Ukraine Invasion Updates

         This page collects the Critical Threats Project (CTP) and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) updates on the invasion of Ukraine. In late February 2022, CTP and ISW began publishing daily synthetic products covering key events related to renewed Russian aggression against Ukraine. These Ukraine Conflict Updates replaced the “Indicators and Thresholds for Russian Military Operations in Ukraine and/or Belarus,” which we maintained from November 12, 2021, through February 17, 2022.

This list also includes prominent warning alerts that CTP and ISW launched outside the crisis update structure. These products addressed critical inflection points as they occurred.

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• Maps on Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes
• Recent Updates
• February 2022 - July 2023 Updates
• Related Reads

Maps on Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes

This interactive map complements the static daily control-of-terrain maps that CTP and ISW produce with high-fidelity and, where possible, street level assessments of the war in Ukraine.

Click here to access the archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that produced daily by showing a dynamic frontline.

The Critical Threats Project and the Institute for the Study of War are publishing a summary of the methodology of our map for those who would like to learn more about the tradecraft for mapping conventional military operations from the open source.                                                                                                     

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         Previous versions of these static maps are available in our past publications. 

Recent Updates

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 7, 2025

Russia launched its largest combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine of the war to date on the night of September 6 to 7 with 823 total projectiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 810 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Bryansk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast, Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske and Cape Chauda, Crimea.[i] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched nine Iskander-from Kursk Oblast and four Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defenses downed or suppressed 747 drones and four Iskander-K cruise missiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that nine missiles and 54 strike drones struck 33 locations throughout Ukraine and that drone and missile debris fell on eight locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged civilian and residential infrastructure in Kyiv, Sumy, Dnipro, and Zaporizhzhia cities; Kremenchuk, Poltava Oblast; Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; Slovyansk, Donetsk Oblast; and Chernihiv and Cherkasy oblasts.[ii]  Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that the Russian strikes injured 44 civilians across Ukraine, primarily targeted Kyiv City, and lasted over 7.5 hours.yiv City Military Administration Head Timur Tkachenko reported that Russian strikes killed two civilians and injured 20 others in Kyiv City.[iv]  Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko reported and published footage showing that Russian forces struck Ukraine’s Cabinet of Ministers building within Kyiv City for the .[v] ISW continues to assess that Russia's ongoing large-scale strikes underscore Ukraine's need for continued Western support for Ukraine's interceptor drone program and for the continued supply of Western air defense systems, especially US-provided Patriot systems.[vi]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) attempted to deny that Russian forces struck civilian infrastructure across Ukraine or the Cabinet of Ministers building within Kyiv City. The Russian MoD claimed on September 7 that Russian forces struck drone facilities and airbases in Ukraine.[vii] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces struck two industrial enterprises on the outskirts of Kyiv City but did not conduct any strikes against any other objects within Kyiv City. Several Russian milbloggers amplified the MoD's narrative that Russian forces did not strike the Cabinet of Ministers building within Kyiv City.[viii] Tat Russian forces hit civilian targets in Ukraine despite ample footage, imagery, and Ukrainian official reports to the contrary.[ix] ISW coonths.[x]

Russian drone strike packages against Ukraine will likely continue to expand as long as Russia is able to increase its long-range strike drone production. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Colonel Andriy Yusov stated on September 5 that Russia can currently produce 2,700 Shahed-type strike drones per month and an unspecified "significant" number of decoy drones.[xi] The GUR indicated in June 2025 that Russia could produce an average of 170 Shahed-type strike and decoy drones per day (about 5,100 per month) and planned to increase production to 190 drones per day (about 5,700 per month) by the end of 2025.[xii] Ukrainian officials have previously warned that Russia intends to increase its strike packages to include over 1,000 drones per day in Fall 2025, and Russia's use of over 800 drones in the September 6 to 7 strike package is a significant increase toward this goal.[xiii] Russia's strike packages against Ukraine will only continue to increase in size as long as Russia is able to continue expanding its Shahed-type drone production unimpeded. More frequent larger-scale Russian strikes will threaten to devastate Ukraine's electrical grid and energy infrastructure ahead of and during the coming winter season.

Russia is continuing to expand its long-range strike drone production in part due to support from the People's Republic of China (PRC). Russia has significantly scaled up its domestic production of Shahed-type drones, including Gerans (Russian Shahed analogues), Garpiyas (Shahed analogues with PRC components), and Gerberas (decoy Shahed varian.[xiv] Russia primarily produces Shahed-type drones at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (ASEZ) in the Republic of Tatarstan and recently opened a at the Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant where Russia already produces Garpiya drones.[xv] Russia has recently significantly invested in developing the ASEZ's drone factory; supporting the plant's infrastructure; and recruiting women, children, and foreigners to work at the ASEZ.[xvi] Russia is increasingly relying on the PRC for its drone components and would not be able to sustain the pace or mass of its Shahed-type drone production without these components. A recent investigation by the Ukraine-based, open-source intelligence organization Frontelligence Insight found that the ASEZ alone depends on the PRC for at least 41 components to produce its long-range strike drones, including engines, electronic and mechanical components, batteries, antennas, radios, carbon fire, carburetors, and telecommunications components.[xvii] Frontelligence Insight assessed that many of the drones that Russia claims to have produced domestically are only assembled domestically given the high number of PRC-produced parts in these drones. Russia also opened a dedicated logistics center at the ASEZ to receive and process cargo trains directly from the PRC, likely in an effort to streamline the delivery of PRC-produced components for drone production at the ASEZ.[xviii]

Russia's latest strikes against Ukraine further demonstrate that Russian President Vladimir Putin . Russia has consistently intensified its strike packages and capabilities since the beginning of its full-scale invasion in 2022 and has notably accelerated its strikes campaign following the Ukraine-Russia bilateral talks in Istanbul on May 15, 2025, launching 16 combined strikes consisting of over 400 air targets since the talks.[xix] Russia's September 6 to 7 strike is the fifth combined strike of over 500 drones and missiles since the August 15 US-Russia summit in Alaska. Putin has repeatedly rejected Ukrainian and US efforts to establish ceasefires on the battlefield and continues to insist that Russia cannot agree to a ceasefire until there is a peace agreement.[xx] Putin has also made no effort to prepare Russian society or the Russian information space for an end to the war that results in less than Ukrainian capitulation to all of Russia's original war demands.[xxi] A Russian milblogger claimed on September 7 that the size of the latest overnight strike demonstrates Russia's "unyielding will" and shows that Russia continues to "politely ignor[e]" US President Donald Trump's repeated condemnation of Russian strikes.[xxii] The milblogger claimed that negotiations are entering a period of "empty talk."[xxiii]

Ukraine contimilitary and oil infrastructure in Russia on the night of September 6 to 7. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 7 that Ukrainian forces, including elements of the Unmanned Systems Forces (USF), struck an near Naitopovichi, Bryansk .[xxiv] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that this oil production station is part of the Steel Horse oil pipeline, which has a pumping capacity of . Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces Commander Major Robert “r” Brovdi reported that the facility is important for the transport of petroleum products to Russia from Belarusian refineries, especially the Mozyr and Novopolatsk refinerie The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) reported on September 7 that the SSO and a pro-Ukrainian resistance group conducted an unspecified attack against the Ilsky Oil Refinery in Krasnodar Krai. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Ilsky Oil Refinery processes 6.42 million tons of oil annually.[xxvii] The Ukrainian SSO reported that the attack destroyed the ELOU-AT-6 oil complex, which is the Refinery's primary oil refining complex.[xxviii] Geolocated footage published on September 7 shows a smoke plume rising from the Ilsky Oil Refinery.[xxix] The Krasnodar Krai operational headquarters claimed on September 7 that drone debris fell on the Ilsky Oil Refinery and caused a fire at one of the processing units.[xxx] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported on September 7 that Ukrainian forces successfully struck Russian military warehouses in Kursk Oblast but are clarifying the damage.[xxxi]

