Ukraine Invasion Updates

         This page collects the Critical Threats Project (CTP) and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) updates on the invasion of Ukraine. In late February 2022, CTP and ISW began publishing daily synthetic products covering key events related to renewed Russian aggression against Ukraine. These Ukraine Conflict Updates replaced the “Indicators and Thresholds for Russian Military Operations in Ukraine and/or Belarus,” which we maintained from November 12, 2021, through February 17, 2022.

This list also includes prominent warning alerts that CTP and ISW launched outside the crisis update structure. These products addressed critical inflection points as they occurred.

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• Maps on Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes
• Recent Updates
• February 2022 - July 2023 Updates
• Related Reads

Maps on Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes

This interactive map complements the static daily control-of-terrain maps that CTP and ISW produce with high-fidelity and, where possible, street level assessments of the war in Ukraine.

Click here to access the archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that produced daily by showing a dynamic frontline.

The Critical Threats Project and the Institute for the Study of War are publishing a summary of the methodology of our map for those who would like to learn more about the tradecraft for mapping conventional military operations from the open source.                                                                                                     

Previous versions of these static maps are available in our past publications. 

Recent Updates

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 2, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin continued to threaten Europe as part of a multi-pronged informational effort to deter the West from responding to hostile Russian actions. Putin claimed on October 2 that Russia is closely monitoring the "militarization" of Europe and explicitly stated that Russia is "listening closely" to Germany regarding remarks that the German military should be the "most powerful in Europe."[1] Putin claimed that "no one doubts" that Russia's response to Europe's "militarization" will not be "long in coming" and that Russia is evaluating whether Europe's efforts are "just talk" or if Russia must take "countermeasures" that "will be very convincing." Putin absurdly claimed that Russia has "never initiated a military confrontation" but suggested that competing with Russia militarily would "ultimately end badly for the provocateur." Putin simultaneously downplayed the threat that Russia poses to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), claiming that European warnings of Russian aggression are "nonsense" and efforts to "whip up hysteria" within Europe. Putin called on European states to "calm down" about Russia and instead focus on domestic issues. Putin is attempting to dissuade European members of NATO from bolstering their own defensive efforts and providing military support for Ukraine, which both oppose Russia's own strategic objectives, by posturing that Russia is only a threat to Europe as long as Europe resists Putin's objectives.

Putin's rhetoric follows the recent Russian and unidentified drone incursions into or within European airspace; Russian aerial overflights in or near European airspace and assets in violation of international safety norms; and Russian hybrid and sabotage operations against NATO military facilities and logistics.[2] Russia also aims to sow discord and fear within Europe through hybrid operations, including within Poland, Germany, and Lithuania.[3] Putin made these remarks during his annual speech at the Valdai Club, an international discussion forum where Kremlin officials, Russian scholars, and foreign officials and scholars meet to discuss international issues. The Valdai Club has served as a useful tool in the Kremlin’s decades-long efforts to influence Western policy in Russia’s favor.[4] Putin likely aimed to use his Valdai Club address as the venue for these remarks to ensure that his various informational efforts, including those targeting Europe, reach a broader audience and cumulatively achieve his desired effect: persuade the West against supporting Ukraine or protecting itself from Russia.

Putin attempted to discourage the United States from selling Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine by downplaying their effectiveness and indirectly threatening the United States. Putin warned the United States against selling Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine, calling the missiles "powerful" and "threatening."[5] Putin noted Ukraine cannot operate Tomahawk missiles without the "direct participation of American military personnel" and that Ukraine's use would mark a "new stage of escalation." Putin also downplayed the Tomahawk missiles as "not entirely modern" and noted that the provision of these missiles to Ukraine "will not change the balance of power on the battlefield."[6]  ISW continues to assess that Ukraine has an operational requirement to strike important military infrastructure protected in Russia's rear.[7]

Putin is attempting to exaggerate Russian advances in Ukraine to support the Kremlin’s false narrative that a Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable. Putin claimed on October 2 that Russian forces have seized two-thirds of Kupyansk.[8] ISW assesses that Russian forces have seized only 14 percent of Kupyansk as of October 2, and that Putin is exaggerating Russian gains in Kupyansk. Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov claimed on August 30 that Russian forces seized roughly 50 percent of Kupyansk, which ISW also assessed was an exaggeration of Russian gains in Kupyansk.[9] The Kremlin has been attempting to use large amounts of quantitative data to create the false impression that Russian forces are rapidly advancing on the battlefield.[10] Putin's October 2 statements are a continuation of the ongoing Kremlin effort to hyperfocus on and exaggerate tactical Russian gains to falsely portray Russia as making rapid advances on the battlefield and to provide Russia with an informational victory in the war.[11] Putin is trying to convince the United States, Europe, and Ukraine that Russia will inevitably achieve its war goals militarily, such that Ukraine should concede to Russian demands and the West should therefore cease its support of Ukraine.

The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported that US President Donald Trump approved intelligence sharing with Ukraine for long-range strikes against legitimate military targets within Russia. WSJ reported on October 1, citing unnamed US officials, that Trump recently approved US intelligence agencies and the Pentagon to share intelligence with Ukraine for long-range strikes against energy infrastructure within Russia, and that the US is asking NATO allies to provide similar intelligence support.[12] It is currently unclear if this approval also extends to military targets within Russia. The US officials stated that the US is considering providing Tomahawk missiles, Barracuda missiles, or other ground- and air-launched missiles with ranges of roughly 500 miles, cohering with prior reports that the Trump administration was considering selling Tomahawks to Ukraine.[13]

To mitigate domestic panic over Ukraine's long-range strike campaign against Russian oil refineries, Russian officials attempted to downplay the reported US decision to increase intelligence sharing with Ukraine. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on October 2 that US intelligence sharing with Ukraine is “not an innovation.”[14] Peskov also claimed that no weapon will be a "magic pill" for Ukraine.[15] Russian State Duma Defense Committee Member Andrei Kolesnik also claimed that the US has already been providing Ukraine with intelligence for long-range strikes.[16] Russian officials are likely attempting to avoid inflaming panic within Russian society, given that Ukraine’s strikes against oil refineries have spurred recent gasoline shortages.[17]

Russian military intelligence is likely conducting hybrid operations in Poland, Germany, and Lithuania to sow fear and discord within NATO states, following indications of a possible future Russian false-flag operation within Poland. Polish media, citing sources associated with the Polish Internal Security Agency (ABW) and Polish General Prosecutor's Office, reported on October 2 that the Russian General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) may have orchestrated planned drone strikes within Poland, Germany, and Lithuania.[18] The ABW detained an alleged courier whom the GRU reportedly recruited on Telegram for transporting explosives in cans for food products, drone parts, and SIM cards between Lithuania, Poland, and Germany. Lithuanian authorities also discovered a cache of explosive-filled cans in a cemetery in Kaunas, and the GRU reportedly intended for actors to use the drones to drop the explosive-filled cans for the strikes. The ABW stated that it is still investigating the people and events. ISW previously assessed that Russia and Belarus may conduct special forces sabotage operations against critical infrastructure in Poland and launch additional drone incursions and blame Ukraine.[19]

Ukraine and Russia conducted another prisoner of war (POW) exchange in accordance with agreements reached during the June 2 bilateral negotiations in Istanbul. The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of POWs and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on October 2 that Ukraine received 185 Ukrainian POWs and 20 Ukrainian civilians and that Russia received 185 POWs and 20 Russian civilians.[20]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin continued to threaten Europe as part of a multi-pronged informational effort to deter the West from responding to hostile Russian actions.
• Putin attempted to discourage the United States from selling Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine by downplaying their effectiveness and indirectly threatening the United States.
• Putin is attempting to exaggerate Russian advances in Ukraine to support the Kremlin’s false narrative that a Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable.
• The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported that US President Donald Trump approved intelligence sharing with Ukraine for long-range strikes against legitimate military targets within Russia.
• To mitigate domestic panic over Ukraine's long-range strike campaign against Russian oil refineries, Russian officials attempted to downplay the reported US decision to increase intelligence sharing with Ukraine.
• Russian military intelligence is likely conducting hybrid operations in Poland, Germany, and Lithuania to sow fear and discord within NATO states, following indications of a possible future Russian false-flag operation within Poland.
• Ukraine and Russia conducted another prisoner of war (POW) exchange in accordance with agreements reached during the June 2 bilateral negotiations in Istanbul.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Lyman and in the Dobropillya tactical area. Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Siversk, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka, and in northern Kharkiv Oblast, eastern Zaporizhia Oblast, and western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 1, 2025

The Kremlin continues the parallel use of nuclear threats and economic incentives to pressure the United States into normalizing US-Russian relations while explicitly rejecting Russian-Ukrainian negotiations. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov claimed on October 1 that the third round of US-Russian discussions to address "irritants" will "definitely take place before the end of autumn [2025]" but that Russia and the United States have not yet agreed on a specific date.[i] Ryabkov claimed that Russia is waiting for US President Donald Trump's response to Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent proposal to extend Russia's adherence to the New START Treaty, a bilateral nuclear arms limitations treaty that entered into force in 2011, for one year after it expires on February 5, 2026.[ii] Ryabkov further claimed that the United States must either "pursue stabilization" with Russia or engage in "a new arms race, which [Russia] opposes, even though [Russia is] guaranteed to ensure [its] own security."[iii] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on October 1 that Russia cannot plan high-level contacts between Russia and Ukraine because Ukraine has stopped the negotiation process.[iv] ISW continues to assess that Russia remains committed to normalizing bilateral relations with the United States for economic and political gain while protracting its war in Ukraine to make additional gains on the battlefield as the Kremlin obstructs peace efforts.[v] Russia is also attempting to discredit Ukraine by baselessly accusing the Ukrainian government of halting the negotiation process to distract from Russia's uncompromising demands that amount to Ukraine's full capitulation.[vi]

Russian shadow fleet oil tankers may be connected to the recent incursions of unidentified drones operating in NATO airspace. Norwegian public broadcaster NRK reported on October 1 that Norwegian authorities spotted an unidentified drone on September 30 near an airport in Bronnesund, prompting authorities to divert one scheduled flight and cancel remaining flights.[vii] NRK also reported that Norwegian police detained eight People's Republic of China (PRC) citizens following reports of an unidentified drone flight near the Svolvaer Airport, arrested one of the tourists, and seized drone equipment. The Norwegian police stated that there is no current apparent connection between a state actor and the Svolvaer Airport or other drone incidents. [viii] French authorities stopped the Russian Borocay shadow-fleet-linked tanker off the coast of the Saint-Nazaire port in western France on September 30 and seized the tanker and detained the captain and first mate on October 1.[ix] French President Emanuel Macron stated that the Borocay's crew committed ”very serious offenses.”[x] Maritime-focused news outlet Maritime Executive reported on September 23 that the Boracay was one of three Russian-linked vessels near the coordinated drone incursion that shut down the Copenhagen Airport on September 22.[xi] The Maritime Executive reported that European authorities are investigating three Russia-linked vessels that were sailing near the Copenhagen Airport when unidentified drone flights recently forced the airport to close.[xii] Danish tabloid Ekstra Bladet reported that the Russian Ropucha-class landing ship Alexander Shabalin had been off the Danish coast for days during heavy drone flights at Danish airports and that Danish authorities are investigating the ship's role in the drone operations.[xiii] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk similarly reported on September 28 and 29 that intelligence indicates that Russia is likely launching drones into NATO airspace from Russian shadow fleet tankers and is leveraging such vessels to conduct reconnaissance and sabotage missions in international waters.[xiv]

The Russian command may be redeploying elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division from the Kramatorsk direction to the Kherson direction. The commander of Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Kherson direction reported on October 1 that the Russian command redeployed elements of the 98th VDV Division from near Chasiv Yar to the Kherson direction to replace elements of the 70th Motorized Rifle Division (18th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) that redeployed from the Kherson direction to Donetsk Oblast at an unspecified date.[xv] Geolocated footage from a Russian source shows Russian forces, purportedly elements of the 98th VDV Division, striking a house in Prydniprovske, Kherson Oblast.[xvi] These are the first reports that ISW has observed elements of the 98th VDV Division operating outside of the Chasiv Yar direction, where the division has operated nearly exclusively since April 2023.[xvii] ISW has observed reports that some elements of the 98th VDV Division remain active near Chasiv Yar as recently as October 1, 2025, indicating that this reported Russian redeployment is likely occurring slowly and that the division may be splitting its elements across various sectors of the front.[xviii] It is currently unclear whether the Russian military command would redeploy some or all of the 98th VDV Division from the Chasiv Yar area to the Kherson direction or other areas of the frontline.

The reason for the redeployment of the 98th VDV Division is unclear. The Russian military command may be redeploying the 98th VDV Division to the Kherson direction to allow it to rest and reconstitute away from active frontline ground operations. ISW has observed Russian redeployments from the Kherson and Sumy directions to the Kostyantynivka and Pokrovsk directions in Donetsk Oblast, including elements of its relatively elite VDV and naval infantry units, indicating that the primary Russian effort in Fall 2025 is more likely in Donetsk Oblast than in Kherson Oblast.[xix] The 98th VDV Division has been in active combat since April 2023, when it participated in the final seizure of Bakhmut and the Russian efforts to advance from Bakhmut toward and through Chasiv Yar, and this redeployment may indicate that elements of the 98th VDV Division are degraded or have limited combat capability after sustaining two and a half years of offensive operations. The redeployment of elements of the 98th VDV Division may alternatively indicate that the Russian military command intends to reprioritize offensive operations in the Kherson direction, however. This would be a significant undertaking, as Russian forces would have to ford and cross the Dnipro River into unoccupied Kherson Oblast under intense Ukrainian fires — an operation Russian forces have not attempted since Ukraine's liberation of west (right) bank Kherson Oblast in November 2022. Forces that have been in combat with as little rest as the 98th VDV Division would be ill-equipped for such an undertaking without significant rest. It is possible that the Russian military command intends to redeploy elements of the division slowly to prepare for a future offensive in the Kherson direction after the division has rested and reconstituted, allowing other Russian forces to fight in Russia's current priority efforts in Donetsk Oblast. ISW will continue to monitor for indications that the Russian command is redeploying elements of the 98th VDV Division to the Kherson direction or any other areas of the front.

Gasoline shortages continue in Russia and occupied Ukraine due to repeated Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries. Russian energy-focused outlet Seala told Russian state outlet RBK on September 30 that Russian oil refineries are temporarily facing a 38 percent decrease (roughly 338,000 tons per day) in their primary oil refining capacity as of September 28 due to Ukrainian drone strikes, which have struck more than two dozen major oil refineries in Russia since early August 2025.[xx] Seala estimated that Russia's total available capacity for gasoline and diesel fuel production fell by 6 percent in August 2025 and by another 18 percent in September 2025, reaching historic lows. Seala estimated that Ukrainian drone strikes caused approximately 70 percent of downtime in gasoline production as the strikes disabled approximately a quarter of Russia’s oil refining capacity (roughly 236,000 tons per day) by the end of September 2025, and that four more Russian refineries, including two of the top five largest Russian oil refineries, halted production after drone strikes. Independent Russian outlet the Moscow Times reported that the fuel crisis has impacted the Far East and occupied Crimea the hardest, where Russian authorities have banned sales of more than 30 liters of gasoline per customer since the beginning of the week (roughly September 28).[xxi] Crimean occupation head Sergey Aksyonov announced on October 1 a limit of 20 liters of gasoline per customer in an effort to mitigate the gasoline shortage.[xxii] Russian economist Vladislav Inozemtsev noted that Russian oil companies have to wait months for repairs to damaged refineries, as Western sanctions have blocked the sale of equipment and replacement parts on which Russia relies and cannot easily replace with Chinese equivalents. Russian business outlet Kommersant reported that Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak outlined to Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin on September 24 several possible means of alleviating Russia’s desperation for gas, including a zero-rate five percent import customs duty on gasoline imported from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), South Korea, and Singapore through certain checkpoints in the Far East.[xxiii] Novak also reportedly proposed a rule that Russia will only authorize certain companies to supply fuel, which would allow Russia to export approximately 150,000 tons of gasoline from Siberian refineries westward per month to maintain supply balances in central Russia. Novak also reportedly proposed increasing gasoline imports from Belarus from 45,000 tons to 300,000 tons per month. RBK reported that Belarus began exporting gasoline to Russia in September 2025 after a pause that began in Fall 2024.[xxiv]

Russia’s problems with oil refinery capabilities will likely persist amidst more damage to Russian oil refineries. Russian authorities and sources reported on October 1 that there was a large fire at the Yaroslavl Oil Refinery, located 700 kilometers from the Ukrainian border.[xxv] Yaroslavl Oblast Governor Mikhail Evraev claimed on October 1 that the incident is unrelated to a drone attack, and neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources have attributed responsibility for the fire.[xxvi] Rostov Oblast Governor Yuriy Slyusar claimed that a Ukrainian drone strike overnight caused a fire at an industrial facility in Verkhnedonsky Raion, Rostov Oblast, and NASA FIRMS data indicates that there was a fire at the Sukhodolnaya Oil Pumping Station in Rostov Oblast.[xxvii]

The Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) has been disconnected from the Ukrainian power grid for over a week as Russia sets conditions to imminently transfer the plant to the Russian power grid. Ukrainian and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officials reported on September 30 that the ZNPP has been disconnected from the Ukrainian power grid since September 23 and is relying on backup diesel generators to maintain its reactor cooling systems.[xxviii] The Ukrainian officials stated that Russian shelling damaged the final operational Ukrainian power line to the ZNPP, and the IAEA stated that the damage occurred about 1.5 kilometers from the ZNPP itself. Damage to the ZNPP's power lines has disconnected the ZNPP from the Ukrainian power grid nine other times since the full-scale invasion prior to September 23, and the current power outage is the longest the ZNPP has ever endured.[xxix] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukrainian Enerhodar Mayor in exile Dmytro Orlov stated that one of the diesel generators supporting the ZNPP has failed, as the diesel generators are not designed to operate for such a long period of time.[xxx] Orlov stated that continued Russian shelling of the area prevents Ukrainian authorities from repairing the power line.[xxxi] IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated that there is no immediate danger to the ZNPP, but that running on the diesel generators is not sustainable.[xxxii] Grossi stated that Ukraine has been ready to repair another power line to the ZNPP that has been disconnected since May 2025, but that the "military situation" has not allowed Ukraine to repair this power line. Russian officials denied the reports of Russian shelling and accused Ukrainian strikes of damaging the power line to the ZNPP.[xxxiii] Greenpeace Ukraine analyzed satellite imagery of damage to the power line since September 23 and assessed that there was no shelling of the power line, suggesting that Russian forces conducted sabotage operations against the power line.[xxxiv]

Russia has been setting conditions to connect the ZNPP to the Russian power grid for months. Russia has been constructing power lines into occupied southern Ukraine that could connect the ZNPP to the Russian power grid, and Russian officials have announced their intention to bring the ZNPP to its full operational capacity under Russian control.[xxxv] Transferring the ZNPP to the Russian power grid requires that the ZNPP remain disconnected from the Ukrainian power grid. The ZNPP's six nuclear reactors have remained in a cold shutdown mode since April 2024 to mitigate the risk of nuclear disaster in wartime conditions, and restarting the ZNPP under conditions of occupation and war would very likely introduce significant risks.[xxxvi] Russia's occupation of the ZNPP has significantly degraded the security of the plant, and Russia's integration of the ZNPP into the Russian power grid will exacerbate security risks, degrade Ukraine's future power generation capacity, and serve as a tool that Russia can use to legitimize its occupation of Ukraine.[xxxvii]

The European Commission (EC) announced a $4.7 billion aid package for Ukraine using funds from frozen Russian assets. The EC announced on October 1 that its Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) loan program issued Ukraine its ninth tranche of funds worth four billion euros (roughly $4.7 billion) secured by proceeds from frozen Russian revenues.[xxxviii] The EC noted that its overall support to Ukraine is now approaching 178 billion euros (roughly $209 billion). EC President Ursula von der Leyen announced on September 30 that two billion euros (roughly $2.3 billion) of the earmarked funds are for drone production.[xxxix]

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin continues the parallel use of nuclear threats and economic incentives to pressure the United States into normalizing US-Russian relations while explicitly rejecting Russian-Ukrainian negotiations.
• Russian shadow fleet oil tankers may be connected to the recent incursions of unidentified drones operating in NATO airspace.
• The Russian command may be redeploying elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division from the Kramatorsk direction to the Kherson direction.
• Gasoline shortages continue in Russia and occupied Ukraine due to repeated Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries.
• The Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) has been disconnected from the Ukrainian power grid for over a week as Russia sets conditions to imminently transfer the plant to the Russian power grid.
• The European Commission (EC) announced a $4.7 billion aid package for Ukraine using funds from frozen Russian assets.
• Russian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area and near Velykomykhailivka and in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 30, 2025

Russia and Belarus may conduct special forces sabotage operations against critical infrastructure in Poland and launch additional drone incursions and blame Ukraine. Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) baselessly claimed on September 30 that Ukraine is preparing to conduct a false flag attack against critical Polish infrastructure in order to implicate Russia and Belarus.[1] The SVR claimed that Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and Polish intelligence will deploy a sabotage and reconnaissance group comprised of Russian and Belarusian nationals from the pro-Ukrainian Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR) and Kastuś Kalinoŭski Regiment to Poland. The SVR claimed that the troops will pose as Russian and Belarusian Spetsnaz personnel at a press conference after Polish security forces capture them and that the pro-Ukrainian troops will blame Russia and Belarus for the incident. The SVR claimed that Ukraine may simultaneously conduct an "attack" on critical infrastructure in Poland in order to "heighten public outcry." The SVR claimed that Ukraine is trying to take advantage of the recent drone incursions into NATO airspace to inflame anti-Russian sentiment in Poland, accelerate escalation in the war, and incite European countries to intervene in the war on behalf of Ukraine. The Kremlin may have ordered the SVR to release this statement in order to evade responsibility for a possible future Russian and Belarusian sabotage operation against Poland.

The Kremlin often uses the SVR to spread unfounded allegations of imminent attacks as part of disinformation campaigns designed to weaken support for Ukraine and sow doubt about the nature of Russia’s own provocations against NATO member states.[2] The Kremlin is likely setting information conditions to blame Ukraine for future attacks that Russia itself may conduct against Poland or other NATO states. Russia similarly accused Ukraine on September 26 of conducting the recent drone incursions into Polish and Romanian airspace to instigate a NATO-Russia war, despite the fact that Polish and Romanian officials attributed the incursions to Russia.[3]

 Kremlin-linked Moldovan politicians may call for protests in the coming days and weeks before Moldovan authorities validate the results of the September 28 parliamentary elections. The Kremlin-linked Patriotic bloc claimed on September 30 that Moldovan authorities committed "egregious" election violations and that the bloc will "seek justice through street protests, in the courts, and, if necessary, in the Constitutional Court."[4] Kremlin-linked Moldovan politicians stated on September 29 that they would appeal the election results on the pretext of electoral violations.[5] High-ranking Kremlin officials continue to buttress Kremlin-linked Moldovan politicians' claims of electoral fraud and violations. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on September 30 that the elections were "fraudulent" and that Moldovan authorities "blatantly manipulated" the votes.[6] Russian Federation Council Chairperson Valentina Matvienko claimed on September 29 that Moldovan President Maia Sandu brought the Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS), which won a parliamentary majority in the elections, to victory "on bayonets" and that the elections were illegitimate.[7] Matvienko claimed that Moldovan citizens will not recognize the election. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on September 29 that the election was "unprecedentedly dirty" and that Moldovan authorities used extra-legal mechanisms, blackmail, and threats.[8]

Moldovan law stipulates that the Central Election Commission (CEC) must create a report on the parliamentary election results within five days of the elections and then submit the report to the Constitutional Court within one day — by October 4.[9] The Constitutional Court must then confirm or invalidate the legality of the elections within 10 days of receiving the CEC report (no later than October 14). Electoral contestants can request that authorities recount the votes up until the court confirms the results. The Constitutional Court can declare the elections invalid if it finds violations of the electoral code during the electoral process or vote counting that influenced the results. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin has been setting conditions to generate (possibly violent) protests to remove Sandu from power after the elections and may launch protests to contest the election results.[10] The Kremlin may still plan to ignite violent protests even should the Constitutional Court validate the results in October 2025, possibly in order to generate a Kremlin-initiated mirror-image of the spontaneous pro-European 2014 Euromaidan protests in Ukraine that drove pro-Russian Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych from office.[11] The Kremlin has set information conditions to ignite protests in Moldova as late as the end of November 2025.

