vovchansk and the southeast near Dvorichna, and ISW noted at the time that Russian forces could spend six months to a year attempting to advance toward Velykyi Burluk from these areas before they could truly threaten the settlement.[13] Russian forces have failed to make any substantive advances toward Velykyi Burluk from Vovchansk or Dvorichna over the last six months, and the Russian military command appears to be activating another avenue of advance toward the settlement.

Russian forces have advanced roughly five kilometers from the international border over the last 10 days and appear to maintain positions roughly 16 kilometers northeast of Velykyi Burluk. Russian forces will likely attempt to widen their salient northeast of Velykyi Burluk and seize Khatnie before attacking further toward the settlement. Russian forces will also have to contend with water features in the area, including the Velykyi Burluk River that runs along the Shevchenkove-Mykhailivka-Velykyi Burluk line. This line of settlements situated along the river could pose a significant challenge for Russian troops should Ukrainian forces choose to defend here. The Russian military command almost certainly must further reinforce the units in this area if it intends to conduct an organized offensive operation against Velykyi Burluk, and Russia may reinforce this effort more rapidly if Russian forces are able to advance quickly in this previously inactive area. A Russian seizure of Velykyi Burluk would complicate Ukraine's defenses in the Vovchansk and Dvorichna directions, as Russian forces would likely be able to operate tube artillery from close enough to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and strike frontline and near rear Ukrainian positions in both directions. The collapse of Ukraine's defense in the Vovchansk and Dvorichna areas would allow Russian forces to establish their envisioned buffer zone to defend Belgorod Oblast from Ukrainian shelling in at least one area of northern Kharkiv Oblast.[14] The Vovchansk-Velykyi Burluk-Dvorichna line could also serve as a significant defensive line within a Russian buffer zone in northern Kharkiv Oblast if Russian forces are able to join their advances from these three directions in the medium- to long-term.

Ukraine signed several strategic agreements with Western defense companies to bolster Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) during the Ukraine Recovery Conference in Rome. Ukrainian Minister of Strategic Industries Herman Smetanin reported on July 12 that Ukraine secured five agreements in the defense sector with international partners on July 11 and 12.[15] Ukraine signed agreements with D&M Holding Company, an American defense manufacturer that specializes in ammunition and primers, to launch a joint production of special chemicals in the United States needed for ammunition production, including gunpowder. Ukraine also concluded agreements with the Italian Ministry of Defense to promote cooperation between unspecified Ukrainian and Italian defense companies to address demands for components and raw materials;  the Italian Industries Federation of Aerospace, Defense, and Security (AIAD) to establish cooperation initiatives in aviation with unspecified Italian companies and to create a joint working group and integrate joint research and production initiatives with the Ukrainian Council of Gunsmiths; and the Italian company IDV, which specializes in armored vehicle production, to establish the joint development and possible production of military equipment.

Key Takeaways:

• Russia launched another large-scale drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of July 11 to 12 — the third combined strike with over 500 drones and missiles in July alone.
• Russian forces recently advanced from the international border toward Velykyi Burluk in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast — likely in an effort to connect Russian operations near Vovchansk with those near Dvorichna, possibly to facilitate Russian efforts to establish a buffer zone along the international border.
• Ukraine signed several strategic agreements with Western defense companies to bolster Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) during the Ukraine Recovery Conference in Rome.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 11, 2025

US President Donald Trump announced on July 10 that the United States will sell NATO weapons, including air defense systems and interceptors, that NATO can then give to Ukraine. Trump stated in an interview with NBC News that the United States will sell NATO an unspecified number and type of American-made weapons, including Patriot air defense systems and interceptors, that NATO will then give to Ukraine.[1] Axios reported on July 11 that sources stated that NATO allies discussed the possibility of the United States using NATO as an intermediary to sell weapons to Ukraine at the most recent NATO Summit on June 24 to 25, and that these weapons could include both air defense support as well as offensive weaponry.[2] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on July 10 that Ukraine requested 10 Patriot air defense systems and additional interceptors, and that Germany is ready to purchase two Patriot systems from the United States for Ukraine, and that Norway is willing to purchase another one.[3] It remains unclear how many Patriot air defense systems or other weapons the United States will sell to NATO. ISW continues to assess that US-provided Patriot systems and interceptors are critical for Ukraine’s ability to defend against Russian long-range overnight strikes and protect its civilian population, particularly against Russian ballistic missiles.[4]

Ukraine’s European allies continue to provide additional aid and pursue joint production initiatives with Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB). The Ukrainian Ministry of Finance announced on July 11 that the United Kingdom (UK) approved a 1.7-billion-pound (roughly $2.3 billion) loan to finance improving Ukraine’s air defense capabilities.[5] The European Commission and Ukraine’s Ministry of Digital Transformation announced that Europe and Ukraine will partner in the BraveTech EU Initiative, which will work to accelerate the European DIB’s innovation cycle.[6] The European Commission reported that the BraveTech EU Initiative will expand on existing European Defense Fund (EDF) projects and will expand relationships between Ukrainian and European defense companies beginning in Fall 2025. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on July 10 that Ukraine signed an agreement with NATO Command Transformation allowing Ukrainian personnel to attend the Joint NATO-Ukraine Analysis, Training, and Education Center (JATEC).[7]

Ukraine continues to expand its production and innovation of interceptor drones for use against Shahed-type drones. Kyiv City Military Administration Head Timur Tkachenko announced on July 11 that Kyiv City will allocate 260 million hryvnia ($6.2 million) to Ukraine’s Clean Sky program aimed at using interceptor drones to defend Kyiv against nightly Russian long-range drone strikes.[8] Tkachenko stated that the program will fund additional equipment, the creation of an interceptor drone training center, and several mobile interceptor drone units. Tkachenko stated that the project has downed 550 Russian drones over Kyiv City in the last four months. Kyiv Oblast Military Administration Head Mykola Kalashnyk estimated that the project has downed almost 650 drones over Kyiv Oblast more broadly.[9] Ukrainian Minister of Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov stated that interceptor drones are downing dozens of Russian long-range drones each night.[10] Ukraine’s interceptor drones will play a critical role in lowering the cost of defense against nightly Russian drone and missile strikes, although US-provided Patriot air defense systems remain the only system capable of downing Russian ballistic missiles.

Ukrainian intelligence assesses that Russian forces are unlikely to realize the Kremlin's goal of seizing the entirety of Donetsk Oblast by the end of 2025, which is consistent with ISW's ongoing assessment of Russia's offensive capabilities. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov assessed on July 11 that Russia’s goal of seizing all of Donetsk Oblast by the end of 2025 is “not realistic.”[11] Budanov stated that the Russian military command has also tasked Russian forces with advancing into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and establishing another 10-kilometer-deep buffer zone in the oblast. Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Colonel Pavlo Palisa stated on June 5 that Russia intends to seize and occupy the full extent of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts by September 1, 2025.[12] The Economist assessed on July 9 that it would take Russian forces until February 2028 to seize the remainder of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts (which Russia has illegally annexed) at their current rate of advance.[13] Russian efforts to seize Donetsk Oblast, enter Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and establish a 10-kilometer-deep buffer zone will likely exacerbate existing constraints in the Russian military by further extending the already degraded Russian Southern and Central groupings of forces that have been engaged in near constant combat operations in Donetsk Oblast since October 2023. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are taking very high casualties in return for disproportionately small gains in pursuit of their political and territorial ambitions.[14] It remains unclear on what basis the Russian military command imagined that it could seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast by September 2025.

Kremlin officials continue to justify the Kremlin's ongoing censorship efforts and appear to be seizing on Russia's hypercontrolled information space to push the Kremlin's informal state ideology. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told Russian business magazine Expert on July 11 that the "situation that [Russia is] in" geopolitically and in relation to the increasing speed of information necessitates military censorship and that the Russian government is "justified" in its ongoing efforts to eliminate media outlets that are critical of the Kremlin.[15] Peskov praised the Russian media’s increase in positive “patriotic” content that generates feelings of loyalty to and pride in Russia. Peskov stated that he believes that the “patriotic” trend will continue and that the Kremlin will take into account the "mistakes" of the past when outlets, such as Russian opposition outlet Meduza, were allowed to criticize Russia broadly. Peskov stated that Russia will demand a "softer" informational policy in the future and that this will allow a number of "neutral" outlets to emerge. The Kremlin is unlikely to take an impartial view of the neutrality of media outlets in the future, however. Peskov stated in September 2024 that Russian media will shift to “freedom of information” if Russia emerges from this period of “acute inflammation,” referring to its war in Ukraine and the geopolitical situation.[16] The refusal to acknowledge that Russia is, in fact, engaged in a major war is part of the Kremlin's general efforts to shape and distort the Russian information space.

Peskov’s recent statements signal that the Kremlin has not abandoned its wartime efforts to censor and centralize control over the Russian information space and is setting conditions to continue censorship efforts post-war. The Kremlin has been engaged in a wide censorship campaign aimed at controlling the narrative of the full-scale invasion since 2022. Russian officials have limited access to foreign websites and platforms, attempted to eliminate access to opposition media, and arrested administrators of Telegram channels that were publicly critical of Russian political and military leadership over the last three years.[17] The Kremlin appears to be setting conditions for long-term control of the information space as it attempts to leverage social media and traditional news outlets to create future generations less likely to question Kremlin decision-making and narratives. The Kremlin is currently establishing an informal state ideology that promotes Russian nationalism, perpetuates the idea that the West unfairly and unjustly seeks to collapse the Russian state, and mythologizes veterans of the Russian military.[18] The Kremlin's efforts to encourage “patriotic” media are only one avenue through which the Kremlin is encouraging military service and loyalty to the Russian government throughout Russian society amid ongoing efforts to expand extracurricular youth military-political organizations and military education programs in Russian schools.[19]

Key Takeaways:

• US President Donald Trump announced on July 10 that the United States will sell NATO weapons, including air defense systems and interceptors, that NATO can then give to Ukraine.
• Ukraine’s European allies continue to provide additional aid and pursue joint production initiatives with Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB).
• Ukraine continues to expand its production and innovation of interceptor drones for use against Shahed-type drones.
• Ukrainian intelligence assesses that Russian forces are unlikely to realize the Kremlin's goal of seizing the entirety of Donetsk Oblast by the end of 2025, which is consistent with ISW's ongoing assessment of Russia's offensive capabilities.
• Kremlin officials continue to justify the Kremlin's ongoing censorship efforts and appear to be seizing on Russia's hypercontrolled information space to push the Kremlin's informal state ideology.
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Kupyansk, Lyman, and Novopavlivka. Russian forces advanced in northern Sumy and western Zaporizhia oblasts, and near Kupyansk, Lyman, and Toretsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 10, 2025

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio expressed frustration following a June 10 meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov about Russia's lack of progress towards ending the war in Ukraine.[i] Rubio stated after the meeting with Lavrov that he conveyed US President Donald Trump's frustration with Russia's insufficient "flexibility" to end the war.[ii] Rubio stated that he and Lavrov shared ideas about "a new or different approach" from Russia and that there must be a "roadmap moving forward" about how the war can end. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claimed that Rubio and Lavrov discussed their "mutual intention" to find a solution to the war.[iii] Kremlin officials' public statements continue to demonstrate that Russia remains committed to achieving its original war goals in Ukraine and is not interested in good faith negotiations to end the war, however. Russian MFA Spokesperson Maria Zakharova reiterated on July 9 Russia's original war demands for Ukrainian regime change and "demilitarization."[iv] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on July 10 that Russia prefers to achieve its war goals through peaceful and diplomatic means but that the war continues and the "realities on the ground" are changing every day.[v] Kremlin officials often call for Ukraine to recognize the "realities on the ground" (a reference to the frontline in Ukraine) to allude to the idea that Russia is in a stronger negotiating position given the battlefield situation and to demand that Ukraine concede to Russia's unwavering demands amounting to complete capitulation to Russia.[vi]

The Kremlin continues efforts to use its diplomatic engagements with the United States in an effort to divert attention from the war in Ukraine and toward the potential restoration of US-Russian relations. The Russian MFA readout of the Rubio-Lavrov meeting heavily emphasized Rubio and Lavrov's reported discussions about bilateral US-Russian issues unrelated to the war in Ukraine, including the restoration of US-Russian contacts, economic and humanitarian cooperation, direct air traffic, and diplomatic missions.[vii] The Russian MFA's readout concluded that the United States and Russia will continue dialogue about a "growing range of issues of mutual interest." Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov claimed on July 10 there has been no "slowdown in progress" in developing US-Russian relations.[viii] ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin attempted to use economic incentives unrelated to the war in Ukraine and the prospect of US-Russian arms control talks to extract concessions from the United States about the war in Ukraine.[ix] ISW also recently assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin unsuccessfully attempted to use Iranian nuclear negotiations and offers to mediate the Israel-Iran war to pose himself to Trump as an effective negotiator as part of efforts to secure concessions on the war in Ukraine.[x] The Kremlin is likely attempting to push the United States to suspend its diplomatic efforts to end the war in Ukraine in exchange for developing US-Russian bilateral relations and economic opportunities.

The Economist assessed that it would take Russia about 89 years to seize all of Ukraine at its current relatively accelerated rate of advance, which has fluctuated throughout the war and is unlikely to remain constant.[xi] The Economist published an analysis on July 9 about the ongoing Russian Summer 2025 offensive campaign, which the Economist assessed started on May 1. The Economist found that Russia has seized an average of about 15 square kilometers per day during this offensive effort -- roughly the area of the Los Angeles International Airport -- cohering with ISW's own assessment of the Russian rate of advance since May 2025.[xii] ISW assesses that Russian forces seized a total of 498.53 square kilometers in May 2025 and 466.71 square kilometers in June 2025, averaging about 15.8 square kilometers per day in May and June 2025. The Economist assessed that it would take Russian forces 89 years to seize the remainder of Ukraine at this rate of advance and until February 2028 to seize the remainder of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts, which Russia has illegally annexed. The Russian rate of advance of 15.8 square kilometers per day is unusually high compared to the Russian rate of advance in Winter 2024-2025 and Spring 2025, and is unlikely to remain constant. The rate of Russian advances in Ukraine has significantly varied throughout the war depending on multiple factors, including the number of active Russian offensive operations on various sectors of the front, the time of year and associated weather and terrain conditions, and Russian and Ukrainian forces' respective staffing levels and materiel stocks.[xiii] The Russian rate of advance will very likely continue to fluctuate in the coming months with the onset of the autumn rains and muddy terrain that affect maneuverability, as it has in the prior three years of war.[xiv]

Russia continues to expend staggeringly high amounts of manpower for its disproportionately small gains. The Economist used a modelling system that factors in "trends in war intensity, territory shifts, and credible open-source and intelligence assessments of losses" to assess Russian personnel casualties.[xv] The Economist used this model to estimate that Russia has suffered between 900,000 and 1.3 million personnel casualties since February 24, 2022, including between 190,000 and 350,000 killed-in-action (KIA). The Economist also estimated that Russia may have suffered about 31,000 KIA since May 1 in its Summer 2025 offensive and that Russia has gained about 0.038 square kilometers of territory (or about nine acres) per KIA soldier since about July 2024. Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Pavlo Palisa previously stated that Russia was sustaining roughly 167 KIA and wounded in action (WIA) per square kilometer of advance as of June 4, or about 0.0059 square kilometers or 1.45 acres per WIA or KIA soldier.[xvi] Russian forces will likely continue to burn through personnel in ongoing summer offensive operations that aim to seize the remainder of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts and advance into Dnipropetrovsk and Sumy oblasts.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg in Rome on July 9.[xvii] Zelensky noted that the discussion largely centered around arms supplies, strengthening Ukraine's air defense, and joint weapons production and localization against the backdrop of increased Russian strikes. Zelensky and Kellogg also discussed possible harsher US sanctions on Russia and those who support its energy and banking sector.

The United States reportedly resumed some military aid shipments to Ukraine. The Associated Press (AP) and Reuters, citing two US officials, reported on July 9 that the United States resumed military aid deliveries to Ukraine, including shipments of 155mm artillery shells and Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) rockets.[xviii] The officials did not specify the quantity of weapons in the resumed shipments or whether a new shipment has already arrived in Ukraine.

Ukraine’s Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine. The United Kingdom (UK) announced on July 10 a defense agreement with Ukraine that includes additional military assistance and joint defense production.[xix] The agreement will provide Ukraine with over five thousand air defense interceptors from Belfast-based Thales Air Defense, a subsidiary of the French defense company Thales Group.[xx] The UK will also commit an additional £283 million (roughly $384 million) in bilateral assistance for Ukraine over the 2025-2026 financial year, including £10.5 million (roughly $14 million) for the Ukrainian Governance Reform Program and £1 million (roughly $1.3 million) for Ukraine‘s Green Transition Office. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz stated on July 10 that Germany is prepared to purchase Patriot air defense systems for Ukraine from the United States.[xxi] The Czech Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on July 9 that the Czech government approved an F-16 training program for up to eight Ukrainian pilots, aiming to provide 150 hours of flight training per pilot by 2026.[xxii]

Russia launched another large-scale missile and drone strike against Ukraine on the night of July 9 to 10 that heavily targeted Kyiv City, resulting in civilian casualties and significant damage to civilian infrastructure. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 397 Shahed-type strike drones and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Millerovo, Rostov Oblast – of which about 200 were Shahed-type drones.[xxiii] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched eight Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Bryansk Oblast, six Kh-101 cruise missiles from Saratov Oblast airspace; and four S-300 air defense missiles at ground targets from Kursk Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 178 total projectiles, including 164 drones, all eight Iskander-M ballistic missiles, and all six Kh-101 cruise missiles, and that 204 drones and missiles were "lost" or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that the main targets of the Russian strike series were Kyiv City and Kyiv Oblast and that Russian strikes also damaged Chernihiv, Sumy, Poltava, Kirovohrad, and Kharkiv oblasts.[xxiv] Kyiv City and Kyiv Oblast officials reported that the Russian strikes damaged residential, medical, educational, commercial, and transport infrastructure, killing at least two civilians and injuring 26.[xxv]

[strikes graphic

Russia's strike tactics, coupled with the increased scale and concentrated targeting of Russia's recent strike packages, aim to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and are resulting in significant damage. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger stated that Russian forces are employing new strike tactics, which involve targeting massive strike packages against one or two main target cities.[xxvi] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian air defenses protecting the cities are unable to repel such large-scale and concentrated strike packages. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reiterated that Russian forces are launching drones and missiles from different directions and at different altitudes, which complicates Ukrainian air defense measures.[xxvii] Ihnat noted that Ukrainian forces are working to destroy Russian reconnaissance drones that use repeaters to fly deep into Ukraine's rear and that relay real-time targeting data to Russian forces. ISW previously observed reports of Russian forces adapting their strike tactics by launching missiles and drones from varying directions and altitudes.[xxviii] Russia continues to use these tactics while increasing the size of its strike packages and targeting particular cities to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and increase damage. ISW continues to assess that Russia's large-scale strike packages in recent weeks aim to maximize damage against Ukraine, are disproportionately affecting civilian areas, and support wider Russian efforts to degrade Ukrainian morale.[xxix] Russia's recent large-scale strike packages underscore Ukraine's need for both continued Western support to Ukraine's interceptor drone development and production capabilities and for the contribution of Western air defense systems like US Patriots. Ukraine requires both indigenous and partner-provided air defense integrated into its wider air defense umbrella in order to secure its cities.