Key Takeaways:

• Russia launched its largest combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine of the war to date on the night of September 6 to 7 with 823 total projectiles.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) attempted to deny that Russian forces struck civilian infrastructure across Ukraine or the Cabinet of Ministers building within Kyiv City.
• Russian drone strike packages against Ukraine will likely continue to expand as long as Russia is able to increase its long-range strike drone production.
• support from the People's Republic of China (PRC).
• Russia's latest strikes against Ukraine further demonstrate that Russian President Vladimir Putin is disinterested in ending his war in Ukraine and stopping the killing.
• Ukraine continued its attacks against military and oil infrastructure in Russia on the night of September 6 to 7.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka and Dobropillya tactical areas. Russian forces advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 6, 2025

Ukrainian officials warned that the Russian military command is regrouping and reinforcing its troops in western Donetsk Oblast, likely ahead of a major offensive operation. Ukrainian Dnipro Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Oleksiy Belskyi reported that the Russian military command is concentrating significant forces in Donetsk Oblast and that the most intense fighting is occurring in the Pokrovsk direction.[1] Belskyi stated that Russian forces are now accumulating significant numbers of drones and heavy armored vehicles in the area after failing to seize Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad during Summer 2025. The Ukrainian 7th Army Corps reported that the Russian military command recently redeployed experienced naval infantry units to the Pokrovsk direction, indicating that Russia is preparing to re-intensify assaults in the area.[2] The Ukrainian 7th Army Corps reported that Russian forces began leveraging infiltration tactics with small teams with the aim of getting as close as possible to Ukrainian drone and artillery positions, overextending Ukrainian forces, gaining footholds in forward positions, and expanding the contested "gray" zone. The Ukrainian 7th Army Corps noted that Russian forces intensified offensive operations on the flanks of Pokrovsk using armored and motorized vehicles in an effort to interdict ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and envelop Pokrovsk. The Ukrainian 7th Army Corps reported that the Russian military command remains committed to seizing Ukraine's fortress belt, which consists of Slovyansk-Kramatorsk-Druzhkivka-Kostyantynivka and forms the backbone of Ukrainian forces' defense in Donetsk Oblast. A senior non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Siversk direction reported that Russian forces are conducting troop rotations in the area and that Ukrainian forces anticipate that Russian forces will soon conduct intensified offensive operations.[3] The NCO noted that the Russian military command is pressuring Russian units to advance during Fall 2025, given that Russian forces did not achieve their given objectives during Summer 2025. The deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Kramatorsk direction also reported that Russian forces are building up their force presence in preparation for future assault operations in the Kramatorsk area and that the Russian military command has deployed unspecified naval infantry units to the area.[4]

A Ukrainian servicemember reported on September 5 that the Russian military command recently redeployed five to six unspecified naval infantry brigades to the Dobropillya direction alongside a tank regiment, an infantry regiment, and two motorized rifle brigades.[5] The Ukrainian servicemember reported that the Russian military command also recently redeployed elements of the 70th Motorized Rifle Division (18th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) to Chasiv Yar. A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on September 6 that elements of the 76th VDV Division, including its 237th VDV Regiment, are redeploying from Sumy Oblast to an unspecified location.[6] ISW recently observed reports that the Russian military command redeployed several units from Kursk Oblast, including elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) to the Dobropillya area and elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla), and 11th Separate VDV Brigade to unspecified areas of Donetsk Oblast.[7] ISW has also observed additional reports that the Russian military command redeployed elements of the 70th Motorized Rifle Division from Kherson Oblast to Bakhmut, possibly to reinforce Russian offensive efforts near Kostyantynivka or Siversk.[8] The Russian military command's reported decision to redeploy more forces to the Dobropillya area suggests that Russia may continue to focus on offensive efforts northeast of Pokrovsk.

Russian forces are also attempting to interdict key Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in western Donetsk Oblast in order to complicate Ukrainian logistics and enable further Russian advances during future offensive efforts in Donetsk Oblast. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on September 6 that Russian forces are attempting to interdict Ukrainian logistics in order to complicate Ukraine's ability to defend and launch counterattacks along the frontline.[9] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are attempting to identify gaps in Ukraine's defensive lines and exploit compromised Ukrainian positions. A senior non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Siversk direction stated that Russian drone operators have recently been loitering drones along Ukrainian GLOCs in the brigade's area of responsibility (AoR) and waiting to strike Ukrainian personnel.[10] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have intensified first person view (FPV) drone strikes against the E-40 Izyum-Slovyansk highway, presumably from positions in the Lyman direction, and are successfully disrupting Ukrainian logistics.[11] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces have struck 10 Ukrainian military vehicles traveling along the E-40 highway in the last few days and that Russian drone strikes may force Ukraine to pursue alternative logistics routes to supply Ukrainian positions along the fortress belt. Additional Russian milbloggers posted footage of damaged Ukrainian vehicles along the highway and claimed that Russian forces are also using Lancet drones to strike these vehicles.[12] Russian forces have previously leveraged interdiction efforts in order to create vulnerabilities in frontline Ukrainian positions that Russian forces can then exploit in infantry and mechanized assaults.[13] Russian forces have historically relied on glide bomb strikes, and now increasingly drone strikes, to raze frontline settlements and towns to the ground in order to destroy any possible Ukrainian defensive positions and force Ukrainian forces to retreat, enabling less costly Russian advances.[14]

Recent geolocated footage indicates that Russian forces have likely advanced into northwestern Kupyansk following the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)'s efforts to falsely portray limited infiltrations as enduring advances. Geolocated footage published on September 5 shows a Ukrainian drone strike against a Russian position in a building in northwestern Kupyansk, indicating that Russian forces have likely established forward positions within northwestern Kupyansk.[15] This footage differs from recent footage that the Russian MoD released, attempting to lend legitimacy to inflated claims of Russian advances. The Russian MoD published footage on September 3 showing individual Russian soldiers out in the open and holding Russian flags at four points within northern, northwestern, and western Kupyansk, and the MoD claimed that Russian forces had seized about half of Kupyansk.[16] The footage did not show indications that Russian forces actually held any areas in Kupyansk. However, it indicated that these soldiers likely infiltrated the town to film this footage. The Russian MoD attempted to portray these limited and temporary infiltrations into Kupyansk as consolidated territorial gains, however.[17] Both Russian and Ukrainian sources rejected the MoD's footage.[18]

ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin appears to be attempting to exploit mapping methodologies used throughout the war to advance an ongoing informational effort intended to portray Russian victory in Ukraine as inevitable and push Ukraine to concede to Russia.[19] The September 5 footage of the Ukrainian drone strike in northwestern Kupyansk is more consistent with the actual establishment of forward positions.[20] Russian forces typically send small fireteam sized groups of personnel on assaults in order to gain positions behind the Ukrainian frontline, after which they can accumulate larger groups and establish enduring positions for further assaults. The September 5 footage of Ukrainian forces conducting a drone strike against a Russian-held building is consistent with this pattern of Russian advances and previous footage that ISW has routinely used to assess further Russian advances. ISW's maps have distinguished between the Russian "forward line of own troops" (FLOT), which the US Army has defined as the most forward observed positions of forces in any operation at a specific time, and areas that Russian forces control.[21] ISW recently introduced a new feature — “Assessed Infiltration Events in Ukraine” — to help distinguish between areas where Russian or Ukrainian forces conducted assessed infiltration missions but have not advanced and do not control the territory. ISW will continue to monitor tactics and operations observed on the battlefield and refine its mapping methodology accordingly.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian officials warned that the Russian military command is regrouping and reinforcing its troops in western Donetsk Oblast, likely ahead of a major offensive operation.
• Russian forces are also attempting to interdict key Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in western Donetsk Oblast in order to complicate Ukrainian logistics and enable further Russian advances during future offensive efforts in Donetsk Oblast.
• Recent geolocated footage indicates that Russian forces have likely advanced into northwestern Kupyansk following the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)'s efforts to falsely portray limited infiltrations as enduring advances.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Lyman and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Lyman, Pokrovsk, and Velykomykhailivka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 5, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected the legitimacy of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and said that it is impossible to conclude a peace agreement with the current Ukrainian government, effectively eliminating the possibility of serious peace negotiations. Putin said on September 5 at the Eastern Economic Forum that he "do[es] not see much point" in negotiating with Ukraine, as it will be "impossible" to reach an agreement with Ukraine.[1] Putin falsely claimed that even if Russia and Ukraine conclude a peace agreement, Ukraine must lift martial law and hold presidential elections ahead of a national referendum to codify the agreement, and that the Ukrainian Constitutional Court must then make a decision on the referendum. Putin claimed that Ukraine lacks the "political will" to make an agreement at all, however, and that the Ukrainian Constitutional Court is non-functional as Zelensky is still in power, effectively reiterating his false claims that Zelensky and the current Ukrainian government are illegitimate. Putin and other Kremlin officials have repeatedly rejected the legitimacy of Zelensky and his government, deliberately misreading the Ukrainian constitution.[2] Putin’s statement is part of his continued effort to portray Zelensky and other Ukrainian officials as partners with whom Russia cannot negotiate or sign a final peace agreement.[3] ISW has long assessed that Putin is uninterested in meaningful negotiations to end the war and instead sought to delay or prolong negotiations, and his September 5 statements are now attempting to justify Russia's refusal to negotiate at all.[4] Putin is attempting to make peace negotiations impossible and falsely deflecting the blame onto Ukraine.

Putin and other Russian officials continue efforts to degrade Western unity and deter Western support for Ukraine, including undermining potential postwar security guarantees. Putin also stated at the Eastern Economic Forum that Russia will consider any foreign troops in Ukraine to be legitimate targets if the war in Ukraine continues.[5] Putin claimed that he "simply do[es] not see any point" in deploying foreign troops to Ukraine after the war because Russia will "respect those security guarantees" that Russia and Ukraine develop. Putin's statement threatening to strike foreign military assets in Ukraine is an attempt to provoke fear in the West about a possibility that European states are not considering. European member states of the Coalition of the Willing have consistently reiterated that any peacekeeping contingents that deploy to Ukraine will only do so after the conclusion of a long-term peace deal and even then would only operate in unspecified rear areas rather than on the frontline.[6] The Kremlin is also intensifying its effort to deter Western states from taking actions unfavorable to Russia writ large, including supporting Ukraine. Russian Security Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev accused Finland on September 5 of senselessly "interfering" in Ukraine and reiterated that Russia cannot accept security guarantees for Ukraine if Russia feels its opinions are not considered.[7] Medvedev also accused Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland of increasing military activity along the Russian border and urged Russia to increase its border protection in response to Finland's accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and increased military activity in the Baltics.[8] Putin's accusations ignore Russia's own electronic warfare (EW) jamming operations that have significantly affected the Baltics and other states along Russia's western border in recent months, including jamming the GPS of planes carrying government officials.[9] Putin and other Russian officials continue to reject Western security guarantees for Ukraine and to aggressively posture against NATO allies in an effort to dissuade European states from supporting Ukraine, including through post-war guarantees, and to demand that Russia have a veto over any Western security guarantees for Ukraine.[10]

Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian military and energy infrastructure in Russia and occupied Ukraine. The Ukrainian General Staff and Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) reported that elements of the Unmanned Systems Forces (USF), Special Operations Forces (SSO), and Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) struck the Ryazan Oil Refinery on the night of September 5.[11] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the strikes hit the ELOU-AVT-6 primary oil refining unit, which has an estimated oil refining capacity of six million tons per year out of the Ryazan Oil Refinery's entire refining capacity of 17.1 million tons of oil per year.[12] Geolocated footage published on September 4 shows a fire at the Ryazan Oil Refinery's ELOU-AVT-6 and AVT-4 refining units.[13] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Ryazan Oil Refinery is one of the four largest oil refineries in Russia and produces gasoline, diesel, jet fuel, liquified gases, and other petroleum products.[14] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Ukrainian SSO also struck an S-400 air defense system in Kaluga Oblast and that preliminary reports indicate that the strikes damaged a Russian command and staff vehicle and a control point. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) struck a Russian military warehouse containing ammunition and drones in occupied Luhansk City.

Russian-Azerbaijani relations continue to deteriorate. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on September 4 that Azerbaijan could help restore bilateral relations with Russia by releasing 13 Russian citizens in Azerbaijani detention.[15] Azerbaijani authorities detained Russian citizens and conducted a raid on ethnic Azerbaijanis in Yekaterinburg in June 2025 after Russian law enforcement conducted a raid on the regional headquarters of Russian state-owned propaganda outlet Sputnik in Baku.[16] The Russian MFA issued a separate statement on September 4 rejecting reports that Russia had not compensated Azerbaijan for the December 2024 Azerbaijani Airlines Plane crash, which was likely the result of Russian air defenses shooting down the passenger plane.[17] The Russian MFA stated that a Russian insurance company had made insurance payments to the families of those killed in the December 2024 Azerbaijan Airlines plane crash. The Azerbaijani MFA responded to Zakharova's September 4 statement and stated that it is wrong for Zakharova to portray the detentions of Russian citizens as the reason for deteriorating bilateral relations and to place the release of the Russian citizens as a condition for improving bilateral relations.[18] The Azerbaijani MFA named Russia's failure to take responsibility for shooting down the Azerbaijan Airlines Flight 8243 as the reason for deteriorating bilateral relations. The Azerbaijani MFA also criticized the Russian MFA's September 5 statement that Russian insurance companies paying individual families satisfies Azerbaijan's demand that the Russian Government compensate Azerbaijan for the lost aircraft.[19] The Russian MFA responded to the Azerbaijani MFA on September 5 and rejected the Azerbaijani MFA's claim that Zakharova had named the release of the 13 detained Russian citizens as a condition to improving relations but emphasized that this release would help normalize bilateral relations.[20] The Russian MFA claimed that the investigation into the December 2024 plane crash is still ongoing. Bilateral Russian-Azerbaijani relations have deteriorated since the December 2024 plane crash and faced further strain due to the mutual detentions in the summer of 2024.[21]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected the legitimacy of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and said that it is impossible to conclude a peace agreement with the current Ukrainian government, effectively eliminating the possibility of serious peace negotiations.
• Putin and other Russian officials continue efforts to degrade Western unity and deter Western support for Ukraine, including undermining potential postwar security guarantees.
• Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian military and energy infrastructure in Russia and occupied Ukraine.
• Russian-Azerbaijani relations continue to deteriorate.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Siversk. Russian forces advanced near Lyman and Pokrovsk and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 4, 2025

The British and French-led Coalition of the Willing and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met in Paris to discuss possible future security guarantees for Ukraine that aim to ensure a just and lasting peace on September 4.[1] The heads of state and leaders of 35 countries and international organizations participated, including French President Emmanuel Macron, Finnish President Alexander Stubb, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, and US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff.