 Ukraine’s European allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine, including to support Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB). European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced on September 30 that the EU will commit two billion euros (roughly $2.3 billion) to Ukraine for drone production.[12] Von der Leyen stated that this funding will allow Ukraine to scale up and use its full drone production capacity and also allow the EU to benefit from such technology. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on September 30 that the US is currently discussing the fifth and sixth weapons packages to Ukraine through NATO’s Prioritized Ukrainian Requirements List (PURL) initiative, which funds NATO purchases of US-made weapons for Ukraine.[13] Zelensky stated that Ukraine's goal is to receive one billion dollars' worth of weapons per month through PURL. NATO launched the PURL initiative in July 2025, and NATO countries, including the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Germany, and Canada, have already contributed more than two billion dollars to Ukraine through the program.[14]

 European officials continue to report unidentified drones operating near European military and economic facilities as Ukraine launched efforts to train its European allies in counter-drone tactics. Norwegian public broadcaster NRK and Norwegian outlet VG reported on September 29 that employees at the Sleipner oil drilling, production, and accommodation platform reported sightings of an unspecified drone near the platform in the North Sea off the western coast of Norway.[15] Norwegian Police official Roger Litlatun stated that Norwegian authorities are investigating the incident. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on September 30 that a group of Ukrainian specialists traveled to Denmark to train Danish troops in counter-drone tactics as part of the "Wings of Defense" joint exercise following similar drone incidents around Europe in recent weeks.[16]

Key Takeaways:

• Russia and Belarus may conduct special forces sabotage operations against critical infrastructure in Poland and launch additional drone incursions and blame Ukraine.
• Kremlin-linked Moldovan politicians may call for protests in the coming days and weeks before Moldovan authorities validate the results of the September 28 parliamentary elections.
• Ukraine’s European allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine, including to support Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB).
• European officials continue to report unidentified drones operating near European military and economic facilities as Ukraine launched efforts to train its European allies in counter-drone tactics.
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Borova and Lyman. Russian forces advanced near Borova, Lyman, Siversk, and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical effort area.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 29, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin issued the decree to start the semi-annual fall conscription cycle on October 1. Russia holds two conscription cycles in the spring and fall every year, and Putin signed a decree on September 29 authorizing the Fall 2025 cycle, to conscript 135,000 Russian citizens between October 1 and December 31 for 12 months of mandatory military service outside of the active combat zone in Ukraine.[i] Russia conscripted 134,500 Russians in Spring 2022 and 120,000 in Fall 2022; 147,000 in Spring 2023 and 130,000 in Fall 2023; and 150,000 in Spring 2024 and 133,000 in Fall 2024.[ii] The fall cycles have historically conscripted fewer Russians than those in the spring, but the number of conscripts has grown each season since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion. Deputy Chief of the Main Organizational and Mobilization Directorate of the Russian General Staff Vice Admiral Vladimir Tsimlyansky emphasized on September 22 that the upcoming conscription cycle is not related to the war in Ukraine.[iii] Tsimlyansky stated that conscripts will only serve on Russian territory and will not conduct tasks related to the war - meaning conscripts will also not serve in occupied Ukraine that Russia illegally defines as ”Russian territory.” Tsimlyansky stated that the Russian military command will start sending conscripts to assembly points on October 15 and that a third of the conscripts will receive specialized training in training units and at military bases.[iv] Russian law prohibits the deployment of conscripts to combat, and Russian forces have typically relied on conscripts for border security, including in Bryansk, Belgorod, and Kursk oblasts.[v] Conscript border guards' participation in combat during the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast caused particular discontent in Russian society.[vi]  

Conscripts from Russia’s semi-annual conscription cycles become reservists after their 12 months of service, and Russia can call up reservists in the future. Conscripts that eventually join the inactive reserve are notably different than the active strategic reserve that Russia reportedly has been forming since July 2025 of soldiers who have signed contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[vii] Russian officials continue to deceive and coerce conscripts to sign military contracts with the Russian MoD to increase the number of servicemembers deployed to combat in Ukraine or to the active strategic reserve.[viii] Russia appears to be taking efforts to mitigate bureaucratic bottlenecks that would slow down Russian involuntary reservist call-ups in the future, including expanding conscription administrative processes to be year-round.[ix]

The Kremlin plans to spend 17 trillion rubles ($183 billion) on national security and defense in 2026 — about 38 percent of its planned annual expenditures. The Russian government submitted to the Russian State Duma on September 29 a draft budget for 2026-2028 that projects federal revenues in 2026 to be roughly 40.3 trillion rubles ($485 billion) and federal expenditures to be roughly 44.1 trillion rubles ($531 billion).[x] The budget calls for 12.9 trillion rubles ($155 billion) to go towards “National Defense” expenditures in 2026 - a decrease from 13.5 trillion rubles ($163 billion) in 2025.[xi] The draft budget projects that defense spending will increase to 13.6 trillion rubles ($164 billion) in 2027 and then decrease to 13 trillion rubles ($156.5 billion) in 2028. The 2026 budget also calls for 3.9 trillion rubles ($47 billion) towards “National Security” - an increase from 3.5 trillion rubles ($42 billion) in 2025. Russia plans to commit roughly 38 percent of its expenditures in 2026 to combined “defense” and “security” expenses - a decrease from 41 percent in 2025.[xii] The budget allocates 58 billion rubles ($698 million) in 2026 to fund compensation payments and social benefits for servicemembers killed or wounded in action and their family members - a decrease from 78 billion rubles ($939 million) spent in 2025.[xiii] The budget also allocated roughly 13.9 billion rubles ($167 million) in 2026 to fund the “Defenders of the Fatherland Fund,” which supports Russian veterans and their families - a decrease from the roughly 34.7 billion rubles ($418 million) spent in 2025.[xiv] Russia is reducing its defense and security spending in 2026 by roughly 200 billion rubles ($2.4 billion) as compared to 2025, despite Russia's ongoing economic struggles. Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov claimed on September 18, for example, that Russian authorities expect the share of Russia’s revenues from oil and gas sales funding the Russian federal budget to be about 20 to 22 percent in 2026, which Siluanov noted is a decrease from about 50 percent previously.[xv] The Kremlin recently announced an increase in value-added tax specifically to fund defense and security, which the Russian Finance Ministry estimated will generate about $14.2 billion in additional revenue in 2026.[xvi]

The Russian government is planning to increase funding to televised propaganda - in line with increased restrictions on social media and internet access. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on September 29 that the Russian government plans to spend 106.4 billion rubles ($1.28 billion) on state television channels in 2026 - a significant increase from the previously planned 69.1 billion rubles ($832 million) in 2025.[xvii] The Russian 2025 budget allocated 4.5 billion rubles ($47 million) and 49 million rubles ($511,000) towards the Solovyov Live Telegram channel and Readovka online news aggregator, respectively, likely as part of the Russian government’s efforts to adapt its propaganda to social media.[xviii] The significant rise in funding toward television in 2026 suggests that the Kremlin is returning to traditional methods of disseminating state propaganda, particularly against the backdrop of recent restrictions on social media, and the creation of the Russian state messenger Max.[xix]

US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg acknowledged that Ukraine has US permission to conduct long-range strikes against Russian territory. Kellogg responded in an interview on September 29 with Fox News to a question asking if US President Donald Trump has authorized Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russian territory.[xx] Kellogg stated that Trump's, US Vice President JD Vance's, and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio's statements all indicate that there are no sanctuaries in Russia and that this is why Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has requested US Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAMs). Kellogg stated that it is up to Trump to decide whether the US will provide Ukraine with Tomahawks. ISW has long argued that Russia should not be permitted to leverage sanctuaries that Western restrictions on Ukrainian strikes against Russian territory create.[xxi] Russia has, in the past, been able to amass ground forces, materiel, and subsequently launch new offensives into Ukraine and conduct long-range strikes against Ukraine within the protection of these sanctuaries.

Kremlin officials are trying to preemptively deter the United States from providing Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov questioned on September 29 whether it would be Ukrainian or American forces that would be launching the Tomahawk missiles into Russia and questioned who would be conducting the targeting for the Ukrainian strikes.[xxii] Peskov claimed that the Kremlin must determine which forces will be involved in the process before it can determine its response. Peskov attempted to downplay the effect Ukrainian Tomahawk strikes could have on the Ukrainian war effort, claiming that Tomahawk missiles will not change battlefield dynamics.[xxiii] First Deputy Chairperson of the Russian State Duma Defense Committee Alexei Zhuravlev claimed that US provisions of Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine will be a new stage in the war, with the United States becoming a direct participant.[xxiv] Zhuravlev threatened that Russia will respond by moving its Oreshnik ballistic missiles closer to the United States, possibly to Venezuela. Chairperson of the Federation Council Committee on Constitutional Legislation and State Building Alexei Pushkov claimed on September 29 that Ukraine would conduct "dangerous" provocations with US-provided Tomahawk missiles, directly involving the United States in the war.[xxv] The Kremlin is attempting to portray US Tomahawk deliveries to Ukraine as a dangerous escalation to deter the United States from sending such weapons to Ukraine, just as the Kremlin has previously employed similar tactics when the United States was discussing sending the Ukrainian Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS), High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), F-16 fighter jets, and Abrams tanks.[xxvi] These efforts are part of Russia's long-standing reflexive control campaign that aims to push the West to make decisions that actually benefit Russia. Previous Ukrainian strikes using US-provided long-range weapons systems did not trigger an escalatory Russian reaction, and the West and Ukraine have repeatedly violated Russia's alleged "red lines" in the past with no resulting escalation, as the Kremlin warned.[xxvii]

European officials continue to report unidentified drones operating within NATO airspace. Norwegian Armed Forces Operational Headquarters Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Vegard Finberg reported on September 29 that the Norwegian Armed Forces observed drones near unspecified military facilities in Troms and Finnmark on the evening of September 28.[xxviii] A spokesperson for a Norwegian airline reported that authorities observed unidentified drones within the exclusion zone at Bronnoysund Airport in Nordland on the evening of September 28.[xxix] The Romanian Ministry of National Defense reported on September 29 that witnesses reported unidentified drones in the Sontea Noua Canal area and that Romanian officials are investigating fallen debris in the area.[xxx] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on September 28 that intelligence indicates that Russian forces are likely launching drones to violate NATO airspace from tankers that are part of the Russian shadow fleet.[xxxi] Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk reported on September 29 that Russian forces are leveraging civilian vessels to conduct reconnaissance and sabotage missions in international waters, including targeting underwater cables with anchors.[xxxii]

The pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) won a parliamentary majority in the September 28 elections in Moldova, as Kremlin-linked Moldovan politicians and Russian officials are preparing to appeal the results and call for protests in the coming days. PAS won 50.2 percent of the vote, securing 55 out of 101 seats in the Moldovan Parliament.[xxxiii] Igor Dodon, a Kremlin-linked former Moldovan president, called on Moldovans to conduct peaceful protests outside of the parliament building in Chisinau on the afternoon of September 29.[xxxiv] The September 29 protests were limited and calm, with about 300 people in attendance and lasting only about 30 minutes.[xxxv] Dodon stated on September 29 that the leaders of the Patriotic bloc, which won 24.17 percent and 26 seats, do not recognize the results and will appeal.[xxxvi] Kremlin-linked Moldovan politician Ilan Shor claimed on Russian state television channel Rossiya 24 that his Pobeda electoral bloc, which Moldovan authorities barred from running in the elections, also does not recognize the results and plans to appeal.[xxxvii] Shor stated that the Pobeda bloc will discuss its plan with unspecified colleagues over the "next day or two" and then will call for protests.[xxxviii]

Kremlin-linked Moldovan and Russian officials are alleging election fraud and procedural violations to set conditions to appeal the results and call for protests. Shor claimed that the elections were "obviously rigged" and that Moldovan authorities intimidated ten to twenty percent of voters to prevent them from voting.[xxxix] Vasile Tarlev, the leader of the Future of Moldova party within the Patriotic bloc, claimed on September 28 that Moldovan authorities restricted observers' and journalists' access to polling stations to "conceal fraud and provocations," including in Transnistria (the pro-Russian parastate in eastern Moldova).[xl] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on September 29 that "some political forces" in Moldova are declaring their disagreement with the election results and are discussing possible election violations.[xli] Peskov claimed that Russia can "confirm" that Moldovan authorities "denied" hundreds of thousands of Moldovans living in Russia the opportunity to vote.[xlii] Russian Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) Head Leonid Slutsky claimed on September 29 that Moldovan authorities violated electoral rights and freedoms, falsified the results, and are leading the country "down the path of Ukraine."[xliii] First Deputy Chairperson of the Russian State Duma Defense Committee Alexei Zhuravlev claimed on September 28 that Western intelligence agencies interfered in the Moldovan elections.[xliv] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin has been setting conditions to generate (possibly violent) protests to remove Moldovan President Maia Sandu from power after the elections.[xlv]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin issued the decree to start the semi-annual fall conscription cycle on October 1.
• The Kremlin plans to spend 17 trillion rubles ($183 billion) on national security and defense in 2026 — about 38 percent of its planned annual expenditures.
• The Russian government is planning to increase funding to televised propaganda - in line with increased restrictions on social media and internet access.
• US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg acknowledged that Ukraine has US permission to conduct long-range strikes against Russian territory.
• Kremlin officials are trying to preemptively deter the United States from providing Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles.
• European officials continue to report unidentified drones operating within NATO airspace.
• The pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) won a parliamentary majority in the September 28 elections in Moldova, as Kremlin-linked Moldovan politicians and Russian officials are preparing to appeal the results and call for protests in the coming days.
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Lyman and in the Dobropillya tactical area. Russian forces advanced near Velykyi Burluk, Lyman, Siversk, Novopavlivka, and Velykomykhailivka and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 28, 2025

US Vice President JD Vance criticized Russia's rejection of American invitations to engage in bilateral or trilateral negotiations as Kremlin officials continue to demonstrate their lack of interest in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine. Vance stated on September 28 that Russia has “refused to sit down” in any bilateral meeting with Ukraine or a trilateral meeting with Ukraine and the United States over the last few weeks — in direct opposition to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s reported agreement with US President Donald Trump on August 18 to hold a bilateral meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.[1] Vance stated that Russia’s economy is “in shambles,” that Russia is making “little, if any,” gains on the battlefield, and that it is time for Russia to "actually talk seriously about peace.” Vance stated that the "reality on the ground" has changed, with Russia killing and losing a lot of people without “much to show for it.” Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated on September 28 that Russia is open to starting negotiations to address  the “root causes” of the war — which Kremlin officials have repeatedly claimed are NATO’s eastward expansion and Ukraine’s alleged discrimination against Russian speakers, among other things.[2] Kremlin officials, including Lavrov, have consistently used “root causes” as shorthand to reiterate Russia’s original war demands, which Kremlin officials have continuously asserted Russia will achieve either militarily or diplomatically.[3] ISW continues to assess that Russia remains unwilling to engage in good faith negotiations and is instead repeatedly demanding that Ukraine capitulate and acquiesce to Russia’s maximalist demands.[4]

Russian forces conducted the third largest combined missile and drone strike against Ukraine of the war to date on the night of September 27 to 28 with 643 total projectiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles from the airspace over Lipetsk Oblast; 38 Kh-101 cruise missiles from the airspace over Saratov Oblast; two drone-launched Banderol missiles from Kursk Oblast; and eight Kalibr cruise missiles from the Black Sea.[5] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 593 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones from the directions of Kursk, Bryansk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda and Kacha, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defenses downed a total of 611 projectiles, including 566 drones; two drone-launched Banderol missiles; 35 Kh-101 cruise missiles; and eight Kalibr cruise missiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that five missiles and 31 drones struck 16 locations throughout Ukraine and that drone debris fell on 25 locations. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that the Russian drones and missiles primarily struck civilian infrastructure in Kyiv City and Oblast and Zaporizhia, Khmelnytskyi, Sumy, Mykolaiv, Chernihiv, and Odesa oblasts and that the strikes lasted over 12 hours.[6] Zelensky reported that Russian strikes on Kyiv City killed four civilians and injured at least 40, including children. Kyiv Oblast Military Administration Head Mykola Kalashnyk reported that Russian strikes on Kyiv City left over 2,500 civilians without gas and roughly 580 civilians without electricity.[7] Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration Head Ivan Fedorov reported that Russian forces struck Zaporizhzhia City with at least eight missiles, injuring 42 civilians and damaging civilian infrastructure.[8] Konotop City Mayor Artem Semenikhin reported that Russian forces appear to be adapting their drone strike tactics by circling Shahed-type drones over neighborhoods up to 12 times instead of striking immediately in order to terrify residents.[9] Poland’s Armed Forces Operational Command scrambled two fighter jets and put air defense on high alert on September 27 in response to Russia’s overnight strikes against Ukraine but did not report any violations of Polish airspace.[10] ISW continues to assess that Russian strikes are increasingly and disproportionately impacting civilian areas in Russia's significantly larger-scale strike packages of recent months and that such strikes underscore Ukraine’s need for continued supply of Western air defense systems, especially US-provided Patriot systems.[11]

European officials continue to report unidentified drones operating within NATO airspace. The Danish Defense Command reported on September 28 that the Danish Armed Forces observed drones near multiple military facilities on the night of September 27 to 28.[12] A Norwegian police official reported on September 27 that the Norwegian Armed Forces and police officers observed unidentified drones near Norway’s Ørland Air Base, which houses F-35 fighter jets, on the morning of September 26 for a period of two and a half hours.[13]

Kremlin-linked Moldovan politicians called for protests in Moldova following the September 28 parliamentary election. Voting has not yet closed in the parliamentary elections as of this writing, and ISW will continue to monitor the results as they become available. Igor Dodon, a Kremlin-linked former Moldovan president, falsely claimed on September 28 that current Moldovan President Maia Sandu spoke about the possibility of annulling the elections — a false claim that Russian state media and milbloggers widely amplified.[14] Dodon called on Moldovans to conduct peaceful protests outside of the parliament building in Chisinau on the afternoon of September 29 in order to prevent Moldovan authorities from annulling their votes. A journalist with Moldovan outlet IPN reported that unspecified sources stated that the Patriotic bloc was calling for people to protest at 22:00 local time in Chisinau and were trying to bring people to the protest from Transnistria (the pro-Russian parastate in eastern Moldova).[15] The Patriotic bloc has already organized some protests near the Moldovan Central Election Commission (CEC) in Chisinau as of this writing, but the protests appear to be limited, with available footage only showing a few dozen demonstrators so far.[16] The Moldovan Police reported on September 28 that they detained three people who were members of the Transnistrian security forces and were coordinating, monitoring, and providing logistical support to groups preparing to provoke mass unrest in Moldova.[17] The police reported that they found unspecified incendiary devices and flammable materials during the arrest. The Serbian Ministry of the Interior stated on September 26 that police arrested two people whom Serbian authorities accused of organizing and financing "combat-tactical training" for protestors before the Moldovan elections.[18] The Serbian police reported that the trainings occurred between July 16 and September 12 near Loznica, Serbia and that 150 to 170 Moldovan and Romanian nationals participated. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin has been setting conditions to generate (possibly violent) protests to remove Sandu from power after the elections, including by spreading narratives about the possible annulment of the results.[19]

The parliamentary elections faced large-scale cyberattacks and bomb threats that aimed to disrupt the voting process. Moldovan Prime Minister Dorin Recean reported that a large-scale cyberattack targeted election-related infrastructure, including the website of the Moldovan CEC and polling stations abroad, on September 27 and 28.[20] Recean stated that the cyberattacks caused about 4,000 websites to go down and that one distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack came from several countries simultaneously. The Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) reported bomb alerts at polling stations in Belgium, Italy, Romania, the United States, and Spain.[21] Neither Recean nor the Moldovan MFA commented on the suspected actor behind the cyberattacks and bomb threats, however.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov emphasized that Russia will use its upcoming United Nations Security Council (UNSC) presidency to "review" the 1995 Dayton Accords in a likely effort to destabilize the Balkans and divide and distract Europe. Lavrov claimed on September 28 that Russia’s UNSC presidency, set for the month of October 2025, will “review the implementation of the Dayton Accords" (which ended the 1992–1995 Bosnian War), claiming that the accords will likely “collapse” as they infringe on “the rights of the Serbian people.”[22] Lavrov further claimed that there are “flagrant violations of the Dayton Accords” and that the West’s recognition of Kosovo’s independence became an attack on Serbia’s statehood.[23] Lavrov accused the West of attempting to disintegrate Bosnia and Herzegovina’s statehood and claimed that there is an attack on “the vital interests of the Serbian people,” including an attack on Serbian Orthodoxy, in both Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Kremlin maintains close relations with the Republika Srpska (the Serbian political entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina) and has previously leveraged its relationship with Republika Srpska to further influence the Balkans, sow divisions in Europe, and undermine the US-backed Dayton Accords to throw the Balkans into turmoil.[24]

Key Takeaways:

• US Vice President JD Vance criticized Russia's rejection of American invitations to engage in bilateral or trilateral negotiations as Kremlin officials continue to demonstrate their lack of interest in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine.
• Russian forces conducted the third largest combined missile and drone strike against Ukraine of the war to date on the night of September 27 to 28 with 643 total projectiles.
• European officials continue to report unidentified drones operating within NATO airspace.
• Kremlin-linked Moldovan politicians called for protests in Moldova following the September 28 parliamentary election.
• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov emphasized that Russia will use its upcoming United Nations Security Council (UNSC) presidency to "review" the 1995 Dayton Accords in a likely effort to destabilize the Balkans and divide and distract Europe.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman and Novopavlivka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 27, 2025

Gasoline shortages continue in Russia and occupied Ukraine due to repeated Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries. Sources in the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne on September 27 that the SBU conducted a long-range drone strike against the Tyngovatovo Oil Pumping Station in Konar, Chuvash Republic, approximately 1,000 kilometers from the international border.[1] The SBU sources stated that a drone struck the pumping station and caused a fire, suspending oil transportation through the facility. Chuvash Republic Head Oleg Nikolaev said on September 27 that Ukrainian forces attempted a drone strike against an oil pumping station near Konar and admitted that there is minor damage to the facility and that the facility suspended operations.[2] On September 26, Lipetsk Oblast Governor Igor Artamonov called on Lipetsk Oblast residents to remain calm despite reports of fuel shortages in the oblast and claimed that the shortages are due to logistical difficulties in loading fuel from some refineries.[3] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that Lipetsk Oblast residents are complaining about high prices for AI-95 gasoline and that prices reached approximately $3.70 a gallon.[4] The Russian government has historically used subsidies to artificially depress and stabilize domestic gas prices, although recent Ukrainian drone strikes appear to be complicating this policy.[5] The average cost of gasoline in Russia was approximately $2.15 per gallon in September 2023 and $2.40 per gallon in September 2024, and prices have largely stayed below $3.00 a gallon since February 2023.[6] Astra reported that gas stations are starting to sell fuel with fuel cards and that some stations in Moscow, Leningrad, Ryazan, and several Far Eastern oblasts are limiting fuel purchases to 10- to 20-liter increments or are only selling diesel. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on September 27 that the Ukrainian strikes against the Russian oil industry are having limited though painful consequences and that fuel shortages are particularly severe in the Far East, frontline areas of Belgorod Oblast, and occupied Crimea, which is entirely reliant on external oil supplies.[7] The milblogger claimed that gas prices are increasing significantly in Nizhny Novgorod, Rostov, Lipetsk, and Tula oblasts and Krasnodar and Stavropol krais.