Russian President Vladimir Putin dismissed Deputy Foreign Minister and Presidential Special Representative to the Middle East and Africa Mikhail Bogdanov on July 9.[xxx] Kremlin newswire TASS, citing unnamed sources, claimed that Putin released Bogdanov from his duties at Bogdanov's request for unspecified personal reasons.[xxxi] Bogdanov was heavily involved in the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)'s efforts to provide military support to the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in exchange for a Russian Red Sea naval base, as the Critical Threats Project's Africa File previously assessed.[xxxii] Sudan provides an alternative base for Russian efforts to project power into the Mediterranean and Red Seas and provide logistic support for its military operations across Africa given its bases in Syria are in jeopardy after the fall of the Assad regime.[xxxiii] Putin may have dismissed Bogdanov in favor of a replacement who can better manage the situation in the MENA region following the fall of Assad.

Key Takeaways:

• US Secretary of State Marco Rubio expressed frustration following a June 10 meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov about Russia's lack of progress towards ending the war in Ukraine.
• The Kremlin continues efforts to use its diplomatic engagements with the United States in an effort to divert attention from the war in Ukraine and toward the potential restoration of US-Russian relations.
• The Economist assessed that it would take Russia about 89 years to seize all of Ukraine at its current relatively accelerated rate of advance, which has fluctuated throughout the war and is unlikely to remain constant.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg in Rome on July 9.
• The United States reportedly resumed some military aid shipments to Ukraine.
• Ukraine’s Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine.
• Russia launched another large-scale missile and drone strike against Ukraine on the night of July 9 to 10 that heavily targeted Kyiv City, resulting in civilian casualties and significant damage to civilian infrastructure.
• Russia's strike tactics, coupled with the increased scale and concentrated targeting of Russia's recent strike packages, aim to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and are resulting in significant damage.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin dismissed Deputy Foreign Minister and Presidential Special Representative to the Middle East and Africa Mikhail Bogdanov on July 9.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Borova, Toretsk, and Novopavlivka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 9, 2025

Russian forces conducted the largest combined drone and missile strike of the war so far on the night of July 8 to 9 with 741 total drones and missiles — an about 34 percent increase from the previous record high of 550 Russian drones and missiles launched on the night of July 3 to 4.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 728 Shahed-type strike and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[2] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched seven Kh-101/Iskander-K cruise missiles from Engels Raion, Saratov Oblast and from Kursk Oblast, and six Kh-47M2 Khinzhal aeroballistic missiles from Lipetsk Oblast airspace. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 718 of the drones and missiles, including seven Kh-101/Iskander-K missiles shot down, 296 Shahed-type drones shot down, and 415 drones “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian strikes primarily targeted Lutsk, Volyn Oblast, and Ukrainian officials reported that the strikes damaged a warehouse, private enterprise, and civilian areas in Lutsk.[3] Ukrainian officials reported that the strikes also hit residential areas, an enterprise, and civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv, Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovohrad, Mykolaiv, Sumy, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, and Zhytomyr oblasts.[4] Kyiv Oblast Military Administration Head Mykola Kalashnyk reported that the July 8 to 9 Russian strike was one of the largest strikes targeting Kyiv Oblast and that the strikes lasted for over seven hours.[5] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukrainian forces used interceptor drones to repel the strike and downed "tens" of drones.[6]

The New York Times reported on July 9 that military analysts estimate that Russia will be able to routinely launch over 1,000 drones per strike package by Fall 2025, echoing a recent warning from Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces Commander Major Robert Brovdi that Russia could escalate its strike packages to include over 1,000 Shahed-type drones per day.[7] Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy "Flash" Beskrestnov estimated on June 20 that Russia has increased Shahed production sevenfold and forecasted that Russian strike packages may soon incorporate up to 800 Shaheds — a forecast that is in line with the July 8 to 9 Russian strike package.[8] ISW previously reported that Russia is significantly expanding its long-range drone production capabilities for modified Geran-2 drones (the Russian-made analogue of the Iranian-origin Shahed-136 drones), including by opening production lines with companies in the People's Republic of China (PRC).[9]

The continued increase in the size of strike packages is likely intended to support Russian efforts to degrade Ukrainian morale in the face of constant Russian aggression. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported that Russian forces used over 400 decoy drones in this strike package in order to overwhelm Ukrainian air defense.[10] Russian forces have equipped their decoy long-range drones with warheads and have also modified their strike drones with warheads designed to inflict a wide spread of damage, indicating that Russian forces aim to maximize damage against areas in Ukraine writ large — which disproportionately affects civilian areas.[11]  Ukrainian Ground Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vitaly Sarantsev stated in an interview with the Washington Post on July 9 that recent Russian strikes against Ukrainian military registration and enlistment offices seek to disrupt Ukrainian force generation efforts.[12] Sarantsev stated that Russia aims to sow fear among Ukrainians and create the perception that it is dangerous to go to recruitment and enlistment offices. ISW assessed in previous years that Russia has used strike packages targeting civilian areas to generate a morale effect in Ukraine, as seems to be the case with the most recent strikes.[13]

The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) found that Russian forces and pro-Russian separatists engaged in illegal military activity in Ukraine between 2014 and 2022. The ECHR found Russian forces and pro-Russian separatists guilty of a pattern of human rights abuses during conflicts in eastern Ukraine and in the first months of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine between May 2014 and September 2022, including indiscriminate military attacks, torture, summary executions, the use of rape as a weapon of war, and the illegal deportation of Ukrainian children.[14] The ECHR noted that Russia ceased to be a member of the European Convention as of September 16, 2022, and that Russia remains culpable for actions prior to this date. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov rejected the ECHR's findings as “null and void” and insignificant.[15] ISW has previously assessed that Russia perpetuates a systemic pattern of conflict-related human rights abuses, including the consistent deportation and indoctrination of Ukrainian children, torture of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) and civilians, the use of chemical weapons on the battlefield, and indiscriminate military actions that disproportionately affect civilians. These abuses have continued well beyond September 2022 and remain a core part of Russia's military culture, style of offensive operations, and policy of occupation to this day.[16]

 The ECHR also determined on July 9 that Russia is responsible for the downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 (MH17) in 2014, which killed 298 passengers and crew, including Dutch nationals.[17] The ECHR concluded that Russia had not followed proper safety measures when firing the missile and did not conduct an “effective investigation” in the aftermath of the event.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted the largest combined drone and missile strike of the war so far on the night of July 8 to 9 with 741 total drones and missiles — an about 34 percent increase from the previous record high of 550 Russian drones and missiles launched on the night of July 3 to 4.
• The continued increase in the size of strike packages is likely intended to support Russian efforts to degrade Ukrainian morale in the face of constant Russian aggression.
• The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) found that Russian forces and pro-Russian separatists engaged in illegal military activity in Ukraine between 2014 and 2022.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova and Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Novopavlivka, and Velyka Novosilka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 8, 2025

US President Donald Trump announced on July 7 that the United States would resume weapons deliveries to Ukraine as discussions about provisions of additional air defense systems and interceptors are reportedly ongoing. Trump stated on July 7 that the United States will send more weapons to Ukraine to help Ukraine defend itself.[1] Trump stated that the United States is "going to see if [it] can make some [Patriot interceptors] available." Politico reported that two sources stated that shipments of US military aid to Ukraine could resume over the "coming weeks."[2] Chief Pentagon Spokesperson Sean Parnell stated on July 7 that Trump directed the US Department of Defense (DoD) to send additional defensive weapons to Ukraine to ensure that Ukraine can defend itself while the United States works to secure a "lasting peace."[3] Axios reported on July 8 that sources stated that Trump told Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky that he wants to help Ukraine's air defenses and promised to immediately send 10 Patriot interceptors and help to find other means of supply.[4] Axios' sources reportedly stated that Trump suggested that Germany should sell one of its Patriot batteries to Ukraine and that the United States and Europe would split the costs of the purchase. Axios reported that US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has identified Patriot batteries in Germany and Greece that the US could finance and send to Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that US-provided Patriot systems and interceptors are critical for Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian long-range overnight strikes, particularly against Russian ballistic missiles.[5]

The Kremlin continues to leverage Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev's aggressive rhetoric to undermine support for US military aid to Ukraine, likely as part of a top-down, concerted Kremlin informational effort. Medvedev responded on July 8 on his Russian- and English-language channels to US President Donald Trump's statements about resuming weapons supplies to Ukraine, claiming that Russia should continue "business as usual."[6] Medvedev claimed that Russia will "push forward" to achieve its war goals and "reclaim [its] land." Medvedev's July 8 statements aim to present Western military aid to Ukraine as futile in the face of an alleged inevitable Russian victory. The West should not disregard all of Medvedev's statements as hyperbole or fringe, however. Russian President Vladimir Putin often leverages Medvedev to amplify inflammatory rhetoric designed to stoke panic and fear among Western decision-makers and discourage aid to Ukraine.[7] Medvedev's statements are part of a wider Kremlin reflexive control campaign against the West. Medvedev's provocative and at times threatening statements are very likely part of a top-down, concerted Kremlin informational strategy. Putin would be able to censor Medvedev's statements should Putin choose to do so, especially considering the coordination within the Kremlin on official statements and the Kremlin's overall grip on the Russian information space, internet, and media. Medvedev's continued use of his platform to make aggressive statements that specifically target the United States and Europe suggests that the Kremlin is approving and encouraging this effort. Medvedev's aggressive statements serve a specific purpose for Putin, as they push the West to see Putin's statements as more moderate and rational by comparison and open space for Putin to make greater demands or larger threats.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast amidst a series of ongoing counterattacks. Geolocated footage published on July 8 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern and northeastern Kindrativka (north of Sumy City).[8] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on July 7 that Ukrainian forces advanced between Kindrativka and Kostyantynivka (north of Kindrativka) and east of Oleksiivka (east of Kindrativka) and entered Novomykolaivka (northeast of Oleksiivka).[9] A Russian milblogger claimed on July 8 that Ukrainian forces entered Kindrativka from the northwest and Oleksiivka from the northeast.[10] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces seized central and northern Kindrativka and have cut off Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) along the C-191502 Novomykolaivka-Volodymyrivka road. The milblogger claimed that the Russian military command deployed elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) to Kindrativka to support Russian personnel retreating from the settlement. The milblogger claimed that the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) is fighting to establish a foothold south of Oleksiivka, but that recent Ukrainian advances are complicating this effort.

Russian advances in northern Sumy Oblast slowed between late May and early June 2025, and Ukrainian forces began counterattacking and regaining territory in mid-June. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on June 14 that Ukrainian forces retook Andriivka (southeast of Kindrativka), and Ukrainian forces advanced in other areas of northern Sumy Oblast throughout late June 2025.[11] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on July 8 that fighting remains intense in the North Slobozhansk (Kursk and northern Sumy oblasts) direction and that Ukrainian forces are restoring positions in this direction and maintaining positions in Kursk and Belgorod oblasts.[12] The Russian military command redeployed some drone and elite naval infantry units from the Kursk and Sumy directions to other higher-priority sectors of the frontline in Donetsk Oblast in May and June 2025, and the command may further deprioritize the offensive in northern Sumy Oblast if Ukrainian forces continue to complicate further Russian advances.[13] Russia could also reinforce its frontline units in northern Sumy Oblast in the near future in order to continue advancing toward Sumy City, however.

Russia continues to expand its domestic drone production capacity amid the ever-growing role of tactical drones in frontline combat operations and Russia's increasingly large nightly long-range strike packages against Ukraine. Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin claimed on July 8 that Russia has already more than tripled its planned overall drone production volumes for 2025.[14] Mishustin credited this increase to state financial support for drone producers and innovators, including civilian companies. Ukraine-based open-source intelligence organization Frontelligence Insight stated on July 8 that Russian forces have launched 28,743 total Shahed variant drones (Shahed-136/131 and Geran 2) since the beginning of the full-scale invasion and that Russian forces launched 10 percent of this total (2,736 drones) in June 2025 alone.[15] Frontelligence Insight assessed that Russia produced an average of 60.5 Geran drones per day, or roughly 1,850 drones per month, between February and April 2025. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on July 8 that Russian forces launched 1.6 times more missiles and drones against Ukraine in June 2025 than in May 2025.[16] Increased Russian long-range drone production is enabling Russia's increasingly large nightly strikes against Ukraine and has also enabled Russian forces to integrate Gerans into strikes against frontline Ukrainian positions.[17] Russian forces are continuing to integrate drones into frontline combat operations to strike frontline and near rear Ukrainian positions and to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in tandem with Russian MLRS and artillery systems.

Ongoing Russian cooperation with Chinese companies is facilitating Russia's increasing domestic drone production. Documents analyzed by Bloomberg, including memos from Russian drone manufacturer Aero-HIT and unspecified Russian officials between late 2022 and June 2025, indicate that the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) has cooperated with Chinese companies to increase Russia's drone manufacturing capacity and subvert Western sanctions for drone components since the start of Russia’s war against Ukraine in February 2022.[18] Bloomberg reported that a Russian delegation visiting China in May 2023 established a joint venture with a Chinese university to form the Aero-HIT drone production facility in Khabarovsk, Khabarovsk Krai. Bloomberg reported that Aero-HIT submitted a 7.1-billion-ruble (roughly $90 million) funding request to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) in June 2025, which stated that Aero-HIT has partnered with Chinese engineers since early 2023. Aero-HIT memos reviewed by Bloomberg state that Aero-HIT's plant can produce up to 10,000 drones per month in 2025 and plans for further production increases. Bloomberg reported that Aero-HIT's relationship with Chinese engineers is crucial to Aero-HIT's ability to manufacture at scale its “Veles” first-person view (FPV) drone, which Russian forces have used significantly in Kherson Oblast.[19] Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy "Flash" Beskrestnov stated on July 7 that Ukrainian forces recently observed a new type of Chinese wi-fi router on Chinese radio modems installed on Russian “Gerber” drones.[20] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported to Radio Svoboda on July 7 that 60 to 65 percent of the components in Russian-produced Geran-type drones (the Russian analogue of the Iranian Shahed drone) are of Chinese origin.[21] Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reported on July 4 that Ukrainian investigators discovered components manufactured at the Chinese Suzhou Ecod Precision Manufacturing Company in Russian Geran-type drones recovered in Kyiv City.[22]

Russian milblogger complaints suggest that the Russian military command is struggling to supply frontline units with drones despite increased drone production, possibly indicating how Russia's centralization and bureaucracy are degrading the effectiveness of Russian drone operations and slowing the Russian innovation cycle. A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor claimed on July 8 that the Russian military command is prioritizing drone supplies to several specialized drone units and that the standards for equipping regular drone units are far below the units' actual needs.[23] Another Russian milblogger complained that the Russian military command is creating a small number of specialized drone units with unlimited support instead of creating drone units in all regiments and brigades.[24] The milblogger claimed that the specialized drone units produce results, but that the other units are left severely under resourced. The milblogger claimed that the Russian military command supplies only 20 drones per month to non-specialized units and that these units have to instead rely on volunteer drone supplies.[25] Another milblogger complained that the Russian military has warehouses full of drones but that only "elite" units receive these supplies.[26] Russia's Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies, to which the Russian MoD reportedly prioritizes supplies and staffing, appears to be Russia's effort to selectively reorganize and centralize unmanned systems detachments and assets.[27] ISW continues to assess that the Russian MoD is attempting to replicate Ukraine's drone programs via Russia's Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) and Rubikon Center, but that Russia's tendency towards centralization and bureaucratic ineptitude is leading to obstacles in this process.[28]

 Key Takeaways:

• US President Donald Trump announced on July 7 that the United States would resume weapons deliveries to Ukraine as discussions about provisions of additional air defense systems and interceptors are reportedly ongoing.
• The Kremlin continues to leverage Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev's aggressive rhetoric to undermine support for US military aid to Ukraine, likely as part of a top-down, concerted Kremlin informational effort.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast amidst a series of ongoing counterattacks.
• Russia continues to expand its domestic drone production capacity amid the ever-growing role of tactical drones in frontline combat operations and Russia's increasingly large nightly long-range strike packages against Ukraine.
• Ongoing Russian cooperation with Chinese companies is facilitating Russia's increasing domestic drone production.
• Russian milblogger complaints suggest that the Russian military command is struggling to supply frontline units with drones despite increased drone production, possibly indicating how Russia's centralization and bureaucracy are degrading the effectiveness of Russian drone operations and slowing the Russian innovation cycle.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast, and Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar and Toretsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 7, 2025

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated the Kremlin's rejection of a ceasefire and unchanged demands, including demilitarization and regime change in Ukraine. Lavrov gave an interview to Hungarian outlet Magyar Nemzet published on July 7 and claimed that a settlement to the war must eliminate the "root causes" of the war, which Lavrov again defined as NATO's expansion and Ukraine's alleged discrimination against Russian-speakers.[i] Lavrov claimed that Russia is against a ceasefire as Ukraine and its allies would use the pause to regroup and reconstitute Ukraine's military. Lavrov explicitly highlighted Russia's demands for Ukraine's demilitarization and "denazification" (a phrase Russia uses to demand regime change in Ukraine), and these demands are notably Russia's original war goals. Lavrov also demanded international recognition of Russia's illegal annexation of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and Crimea – including the areas of these four oblasts that Russian forces do not currently occupy – and called for a future settlement to include sanctions relief and the return of frozen Russian assets. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin remains uninterested in good-faith peace negotiations and any settlement to the war that does not acquiesce to its demands.[ii]

Russia is leveraging its "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies to improve its theater-wide drone capabilities, including in priority frontline areas in Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian servicemembers operating in the Kostyantynivka direction told the New York Times in an interview published on July 7 that the recent arrival of drone operators of the Rubikon Center – Russia's recently formed drone training and innovation center – represented a "turning point" in Russia's tactical drone capacity.[iii] Russia reportedly deployed Rubikon drone units to Kursk Oblast in early 2025, where Rubikon drone operators equipped with fiber optic drones played a significant role in eliminating the remaining Ukrainian salient.[iv] Ukrainian servicemembers reported that Russia redeployed Rubikon units to the Kostyantynivka area in Spring 2025, which has allowed Russian forces to significantly complicate Ukrainian logistics in the area. Russian and Ukrainian use of the fiber optic drones that Rubikon introduced en masse in Kursk Oblast has played a key role in creating the 15- to 20-kilometer-wide kill zones between frontline Russian and Ukrainian positions.

Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy "Flash" Beskrestnov stated in May 2025 that the  Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) oversees Rubikon and prioritizes supplying and staffing the center.[v] Beskrestnov stated that Rubikon is organized into four parts: the center for unmanned systems and robotic ground complexes development; the center for teaching instructors to train military personnel to use innovative unmanned solutions; the center for analytics; and frontline combat units. Beskrestnov stated that Rubikon units operate various types of drones, including Lancet loitering munitions, Molniya strike drones, fiber optic drones, and long-range first-person view (FPV) drones, and that some units receive special training to operate against Ukrainian aircraft. Beskrestnov noted that some Rubikon units are still operating in the Sumy-Kursk direction, but that Russia redeployed various units to eastern Ukraine, mainly to Donetsk Oblast. The Russian MoD is reportedly forming five unmanned systems detachments under Rubikon to support combat operations in the five Russian groupings of forces operating in Ukraine.[vi]

ISW has observed reports of Rubikon units operating in Kursk Oblast and throughout eastern Ukraine from the Borova direction in eastern Kharkiv Oblast to the Velyka Novosilka direction in western Donetsk Oblast.[vii] ISW has not observed reports of Rubikon units operating in western Zaporizhia or Kherson oblasts as of this report, indicating that the MoD is likely still expanding Rubikon. ISW previously assessed that Rubikon appears to be the central thrust of the MoD's initiative to establish the educational and drone development infrastructure necessary for the establishment of Russia's new Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) and an effort to selectively reorganize and centralize unmanned systems detachments and assets.[viii]

Russian forces have yet to reach parity with Ukraine's innovative and deeply integrated drone program, however. The Russian MoD is currently attempting to replicate Ukraine's drone programs via Russia's USF and Rubikon Center, but Russia's tendency towards centralization and bureaucratic ineptitude will likely lead to obstacles in this process. ISW previously assessed that Russia's centralization and restructuring efforts may degrade the effectiveness of Russian drone operations and slow the Russian unmanned systems innovation cycle.[ix] Russia's efforts should not be dismissed, however, as a sufficiently trained and organized class of Russian drone operators spread across the frontline and integrated with Russian ground units in the future represents a long-term threat not only to Ukraine, but also to NATO.