Macron stated that a strong Ukrainian military must be at the center of any postwar security guarantees. Macron stated that any security guarantees would need to involve commitments to rebuild and bolster the Ukrainian military.[2] Macron reported that the meeting participants agreed that the Coalition of the Willing's primary objective in any potential negotiations is to ensure that Russia does not impose any limits on the size or capabilities of the Ukrainian military.[3] Macron stated that Ukraine's allies must seek to provide Ukraine with the means to restore its military in order to deter and resist future Russian aggression.

Macron stated that 26 states formally agreed to form a "reassurance force" as part of security guarantees for postwar Ukraine. Macron stated that 26 unspecified states agreed to send ground forces to Ukraine or to provide assets to support at sea or in the sky.[4] Macron stated that the forces will be ready to deploy to Ukraine the day after Ukraine and Russia reach a ceasefire or peace agreement in the future. Macron noted that the foreign troops would not deploy to the frontline but to still undecided areas behind the front to prevent future Russian aggression.[5] Macron stated that the United States has been involved in every stage of the security guarantee process and that the Coalition of the Willing will finalize US support for European-led security guarantees in the coming days. France and the UK have previously indicated their willingness to deploy troops to postwar Ukraine.[6] Reuters reported on September 4 that a German government spokesperson stated that Germany will decide on its military engagement "in due course when the framework is clear," including the kind and extent of US involvement and the result of the peace negotiation process.[7]

The Kremlin continues to explicitly reject any foreign troops on Ukrainian territory as part of postwar security guarantees. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova stated on September 4 that Russia will not discuss "any security foreign intervention" in Ukraine "in any form, in any format."[8] Zakharova claimed that such a foreign troop deployment is "fundamentally unacceptable." Zakharova similarly said on August 18 that Russia "categorical[ly] reject[s]" "any scenario that envisages the appearance in Ukraine of a military contingent with the participation of NATO countries," and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on August 27 that Russia takes a "negative view" of European proposals of security guarantees for Ukraine and will perceive European force deployments to postwar Ukraine as an expansion of NATO's presence.[9] These repeated Kremlin rejections of Western security guarantees are part of Russia's calls for it to have a veto over any Western security guarantees for Ukraine.[10] Russia also previously tried to impose severe restrictions on the size of the Ukrainian military in the 2022 Istanbul draft peace agreement, and Russia has indicated that it continues to view the 2022 Istanbul draft treaty as the basis for any future peace settlement.[11] Russia has repeatedly demonstrated that it remains committed to achieving its original war aims, including the reduction of Ukraine's military such that Ukraine cannot defend itself against future Russian attacks.[12]

The Coalition of the Willing also outlined ways for states that are unable to deploy ground, sea, or air assets to participate in security guarantees for postwar Ukraine. Zelensky stated after the meeting that the Coalition of the Willing can also support a strong Ukrainian military with weapons provisions, training, and financing for Ukraine's weapons production.[13] Zelensky stated that states that do not have their own forces can contribute to the security guarantees financially, including by financing Ukrainian weapons production. Starmer stated that he welcomed announcements from unspecified Coalition of the Willing partners that they plan to supply Ukraine with long-range missiles.[14] Czech Prime Minister Petr Fiala emphasized that security guarantees are necessary in order to deter Russian aggression and that the Coalition of the Willing is in agreement that Ukraine needs continued defense aid to ensure a just and lasting peace.[15] Fiala announced that Czechia will begin training Ukrainian F-16 pilots on subsonic aircraft and simulators as part of Czechia's aid package to Ukraine. Fiala stated that Czechia will continue to supply Ukraine with ammunition.

The Coalition of the Willing discussed additional sanctions against Russia with US President Donald Trump as part of coordinated Western efforts to deny Russia funding for its war against Ukraine. Reuters reported that a White House official stated that US President Donald Trump spoke with the leaders of the Coalition of the Willing after the meeting and that Trump called on them to stop buying Russian oil as this helps fund Russia's war machine.[16] The White House official stated that Trump also called for European leaders to put economic pressure on the People's Republic of China (PRC) for its involvement in Russia's war effort. Macron confirmed that the coalition spoke with Trump about sanctions and stated that the parties agreed to work more closely on future sanctions, especially those targeting Russia's gas and energy sectors and the PRC.[17] Macron stated that Europe and the United States will impose additional sanctions against Russia if Moscow continues to refuse peace negotiations.

Russian bankers continue to express concerns over the increasingly stagnant Russian economy. Sberbank CEO and Former Russian Minister of Economic Development and Trade, German Gref, claimed on September 4 that the Russian Central Bank will likely lower its key interest rate to 14 percent by the end of 2025, but that this would not be enough to revive the Russian economy.[18] Gref called on the Central Bank to lower the key interest rate to 12 percent or less to stimulate economic growth. The Central Bank already lowered its key interest rate twice in the last three months, from a record high of 21 percent down to 20 percent in June 2025 and to 18 percent in July 2025 - likely as part of a premature effort to maintain the facade of economic stability.[19] Gref acknowledged that the Russian economy is in a ”cooling period” and that Sberbank lowered its forecast for growth in corporate lending from nine to 11 percent to seven to nine percent. Gref added that the Russian ruble will likely weaken by the end of 2025. Russia has been leveraging the strengthened ruble to soften the blow of Western sanctions as parallel imports are cheaper and substitutes are affordable, and the Central Bank used the strengthened ruble to justify lowering its key interest rate in Summer 2025.[20] The Russian economy is already struggling with gasoline price spikes, labor shortages, and wage inflation from increased payments to sustain military recruitment and to augment the defense industrial base's (DIB) labor force.[21] Gref’s proposal to lower the key interest rate even further to 12 percent would flood the Russian economy with money and likely weaken consumer purchasing power, devalue the ruble in the medium-to long-term, and create further macroeconomic instability in Russia.[22]

Key Takeaways:

• The British and French-led Coalition of the Willing and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met in Paris to discuss possible future security guarantees for Ukraine that aim to ensure a just and lasting peace on September 4.
• Macron stated that a strong Ukrainian military must be at the center of any postwar security guarantees.
• Macron stated that 26 states formally agreed to form a "reassurance force" as part of security guarantees for postwar Ukraine.
• The Kremlin continues to explicitly reject any foreign troops on Ukrainian territory as part of postwar security guarantees.
• The Coalition of the Willing also outlined ways for states that are unable to deploy ground, sea, or air assets to participate in security guarantees for postwar Ukraine.
• The Coalition of the Willing discussed additional sanctions against Russia with US President Donald Trump as part of coordinated Western efforts to deny Russia funding for its war against Ukraine.
• Russian bankers continue to express concerns over the increasingly stagnant Russian economy.
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Kupyansk and Siversk and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Russian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Velykomykhailivka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 3, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin explicitly stated that he does not consider Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to be the legitimate president of Ukraine, invalidating the very basis of any future peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia. Putin spoke to journalists in Beijing on September 3 and falsely claimed that the Ukrainian Constitution has "no ways to extend the powers of the president" and that Zelensky's "powers are over" now that his five-year term limit "passed" in 2024.[i] Putin described Zelensky rather as the "current head of the administration" and claimed that a meeting with Zelensky would therefore be "a road to nowhere." Putin claimed that a bilateral meeting is nonetheless possible, but that Zelensky should come to Moscow. Putin has repeatedly flaunted an inaccurate reading of the Ukrainian Constitution to falsely claim that Zelensky is not the legitimate president of Ukraine – claims that ISW has repeatedly shown to be inaccurate.[ii] ISW continues to assess that Putin's claims of Zelensky's illegitimacy demonstrate Putin's disinterest in a peace settlement and set conditions for Russia to renege on any future peace agreement Putin should sign with Zelensky at a time of Russia's choosing in the future.[iii] Kremlin newswire TASS reported in May 2024 that the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) put Zelensky on Russia's wanted list for unspecified reasons, a report that puts a very different color on Putin's ostensible invitation to Zelensky to come to Moscow, considering that Putin has said he does not recognize Zelensky's legitimacy.[iv]