Ukraine’s Western partners continue to provide military aid to Ukraine, including through the purchase of US weapons. The Estonian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on September 27 that Estonia will contribute 10 million euros (roughly $11.7 million) to Ukraine through NATO's Prioritized Ukrainian Requirements List (PURL) initiative, which funds NATO purchases of US-made weapons for Ukraine.[8] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on September 27 that Israel supplied Ukraine with a Patriot system in August 2025 and that Ukraine will receive two Patriot air defense systems in Fall 2025.[9]

Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova absurdly blamed Ukraine on September 26 for the September 9 to 10 Russian drone incursion in Poland and the September 13 Russian drone incursion in Romania. Zakharova continued to deny Russian involvement in the drone incursions over Poland and Romania and claimed that Ukraine was responsible and orchestrated the incursions in order to frame Russia and provoke a war between NATO and Russia.[10] Zakharova claimed that a third world war will break out imminently if someone confirms Ukraine's alleged involvement in false flag operations in Romania and Poland.[11] Polish and Romanian authorities previously identified the drones that violated their airspaces as Russian.[12]

European officials continue to report unidentified drones operating within NATO airspace. The Danish Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on September 27 that Danish Defense Command observed drones near multiple Danish military facilities, including Skrydstrup Air Base and the barracks of the Jutland Dragoon Regiment in Holstebro.[13] The Vilnius Public Security Service reported on September 26 that three unidentified drones disrupted flights at the Vilnius Airport twice on the afternoon of September 26.[14] Finnish outlet Yle reported on September 27 that an unknown entity piloted a drone over the Valajaskoski Power Plant in Rovaniemi, Lapland, in northern Finland.[15]

Key Takeaways:

• Gasoline shortages continue in Russia and occupied Ukraine due to repeated Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries
• Ukraine’s Western partners continue to provide military aid to Ukraine, including through the purchase of US weapons.
• Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova absurdly blamed Ukraine on September 26 for the September 9 to 10 Russian drone incursion in Poland and the September 13 Russian drone incursion in Romania.
• European officials continue to report unidentified drones operating within NATO airspace.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy and western Zaporizhia oblasts. Russian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area and near Siversk, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 25, 2025

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to artificially inflate its claims of advance in Ukraine to support the Kremlin's false narrative that a Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces seized at least 4,714 square kilometers across the theater between January 1 and September 25, 2025: 205 square kilometers in Luhansk Oblast; 3,308 square kilometers in Donetsk Oblast; 261 square kilometers in Zaporizhia Oblast; 175 square kilometers in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; 542 square kilometers in Kharkiv Oblast; and 223 square kilometers in Sumy Oblast.[1] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces seized 205 settlements in Ukraine during this time period. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have seized only 3,434 square kilometers since January 1: 151 square kilometers in Luhansk Oblast; 2,481 square kilometers in Donetsk Oblast; 248 square kilometers in Zaporizhia Oblast; 96 square kilometers in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; 255 square kilometers in Kharkiv Oblast; and 210 square kilometers in Sumy Oblast. ISW assesses that the Russian MoD is inflating its claimed advances by 36 percent in Luhansk Oblast; 33 percent in Donetsk Oblast; five percent in Zaporizhia Oblast; 83 percent in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; 112 percent in Kharkiv Oblast; and six percent in Sumy Oblast.

The Russian MoD often inflates its territorial claims in order to shape Western thinking about Russia's military capabilities and prospects for victory. Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov claimed on August 30 that Russian forces had seized 3,500 square kilometers of territory and 149 settlements since March 2025, whereas ISW assessed at the time that Russian forces had gained only roughly 2,346 square kilometers since March 1.[2] The Russian MoD's September 25 claims are a continuation of these wider efforts to use large amounts of false quantitative data to create the impression that Russian forces are advancing at a fast rate on the battlefield, even though Russian forces continue to advance at a slow foot pace. ISW also assesses that the Russian MoD has been leveraging footage showing Russian soldiers holding flags within specific settlements to claim that Russian forces had seized entire settlements.[3] The Russian footage only shows small group infiltration missions into areas where Russian forces are unable to secure enduring positions, however.[4] The Kremlin is attempting to convince the West that Russia will inevitably achieve its original war goals on the battlefield in order to force Ukraine and its partners into conceding to Russian demands.

Russian forces are reportedly rearranging forces to prepare for offensive operations across several sectors of the frontline but lack the forces and means required to sustain these operations simultaneously. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on September 24 that the Russian military command is rearranging forces in order to conduct several operational-level efforts across the frontline, including offensive operations in the Kupyansk, Lyman, Kostyantynivka, Pokrovsk, and Zaporizhia directions, as part of Russia's wider strategic-level plan for 2025.[5] Many of these Russian efforts are not mutually supportive in that forces assigned to one sector of the front are not conducting offensive operations in a way that supports the offensive operations of another sector. Mashovets noted that the Russian military command began in August 2025 to redeploy some forces from deprioritized sectors of the front, including Sumy and Kherson oblasts, to higher priority sectors in eastern Ukraine — some of which Mashovets characterized as "odd."[6] Mashovets stated that the Russian military command redeployed elements of the 76th Airborne (VDV) Division from Sumy Oblast to the area of responsibility (AoR) of the 5th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) in the south Donetsk direction (likely referring to the Novopavlivka and Velykomykhailivka directions) and to the AoR of the 35th CAA (EMD) in the Hulyaipole direction.[7] Russian VDV are among Russia's relatively more combat capable forces, and Russia tends to redeploy these forces to their most prioritized areas of the front, including the Kostyantynivka and Dobropillya areas.[8] Mashovets reported that unspecified sources expected Russia to redeploy elements of the 76th VDV Division to western Zaporizhia Oblast to participate in offensive operations south of Zaporizhzhia City.[9] Mashovets reported that Russia is establishing operational reserves in the 58th CAA (Southern Military District [SMD]) operating in the deprioritized Kherson direction from the 25th CAA (Central Miliary District [CMD]) that is currently operating in the Lyman direction, rather than from units and formations of the 58th CAA itself.[10] Mashovets reported that the Russian command is similarly establishing operational reserves in the 3rd CAA (formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps, SMD), which is currently operating in the Lyman direction, from elements of the 70th Motorized Rifle Division (18th CAA, SMD) in the Kherson direction.

Russia's decision to reorganize forces from the Lyman direction to the operational reserve in the Kherson direction and from the Kherson direction to the operational reserve in the Lyman direction is unusual given Russia's current focus on operations in Donetsk Oblast, particularly between Kostyantynivka and Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently redeployed VDV and the relatively elite naval infantry elements to this area, and some of these forces have since reportedly entered combat. Elements of the Russian 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) and of the 40th and 155th naval infantry brigades (both Pacific Fleet) recently entered combat near Poltavka after redeploying from northern Sumy Oblast, and elements of the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet) are reportedly fighting near Nove Shakhove after redeploying from the Novopavlivka direction.[11] The Russian military command is reportedly holding elements of the 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) in reserve in the near rear of the Dobropillya area after redeploying from the Kherson direction, though ISW continues to observe reports that elements of the 61st Naval Infantry Brigade are operating in the Kherson direction, indicating that elements of the brigade are likely split across the front.[12]

The Russian offensive in Kupyansk is reportedly vulnerable due to the lack of sufficient forces to sustain simultaneous offensive operations against Kupyansk and several other areas along the frontline. Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 6th CAA (Leningrad Military District [LMD]) fighting within and on the northwestern outskirts of Kupyansk are "fragile" and would be vulnerable to Ukrainian counterattacks should Russian forces stop attacks within Kupyansk and from the Russian foothold north of Kupyansk on the west (right) bank of the Oskil River.[13] Mashovets noted that Russia must simultaneously allocate forces and means to offensive operations within and north of Kupyansk  to protect the flanks and logistics of the Russian forces assaulting Kupyansk. Mashovets assessed that Russian forces will need to allocate one to two additional divisions' worth of forces to offensive operations to actually seize Kupyansk. Mashovets noted that the Russian military command is aware that it needs to reinforce, break through Ukrainian defensive positions, and consolidate in the Kupyansk direction, and that these efforts are in tension with the Russian strategic objective of maintaining several simultaneous offensive operations across the frontline — an objective that Russian forces have struggled with since Summer 2022.[14] Mashovets assessed that Russian forces would have to redistribute resources in order to stabilize the situation in the Kupyansk direction.[15] Russian forces will likely continue to struggle to maintain simultaneous offensive operations across discrete areas of the frontline, particularly in areas that are not receiving redeployments of relatively combat-effective units from deprioritized sectors of the frontline. Russian forces may also struggle to advance in their prioritized sectors — chiefly in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka and Dobropillya tactical areas and the Pokrovsk direction in Donetsk Oblast — if the Russian military command sends reinforcements to other areas that could be more effective in Donetsk Oblast.

Russian officials privately admitted that Russia is responsible for the September 19 incursion of three MiG-31 interceptor jets into Estonian airspace. Unnamed officials told Bloomberg in an article published on September 24 that Russian, British, French, and German envoys met in Moscow to address concerns about the incursion of three Russian MiG-31 fighter jets into Estonian airspace on September 19.[16] The officials reportedly concluded that Russian commanders deliberately ordered the jets into Estonian airspace. A Russian diplomat reportedly told the European diplomats that the incursions — likely referring to the Estonia incursion as well as several other recent Russian violations of NATO state airspace — were a response to Ukrainian strikes on occupied Crimea. Bloomberg noted that the Russian official claimed that NATO support enabled the Ukrainian strikes and stated that Russia considers itself to be already engaged in a confrontation, including against European states. Russia has publicly denied its involvement in the incursion into Estonia, claiming that the three Russian jets were completing a “scheduled flight” from an airfield in Karelia.[17] ISW continues to assess that Russia is deliberately gauging NATO’s capabilities and reactions to various air incursions.[18]

Polish Border Guards reported on September 19 that two Russian fighter jets performed a low altitude pass over the Polish Lotos Petrobaltic oil and gas drilling platform in Poland's exclusive economic zone in the Baltic Sea, violating the platform's safety zone.[19] Danish Defense Minister Troels Lund Poulsen stated on September 25 that unidentified drones flew over at least four airports in Denmark on the night of September 23 to 24 and that the near-simultaneous deployment of drones in multiple locations indicates that a "professional actor" was involved in a "systematic operation" and "hybrid attack."[20] Latvian Foreign Minister Baiba Braže reported to Reuters on September 25 that Denmark told NATO allies that unspecified "state actors" conducted the drone incursion over Denmark overnight on September 24 to 25, though unspecified other Danish officials told Reuters that the actor behind the incidents is unclear.[21] Danish and European officials have not directly accused Russia of violating Danish airspace as of this writing — as Polish and Romanian officials did after Russian drones violated Polish airspace on the night of September 9 to 10 and Romanian airspace on September 13.[22] North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) reported on September 25 that NORAD detected and tracked two Russian Tu-95 bombers and two Su-35 fighter jets operating in the Alaskan Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) on September 24.[23] NORAD scrambled an E-3 airborne early warning and control (AWACS) aircraft, four F-16 fighter jets, and four KC-135 tankers to identify and intercept the Russian aircraft. NORAD clarified that Russian activity in the Alaskan ADIZ is normal and nonthreatening and that the Russian aircraft did not enter US or Canadian airspace.

Russian officials continued attempts to convince the Trump administration to allow Russia to continue its war against Ukraine unimpeded in the wake of US President Donald Trump’s September 23 comments emphasizing that Ukraine has the ability to retake all of its territory. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on September 24, during which Rubio reiterated Trump’s call for the Kremlin to take meaningful steps toward a durable resolution of the war in Ukraine.[24] Lavrov stated that he and Rubio “exchanged views" on resolving the war and claimed that Russia is ready to coordinate with the United States to address the "root causes" of the war.[25] The Kremlin has repeatedly defined the "root causes" as NATO’s eastward expansion and Ukraine’s alleged discrimination against Russian speakers.[26] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev used his English-language X (formerly Twitter) account on September 25 to claim that Russia can use weapons that "a bomb shelter will not protect against” and threatened Americans to "keep this in mind.”[27] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on September 25 that Russia assumes that Trump “maintains the political will" to resolve the war and that Russia remains open to entering peace talks.[28] Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO and key Kremlin negotiator Kirill Dmitriev amplified an opinion piece in the Telegraph claiming that Trump is washing his hands of the war in Ukraine.[29] Russian officials have launched several different information operations in recent days trying to dissuade Trump and the West from continuing to support Ukraine, including using narratives decrying the Kremlin’s continued commitment to its original war aims, claims that a Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable, and claims that the United States should focus on bilateral US-Russian economic relations.[30]

The Kremlin reportedly plans to allocate less to national defense spending in 2026 than in 2025 but acknowledged that it is increasing some taxes to fund "defense and security." Reuters reported on September 24 that it viewed documents from the Russian Finance Ministry stating that Russia plans to allocate 12.6 trillion rubles (about $150 billion) to "National Defense" spending in 2026 — down from 13.5 trillion (about $160 billion) in 2025.[31] The Russian Finance Ministry stated on September 24 that the key priorities in the 2026-2028 draft budget include the fulfillment of social obligations to citizens, support for Russia's defense and security needs, and social support for families of Russian soldiers fighting in Ukraine.[32] The Finance Ministry stated that the budget allocates funding to ensure that Russia can equip the military, pay military personnel and their families, and modernize the defense industrial base (DIB), including through the allocation of 87.9 billion rubles (about $1 billion) toward the Unmanned Aircraft Systems project over three years. The Finance Ministry also announced an increase in value-added tax (VAT) from 20 percent to 22 percent starting January 2026 and a decrease in the annual revenue threshold for businesses that must pay VAT from 60 million rubles (about $714 thousand) to 10 million rubles (about $119 thousand). The Finance Ministry noted that the VAT changes are primarily meant to fund defense and security. Reuters reported that unpublished documents from the Russian Finance Ministry estimated that the VAT increase would generate about 1.2 trillion rubles (about $14.2 billion) in additional revenue in 2026. Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov claimed on September 18 that Russian authorities expect the share of Russia's revenues from oil and gas sales funding the Russian federal budget to be about 20 to 22 percent in 2026, which Siluanov noted is a decrease from about 50 percent previously.[33] The Kremlin is likely seeking other revenue streams as oil and gas revenues, on which Russia has relied to fund its war in Ukraine, are decreasing in the face of impending Western sanctions and Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil infrastructure.

The Kremlin is likely looking for different avenues to raise funding for defense and national security spending without aggravating existing socio-economic tensions. Recent Kremlin state media coverage and social media campaigns following the announcement of the VAT increase suggest that the Kremlin is aware of the possibility of social discontent due to the resulting increase in prices of everyday goods. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on September 24 that Russia's main state television channels reported on the VAT increase "discreetly," only mentioning the change at the end of broadcasts after reports about the war in Ukraine, US President Donald Trump's speech at the United Nations, and the upcoming parliamentary elections in Moldova.[34] Meduza noted that Russian state outlets Pervyi Kanal, Rossiya 1, and NTV each mentioned the VAT change in only one sentence. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on September 25 that pro-Russian government bots have written nearly one thousand comments on Kremlin-controlled social media outlet VKontakte (VK) in support of the VAT rise.[35] The bots reportedly focused on how the VAT revenue will go "to defense" and help those involved in the war in Ukraine, how tax raises are better than cuts to social programs, and how Russian citizens "will not really notice" the two percent difference.

Russian Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina attempted to downplay the effect that the VAT increase could have on inflation but acknowledged that VAT hikes have worsened inflation in the past. Nabiullina claimed on September 25 that the VAT increase is a "very positive factor" and that a balanced budget is better than an increasing deficit.[36] Nabiullina claimed that the Central Bank would have had to significantly raise its rate forecasts for 2026 had the government increased the deficit to finance necessary expenditures. Nabiullina stated that the Central Bank sees "certainty" in the federal budget and will take this into account when making a decision about possibly cutting the key interest rate further in October 2025. Nabiullina claimed that the 2026 draft budget is disinflationary but that the experience of 2019 — when a two percent rise in VAT increased inflation by 0.6 to 0.7 percent — suggests that prices will likely rise in the short-term. ISW continues to assess that the Russian Central Bank's efforts to maintain the facade of domestic economic stability by pursuing economic policies will likely exacerbate Russia's economic instability.[37]

Russia continues to suffer from gasoline shortages in Russia and occupied Ukraine due to repeated Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries.[38] Kremlin officials are attempting to downplay the gasoline shortages to domestic audiences as a result of reduced production at refineries, however.[39] Several milbloggers from Russia's ultranationalist community — one of Russian President Vladimir Putin's most important constituencies — complained about the gas shortages and rising taxes on Russian citizens.[40] Continued or worsening gasoline shortages, possibly coupled with rising inflation due to the VAT increase, may fuel additional social discontent in the near future.

Key Takeaways:

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to artificially inflate its claims of advance in Ukraine to support the Kremlin's false narrative that a Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable.
• Russian forces are reportedly rearranging forces to prepare for offensive operations across several sectors of the frontline but lack the forces and means required to sustain these operations simultaneously.
• The Russian offensive in Kupyansk is reportedly vulnerable due to the lack of sufficient forces to sustain simultaneous offensive operations against Kupyansk and several other areas along the frontline.
• Russian officials privately admitted that Russia is responsible for the September 19 incursion of three MiG-31 interceptor jets into Estonian airspace.
• Russian officials continued attempts to convince the Trump administration to allow Russia to continue its war against Ukraine unimpeded in the wake of US President Donald Trump’s September 23 comments emphasizing that Ukraine has the ability to retake all of its territory.
• The Kremlin reportedly plans to allocate less to national defense spending in 2026 than in 2025 but acknowledged that it is increasing some taxes to fund "defense and security."
• The Kremlin is likely looking for different avenues to raise funding for defense and national security spending without aggravating existing socio-economic tensions.
• Russia continues to suffer from gasoline shortages in Russia and occupied Ukraine due to repeated Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries.
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Velykomykhailivka. Russian forces advanced near Lyman and within the Dobropillya salient.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 24, 2025

The Kremlin is using nuclear threats to influence US President Donald Trump to stop his efforts to secure peace in Ukraine. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev used his English-language X (formerly Twitter) account on September 23 to reiterate Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent announcement that Russia is prepared to continue to adhere to the nuclear arms limitations in the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) for one year after it expires on February 5, 2026.[1] Medvedev stated that the Trump administration must now decide whether it will follow suit. Medvedev claimed that US adherence to the letter of the treaty “is not enough,” however, and that the United States “must give up on weakening Russia with sanctions and tariffs” or else “the risk of direct conflict remains high.” Medvedev’s veiled nuclear threats directly tie US agreement to stop all its economic measures targeting Russia—the main tool that the Trump administration is using to try to bring Putin to the negotiating table to end the war in Ukraine—to Russia's continued adherence to New START or readiness to agree to any future arms control treaties. Medvedev's threats are part of wider Kremlin efforts to delay peace negotiations, use threats to secure Russia’s desired demands in Ukraine, secure concessions that benefit Russia, and deter the United States from supporting Ukraine.

Russia launched a multipronged informational campaign intended to mask Russia's economic weakness that US President Donald Trump recently correctly identified. Kremlin officials responded on September 24 directly and indirectly to Trump's September 23 statement outlining Russia's military shortcomings and economic turmoil.[2] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded to Trump's statement about how Russia's poor economic situation makes Russia look like a “paper tiger,” claiming that Russia is “more closely associated with a bear” and that “there are no paper bears.”[3] Peskov also explicitly rejected Trump's assertion that Ukraine could retake territory with assistance from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU).[4] Peskov claimed that Ukraine's military position is significantly worse than in Spring 2022 and that US efforts to “encourage” Ukraine to continue military operations are “misguided.”[5] The Kremlin aims to convince Trump and the West that continuing to support Ukraine and oppose Russia is not viable and that the United States should instead allow Russia to continue its war unimpeded.

The Kremlin launched three distinct narratives in response to Trump's September 23 statement: statements about the Kremlin's continued commitment to its original war aims; claims that a Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable; and claims that the United States should focus on bilateral US-Russian economic relations. Peskov claimed that Russian President Vladimir Putin is open to the settlement process to end the war in Ukraine and that Trump “cannot help but see Putin’s openness to this process.”[6] Peskov claimed that the “war is not aimless” but is meant to ensure Russia's security and Russian interests and to eliminate the war's “root causes.”[7] The Kremlin has repeatedly defined the alleged root causes as NATO’s eastward expansion and Ukraine’s alleged discrimination against Russian speakers. The Kremlin often uses claims about the root causes to call for Ukraine and the West to give in to Russia's original war aims.[8] Peskov also provided excuses for Putin's disinterest in participating in a bilateral meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, claiming that a meeting without significant preparation would be a “public relations stunt doomed to fail.”[9] Putin remains uninterested in good faith negotiations that require compromises and is instead making the same demands of Ukraine and the West as he did in late 2021 and February 2022.[10]

Peskov claimed that there is an influx of volunteers joining the Russian military, allowing the Russian military command to fully staff all its units, and that the Russian economy is fully meeting the Russian military's needs.[11] Peskov claimed that Ukraine must “not forget” that its position only worsens with every day that Ukraine refuses to negotiate and that the situation on the frontline is evidence of Ukraine's deteriorating situation.[12] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed that Trump's September 23 statements show that Trump is living in an “alternate reality.”[13] Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO and key Kremlin negotiator Kirill Dmitriev claimed that Russia’s economy is outperforming those of the EU, the United Kingdom, and the United States.[14] The Kremlin is attempting to frame Russian battlefield victory as inevitable to push Ukraine and the West to capitulate and agree to all of the Kremlin's demands out of fear that Russia has the capacity to sustain and even worsen its aggression.

Peskov claimed that there are a “huge number” of mutually beneficial areas for cooperation between American and Russian businesses and that the Trump administration is “generally business oriented.”[15] Peskov claimed that the Trump administration “cannot help but understand” the benefits of US-Russian trade and economic cooperation and that Russia remains open to the resumption of trade. Peskov stated that US-Russia relations are proceeding much more slowly than Russia would like.[16] The Kremlin has for months been trying to use economic carrots to influence the Trump administration into normalizing US-Russian bilateral relations without concluding the war in Ukraine.[17] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is dangling the prospect of business incentives unrelated to the war to extract concessions from the United States about the war.[18]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated his commitment to engaging in peace negotiations and holding elections in accordance with the Ukrainian Constitution and Ukrainian law. Zelensky stated on September 24 in an interview with Fox News that Ukraine is ready to end the war as soon as possible.[19] Zelensky also reiterated that he is ready to hold elections once a ceasefire is in place and Ukraine has received security guarantees. The Ukrainian Constitution and Ukrainian law explicitly prohibit the government from holding elections during times of martial law, which Ukrainian authorities cannot lift during times of external aggression, such as Russia's full-scale invasion.[20]

Former Ukrainian Command-in-Chief and current Ukrainian Ambassador to the United Kingdom General Valerii Zaluzhnyi assessed on September 24 that Russian forces are adapting technological innovations and ground tactics in an attempt to restore maneuver to the battlefield. Zaluzhnyi stated that Russian and Ukrainian forces are engaged in positional warfare, even as Russian forces continue to make what Zaluzhnyi characterized as “grinding” advances.[21] Zaluzhnyi assessed that Russian drone strikes and innovations have forced Ukrainian forces to disperse their defenses on the frontline, with scattered small infantry groups that must act autonomously. Zaluzhnyi stated that this dispersion is blurring the frontline and that the “kill zone” (an area immediately near the frontline where a mass of tactical strike and reconnaissance drones pose an elevated risk to any equipment or personnel that enters the area) extends 20 kilometers from the frontline. Zaluzhnyi stated that the dominance of drones is dispersing the battlefield by preventing both sides from concentrating in their near rear and rear areas. Zaluzhnyi noted that Russian forces have developed infiltration tactics to take advantage of the resulting gaps in Ukrainian defenses, most notably near Dobropillya and Kupyansk. Zaluzhnyi also assessed that drones with artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities present a new threat on the battlefield.

ISW recently assessed that Russian forces are integrating drone tactics and adaptations to achieve some effects of battlefield air interdiction (BAI).[22] ISW assesses that Russian forces are actively targeting Ukrainian training grounds in the near rear with precise missile strikes enabled by improved reconnaissance and are developing drones that are more resistant to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference and capable of operating at longer distances, higher speeds, and in challenging environments.[23] The Ukrainian Ground Forces reported on September 24 that Russian forces struck a training ground with Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles, in line with Zaluzhnyi's and ISW's assessment that Russia's technological innovations are preventing Ukrainian forces from being able to safely concentrate in the rear.[24] Russia is continuing to adapt its drones to be resistant to Ukrainian EW. Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported on September 24 that some Russian drones do not have any communication channels and are able to navigate and strike targets autonomously.[25] Beskrestnov noted that Ukrainian forces cannot suppress such drones because these drones do not rely on radio frequencies.