Russian forces appear to be reprioritizing offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction over the Kostyantynivka direction after several weeks of unsuccessful activity aimed at advancing toward Kostyantynivka. Geolocated footage published on July 6 and 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Novoekonomichne (east of Pokrovsk) and in southern Novoekonomichne during a platoon-sized mechanized assault.[x] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced northwest of Koptieve, west of Myrne (both northeast of Pokrovsk), and southwest of Myrolyubivka (east of Pokrovsk).[xi] Russian forces appear to be refocusing their attention on the area northeast of Pokrovsk in the direction of Dobropillya (northwest of Pokrovsk) after renewing assaults in this area in May 2025.[xii] ISW recently assessed that these advances support both the envelopment of Pokrovsk and the establishment of a salient to allow Russian forces in the longer term to try to envelop Kostyantynivka and Ukraine's wider fortress belt — a series of fortified cities that form the backbone of Ukraine’s defensive positions.[xiii] Russian forces have not made significant gains in the area west of Toretsk toward Kostyantynivka since early June 2025, and the Russian military command is likely temporarily deprioritizing that effort in favor of more opportunistic advances in the Pokrovsk direction.[xiv] One Russian milblogger noted that Russian forces previously unsuccessfully attempted to advance into Novoekonomichne from the east near Malynivka, but that Russian forces were able to advance into the settlement from the south.[xv] Russian forces have struggled to advance into Novoekonomichne over the last two months in the face of ongoing Ukrainian defensive operations and counterattacks in the area.[xvi] Russian forces will likely attempt to leverage these gains to advance toward Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk and northeast of Novoekonomichne) and force Ukrainian forces to withdraw from Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) under threat of encirclement before refocusing on the Kostyantynivka direction.

Russian Minister of Transport and former Kursk Oblast Governor Roman Starovoit reportedly recently committed suicide after Russian President Vladimir Putin removed Starovoit from his position, likely due in part to the Ministry of Transport's role in Russian failures that enabled Ukraine's Operation Spider Web in June 2025. Russian President Vladimir Putin dismissed Starovoit on July 7.[xvii] The Russian Investigative Committee claimed that unspecified actors found Starovoit's body on July 7 in his car with a gunshot wound and that Starovoit's preliminary cause of death is suicide.[xviii] Deputy Head of the Ministry of Transport's Property Management Department Andrei Korneichuk also reportedly died on July 7 at the Ministry of Transport in Moscow of a heart attack.[xix] Ukraine's Operation Spider Web was able to transport drones into Russia and strike major Russian military airfields by storing the drones in cargo containers transported throughout the country.[xx] Putin appointed Deputy Minister of Transport Andrei Nikitin to replace Starovoit as the acting minister, and Nikitin emphasized during his July 7 meeting with Putin that the ministry is taking measures to monitor cargo moving in Russia and to identify unmanned systems – suggesting that Putin is laying part of the blame for Operation Spider Web on the Ministry of Transport.[xxi]

Putin may have planned to punish Starovoit by arresting him on charges related to his time as the governor of Kursk Oblast in order to avoid acknowledging the Kremlin's failure to prevent Operation Spider Web. Russian business outlet Kommersant reported that former Kursk Oblast Governor Alexei Smirnov, whom Russian authorities arrested in April 2025 on fraud charges, testified against Starovoit in the case on the theft of at least one billion rubles (about $12.7 million) allocated for the construction of defensive structures on the Russian-Ukrainian border in Kursk Oblast.[xxii] Smirnov's arrest was likely part of a wider Kremlin effort to scapegoat Kursk Oblast officials for Russia's failure to respond to Ukraine's August 2024 incursion into Kursk Oblast, and Starovoit was the governor of Kursk Oblast before Smirnov from October 2018 to May 2024.[xxiii] Putin has been unwilling to acknowledge Russia's failures in preventing Operation Spider Web and may have planned to use charges related to the defense of Kursk Oblast to punish Starovoit.

Ukrainian forces continue to conduct long-range strikes against Russia's defense industrial base (DIB). The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 7 that Ukrainian forces, including elements of the Unmanned Systems Forces, conducted a drone strike against the Russian Krasnozavodsk Chemical Plant in Moscow Oblast on the night of July 6 to 7.[xxiv] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that the plant produces pyrotechnics, ammunition, and thermobaric warheads for Shahed-type drones. Geolocated footage published on July 7 shows smoke and fires at the Krasnozavodsk Chemical Plant.[xxv] Ukrainian intelligence sources told Ukrainian outlet Suspline that Ukrainian forces also struck the Ilsky Oil Refinery in Krasnodar Krai on July 7 and damaged a technical workshop and the refinery itself.[xxvi] The sources stated that the Ilsky Oil Refinery processes and stores hydrocarbon raw materials and is directly involved in the Russian DIB. Head of Ukraine's Center for Combatting Disinformation Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko previously reported that the Ilsky Oil Refinery has an annual refining capacity of roughly 6.6 million tons; specializes in producing fuel, mazut, bitumen, and gas oil; and supplies Russian forces, particularly in southern Russia and occupied Ukraine.[xxvii]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated the Kremlin's rejection of a ceasefire and unchanged demands, including demilitarization and regime change in Ukraine.
• Russia is leveraging its "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies to improve its theater-wide drone capabilities, including in priority frontline areas in Donetsk Oblast.
• Russian forces have yet to reach parity with Ukraine's innovative and deeply integrated drone program, however.
• Russian forces appear to be reprioritizing offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction over the Kostyantynivka direction after several weeks of unsuccessful activity aimed at advancing toward Kostyantynivka.
• Russian Minister of Transport and former Kursk Oblast Governor Roman Starovoit reportedly recently committed suicide after Russian President Vladimir Putin removed Starovoit from his position, likely due in part to the Ministry of Transport's role in Russian failures that enabled Ukraine's Operation Spider Web in June 2025.
• Putin may have planned to punish Starovoit by arresting him on charges related to his time as the governor of Kursk Oblast in order to avoid acknowledging the Kremlin's failure to prevent Operation Spider Web.
• Ukrainian forces continue to conduct long-range strikes against Russia's defense industrial base (DIB).
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 6, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be trying to increase volunteer recruitment among the Russian population, likely due to waning domestic support for the Kremlin's crypto-mobilization efforts. Putin attended the "Everything for Victory" forum hosted by the People's Front (Narodnyi Front, formerly the All-Russia People's Front) on July 6 in Moscow City.[1] The People's Front is a Russian Ministry of Defense- (MoD) and state-backed political coalition of non-governmental organizations and political parties largely led by United Russia. Putin created the People's Front in 2011 when he was prime minister. The People’s Front monitors the implementation of Putin’s decrees and has increasingly served as a military assistance initiative, providing aid to Russian servicemembers fighting in Ukraine through its "Everything for Victory" program. The organization also includes the "Kulibin Club" drone and electronic warfare (EW) production initiative, which develops and tests technology for the Russian military. Putin claimed during his address to the forum that the People's Front has become a mass public movement due to "the overwhelming majority of Russian citizens" who wish to defend "the life principles and values" passed down from previous generations and that the Russian military enjoys "universal, nationwide support" among the Russian population.[2] Putin highlighted the contributions that the organization has made to Russian forces in Ukraine, such as supplying 110,000 drones and more than 14,000 vehicles. Putin is likely attempting to shore up public support for the People's Front and the war to increase voluntary recruitment among Russian citizens. Putin's focused messaging on the Russian populace's alleged "overwhelming" support for Russian forces fighting in Ukraine suggests that the Kremlin is trying to combat issues with voluntary recruitment and societal support for the war. ISW has observed indications that the Kremlin is struggling to maintain its voluntary recruitment rates.[3] ISW continues to assess that Putin remains averse to declaring another partial mobilization out of fear of domestic discontent and remains committed to promoting crypto-mobilization efforts.[4]

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 5 to 6, including a "double-tap strike" against emergency responders. Recent adaptations to Russian long-range drone technologies and strike tactics suggests that Russian strikes against civilian targets are very likely intentional. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on July 6 that Russian forces launched 157 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea, and four S-300 air defense missiles from Kursk Oblast.[5] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 177 drones and that 19 were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck civilian, energy, and military infrastructure in Kharkiv, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Poltava, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[6] Ukraine’s Ground Forces reported that Russian forces targeted a Ukrainian military registration and enlistment office in Kremenchuk, Poltava Oblast - the third such strike since June 30.[7] Russian strikes against Ukrainian military registration and enlistment offices likely aim to disrupt Ukrainian recruitment efforts.[8]

Ukraine’s State Emergency Service reported on July 6 that Russian forces conducted two double-tap strikes targeting Ukrainian

Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be trying to increase volunteer recruitment among the Russian population, likely due to waning domestic support for the Kremlin's crypto-mobilization efforts. Putin attended the "Everything for Victory" forum hosted by the People's Front (Narodnyi Front, formerly the All-Russia People's Front) on July 6 in Moscow City. The People's Front is a Russian Ministry of Defense- (MoD) and state-backed political coalition of non-governmental organizations and political parties largely led by United Russia. Putin created the People's Front in 2011 when he was prime minister. The People’s Front monitors the implementation of Putin’s decrees and has increasingly served as a military assistance initiative, providing aid to Russian servicemembers fighting in Ukraine through its "Everything for Victory" program. The organization also includes the "Kulibin Club" drone and electronic warfare (EW) production initiative, which develops and tests technology for the Russian military. Putin claimed during his address to the forum that the People's Front has become a mass public movement due to "the overwhelming majority of Russian citizens" who wish to defend "the life principles and values" passed down from previous generations and that the Russian military enjoys "universal, nationwide support" among the Russian population. Putin highlighted the contributions that the organization has made to Russian forces in Ukraine, such as supplying 110,000 drones and more than 14,000 vehicles. Putin is likely attempting to shore up public support for the People's Front and the war to increase voluntary recruitment among Russian citizens. Putin's focused messaging on the Russian populace's alleged "overwhelming" support for Russian forces fighting in Ukraine suggests that the Kremlin is trying to combat issues with voluntary recruitment and societal support for the war. ISW has observed indications that the Kremlin is struggling to maintain its voluntary recruitment rates. ISW continues to assess that Putin remains averse to declaring another partial mobilization out of fear of domestic discontent and remains committed to promoting crypto-mobilization efforts.

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 5 to 6, including a "double-tap strike" against emergency responders. Recent adaptations to Russian long-range drone technologies and strike tactics suggests that Russian strikes against civilian targets are very likely intentional. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on July 6 that Russian forces launched 157 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea, and four S-300 air defense missiles from Kursk Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 177 drones and that 19 were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck civilian, energy, and military infrastructure in Kharkiv, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Poltava, and Zaporizhia oblasts. Ukraine’s Ground Forces reported that Russian forces targeted a Ukrainian military registration and enlistment office in Kremenchuk, Poltava Oblast - the third such strike since June 30. Russian strikes against Ukrainian military registration and enlistment offices likely aim to disrupt Ukrainian recruitment efforts.

Ukraine’s State Emergency Service reported on July 6 that Russian forces conducted two double-tap strikes targeting Ukrainian emergency responders during overnight drone strikes against Kharkiv City and after shelling against Kherson City on the morning of July 6. Russia’s recent drone technological adaptations and strike tactics, such as accumulating drones near a target before simultaneously striking, have increased Russia's ability to precisely coordinate strikes and hit intended targets. Russia's recent overnight strikes series have increasingly resulted in civilian casualties, and Russia is very likely intentionally targeting Ukrainian civilians, including with "double tap" strikes likely meant to kill first responders and strikes against military registration and enlistment offices.

Russian Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) has stopped reporting on the number of deaths in Russia, likely as part of Kremlin efforts to conceal Russia's losses from the war in Ukraine. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on July 5 that Rosstat did not report demographic data in its January to May 2025 “Socioeconomic Situation in Russia” report. Electoral statistics researcher Dmitry Kobak reported in late June 2025 that Rosstat refused to fulfill his request for data pertaining to 2024 male excess mortality and monthly deaths by date of death. ISW previously assessed that Rosstat is concealing population data in an attempt to obfuscate Russia’s ongoing demographic problems, and the omission of demographic data in Rosstat's reports likely also aim to obscure the Russian military's high personnel loss rates.

Key Takeaways:
• Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be trying to increase volunteer recruitment among the Russian population, likely due to waning domestic support for the Kremlin's crypto-mobilization efforts.
• Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 5 to 6, including a "double-tap strike" against emergency responders. Recent adaptations to Russian long-range drone technologies and strike tactics suggests that Russian strikes against civilian targets are very likely intentional.
• Russian Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) has stopped reporting on the number of deaths in Russia, likely as part of Kremlin efforts to conceal Russia's losses from the war in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova. Russian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka.

emergency responders during overnight drone strikes against Kharkiv City and after shelling against Kherson City on the morning of July 6.[9] Russia’s recent drone technological adaptations and strike tactics, such as accumulating drones near a target before simultaneously striking, have increased Russia's ability to precisely coordinate strikes and hit intended targets.[10] Russia's recent overnight strikes series have increasingly resulted in civilian casualties, and Russia is very likely intentionally targeting Ukrainian civilians, including with "double tap" strikes likely meant to kill first responders and strikes against military registration and enlistment offices.

 Russian Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) has stopped reporting on the number of deaths in Russia, likely as part of Kremlin efforts to conceal Russia's losses from the war in Ukraine. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on July 5 that Rosstat did not report demographic data in its January to May 2025 “Socioeconomic Situation in Russia” report.[11] Electoral statistics researcher Dmitry Kobak reported in late June 2025 that Rosstat refused to fulfill his request for data pertaining to 2024 male excess mortality and monthly deaths by date of death.[12] ISW previously assessed that Rosstat is concealing population data in an attempt to obfuscate Russia’s ongoing demographic problems, and the omission of demographic data in Rosstat's reports likely also aim to obscure the Russian military's high personnel loss rates.[13]

 Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be trying to increase volunteer recruitment among the Russian population, likely due to waning domestic support for the Kremlin's crypto-mobilization efforts.
• Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 5 to 6, including a "double-tap strike" against emergency responders. Recent adaptations to Russian long-range drone technologies and strike tactics suggests that Russian strikes against civilian targets are very likely intentional.
• Russian Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) has stopped reporting on the number of deaths in Russia, likely as part of Kremlin efforts to conceal Russia's losses from the war in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova. Russian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 5, 2025

Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Pokrovsk and may attempt to advance further toward Dobropillya as part of a mutually reinforcing effort to envelop Pokrovsk and bypass Ukraine's fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast from the west in the coming months. Geolocated footage published on July 4 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Koptieve and Shevchenko Pershe and advanced to southeastern Razine (all northeast of Pokrovsk).[1] Russian forces have recently seized on opportunistic advances northeast of Pokrovsk, following their focus on advances along the Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka T-0504 highway since early 2025.[2] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on June 28 that Russian forces appear to be attacking in the “Dobropillya direction” (northwest of Toretsk and Pokrovsk) and that elements of the Russian 68th Army Corps (AC) (Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 20th and 150th motorized rifle divisions (both of the 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are attacking in the area.[3] ISW previously assessed that the Russian military command may intend to leverage the Russian salient between Pokrovsk and Toretsk to envelop Pokrovsk from the northeast and north or to bypass Ukrainian defenses in Kostyantynivka from the southwest and west.[4]

The Russian units conducting these assaults have been engaged in combat since they redeployed to reinforce the Russian force grouping operating east of Pokrovsk in February and March 2025.[5] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on July 3 that elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC) and 150th Motorized Rifle Division have been operating near Novotoretske (north of Razine) and Novoekonomichne (south of Razine) after seizing Malynivka in mid-June 2025 and recently seizing Koptieve (all northeast of Pokrovsk).[6] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic AC, SMD) are also operating northeast of Pokrovsk.[7] Ukrainian forces have been degrading these Russian units, and it is unclear whether the Russian military command intends to leverage the same units to push further north and west of Razine or if Russia may attempt to reinforce these units with additional redeployments. These Russian units will have to cross the Kazenyi Torets River to advance west of Razine, which may present another obstacle to the Russian advance depending on the river’s water level.

Russian advances west and northwest of Razine most immediately support the envelopment of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad — an operational objective that Russian forces have been pursuing over the last 18 months. ISW forecasted in December 2024 that Russian forces would need to make significant advances in the direction of Rodynske (west of Razine) to envelop Pokrovsk from the northeast, and the Russian forces' recent advances near Razine cohere with this assessment.[8] The commander of a Ukrainian National Guard artillery reconnaissance battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on July 5 that Russian forces are focusing their attacks between Malynivka, Novoolenivka, and Popiv Yar (all northeast of Pokrovsk) in an effort to interdict Ukrainian logistics into Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) and Pokrovsk.[9] The Ukrainian commander noted that Russian forces are constantly conducting assaults with motorcycles and buggies. Russian milbloggers claimed on July 4 and 5 that Russian forces are trying to complicate Ukrainian logistics in the area by damaging a bridge near Shakhove (east of Dobropillya), interdicting Ukrainian forces' ground lines of communication (GLOCs) near Udachne, and along the railway line near Kotlyne.[10]

Russian forces have largely struggled to advance southeast, south, and southwest of Pokrovsk in the face of Ukrainian drones since late 2024 and have essentially held close to the same positions in these areas since January 2025. The Russian military command may be prioritizing advances northeast of Pokrovsk in an effort to establish a stronghold in Rodynske, which could enable Russian forces to either attack Pokrovsk directly or advance toward Novooleksandrivka (northwest of Pokrovsk) with the aim of interdicting the Pokrovsk-Pavlohrad M-30 highway and forcing Ukrainian forces to withdraw from Pokrovsk under the threat of envelopment Russian forces could also advance north of Udachne or Kotlyne (both southwest of Pokrovsk) in order to interdict the M-30 highway if they can overcome Ukrainian defensive positions in the area, which currently seems uncertain.