Putin himself is responsible for Ukraine's inability to legally hold the referendums and elections for which Putin is calling. Putin claimed that Ukrainian authorities should hold a referendum, including to decide on "territorial issues," "if they want to be legitimate and fully participate in the settlement process."[v] Putin correctly noted that Ukrainian law does not allow Ukrainian authorities to hold elections during martial law, but claimed that Ukraine "must" lift martial law. Ukrainian law states that Ukrainian authorities cannot lift martial law while "the threat of attack or danger to the state independence of Ukraine and its territorial integrity" remains.[vi] Ukrainian authorities are unable to hold the referendums and elections Putin is calling for until, at a minimum, Russia agrees to a ceasefire – which Putin has repeatedly refused to do.[vii] It is standard practice for peace processes to include ceasefires or armistices before the final stages of negotiations toward a war termination agreement. Putin, instead, is trying to force Ukraine to first make concessions and agree to Russia's demands before the implementation of the theater-wide, longer-term ceasefire that would actually allow Ukraine to lift martial law and hold referendums and elections as Putin claims he wants. Putin's statement that Ukraine cannot, in fact, make the concessions he is demanding under the conditions he is imposing is a further indication that Putin is completely unserious about negotiations.

Putin and other high-ranking Kremlin officials continue to explicitly and publicly state that they are committed to achieving Russia's original war aims through military means. Putin stated in Beijing that Russia will have to "solve all the tasks" surrounding Russia's war in Ukraine by "armed means" if current peace efforts fail.[viii] Putin claimed that the "overwhelming majority" of his Russian military commanders are "in favor of Russia achieving all of its goals outlined at the beginning of the [war]." Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov claimed on September 3  that lasting peace in Ukraine requires international legal recognition of the "new territorial realities" that emerged after the referendums in occupied  Crimea and Russian-occupied areas of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts – a reference to the illegal referendums Russia held in Crimea in 2014 and parts of the four oblasts in 2022 in which Russia claimed that Ukrainian citizens overwhelmingly voted to join Russia and that Russia uses to legitimize its claim to all of the territory of these five areas.[ix] Lavrov reiterated Russia's demands that any future peace settlement must "eradicate" the "root causes" of the war. Lavrov repeated Kremlin claims that these "root causes" include the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) post-Cold War expansion; NATO's efforts to include Ukraine in the alliance; and alleged Ukrainian violations of human rights in Ukraine, including the supposed persecution of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers and the purported destruction of the Russian language, culture, traditions, "canonical Orthodoxy," and Russian-language media. Lavrov reiterated Russian demands that Ukraine must be "neutral, non-aligned, and non-nuclear."

Putin's and Lavrov's statements make clear that Russia remains committed to the demands it made in 2021 and 2022 when Russia issued its prewar ultimatums to NATO and launched the full-scale invasion.[x] Putin's reference to Russian military commanders' support for a protracted war is an attempt to deflect responsibility for the decision about continuing the war from Putin onto his military subordinates. Putin has notably been intentionally cultivating Russian society’s commitment to achieving Russia's original war aims through a protracted war, and Putin has not sought to prepare Russian society to accept a peace settlement other than total Ukrainian capitulation.[xi]

Putin underscored his continued commitment to his theory of victory, a belief that Putin first outlined in June 2024, on September 3. Putin claimed that Russian forces are successfully advancing "in all directions," although at "different speeds."[xii] Putin claimed that Ukrainian forces are unable to conduct large-scale offensive operations and are only "holding the existing line." Putin has maintained a theory of victory that posits that Russian forces will be able to sustain gradual tactical gains regardless of the losses incurred, that Russia can outlast Western support for Ukraine, and that Ukraine will be unable to regain significant territory or launch effective counteroffensives.[xiii] Putin remains committed to achieving his goals on the battlefield through a protracted war and is uninterested in genuine peace efforts.

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko continues to publicly deepen Belarusian integration into Russia. Lukashenko stated on September 2 that Belarus and Russia are "working together on all fronts" and that they are “one country in principle,” likely referencing the Union State Treaty of Russia and Belarus.[xiv] The Union State framework establishes a political union between Belarus and Russia with a Kremlin-dominated federated government with a common set of federal laws and institutions for Belarusians and Russians to be governed as a single polity.[xv] The Kremlin has long pursued its strategic efforts to de facto annex Belarus through the framework of the Union State Treaty.[xvi]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) attempted to use footage showing a small-scale infiltration mission to lend legitimacy to inflated claims by Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov on August 30 that Russian forces had seized roughly half of Kupyansk.[xvii] The Russian MoD posted footage on September 3 that it claimed confirms that Russian forces control roughly half of Kupyansk.[xviii] The Russian MoD claimed that the footage shows Russian forces in central Kupyansk. The drone footage shows lone Russian servicemembers walking with a Russian flag. The geolocations of the MoD's footage indicate that the individual soldiers were operating at four points in northern, northwestern, and central Kupyansk.[xix] Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces killed the Russian soldiers in the footage, indicating that Russian forces do not maintain positions in these areas of the town. A Ukrainian army corps operating in the Kupyansk direction reported that Russian forces changed into civilian clothing to enter Kupyansk and that Ukrainian forces killed the Russian soldiers involved in filming the MoD's footage.[xx] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko also stated that soldiers from a Ukrainian brigade operating in the area reported that Ukrainian forces killed a Russian soldier in the footage.[xxi] Kovalenko noted that Russian forces are attacking Kupyansk's northern flank. The commander of a Ukrainian drone regiment operating in the area similarly reported that Russian soldiers are changing into civilian clothing and infiltrating into Kupyansk to film footage with a Russian flag.[xxii] The commander stated that Ukrainian forces control the situation in Kupyansk and are blocking Russian forces on the northwestern outskirts. The commander stated that Ukrainian forces have taken several tens of Russian soldiers who have infiltrated Kupyansk in civilian clothing prisoner in the past week and a half. The Russian MoD's footage shows one Russian servicemember starting to run away from the street after unfurling the flag for a few seconds – in line with Ukrainian reporting that Russian forces lack enduring positions and do not control the area. It would also be unprecedented for Russian forces to make an advance this deep into an urban area without more significant, objective corroborating evidence.