Russian jamming originating from Kaliningrad Oblast likely disrupted the GPS on Spanish Defense Minister Margarita Robles' plane flying to Lithuania on September 24. Spanish news outlet El Mundo reported on September 24 that a plane carrying Robles experienced GPS disruptions while flying in the airspace near Kaliningrad Oblast.[26] El Mundo reported that the plane was flying to Siauliai Air Base in Lithuania and that the pilot was still able to receive military satellite signals during the flight despite the GPS disruptions. An anonymous defense source told Reuters that they did not think that the disruption was targeted and that such disruptions are common on the route.[27] El Mundo reported that a Spanish commander on board similarly downplayed the disruption as a common occurrence. Robles stated that it is essential to defend the right to freely move throughout European territory without experiencing such disruptions.[28] Russia has likely previously jammed the satellite signal of other planes carrying high-ranking European officials, including a jet transporting then-UK Defense Secretary Grant Shapps in March 2024 and a plane carrying European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on September 1.[29]

Russia is likely using Kaliningrad Oblast for jamming operations due to its proximity to European states. A pro-Ukrainian investigative outlet previously found that Russia was constructing a Circularly Disposed Antenna Array (CDAA), a military grade antenna array designed for radio intelligence or communication, just south of Chernyakhovsk, Kaliningrad Oblast.[30] The CDAA may allow Russia to monitor NATO communications in Eastern Europe and the Baltic Sea, communicate with submarines operating in the Baltic Sea or northern Atlantic Ocean, and support passive intelligence gathering.

Ukrainian forces recently conducted a series of aerial and naval drone strikes against Russia and occupied Crimea, including against Russian oil infrastructure and drone production facilities. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Gazprom Neftekhim-Salavat petrochemical plant in Salavat, Republic of Bashkortostan on the night of September 23 to 24, hitting the primary oil processing unit and starting a fire.[31] The enterprise reportedly processes up to 10 million tons of oil per year and is a key producer of liquid rocket fuel in Russia. The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces struck two oil pumping stations in Volgograd Oblast: Kuzmychi-1 oil pumping station, which transports crude oil to southern Russia, and Zenzevatka oil pumping station, which transports oil through the Kuibyshev-Tikhoretsk main oil pipeline that Russia uses for oil exports through the port of Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai.

Geolocated footage published on September 24 shows a likely Ukrainian naval drone exploding at the port of Tuapse, Krasnodar Krai (southeast of Novorossiysk).[32] Additional geolocated footage published on September 24 shows a smoke plume in central Novorossiysk.[33] Krasnodar Krai Governor Veniamin Kondratyev claimed that Ukrainian drones hit central Novorossiysk on the afternoon of September 24.[34] The Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) confirmed on September 24 that a Ukrainian drone strike damaged a CPC office in central Novorossiysk, temporarily suspending operations.[35] Bloomberg reported on September 24, citing an unnamed source, that the Sheskharis oil port facility in Novorossiysk also stopped operations.[36] Bloomberg noted that Sheskharis and CPC together export over two million barrels a day of Russian and Kazakh oil to global markets. The Kazakhstan Energy Ministry reported that oil shipments and transportation through Novorossiysk are proceeding as usual.[37]

Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) reported that USF elements conducted a drone strike against drone production facilities near the railway station in Valuyki, Belgorod Oblast on the evening of September 23, causing a large fire.[38] NASA's Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data shows heat anomalies at Valuyki.[39] A Russian source also claimed that there was an explosion near Belbek and Kacha air bases in occupied Crimea on the morning of September 24, likely due to a Ukrainian drone strike.[40] Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhaev claimed on September 24 that Russian air defenses and elements of the Black Sea Fleet shot down 16 Ukrainian drones targeting occupied Sevastopol.[41]

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin is using nuclear threats to influence US President Donald Trump to stop his efforts to secure peace in Ukraine.
• Russia launched a multipronged informational campaign intended to mask Russia's economic weakness that US President Donald Trump recently correctly identified.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated his commitment to engaging in peace negotiations and holding elections in accordance with the Ukrainian Constitution and Ukrainian law.
• Former Ukrainian Command-in-Chief and current Ukrainian Ambassador to the United Kingdom General Valerii Zaluzhnyi assessed on September 24 that Russian forces are adapting technological innovations and ground tactics in an attempt to restore maneuver to the battlefield.
• Russian jamming originating from Kaliningrad Oblast likely disrupted the GPS on Spanish Defense Minister Margarita Robles' plane flying to Lithuania on September 24.
• Ukrainian forces recently conducted a series of aerial and naval drone strikes against Russia and occupied Crimea, including against Russian oil infrastructure and drone production facilities.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Lyman and Pokrovsk and in the Dobropillya tactical area. Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk and Pokrovsk, in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 23, 2025

US President Donald Trump expressed confidence in Ukraine's ability to fully liberate all of its internationally recognized territory that Russia currently occupies, following a bilateral meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Trump stated at a press conference with Zelensky on September 23 that he has “great respect” for Ukraine's resistance to Russia’s invasion and that Ukraine is “doing a very good job” of defending its territory against Russia’s efforts to quickly seize it.[i] Trump affirmed NATO member states' right to shoot down Russian fighter jets violating their airspace, in response to a series of recent Russian incursions into Polish and Estonian airspace. Trump subsequently wrote that he assesses that the Ukrainian military, with the help of the European Union (EU) and NATO, is capable of “[winning] all of Ukraine back in its original form,” likely referring to Ukraine’s internationally recognized 1991 borders.[ii] Trump wrote that Russia’s military shortcomings in Ukraine, despite its large-scale financial investments in military industrial production, make Russia look like a ”’paper tiger’,” and that Ukraine should act now, while Russia is facing economic turmoil, including gasoline shortages. Trump concluded that the United States will continue to supply weapons to NATO‘s Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) initiative, through which European states purchase US-made weapons for Ukraine.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) publicly acknowledged Russia's intent to advance further into Kharkiv Oblast should Russian forces seize Kupyansk, supporting ISW's assessment of Russia's operational intent. The Russian MoD claimed in a social media post on September 23 that Russian forces are continuing their offensive operation aimed at seizing Kupyansk and that Russian forces have partially enveloped Ukrainian forces in the city.[iii] ISW has not observed geolocated evidence to support the claim that Russian forces have enveloped Ukrainian forces in Kupyansk as of this report, however. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces intend to leverage the seizure of Kupyansk to attack further into eastern Kharkiv Oblast in several directions simultaneously, including toward Chuhuiv (west of Kupyansk) and Izyum (southwest of Kupyansk) and toward Vovchansk (northwest of Kupyansk). The Russian MoD claimed that the Russian Western and Northern groupings of forces intend to unite the Vovchansk and Kupyansk efforts, which would effectively establish a "buffer zone" near the international border in northern Kharkiv Oblast. The Russian MoD claimed that the seizure of Kupyansk will also support Russian efforts to advance toward Slovyansk and Kramatorsk (both south of Kupyansk in Donetsk Oblast) and seize Ukraine's fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast.

ISW assessed in February 2024 that the Russian MoD likely intended for Russian efforts to seize Kupyansk and the east (left) bank of the Oskil River to set operational conditions for Russian forces to advance into northern Donetsk Oblast toward Ukraine's fortress belt and/or eastern Kharkiv Oblast toward Kharkiv City.[iv] ISW assessed on July 12, 2025 that Russian forces likely began an offensive operation aimed at connecting Russian operations near Vovchansk with those near Dvorichna (north of Kupyansk), possibly to facilitate ongoing Russian efforts to establish a buffer zone along the international border.[v] The Russian MoD's statement confirms these prior assessments of the Russian military command’s operational intent.

The MoD's September 23 statement undermines repeated Russian claims that Russia’s main military objective and territorial demands in Ukraine are limited to Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts. Russian officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, have long claimed that Russia "only" wants control over Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts as a prerequisite for ending the war.[vi] Ongoing Russian efforts to advance into Kharkiv Oblast — an oblast that the Russian government has not illegally annexed and does not currently lay claim to — are an indicator that Russia retains territorial ambitions beyond the four aforementioned oblasts.

The Russian MoD may be issuing this statement about Russian operational intent to justify ongoing Russian operations to seize Kupyansk to Russian society and frontline forces. The Russian MoD has rarely publicized its operational intent as openly as in the September 23 post, and the MoD likely sought to use the post to generate informational effects. Russian forces have been engaged in re-intensified assaults near Kupyansk since late 2024, and the Russian military command may be explicitly outlining its operational intent for the Kupyansk-Borova-Lyman area in order to justify the significant casualties and time that Russian forces have lost over the last year by framing Kupyansk as an important gateway to the rest of Kharkiv Oblast and the fortress belt.[vii] It is notable that the Russian MoD did not provide a timeline or deadline by which Russian forces intended to accomplish these goals. The MoD may be willing to share these goals if the Russian military command assesses with high confidence that Russian forces will be able to accomplish these goals eventually, assuming that Russia continues its war in Ukraine indefinitely under Putin's theory of gradual and attritional Russian victory. Russian efforts to advance toward and seize Kharkiv City and Ukraine's fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast likely remain years-long endeavors, assuming that the West continues to arm Ukraine and empower Ukraine to defend itself.

Key Takeaways:

• US President Donald Trump expressed confidence in Ukraine's ability to fully liberate all of its internationally recognized territory that Russia currently occupies, following a bilateral meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA).
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) publicly acknowledged Russia's intent to advance further into Kharkiv Oblast should Russian forces seize Kupyansk, supporting ISW's assessment of Russia's operational intent.
• The Russian MoD's September 23 statement undermines repeated Russian claims that Russia’s main military objective and territorial demands in Ukraine are limited to Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts.
• The Russian MoD may be issuing this statement about Russian operational intent to justify ongoing Russian operations to seize Kupyansk to Russian society and frontline forces.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova, Novopavlivka and in the Dobropillya tactical area and western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and near Siversk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 22, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin announced on September 22 that Russia will adhere to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) for one year following its expiration in February 2026 and used threats to urge the United States to do the same. Putin claimed that Russia is prepared to continue to adhere to New START's nuclear arms limitations for one year after it expires on February 5, 2026.[i] New START limits the number of deployed US and Russian strategic nuclear warheads and bombs to 1,550; the number of deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers for nuclear missions to 700; and the number of deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and bombers to 800.[ii] New START went into effect in 2011, and Russia suspended its participation in the treaty in February 2023, claiming that the United States was developing new nuclear weapons.[iii] Putin claimed that Russia will decide between continuing its “voluntary self-restraint” in February 2027. Putin called on Russian agencies to monitor US adherence to New START until then and threatened that Russia “will respond accordingly.” Putin claimed that completely abandoning New START would be a “mistake” and “short-sighted.” Putin claimed that Russia can respond to any threats “not with words but through military-technical measures.” Putin's veiled threats are the latest in Russia's nuclear saber rattling, a tool that the Kremlin often employs as part of its wider reflexive control campaign that aims to push the West to make decisions that benefit Russia.[iv]

Putin blamed the West for undermining Russian-US arms cooperation and violating bilateral arms agreements—ignoring how Russia has violated numerous multilateral and bilateral treaties in the past decades. Russia has violated multiple treaties since Putin first became president in 2000.[v] Russia exploited provisions of the Open Skies Treaty (which provided for mutual surveillance flights over member states’ territory) to collect imagery for intelligence purposes and instituted illegal overflight restrictions and airfield designations to legitimize Russia’s occupation of Ukraine and Georgia.[vi] Russia suspended its adherence to the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty (which placed limits on the deployment of heavy military equipment in Europe) in 2007 and continues to violate the treaty by stationing troops in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine without these states' consent.[vii] Multiple US State Department Compliance Reports published since 2015 have noted how Russia selectively implements provisions of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe's (OSCE) Vienna Document on the exchange of data about armed forces between OSCE states, including Russia.[viii] A 2020 State Department report noted that Russia “no longer feels bound” by the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives that the United States and Russia agreed to in the early 1990s on the non-deployment and elimination of Russia’s arsenal of non-strategic nuclear weapons and that Russia maintained up to 2,000 such weapons in its stockpiles.[ix] Russia has repeatedly violated the Chemical Weapons Convention (which prohibits the use of chemical weapons and the development, production, acquisition, and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their precursors) both on the battlefield in Ukraine and with its poisoning of political opponents in Europe; Russia has refused to fully declare its chemical weapons stockpiles and production and development facilities.[x] The State Department noted in response to Russia's suspension of its participation in New START in 2023 that Russia refused to comply with the treaty's requirements that the parties exchange data, including ICBM location and status updates and missile launch telemetry data; Russia denied US inspectors’ right to inspect ballistic missile sites in Russia.[xi] The United States suspended its participation in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty (which banned US and Russian ground-launched nuclear and conventional intermediate- and shorter-range missiles) in February 2019 due to Russian violations with its development, testing, and deployment of intermediate-range 9M729 (SSC-8) missiles.[xii] Russia has also used Oreshnik ballistic missiles (which reportedly have a range banned under the INF Treaty) against Ukraine in November 2024 and announced that the missile entered into service in August 2025.[xiii]

Putin is attempting to pressure the Trump administration to engage in arms control talks to facilitate US-Russian rapprochement and extract concessions from the United States about the war in Ukraine, as ISW forecasted Russia would in August 2025.[xiv] Putin claimed that US implementation of his New START initiative, coupled with the “entire range of efforts to normalize bilateral relations,” could create an atmosphere “conducive to substantive strategic dialogue” with the United States.[xv] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is dangling the prospect of bilateral arms control talks in front of the United States to secure Russia's desired demands in Ukraine and deflect from Russia's responsibility for the lack of progress in Russia-Ukraine peace negotiations.[xvi] Russia has been trying to manufacture an escalation in recent months, including by withdrawing from the INF Treaty in August 2025, to coerce the Trump administration to engage in arms control talks.[xvii] Putin has notably used New START to try to extract concessions about Ukraine from the United States in the past, linking Western aid to Ukraine and his decision to suspend Russia's participation in New START in February 2023.[xviii] Putin's September 22 statements aim to present himself as equal to US President Donald Trump and to present Russia as a global power comparable to the United States, and Putin has been trying to posture Russia as the heir of the Soviet Union's "superpower" status since Trump assumed office in January 2025.[xix] Putin's posturing aims to reinforce the Kremlin's false narrative that a Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable, so Ukraine and the West should concede to Russia's maximalist demands now out of fear that Russian aggression will only worsen in the future.[xx]

Some Russian defense industrial enterprises are reportedly struggling to expand their production and workforces due to economic constraints, while the Kremlin is prioritizing funding for high-priority enterprises such as drone and missile manufacturers. Russian opposition outlet Novaya Gazeta reported on September 22 that wages within the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) are declining for the first time during Russia's full-scale invasion and that expansion is slowing due to economic constraints.[xxi] The Georgia-based open-source intelligence organization Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT) reported to Novaya Gazeta that the Russian DIB reached “saturation” in 2024, at which point the DIB's need for new employees began to decline, and that many defense industrial enterprises need to build new production facilities, equip new production lines, and purchase more machine tools to expand production. Novaya Gazeta noted that limitations in the market, including supply chains, and issues with employee retention are restricting production expansion efforts, however. Novaya Gazeta reported that the Russian DIB is struggling to further expand, as current factories are already operating at capacity and cannot afford to build new factories and production lines. Novaya Gazeta noted that current financial constraints and inflation issues are limiting Russia's ability to offer subsidized loans to all defense industrial enterprises, limiting the enterprises' ability to increase production and hire new employees.

Novaya Gazeta reported that Russia is prioritizing directing funding toward the production of higher demand weapons, like drones and missiles, further restraining production within other defense industrial enterprises. Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) manufacturers, such as Tactile Missile Weapons, Zaslon, Agregat, and Kalashnikov, are reportedly increasing salaries. CIT reported that many defense industrial enterprises that produce lower priority products do not see the point in expanding production, including armored vehicle manufacturers, which are primarily repairing and modernizing vehicles as Russia reduces its use of armored vehicles on the battlefield, and aircraft manufacturers, which are already able to replace Russian military aircraft losses. The Kremlin's prioritization of drone and missile manufacturers underscores the ways the Russian DIB is evolving to address Russia's needs on the battlefield. ISW has previously assessed that Russia is increasing its domestic drone production while decreasing its frontline use of armored vehicles in Ukraine—in line with reports that the Kremlin is increasing funding to drone producers and not vehicle producers.[xxii] Russia's emphasis on building up the DIB throughout the war has, in part, led to many of Russia's current economic issues, such as inflation.[xxiii] ISW continues to assess that the Russian government is overprioritizing investment in the DIB at the expense of other sectors and that the Russian economy continues to flag under the weight of the war in Ukraine.[xxiv]

The United Nations (UN) reported that the number of casualties from Russian drone strikes targeting Ukrainian civilians has increased by 40 percent so far in 2025 as compared to 2024. UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine Head Erik Møse reported on September 22 that the commission found that Russian forces conducted strikes against Ukrainian civilians walking or using transport, residences, and critical infrastructure in Kherson, Dnipropetrovsk, and Mykolaiv oblasts since July 2024.[xxv] Møse also noted Russian forces are systemically conducting “double tap” strikes against Ukrainian rescue workers responding to Russian strikes. The commission concluded that Russia's deliberate drone strikes against civilians violate international law, amount to the crimes against humanity of murder and forcible population displacement, and are in accordance with a concerted state policy that aims to sow terror among the Ukrainian population. ISW has observed numerous instances of Russian drone strikes and war crimes against civilians throughout 2025, and Ukrainian authorities have reported on numerous such instances in the past day alone. The Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor’s Office reported on September 22 that Russian forces shot and wounded an elderly civilian riding a bike in Kupyansk and wounded a civilian during a first-person view (FPV) drone strike against a civilian car in Borova.[xxvi] Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne published on September 21 footage that a resident filmed on September 19 of a Russian drone dropping an unknown explosive device, reportedly a PFM-1 Lepestok anti-personnel land mine, on a street in central Nizhyn, Chernihiv Oblast, as civilian vehicles travelled along the road.[xxvii]

Ukrainian forces may have targeted high-ranking Russian officials in a reported strike against occupied Crimea on the night of September 21 to 22. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on September 22 that Ukrainian forces struck a resort area in occupied Crimea, killing two and injuring 15 others.[xxviii] Crimean occupation head Sergey Aksyonov claimed on September 22 that Ukrainian forces struck a sanatorium in occupied Foros, Crimea.[xxix] Several Russian sources reported that there was a closed-door private party at the sanatorium and that high-ranking Russian officials, possibly including military officials, were present at the time of the reported strike.[xxx] Ukrainian forces conducted a separate confirmed strike against a Russian airfield near occupied Kacha, Crimea. Ukraine's Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on September 22, and geolocated footage confirmed, that it conducted a strike against occupied Crimea on the night of September 21 to 22.[xxxi] The GUR reported that it struck two Russian Beriev Be-12 maritime patrol aircraft and one Mi-8 helicopter.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin announced on September 22 that Russia will adhere to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) for one year following its expiration in February 2026 and used threats to urge the United States to do the same.
• Putin blamed the West for undermining Russian-US arms cooperation and violating bilateral arms agreements—ignoring how Russia has violated numerous multilateral and bilateral treaties in the past decades.
• Putin is attempting to pressure the Trump administration to engage in arms control talks to facilitate US-Russian rapprochement and extract concessions from the United States about the war in Ukraine, as ISW forecasted Russia would in August 2025.
• Some Russian defense industrial enterprises are reportedly struggling to expand their production and workforces due to economic constraints, while the Kremlin is prioritizing funding for high-priority enterprises such as drone and missile manufacturers.
• The United Nations (UN) reported that the number of casualties from Russian drone strikes targeting Ukrainian civilians has increased by 40 percent so far in 2025 as compared to 2024.
• Ukrainian forces may have targeted high ranking Russian officials in a reported strike against occupied Crimea on the night of September 21 to 22.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area. Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman and Pokrovsk and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 21, 2025

Russia has reportedly been forming a strategic reserve from new recruits since July 2025. A Russian insider source that has consistently provided accurate reports about changes in the Russian military command stated on September 21 that roughly 292,000 people signed contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) between the start of 2025 and September 15—an average of approximately 7,900 recruits per week or 31,600 per month.[1] The insider source stated that some of these recruits are joining the strategic reserve that Russia has been forming since early July 2025. The source did not specify how many recruits are going to the strategic reserve as opposed to the frontline in Ukraine.

The Russian military command may have assessed that Russia could afford to create a strategic reserve after Russian losses began to decrease in the summer of 2025. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russia suffered roughly 32,000 to 48,000 casualties per month between January and July 2025 – more casualties than the average reported monthly recruitment rate. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russia suffered roughly 29,000 casualties in August 2025 and 13,000 casualties in the first half of September 2025—the only months so far in 2025 with casualty rates below the average reported recruitment rate. ISW recently assessed that Russian territorial gains were less costly in May to August 2025 compared to the spring of 2025, as Russian forces sustained a lower casualty rate per square kilometer seized.[2] The reduced casualty rates in Summer 2025 may have convinced the Russian military command that Russia could afford to transfer some new recruits to a strategic reserve while still maintaining the tempo of offensive operations on the frontline in Ukraine. Changes in Russian tactics on the battlefield in the past few months likely contributed in part to the reduced casualty rates. Russian forces have been conducting assaults in smaller infantry groups and are increasingly employing small group infiltration tactics that seek to find and exploit weaknesses and holes in Ukraine's undermanned defenses.[3] The formation of the strategic reserve may indicate that the Russian military command assesses that Russian forces will be able to continue their current rate of advance using these small group tactics that allow the Russian command to deploy fewer personnel to the frontline.