Further Russian advances toward Dobropillya would indicate that Russian forces are placing a tactical prioritization on advancing west of Ukraine's fortress belt — a series of fortified cities that form the backbone of Ukraine’s defensive positions — and forcing Ukrainian forces to withdraw from the fortress belt under pressure of envelopment rather than conduct a head-on assault against the fortress belt. Russian forces have thus far struggled to break out of Toretsk and make significant advances from Chasiv Yar or north of the Kleban Byk Reservoir (northwest of Toretsk), which has likely complicated the Russian military command's original plan for an operation against Kostyantynivka (northwest of Toretsk) and the wider fortress belt. The Russian military command may be adjusting its plan, and Russian forces may attempt to create a salient in the fields and small settlements between Dobropillya and Kostyantynivka in order to bypass the fortress belt from the west. Russian forces would likely have to cross the Kazenyi Torets River in several places and would have to be able to sufficiently supply troops on the west (right) bank in order to maintain such a salient. Russian forces would likely also have to seize the settlements along the Pokrovsk-Oleksandrivka (north of Dobropillya) line in order to fully interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to the fortress belt. It is unclear whether the Russian Central Grouping of Forces, which is currently in charge of activity in the Pokrovsk direction, is capable of conducting such an operation with the degraded forces currently at its disposal. Russian forces are likely reaching higher levels of exhaustion and degradation after well over a year of intensified offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction. Such an operation would likely be a multi-year effort with significant personnel losses and hard-fought gains, although Russian forces have proven willing to undertake such long-term operations.[11]

Such an operation would be consistent with Russia's recent tactics and operational concepts designed to advance by leveraging smaller partial envelopments to seize territory instead of attempting rapid, deep operational-level penetrations of Ukraine's defense — which Russian forces currently do not have the means to conduct. ISW previously assessed that the Russian military command appears to be developing and disseminating a doctrinal method for advances throughout the theater that aims to leverage creeping partial envelopments of frontline towns and settlements to force Ukrainian withdrawals, based on Russian forces operational pattern demonstrated in its seizures of Avdiivka in February 2024 and Vuhledar in October 2024[12] Russian forces have demonstrated an ability to plan and execute limited campaigns in a designated area of operations to exert and sustain maximum pressure and to mitigate the risk of overextending their forces while forcing Ukrainian forces to withdraw under threat of tactical encirclement. The Russian military command is likely implementing the same doctrinal method used to seize Avdiivka and Vuhledar in its attempts to seize Pokrovsk and possibly Ukraine's fortress belt.

Ukrainian forces continue to demonstrate their ability to conduct long-range strikes that target Russia's defense industrial base (DIB). The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 5 that Ukrainian Forces, including elements of the Unmanned Systems Forces, conducted a strike against the Russian Joint Stock Company VNIIR-Progress Plant in Cheboksary, Chuvashia Republic, on the night of July 4 to 5.[13] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that the plant produces the "Kometa" adaptive antenna arrays, which are used in Shahed drones, Iskander-K cruise missiles, KAB guided bombs, and other high-precision weapons. Geolocated footage published on July 4 shows that a Ukrainian drone struck the VNIIR-Progress Plant.[14] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on July 5 that the Ukrainian drone strike caused a fire at the plant.[15] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian Forces, including elements of the Unmanned Systems Forces, also conducted a strike against the Borisoglebsk Airfield, Voronezh Oblast, and struck a KAB guided glide bomb warehouse and combat training aircraft.[16] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian forces base Su-34 fighter-bombers, Su-35M fighter jets, and Su-30SM fighter jets at the Brisoglebsk Airfield. NASA Fire Information for Resource Management (FIRMS) data for July 5 shows satellite-detected heat anomalies at Borisoglebsk Airfield, including in the central part of the airport and the logistical section.[17]

Ukraine's Western partners continue to allocate aid to Ukraine and collaborate with the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB). Ukraine’s Ministry of Economy announced on July 4 that Ukraine and South Korea launched a new Economic Innovation Partnership Program (EIPP) in which South Korea will allocate $10 million for the implementation of infrastructure projects in Ukraine over the next four years.[18] Ukraine’s Ministry of Economy reported that the initiative includes provisions for strategic consultations, development projects, and feasibility studies aimed at long-term economic cooperation between Ukraine and South Korea in the public and private sectors. Ukraine’s Minister of Strategic Industry Herman Smetanin announced on July 4 that Ukraine signed an agreement with Denmark that will allow Ukrainian defense industrial companies to export production to Denmark, increasing the scale and supply of Ukrainian weapons in a location where Russian forces are unable to strike Ukrainian defense industrial facilities.[19] The Danish Ministry of Defense (MoD) similarly announced on June 29 that Denmark is allocating 67 million euros (roughly $79 million) to accelerate the establishment of Ukrainian defense industrial companies in Denmark.[20]

European intelligence services continue to report that Russia is intensifying its deployment of chemical agents in Ukraine in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to which Russia is a signatory. Dutch Defense Minister Ruben Brekelmans reported on July 4 that Dutch and German intelligence agencies have evidence that Russian forces are frequently employing banned chemical agents in Ukraine.[21] Brekelmans stated that Russian forces are intensifying their use of chemical agents, including using drones to drop choking agents into Ukrainian trenches to force Ukrainian soldiers into the line of fire. The Dutch and German intelligence agencies reported that Russian forces are normalizing and standardizing the use of chemical agents, such as tear gas and chloropicrin, along the frontline and that Russia is investing in chemical weapons research.[22]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Pokrovsk and may attempt to advance further toward Dobropillya as part of a mutually reinforcing effort to envelop Pokrovsk and bypass Ukraine's fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast from the west in the coming months.
• Russian advances west and northwest of Razine most immediately support the envelopment of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad — an operational objective that Russian forces have been pursuing over the last 18 months.
• Further Russian advances toward Dobropillya would indicate that Russian forces are placing a tactical prioritization on advancing west of Ukraine's fortress belt - a series of fortified cities that form the backbone of Ukraine’s defensive positions - and forcing Ukrainian forces to withdraw from the fortress belt under pressure of envelopment rather than conduct a head-on assault against the fortress belt.
• Such an operation would be consistent with Russia's recent tactics and operational concepts designed to advance by leveraging smaller partial envelopments to seize territory instead of attempting rapid, deep operational-level penetrations of Ukraine's defense, which Russian forces currently do not have the means to conduct.
• Ukrainian forces continue to demonstrate their ability to conduct long-range strikes that target Russia's defense industrial base (DIB).
• Ukraine's Western partners to continue to allocate aid to Ukraine and collaborate with the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB).
• European intelligence services continue to report that Russia is intensifying its deployment of chemical agents in Ukraine in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to which Russia is a signatory.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Siversk. Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Siversk, and Pokrovsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 4, 2025

Russian forces conducted the largest combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion on the night of July 3 to 4, primarily targeting Kyiv City. Russian forces have conducted 10 of the largest strikes in the war since January 2025. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 330 Shahed drones and 209 Shahed-type and other decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched one Kh-47M2 "Kinzhal" aeroballistic missile from the airspace over Lipetsk Oblast, six Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Bryansk Oblast, and four Iskander-K cruise missiles from Kursk and Voronezh oblasts. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed two Iskander-K cruise missiles and 268 drones, and that 208 drones were "lost" or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that nine missiles and 63 drones struck eight locations throughout Ukraine and that Kyiv City was the primary target of the strikes. The Ukrainian General Staff and the Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated that the Russian strikes injured at least 20 people in Kyiv City.[2] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that the Russian strikes injured at least 23 people in total.[3] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential and civilian infrastructure in Kirovohrad, Poltava, Odesa, and Kyiv oblasts.[4] Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski confirmed that the Russian strike against Kyiv City damaged a consular building at the Polish Embassy.[5] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha reported that the Russian strike against Odesa City damaged the People's Republic of China (PRC) consulate.[6] Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reported on July 4 that Ukrainian investigators discovered components manufactured at the Chinese Suzhou Ecod Precision Manufacturing Company in Russian Geran-type drones (Russian analogue of the Iranian Shahed drone) recovered in Kyiv City.[7]

US Patriot air defense systems remain critical to Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian ballistic missile strikes. ISW continues to assess that US aid to Ukraine, particularly Patriot air defense systems and interceptors, is critical to Ukraine's ability to protect its defense industrial base (DIB), safeguard the capabilities it obtains from its partners in the face of long-range Russian strikes, and defend its civilian population.[8] US-provided air defense systems are vital to Ukraine's DIB and will support Ukraine's efforts to increase self-sufficiency and protect civilian lives.

US President Donald Trump acknowledged Russian President Vladimir Putin's unwillingness to end the war in Ukraine on July 3 as Kremlin officials continue to demonstrate a critical lack of interest in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine. Trump correctly assessed on July 4 that Putin is “not there” and not “looking to stop” military actions against Ukraine and reiterated his “disappointment” with his July 3 phone call with Putin.[9] Trump stated on July 3 that he did not make any progress “at all” with Putin and that he is “not happy” with Putin.[10] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on July 4 that Putin told Trump that Russia is willing to achieve its objectives for the war against Ukraine through diplomatic negotiations, but will continue military actions, as a diplomatic option that satisfies Russia’s objectives has not yet been presented.[11] Russian forces conducted the largest combined strike of the war thus far on the night of July 3 and 4, following the phone call between Trump and Putin.[12] Putin's and Peskov’s statements indicate that Russia has not abandoned its original objectives for its war against Ukraine.[13] ISW continues to assess that Russia’s terms – the "denazification" and "demilitarization" of Ukraine, which Russia has demanded since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022 – amount to demands for regime change, the installation of a pro-Russian proxy government in Ukraine, and significant limitations on Ukraine's ability to defend itself against future Russian aggression.[14]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and US President Donald Trump discussed diplomatic efforts and joint work supporting Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) during a phone call on July 4. Zelensky stated that he spoke with Trump about increased Russian strikes against Ukraine's civilian population and noted that he and Trump discussed strengthening air defense and increasing protection of Ukrainian airspace.[15] ISW previously reported that Russia is increasingly prioritizing long-range drone and missile production, stockpiling ballistic missiles, and targeting densely populated cities far from the frontline as part of a cognitive warfare effort to weaken Ukrainian resolve and to undermine Western support for Ukraine.[16] Zelensky stated that his and Trump's teams agreed to meet to discuss enhancing Ukraine's air defense and protection. Zelensky stated that he and Trump also discussed prospects for joint defense industrial base (DIB) production and the Ukrainian defense industry’s capabilities. Zelensky stated that he advocated for the development of new projects regarding drones and related technologies, and both leaders discussed mutual purchases and investments.

Ukraine and Russia conducted the eighth prisoner of war (POW) exchange since Ukrainian and Russian officials met in Istanbul and agreed to a series of exchanges on June 2. Ukrainian officials and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed on July 4 that Ukraine and Russia exchanged an unspecified number of severely wounded and sick POWs, POWs under 25 years old, and some civilians.[17] Ukrainian officials reported that Russia captured most of the released Ukrainian POWs and civilians in 2022.[18] Kremlin newswire TASS, citing an unnamed source, claimed that Russia received two civilians from Kursk Oblast in addition to the POWs and noted that each side exchanged the same number of POWs.[19]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted the largest combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion on the night of July 3 to 4, primarily targeting Kyiv City. Russian forces have conducted 10 of the largest strikes in the war since January 2025.
• US Patriot air defense systems remain critical to Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian ballistic missile strikes.
• US President Donald Trump acknowledged Russian President Vladimir Putin's unwillingness to end the war in Ukraine on July 3 as Kremlin officials continue to demonstrate a critical lack of interest in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and US President Donald Trump discussed diplomatic efforts and joint work supporting Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) during a phone call on July 4.
• Ukraine and Russia conducted the eighth prisoner of war (POW) exchange since Ukrainian and Russian officials met in Istanbul and agreed to a series of exchanges on June 2.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Chasiv Yar and Velyka Novosilka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 3, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected US President Donald Trump's call for a quick peace in Ukraine during a phone call with Trump on July 3.[i] Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov claimed on July 3 that Trump once again raised the issue of a quick end to Russia's war in Ukraine and that Putin claimed that Russia continues its efforts for a negotiated end to the war. Ushakov claimed, however, that Putin reiterated that Russia "will achieve its goals" and "eliminat[e] the root causes" that led to the war and that "Russia will not back down from these goals," essentially emphasizing that Russia will continue its war on its own terms. Ushakov claimed that Putin and Trump discussed the possibility of a third round of Ukrainian–Russian negotiations in Istanbul and agreed that peace negotiations will continue in a bilateral format at an unspecified date. Ushakov claimed that Putin and Trump did not discuss the recent US decision to halt military aid shipments to Ukraine but discussed bilateral economic projects, including in the energy and space spheres.

Putin's stated commitment to his goals in Ukraine, including eliminating the so-called "root causes" of the war directly contradicts his claim that Russia supports meaningful negotiations to end the war. Putin and other Kremlin officials have repeatedly referred to the need for any future peace settlement to eliminate the alleged "root causes" of the war to allude to Russia's unwavering demands for regime change in Ukraine, Ukrainian neutrality, and changes to NATO's foundational open-door policy.[ii] ISW continues to assess that Russia remains uninterested in good-faith peace negotiations to end the war. Putin's statement that Russia will not back down from its goals further demonstrates Putin's willingness to prolong the war in Ukraine and achieve his goals through military means should Russia be unable to force Ukraine to capitulate through diplomatic means — in direct contrast to Trump's calls for a speedy end to the war. The Kremlin has continually indicated in recent weeks that there are no plans yet for a third round of bilateral negotiations in Istanbul, so it is unclear if or when bilateral Ukrainian–Russian negotiations will resume.[iii] ISW continues to assess that Russia will likely leverage any future negotiations to try to extract concessions from Ukraine and the United States while Russian forces continue efforts to secure additional gains on the battlefield through creeping and highly attritional advances. Russia previously exploited peace talks with Ukraine in Istanbul to obfuscate its own uninterest in meaningful negotiations, and any future Ukrainian–Russian negotiations on anyone's terms but Kyiv's are very unlikely to bring about Trump's desired expeditious end to the war and just and lasting peace.

Details about the recent US suspension of aid to Ukraine remain unclear. Journalists for National Public Radio (NPR) and the Economist stated on July 2 and 3 that the United States halted aid shipments to Ukraine in Poland that included 30 PAC-3 interceptors for Patriot air defense systems; 8,496 155mm high explosive howitzer munitions; 142 AGM-114 Hellfire air-to-ground missiles; 252 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) rockets; 25 missiles for Stinger man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS); 125 AT-4 grenade launchers; and 92 AIM air-to-air missiles.[iv] The Economist reported on July 3 that the Pentagon turned around planes carrying air defense interceptors and other US military aid to Ukraine on June 30 and July 1, suspending deliveries.[v] US Department of State Spokesperson Tammy Bruce stated on July 3 that Trump has indicated his "remaining commitment" to US provisions of Patriot interceptors to Ukraine.[vi] Bruce stated that the United States "hasn't paused" sending weapons to Ukraine but that the recent suspension is "one aspect, one situation, one event that has been changed." Chief Pentagon Spokesperson Sean Parnell stated on July 2 that the US Department of Defense (DoD) “paused” weapons shipments to Ukraine to conduct a “capability review” to ensure that US military aid aligns with the DoD’s defense priorities while preserving US military readiness.[vii] Parnell stated that DoD recommendations about military aid to Ukraine are consistent with US President Donald Trump’s stated goal of ending the war in Ukraine.

A Ukrainian strike killed the deputy commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy in Kursk Oblast, and an unknown actor may have assassinated a high-ranking Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) official in Moscow City. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) acknowledged on July 3 that Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy Major General Mikhail Gudkov died on July 2 during combat operations in the Kursk Oblast border area.[viii] Gudkov previously served as commander of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), and Russian President Vladimir Putin promoted him to deputy commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy in March 2025.[ix] Primorsky Krai Governor Oleg Kozhemyako reported on July 3 that Captain Second Rank Nariman Shikhaliev died alongside Gudkov.[x] Gudkov's obituary from the "Typhoon" All-Russian Organization of Naval Infantry stated that Ukrainian forces launched a missile strike against the command post of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade near Korenevo, Kursk Oblast, on July 2, killing over 10 servicemembers, including Gudkov and several senior officers.[xi] Ukrainian military observer Yuriy Butusov reported that the strike killed Gudkov's deputy and 20 other Russian servicemembers.[xii] Radio Svoboda stated that "unconfirmed official reports" suggest that a Ukrainian HIMARS strike killed Gudkov.[xiii] Telegram channel Nexta additionally claimed on July 3 that there are unconfirmed reports that Alexei Komkov, head of the FSB's Fifth Directorate, which is officially tasked with overseeing operational information and international relations, died after a car exploded in central Moscow City.[xiv] ISW cannot confirm the death of Komkov or the actor responsible for the reported car explosion in Moscow City.

Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reportedly assassinated the former occupation mayor of Luhansk City. Kremlin newswire TASS reported on July 3 that former occupation mayor of Luhansk City Manolis Pilavov died in an explosion in occupied Luhansk City.[xv] Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported on July 3 that sources stated that the SBU killed Pilavov by detonating an explosive device.[xvi] Pilavov was the occupation mayor of Luhansk City from 2014 to 2023.

Ukraine’s Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine, but the United States remains the only Ukrainian partner that can provide certain critical weapons systems – especially air defenses -- at scale and quickly. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on July 3 that Ukraine signed a memorandum on a long-term strategic partnership with US autonomous system engineering company Swift Beat, agreeing to produce hundreds of thousands of interceptor drones in 2025 that are capable of shooting down Russian Shahed drones and to expand production further in 2026.[xvii] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov also announced on July 1 that Ukraine is launching a joint arms production program with its international Ramstein format partners to produce weapons for the Ukrainian military in Ukraine and abroad.[xviii] Swedish Defense Minister Pål Jonson stated on July 3 that Sweden is allocating an additional 1.5 billion Swedish kroner (roughly $156 million) to purchase over 10 new Archer artillery barrels, augment long-range strike and underwater capabilities, and support unspecified logistical support for Ukraine.[xix] The Latvian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on July 2 that Belgium and Turkey joined the UK- and Latvian-led international drone coalition.[xx] The Latvian MoD also announced on July 1 that it approved the transfer of 42 Patria armored personnel carriers (APCs) and other military equipment to Ukraine.[xxi] UK defense and security enterprise Prevail Partners announced on July 2 that it launched a joint partnership with Ukrainian drone manufacturer Skyeton International to increase production of long-range drones as part of efforts to supply drones to Ukraine and provide the UK with modern military equipment.[xxii] Unspecified German security forces told German media outlet Die Welt on July 1 that Germany signed a contract to finance the production of over 500 Antonov-196 (AN-196) ”Lyutyi” long-range drones for Ukraine.[xxiii] ISW continues to assess that US aid to Ukraine, particularly Patriot air defense systems and interceptors, is critical to Ukraine's ability to protect its defense industrial base (DIB) and safeguard the capabilities it obtains from its partners in the face of long-range Russian strikes.[xxiv] Such US-provided systems are required soh that Ukraine's DIB can grow to be largely self-sufficient and able to sustain Ukraine's materiel requirements with domestic production.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected US President Donald Trump's call for a quick peace in Ukraine during a phone call with Trump on July 3.
• Putin's stated commitment to his goals in Ukraine, including eliminating the so-called "root causes" of the war directly contradicts his claim that Russia supports meaningful negotiations to end the war.
• Details about the recent US suspension of aid to Ukraine remain unclear.
• A Ukrainian strike killed the deputy commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy in Kursk Oblast, and an unknown actor may have assassinated a high-ranking Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) official in Moscow City.
• Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reportedly assassinated the former occupation mayor of Luhansk City.
• Ukraine’s Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine, but the United States remains the only Ukrainian partner that can provide certain critical weapons systems – especially air defenses -- at scale and quickly.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova and Siversk and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, and Velyka Novosilka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 2, 2025

The United States paused weapons supplies to Ukraine, including critical air defense interceptors, artillery shells, missiles, and rockets. Western media outlets reported that sources stated on July 2 that the US pause on weapons supplies to Ukraine will affect dozens of PAC-3 interceptors for Patriot air defense systems, dozens of Stinger man-portable air defense systems, thousands of 155mm high explosive howitzer munitions, over 100 Hellfire air-to-ground missiles, over 250 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) rockets, dozens of grenade launchers, and dozens of AIM air-to-air missiles.[i] Familiar sources told Politico on July 1 that the United States decided in early June 2025 to withhold some of the aid that the United States promised Ukraine under the Biden administration but that the decision is only now taking effect.[ii] Politico reported that the halted weapons come from two different streams of Biden administration-era support — weapons from drawdowns of current US stockpiles that the US Department of Defense (DoD) received money to replenish, and the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, in which the United States funds the purchase of weapons for Ukraine from US defense firms. White House Deputy Press Secretary Anna Kelly stated on July 1 that US authorities made the decision following a DoD review of US military support to states around the world.[iii] Six defense officials, congressional officials, and other sources told NBC that the Pentagon ordered the pause after a review of US munitions stockpiles.[iv] NBC's defense and congressional sources stated that the United States could hold up the weapons flow to Ukraine until the assessment of US stockpiles is complete but that the United States could extend the pause of military assistance to Ukraine even longer if the weapons are in short supply or if the United States needs to supply them to other parts of the world.