The Russian MoD's claims about Kupyansk have failed to convince large parts of the Russian milblogger community, even Kremlin-affiliated and coopted milbloggers. One Russian milblogger blamed the command of the Russian 6th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) for lying to the Western Grouping of Forces and subsequently the Russian MoD about battlefield successes in Kupyansk.[xxiii] The milblogger claimed that sources "in the know" were "bewildered" by Gerasimov's August 30 claim.[xxiv] The milblogger claimed that the MoD's September 1 footage is questionable, particularly as the drone footage filmed the lone Russian soldiers from afar and for a short period of time – unlike previous MoD footage celebrating Russian settlement seizures that showed multiple Russian soldiers up close for minutes at a time.[xxv] Another Russian milblogger cautioned that Russian forces do not control all of the areas that the Russian MoD claimed Russian forces seized.[xxvi] The milblogger claimed that "pairs" of Russian soldiers may be in the area alongside Ukrainian forces. The milblogger acknowledged that it is unclear how to portray the situation accurately on a map. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that it was "curious" that the MoD's footage showed "practically no destruction" in Kupyansk.[xxvii] The milblogger attempted to reason that Russian forces may have pushed Ukrainian forces back using small group tactics without large-scale clashes. The milblogger acknowledged that Russian forces may not have completely cleared the area.

The Kremlin appears to be trying to exploit the mapping methodologies that have become widespread throughout the war, including from open source intelligence (OSINT) sources like ISW. Russian officials and milbloggers have repeatedly claimed that footage showing Russian forces holding flags was evidence of Russian seizures of settlements.[xxviii] These Russian information operations seek to assert Russian territorial control by having soldiers infiltrate areas and ostentatiously wave flags.[xxix] The Russian MoD has even been adapting these methods to be more convincing, moving from amplifying footage of flags that Russian forces hung in settlements using drones to promoting footage showing actual Russian soldiers holding the flags.[xxx]

Russia has previously benefited from confusion that maps depicting limited Russian raids or infiltration missions have generated in the information space, such as Russia's recent limited sabotage and reconnaissance groups penetration near Dobropillya, which Russian forces were unable to actually consolidate and exploit. ISW’s Assessed Russian Advances map layer does not differentiate between enduring Russian positions and limited raids or infiltration missions. ISW has deliberately distinguished between the Russian “forward line of own troops” (FLOT) and areas that ISW assesses that Russian forces control, however. (ISW uses the US Army doctrinal term FLOT to indicate the most forward observed positions of forces in any kind of operation at a specific time.) The Kremlin's "flag raising" tactics are meant to support wider informational efforts to posture a Russian victory in Ukraine as inevitable and to push Ukraine to concede to Russia's maximalist demands sooner rather than later. Informational efforts like the one surrounding Kupyansk are also meant to reinforce Putin's theory of victory – the belief that Russian forces will be able to continue gradual advances indefinitely, prevent Ukraine from conducting counteroffensive operations, and win a war of attrition.[xxxi] ISW is combating these Russian information operations by introducing a new feature - the "Assessed Infiltration Events in Ukraine" feature - to visualize geolocated points where Russian or Ukrainian forces conducted assessed infiltration missions but have not advanced and do not control the territory.

Russia launched another large-scale combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of September 2 to 3 — the fourth combined strike of over 500 drones and missiles since the August 15 US-Russia summit in Alaska. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 16 Kalibr cruise missiles from the Black Sea and eight Kh-101 cruise missiles from the airspace over Saratov Oblast and Krasnodar Krai.[xxxii] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russia also launched 502 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defenses downed 430 drones, 14 Kalibr cruise missiles, and seven Kh-101 cruise missiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that three missiles and 69 drones struck 14 locations throughout Ukraine and that drone debris fell on 14 locations. Ukrainian officials, including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the Ukrainian State Emergency Service, reported that Russian drones and missiles struck civilian, energy, transportation, and residential infrastructure in Chernihiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Khmelnytskyi, Kharkiv, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Lviv, and Sumy oblasts.[xxxiii] Zelensky noted that Russian forces are increasingly launching drone strikes against Ukraine during the daytime.[xxxiv] Zelensky also stated that Russia’s drone and missile strike campaign is intentionally targeting Ukrainian civilian energy infrastructure ahead of the winter season in an effort to undermine Ukrainian morale.[xxxv] ISW continues to assess that Russia used the lead-up to the August 15 Alaska summit to stockpile drones and missiles and conducted more limited strikes against Ukraine before the summit to falsely present itself as a good-faith negotiator to the Trump administration.[xxxvi] Russia will likely continue to escalate its strikes against Ukraine in the coming weeks to leverage its replenished missile and drone stockpiles and degrade Ukrainian energy infrastructure ahead of the coming winter.[xxxvii]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin explicitly stated that he does not consider Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to be the legitimate president of Ukraine, invalidating the very basis of any future peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia.
• Putin himself is responsible for Ukraine's inability to legally hold the referendums and elections for which Putin is calling.
• Putin and other high-ranking Kremlin officials continue to explicitly and publicly state that they are committed to achieving Russia's original war aims through military means.
• Putin underscored his continued commitment to his theory of victory, a belief that Putin first outlined in June 2024, on September 3.
• Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko continues to publicly deepen Belarusian integration into Russia.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) attempted to use footage showing a small-scale infiltration mission to lend legitimacy to inflated claims by Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov on August 30 that Russian forces had seized roughly half of Kupyansk.
• The Russian MoD's claims about Kupyansk have failed to convince large parts of the Russian milblogger community, even Kremlin-affiliated and coopted milbloggers.
• The Kremlin appears to be trying to exploit the mapping methodologies that have become widespread throughout the war, including from OSINT sources like ISW.
• Russia launched another large-scale combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of September 2 to 3—the fourth combined strike of over 500 drones and missiles since the August 15 US-Russia summit in Alaska.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 2, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin leveraged a meeting with Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico to pretend to offer marginal concessions to US demands while continuing to refuse to meet actual US demands and while blaming Europe and the United States for provoking Russian aggression. Putin claimed to Fico in Beijing on September 2 that Russia has never opposed Ukraine joining the European Union, although Russia remains opposed to Ukraine joining NATO.[i] Putin reiterated his claim that the Western-backed "coup” in Ukraine in 2014 (referring to Ukraine’s democratically-organized Revolution of Dignity) provoked Russia to invade Ukraine in 2014 and 2022 and denied that Russia has any future plans to attack another European country. Putin suggested that Russia could be open to operating the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) with the United States and Ukraine in the future if "favorable circumstances" arise. Putin is likely presenting these very limited and tangential concessions in order to feign interest in peace negotiations to the Trump Administration, roughly two weeks after US President Donald Trump reiterated on August 21 his desire for direct and serious peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine.[ii]

Kremlin officials continue to deny White House statements about the prospect of a bilateral Ukrainian-Russian or trilateral US-Ukrainian-Russian meeting in the near future. Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov, who was present at the Alaska Summit, claimed on September 2 that the United States and Russia have planned another round of consultations and that many issues remained unresolved.[iii] Ushakov claimed that the ongoing US-Russian dialogue is primarily related to the “Ukrainian conflict” and that it is too early to discuss bilateral relations. Ushakov denied on September 1 that the United States and Russia agreed on a bilateral Ukrainian-Russian meeting.[iv] Ushakov’s statements reflect the Kremlin’s continued unwillingness to organize a bilateral meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and reject US President Donald Trump’s August 18 statements that officials were planning a bilateral meeting between Zelensky and Putin with a subsequent meeting between Trump, Zelensky, and Putin.[v]

Russia continues to feel the economic impacts of secondary sanctions against Russian oil-and-gas importers and of recent Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil refineries. Bloomberg reported on September 2 that sources who received offers from Russian crude oil exporters stated that Russian exporters are offering Urals crude to Indian importers at a discount of $3 to $4 per barrel, compared to Brent, on a delivered basis for cargo shipments in late September to October 2025.[vi] Bloomberg reported that sources stated that Russian exporters were offering Indian importers a discount of around $2.50 a barrel during the week of August 24 to 30 and a discount of $1 in July 2025. Russia is likely offering Indian importers discounted crude oil to ensure that India continues to purchase crude from Russia despite Western secondary sanctions against India, including a 50 percent US tariff against Indian exports to the United States.[vii] Russia is currently selling crude oil below market price, which will decrease the incoming flow of foreign funds into the Russian economy and deplete Russia's primary source of wealth unless Russia significantly increases its export of crude oil.