Reports that Russia is creating a strategic reserve further indicate that the Kremlin is not interested in ending its war against Ukraine but remains committed to achieving its war goals on the battlefield and may be preparing for a conflict with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly put forward a theory of victory that assumes that Russian forces will be able to make slow, creeping advances on the battlefield indefinitely, enabling Russia to win a war of attrition against Ukraine.[4] The reported decision to create a strategic reserve and not deploy all new recruits to the frontline indicates that Putin and the Russian military command are content with the current rate of advance, even though Russian forces continue to only advance at a foot pace. The reported creation of a strategic reserve suggests that Russia plans to escalate offensive operations in Ukraine in the near-to-medium term rather than end the war. Russia may also be building out its strategic reserve as part of wider Kremlin preparations for a possible Russia-NATO conflict in the future, particularly as Russia intensifies its youth military-patriotic programs that aim to recruit Russian youth into the military in the years to come.[5]

Russia continues to test the limits of NATO's air defenses over the Baltic Sea as Russia increases the frequency of its violations of NATO states' airspace. The German Air Force reported on September 21 that NATO tasked the German Air Force with scrambling two German Eurofighters to intercept an unidentified aircraft without a flight plan or radio contact in international airspace over the Baltic Sea.[6] German forces later visually identified the plane as a Russian IL-20M reconnaissance aircraft. The German Air Force did not specify where over the Baltic Sea the incident occurred. Russia's violation of standard operating procedures in international airspace is the latest in a string of aerial incursions into NATO territory since the Russian drone incursion into Polish airspace on the night of September 9 to 10.[7] US President Donald Trump reaffirmed on September 21 that the United States will "help" Poland and the Baltic States if Russia "keeps accelerating."[8] ISW continues to assess that Russia is pursuing an aggressive campaign to test NATO air defenses and political will as part of a broader effort to collect actionable intelligence that Russia may then apply to a potential future conflict against NATO.[9]

Russian forces continue to develop drone technologies to increase the volume and precision of strikes against the Ukrainian near rear to further complicate Ukrainian logistics. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on September 21 that Russian forces developed fiber optic first-person view (FPV) repeater drones that could potentially quadruple the range of frontline drones.[10] Russia's fiber optic drones are resistant to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference, and repeater drones contain a radio repeater that extends communication signals by acting as a relay station.[11]  Russian drone operators may leverage the fiber optic repeater drones to protect other Russian drones from Ukrainian EW interference and increase the viability and precision of strikes against Ukraine's near rear. The milblogger claimed that the newly developed fiber optic repeater drones can fly 50 to 60 kilometers, while traditional fiber optic drones are only able to fly 25 to 30 kilometers. Russia's use of the longer-range repeater drones would allow Russian forces to strike more precisely and deeper into the Ukrainian near rear, particularly along ground lines of communication (GLOCs), further complicating Ukrainian frontline logistics. Russian milbloggers claimed on September 21 that Russian forces have created a "kill zone" (an area immediately near the frontline where a mass of tactical strike and reconnaissance drones pose an elevated risk to any equipment or personnel that enters that area) that extends roughly 45 kilometers from the frontline in both the Vovchansk and Kupyansk directions.[12] Ukrainian 11th Army Corps (AC) Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets stated in a September 20 Wall Street Journal (WSJ) article that Russian forces are now systemically targeting Ukrainian logistics routes, depots, roads, and evacuation routes, but that Russian strikes of this nature were infrequent in 2024.[13] A sergeant of a Ukrainian reconnaissance unit reported to the WSJ that the nets that Ukrainian forces are constructing over roads to protect against Russian drone strikes are imperfect solutions, as Russian drone operators strike the poles that hold the nets up. Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast Military Administration Head Vadym Filashkin reported to the WSJ that Ukrainian forces are constantly repairing damage to anti-drone netting. ISW previously assessed that Russian forces are achieving some effects of battlefield air interdiction (BAI) with drone strikes against Ukrainian GLOCs that are enabling Russian advances in eastern Ukraine, and that Russia's recent drone innovations are likely to enhance these BAI effects.[14]

The Kremlin reportedly dismissed former Northern Group of Forces and Leningrad Military District (LMD) Commander Colonel General Alexander Lapin from military service. Russian outlet RBK reported on September 21 that a source stated that Russian authorities dismissed Lapin from military service.[15] A local Republic of Tatarstan outlet, Tatar-Inform, reported on September 19 that sources stated that Lapin would serve as an assistant to Republic of Tatarstan Head Rustem Minnikhanov but that the Kremlin has not published an official decree on the appointment yet.[16] Russian business newspaper Vedomosti similarly reported on September 21 that a source close to the Republic of Tatarstan leadership stated that Lapin may become Minnikhanov's advisor next week and that he will be responsible for recruiting contract personnel and possibly oversee security issues related to Ukrainian strikes against the republic.[17] The Republic of Tatarstan is the main recruitment hub for the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) Africa Corps and is home to Russian domestic drone production at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone.[18] Lapin served as the commander of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces at the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022; moved to be the Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground Forces in 2023; and became the commander of the Leningrad Military District (LMD) and Northern Grouping of Forces in 2024.[19] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed in August 2025 that it replaced Lapin as the LMD and Northern Grouping of Forces commander with Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground Forces Colonel General Yevgeny Nikiforov.[20]

Lapin has proven to be an incompetent commander throughout the war against Ukraine, but the Kremlin is likely punishing Lapin now as part of its ongoing campaign to scapegoat and punish high ranking officials for their failure to repel Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024. Russian President Vladimir Putin has generally been reluctant to dismiss commanders despite displayed command deficiencies, choosing rather to reappoint commanders than dismiss them.[21] Lapin's complete dismissal from military service is a notable inflection. Lapin has faced heavy criticism for his failures as a commander throughout the war. Lapin commanded the Central Grouping of Forces in 2022, when Ukraine's counteroffensive in Kharkiv Oblast in Fall 2022 forced Russian forces to withdraw from Lyman. Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov and deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin were both highly critical of Lapin's failures in Kharkiv Oblast in October 2022, accusing the Russian military command of failing to promptly respond to the deteriorating situation around Lyman.[22] Kadyrov's and Prigozhin’s criticisms were especially noteworthy as Putin and his mouthpieces had been extremely tight-lipped about the performance of military commanders or their replacements. Lapin also commanded the Northern Grouping of Forces when Ukraine launched its incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024. The Northern Grouping of Forces under Lapin had been conducting offensive operations to create a buffer zone in northern Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts since May 2024 and March 2025, respectively.[23] Ukrainian forces have been successful in preventing Russian forces from establishing a significant and enduring buffer zone in both northern Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts, however. Lapin's dismissal from military service is likely part of the Kremlin's wider efforts to scapegoat and punish Russian authorities who failed to prevent Ukraine's Kursk incursion. Russian authorities have detained and charged several high-ranking regional officials in Kursk, Bryansk, and Belgorod oblasts with mishandling the construction of defensive fortifications in Russia's border areas.[24] The Kremlin notably did not punish Lapin for his numerous operational failures in Ukraine but is likely choosing to punish him now over his failure to protect Russian territory.

Key Takeaways:

• Russia has reportedly been forming a strategic reserve from new recruits since July 2025.
• The Russian military command may have assessed that Russia could afford to create a strategic reserve after Russian losses began to decrease in the summer of 2025.
• Reports that Russia is creating a strategic reserve further indicate that the Kremlin is not interested in ending its war against Ukraine but remains committed to achieving its war goals on the battlefield and may be preparing for a conflict with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
• Russia continues to test the limits of NATO's air defenses over the Baltic Sea as Russia increases the frequency of its violations of NATO states' airspace.
• Russian forces continue to develop drone technologies to increase the volume and precision of strikes against the Ukrainian near rear to further complicate Ukrainian logistics.
• The Kremlin reportedly dismissed former Northern Group of Forces and Leningrad Military District (LMD) Commander Colonel General Alexander Lapin from military service.
• Lapin has proven to be an incompetent commander throughout the war against Ukraine, but the Kremlin is likely punishing Lapin now as part of its ongoing campaign to scapegoat and punish high ranking officials for their failure to repel Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Pokrovsk, and Velykomykhailivka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 20, 2025

Kremlin insider statements continue to indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin remains committed to his strategy that Russian forces will be able to win a war of attrition against Ukraine and the West and that the West has thus far failed to convince Putin to reevaluate his strategy. Bloomberg reported on September 20 that undisclosed people close to the Kremlin stated that Putin has concluded that military escalation is the best way for Russia to force Ukraine into peace negotiations on Putin's terms.[1] The sources stated that Putin assesses that US President Donald Trump is unlikely to "do much" to bolster Ukraine's defense and that the US-Russian talks in Alaska on August 15, 2025, convinced Putin that Trump has no interest in intervening in the war in Ukraine. The sources stated that Putin intends to remain engaged in any ongoing bilateral dialogue with the United States but will continue to act in what he perceives to be Russia's interest. The sources stated that Putin intends to continue targeting Ukraine's energy network and other critical infrastructure. Putin's long-standing theory of victory posits that Russia can militarily defeat Ukraine by indefinitely maintaining the theater-wide initiative and outlasting Western military support for Ukraine.[2] The sources' statements indicate that recent US efforts to mediate a peaceful resolution to the war in Ukraine have not impacted Putin's calculus and that Putin remains committed to defeating Ukraine militarily, as ISW has continued to assess. Putin's recent actions — including the decision to redeploy more forces to Donetsk Oblast and recent Russian incursions into the airspace of NATO member states — further underscore his commitment to both continued military aggression against Ukraine and future military aggression against NATO member states.[3]

Putin may have allowed these Kremlin sources to share his logic with Bloomberg and likely seeks to leverage Bloomberg's article to exploit friction between European and US officials, to feed into the wider Russian narrative that a Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable, and to create fear in Ukrainian society ahead of Winter 2025-2026. The Kremlin maintains a tight grip on the Russian information space and holds significant influence over most Russian officials and insiders, which suggests that Putin may have orchestrated or at least approved of sources in the Kremlin leaking information to a Western publication.[4] The Kremlin sources' emphasis on the Trump Administration's reported failure to influence Putin's decision making is likely an attempt to seize on friction between US and European officials and to sow further discord between Western allies. The Kremlin has long sought to divide Ukraine's US and European supporters in order to weaken cohesive Western support for Ukraine and has intensified this campaign since Trump's inauguration in January 2025.[5]

Putin likely also intends for this article to feed into the Kremlin's long-running narrative that a Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable and that Putin can bring about a Russian victory in Ukraine seemingly by will alone. The Kremlin sources' emphasis on Putin's commitment to a military victory in Ukraine ignores the Russian military's systemic shortcomings and limitations that have thus far denied Putin's ability to achieve Russia’s strategic objectives of politically controlling all of Ukraine, or decisively winning on the battlefield. ISW has repeatedly observed instances of Putin tasking the Russian military with goals far beyond its capabilities, and it is unclear whether Putin is receiving inaccurate information about Russian military capabilities or whether Putin is choosing to ignore Russia's limitations and push on with grinding offensives to further Russian narratives about Russia’s ability to wage war indefinitely, no matter the costs.[6] ISW continues to assess that a Russian military victory in Ukraine is not inevitable, however, and that Ukraine, the United States, and European states maintain agency over the outcome of the war in Ukraine.[7]

Putin likely also intends for this article to generate panic in Ukraine about Russia's long-range strike campaign ahead of Winter 2025-2026. The Kremlin sources' reference to continued Russian strikes against Ukraine's energy infrastructure is almost certainly intended to invoke the memory of Russia's Fall 2022 and Winter 2022-2023 strike campaign against Ukraine's energy grid and the subsequent power outages that affected Ukraine, particularly civilians.[8] The Kremlin is likely resurfacing this memory in order to create fear amongst Ukrainians and to provoke Ukrainians into demanding that the Ukrainian government negotiate a settlement to the war before Winter 2025-2026. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned in August 2025 that Russia was increasingly targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure in order to undermine Ukraine's preparations for the winter heating season.[9] Putin is likely hoping to seize on the uncertainty that recent large-scale long-range Russian strikes have caused in Ukraine in order to exacerbate domestic discontent and increase pressure on the Ukrainian government to end the war.

Russian forces conducted one of the largest drone and missile strikes against Ukraine in recent weeks on the night of September 19 to 20. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 8 Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Yeysk, Krasnodar Krai; 32 Kh-101 cruise missiles from Saratov Oblast; and 579 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Bryansk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[10] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 2 Iskander-M/KN-32 ballistic missiles and 29 Kh-101 cruise missiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defenses downed 552 drones. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that an unspecified number of ballistic and cruise missiles and 23 drones struck ten locations and that drone fragments fell in ten locations. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces conducted a simultaneous strike on targets with large numbers of missiles and drones and that Ukrainian forces used tactical aviation, including F-16s, to intercept the cruise missiles. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Russian forces targeted Dnipro City and Dnipropetrovsk Oblast broadly and locations in Mykolaiv, Chernihiv, Zaporizhia, Poltavka, Kyiv, Odesa, Sumy, and Kharkiv Oblasts.[11] Zelensky stated that Russian forces directly struck a high-rise residential building in Dnipro City with a missile equipped with cluster munitions.[12] Footage reportedly shows a Kh-101 cruise missile striking the residential building in Dnipro City, underscoring the need to further bolster Ukraine's air defense umbrella.[13] Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Military Administration Head Serhiy Lysak reported that the strike killed one and injured 13 civilians.[14] The Ukrainian Prosecutor General's Office reported that Russian strikes in Khmelnytskyi Oblast killed one and injured three civilians.[15] Other Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces damaged civilian infrastructure in Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, and Sumy oblasts.[16]

Russia is intensifying its efforts to test NATO's defensive capabilities and resolve by violating NATO members’ safety zones in the air domain. Polish Border Guards reported on September 19 that two Russian fighter jets performed a low altitude pass over the Polish Lotos Petrobaltic oil and gas drilling platform in the Baltic Sea in direct violation of the platform's safety zone.[17] The Polish state-owned energy company Orlen Petrobaltic owns and operates the Petrobaltic platform and is Poland's only offshore oil platform.[18] Polish Border Guard Spokesperson Katerzyna Przybysz stated, and open-source naval vessel tracking sites indicate, that the Petrobaltic drilling platform is in Poland's exclusive economic zone.[19] It remains unclear whether the Russian jet incursion near the Petrobaltic platform occurred during the September 19 sortie in which three Russian MiG-31 interceptor jets violated Estonia's airspace or if this was a separate incident.[20] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on September 19 that Russian aircraft did not violate Estonian airspace and that the three Russian jets completed a "scheduled flight" from Karelia airfield to an unspecified airfield in Kaliningrad Oblast in accordance with international law.[21] ISW continues to assess that Russia is deliberately testing the limits of NATO's capabilities with various air incursions in an effort to gather data on the alliance's response measures and political will that Russia may then apply to potential conflicts against NATO.[22]

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 18, 2025

The Russian military command continues to signal its commitment to Russian President Vladimir Putin's theory of victory that posits that Russia can win a war of attrition against Ukraine. Putin claimed on September 18 that there are over 700,000 Russian soldiers on the frontline in Ukraine.[1] Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov claimed on September 17 that Russian forces are advancing on "practically all fronts" in the war.[2] Putin's and Gerasimov's statements are in line with Putin's overarching theory of victory that assumes that Russia has the resources and combat capability to continue gradual advances indefinitely and win a war of attrition against Ukraine.[3] Putin's theory of victory is predicated on the assumption that Russia will be able to outlast Western support for Ukraine and Ukraine's ability to resist Russian aggression. Putin has repeatedly indicated that he believes that Russian forces will be able to achieve his war goals on the battlefield, even if they are only making creeping advances, as Putin likely assesses that his troops will be able to leverage their manpower and materiel advantages to overwhelm Ukrainian forces. Putin's and Gerasimov's recent statements are part of wider Kremlin efforts to push Ukraine and the West to immediately acquiesce to Putin's maximalist demands out of fear that a Russian victory is inevitable and that Russian aggression will only increase in the future.[4]

ISW continues to assess that a Russian victory is not inevitable, however, and that Ukraine and the West can leverage several key Russian weaknesses to force Putin to change his calculus and engage in good-faith negotiations. Russian gains on the battlefield have come at a high cost, with Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reporting on September 9 that Russian forces have suffered 299,210 casualties killed and wounded in action since January 2025 alone.[5] Russian forces have been advancing at a creeping foot pace throughout 2025, and Russia's casualty rates have been disproportionately high compared to the amount of territory seized. Putin has also mismanaged Russia’s economy throughout the war, resulting in increased and unsustainable wartime spending, growing inflation, and significant labor shortages.[6] Putin's focus on defense spending and the buildup of Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) has notably come at the expense of the civilian economic sectors. Russia's ability to fund its war machine is in part reliant on Russian oil exports, which fund a significant portion of Russia's federal revenues.[7] US President Donald Trump noted these Russian weaknesses, stating on September 18 that Russia is incurring more losses in the war than Ukraine and that Putin will have to "drop out" of the war should oil prices come down.[8]

The Kremlin continues to demonstrate its commitment to its original war aims in Ukraine. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated on September 18 that Russia is only willing to compromise in Ukraine if a peace settlement ensures Russia's "legitimate security interests" as well as the interests of Russians who live in Ukraine.[9] Lavrov also claimed that the United States understands the need to address the so-called "root causes" of the war.[10] Kremlin officials, including Lavrov, have consistently used "legitimate security interests" and "root causes" as shorthand to reiterate Russia's original war demands, which Kremlin officials have continuously asserted Russia will achieve either militarily or diplomatically.[11] Lavrov is attempting to falsely posture Russia as willing to compromise despite the Kremlin's repeated demands that Ukraine capitulate and acquiesce to Russia's maximalist demands.[12]

The Kremlin is also attempting to manipulate the Trump administration into normalizing US-Russian bilateral relations without concluding the war in Ukraine — contrary to Trump's desired timeline of working on bilateral relations after concluding a peace in Ukraine.[13] Lavrov claimed on September 18 that US President Donald Trump aims to "remove the topic of Ukraine" from the US-Russian agenda in order to "normalize" bilateral economic, technological, and other relations.[14] Lavrov also claimed on September 17 that efforts to "entice" Russian President Vladimir Putin into economic deals with the United States will not stop the war.[15] The Kremlin is attempting to push Trump to separate the war in Ukraine from discussions about US-Russian bilateral relations, particularly in the economic sphere. The Kremlin likely aims to simultaneously continue its war in Ukraine while alleviating the pressure that existing and possible future sanctions are putting on the Russian economy, particularly sanctions targeting the energy revenues that largely fund the war.[16] The Kremlin has similarly leveraged the CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) Kirill Dmitriev to promote the prospect of expanding US-Russian economic and business relations in order to gain concessions from the Trump administration on Ukraine.[17]

The Kremlin appears to be conducting a coordinated information campaign threatening Finland. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on September 18 that the Finnish government’s “neutral veneer peeled off” and that revanchism is “literally on the rise” in Finland.[18] Russian Environmental Protection, Ecology, and Transport Special Presidential Representative Sergei Ivanov claimed on September 18 that Russian-Finnish relations "practically do not exist" and will not improve in the near future as Finland is a NATO member and is “actively calling for strengthening [its] eastern border.”[19] Ivanov claimed that the Finnish population is unsatisfied with the Finnish government and alleged that the lack of Russian tourists has led to “depopulation” and a weakening economy in southeastern Finland. Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa similarly claimed on September 18 that Finland’s NATO membership caused Russians to stop buying property and visiting Finland, leading to “depopulation.”[20]

Ivanov is a member of Putin’s inner circle, serving as the deputy director of the Federal Security Service (FSB) from 1998 to 1999 when Putin headed the organization.[21] Ivanov also served as the defense minister, deputy prime minister, and chief of staff of the Presidential Administration.[22] Ivanov's removal from his position as the chief of staff of the Presidential Administration in 2016 was likely a demotion at the time, but the Kremlin appears to be using him to reinforce ongoing Russian efforts to threaten Finland.[23] Kremlin newswire TASS and other Russian state media outlets notably amplified Lavrov’s, Ivanov’s, and Chepa’s statements.[24] The similar wording in both Ivanov’s and Chepa’s claims and TASS' amplification of their comments suggests that this is a concerted top-down Kremlin informational effort targeting Finland.[25] High-ranking Kremlin officials have increased threats against Finland in recent weeks, including by using language that mirrors the Kremlin’s false justifications for its invasions of Ukraine.[26] ISW continues to assess that the playbook Russia is currently using to threaten NATO mirrors the playbook Russia previously used to set informational conditions justifying its aggression against Ukraine.[27]

Lithuanian authorities connected Russian military intelligence to several incidents of arson in Europe in late July 2024 that were likely part of Russia’s ongoing hybrid warfare campaign that aims to sow fear and discord within Europe. The Lithuanian Prosecutor General's Office and Criminal Police Bureau reported on September 17 that three individuals, two of whom are Russian citizens affiliated with Russian military intelligence services, shipped four packages with incendiary devices from Vilnius to various European countries in late July 2024.[28] Lithuanian authorities reported that three of the packages detonated at the airport in Leipzig, Germany; on a freight truck in Poland; and at a DHL warehouse in Birmingham, United Kingdom between July 20 to 22, 2024. Lithuanian authorities reported that the fourth package reached Poland over land but did not detonate due to a technical failure. The devices reportedly contained homemade electronic timer-controlled incendiary charges as well as additional flammable substances. Lithuanian authorities reported that Lithuanian and other authorities are pursuing charges against 15 total suspects for their involvement in the organization and execution of these acts, including several suspects implicated in the attempted attack against an IKEA shopping center in Vilnius on May 9, 2024. Russia likely intends for these attacks to sow discord and chaos within European states and undermine domestic stability and the harmony between European states. Russia has been engaged in a multipronged hybrid warfare campaign since at least 2022 against Europe that has included electronic warfare (EW) interference and GPS jamming, sabotage missions, arson attacks, and attempted assassinations.[29]

Ukraine and Poland agreed on joint drone development and training mechanisms following the Russian drone incursion into Polish airspace on September 9 to 10. Ukrainian Defense Minister Denys Shmyhal stated on September 18 that Poland and Ukraine will create a joint unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) task force that will serve as a platform to coordinate and develop joint drone initiatives.[30] Shmyhal stated that Ukraine and Poland will use the task force to exchange knowledge and experiences with drones, develop and test counter-drone technologies, increase interoperability between Polish and Ukrainian forces, and train Polish forces and engineers on how to use air defense systems to protect against Russian drone and missile strikes. Shmyhal and Polish Defense Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz also signed a memorandum of understanding on September 18 establishing a training ground in Poland where Ukraine will train Polish forces on drone use.[31] Shmyhal stated that Ukraine will help Poland to create a "drone line" that works with EW systems to enable Poland to use drones to repel strikes. Shmyhal added that Ukraine will provide Poland with access to programs to monitor Russian strikes, possibly directed toward Poland. Shmyhal stated that Poland will also receive 43.7 billion euros (about $51.5 billion) from the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) program, the EU's financial instrument to facilitate common defense procurement efforts between EU states in order to boost Europe's defense industrial production capacity.[32] Shmyhal stated that Ukraine and Poland will establish joint defense programs through the SAFE mechanism.[33] ISW continues to assess that the September 9-10 Russian drone incursion was the latest in Russia's yearslong efforts to conduct kinetic provocations against Europe, including through its hybrid warfare campaign, while also increasing its rhetorical provocations threatening neighboring NATO states.[34]

The Kremlin will likely introduce a quota to systematically appoint hand-selected veterans of the war in Ukraine to positions in municipal, regional, and federal government in support of the Kremlin’s long-term campaign to militarize Russian society. A Just Russia Party Leader Sergey Mironov told Russian President Vladimir Putin during a meeting with political party leaders on September 18 that his party is proposing to establish a three percent quota for Russian veterans serving in municipal, regional, and federal government positions.[35] Mironov claimed that he agrees with Putin's belief that veterans must form the "future elite" in Russia. Putin responded to Mironov’s proposal, claiming that it is an "attractive idea," but warned that such a quota might turn into "formalism." Putin claimed that there are 700,000 Russian servicemembers fighting in Ukraine and that the Kremlin will need to be diligent about selecting the right candidates via the Time of Heroes program (the Kremlin’s program that prepares loyal veterans of the war in Ukraine for work in government and state enterprises). Putin and Mironov are likely setting informational conditions to systematically appoint veterans who are loyal to the regime to positions of power. ISW continues to assess that Putin launched the Time of Heroes program to ensure that Russian society is deeply militarized and ready to make greater sacrifices in the war in Ukraine and during potential Russian aggression against NATO in the future.[36]

Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly extended Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov's military service for five more years, demonstrating how Putin continues to retain an aging cadre of loyalists despite his stated efforts to raise a new, younger elite. A source close to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) told Russian outlet RBK on September 18 that the Kremlin extended Gerasimov's service term, with another source specifying that the Kremlin extended his term for five more years.[37] Gerasimov turned 70 years old on September 8, reaching the standard mandatory retirement age. Putin notably signed a decree in March 2021 that removed the mandatory retirement age for senior presidential appointees, allowing them to serve past the age of 70.[38] Putin awarded Gerasimov with the Order of Courage on September 8, despite the fact that Russian veterans and ultranationalists frequently criticize Gerasimov for his command incompetence.[39] A Kremlin insider source assessed on September 9 that Putin retained Gerasimov in order to maintain stability in the chain of command.[40] Russian independent newspaper The Moscow Times reported that Gerasimov is likely at least the fourth known senior Russian military and security official who has maintained his role after reaching the mandatory retirement age.[41] Putin's commitment to retaining aging but loyal military and security officials within his inner circle contradicts the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to appoint younger veterans of the war in Ukraine to positions of power. Putin is also contradicting his promises from the early 2000s not to remain in power past the age of 65.[42]

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov confirmed the departure of Kremlin Deputy Chief of Staff Dmitry Kozak from his senior Kremlin position. Peskov claimed on September 18 that Kozak resigned voluntarily but did not offer details about his departure.[43] ISW continues to assess that Kozak’s repeated disagreements with Russian President Vladimir Putin over the war in Ukraine suggest that Putin and possibly other Kremlin powerbrokers, such as Russian Presidential Administration Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko, removed Kozak from his position or pushed him to “resign” on his own.[44] A Russian insider source Kozak’s departure demonstrates the ineffectiveness of his policies, particularly those related to former Soviet states, including Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and the Baltics, and is a signal that the Kremlin views its current foreign policy model in the post-Soviet space as insufficient.[45]

Ukraine and Russia conducted another exchange of the bodies of soldiers killed in action (KIA) on September 18. The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War (POWs) reported on September 18 that Russia released the bodies of 1,000 deceased Ukrainian soldiers.[46] Ukraine's “I Want to Find” project reported on September 18 that Russia received the bodies of 24 KIA servicemembers.[47]

Key Takeaways:

• The Russian military command continues to signal its commitment to Russian President Vladimir Putin's theory of victory that posits that Russia can win a war of attrition against Ukraine.
• ISW continues to assess that a Russian victory is not inevitable, however, and that Ukraine and the West can leverage several key Russian weaknesses to force Putin to change his calculus and engage in good-faith negotiations.
• The Kremlin continues to demonstrate its commitment to its original war aims in Ukraine.
• The Kremlin is also attempting to manipulate the Trump administration into normalizing US-Russian bilateral relations without concluding the war in Ukraine - contrary to Trump's desired timeline of working on bilateral relations after concluding a peace in Ukraine.
• The Kremlin appears to be conducting a coordinated information campaign threatening Finland.
• Lithuanian authorities connected Russian military intelligence to several incidents of arson in Europe in late July 2024 that were likely part of Russia’s ongoing hybrid warfare campaign that aims to sow fear and discord within Europe.
• Ukraine and Poland agreed on joint drone development and training mechanisms following the Russian drone incursion into Polish airspace on September 9 to 10.
• The Kremlin will likely introduce a quota to systematically appoint hand-selected veterans of the war in Ukraine to positions in municipal, regional, and federal government in support of the Kremlin’s long-term campaign to militarize Russian society.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly extended Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov's military service for five more years, demonstrating how Putin continues to retain an aging cadre of loyalists despite his stated efforts to raise a new, younger elite.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman and Velykomykhailivka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 17, 2025

US officials acknowledged that Putin has yet to demonstrate a willingness to offer the concessions necessary to reach a peace agreement. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated in an interview with Face the Nation on August 17 that both Russia and Ukraine need to make concessions in order to achieve a peace agreement.[1] Rubio noted that any agreement in which only one side makes concessions would be a surrender, not a peace agreement. Rubio stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin offered "a couple" of unspecified concessions at the August 15 Alaska summit but did not offer enough concessions to reach a just peace agreement immediately. Rubio reiterated Trump's August 13 statement that the United States is not in a position to accept or reject a deal on behalf of Ukraine and that Ukraine must decide for itself what conditions it will accept for a peace deal.[2] Rubio stated that the Trump administration wants a deal that allows Ukraine to rebuild its country and to "be assured" a Russian invasion "never happens again." Rubio stated that harsher US sanctions against Russia would end the peace talks and continue the war for at least another year to year and a half. ISW continues to assess that Putin has not moderated his original war aims throughout the full-scale invasion and has offered no indication that he intends to change or compromise on these aims in any peace talks with Ukraine.[3]

Russia will be unable to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast rapidly through force as Russian forces have failed to do for over a decade. Russia could only rapidly seize all of Donetsk Oblast if Ukraine concedes to Putin's demand and withdraws from the remainder of the oblast. Axios reported on August 16, citing a source with direct knowledge of Trump's August 16 call with Zelensky and European leaders, that Trump stated that Putin told him that Russia could seize all of Donetsk Oblast if Putin so desired.[4] Putin's claim that Russian forces will inevitably seize all of Donetsk Oblast if the war continues is false. The Russian campaign to seize all of Donetsk Oblast has been ongoing since Russia's first invasion in 2014 and remains incomplete. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky noted on August 17 that Russia has tried and failed to seize all of Donetsk Oblast in the past 12 years of fighting in eastern Ukraine.[5] Russian forces have been bogged down in campaigns to seize multiple towns and cities in Donetsk Oblast since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022, and Russian forces are still struggling to achieve the objectives of several of these campaigns today. Seizing the remainder of Donetsk Oblast will very likely take Russian forces multiple years to complete after several difficult campaigns.