The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) stated on July 2 that continued deliveries of previously allocated US defense packages are critically important, particularly in order to strengthen Ukraine's air defense.[v] The Ukrainian MFA emphasized that any delay in supporting Ukraine's defense capabilities will encourage Russia to continue its war — and not seek peace. The Ukrainian MFA stated that US-Ukrainian consultations about defense supplies are ongoing at all levels and that Ukraine will speak with the United States about finding mutually beneficial solutions to strengthen Ukraine's defense capabilities.

The decision to suspend military aid to Ukraine will likely force Ukrainian forces to continue to husband materiel, although the exact timing of the planned deliveries that the United States paused remains unclear at this time. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated that Ukraine had not received any official notifications about any suspension or revision to the delivery schedules of the agreed US military aid prior to the US announcement.[vi] The New York Times (NYT) reported that US officials stated that the United States had not scheduled to ship the affected munitions to Ukraine for several months, but the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported that US weapons shipments already in Poland were halted as of July 1.[vii] A Trump administration official told Politico that the administration had not requested any further aid but that there is enough aid left over from the Biden administration to last Ukraine "several more months."[viii] The deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion told the Washington Post in an article published on July 2, however, that Ukrainian forces already have to concentrate on holding positions and conserving resources rather than advancing.[ix] Ukrainian forces have had to husband critical materiel, including air defense interceptors, GMLRS rockets, and artillery shells, during previous suspensions of US aid. Ukraine's European partners are increasing their efforts to provide Ukraine with military assistance and the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) continues its efforts to become self-sufficient, but only the United States can provide certain weapons systems at scale and quickly.[x] Ukrainian forces very likely will have to conserve materiel again should the United States continue to suspend weapons deliveries.

The suspension of US aid to Ukraine will likely accelerate Russian gains on the battlefield, as previous US aid suspensions have in the past. Delays in US military aid in Fall 2023 and Winter-Spring 2024 set conditions for Russian forces to make more accelerated battlefield gains than Russian forces had previously been able to make.[xi] Russian forces significantly intensified offensive operations near Avdiivka, Donetsk Oblast in mid-January 2024 and concentrated significant manpower and materiel to their effort to seize the settlement in mid-February 2024 amid the protracted debate in the US (from October 2023 until April 2024) about passing supplemental aid for Ukraine. Ukrainian forces also faced significant artillery constraints during the Russian offensive against Avdiivka, allowing Russian forces to attack under less pressure from Ukrainian counterbattery fire. Russian forces sustained a high tempo of offensive operations after seizing Avdiivka in order to push as far west as possible, and Russian forces subsequently launched offensive operations in Spring 2024 intended to seize Pokrovsk when the suspension of US assistance was still greatly constraining Ukrainian materiel supplies.[xii] ISW assesses that Russian forces advanced roughly three kilometers per day between the suspension of US aid to Ukraine on December 6, 2023 and the resumption of aid on April 24, 2024, much of which was in Donetsk Oblast — as compared to the six months prior to the December 2023 aid suspension when Russian forces actually lost a total of roughly 203 square kilometers at a rate of 1.1 square kilometers lost per day (due to Ukraine’s gains during the 2023 counteroffensive, which was enabled by the US and other allies surging military aid to Ukraine).

Russian forces also notably intensified offensive operations in Kursk Oblast following the suspension of US intelligence sharing in early March 2025.[xiii] Russian forces, augmented by North Korean forces, had been trying to push Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast through slow, grinding advances since the start of Ukraine's incursion in August 2024. The Trump administration suspended US intelligence sharing with Ukraine on March 5, and Russian forces intensified offensive operations to expel Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast on March 6 and 7.[xiv] Ukrainian sources reportedly stated at the time that Russian forces started making more rapid advances in Kursk Oblast on March 5 and that the suspension of US intelligence sharing impacted Ukrainian operations in Kursk Oblast the most. Kremlin officials at the time announced their intention to take advantage of the suspension of US military aid and intelligence sharing to "inflict maximum damage" to Ukrainian forces "on the ground."[xv] Russian forces very likely exploited the US suspension of aid and intelligence sharing in March 2025 to accelerate Russia’s ongoing counteroffensive operation in Kursk Oblast. ISW assesses that Russian forces advanced at a rate of about 31 square kilometers per day in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast between the suspension of US intelligence sharing with Ukraine on March 3, 2025 and the resumption of intelligence sharing on March 11, 2025 — as opposed to a rate of advance of about 19 square kilometers per day in the six months prior to the intelligence sharing suspension.

The suspension of US aid to Ukraine will reinforce Russian President Vladimir Putin's theory of victory that posits that Russia can win the war of attrition by making slow, creeping advances and outlasting Western support for Ukraine. Putin articulated a theory of victory in June 2024 — and has emphasized this same theory of victory since — that assumes that Russian forces will be able to continue gradual, creeping advances indefinitely and win a war of attrition against Ukrainian forces.[xvi] Putin's theory assumes that Russia will be able to outlast pledged Western security assistance and that Ukraine will not acquire and sustain the manpower and materiel needed to prevent these gradual Russian gains or to contest the initiative and conduct counteroffensive operations to liberate Ukrainian territory. The latest US suspension of aid will strengthen Putin's belief that time is on Russia's side and his commitment to delaying negotiations toward a peace settlement and protracting the war.

Russia remains unlikely to make operational-level breakthroughs in the near future. Future Russian gains — even relatively accelerated advances following the suspension of US aid — will likely remain gradual and creeping and result in disproportionally high losses as Russian forces still have not restored operational maneuver to the increasingly transparent battlefield. ISW has observed geolocated evidence to assess that Russian forces gained roughly 498 square kilometers in May 2025 and roughly 466 square kilometers in June 2025, and Russian gains in January to April 2025 ranged from roughly 175 to 590 square kilometers per month. These Russian gains are remarkably smaller than the 1,265 square kilometers per day that ISW assesses Russian forces were gaining at the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in March 2022.

Russia appears, however, to be preparing to undertake likely months- and years-long offensive campaigns — demonstrating the Russian military command's acceptance of continued slow, gradual advances and Putin's belief in his theory of victory. The Russian military command has recently prioritized efforts to attack Ukraine's fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast, a campaign that is likely to take Russia years to achieve at Russian forces’ current tempo.[xvii] Russian forces may not be able to achieve these objectives by themselves. CNN reported on July 2 that a Ukrainian intelligence assessment stated that North Korea will likely send an additional 25,000 to 30,000 soldiers to Russia in the coming months and that there is a "great possibility" that the North Korean forces will augment Russian forces in Ukraine, including "during large-scale offensive operations."[xviii]

Kremlin officials are responding to the US military aid suspension by publicly flouting Putin's theory of military victory as successful — in direct opposition to US President Donald Trump's stated goal of bringing Russia to the negotiating table and achieving a lasting and just peace. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on July 2 in response to the suspension of US military aid that the "fewer weapons that are supplied to Ukraine, the closer the end of the [Russian invasion of Ukraine] is."[xix] Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev, who has been heavily involved in diplomatic and rhetorical efforts vis-à-vis Ukraine and the United States, stated that the suspension "raises questions about the West's ability to continue supporting Ukraine."[xx] Russian State Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Zhuravlev suggested that the US military aid suspension will degrade Ukraine's ability to "hold out" against Russian offensive operations and claimed that the United States will not be able to "hide" any future arms deliveries to Ukraine from Russia.[xxi] These Russian statements underscore how the Kremlin perceives Putin's theory of victory as it relates to Western — particularly American — military assistance to Ukraine and flout the Kremlin's goal of coercing the United States and other Western states into ceasing military assistance to Ukraine.[xxii] The Kremlin is capitalizing on the US aid suspension to intensify its messaging that Europe should also cease weapons supplies to Ukraine. Putin had a phone call with French President Emmanuel Macron on July 2, the first Putin-Macron call in nearly three years, and used the call to reiterate boilerplate Kremlin narratives aimed at discouraging further Western military assistance to Ukraine.[xxiii] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova also criticized continued European military assistance to Ukraine.[xxiv] The Kremlin's messaging about the suspension of US military aid to Ukraine is yet another indicator that Russia remains committed to achieving its war goals by force and is uninterested in meaningful peace negotiations to end the war.[xxv] These senior Russian officials’ statements indicate that suspending US military aid to Ukraine very likely will not compel Russia to conduct meaningful negotiations with Ukraine as President Trump desires, but rather embolden Moscow to continue protracting Russia’s war.

The Kremlin is also using the US aid suspension as a basis to continue rhetorical attacks against European defensive efforts that are in line with Trump's initiative for Europe to shoulder more of the burden for collective defense. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko claimed on July 2 that the European Union's (EU) increased defense spending and development of its DIB show that the EU is becoming an “aggressive military bloc” that Russia will have to defend itself against.[xxvi] Grushko claimed that the EU carries out NATO's tasks and that the two organizations are deeply linked. Zakharova also claimed that the EU is turning into a military bloc and is "pumping" Ukraine with weapons.[xxvii] Russian Ambassador to Norway Nikolay Korchunov told the Russian state news agency RIA Novosti in an interview published on June 30 that Norway is trying to benefit from the "militarization" of Europe and is "pumping up" the Ukrainian military.[xxviii] Korchunov claimed that Norway is intensifying NATO military exercises on Norwegian territory near the Russian border and that Norway's militarization will increase tension and escalation risks in the Arctic and destabilize European security. Russian officials continue to mischaracterize increased NATO defense spending that is aimed at deterring war in Europe by building defense capabilities in response to Russia’s ongoing efforts to restructure and expand Russia’s military capabilities.[xxix] The Kremlin's efforts to deter Western military assistance to Ukraine and European rearmament efforts are part of its wider cognitive warfare efforts that aim to shape Western decision-making and erode the West's will to act against Russian interests and resist Russia.[xxx]

The US decision to suspend military aid to Ukraine will particularly degrade Ukraine's ability to defend against Russia's enhanced long-range missile and drone strike capabilities that have inflicted significant civilian casualties — in sharp contrast to President Trump's stated objective of stopping civilian casualties in Ukraine. US provisions of Patriot air defense systems and interceptors have been critical for Ukraine's ability to defend against Russia's missile strikes, particularly those with ballistic missiles.[xxxi] Russia's long-range strikes have increasingly targeted densely populated cities far from the frontline.[xxxii] Russia has recently prioritized expanding its long-range drone and missile production and stockpiling its ballistic missiles, enabling Russia to conduct larger, more effective combined missile and drone strike series against Ukraine.[xxxiii] Russia has notably conducted five of its largest combined strikes against Ukraine throughout the full-scale invasion between March and June 2025 and is launching an increasingly high number of Shahed and decoy drones that overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses, allowing more Russian missiles to hit their targets.[xxxiv] Russia has also recently adapted its strike tactics to inflict maximum damage to civilians, including by deploying cluster munitions with delayed detonations, and Shahed drones equipped with capsules of chemical weapons and conducting "double tap" strikes that maximize casualties of civilian first responders.[xxxv] Russia will very likely continue to increase the size of its combined strikes against Ukraine as Russia remains committed to accelerating its missile and drone production. The US suspension of critical Patriot interceptor supplies to Ukraine will likely impact Ukraine's ability to protect its critical, industrial, and civilian infrastructure. Russian forces exploited pauses in US military aid to Ukraine in late 2023 and early 2024 to conduct large-scale combined strikes designed to exhaust Ukraine's degraded air defense umbrella that was suffering from the lack of Western aid.[xxxvi] A dwindling supply of Patriot interceptors will force Ukraine to continue to make difficult defense prioritization decisions.

Key Takeaways:

• The United States paused weapons supplies to Ukraine, including critical air defense interceptors, artillery shells, missiles, and rockets.
• The decision to suspend military aid to Ukraine will likely force Ukrainian forces to continue to husband materiel, although the exact timing of the planned deliveries that the United States paused remains unclear at this time.
• The suspension of US aid to Ukraine will likely accelerate Russian gains on the battlefield, as previous US aid suspensions have in the past.
• The suspension of US aid to Ukraine will reinforce Russian President Vladimir Putin's theory of victory that posits that Russia can win the war of attrition by making slow, creeping advances and outlasting Western support for Ukraine.
• Kremlin officials are responding to the US military aid suspension by publicly flouting Putin's theory of military victory as successful — in direct opposition to US President Donald Trump's stated goal of bringing Russia to the negotiating table and achieving a lasting and just peace.
• The Kremlin is also using the US aid suspension as a basis to continue rhetorical attacks against European defensive efforts that are in line with Trump's initiative for Europe to shoulder more of the burden for collective defense.
• The US decision to suspend military aid to Ukraine will particularly degrade Ukraine's ability to defend against Russia's enhanced long-range missile and drone strike capabilities that have inflicted significant civilian casualties — in sharp contrast to President Trump's stated objective of stopping civilian casualties in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast. Russian forces advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and near Toretsk and Novopavlivka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 1, 2025

A Russian occupation official claimed that Russian forces seized the entirety of Luhansk Oblast for the second time during Russia's full-scale invasion, but Russian milbloggers denied this claim. Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik claimed on June 30 that Russian forces seized all of Luhansk Oblast.[1] Russian milbloggers denied Pasechnik's claim, however, stating that Russian forces have not cleared Nadiya and Novoyehorivka (both east of Borova).[2] One milblogger claimed that some border areas are still contested "gray zones."[3] Then-Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu claimed on July 3, 2022, that Russian forces captured all of Luhansk Oblast, but Ukrainian forces were subsequently able to regain positions in Luhansk Oblast during the Fall 2022 Kharkiv counteroffensive.[4] Ukrainian forces made advances in Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts during the Fall 2022 counteroffensive and disrupted Russian plans to resume efforts to drive on the northern edge of the "fortress belt" in Donetsk Oblast.[5] Russian forces have since failed to retake significant swathes of territory that Ukrainian forces liberated in the Kharkiv counteroffensive, including Kupyansk, Borova, Izyum, and Lyman. Russian forces intensified offensive operations in the Kupyansk, Borova, and Lyman directions in early 2024 and have continued attempts to advance toward these three settlements over the last one and a half years.[6] ISW assessed in late November 2024 that Russian forces had seized roughly 99 percent of Luhansk Oblast, and Russian forces have struggled in the seven months to seize the last one percent.[7]

The Russian military command is modernizing Russian training grounds to include motorcycle tracks and reportedly intends to purchase up to 200,000 Chinese-made motorcycles for the Russian military. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published footage on June 27 and 28 showing Russian officials visiting the Novosibirsk Higher Military Command School and a new military training ground in Krasnodar Krai and highlighted that Russia is creating motorcycle training programs at these facilities.[8] Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov and Russian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Andrei Mordvichev discussed improving Russia's ability to train forces and generate new officers at the Novosibirsk Higher Military Command School, and Belousov ordered Mordvichev to equip the school with motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) to help train cadets in modern tactics. Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov stated that the Krasnodar Krai training ground has a modern driving range for motorcycles, ATVs, and quad bikes and noted that Russia has modernized over 200 training centers to account for the new tactics that Russian forces are using in Ukraine. The Russian military command has been working to formalize motorcycle tactics and training throughout the Russian military in recent months.[9]

Russian sources continue to speculate on the Russian MoD's ability to formalize and further improve Russian motorcycle usage, however. A Russian Telegram channel claimed on June 13 that Mordvichev pioneered the use of motorcycles and ATVs in late 2024 in order to facilitate further Russian advances toward Pokrovsk.[10] The Telegram channel stated that the Russian force grouping in the Pokrovsk direction developed formal norms for using motorcycles by June 2025 and that the Russian military command is attempting to replicate these norms in other frontline areas. The Telegram channel reiterated that Russian servicemembers receive most of their motorcycles from volunteer organizations or purchase motorcycles independently, but noted that Mordvichev intends for the Russian MoD to centrally provide motorcycles for troops and establish a motorcycle stockpile. The Telegram channel, citing unspecified sources in the Russian military, stated that Russia purchased over 40,000 Chinese-made motorcycles in 2024 and that Russian forces have received 20,000 of these motorcycles. One Russian military source told the channel that the Russian MoD intends to purchase 120,000 motorcycles, 30,000 ATVs, and 12,000 buggies by the end of 2025. Another source in the Russian MoD stated that the MoD intends to purchase up to 200,000 motorcycles and 60,000 other types of light vehicles — likely in 2025. The Telegram channel stated that Mordvichev also intends to hire a group of instructors to teach troops how to best operate motorcycles and that some of these instructors may be former Wagner Group members.

A Russian milblogger and former Storm Z instructor complained on June 30 that Russian motorcycles and ATVs are vulnerable to Ukrainian first-person view (FPV) drone strikes and that Russian motorcycle assaults result in higher killed-in-action (KIA) to wounded-in-action (WIA) ratios, however.[11] The milblogger noted that motorcycle assaults could be more successful should Russian forces use motorcycles in tandem with significant air, drone, and electronic warfare (EW) support. Motorcycle usage has allowed Russian forces to marginally improve their ability to dodge Ukrainian drones in contested "gray zones" along the frontline, but Russia's rate of advance has yet to increase beyond a foot pace despite efforts to integrate faster-moving vehicles into assault tactics.

Ukrainian forces continue to strike defense industrial enterprises in Russia's rear. Sources within Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne on July 1 that SBU drones struck the “Kupol” Electromechanical Plant in Izhevsk, Republic of Udmurtia.[12] The SBU sources reported that the drones traveled 1,300 kilometers to the target and that at least two drones struck two factory buildings, causing a fire. The SBU sources reported that the plant produces Tor and Osa air defense systems and Garpiya long-range strike drones. Geolocated footage published on July 1 shows a drone striking the plant, causing an explosion.[13] Republic of Udmurtia Head Alexander Brechalov acknowledged on July 1 that Ukrainian drones struck an enterprise in Izhevsk, starting a fire.[14] Russian milbloggers largely responded to the strike by continuing to call for Russian authorities to strengthen air defenses to protect the defense industrial base in the Russian rear.[15]

 The Ukrainian military command continues to transition to a corps structure and improve its training system. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on July 1 that the Ukrainian command will assign training battalions to the newly created army corps and that the training battalions will operate as part of unit training centers.[16] Syrskyi announced that Deputy Chief of Staff of the Ukrainian General Staff Major General Ihor Skybyuk will oversee the training. Syrskyi announced a prohibition on accumulations of Ukrainian forces and means and tent camps, likely in response to recent Russian strikes against Ukrainian concentrations in the Ukrainian rear.[17] Syrskyi stated that Ukrainian authorities are building structures to protect training areas from strikes. Syrskyi noted that Ukrainian forces will undergo more training to counter Russian strike drones.