Russia and occupied Ukraine are also facing acute gasoline shortages due to Ukrainian strikes.[viii] The Kherson Oblast occupation administration claimed on September 2 that some gas stations in occupied Kherson Oblast are experiencing shortages of AI-92 and AI-95 (premium) gasoline and that gasoline prices are increasing due to shortages.[ix] Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Head Oleksiy Kharchenko reported that occupied Luhansk Oblast is also experiencing shortages of AI-92 and AI-95 gasoline and that the Luhansk Oblast occupation administration claimed that the shortage is due to a reduction in gasoline supply and a simultaneous increase in demand.[x] Kurilsky Municipal Okrug Head Konstantin Istomin reported on August 25 that Russian authorities suspended the sale of A-92 gasoline to residents in the Kuril Islands, Sakhalin Oblast.[xi] The Kremlin extended on August 14 a temporary ban on processed gasoline exports for all exporters through September 2025 and for non-producers through October 2025, a move that seeks to blunt a domestic price surge for gasoline due to Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil refineries.[xii]

North Korea is reportedly planning to send about 6,000 more troops to Russia, likely to serve in supporting roles in the Russian rear. South Korea's Yonhap News Agency reported on September 2 that South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) assessed to the South Korean Parliamentary Intelligence Committee that North Korea is planning to send roughly 6,000 additional soldiers to Russia and that roughly 1,000 North Korean military engineers have already arrived in Russia in the "rear front as reserve forces."[xiii] Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu announced on June 16 that North Korea would send 6,000 sappers and military engineers to help with reconstruction efforts in Kursk Oblast.[xiv] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi reported on August 12 that North Korea had agreed to send additional troops to Russia to support reconstruction efforts in Kursk Oblast.[xv] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on August 31 that North Korean sappers will soon operate in the Sudzha and Guyevo areas in Kursk Oblast and that Russian commanders received orders to prepare subordinates for the upcoming North Korean deployments to prevent friendly fire incidents or other "misunderstandings."[xvi] The milblogger assessed that North Korean forces are unlikely to conduct combat operations against Ukraine and will likely conduct tasks in the rear, including serving as cooks and cleaners, to free up other Russian personnel for infantry assaults. ISW continues to assess that it is unclear whether North Korean troops will deploy to Ukrainian territory, which would mark a significant inflection, but that North Korean troops operating in Russian border areas would still allow more Russian forces to be deployed to the battlefield in Ukraine.[xvii]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin leveraged a meeting with Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico to pretend to offer marginal concessions to US demands while continuing to refuse to meet actual US demands and while blaming Europe and the United States for provoking Russian aggression.
• Kremlin officials continue to deny White House statements about the prospect of a bilateral Ukrainian-Russian or trilateral US-Ukrainian-Russian meeting in the near future.
• Russia continues to feel the economic impacts of secondary sanctions against Russian oil-and-gas importers and of recent Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil refineries.
• North Korea is reportedly planning to send about 6,000 more troops to Russia, likely to serve in supporting roles in the Russian rear.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and near Lyman and Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 1, 2025

Kremlin officials continue to deny White House statements about the prospect of a bilateral Ukrainian-Russian or trilateral US-Ukrainian-Russian meeting in the near future. Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov stated on September 1 that “there was no agreement” on a bilateral meeting between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Russian President Vladimir Putin, or a trilateral meeting between US President Donald Trump, Zelensky, and Putin.[1] Ushakov stated on August 16, after the US-Russian Alaska summit, that he did not know when Trump and Putin would meet again and that the leaders had not discussed the prospect of a trilateral meeting.[2] US President Donald Trump stated on August 18, however, that he was planning a bilateral meeting between Zelensky and Putin with a subsequent meeting between Trump, Zelensky, and Putin.[3] Ushakov’s reiteration of Russia’s refusal to commit to Trump's desired bilateral and trilateral meetings undermines Trump’s ongoing diplomatic efforts to achieve a peace settlement in Ukraine.

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to demonstrate his unwillingness to compromise on his unwavering demands for Ukraine’s full capitulation. Putin claimed on September 1 at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin, People's Republic of China (PRC), that the “crisis” in Ukraine arose from the Western-provoked "coup” in Ukraine in 2014 (referring to Ukraine’s democratically organized Revolution of Dignity), not "as a result of Russia's attack on Ukraine."[4] Putin also claimed that the war in Ukraine stemmed from the West’s constant attempts to bring Ukraine into NATO, which Putin claimed would pose a direct threat to Russian security. Putin claimed that the 2014 "coup" eliminated the political leadership of Ukraine that did not support Ukrainian membership in NATO. Putin claimed that peace in Ukraine can only be sustainable and long-term if the settlement eliminates the ”root causes” of the war, which Kremlin officials have repeatedly defined as Ukraine's alleged discrimination against Russian-speakers in Ukraine and NATO expansion.[5] The Kremlin has often used this "root causes" narrative to call for the replacement of the current Ukrainian government with a Russian puppet government, Ukraine’s commitment to neutrality, and the revocation of NATO's Open Door Policy.[6] Putin's claim that the 2014 "coup" "eliminated" Ukrainian leaders is also a reference to the Kremlin's repeated narrative that the current Ukrainian government is illegitimate and should not be in power.[7] Putin is reiterating these Kremlin narratives in his own voice, indicating that Putin maintains his original war goals.

The Kremlin likely timed the publication of a video address by former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych to coincide with Putin's SCO speech in order to lend legitimacy to Putin's demand for regime change in Ukraine. Russian state media published a video message on September 1 of Yanukovych claiming that he worked to bring Ukraine closer to the EU during his presidency and that his ultimate goal was Ukraine's EU accession.[8] Yanukovych blamed Ukraine's EU partners for behaving "incorrectly" during Ukrainian-EU negotiations and criticized the EU for not understanding the difficulties of Ukraine's economic situation. Yanukovych also claimed that he has always opposed Ukraine's membership in NATO, which he alleged would have been a "catastrophe" and "a direct road to civil war." Yanukovych's last public media appearance was in July 2022, when he called on Ukrainians to surrender to Russia.[9] The timing of the filming of Yanukovych's video address is unknown, but he opened by stating that Putin "is absolutely correct" – seemingly in response to Putin's remarks about Ukraine at the SCO summit, indicating this was likely a choreographed information effort. The publication of Yanukovych's video on Russian state media was likely intentionally timed to coincide with Putin's remarks. The Kremlin may be setting conditions to claim that Yanukovych is the legitimate leader of Ukraine – not Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Such claims are false, however, as Yanukovych fled Ukraine on his own accord after the Revolution of Dignity, and Ukraine has held several democratic elections since.