Russian forces have historically thrown themselves into costly campaigns to seize fortified or urban areas in eastern Ukraine, a reality far from Putin's claims of rapid advances. Russian forces undertook four notable campaigns in eastern Ukraine in 2024 into 2025 that illustrate how difficult it will likely be for Russian forces to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast through force.[6] Russian forces first began efforts to retake Kupyansk, Kharkiv Oblast in October 2023 and have conducted multiple separate campaigns aimed at seizing the town in the nearly two years since.[7] Russian forces are currently struggling to complete the encirclement or envelopment of Kupyansk from the northwest and have not yet seized the settlement despite 22 months of offensive operations. Russian forces began a dedicated effort to seize Toretsk, Donetsk Oblast in mid-June 2024.[8] Russian forces started this effort not far from the positions that Russian forces held prior to the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022. Russian forces seized Toretsk by August 1, 2025, taking 14 months to advance about 6.4 miles from the southeastern outskirts of Toretsk to the northwestern outskirts of Toretsk.[9]

The Russian campaign for Chasiv Yar, Donetsk Oblast began in May 2023 after Russian forces seized Bakhmut (east of Chasiv Yar), and Russian forces intensified efforts to seize Chasiv Yar in April 2024.[10] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces completed the seizure of Chasiv Yar on July 31, 2025, although ISW has yet to observe evidence that Russian forces have seized the entirety of the settlement.[11] It has taken Russian forces 26 months to advance about 6.8 miles (roughly 11 kilometers) from western Bakhmut to the western edge of Chasiv Yar.

Russian forces began efforts to seize Pokrovsk, Donetsk Oblast in February 2024 after the seizure of Avdiivka and have dedicated multiple efforts to seizing Pokrovsk through frontal assaults, envelopment, or encirclement – all of which have thus far yet to be successful after more than 18 months.[12]

Recent Russian advances northeast of Pokrovsk do not indicate that Russia can rapidly seize fortified or urban areas. Russian forces took open areas without any significantly fortified settlements during their recent penetration northeast of Pokrovsk near Dobropillya.[13] Russian forces still have not demonstrated any capability to rapidly seize large, fortified positions, however, as the campaigns for Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk have shown.[14] Russian forces are struggling to supply and reinforce their tactical penetration near Dobropillya and defend against Ukrainian counterattacks on the flanks —suggesting that Russian forces may not be able to consolidate their positions and exploit this penetration. The Russian effort for Dobropillya is just one part of Russia's broader 18-month effort to seize Pokrovsk, moreover. Russia's efforts near Dobropillya result from the failure of Russia's initial effort to encircle Pokrovsk from the southwest and northeast, causing the Russian command to try a deeper envelopment further northeast and north. ­_­

None of these many-months-long efforts to take Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk have been at the scale needed to seize all of Ukraine's fortress belt – Ukraine's highly fortified, main defensive line in Donetsk Oblast that consists of cities that are significantly larger in terms of size and population.[15] Russian efforts to seize the rest of Donetsk Oblast by force would take several years given the number of fortified urban areas Russian forces must overcome to reach the Donetsk Oblast administrative boundaries.

Russia continues to deny Ukraine's sovereignty and to demand the right to dictate Ukrainian domestic affairs. The New York Times (NYT), Reuters, and BBC, citing anonymous European officials, reported on August 17 that Putin asked Trump on August 15 for guarantees that Russian would become an official language again in parts or all of Ukraine and that Ukraine would end its "persecution" of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP).[16] The UOC MP is not an independent religious organization, but rather is the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church's (ROC) subordinate element in Ukraine.[17] The ROC is notably an element of Russia's hybrid warfare toolkit, particularly in the Kremlin's efforts to promote Kremlin narratives and Russian nationalist ideology to sustain and expand Russia's influence in former Soviet states.[18] The ROC has also advocated for the codification of a Russian state ideology premised on the idea that Ukraine should not exist.[19] Putin's demands regarding the Russian language and the protection of the ROC's activities in Ukraine via the UOC MP deny Ukraine the right to establish its own domestic laws as a sovereign and independent state.

Putin's demands that Ukraine make Russian an official language again and allow the UOC MP to operate in Ukraine are similar to Russian demands to exert control over Ukraine's domestic affairs in the 2015 Minsk accords. The Minsk II agreement required Ukraine to amend its constitution to give more autonomy to the Russia-controlled Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republic (DNR and LNR) and expand their role in Ukraine’s politics.[20]

Russian President Vladimir Putin's insistence that any peace agreement must address Russia's perceived "root causes" of the war will make it difficult to reach a peace agreement as rapidly as Trump desires given the complexity of the "root causes." Putin reiterated his ongoing demand that any peace agreement must eliminate the "root causes" of the war during the joint press conference at the Alaska summit on August 15.[21] Putin stated on August 1 that the "main thing" in the peace process is the eradication of the war's "root causes," which Putin described as issues related to Russia's security, the use of the Russian language in Ukraine, and the conditions for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP) – the ROC's arm in Ukraine.[22] Putin's demands to formalize Russian an official language in Ukraine and protect the ROC in Ukraine come from Russia's demands of Ukraine the Kremlin made in the Spring 2022 Istanbul negotiations. Russia demanded in Spring 2022 during the Istanbul negotiations that Ukraine "prevent restrictions and discrimination" against the UOC MP and restore all of the church's rights.[23] Russia also demanded in Spring 2022 that Ukraine guarantee the Russian language as an official language.[24] Marco Rubio responded to a question regarding Putin's demands at the Alaska summit during an interview with Face the Nation on August 17, stating that Putin's demands to address the alleged "root causes" allude to long historical complaints that the Kremlin has repeatedly invoked.[25] Rubio stated that the United States is not going to focus on the "root causes" but rather on halting the fighting.

Russia's "root causes" extend beyond Ukraine and eliminating them would require substantial negotiations with NATO. Russian officials have defined one of the "root causes" of the war as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to expand into eastern Europe and along Russia's borders in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s.[26] Russia issued a broad set of ultimatums to the United States in December 2021 demanding that NATO commit to not accepting Ukraine or any other countries as new members; not deploy any military forces to states that became NATO members after May 1997; refrain from military activity in Ukraine, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia; and refrain from deploying intermediate-range missiles within range of Russian territory.[27] The 2021 ultimatums also demanded that the United States commit to upholding the ban on NATO enlargement and refrain from deploying weapons in Europe. Putin's demand that any peace agreement eliminate the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine would require a lengthy, complicated negotiation process not only with Ukraine but also with NATO and the United States. Russia's demands about the "root causes" are demands for massive NATO concessions that would jeopardize NATO's integrity and European and US security more broadly.

Putin's offer of a Russian law forbidding a future invasion of Ukraine is not credible because Russia has already twice broken previous binding international commitments to not invade and as Putin has shown that he can freely change Russian law as he desires. US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff stated on August 17 that Putin agreed during the Alaska summit that Russia would "legislatively enshrine" promises that Russia would not invade any other territory in Ukraine or elsewhere in Europe – likely referring to the creation of new Russian legislation or amendments to the Russian Constitution.[28] Putin has extensively disregarded and amended the Russian Constitution to support his political objectives, as evidenced by the Kremlin's manipulating of the 2020 vote for a constitutional amendment to allow Putin to run for president again in 2024 and potentially remain in power until 2036.[29] Putin's two invasions of Ukraine also broke Russia's obligations under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum to respect the independence and sovereignty of Ukraine within Ukraine's borders at the time.[30] Russia has continually violated international agreements prohibiting aggression against Ukraine, including the Minsk agreements.[31] Putin’s promise to codify Russian promises against future aggression into Russian legislation or the Russian Constitution is neither credible nor a concession, and there is no evidence to suggest that Putin would abide by any such law forbidding a renewed invasion of invade Ukraine after concluding a peace agreement.

The details about Ukrainian security guarantees to which Putin may have agreed remain unclear at this time, but the Kremlin may be attempting to resurrect its demands about security guarantors from April 2022 that would have neutered such guarantees. Axios stated on August 16 that sources briefed on Trump's call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and European leaders after the Trump-Putin meeting in Alaska stated that Putin said he was willing to discuss security guarantees for Ukraine and mentioned the People's Republic of China (PRC) as one of the possible guarantors.[32] Witkoff stated on August 17 that Trump and Putin came to an agreement that the United States and Europe could "effectively offer Article 5-like language" as a security guarantee for Ukraine against future renewed Russian aggression – referring to NATO's collective defense clause.[33] Putin's reported suggestion that the PRC could be a security guarantor mirrors Russia's proposed peace settlement in Istanbul in April 2022. The April 2022 proposed treaty listed the PRC, several Western states, and Russia, as the security guarantors for Ukraine.[34] Russia demanded in the proposal that guarantor states provide Ukraine with aid in the event of a future attack only after all guarantor states had agreed to such a decision. The PRC is a close Russian ally that has significantly helped the Russian war effort and defense industrial base (DIB), and the PRC would not be a neutral guarantor.[35] Russia's involvement in the guarantee would make it meaningless. The parameters of the security guarantees for Ukraine that Putin is reportedly willing to accept are unclear. Any future peace settlement that includes stipulations similar to the demands that Russia made in April 2022 requiring unity among guarantor states would enable the PRC (or Russia, if Russia is one of them) to veto any decisions to help Ukraine in the event of another Russian invasion.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky arrived in Brussels on August 17 to meet with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and to participate in a Coalition of the Willing teleconference.[36] The teleconference aimed to coordinate Ukraine's and Europe's positions before Zelensky's visit to the White House on August 18. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, Italian President Giorgia Meloni, Finnish President Alexander Stubb, French President Emmanuel Macron, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte, and Von der Leyen announced that they will accompany Zelensky during his meeting with Trump.[37]

Key Takeaways:

• US officials acknowledged that Putin has yet to demonstrate a willingness to offer the concessions necessary to reach a peace agreement.
• Russia will be unable to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast rapidly through force as Russian forces have failed to do for over a decade. Russia could only rapidly seize all of Donetsk Oblast if Ukraine concedes to Putin's demand and withdraws from the remainder of the oblast.
• Russian forces have historically thrown themselves into costly campaigns to seize fortified or urban areas in eastern Ukraine, a reality far from Putin's claims of rapid advances.
• Recent Russian advances northeast of Pokrovsk do not indicate that Russia can rapidly seize fortified or urban areas.
• Russia continues to deny Ukraine's sovereignty and to demand the right to dictate Ukrainian domestic affairs.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin's insistence that any peace agreement must address Russia's perceived "root causes" of the war will make it difficult to reach a peace agreement as rapidly as Trump desires given the complexity of the "root causes."
• Russia's "root causes" extend beyond Ukraine and eliminating them would require substantial negotiations with NATO.
• Putin's offer of a Russian law forbidding a future invasion of Ukraine is not credible because Russia has already twice broken previous binding international commitments to not invade and as Putin has shown that he can freely change Russian law as he desires.
• The details about Ukrainian security guarantees to which Putin may have agreed remain unclear at this time, but the Kremlin may be attempting to resurrect its demands about security guarantors from April 2022 that would have neutered such guarantees.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 16, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin oversaw the final day of the Russian-Belarusian Zapad-2025 joint military exercises on September 16. Putin, Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov, Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, and Presidential Aide Alexei Dyumin visited the Mulino Training Ground in Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast and inspected the troops participating in Zapad-2025.[i] Belousov reported that personnel from Russia's Leningrad and Moscow military districts (LMD/MMD), Aerospace Forces (VKS), Airborne (VDV) Forces, and Northern and Baltic fleets and Belarusian elements of as part of the Union State’s combined Regional Grouping of Forces (RGV) participated in Zapad-2025. Putin stated that 100,000 military personnel participated in the exercises, including military personnel from six additional countries. Putin later met with personnel from Bangladesh, India, Burkina Faso, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, and Iran. India announced on September 9 that it sent 65 military personnel to the Mulino Training Ground to participate in Zapad-2025 to enhance military cooperation and exchange information about combat tactics with Russia and Belarus.[ii] This is India's second time participating in the joint exercises, after 200 Indian personnel participated in counterterrorism operations during the Russian-Belarusian Zapad-2021 joint exercises in September 2021.[iii] Putin notably wore a military uniform to observe the exercises - the second time Putin has worn a military uniform at a public event since the beginning of his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.[iv] Putin first wore a military uniform during the full-scale invasion while visiting Kursk Oblast in March 2025, and ISW assessed at that time that Putin was likely trying to portray himself as an engaged wartime leader and to share the credit for Russian forces retaking territory in Kursk Oblast.[v] Putin likely attended the September 16 exercises in a military uniform in order to posture Russian-Belarusian military strength against the backdrop of recent Kremlin kinetic and rhetorical escalation against NATO states neighboring Russia, such as Poland and Norway, and repeated Russian threats against the Baltic states and Finland.[vi]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published footage of elements of the Russian Northern Fleet repelling a mock enemy air raid in the Barents Sea and practicing a landing operation with drone support on Sredniy Peninsula, Murmansk Oblast.[vii] The Russian MoD also published footage of elements of the Baltic Fleet conducting a mock cruise missile strike against a naval target and supporting infantry units.[viii] The Russian MoD published footage of elements of the LMD repelling a mock sabotage and reconnaissance mission and conducting mock drone reconnaissance and electronic intelligence missions in Kaliningrad Oblast.[ix] The Russian MoD emphasized that Russian and Belarusian forces focused on integrating unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) during the exercises.[x] Belarusian First Deputy Defense Minister and Chief of the General Staff Major General Pavel Muraveiko stated that Belarusian forces practiced the use of non-strategic nuclear weapons and deployment of an Oreshnik ballistic missile system during the exercises.[xi] Muraveiko stated that Belarusian forces also practiced integrating drones, motorcycles, and robotic platforms – common systems that Russian forces utilize in Ukraine – during the exercises. ISW continues to assess that Russian and Belarusian forces are using the Zapad exercises to implement some tactical lessons from Russia's experience in Ukraine.[xii]

Ukraine's ongoing long-range strike campaign targeting critical Russian energy infrastructure continues to degrade Russia's oil and gasoline markets, likely affecting Russia's long-term ability to finance its war in Ukraine. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 16 that Ukraine's Special Operation Forces (SOF), alongside unspecified Ukrainian forces, conducted a drone strike against the Saratov Oil Refinery in Saratov Oblast, resulting in several explosions and a fire.[xiii] The Saratov refinery specializes in gasoline, diesel fuel, and oil fuel production and other oil products; has a 4.8-million-ton production capacity; and supplies the Russian military. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces are conducting a battle damage assessment.

 Reuters reported on September 16 that three industry sources stated that Russian state-controlled petroleum company Transneft warned producers that Transneft may need to reduce output following a series of Ukrainian drone strikes on critical export ports and refineries.[xiv] Two industry sources told Reuters that Transneft recently restricted unspecified oil firms' ability to store oil in the Transneft pipeline system and warned producers that they may have to accept less oil if Transneft's infrastructure sustains further damage. The three sources informed Reuters that the Ukrainian strikes could force Russia, which accounts for nine percent of global oil production, to ultimately cut output. Reuters noted that Russia lacks significant capacity to stockpile oil and Russian industry sources reported that Russia has already lost some oil exporting capacity following August 2025 Ukrainian drone strikes against the Ust-Luga oil terminal in Leningrad Oblast. Reuters reported on September 15 that two industry sources stated that Ukrainian forces damaged a unit at the Russian Surgutneftegaz's Kirishinefteorgsintez refinery plant, one of Russia's largest oil refineries, in Leningrad Oblast in a drone strike on September 14, forcing authorities to halt operations due to a subsequent fire.[xv] Reuters reported that the unit accounts for nearly 40 percent of the plant's total processing capacity of roughly 20 million tons per year. Sources told Reuters that the Ukrainian strike caused a fire and damaged a furnace and other unspecified equipment at the unit, which may take up to a month to repair. The sources noted that the plant aims to boost operations at other units to compensate for the damage, which will allow the plant to maintain 75 percent of its processing volumes. Ukraine's ongoing strike campaign targeting critical Russian energy infrastructure, particularly against oil refineries, is generating compounding effects on Russia's ability to finance its war in Ukraine and exacerbating chronic gasoline shortages in Russia and occupied Ukraine.[xvi]

 Ukraine continues to demonstrate its adeptness at innovating and fielding drones with increasingly sophisticated artificial intelligence (AI) technology while maintaining accessible costs, significantly augmenting Ukrainian drone effectiveness. Ukrainian outlet United24 Media reported on September 15 that Ukrainian drone producer Vyriy and Ukrainian defense technology company The Fourth Law (TFL) are launching mass production of Vyriy-10 first-person view (FPV) drones.[xvii] United24 Media reported that Vyriy equipped the Vyriy-10 drones with TFL's TFL-1 terminal guidance module, an advanced AI guidance system that will enable drone operators to execute more precise strikes and navigate environments with pervasive electronic warfare (EW). TFL Head Yaroslav Azhnyuk stated that several Ukrainian units have leveraged the modified Vyriy-10 drones to increase drone strike effectiveness by two to four times. United24 Media noted that the drones cost approximately $448, making it only slightly more expensive than traditional Ukrainian-made FPV drones. The integration of Ukrainian drones with AI guidance systems represents a significant technological advancement that will enable Ukrainian drone operators to conduct more accurate strikes and bypass frontline Russian EW to strike targets in the Russian near rear.[xviii]

 Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko continues to rhetorically distance himself from Russia’s recent incursion into Polish airspace in an attempt to obfuscate the fact that Belarus is de facto a cobelligerent in Russia’s war against Ukraine. Lukashenko claimed on September 15 in response to Russia’s incursion into Polish airspace on September 9 to 10 that Belarus was not involved in any drone incursions into Polish and Lithuanian that Belarusian forces downed drones heading toward Poland and spent "massive" resources destroying the drones. Lukashenko claimed that Belarus informed Polish authorities about the drones that Belarusian forces failed to down. Lukashenko accused Poland of “playing dirty tricks” and claimed that Poland clearly has unspecified plans that Belarus must ”unravel“ and ”resist.“ Lukashenko’s statements are likely an attempt to deflect from the ways Belarus is cooperating with Russia and assisting Russia's war effort, including through the Russian-Belarusian Zapad-2025 military exercises, Belarusian efforts to assist Russia in its

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin oversaw the final day of the Russian-Belarusian Zapad-2025 joint military exercises on September 16.
• Ukraine's ongoing long-range strike campaign targeting critical Russian energy infrastructure continues to degrade Russia's oil and gasoline markets, likely affecting Russia's long-term ability to finance its war in Ukraine.
• Ukraine continues to demonstrate its adeptness at innovating and fielding drones with increasingly sophisticated artificial intelligence (AI) technology while maintaining accessible costs, significantly augmenting Ukrainian drone effectiveness.
• Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko continues to rhetorically distance himself from Russia’s recent incursion into Polish airspace in an attempt to obfuscate the fact that Belarus is de facto a cobelligerent in Russia’s war against Ukraine.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, and in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 15, 2025

The Kremlin is escalating its rhetoric threatening NATO states in parallel with the kinetic escalation of Russia's recent drone incursion into Poland. Russian Security Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on September 15 on his Russian- and English-language channels that a “no-fly zone” over Ukraine that would allow NATO aircraft to shoot down Russian drones would “mean only one thing – a war between NATO and Russia.”[i] Medvedev also claimed that Russia will "go after" EU states that provide Ukraine with loans backed by Russian assets in "all possible international and national courts." Medvedev threatened that “in some cases, [Russia will] bypass court procedure” - a possible threat to use kinetic action against EU states. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov explicitly claimed on September 15 that “NATO is at war with Russia" and that "NATO is de facto involved in" the war in Ukraine by providing support to Ukraine.[ii] Peskov, like Medvedev, condemned European efforts to seize frozen Russian assets, saying that ”such steps will not go unnoticed.”[iii]

Peskov's and Medvedev's references to a possible Russia-NATO war aim to prevent NATO and European states from taking action to defend themselves and Ukraine against aggressive and threatening Russian behavior, such as the September 9 to 10 drone incursion into Poland. Peskov's and Medvedev's threats come against the background of Russian threats against Serbia and NATO member Norway. Russian Ambassador to Norway Nikolai Korchunov accused Norwegian officials of encroaching on allegedly ”Russian” settlements on sovereign Norwegian land, and the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) claimed that European officials are preparing a ”Serbian Maidan,” referencing the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution in Ukraine.[iv] Kremlin officials have routinely invoked narratives mirroring those that Russia has used to try to justify its invasions of Ukraine - including Russian territorial claims in Ukraine and false claims portraying the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution as a "coup" - in order to threaten other neighboring states, including NATO members.[v]  Russia has employed similarly escalatory rhetoric in recent weeks against Finland—another NATO member.[vi]

Russian and Belarusian forces continued the Zapad-2025 joint military exercises on September 15 and appear to be implementing some tactical lessons from Russia's experience in Ukraine. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian and Belarusian forces conducted training exercises at the Borisovsky and 227th Combined Arms training grounds in Minsk Oblast and in Kaliningrad Oblast and the Barents Sea.[vii] Russian forces also conducted exercises in Russia's Far East.[viii] The Russian MoD confirmed that Russian elements of the Leningrad Military District (LMD) practiced deploying nuclear-capable Iskander-M ballistic missiles systems in Kaliningrad Oblast.[ix] The Russian MoD claimed that the nuclear-capable Arkhangelsk submarine practiced launching a missile strike against a naval target and that elements of the Russian Northern Fleet practiced striking a mock enemy nuclear submarine in the Barents Sea.[x] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian Tu-22M3 long-range strategic bombers patrolled ”the neutral waters of the Barents Sea” for four hours.[xi] The Belarusian MoD reported that representatives from 23 countries, including the United States, Hungary, and Turkey, observed Zapad-2025 exercises in Belarus.[xii]

The Russian MoD claimed that Russian and Belarusian forces practiced maneuvering with light motor vehicles, such as all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), as rapid movement on such vehicles reduces the time required to cross open areas, decreases the risk of  first-person view (FPV) drone strikes, and allows troops to quickly attack from the flanks. The Russian MoD appears to be implementing lessons it has learned from the war in Ukraine, such as Russian tactics to move near the frontline on ATVs in order to evade Ukrainian drones, and is disseminating such knowledge with Belarus. Such joint exercises also give Russia the opportunity to iterate and institutionalize the lessons it is learning on the battlefield in Ukraine outside of the chaos of the actual combat zone. Russia and Belarus are likely to use Zapad-2025 to improve on their joint interoperability under the conditions of modern warfare.