 Russian-Azerbaijani relations continue to deteriorate over a number of smaller-scale incidents in recent days, inflaming unresolved disputes over the December 2024 Russian shoot down of an Azerbaijan Airlines plane. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) protested on July 1 against Azerbaijan's "unfriendly actions" that the Russian MFA claimed are "deliberate" steps to dismantle bilateral relations.[18] The Russian MFA claimed that the recent detention of ethnic Azerbaijanis in Yekaterinburg was lawful and that Baku's accusations against Russian law enforcement agencies are an interference in Russia's internal affairs. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov accused Baku of taking actions that are "not in line" with the "spirit and character" of Russian-Azerbaijani relations.[19] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev spoke on the phone on July 1 and discussed the detentions in Yekaterinburg.[20] Russian milbloggers largely criticized Azerbaijan for deliberately trying to undermine its relationship with Russia and claimed that Azerbaijani authorities and media are trying to play up the detention of ethnic Azerbaijanis in Russia to galvanize Azerbaijani society against Russia.[21] Azerbaijani-Russian relations deteriorated in late 2024 when Russia refused to take full responsibility for the December 25, 2024, downing of an Azerbaijan Airlines passenger plane, likely shot in mid-air by Russian air defense before crashing in Kazakhstan.[22]

 An investigation by the Center for Human Rights in Armed Conflict found that Russian forces were responsible for a 2022 strike that killed Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in occupied Donetsk Oblast, as ISW assessed at the time. The Center for Human Rights in Armed Conflict reported on June 26 that Russian forces conducted the July 28, 2022, strike against a barracks at the Volnovaska Penal Colony near Olenivka, Donetsk Oblast that killed Ukrainian POWs.[23] The Center for Human Rights in Armed Conflict reported that available evidence disproves the Russian claim that Ukrainian forces struck the barracks with HIMARS rockets. The report found that Lyubivka (roughly four kilometers east of Olenivka) was the likely launch site of the strike. The Center for Human Rights in Armed Conflict reported that the Russian military — likely a group affiliated with the Russian General Staff — planned and organized the strike and likely coordinated with the Federal Service in Executing Punishments (FSIN). ISW assessed at the time of the strike that Russian forces were responsible for the killing of 53 Ukrainian POWs at the Russian-controlled prison.[24]

 Key Takeaways:

• A Russian occupation official claimed that Russian forces seized the entirety of Luhansk Oblast for the second time during Russia's full-scale invasion, but Russian milbloggers denied this claim.
• The Russian military command is modernizing Russian training grounds to include motorcycle tracks and reportedly intends to purchase up to 200,000 Chinese-made motorcycles for the Russian military.
• Ukrainian forces continue to strike defense industrial enterprises in Russia's rear.
• The Ukrainian military command continues to transition to a corps structure and improve its training system.
• Russian-Azerbaijani relations continue to deteriorate over a number of smaller-scale incidents in recent days, inflaming unresolved disputes over the December 2024 Russian shoot down of an Azerbaijan Airlines plane.
• An investigation by the Center for Human Rights in Armed Conflict found that Russian forces were responsible for a 2022 strike that killed Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in occupied Donetsk Oblast, as ISW assessed at the time.
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces advanced near Toretsk and Novopavlivka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 30, 2025

High-ranking Kremlin statements, including from Russian President Vladimir Putin, continue to demonstrate Russia's wider territorial ambitions in Ukraine beyond Crimea and the four oblasts that Russia has illegally annexed. Russian President Vladimir Putin held a meeting on June 30 on the socioeconomic development of occupied Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts during which he frequently referred to occupied Ukraine as “Donbas and Novorossiya.”[1] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded on June 30 to a June 27 statement by Odesa City Mayor Gennadiy Trukhanov that Odesa City is not a “Russian” city and has its own history, claiming that the history of Odesa City is "inextricably linked" with Russia.[2] Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky claimed on June 30 that Russians and Ukrainians are "one people" with a "historical homeland" and referenced the "ancient Russian lands on both sides of the Dnipro (River), Novorossiya, and Crimea."[3]

Putin's, Peskov's, and Medinsky's June 30 statements are only the latest statements from high-ranking Kremlin officials indicating the extent of Russia's territorial ambitions. Putin reiterated at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) on June 20 that he considers the Russian and Ukrainian people to be "one people in reality" and that "Ukraine is [Russia's]."[4] Kremlin officials have routinely labelled Odesa City as a "Russian" city, including Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov most recently on June 9.[5] Kremlin officials have also repeatedly referenced "Novorossiya," which Russian officials have defined as all of eastern and southern Ukraine.[6] Medinsky's reference to the "ancient Russian" lands on "both sides of the Dnipro" also coheres with Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo's April 2025 call for Russia to completely control the areas of the Dnipro River that pass through Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.[7] Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Colonel Pavlo Palisa stated in early June 2025 that Russia intends to occupy the entirety of Ukraine on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River and seize Odesa Oblast by the end of 2026.[8] Putin and other Kremlin officials have consistently indicated that they do not believe that Ukraine is an independent state with its own history, identity, and culture separate from Russia.[9] Russian officials' ongoing commitment to these narratives demonstrates the Kremlin's continued objective of destroying the Ukrainian state and subjugating the Ukrainian people.

The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN OHCHR) issued its December 2024-May 2025 report detailing Ukrainian civilian casualties, systemic Russian mistreatment of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs), and limited Ukrainian mistreatment of Russian POWs. The UN OHCHR reported that 968 Ukrainian civilians died and 4,807 sustained injuries from conflict-related violence from December 1, 2024, to May 31, 2025 — a 37 percent increase compared to the same time period last year.[10] The UN OHCHR assessed that the vast majority of these civilian casualties resulted from Russian military operations to seize territory along the front, the use of explosives in urban areas, and the increased use of short-range combat drones. The UN OHCHR reported that it had recorded credible allegations of the execution of 106 Ukrainian POWs by Russian forces between late August 2024 and May 2025, with 35 of these executions likely occurring between December 2024 and May 2025. The report stated that most of these executions occurred in areas where Russian forces were advancing in Donetsk and Kursk oblasts. The UN OHCHR reported that interviews with Ukrainian POWs released from Russian captivity confirmed Russia's "widespread and systematic" practices of torture. The report states that the UN verified the execution of one Russian soldier rendered hors de combat by a Ukrainian soldier in late 2024. The UN OHCHR stated that it has verified the execution of 26 persons hors de combat, including Russian POWs, by Ukrainian forces since February 2022, but that all but one of these executions occurred in 2022 or early 2023. The UN OHCHR stated that interviewed POWs held in Ukrainian captivity reported torture and ill-treatment, but noted that most of these acts occurred in transit places before arrival at official internment locations. Russian state media largely misrepresented the UN OHCHR report by ignoring assessments about Russia's widespread execution and systemic mistreatment of Ukrainian POWs and reporting only on the assessments about Ukrainian mistreatment of Russian POWs.[11] Russian state media similarly misrepresented the UN OHCHR's previous reports.[12]

The Kremlin is poised to launch a new "national messenger" application affiliated with Kremlin-controlled social media site VKontakte (VK) as part of ongoing efforts to censor Russian citizens and isolate them from the global internet. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on June 24 approving the creation of a national messenger application that will allow Russian citizens to virtually access government services and documents.[13] The decree orders that the application combine the functions of a social media messenger application with government services and documents and that it be available by Fall 2025. Russian citizens would not be able to have an anonymous social media presence on this national messenger application. VK announced its "Max" digital platform and messenger application in March 2025, and Russian officials have acknowledged that Max could serve as the basis for the new "national messenger" application.[14] The Kremlin has reportedly been planning to partner with VK to launch a national messenger since at least Fall 2024.[15] A source familiar with VK's plans told Russian news organization Vedomosti in March 2025 that Max could become an analogue to the Chinese WeChat application.[16] A Max representative told Vedomosti on June 30 that one million users have registered with the beta-version of Max over the last "several weeks."[17] Russian State Duma Information Technology (IT) Committee First Deputy Chairperson Anton Gorelkin claimed on June 5 that Russia will not ban Telegram in connection with the launch of Max, although the Kremlin may attempt to ban Telegram and other social media connected to the Western world in the medium- to long-term if the roll out of the new national messenger application is successful.[18]

Azerbaijani authorities raided the offices of Russian state-owned propaganda outlet Sputnik in Baku as Russian-Azerbaijani relations have deteriorated recently after a raid against ethnic Azerbaijanis in Russia. Azerbaijani outlet Qafqazinfo reported on June 30, citing the Azerbaijani Ministry of Internal Affairs, that local police raided the office of Sputnik in Baku.[19] Local Azerbaijani outlets claimed that Azerbaijani authorities detained two Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) agents during the raid on Sputnik's Baku office.[20] The Azerbaijani Ministry of Internal Affairs stated that Sputnik had continued working in Azerbaijan via "illegal financing" despite the revocation of its official accreditation in February 2025.[21]  The raid on the Sputnik office in Baku comes after a recent raid by Russian security forces in Yekaterinburg that resulted in the detention of nine Azerbaijani citizens accused of contract killings in the early 2000s and left two Azerbaijanis dead.[22] The Azerbaijani Ministry of Culture cancelled all cultural events that Russia organized in Azerbaijan, and Azerbaijani officials cancelled planned trips to Moscow in response to the Yekaterinburg raid.[23] Continued Azerbaijani restraints on Russian state media or cultural events in Azerbaijan would likely further deteriorate bilateral relations and undermine Russia's influence in the south Caucasus, particularly as the Kremlin uses its media presence and cultural soft power abroad to further its objectives in the former Soviet space.[24]

Key Takeaways:

• High-ranking Kremlin statements, including from Russian President Vladimir Putin, continue to demonstrate Russia's wider territorial ambitions in Ukraine beyond Crimea and the four oblasts that Russia has illegally annexed.
• The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN OHCHR) issued its December 2024-May 2025 report detailing Ukrainian civilian casualties, systemic Russian mistreatment of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs), and limited Ukrainian mistreatment of Russian POWs.
• The Kremlin is poised to launch a new "national messenger" application affiliated with Kremlin-controlled social media site VKontakte (VK) as part of ongoing efforts to censor Russian citizens and isolate them from the global internet.
• Azerbaijani authorities raided the offices of Russian state-owned propaganda outlet Sputnik in Baku as Russian-Azerbaijani relations have deteriorated recently after a raid against ethnic Azerbaijanis in Russia.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk and Novopavlivka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 29, 2025

Russia conducted its largest combined strike series of the war on the night of June 28 to 29 by launching over 500 missiles and drones against Ukraine. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian launched a total of 537 strike vehicles, including 447 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[i] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched four Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles from the airspace above Tambov Oblast; seven Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Voronezh Oblast; 41 Kh-101/Iskander-K cruise missiles from Saratov, Kursk, and Bryansk oblasts; five Kalibr cruise missiles from the Black Sea; and three S-300 air defense missiles from Kursk Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 221 drones, one Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missile, 33 Kh-101/Iskander-K cruise missiles, and four Kalibr cruise missiles and that 225 drones and one Kh-101/Iskander-K cruise missile were "lost in location" or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck civilian infrastructure, including residences and educational facilities, in Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk, Cherkasy, and Mykolaiv oblasts and railway and industrial infrastructure in Lviv and Poltava oblasts.[ii] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky acknowledged that a Ukrainian F-16 fighter pilot died while repelling the strikes.[iii] Russia is continuing to use increasingly large numbers of drones in its overnight strike packages in order to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and enable subsequent cruise and ballistic missile strikes.[iv] The increases in Russia's strike packages in recent weeks are largely due to Russia's efforts to scale up its defense industrial production, particularly of Shahed and decoy drones and ballistic missiles.[v]

[strikes graphic]

Ukrainian forces were notably only able to shoot down one of the seven Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles and did not shoot down any of the four Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles during the June 28 to 29 strike series. Zelensky called on Ukraine to strengthen its air defenses and reiterated that Ukraine is ready to buy US air defense systems.[vi] US President Donald Trump recently spoke with Zelensky about possible US sales of Patriot air defense systems on June 25.[vii] Patriot systems are vital to Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian ballistic missile strikes, especially as Russia is reportedly increasing its production and stockpile of ballistic missile production capacity to enable larger and more frequent ballistic missile strikes against Ukraine.[viii]

Russia appears to be increasingly striking civilian areas in its large-scale strike packages. Kyiv City Military Administration Head Timur Tkachenko stated that Russia has changed its strike tactics in order to inflict as much damage to civilian areas as possible.[ix] Tkachenko noted that Russian missile and drone strikes heavily targeted Kyiv City three times in June 2025, launching a total of 285 drones and 65 missiles against the capital so far in June 2025 – a sharp increase from the 35 drones and one ballistic missile that Russian forces launched against Kyiv City in January 2025. Tkachenko noted that 42 civilians, including a child, have died due to Russian strikes against the capital since the start of June 2025 and that 234 people, including 11 children, have sustained injuries. Tkachenko reported that Russian forces are conducting "double tap" strikes against emergency responders and using cluster munitions with delayed detonations that threaten both civilians and rescue workers. ISW has observed Russian officials and milbloggers respond to recent large-scale and deadly Russian strikes against Kyiv City by calling on Russia to intensify its strikes.[x]

Satellite imagery and Russian government announcements indicate that Russia is trying to increase its aircraft production in the medium- to long-term. Finnish outlet Yle reported on June 28 that satellite imagery collected between mid-2024 and May 2025 shows that Russia has constructed or expanded at least five buildings at the Kazan Aviation Plant by 19,000 square meters.[xi] Yle reported that the plant produces and modernizes Russian strategic Tupolev aircraft, such as the Tu-160M, Tu-160M2, and Tu-22M3, as well as helicopters. Yle reported that Russian authorities plan to continue new construction until the end of 2026 to increase the plant's production capabilities. The Russian state United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) press service announced in January 2025 that officials had already built a new final assembly hall, upgraded manufacturing technology, and procured new equipment for the plant, such as computer numerical control machine tools, welding robots, and measurement and control systems.[xii] UAC reported that Russia intends for the Kazan plant to produce four Tu-214 aircraft by 2025, seven by 2026, 17 by 2027, and 28 annually by 2028. Russian regional outlet Evening Kazan reported in February 2025 that Russian officials plan to spend as much as 90 billion rubles (about $1.2 billion) on the plant's modernization.[xiii] Yle reported that the plant is struggling to keep pace with the modernization and increased aircraft production plans due to sanctions and Russia's ongoing labor shortages.[xiv] Yle reported that the plant only delivered two Tu-160M2s and two Tu-160Ms in 2024. The plant’s current annual production rate remains unclear, however, as the Tupolevs that the plant delivered in 2024 have likely been under construction for some time. Sanctions and parts and labor shortages will likely continue to slow Russia's aircraft production, even as Russia works to expand physical production capabilities.

Russia is also reportedly expanding its production of Sukhoi aircraft. UAC Head Vadim Badekha announced on June 25 that Russia intends to increase the production effectiveness of Sukhoi aircraft by 30 percent by 2030.[xv] Badekha stated that Russia is working to increase its Sukhoi production volumes beyond its 2024 production rate. Ukrainian military observer Oleksandr Kovalenko stated in May 2025 that Russia can currently produce a Sukhoi aircraft in one to two months.[xvi] ISW previously reported that UAC intends to lay off 1,500 managerial staff in Moscow and assessed that the Kremlin may be deprioritizing the aircraft industry to conserve funds and materials for drone and weapons production.[xvii] Badekha's June 25 statement and Yel's satellite imagery assessment indicate that Russia is likely attempting to balance allocating significant resources to drone production with the continued need to produce traditional systems.

Key Takeaways:

• Russia conducted its largest combined strike series of the war on the night of June 28 to 29 by launching over 500 missiles and drones against Ukraine.
• Russia appears to be increasingly striking civilian areas in its large-scale strike packages.
• Satellite imagery and Russian government announcements indicate that Russia is trying to increase its aircraft production in the medium- to long-term.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Chasiv Yar.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 28, 2025

Ukrainian forces conducted a series of strikes against Russian military infrastructure and defense industrial base (DIB) facilities from June 26 to 28. Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reported on June 28 that the SBU conducted a drone strike that destroyed a Russian Pantsir-S1 air defense system and three combat helicopters — Mi-8, Mi-26, and Mi-28 — at the Kirovske Air Base in occupied Crimea on the night of June 27 and 28.[i] The SBU noted that the strike also caused a secondary explosion at the airfield. A local Crimean source reported on June 28 that the strike caused five to six explosions and likely damaged an ammunition depot, warehouses, and air defense facilities, and set at least one combat helicopter on fire.[ii] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 27 that Ukrainian Special Forces and the SBU struck the Marinovka Air Base in Volgograd Oblast on the night of June 26 and 27 and damaged four Su-34 aircraft and a technical maintenance facility.[iii] The Ukrainian General Staff is conducting ongoing battle damage assessments (BDA). An unspecified intelligence source told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne on June 28 that Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) conducted several drone strikes targeting facilities linked to the 120th arsenal of the Russian General Staff's Main Directorate (GRU) in Bryansk Oblast and that Ukrainian authorities are conducting BDA.[iv] An unspecified intelligence source reported on June 26 that the GUR conducted a drone strike against a fuel and lubricants depot located at the GRU's 1061st MTZ Center in Bryansk Oblast on the night of June 26 and 27.[v] Residents reported heavy gunfire and a series of explosions and noted that the oil depot was on fire.[vi]

Russia’s deployment of an experimental Grom-1 missile-bomb and likely efforts to increase its Shahed production are part of ongoing efforts to adapt Russian strike packages against Ukraine to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and cause maximum damage. Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Military Administration Head Serhiy Lysak reported on June 28 that Ukrainian air defenses downed a Russian Grom-1 hybrid missile-bomb on the outskirts of Dnipro City.[vii] A local Ukrainian air defender in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne on June 28 that Russian forces may have deployed an experimental KAB guided glide bomb as part of ongoing efforts to increase the range of KAB bombs.[viii] The local source stated that Russia has long used jet engines on the bomb to increase its range and likely used a bomb with a lighter warhead against Dnipro City to decrease the weight and increase the range of the bomb. The source also stated that Russian forces may have launched the bomb from a plane as close to Dnipro City as possible. Ukrainian political scientist and design engineer at satellite and rocket design enterprise Pivdnenne Design Office Oleksandr Kochetkov told Suspilne on June 28 that Russia created the Grom-1 as part of an effort to increase the range and accuracy of KAB bombs in order to preserve Russian aircraft that launch the bombs.[ix] Kochetkov stated that Grom-1 is a hybrid of a glide bomb and the Kh-38 air-to-air missile and uses the Kh-38 missile’s engine, which gives the bomb a range of 100 to 150 kilometers. Kochetkov noted that Russian forces used the Grom-1 possibly for the first time in August 2024 during a strike against Kostyantynivka, Donetsk Oblast, and that Russia is not yet mass producing Grom-1 missile-bombs.