Putin's demands for regime change in his SCO speech are not new, but rather the reiteration of his pre-war demands that he has been pursuing throughout the war. Putin referenced the alleged "coup" in both his 2021 "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians" essay and his speech launching the full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022.[10] Yanukovych was also notably in Belarus in March 2022, possibly as part of Kremlin efforts to reestablish him as the president of Ukraine.[11] Putin's reiteration of this same demand demonstrates how Putin's unwillingness to pull back from his original war aims is the key contributor to the lack of progress toward peace since the US-Russian summit in Alaska in August 2025.

The Russian military command reportedly redeployed relatively "elite" naval infantry and airborne (VDV) forces to Donetsk Oblast from northern Sumy Oblast and the Kherson direction. A Ukrainian drone unit operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that the Russian military command redeployed several units from Kursk Oblast, including elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), to reinforce Russian offensive operations toward Dobropillya.[12] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Group of Forces claimed on August 18 that the Russian command redeployed elements of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment and the 155th and 40th naval infantry brigades from northern Sumy Oblast to another unspecified direction.[13] An OSINT analyst on X (formerly Twitter) reported on August 30 that the Russian command redeployed elements of the 40th and 155th naval infantry brigades (both of the Pacific Fleet) and likely elements of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) to Donetsk Oblast.[14] The OSINT analyst also stated that there are reports that elements of the 11th Separate VDV Brigade and 76th VDV Division were "spotted nearby" in Donetsk Oblast after the Russian military command "urgently" deployed these elements to ”the hottest direction.” The OSINT source noted that the exact axis of attack of the redeployed VDV elements is still unclear. The Russian command also reportedly redeployed elements of the 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) from Kherson Oblast to Bakhmut, possibly to reinforce Russian offensive efforts in Kostyantynivka or Siversk.[15] ISW previously observed reports that elements of the 40th and 155th naval infantry brigades, 11th Separate VDV Brigade, and 76th VDV Division were operating in northern Sumy Oblast as of late August 2025.[16] ISW previously observed reports that elements of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment were operating in northern Sumy Oblast as of August 11.[17] ISW previously observed reports in November 2024 that the 11th VDV Brigade formed a special battalion staffed by North Korean troops for combat operations in Kursk Oblast, and ISW assessed at the time that North Korean troops training in Russia were likely training with elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade and 11th VDV Brigades.[18]

The reported redeployments suggest that the Russian Fall 2025 offensive will focus on efforts to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast, particularly in the Dobropillya, Pokrovsk, and Kostyantynivka areas. The Russian command’s redeployment of forces from northern Sumy Oblast to Donetsk Oblast suggests that Russia is deprioritizing its offensive operations in Sumy Oblast. Russian forces have intensified efforts to envelop Pokrovsk, advance toward Dobropillya, and bypass Ukraine’s Donetsk Oblast fortress belt from the west.[19] These efforts have resulted in significant manpower losses, likely requiring the Russian military command to redeploy forces to the area.[20] Russia’s Fall 2024 offensive also focused on offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction - demonstrating Russia's slow progress in achieving its objectives on the battlefield at tremendous human and material costs.[21]

Likely Russian GPS jamming affected a plane carrying European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on September 1. The Associated Press (AP) reported on September 1 that European Commission spokesperson Adrianna Podestà confirmed that a plane carrying von der Leyen suffered problems from GPS jamming while flying to Bulgaria and noted that Bulgarian authorities suspect “blatant” Russian interference.[22] Podestà stated that von der Leyen’s plane landed safely at Plovdiv Airport in central Bulgaria after flying from Warsaw, Poland. The Financial Times (FT) reported on September 1 that the pilot flying von der Leyen’s plane landed the plane using paper maps, and a knowledgeable official source confirmed that GPS in the airport’s vicinity “went dark.”[23] Bulgarian Air Traffic Services Authority stated that there has been a notable increase in GPS jamming since February 2022 and that there have been issues with spoofing more recently. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed in response to a question from FT that their "information is incorrect.”[24] ISW previously observed reports that Russian electronic warfare (EW) interference significantly impacted flights in the Baltics, Poland, and Finland, particularly in early 2024.[25] Russia notably likely jammed the satellite signal of a Royal Air Force (RAF) jet transporting then-UK Defense Secretary Grant Shapps, his staff, and select journalists back to the UK from Poland in March 2024.[26] The latest reports of likely Russian GPS jamming indicate that Russia is continuing its hybrid operations in Europe, and Russia could continue to target Western political and military officials as part of these operations. Von der Leyen has notably been leading discussions with European and US officials about possible European troop deployments as part of security guarantees for Ukraine after the war.[27]

Ukraine reportedly conducted its first strike with its domestically produced FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile on August 30 against occupied Crimea. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on August 31 that Ukrainian forces conducted a Neptune missile strike against a Russian border post near occupied Voloshyne, Crimea, on August 30.[28] Sources in Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) told Ukrainian outlet Militarnyi on August 31 that Ukrainian forces used a Flamingo cruise missile – not a Neptune missile –  to strike the Russian border post.[29] ISW previously reported on August 31 that Ukrainian forces conducted this strike with a Neptune missile based on available evidence at the time.[30] Astra amplified Militarnyi’s reporting on September 1.[31] The Associated Press (AP) reported on August 21 that Ukraine launched mass production of its new Flamingo cruise missiles, which have a range of up to three thousand kilometers and can carry warheads up to 1,150 kilograms.[32]

Ukrainian authorities reportedly collected new evidence of Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov endorsing war crimes against Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs). The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) reported on September 1 that Kadyrov stated in a speech that he ordered Chechen military commanders to shoot Ukrainian soldiers on the battlefield instead of taking them prisoner.[33] The SBU added that Kadyrov also ordered Chechen soldiers to place Ukrainian POWs on the roofs of military facilities in Grozny, Republic of Chechnya, to act as human shields against Ukrainian drone strikes. Kadyrov’s statements endorsing war crimes are in line with March 2025 claims by Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander Apty Alaudinov that Russian forces used the same color of identification tape as Ukrainian forces during a covert attack behind Ukrainian positions in Kursk Oblast, which may constitute acts of perfidy, a war crime under the Geneva Convention.[34] There has been a sharp increase in credible reports and footage of Russian forces executing Ukrainian POWs throughout 2024 and 2025, and ISW continues to assess that Russian military commanders are either complicit in or directly enabling their subordinates to conduct systemic executions in direct violation of international law.[35]

Key Takeaways:

• Kremlin officials continue to deny White House statements about the prospect of a bilateral Ukrainian-Russian or trilateral US-Ukrainian-Russian meeting in the near future.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to demonstrate his unwillingness to compromise on his unwavering demands for Ukraine’s full capitulation.
• The Kremlin likely timed the publication of a video address by former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych to coincide with Putin's SCO speech in order to lend legitimacy to Putin's demand for regime change in Ukraine.
• Putin's demands for regime change in his SCO speech are not new, but rather the reiteration of his pre-war demands that he has been pursuing throughout the war.
• The Russian military command reportedly redeployed relatively "elite" naval infantry and airborne (VDV) forces to Donetsk Oblast from northern Sumy Oblast and the Kherson direction.
• The reported redeployments suggest that the Russian Fall 2025 offensive will focus on efforts to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast, particularly in the Dobropillya, Pokrovsk, and Kostyantynivka areas.
• Likely Russian GPS jamming affected a plane carrying European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on September 1.
• Ukraine reportedly conducted its first strike with its domestically produced FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile on August 30 against occupied Crimea.
• Ukrainian authorities reportedly collected new evidence of Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov endorsing war crimes against Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs).
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces advanced near Kupyansk and Novopavlivka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

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