Russia is using the Zapad-2025 exercises to practice potential future kinetic provocations against neighboring NATO states. Russian forces practiced defending against and using nuclear capabilities in the waters of the Barents Sea, which borders NATO member Norway.[xiii] Russian forces also practiced using nuclear capable missiles in Kaliningrad Oblast, which immediately borders NATO states Lithuania and Poland.[xiv] Russian officials have previously used Kaliningrad Oblast as a launchpad for GPS jamming and spoofing across Europe, and Russia reportedly constructed a Circularly Disposed Antenna Array (CDAA), a military-grade antenna array designed for radio intelligence or communication, just south of Chernyakhovsk, Kaliningrad Oblast and 25 kilometers from the Polish border.[xv] The EU Commissioner for Defense and Space Andrius Kubilius stated on September 15 that 40 percent of all flights in Europe face some form of jamming - likely from Russia.[xvi]  Zapad-2025 is providing both Russia and Belarus a platform with which to refine kinetic escalation techniques, which in themselves serve as a subtle form of pressure against NATO.

The September 12-14 gubernatorial elections in Russia further demonstrated the Kremlin's grip on power throughout the country. Russia held 20 gubernatorial and 11 regional parliamentary elections on September 12 to 14.[xvii] Incumbents won in all of the gubernatorial races, including 19 candidates from the ruling United Russia party and one independent candidate from the A Just Russia Party, whose candidacy Russian President Vladimir Putin’s previously approved. All of the incumbents won with at least 60 percent of the vote, with seven candidates gaining more than 80 percent of the vote.[xviii] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on September 15 that the elections were a success and that the results indicate Russian society's "consolidation...around [Russian President Vladimir] Putin and his team.”[xix] Russian Security Council Chairperson and United Russia Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed that the number of electoral violations was "minimal" but that Russian authorities will "deal" with the violations that did occur.[xx] Russia’s Central Election Commission (CEC) claimed that there were 149,717 observers present at polling stations, but Russian opposition outlet Meduza noted that the Kremlin has not allowed independent observers to monitor Russian elections since 2016.[xxi]

The Kremlin continues to build out a loyal cadre of elected officials from veterans of its war against Ukraine. Acting Tambov Oblast Governor and former “Time of Heroes” participant Yevgeny Pervyshov won with 74.3 percent of the vote and highlighted his experience fighting in the war against Ukraine during his election campaign.[xxii]  Russian CEC Chairperson Ella Pamfilova claimed on September 12 that 1,616 Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine ran for positions in various levels of government in the September 12 to 14 elections.[xxiii] The Kremlin has continually used its ”Time of Heroes” program, which handpicks veterans of the war in Ukraine to work in the federal government, and its regional and local analogues to militarize various levels of government in Russia and occupied Ukraine.[xxiv]

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin is escalating its rhetoric threatening NATO states in parallel with the kinetic escalation of Russia's recent drone incursion into Poland.
• Russian and Belarusian forces continued the Zapad-2025 joint military exercises on September 15 and appear to be implementing some tactical lessons from Russia's experience in Ukraine.
• Russia is using the Zapad-2025 exercises to practice potential future kinetic provocations against neighboring NATO states.
• The September 12-14 gubernatorial elections in Russia further demonstrated the Kremlin's grip on power throughout the country.
• The Kremlin continues to build out a loyal cadre of elected officials from veterans of its war against Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area. Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk and Novopavlivka and in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 14, 2025

A Russian drone entered Romanian airspace on the night of September 13, days after a Russian drone incursion into Polish airspace on the night of September 9 to 10. Romanian Defense Minister Ionuț Moșteanu reported on September 13 that Romanian forces scrambled two F-16 fighter jets from the 86th Air Base near Fetești after a Romanian radar detected a Russian drone in Romanian airspace at 1823 local time.[1] Moșteanu stated that Romania faces “provocations from Russia” nearly every week. Romanian Foreign Minister Oana-Silvia Țoiu stated that the F-16s tracked the drone until it left Romanian airspace without causing any damage or casualties 50 minutes after the moment of entry.[2] Toiu noted that two allied German Eurofighter jets were ready to aid Romanian forces, condemned the attack as “unacceptable and reckless,” and stated that Romania will take the necessary measures to protect Romanian sovereignty and security. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky noted that Russian drone flight paths are ”always calculated” and that the drone did not accidentally enter the Romanian airspace due to a mistake or actions of lower-level commanders.[3] This is Russia’s second incursion into NATO airspace over the course of four days. The Romanian Ministry of Defense (MoD) provided data to ABC News on September 14 indicating that Russian drones have penetrated Romanian airspace 11 times since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, inclusive of the September 13 incursion.”[4] The Romanian MoD noted that Russian drones have conducted about 50 drone strikes near the Ukrainian-Romanian border since February 2022, including 30 strikes in which drone debris fell on Romanian territory.

Poland authorized NATO reinforcements to deploy to Poland for Operation Eastern Sentry in response to the September 9 to 10 Russian drone incursion into Polish territory. Polish President Karol Nawrocki signed a decree on September 14 authorizing NATO to deploy another foreign contingent to Poland as reinforcements, specifically in support of the Operation Eastern Sentry.[5] NATO announced the start of Operation Eastern Sentry on September 12, and NATO officials noted that the intent of the operation is to reinforce NATO's eastern flank, including Poland, following the Russian drone incursion and violation of NATO airspace.[6] Polish and NATO allied aircraft scrambled, and Poland's ground-based air defense systems were activated to the highest possible readiness again in response to Russian drone strikes against Ukrainian border regions overnight on September 13 to 14.[7] NATO and member state officials have continued denouncing the Russian drone incursion into Poland and reiterated that the drone incursion was likely intentional, as ISW continues to assess.[8] Russian officials and pro-Kremlin sources have continued deflecting blame for the drone incursion and downplaying NATO states reactions to the drone incursion.[9] ISW continues to assess that Russia is likely attempting to gauge NATO's capabilities and reactions to the drone incursion in hopes of applying lessons learned to possible future conflicts against the NATO alliance.[10]

Russian and Belarusian forces continued the Zapad-2025 joint military exercises. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on September 14 that Russian and Belarusian forces conducted several naval exercises as part of Zapad-2025, including training to use Bal coastal missile systems and Uran cruise missiles to strike simulated enemies and ships in the Barents Sea, and launch a Ka-27 naval helicopter from the Udaloy-class anti-submarine destroyer Severomorsk.[11] The Russian MoD claimed that the Russian Baltic Fleet practiced emergency rescue assistance to surface ships.[12] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian and Belarusian forces conducted several joint aviation exercises, including training to conduct long-range Il-76 military transport aircraft flights behind enemy lines, use Ka-52M and Mi-28NM combat helicopters to provide fire support for air assault landings, and fly MiG-31 interceptor aircraft with Kinzhal ballistic missiles to strike enemy targets.[13] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) Su-34 fighter-bomber crews practiced conducting air strikes.[14] The Belarusian MoD claimed that Russian and Belarusian forces practiced conducting reconnaissance; counter-sabotage operations; relocating a command post; recapturing a defense infrastructure facility from a hostile formation; defending against forces crossing a river; operating drones, including quadcopter and first-person view (FPV) drones; operating the Kvadrat and Sprint satellite communications systems; and coordinating with military command.[15] Footage published on September 14 purportedly shows a Russian Iskander-M ballistic missile system deployed in Kaliningrad Oblast as part of the Zapad-2025 exercises.[16] Ukrainian open-source intelligence group CyberBoroshno geolocated the footage to the E28 Kaliningrad-Elblag highway about 35 kilometers from the Polish border.[17] Russia permanently deployed Iskander-M systems to Kaliningrad Oblast in 2018.[18]

A Russian milblogger claimed that the Zapad-2025 exercises are training exercises to prepare for war against NATO.[19] The milblogger claimed that Russia is one of the only countries with experience in modern warfare and that Russia should share its lessons learned in Ukraine with other Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) allies, or "at least" to Belarus. Russia previously used the September 2021 Zapad-2021 exercises to prepare and secure logistics that were crucial for Russia's initial offensives into northern Ukraine at the start of the invasion.[20]

Ukraine continued its long-range drone strike and sabotage campaign against Russian oil, gas, railway, and military infrastructure in Russia and occupied Crimea on the night of September 13 to 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 14 that elements of the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) and Special Operations Forces (SSO) struck the Kirishi Oil Refinery in Leningrad Oblast on the night of September 13 to 14.[21] The Ukrainian USF stated that the refinery is the second largest in Russia after the Omsk Oil Refinery, with an annual capacity of over 20 million tons of oil.[22] The Ukrainian USF stated that the refinery produces about 80 varieties of petroleum products and supplies the Russian Armed Forces. Geolocated footage published on September 14 shows a fire at the refinery’s primary oil distillation unit.[23] A source within Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) told Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne on September 13 that GUR drone units conducted the September 13 strike against the Bashneft-Novoil Oil Refinery in Ufa, Republic of Bashkortostan, and that preliminary data indicates that explosions at the refinery caused significant damage to a vacuum column essential for primary oil processing.[24] GUR sources told Suspilne on September 14 that GUR units conducted an overnight drone strike against the Metafrax Chemical Plant in Gubakha, Perm Krai — a producer of chemicals that Russian defense industrial facilities use to manufacture explosives — and that preliminary data indicates that the strike damaged urea production equipment.[25] Geolocated footage published on September 13 shows a fire at the Metafrac Chemical Plant.[26] Perm Krai Head Dmitry Makhonin claimed on September 14 that a Ukrainian drone struck an industrial facility in Gubakha.[27]

Ukrainian intelligence sources told Suspilne on September 14 that GUR and Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) units planted an explosive device on a section of the Kursk City-Oryol City railway between Maloarkhangelsk and Glazunovka, Oryol Oblast.[28] Oryol Oblast Governor Andrey Klychkov claimed on September 14 that Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) servicemen attempted to defuse the device on September 13 when it detonated, killing three servicemen.[29] The intelligence sources stated that the explosion destroyed the railway roadbed and fuel tanks.[30] Russian Railways claimed on September 14 that the explosion delayed 17 trains.[31] The intelligence sources stated that GUR and SSO units also detonated a section of the St. Petersburg-Pskov railway between Stroganovo and Mshinskaya in Leningrad Oblast overnight, derailing a train and destroying 15 fuel tanks.[32] The sources added that both railway sections are crucial logistical routes for Russian forces fighting in the Kharkiv and Sumy directions. Leningrad Oblast Governor Aleksandr Drozdenko claimed on September 14 that a train with 15 cars derailed in Luzhsky Raion, Leningrad Oblast.[33]

The Ukrainian Navy reported on September 14 that unspecified naval units struck the Russian Black Sea Fleet communications center at the 184th Scientific and Research Experimental Base in Sevastopol, occupied Crimea, on the night of September 10 to 11.[34] Geolocated satellite imagery taken on September 14 shows damage to two buildings at the communications center.[35]

The Kremlin is facing a massive budget deficit and may increase consumer taxes to compensate for the deficit rather than decreasing funding for its war machine, passing the economic costs off as a sacrifice that the Russian population must accept to support Russia’s war in Ukraine. Several Russian government sources told Russian opposition outlet The Bell on September 11 that the Russian government is considering increasing the Value-Added Tax (VAT), a federal tax imposed on most Russian goods and services domestically, from 20 to 22 percent in the near future due to large federal budget deficits.[36] The Russian government could generate an additional one trillion rubles annually (roughly $11.9 billion), or 0.5 percent of Russia's Gross Domestic Product (GDP), by increasing the VAT to 22 percent. This tax increase would functionally remove money from the Russian population as businesses pass most tax increases onto consumers by raising the costs of goods and services. The Russian Ministry of Finance reported on September 9 that the Russian federal budget deficit for January to August 2025 amounted to 4.2 trillion rubles (roughly $50 billion), well exceeding its planned 3.8 trillion-ruble (roughly $45 billion) deficit for all of 2025.[37] Russian President Vladimir Putin previously claimed that Russia’s military budget is currently 6.3 percent of its GDP, or 13.5 trillion rubles (roughly $160 billion), much of which is likely contributing to the Russian federal budget deficit.[38] This 6.3 percent of GDP notably does not include Russia's investments in its defense industrial base (DIB) production. The Kremlin, on the contrary, offered Russian small drone producers a zero VAT rate in late July 2025.[39]

Increasing the VAT could reverse any progress the Russian Central Bank may have made against inflation while also failing to address any of the issues that will likely arise from prematurely lowering the key interest rate. A Kremlin source claimed to Reuters in late August 2025 that increasing the VAT is the only way for the Russian government to address the federal budget deficit.[40] The Russian government last increased the VAT in 2019 from 18 to 20 percent, which the Russian Central Bank reported caused inflation to rise by 0.55 to 0.7 percentage points.[41] The Russian Central Bank has been combating inflation for the last year and has lowered its key interest rate from 21 percent to 18 percent gradually since June 2025, likely a reaction to the opinion that the Russian Central Bank's counter-inflationary measures were succeeding.[42] An increase in VAT will likely cause inflation to rise while simultaneously lowering cash flow in the Russian economy, weakening consumer purchasing power and further stagnating Russian economic growth.[43] Putin has unintentionally created an economic situation from which Russia will struggle to escape by adopting policies aimed at increasing Russian society's reliance on military spending by heavily investing in Russia’s DIB, all while Russian society faces labor and gasoline shortages, broader demographic issues, and declining savings.

Key Takeaways:

• A Russian drone entered Romanian airspace on the night of September 13, days after a Russian drone incursion into Polish airspace on the night of September 9 to 10.
• Poland authorized NATO reinforcements to deploy to Poland for Operation Eastern Sentry in response to the September 9 to 10 Russian drone incursion into Polish territory.
• Russian and Belarusian forces continued the Zapad-2025 joint military exercises.
• Ukraine continued its long-range drone strike and sabotage campaign against Russian oil, gas, railway, and military infrastructure in Russia and occupied Crimea on the night of September 13 to 14.
• The Kremlin is facing a massive budget deficit and may increase consumer taxes to compensate for the deficit rather than decreasing funding for its war machine, passing the economic costs off as a sacrifice that the Russian population must accept to support Russia’s war in Ukraine.
• Increasing the VAT could reverse any progress the Russian Central Bank may have made against inflation while also failing to address any of the issues that will likely arise from prematurely lowering the key interest rate.
• Russian forces advanced near Pokrovsk and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 13, 2025

Russian forces recently attempted to advance behind Ukrainian positions in Kupyansk via an underground gas pipeline – the third time Russian forces have used this tactic so far in the war. Russia's repeated use of this tactic further indicates that Russian forces are improving their ability to disseminate tactical lessons between various sectors of the frontline. A Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR)-affiliated source reported on September 12 that Russian forces entered a gas pipeline from a wooded area near Lyman Pershyi (northeast of Kupyansk), traveled through the pipe for an estimated four days with electric scooters and modified wheeled stretchers, and exited the pipe near Radkivka (immediately north of Kupyansk).[1] The Ukrainian source reported that Russian forces then advanced toward Kupyansk and the nearby railway line. The Ukrainian General Staff acknowledged that Russian forces conducted the mission and stated that Russian forces are accumulating on the northern outskirts of Kupyansk but have not entered Kupyansk itself.[2] The commander of a Ukrainian drone regiment operating in the Kupyansk direction stated that Ukrainian forces have since struck and damaged the pipeline and that Russian forces are no longer able to advance through the pipeline.[3] Russian milbloggers claimed that it is unclear when Russian forces conducted the mission, and some claimed that Russian forces may have advanced through the gas pipeline in early September 2025, indicating that the footage may be up to a week and a half old.[4] Kupyansk Military Administration Head Andriy Besedin stated on September 13 that Russian forces do not currently hold positions in Kupyansk but that fighting is ongoing near the outskirts of the city.[5]

Russian forces previously leveraged underground pipelines to advance behind Ukrainian defensive positions in Avdiivka, Donetsk Oblast in January 2024 and in Sudzha, Kursk Oblast in March 2025. Elements of the Russian 60th Veterany Separate Assault Brigade (Volunteer Assault Corps) reportedly participated in both of the gas pipeline missions in Avdiivka and Sudzha.[6] ISW has not observed reports of the brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction, indicating that the Russian military command is disseminating the brigade's knowledge and success in such missions to other units and formations. ISW noted in January 2025 that the Russian military command appeared to be at least attempting to improve its ability to disseminate lessons learned, given that Russian forces are exhibiting similar operational patterns across the front line.[7] Alternatively, the use of pipelines to enable infiltration may be more reflective of individual Russian units’ on-the-spot tactical innovation and adaptation in the face of proliferated Ukrainian drone capabilities, as such pipelines provide Russian forces with natural cover and concealment that can enable forward movement.

The international community continues to condemn the recent Russian drone incursion into Poland’s airspace. Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Marcin Bosacki presented a joint statement at the United Nations (UN) on September 12, in which nearly 50 countries denounced Russia’s incursion into Polish airspace on the night of September 9 to 10 with 19 drones.[8] Bosacki stated that Russia purposely violated Poland’s territorial integrity and trespassed against NATO and the EU. Ukrainian Permanent Representative to the UN Andriy Melnyk stated that Ukraine shares Poland’s view that the Russian drone incursion was not a technical error but rather a deliberate act aimed at escalating tensions and testing the international community’s response to ongoing Russian aggression. Melnyk warned leaders that Russia may continue to escalate if the international community fails to respond decisively. US Acting Permanent Representative to the UN Dorothy Shea reiterated that the United States remains committed to defending “every inch of NATO” and noted that Russia’s incursion undermines the ongoing US efforts to broker an end to Russia’s war in Ukraine. Shea stated that Russia has intensified its air campaign against Ukraine following the US-Russia Alaska Summit on August 15 and that such actions demonstrate “immense disrespect for good faith US efforts” to usher in peace. ISW has also observed a marked intensification in Russia's long-range strikes against Ukraine since mid-August 2025.[9] Shea conveyed that the United States is urging Russia to negotiate directly with Ukraine to demonstrate its seriousness in seeking an immediate end to hostilities and to prevent Russia’s war from expanding.

Russian and Belarusian officials continue to deflect responsibility for Russia's recent drone incursion into Polish airspace. Russian Permanent Representative to the UN Vasily Nebenzya claimed on September 12 that Poland “hastened to place the blame on Russia without presenting any evidence linking Russia to the incident.”[10] Nebenzya denied that the drones used in the incursion could be of Russian origin because the range of the drones found in Poland does not exceed 700 kilometers. Nebenzya claimed that Russia "expressed its readiness for a professional dialogue" with Poland after the incursion. Nebenzya proceeded to shift blame onto the West and accused European countries of using the Russian incursion into Polish airspace to spread "an information campaign" aimed at increasing support for Ukraine and guaranteeing new arms deliveries. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed on September 12 that Russia "refuted the speculations... about plans to attack one of the NATO countries" and that such speculations could lead to "an inevitable escalation," which Russia does not want.[11] Belarusian Chargé d'Affaires of the Permanent Mission to the UN Artem Tozik claimed that Poland’s accusations against Belarus' involvement in the drone incursion are "baseless," and that Belarus was the first to inform Poland about the approach of drones that "went off course" during the overnight Russian strikes against Ukraine.[12]

Additional information about the Russian drone incursion undermines Nebenzya's and Tozik's statements, however. Sky News published an image on September 11 of one of the Russian Gerbera drones that landed in Poland, and Bosacki shared an image at the UN Security Council meeting showing Cyrillic letters on one of the drones.[13] Ukrainian outlet Militarnyi analyzed Sky News' image and determined that the Russian drone was equipped with an Iranian-made Tallysman satellite navigation four-channel controlled reception pattern antenna (CRPA).[14] Militarnyi reported that CRPAs filter out false signal sources from electronic warfare (EW) systems in order to make the drone more resistant to EW. The presence of CRPAs indicates that it is unlikely that these Russian drones flew off course due to EW jamming. The September 9 to 10 incursion of at least 19 drones in a single night is notable and is roughly three times the number of projectiles that have breached Polish airspace during the entirety of Russia’s full-scale invasion. It is extremely unlikely that such a concentrated number of drones could have violated Polish airspace accidentally or due to technical or operator error. ISW has observed other evidence refuting Russian and Belarusian denials, including evidence that the drones had fuel tanks that increased their range to as far as 900 kilometers.[15]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces recently attempted to advance behind Ukrainian positions in Kupyansk via an underground gas pipeline – the third time Russian forces have used this tactic so far in the war. Russia’s repeated use of this tactic further indicates that Russian forces are improving their ability to disseminate tactical lessons between various sectors of the frontline.
• The international community continues to condemn the recent Russian drone incursion into Poland’s airspace.
• Russian and Belarusian officials continue to deflect responsibility for Russia's recent drone incursion into Polish airspace.
• Additional information about the Russian drone incursion undermines Nebenzya's and Tozik's statements, however.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, and Velykomykhailivka and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 12, 2025

Russian and Belarusian forces began joint Zapad-2025 military exercises on September 12 for the first time since Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Belarusian and Russian officials reported that the Zapad-2025 exercise will occur in Russia and Belarus, including Belarus' Vitebsk, Minsk, and Grodno oblasts, and in the Baltic and Barents seas from September 12 to September 16.[i] Belarusian military officials indicated that Russian and Belarusian forces are using the 227th Combined Arms Training Ground in Barysaw, Minsk Oblast for the Zapad-2025 exercises.[ii] Belarusian Chief of the General Staff and First Deputy Defense Minister Major General Pavel Muraveiko stated on September 12 that the Zapad-2025 exercises consist of two stages: the first stage consists of air and ground defense operations, and the second stage consists of clearing territory of enemy forces and conducting counteroffensive operations.[iii] Belarusian and Russian officials have not publicly confirmed how many troops are participating in Zapad-2025. Lithuanian Second Operational Services Department Head Colonel Mindaugas Mazonas reported on August 25 that 30,000 total Russian and Belarusian troops will participate in the Zapad-2025 exercises, but noted that only 8,000 of these troops will actually be within Belarus.[iv] Mazonas stated that of these 8,000 troops exercising in Belarus, 2,000 will be Russian and 6,000 will be Belarusian soldiers.