Ukrainian outlet New Voice assessed on June 27 that satellite imagery from early October 2024 and June 2025 shows that Russia is expanding its Shahed factory in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) near Yelabuga, Republic of Tatarstan.[x] The imagery shows that Russia has built four new sites at the Alabuga SEZ spanning about 163 hectares between October 2024 and June 2025, and that another 30-hectare site is currently under construction. New Voice reported that the new construction includes dormitories for factory workers and that Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) previously assessed in June 2025 that laborers are Russia's main need to increase its drone production. New Voice noted that the GUR reported on June 21 that Russia produces up to 170 Shahed and decoy drones daily and that production rates may increase to 190 drones per day by the end of 2025. Japanese outlet NHK reported on June 19, citing unspecified Western and Russian diplomatic sources, that North Korea is “considering” sending 25,000 workers to drone production facilities at the Alabuga SEZ, and dormitory construction may be related to this possible influx of workers in the future.[xi]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces conducted a series of strikes against Russian military infrastructure and defense industrial base (DIB) facilities from June 26 to 28.
• Russia’s deployment of an experimental Grom-1 missile-bomb and likely efforts to increase its Shahed production are part of ongoing efforts to adapt Russian strike packages against Ukraine to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and cause maximum damage.
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Lyman. Russian forces advanced near Novopavlivka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 27, 2025

The Kremlin continues to downplay the social and economic costs of Russia's war in Ukraine and inflated military spending. Russian President Vladimir Putin told journalists on June 27, following the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) summit in Minsk, that sanctions cannot hurt Russia’s economy and that Russia's economic indicators are “satisfactory.”[1] Putin acknowledged that Russia’s economy is still contending with high inflation and that Russia’s economic growth in 2025 will be “much more modest to combat inflation.” Putin also claimed that Russia’s military budget is currently 6.3 percent of its GDP, or 13.5 trillion rubles (roughly $172 billion), and that Russia plans to steadily decrease defense spending beginning in 2026. Russia notably increased its defense budget by 25 percent between the 2024 and 2025 federal budgets and has been increasing its investments in Russia's defense industry throughout 2025.[2]

Putin’s statements likely seek to portray the Russian government as committed to social and civilian expenditures and to downplay recent indicators of the societal and economic toll of Russia’s war against Ukraine and corresponding prioritization of military-industrial sector investment. Russian officials previously claimed that the 2025-2027 federal budgets would prioritize civilian and social sector investments, despite the September 2024 draft budgets indicating Russia will spend roughly 41 percent of its annual expenditures in 2025 on national security and defense.[3] The Russian Finance Ministry more than tripled its budget deficit target for 2025 in May – from 0.5 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to 1.7 percent of GDP – after several months of staggeringly low oil and gas profits.[4] Russian Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina notably stated at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) on June 19 that Russia has exhausted many of its “free resources“ since the start of Russia‘s full-scale war against Ukraine, including Russia’s workforce, production and import substitution capacities, and reserves of the National Welfare Fund and Russia’s banking sector.[5] Russia’s military force generation strategy currently hinges on large recruitment and pension payouts, and it remains unclear how the Kremlin intends to fund these payments in the medium- to long-term, as Russia reportedly depleted the entire 2025 federal recruitment budget fund between January and March 2025.[6] Russia is also making significant financial investments in its domestic drone production capacity and committed 243 billion rubles (about $3 billion) to Russian drone companies between 2023 and 2024.[7] Any sharp decrease in Russia's defense spending will likely depress the Russian economy in the medium term, as Russia’s defense industrial base now accounts for a significant portion of overall Russian domestic production.

Putin also reiterated Kremlin narratives aimed at discrediting Ukraine and blaming the West and NATO for his decision to invade Ukraine. Putin claimed that Russia has agreed to conduct a third round of negotiations, is ready to meet with Ukraine in Istanbul, and has demonstrated its willingness to negotiate through prisoner of war (POW) and killed-in-action (KIA) exchanges.[8] Putin claimed that Ukraine is refusing to accept the bodies of some deceased servicemembers, an unsubstantiated claim that is part of an ongoing Russian information campaign depicting Ukraine as spoiling POW exchanges and KIA repatriations in order to provoke discontent and demoralize Ukrainian society and to discredit the Ukrainian government.[9] Putin reiterated Russia's long-term claim that NATO promised Russia it would never expand east and claimed that Russia was "crudely deceived."[10] Putin claimed that Western countries in opposition to Russia will "soon die" themselves. Putin also reiterated that Russia will only conclude its war against Ukraine on Russia’s terms and claimed that Russian defense spending is designed to achieve this goal. ISW has previously noted that Russia’s terms – the "denazification" and "demilitarization" of Ukraine, which Russia has demanded since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022 – amount to demands for regime change, the installation of a pro-Russian proxy government in Ukraine, and significant limitations on Ukraine's ability to defend itself against future Russian aggression.[11]

Open-source data suggests that Russia is increasingly investing in its defense industry and expanding its drone, infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), and aircraft production and shipbuilding capabilities – several of the key platforms that Russia would likely rely on in a future war with NATO. Data from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)-affiliated Center of Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-Term Forecasting published on June 26 indicates that Russia increased its industrial production by 2.6 percent between April and May 2025 and that the majority of this increase is due to a "sharp" increase in Russia's defense industrial output.[12] The center reported that Russia's monthly aircraft production rate increased by 16.9 percent in May 2025 compared to April 2025 and is 1.6 times greater than Russia's 2024 monthly production rates. The center reported that Russia increased its naval and aircraft production capacity by 16 percent between February and May 2025. The center's data suggests that Russia is attempting to expand its shipbuilding and aircraft production capacity, which are medium- to long-term efforts and likely part of Russia's ongoing force restructuring and regeneration efforts in preparation for a longer-term conflict with NATO.

Satellite imagery of select armored vehicle repair plants in Russia provides further evidence that Russia is increasing its ability to produce IFVs. A social media source tracking equipment at Russian military depots and repair facilities via satellite imagery reported on June 26 that Russia is now able to refurbish and produce more BMPs than before an unspecified time and that Russia's decreased use of armored vehicles and tanks since Winter 2024-2025 is allowing Russia to stockpile IFVs.[13] The source noted that the Kurganmashzavod remains the sole publicly known Russian facility capable of producing Soviet-era BMP-3 IFVs. The source stated that satellite imagery indicates that some Russian armor repair plants appear to have used most of their Soviet IFV stocks, although at least one production plant in Rubtsovsk, Altai Krai, appears to have dramatically improved its modernization capabilities. It remains unclear whether Russia is aiming to stockpile materiel in preparation for a larger offensive operation against Ukraine in the near to medium term or to reconstitute the Russian military in preparation for broader future conflict with NATO. Additional open-source intelligence indicates that Russia is successfully increasing its T-90M tank production capabilities, further underscoring Russia's ongoing investment in long-term tank and armored vehicle production capacity.[14]

Russia's ongoing efforts to expand drone production are having a more immediate impact on the frontline in Ukraine, although Russia will continue to benefit from enhanced drone production capabilities during any future conflict. Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov visited various Russian military industrial facilities in Novgorod Oblast on June 27, including a fiber-optic drone production site that produced Russia's first model of fiber-optic "Prince Vandal Novgorodsky" drones[15] The Russian government's press release of the visit reported that Russia is now capable of domestically producing hundreds of thousands of fiber-optic drones per month and fully satisfying the needs of the Russian Armed Forces. Manturov also visited a series of other defense companies in Novgorod Oblast, including companies that specialize in electronic components, and inspected the Intelligent Electronics-Valdai Innovative Scientific and Technological Center's new semiconductor materials science laboratory.[16] Manturov instructed the Ministry of Industry and Trade to examine the possibility of recapitalizing Novgorod Oblast's industrial development fund to support the production of high-tech products. ISW previously noted that Russian fiber optic production has allowed Russian forces to impose new battlefield dilemmas on Ukrainian forces starting in mid-2024 because these drones were resistant to electronic warfare (EW) interference, enable precision strikes on armored equipment, and are scalable due to their simplicity.[17]

Russian forces continue to implement tactical innovations that correspond with technological weapons system advancements. A Russian milblogger claimed on June 27 that Russian forces are increasingly utilizing Geran 2 and 3 drones – Russian analogues of the Iranian origin Shahed-136 – over guided glide bombs for short- to mid-range frontline strikes.[18] The milblogger noted that Russian forces began reprioritizing the use of Geran drones last winter when Russia began mass producing modernized Geran 2 drones with improved speed, range, and carrying capacities, and claimed that Russian forces are using these drones to target Ukrainian storage areas, command posts, and strongholds on the frontline and in the near rear. The milblogger noted that elements of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army [CAA] (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) have pioneered mass frontline use of Geran drones and that Russia's Central Grouping of Forces, operating largely in the Pokrovsk and Novopavlivka directions, will reportedly soon adopt the use of Geran 2 drones once Russian manufacturers further increase production rates. The milblogger assessed that Russian forces may be able to replace 500- and 1000-kilogram KAB glide bombs with Geran 3 drones if Russian developers are willing to compromise on the drone's range to account for an increased payload. The Russian milblogger’s analysis largely coheres with ISW's observations that Russian forces are increasingly using Shahed-like drones to strike Ukrainian targets along the frontline.[19] Russia's defense industrial base has thus far successfully increased Geran drone production rates and improved the Geran drone's precision and operability, which have enabled Russian forces to more readily deploy such drones along the frontline.[20]

Russia continues to use chemical weapons against Ukrainian forces and civilians in direct violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), of which Russia is a signatory. The Ukrainian Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security reported on June 27 that Ukrainian forces recorded 888 cases of Russian forces using chemical weapons in May 2025, including in grenades.[21] The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) published a report on June 26 confirming that environmental sample testing indicates that Russian forces used a first-person view (FPV) drone equipped with grenades containing chlorobenzalmalonodinitrile (CS) gas, a riot control agent (RCA) banned in modern warfare under the CWC, against Ukrainian forces near the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative boundary in June 2025.[22]

 Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin continues to downplay the social and economic costs of Russia's war in Ukraine and inflated military spending.
• Putin’s statements likely seek to portray the Russian government as committed to social and civilian expenditures and to downplay recent indicators of the societal and economic toll of Russia’s war against Ukraine and corresponding prioritization of military-industrial sector investment.
• Putin also reiterated Kremlin narratives aimed at discrediting Ukraine and blaming the West and NATO for his decision to invade Ukraine.
• Open-source data suggests that Russia is increasingly investing in its defense industry and expanding its drone, infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), and aircraft production and shipbuilding capabilities – several of the key platforms that Russia would likely rely on in a future war with NATO.
• Russia's ongoing efforts to expand drone production are having a more immediate impact on the frontline in Ukraine, although Russia will continue to benefit from enhanced drone production capabilities during any future conflict.
• Russian forces continue to implement tactical innovations that correspond with technological weapons system advancements.
• Russia continues to use chemical weapons against Ukrainian forces and civilians in direct violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), of which Russia is a signatory.
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Lyman. Russian forces advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast and near Kupyansk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 26, 2025

 South Korean intelligence suggests that North Korea may deploy North Korean troops to Ukrainian territory, which would represent a significant battlefield inflection. Reuters, citing a South Korean lawmaker privy to intelligence from South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS), reported on June 26 that North Korea may deploy an unspecified number of additional North Korean forces to Russia to fight against Ukraine as early as July or August 2025 and that North Korea continues to arm Russia with artillery ammunition and missiles.[1] The South Korean lawmaker told Reuters that the NIS assessed that Russia may be preparing to initiate a large-scale assault against Ukraine in July or August 2025 and that North Korea is likely receiving technical advice from Russia on satellite launches and missile guidance systems in return. ISW has observed evidence of North Korean forces augmenting Russian forces in Kursk Oblast and North Korea supplying Russia with artillery ammunition and ballistic missiles.[2] Ukrainian forces maintain a limited presence in Kursk Oblast, so North Korean personnel participating in combat operations would most likely be fighting in Ukrainian territory.[3] The North Korean and Russian military commands authorizing the deployment of North Korean forces to Ukrainian territory would mark a significant battlefield inflection that may improve Russian forces' ability to sustain simultaneous offensive operations in multiple directions, which the Russian military has traditionally struggled to conduct.[4] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces compensated by conducting pulsing, more contained, offensive operations along different sectors of the frontline, but recent reporting indicates that Russian forces appear to be gradually advancing in at least three simultaneous large-scale offensive operations in the Borova-Lyman, Kostyantynivka, and Novopavlivka directions.[5] It is not possible to forecast the likely impact of North Korean support of this type without more information about the size and composition of the North Korean troop contingent that would be going to Ukraine, nor is it clear how rapidly new North Korean troops would become effective in operations alongside Russian troops in Ukraine.

US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met at the NATO summit on June 25 and discussed possible US sales of Patriot air defense systems to Ukraine and joint weapons production. Trump stated that he and Zelensky did not talk about a possible ceasefire in Ukraine during the meeting, but that Trump may talk to Russian President Vladimir Putin in the near future about a ceasefire.[6] Zelensky stated that he reiterated during the meeting that Ukraine supports the US position on a ceasefire.[7] Zelensky stated that he and Trump discussed the increase in the number of "massive" Russian strikes against Ukraine's civilian infrastructure and people, and Trump stated that the United States "should consider" selling Patriot air defense systems and missiles to Ukraine as Ukraine's supply is limited.[8] Trump and Zelensky agreed to continue talks about strengthening Ukraine's air defense with European partners. Trump and Zelensky also discussed possible joint production of drones and electronic warfare (EW) equipment.[9] Zelensky stated in April 2025 that Ukraine proposed to the United States that Ukraine purchase "30 to 50 billion" (likely USD) worth of air defense and weapons systems from the United States and that Ukraine is prepared to purchase these systems itself — either through direct payment to the United States or through the fund established by the US-Ukrainian minerals deal.[10] Zelensky had stated that Ukraine will consider the provision of at least 10 air defense systems to Ukraine as a "security guarantee." US Patriot air defense systems are vital to Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian ballistic missile strikes and will become increasingly important as Russia is reportedly increasing its production and stockpile of ballistic missiles, which would enable larger and more frequent ballistic missile strikes against Ukraine.[11] ISW continues to assess that a strong Ukrainian military backed by Western security guarantees remains the most vital component of a stable post-war European security architecture, guaranteeing a sustainable peace in Ukraine and deterring future Russian aggression.[12]

Kremlin officials continue to platform bellicose rhetoric aimed at undermining Western support for Ukraine and to demonstrate Russia's uncompromising position on Ukraine. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko claimed on June 25 at the Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) conference that the West is adopting "hostile policies and military planning...that could explode from any spark."[13] Glushko further claimed that new Western military aid packages "fuel" the war in Ukraine.[14] The Kremlin regularly promotes rhetoric that is designed to pressure the West into making decisions that benefit Russia, such as refraining from providing further assistance to Ukraine, in response to the fact that sustained Western aid has allowed Ukrainian forces to impose significant challenges on Russian forces in Ukraine and threatens Russia's ability to achieve its war aims.[15]

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin reiterated on June 26 Russia's long-standing demand that Ukraine commit to an official non-aligned status and claimed that NATO violated promises from the early 1990s to refrain from expanding eastward.[16] Russia has consistently demanded that Ukraine commit to a neutral, non-aligned status, which would require Ukraine to amend its constitution and NATO to fundamentally alter its open-door policy.[17] The Kremlin continues to signal its unyielding demands and disinterest in peace, further indicating that Russia will very likely continue to pursue efforts to prolong negotiations in an attempt to extract additional concessions and secure additional gains on the battlefield.[18] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin will continue to protract the negotiation process so long as Russian leadership maintains the position that Russian forces can outlast Ukraine's defense capabilities and Western support for Ukraine.[19]

 Satellite imagery of select armored vehicle repair plants in Russia indicates that Russia continues to rely on refurbishing its Soviet-era stores of armored vehicles. A social media source tracking equipment at Russian military depots and repair facilities via satellite imagery shared on June 26 an updated analysis of Russian Armor Repair Plants (BTRZs) that repair damaged armored vehicles and refurbish stored vehicles and stated that most armored fighting vehicle (AFVs) that Russia is taking from storage are no longer in good enough condition to immediately deploy to the front without refurbishment, as Russia was able to do at the start of the war.[20] The source estimated that the 81st BTRZ in Armavir, Krasnodar Krai, which repairs and modernizes stored BTR-70/80 armored personnel carriers (APCs) and likely also repairs damaged BTRs from the battlefield, has likely been refurbishing up to 200 BTR-70/80/82 APCs annually since 2023.[21] The source estimated that the 144th BTRZ in Yekaterinburg, Sverdlovsk Oblast, which is the only BTRZ that refurbishes older BMD infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and also repairs BMP-2 and BMD-2 IFVs, has likely been annually refurbishing between 100 to 150 BMD-2 IFVs and BTR-D APCs since an unspecified year.[22]

The source estimated that the Arzamas Mechanical Plant in Arzamas, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, likely annually produces over 500 BTR-82 APCs but noted that satellite imagery showing a growing pile of hulls at the plant suggests that the plant is either increasing production rates or also does repairs of damaged BTRs.[23] The source noted that Arzamas’ production numbers are unclear but are likely high due to the high number of BTR-80/82s that Russian forces are losing in Ukraine and how quickly Russian forces are replenishing these vehicles.[24] The source also estimated that armored vehicle manufacturer Kurganmashzavod in Kurgan, Kurgan Oblast, likely annually produces 100 to 120 BMD-4M IFVs, roughly 360 BMP-3 IFVs, and 20 to 30 BTR-MDM APCs.[25]

Russia has maintained its offensive operations throughout the war by tapping into its Soviet-era stocks of armored vehicles to compensate for high loss rates, but this resource is finite and approaching a point of diminishing availability.[26] Russian forces have been increasingly using motorcycles and buggies in place of armored vehicles along the frontline in Ukraine due to high Russian vehicle losses in late 2023 and 2024.[27] The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) estimated in February 2025 that Russian forces lost over 3,700 IFVs and APCs in 2024 alone.[28] It remains unclear whether Russia's reliance on motorcycles and buggies will be sufficient to offset these losses in the medium- to long-term.

 Ukraine and Russia conducted the seventh prisoner of war (POW) exchange, in accordance with the June 2 Istanbul agreements. Ukrainian officials and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed that Ukraine and Russia exchanged an unspecified number of severely wounded and sick POWs as well as those under 25 years old on June 26.[29] Ukrainian officials reported that Russia captured a majority of the released Ukrainian POWs in 2022.

 Key Takeaways:

• South Korean intelligence suggests that North Korea may deploy North Korean troops to Ukrainian territory, which would represent a significant battlefield inflection.
• US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met at the NATO summit on June 25 and discussed possible US sales of Patriot air defense systems to Ukraine and joint weapons production.
• Kremlin officials continue to platform bellicose rhetoric aimed at undermining Western support for Ukraine and to demonstrate Russia's uncompromising position on Ukraine.
• Satellite imagery of select armored vehicle repair plants in Russia indicates that Russia continues to rely on refurbishing its Soviet-era stores of armored vehicles.
• Ukraine and Russia conducted the seventh prisoner of war (POW) exchange, in accordance with the June 2 Istanbul agreements.
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Novopavlivka. Russian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Toretsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 25, 2025

US President Donald Trump stated that Russia may have territorial ambitions beyond Ukraine — consistent with ISW's long-held assessments that Russia is preparing for a future conflict with NATO and setting conditions to justify future aggression against non-NATO former Soviet Union states. A reporter asked Trump during a press conference at the NATO summit on June 25 whether it is possible that Russian President Vladimir Putin has territorial ambitions beyond Ukraine, and Trump responded that "it's possible."[i] ISW has long assessed that Russia is preparing its military and society for a possible future conflict with NATO following the conclusion of the war in Ukraine, including by pursuing military reforms; integrating veterans into all levels of Russian local, regional, and federal governments; and setting rhetorical conditions to justify future aggression against NATO.[ii] ISW has observed the Kremlin leverage the same rhetoric that it used against Ukraine before the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022 to threaten NATO states.[iii] The Kremlin has also specifically weaponized the concept of "compatriots abroad" — Russian-speaking populations living outside of Russia, whom Russia claims it needs to protect—to justify aggression against former Soviet states in the past.[iv] The Kremlin has also promoted its concept of "Russkiy Mir" ("Russian World") — an amorphous ideological and geographic conception that includes all of the former territories of Kyivan Rus, the Kingdom of Muscovy, the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and the contemporary Russian Federation and which Putin uses to frame any territories a Russian regime ruled or claimed to have ruled as Russia's "historical territories."[v] The Kremlin has been setting informational conditions to justify potential aggression against Moldova and the Baltic states using the alleged need to protect its "compatriots abroad" and the claim that these countries are part of the "Russkiy Mir" — the same narratives that the Kremlin used to justify the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.[vi] Trump's statements therefore, cohere with ISW's fundamental assessment that Russia maintains territorial ambitions beyond Ukraine and will continue pursuing these ambitions unless Putin is forced to reconsider his theory of victory.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio correctly stated that Russia has not shown a willingness to move forward in peace negotiations. Rubio stated in an interview with Politico published on June 25 that Russia is trying to "achieve on the battlefield what [Russia is] demanding at the negotiating table" including "control over certain territories," but noted that this objective will be more difficult to achieve than Russia currently believes.[vii] Rubio stated that Russia has suffered over 80,000 killed-in-action (KIA) since January 2025 but that Putin nevertheless continues "feeding into the war machine" and that Russia has "not shown a willingness to move forward" in peace negotiations. Rubio's statements are consistent with ISW's assessments that Russia has been attempting to delay the negotiation process and protract the war in order to secure additional territorial gains.[viii] Russia's maximalist negotiating demands for Ukrainian territory, including significant amounts of territory that Russia does not currently occupy, represent an informational tactic intended to force territorial concessions to compensate for gains that Russia cannot achieve on the battlefield. ISW continues to assess that Russia is unwilling to engage in substantive negotiations to end the war in Ukraine in any way that falls short of acquiescing to Russia's maximalist demands, which have remained consistent since before the start of the full-scale invasion.[ix]

The Kremlin continues to leverage Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev's aggressive rhetoric to undermine Western support for Ukraine. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on June 25 on his social media accounts, including his English-language channels, that the EU is becoming a politicized, "Russophobic organization...that dreams of revenge against Russia."[x] Medvedev further accused the EU of becoming a militarized bloc that presents just as prominent a threat to Russia as NATO does, claiming that "Brussels today is Russia's true enemy" for arming Ukraine. Medvedev claimed that Ukrainian accession into the EU would endanger Russia and implied that Russia could destroy all of Ukraine to prevent this outcome. The Kremlin typically leverages Medvedev to amplify inflammatory rhetoric designed to stoke panic and fear among Western decision-makers and discourage Western provisions of aid to Ukraine.[xi] Kremlin officials and affiliates have repeatedly promoted narratives that the EU is essentially a military organization like NATO.[xii] The Kremlin most recently activated Medvedev to project nuclear proliferation threats following US strikes on Iran's nuclear program.[xiii] Medvedev's recent comments do not represent a serious rhetorical inflection, but rather a continuation of the Kremlin's informational campaign to undermine Western support for Ukraine.

Russian officials are promoting purposely vague rhetoric about the "root causes" of Russia's war against Ukraine in order to allow the Kremlin the flexibility to adapt its demands as it sees fit. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on June 24 that the "root causes" of the war are the alleged discrimination against Russian-speakers in Ukraine and NATO violations of its obligations to not expand closer to Russia, including claimed NATO plans to build bases in Crimea and British plans to build a base on the Sea of Azov.[xiv] Lavrov previously claimed in an interview in December 2024 that the two main "root causes" of the war are NATO's alleged violation of obligations to not advance eastward and "aggressive absorption" of areas near Russia's borders and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine.[xv] Kremlin officials have repeatedly demanded in recent months that any settlement to the war must "eliminate the root causes," but Lavrov's June 24 claim that these root causes include alleged NATO and UK plans to build bases in Crimea and along the Sea of Azov is unusually specific and likely aimed at further deterring Western support for Ukraine and portraying NATO as a threat to Russia.[xvi] The ambiguity of what Russian officials constitute as "root causes" of the war allows the Kremlin the flexibility to add specificity when it chooses and to adapt its demands of Ukraine in any potential peace settlement in the future.

Russia is reportedly accelerating its missile production capacity with sanctions evasion support from Belarus and the People's Republic of China (PRC). Ukrainian outlet Kyiv Independent reported on June 24 that Russia's state-owned Votkinsk Plant has hired 2,500 workers, built new facilities, and imported specialized manufacturing equipment as part of efforts to expand Russia's production of Iskander-M ballistic missiles, Iskander-K cruise missiles, Yars and Bulava intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and likely Oreshnik ballistic missiles since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.[xvii] The Kyiv Independent stated that an analysis of the plant's internal business operations shows that the plant sourced manufacturing equipment from companies in the PRC, Taiwan, and Belarus via private Russian intermediaries. The Kyiv Independent stated that it is unclear how many ICBMs the Votkinsk Plant is currently producing, but noted that internal documents indicate that Russia is investing in its ICBM arsenal and that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) ordered the Votkinsk Plant in March 2022 to fulfill a production contract for $13 million worth of parts for the Bulava ICBM by 2024. A senior official from Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) told the Kyiv Independent that Russia is preparing for a long war and is stockpiling various types of missiles. The Kyiv Independent, citing the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), stated that Russia increased its production of Iskander-M ballistic missiles from 250 in 2023 to 700 in 2024 and noted that its GUR source agreed with RUSI's assessment. The Kyiv Independent reported that it received GUR intelligence in early June 2025, indicating that Russia had stockpiled roughly 600 Iskander-M ballistic missiles and 300 Iskander-K cruise missiles — a stockpile that would last about two years, should Russia maintain its current pace of strikes against Ukraine. ISW recently observed reports indicating that Russia is actively expanding and stockpiling its production of T-90M tanks, and Russia's expansion and acceleration of missile production capacity further supports ISW's assessment that Russia is working to expand its defense industrial base (DIB) likely in preparation for a protracted war in Ukraine and a potential expanded future conflict with NATO.[xviii]

The United States signaled receptiveness to provisioning Ukraine with additional Patriot air defense systems—a particularly salient issue given reports of Russia's increased ballistic missile production. US President Donald Trump responded to a question during the NATO summit on June 25 on whether the United States planned to provide Ukraine with additional Patriot air defense systems by stating that the United States would "see if they can make some available."[xix] US Patriot air defense systems are vital to Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian ballistic missile strikes and will become increasingly important as Russia increases its production and stockpile of ballistic missiles, which would enable larger and more frequent ballistic missile strikes against Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that Ukraine's limited Patriot air defense systems are forcing Ukraine to make difficult decisions about which areas of Ukraine to protect.[xx]

NATO and Western officials reaffirmed their commitment to collective defense and security, to increasing defense spending in the face of increased Russian aggression, and to providing support to Ukraine. The NATO heads of state and government participating in the NATO summit in The Hague published a joint declaration on June 25.[xxi] The declaration reaffirmed NATO's commitment to collective defense, as defined in Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, and committed to investing five percent of gross domestic product (GDP) annually in core defense requirements and defense- and security-related spending by 2035. The declaration also reaffirmed NATO's commitment to supporting Ukraine and that NATO members will include direct contributions to Ukraine's defense and defense industry in their spending calculations. The declaration highlighted that Ukraine's security contributes to NATO's security. NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte told reporters on June 25 that NATO faces a long-term threat from Russia, especially because North Korea, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and Iran are supporting Russia's war effort against Ukraine, and that NATO must increase its defense spending.[xxii] Rutte emphasized in his plenary speech at the NATO summit the importance of Article 5 and the commitment to invest five percent of GDP into defense, stating that NATO will need to expand its DIB on both sides of the Atlantic.[xxiii] US President Donald Trump told reporters at the NATO summit that the United States is committed to Article 5.[xxiv] A large group consisting of members of the European Parliament, members of national parliaments, politicians, diplomats, military personnel, and subject matter experts sent an open letter to the heads of NATO countries calling for support of Ukraine, including calling for increased aid and air defense.[xxv]

Ukraine's European partners continue to allocate military aid to Ukraine and deepen cooperation with the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB). The Norwegian government announced on June 24 that it will allocate 6.5 billion Norwegian kroner (about $642 million) to drone procurement for Ukrainian forces from Ukrainian and European manufacturers.[xxvi] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov and Danish Defense Minister Troels Lund Poulsen signed a letter of intent on June 24 to begin efforts to establish the joint production of Ukrainian weapons in Denmark.[xxvii] The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that the Danish government allocated 500 million Danish kroner (about $78 million) to accelerate Ukrainian weapon production. UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced that the UK will provide a new package of 350 Advanced Short Range Air-to-Air Missiles (ASRAAMs), financed for the first time using £70 million (about $96 million) of funding from the interest on seized Russian assets through the Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration (ERA) framework.[xxviii] Starmer announced that UK Armed Forces engineers had adapted the ASRAAM missiles to be compatible with Ukraine's UK-supplied RAVEN ground-based air defense systems. Starmer stated that the UK will imminently deliver five new RAVEN air defense systems, bringing the total that Ukraine has to 13 systems.

Ukrainian forces likely conducted a long-range strike against a Russian military industrial enterprise in Rostov Oblast on June 24. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, who often reports on successful Ukrainian drone strikes, reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Russian Atlant-Aero plant in Taganrog, Rostov Oblast.[xxix] Kovalenko reported that the Atlant-Aero plant specializes in producing critical Russian combat drone components and control systems, including “Orion” drones, electronic warfare (EW) systems, and digital integration for first-person view (FPV) drones and loitering munitions. Russian sources posted footage of explosions in Taganrog and claimed that Russian air defenses repelled a drone strike near Taganrog and other areas of Rostov Oblast overnight.[xxx]

Key Takeaways:

• US President Donald Trump stated that Russia may have territorial ambitions beyond Ukraine – consistent with ISW's long-held assessments that Russia is preparing for a future conflict with NATO and setting conditions to justify future aggression against non-NATO former Soviet Union states.
• US Secretary of State Marco Rubio correctly stated that Russia has not shown a willingness to move forward in peace negotiations.
• The Kremlin continues to leverage Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev's aggressive rhetoric to undermine Western support for Ukraine.
• Russian officials are promoting purposely vague rhetoric about the "root causes" of Russia's war against Ukraine in order to allow the Kremlin the flexibility to adapt its demands as it sees fit.
• Russia is reportedly accelerating its missile production capacity with sanctions evasion support from Belarus and the People's Republic of China (PRC).
• NATO and Western officials reaffirmed their commitment to collective defense and security, to increasing defense spending in the face of increased Russian aggression, and to providing support to Ukraine.
• Ukraine's European partners continue to allocate military aid to Ukraine and deepen cooperation with the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB).
• Ukrainian forces likely conducted a long-range strike against a Russian military industrial enterprise in Rostov Oblast on June 24.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova and Velyka Novosilka, and Russian forces recently advanced in Vovchansk and near Pokrovsk and Novopavlivka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 24, 2025

NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte assessed that Russia is the largest existential threat to NATO members today and that Russia is preparing for a protracted war with NATO. Rutte stated on June 24 at the NATO summit at The Hague that Russia remains the most significant and direct threat to NATO, especially considering the support North Korea, the People's Republic of China (PRC), Iran, and Belarus provide Russia.[1] Rutte stated that Russia could attack NATO within three to seven years and is currently more prepared for a war than NATO. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in an interview with Sky News on June 24 that Russia would not be ready to attack NATO in the immediate future but could be ready for a war with NATO by 2030.[2] Zelensky stated that the war in Ukraine is currently constraining Russia's ability to train and reconstitute its forces and that any decrease in aid to Ukraine would benefit Russia. ISW continues to assess that Russia is preparing its military and society for a potential future war with NATO in the medium- to long-term.[3] Any future ceasefire or long-term pause in combat in Ukraine would free up Russian forces for redeployment to Russia's eastern border with NATO and allow Russia to rearm and reconstitute, whereby Russia may be able to pose a significant threat to NATO earlier than 2030.

 The Kremlin continues efforts to augment Russian combat power by setting conditions to subsume forces from Russia's Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) allies under a Russian military command. The Russian State Duma ratified on June 24 a protocol that allows CSTO states to send their troops to other CSTO states' territory in the event of armed conflict, threats, crisis situations, and exercises; to respond to the consequences of emergencies; and to provide humanitarian aid.[4] The protocol now allows for the CSTO to transport troops one day after a decision from the CSTO Council — as opposed to after 30 days as the protocol stated previously. The protocol also introduces the concept of a "command of formations" that will command CSTO military forces sent to one CSTO state. This “command of formations” will likely be a Russian-dominated command. The CSTO Collective Security Council approved the protocol in November 2024.[5] ISW has long assessed that the Kremlin has been trying to subordinate the militaries of former Soviet states to the Russian Armed Forces to recreate a multinational combined army in the former Soviet space.[6] Western assessments of Russia's future combat power must take into account the forces of Russia's CSTO allies that Russia may use in future operations — not only those of Russia.

 Russian forces are expanding their use of motorcycles along the frontline in Ukraine — a tactic that the Russian military may leverage in future wars beyond Ukraine, possibly including operations against NATO states. A servicemember in a Ukrainian brigade reported on June 24 that the threat of Russian motorcycle assaults is increasing along the frontline as Russian forces increasingly integrate motorcycles into assault tactics.[7] The servicemember stated that Russian motorcycle forces are no longer attacking along roads but mainly attacking through open fields and trying to bypass Ukrainian engineering barriers along the frontline. Ukraine-based open-source intelligence organization Frontelligence Insight provided additional information on June 23 about the tactical doctrine the Russian military is establishing for motorcycle usage.[8] Frontelligence Insight reported that Russian forces are mainly using motorcycles as a form of transport for attacking infantry to support diversion, reconnaissance, infiltration, and flanking support missions. Frontelligence Insight reported that Russian motorcyclists operate in squads of six to eight motorcycles with one or two riders on each motorcycle (between six and 16 personnel in total). Each squad reportedly has two to four portable electronic warfare (EW) systems and one device scanning for Ukrainian drones. Frontelligence Insight reported Russian forces are also leveraging motorcycles for casualty evacuation and logistics support. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported in May 2025 that Russian forces were mainly using motorcycles in tandem with armored vehicles.[9] Russian forces appear to be increasingly relying on motorcycles as a method of transport and advancement independent from tanks and armored vehicles in recent weeks, however.[10]

Frontelligence Insight reported that Russian forces have been training troops on motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) at ad hoc motocross tracks in Russia and occupied Ukraine as of Spring 2025.[11] Frontelligence Insight reported that Russian forces are also conducting more advanced training programs, including for drone evasion, and that the length of these courses varies between 16 hours to over a month. Frontelligence Insight reported that Russian forces are mainly using foreign-made motorcycles, primarily those manufactured in the People's Republic of China (PRC), and that volunteer organizations in Russia provide most of the motorcycles for frontline Russian units. Frontelligence Insight reported, citing internal documents from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), that Russia intends to equip over half of its infantry forces with motorcycles, ATVs, and buggies in the future. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will likely increasingly depend on motorcycles and other quicker unarmored vehicles, as slower-moving vehicles have become a hazard on the more transparent battlefield of Ukraine.[12] Russian efforts to integrate tactical innovations, such as motorcycle usage, among frontline units indicates that the Russian military is learning modern ground warfare lessons that it intends to leverage beyond the war in Ukraine.[13]

 NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte highlighted NATO's plans to invest more in its own defense capabilities, including by investing in the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) — in line with US President Donald Trump's initiative for Europe to shoulder more of the burden of collective security. Rutte called on NATO states to invest in Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB), which Rutte assessed has an untapped potential of about $35 billion, in order to prevent NATO states from reducing their own stockpiles and to allow NATO states and allies to buy weapons from Ukraine in the future.[14] Rutte stated that NATO states will agree to introduce a baseline of allocating five percent of GDP toward defense spending during the NATO summit.[15] Rutte stated that NATO's new defense investment plan will include a five-fold increase in investments in NATO air defense capabilities and investments to produce "thousands" more tanks and armored vehicles and millions of artillery ammunition rounds.

 Ukraine's European partners allocated military aid to Ukraine and financial support for drone production during the NATO summit on June 24. Dutch Defense Minister Ruben Brekelmans announced on June 24 that the Netherlands approved a new military aid package for Ukraine worth 175 million euros (about $203.4 million), which provides 100 drone detection radars and 20 Ermine partly unmanned vehicles for casualty evacuation and includes 80 million euros (about $93 million) toward the international drone coalition.[16] Brekelmans stated that the Netherlands also recently signed a contract worth 500 million euros (about $5.8 million) with Ukrainian drone manufacturers to fund the production of 600,000 drones.[17] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced on June 24 that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and United Kingdom (UK) Prime Minister Keir Starmer agreed to launch a new joint drone production initiative.[18] Umerov stated that the UK will produce Ukrainian-designed drones in the UK for three years as part of a project to support integration between the British and Ukrainian defense industries. Umerov stated that the UK and Ukraine will share the produced drones after the war in Ukraine ends and that the project will enable British defense companies to rapidly design and produce state-of-the-art drones at scale. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister for Digital Development Kateryna Chernohorenko, NATO Digital Staff Deputy Director Marco Criscuolo, and NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA) Director General Ludwig Descamps announced on June 24 that NATO will provide 37 million euros (about $43 million) for Ukrainian satellite communications, including satellite radio stations, trackers, and services.[19]

 Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 23 to 24 that resulted in over 100 civilian casualties. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 97 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[20] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 63 drones and that 15 drones were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck Dnipro City and Samara, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, damaging educational and medical facilities.[21] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Military Administration Head Serhiy Lysak reported that Russian forces struck a passenger train in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, killing at least 17 people and injuring at least 279.[22] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces also struck civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv City and Velykyi Bobryk, Sumy Oblast.[23] Russia's ongoing strike campaign against Ukraine in recent months has increasingly impacted civilian areas and infrastructure and Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) — underscoring the urgency of providing additional air support to Ukraine and strengthening Ukraine's air defense umbrella.

 Key Takeaways:

• NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte assessed that Russia is the largest existential threat to NATO members today and that Russia is preparing for a protracted war with NATO.
• The Kremlin continues efforts to augment Russian combat power by setting conditions to subsume forces from Russia's Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) allies under a Russian military command.
• Russian forces are expanding their use of motorcycles along the frontline in Ukraine — a tactic that the Russian military may leverage in future wars beyond Ukraine, possibly including operations against NATO states.
• NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte highlighted NATO's plans to invest more in its own defense capabilities, including by investing in the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) — in line with US President Donald Trump's initiative for Europe to shoulder more of the burden of collective security.
• Ukraine's European partners allocated military aid to Ukraine and financial support for drone production during the NATO summit on June 24.
• Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 23 to 24 that resulted in over 100 civilian casualties.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Kherson City, and Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka.

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