Elements of the Russian 4th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]), including its 423rd Motorized Rifle Regiment, the 2nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division (1st GTA, MMD), and the 71st Motorized Rifle Division (reportedly formerly the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly arrived in Belarus in May 2025 and August 2025 to participate in Zapad-2025.[v] Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division recently participated in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) joint military exercises in northern Belarus in early September 2025, and it is unclear if these units remained in Belarus for Zapad-2025.[vi] ISW has observed elements of the 98th VDV Division operating largely near Chasiv Yar and Bakhmut in Donetsk Oblast since at least April 2023.[vii] Elements of the Belarusian 19th Mechanized Brigade, 120th Mechanized Brigade, 336th Rocket Artillery Brigade, and 116th Assault Air Base, along with other unspecified elements of the Northwestern and Western operational commands and Air Force and Air Defense Forces, are reportedly participating in the Zapad-2025 exercises.[viii] Russia and Belarus have historically conducted Zapad joint exercises biannually but canceled the Zapad-2023 exercises, very likely due to Russia's equipment and manpower requirements for its war in Ukraine.[ix] The Zapad-2025 exercises are notably much smaller than the Zapad-2021 exercises, which involved roughly 200,000 total Russian and Belarusian personnel.[x]

Russia and Belarus may have walked back efforts to use Zapad-2025 to support nuclear saber-rattling operations against the West, at least temporarily. Belarusian Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin claimed in early August 2025 that the Zapad-2025 exercises would focus on the use of nuclear weapons and Oreshnik missiles in response to militarization on Belarus's western and northern borders and as part of strategic deterrence.[xi] Belarusian officials have significantly softened their rhetoric in recent days, however, potentially in response to increased tension with NATO due to the September 9-10 Russian drone incursion into Polish airspace. Belarusian Security Council Secretary Lieutenant General Alexander Volfovich claimed on September 12 that the Zapad-2025 exercises are “purely defensive in nature” and that their goal is “to work out issues related to ensuring the military security of the Union State.”[xii] Volfovich claimed that Russia and Belarus moved the exercises "deep inside" Belarus, "far from the state borders," and claimed that the Belarusian military communicated their plans for the exercises with the West. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on September 11 that the Zapad-2025 exercises "are not aimed against anyone," but that Russia and Belarus need to practice force integration.[xiii] These statements are a notable walking back of prior comments ahead of the Zapad-2025 exercises. ISW continues to assess that Russia does not seek nuclear escalation and that Russia’s use of nuclear weapons remains unlikely.[xiv] Russia and Belarus may assess that nuclear saber-rattling efforts would be unwise due to NATO's developing response to the September 9-10 drone incursion.

Belarusian and Russian officials blamed Poland for overreacting to the threat of Russian aggression in response to Poland's decision to close its border with Belarus due to Zapad-2025. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk announced the border closure on September 9, citing security concerns related to the Zapad-2025 exercises, and the border closed indefinitely on September 12.[xv] A Belarusian customs official told Belarusian state news agency Belta on September 12 that the border between Belarus and Poland experienced significantly higher traffic than normal ahead of the border closure.[xvi] Belta published images purportedly of Polish authorities installing barbed wire along the border following the border closure.[xvii] The Belarusian State Border Committee claimed that Belarus is ready to increase traffic through checkpoints on the Latvian and Lithuanian borders in response to the Polish border closure.[xviii] The Belarusian State Border Committee also claimed that Belarus does not plan to close its border checkpoints with Poland.[xix] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Maria Zakharova accused Poland of ignoring the fact that Russia and Belarus moved maneuver exercises away from the border with Poland and reduced the number of personnel and military equipment in the exercise as signs of goodwill, and the fact that Belarus invited representatives from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), including Poland, to observe the exercises. Belarusian and Russian officials are downplaying aggressive posturing against NATO in order to claim that NATO does not need to prepare defenses against Russia or Belarus. Belarus has previously weaponized its border with Poland to instigate crises within the EU, most notably in November 2021 when Belarus attempted to force thousands of migrants across the Polish border as part of the Kremlin-backed effort to pressure the EU.[xx]

NATO announced the Eastern Sentry operation on September 12 in response to the Russian drones that violated Polish airspace on the night of September 9 to 10. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte and US Commander of European Command and NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe General Alexus Grynkewich announced that NATO is launching the Eastern Sentry operation to bolster NATO's eastern flank and that it will involve assets from Denmark, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and other NATO allies.[xxi] Grynkewich stated that the immediate focus of this operation is Poland, but that "this situation transcends the borders of one nation" as "what affects one Ally affects us all." Grynkewich stated that the operation will integrate air and ground-based defenses, increase information sharing among NATO allies, incorporate unspecified enhanced capabilities, and strengthen NATO posturing to protect the Alliance. Grynkewich also stated that NATO will rapidly test and field new technologies, including counter-drone sensors and systems, during Eastern Sentry. Rutte stated that NATO is a defensive Alliance and reiterated that Russia's behavior toward Poland was "reckless" and "deeply dangerous."[xxii] Rutte stated that NATO must make clear its resolve and ability to defend its territory in response to Russia's violation of NATO airspace. ISW assessed that Russia likely launched the drones into Polish airspace in part to gauge NATO's capabilities and reactions in order to apply lessons learned to potential conflict scenarios with NATO.[xxiii]

The Russian Central Bank likely prematurely lowered its key interest rate for the third time since June 2025 in an attempt to maintain the facade of domestic economic stability. The lowering of the key interest rate will likely continue to exacerbate Russia’s economic instability. The Russian Central Bank announced on September 12 that it lowered its key interest rate from 18 to 17 percent.[xxiv] The Central Bank previously lowered its key interest rate from a record 22-year high of 21 percent to 20 percent in June 2025 and lowered it again to 18 percent in July 2025.[xxv] The Central Bank claimed that officials measured annual inflation at 8.2 percent as of September 8 and forecasted that annual inflation in Russia will decline to between six and seven percent for the remainder of 2025 and four percent for 2026. The Central Bank acknowledged that the Russian economy is still highly susceptible to pro-inflationary rises associated with high inflation expectations and deteriorating Russian foreign trade. The Central Bank’s decision to lower the key interest rate will likely adversely affect the Russian economy and raise inflation by weakening consumer purchasing power, devaluing the ruble in the medium-to long-term and creating deeper macroeconomic instability.[xxvi]

Ukraine’s partners continue to sanction Russia. The United Kingdom announced on September 12 that it introduced 100 new sanctions targeting the Russian military sector and illicit shadow fleet.[xxvii] The UK sanctions targeted 30 entities and individuals that supply key equipment to Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB), including electronics, chemicals, and explosives that Russia uses to manufacture missiles and other weapons systems. The United Kingdom sanctioned 70 additional ships connected to Russia's shadow fleet. Japan announced on September 12 that it expanded sanctions against Russia, freezing the assets of 14 individuals and 51 organizations, including Russian officials, company executives, and pro-Russian fighters in Ukraine.[xxviii] Japan lowered the current oil price cap from $60 to $47.60 per barrel in alignment with the recent EU price cap on Russian crude oil. New Zealand Foreign Minister Winston Peters reported on September 12 that New Zealand is also lowering the price cap on Russian crude oil from $60 to $47.60 per barrel and sanctioned Russian actors involved in cyber-attacks against Ukraine.[xxix] EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas reported on September 12 that the EU extended its sanctions on Russia.[xxx] Additional Western sanctions targeting Russian oil revenues will likely exacerbate greater economic challenges that can degrade Russia’s long-term ability to continue its war in Ukraine.

Ukraine conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against energy infrastructure in Leningrad and Smolensk oblasts on the night of September 11 to 12. A source within Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) told Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne on September 12 that the SBU conducted drone strikes against the port of Primorsk, Leningrad Oblast, Russia’s largest Baltic Sea oil port, starting fires on a ship in the port and at the pumping station that forced port authorities to suspend oil shipments.[xxxi] The SBU source assessed that Russia transports roughly 60 million tons of oil worth $15 billion through the port per year. The source stated that the SBU also struck the NPS-3, NPS Andreapol, and NPS-7 oil pumping stations of the Transneft Baltic Pipeline System-2 that supply crude oil to the port of Ust-Luga, Leningrad Oblast. Leningrad Oblast Governor Alexander Drozdenko claimed on September 12 that Russian air defenses downed over 30 Ukrainian drones over Leningrad Oblast overnight and that authorities extinguished fires on a ship in the port of Primorsk and at a pumping station.[xxxii] Geolocated footage published on September 11 shows fires after a drone strike on a Lukoil oil depot in Kardymovo, Smolensk Oblast.[xxxiii] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces downed 42 drones over Smolensk Oblast overnight.[xxxiv]

US senators Lindsey Graham, Richard Blumenthal, Katie Britt, and Amy Klobuchar introduced a bill to the US Senate on September 11 to facilitate the return of Ukrainian children that Russia deported. The bill proposes that the United States label Russia and Belarus as state sponsors of terrorism if they refuse to return the more than 19,000 Ukrainian children that Russia illegally deported during the war.[xxxv] The Yale Humanitarian Research Lab notably believes that Russia has illegally deported upwards of 35,000 Ukrainian children, however.[xxxvi]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian and Belarusian forces began the joint Zapad-2025 military exercises on September 12 for the first time since Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
• Russia and Belarus may have walked back efforts to use Zapad-2025 to support nuclear saber-rattling operations against the West, at least temporarily.
• Belarusian and Russian officials blamed Poland for overreacting to the threat of Russian aggression in response to Poland's decision to close its border with Belarus due to Zapad-2025.
• NATO announced the Eastern Sentry operation on September 12 in response to the Russian drones that violated Polish airspace on the night of September 9 to 10.
• The Russian Central Bank likely prematurely lowered its key interest rate for the third time since June 2025 in an attempt to maintain the facade of domestic economic stability. The lowering of the key interest rate will likely continue to exacerbate Russia’s economic instability.
• Ukraine’s partners continue to sanction Russia.
• Ukraine conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against energy infrastructure in Leningrad and Smolensk oblasts on the night of September 11 to 12.
• US senators Lindsey Graham, Richard Blumenthal, Katie Britt, and Amy Klobuchar introduced a bill to the US Senate on September 11 to facilitate the return of Ukrainian children that Russia deported.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka. Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman and Velykomykhailivka, and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 11, 2025

Polish officials provided additional clarification on the impacts of the September 9-10 Russian drone incursion into Polish airspace. Poland's Ministry of Internal Affairs reported that as of 1900 local time on September 11, Polish law enforcement agencies found 17 total drones throughout eastern and northern Poland.[1] Polish media reported that at least one drone crashed near a Polish Territorial Defense Force unit in Nowe Miasto nad Pilicą (southwest of Warsaw).[2] A Polish defense analyst stated that at least 15 of the recovered drones were Gerbera decoy drones, many of which were equipped with fuel tanks that doubled their range to as far as 900 kilometers.[3] The Polish Air Navigation Services Agency announced that it will limit air traffic in eastern Poland along the borders with Ukraine and Belarus until December 9 in response to the September 9-10 drone incursion.[4] Polish media reported on September 11 that about 40,000 Polish troops will deploy to the Poland-Belarus border area as a result of heightened tensions following the drone incursion and the upcoming Russia-Belarus Zapad-2025 joint military exercises, which begin on September 12.[5] Latvian Defense Minister Andris Spruds stated that Latvia will also close its airspace along its eastern border with Belarus and Russia until at least September 18, following in Poland's footsteps.[6]

Poland's allies reiterated their support for Poland following the drone incursion, condemning Russia for purposefully conducting the incursion to test NATO readiness. Polish Deputy Defense Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz reported on September 10 that Sweden has provided an emergency package of air defense assets and aircraft to Poland; that the Netherlands is providing Poland with systems such as Patriots, National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS), and anti-drone systems; and that other allies are also providing Poland with concrete declarations of support.[7] Czech Defense Minister Jana Černochová announced during a phone call with Kosiniak-Kamysz that Czechia will provide a helicopter unit with specially modified Mi-171 helicopters to Poland following the drone incursion.[8] Several NATO member states, including the Netherlands and Czechia, summoned Russian ambassadors due to the drone incursion.[9] Bloomberg reported on September 11 that a source familiar with the matter stated that NATO is preparing unspecified defensive military measures in response to the drone incursion into Poland, in addition to a political response.[10] German Chancellor Friedrich Merz stated that Russia deliberately provoked NATO during the drone incursion and noted that this was "part of a long series of provocations" along NATO's entire eastern flank.[11] ISW assessed on September 10 that the Russian drone incursions were part of a multipronged and longstanding Russian effort to test NATO's technical capabilities and political resolve in preparation for a potential future war with NATO.[12]

Ukrainian officials responded to the drone incursion by drawing parallels to Russian cycles of aggression and escalation against Ukraine and offered to share Ukraine's now-institutional counter-drone knowledge with Poland. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated during a meeting with Finnish President Alexander Stubb on September 11 that Russia flew drones into Poland on September 9-10 in order to test NATO's military and political abilities to respond to Russian kinetic provocations.[13] Zelensky noted that the psychological effects of the drone incursion mirror the psychological impacts of Russia's deployment of "little green men" to Crimea before the illegal occupation of the peninsula in 2014. Zelensky implied that Russia hopes to use these drone strikes to push the Overton Window of what NATO is willing to absorb as an "acceptable" escalation, much like Russia did when it deployed unmarked, illegal combatants to Crimea to seize the peninsula in 2014. Zelensky also reaffirmed that Ukraine has offered to help train Polish forces to shoot down Russian drones.[14] Ukraine has developed invaluable tactics and technologies to effectively counter Russian drone strikes, and NATO states must work to absorb and institutionalize this experience the way Ukraine has in order to properly respond to potential Russian kinetic aggression against the alliance.

 The Kremlin continues efforts to destabilize the Balkans and dismantle the 1995 Dayton Accords that ended the 1992-1995 Bosnian War, likely as part of a larger campaign to divide and distract Europe. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with President of Republika Srpska (the Serbian political entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina) Milorad Dodik on September 9 in Moscow and gave a press conference following the meeting.[15] Lavrov stated that he and Dodik met on the thirtieth anniversary of the signing of the Dayton Accords, which ended NATO "aggression" in Bosnia and Herzegovina during NATO's 1995 Operation Deliberate Force. Lavrov stated that Russia is one of the guarantors of the December 1995 Dayton Accords and accused the West of "trampl[ing]" on the accords to gain "undivided control" over Bosnia and Herzegovina and strip the Serbs of their rights. Lavrov stated that "external interference" in Bosnia and Herzegovina is inadmissible and that Russia condemns Western attempts to remove "undesirable" Serbian leaders from power, referencing the fact that the appeals court in Bosnia and Herzegovina recently sentenced Dodik for disregarding the decisions of an international peace envoy and defying the Constitutional Court.[16] Lavrov claimed that "destroying the consensus that underlies Bosnia and Herzegovina is... an invitation to another war in the Balkans." Lavrov praised Dodik for planning a referendum in Republika Srpska in October and claimed that "the West does not like referendums," including the "transparent" referendum in Crimea. Lavrov and Dodik notably met on the same day that Russia launched a major drone incursion in Polish airspace, which likely also sought to test NATO and EU unity.[17] The Kremlin has previously leveraged its relationship with Republika Srpska to further influence the Balkans, sow divisions in Europe, and undermine the US-backed Dayton Accords to throw the Balkans into turmoil.[18]

Russian state media is acknowledging the growing gasoline shortages in Russia, but is downplaying the role that Ukraine's deep strike campaign is playing in generating these shortages. The Russian Independent Fuel Union, an association of gas station owners, stated in an interview with Russian state newspaper Izvestiya on September 10 that over 10 Russian federal subjects are experiencing fuel shortages, including Ryazan, Nizhny Novgorod, Saratov, and Rostov oblasts, Far Eastern regions, and occupied Crimea and that fuel shortages are also reaching central regions such as Nizhny Novgorod Oblast.[19] Russian State Duma Anti-Monopoly Committee Expert Council member Dmitry Tortev told Izvestiya that local fuel shortages are becoming widespread in Russia. Russian Independent Fuel Union representatives stated that many gas stations have not received refinery deliveries for several weeks, forcing some gas stations to shut down. Russian officials downplayed the impact of Ukraine’s strike campaign, attributing the fuel shortages to peak vacation season and agricultural demands in August and September 2025.[20] ISW continues to assess that Ukraine’s strike campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure is impacting Russia’s domestic gasoline market, exacerbating shortages, and causing price spikes that will likely push inflation upwards and create further macroeconomic instability in Russia.[21] It is noteworthy that Russian state media is more openly discussing gasoline shortages, as it suggests that the issue is beginning to permeate into more mainstream Russian society.

Sweden pledged additional military and financial assistance to Ukraine. The Swedish Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on September 11 that Sweden announced its twentieth military aid package to Ukraine, which allocates roughly 9.2 billion Krona (SEK) ($987 million) for battlefield needs.[22] The Swedish MoD procured 18 Archer guns and artillery ammunition as well as long-range drones, worth roughly 3.6 billion SEK ($386 million); marine equipment, including coastal radar systems, rope ferries equipped with grenade launchers, diving chambers, and crane trucks, worth 2.1 billion SEK ($225 million); air defense (AD) equipment, including ammunition, equipment and sensors for air base operations, sensors to detect drones and robots, and sensors and control systems for the already-donated Swedish Tridon system, worth 3.5 billion SEK ($367 million); and other investments in civil defense and services via the Swedish National Defense Research Institute and the Swedish National Defense University. The Swedish MoD also announced that the Swedish government proposed adding an additional 31.5 billion SEK ($3.3 billion) to the budget bill for 2026 and an extension of support to 2027, amounting to 40 billion SEK ($4.2 billion) in 2026 and 2027, respectively.

Key Takeaways:

• Polish officials provided additional clarification on the impacts of the September 9-10 Russian drone incursion into Polish airspace.
• Poland's allies reiterated their support for Poland following the drone incursion, condemning Russia for purposefully conducting the incursion to test NATO readiness.
• Ukrainian officials responded to the drone incursion by drawing parallels to Russian cycles of aggression and escalation against Ukraine and offered to share Ukraine's now-institutional counter-drone knowledge with Poland.
• The Kremlin continues efforts to destabilize the Balkans and dismantle the 1995 Dayton Accords that ended the 1992-1995 Bosnian War, likely as part of a larger campaign to divide and distract Europe.
• Russian state media is acknowledging the growing gasoline shortages in Russia but is downplaying the role that Ukraine's deep strike campaign is playing in generating these shortages.
• Sweden pledged additional military and financial assistance to Ukraine.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Velykomykhailivka, and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 10, 2025

Russian drones violated Polish airspace on the night of September 9 to 10 in what NATO and European officials have suggested was an intentional Russian incursion. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk stated on September 10 that at least 19 drones violated Polish airspace overnight and that a significant portion of the drones entered the country from airspace over Belarus.[i] Tusk confirmed that Poland shot down three drones and possibly downed a fourth as of the afternoon of September 10.[ii] Tusk noted that Polish authorities are still confirming the number of drones that violated Polish airspace and the number of downed drones. Tusk reported that the aerial incursion lasted about seven hours, starting at 2330 local time on September 9 until 0630 on September 10. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that as many as 24 Russian drones entered Polish airspace overnight.[iii] NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte reported that NATO scrambled Polish F-16 fighter jets, Dutch F-35 fighter jets, Italian airborne early warning and control (AWACS) planes, and NATO mid-air refueling aircraft in order to intercept the drones over Poland.[iv] NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) reported on September 10 that Polish authorities put German Patriot air defense systems on alert in response to the incursion, and Rutte confirmed that German Patriots participated in efforts to repel the drone incursion.[v] Tusk invoked Article 4 of the NATO Treaty on the morning of September 10 in response to the incursion.[vi] Article 4 states that a NATO member state can call a meeting to consult on any issue in which the "territorial integrity, political independence, or security of any Parties is threatened" and that fellow member states are encouraged to respond to the situation.[vii] NATO states last invoked Article 4 with the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.[viii]

The large number of Russian drones that violated Polish airspace suggests that this was likely an intentional Russian effort. Tusk stated that this is the first time that a significant portion of the drones entered Polish airspace from the direction of Belarus and that the scale of the incursion was unusual.[ix] Tusk stated that previous Russian drone incursions of Polish airspace were due to "mistakes" (possibly referring to operator error), drone disorientation from electronic warfare (EW), or the result of smaller scale Russian provocations. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on September 10 that drones have entered Polish airspace six times during the full-scale invasion, with the first occurrence in November 2022, and that a total of at least seven drones and one missile have fallen on Polish territory during the war.[x] The September 9-10 incursion of at least nineteen drones in a single night is notable and is roughly three times the number of projectiles that have fallen in Poland in the entire war. It is unlikely that such a number of drones could have all entered into Polish airspace by accident or as a result of a technical or operator error.

At least some of the drones that violated Polish airspace were Gerbera decoy drones, and Russia may have been preparing for an incursion of this size into Polish airspace since Summer 2025. A Polish military official stated to Reuters on September 10 that at least some of the Russian drones in Polish airspace were Gerbera drones.[xi] Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov posted an image on September 10 of one of the downed drones and reported that it was a non-reconnaissance version of a Gerbera decoy drone without cameras.[xii] The Russian Gerbera drone is a decoy drone designed to mimic Shahed- and Geran-type drones in order to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses.[xiii] Beskrestnov also reported that he has documented Russian Shahed-type drones with Polish SIM cards recently.[xiv] Polish journalist Marek Budzisz reported on July 10 that a report written by unspecified sources and published on July 2 stated that the Ukrainian military had recovered Russian drones with Polish and Lithuanian SIM cards and that these SIM cards could indicate Russian preparations to test strike corridors in Poland and Lithuania.[xv] Russia may have been preparing for the September 9-10 incursion for months, further indicating that the incursion was not an accident or the result of Ukrainian EW interference.

Russian officials denied that the drones came from Russia and attempted to deflect blame onto Ukraine. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on September 10 that Russia did not target anything "for destruction" on Polish territory in their overnight strike series and that the maximum flight range of the drones that Russian forces launched overnight against Ukraine was 700 kilometers and therefore could not have violated Polish airspace.[xvi] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claimed that the Russian MoD's claims "debunk" Polish "myths," which the Russian MFA claimed aim to further escalate the war in Ukraine.[xvii] A Ukrainian source reported, however, that Russia may have equipped the drones with auxiliary fuel tanks that could have extended their range beyond 700 kilometers and that Russia may have modified these drones to be different than the ones Russia uses against Ukraine, casting doubts on the Russian MoD's claim about the drone ranges.[xviii] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded to the drone incursion into Poland and claimed that the EU and NATO accuse Russia of provocations every day without evidence.[xix] The Polish MFA summoned the Russian Chargé d'affaires to Poland Andrey Ordash in response to the airspace violation.[xx] Ordash claimed to journalists after the meeting that the drones came from the direction of Ukraine, that Russia has not received any evidence that the drones were of Russian origin, and that Russia does not anticipate Poland being able to present any such evidence. Ordash claimed that Poland constantly blames Russia for emergencies in Poland.

Belarusian officials attempted to deny any involvement in the Russian drone incursion despite evidence that the drones entered Polish airspace from the direction of Belarus. The Belarusian MoD posted a statement from Belarusian First Deputy Defense Minister and Chief of the General Staff Major General Pavel Muraveiko claiming that Belarusian forces were tracking drones that lost their flight paths due to unspecified electronic warfare (EW) during Russia's and Ukraine's overnight "exchange" of drone strikes.[xxi] Muraveiko claimed that Belarusian forces destroyed some of the "lost" drones over Belarusian territory and exchanged information about the "air and radar situation" with Polish and Lithuanian forces about unknown drones approaching their countries. Muraveiko claimed that this information exchange allowed Poland to respond promptly to the drones and scramble their forces, and that Poland also informed Belarus about a drone approaching Belarus from Ukraine. The Belarusian MoD is implying that the drones may not have been Russian or that Ukrainian EW may have been responsible for the violations of Polish airspace. The Russian drone incursion into Poland notably comes against the backdrop of the upcoming September 12 to 16 Belarusian-Russian Zapad-2025 joint military exercise and Tusk's September 9 announcement to close the Polish-Belarusian border starting September 11 due to the Zapad exercise.[xxii]

Russia is likely attempting to gauge both Poland's and NATO's capabilities and reactions in the hopes of applying lessons learned to future conflict scenarios with the NATO alliance. NATO SHAPE stated that this was the first time that NATO aircraft had engaged potential threats in NATO airspace.[xxiii] Russia is likely trying to probe Poland's and NATO's defensive capabilities and reaction times while observing their command and control (C2) structure in action. Russia likely also aimed to test the interoperability of NATO member states working to neutralize a threat in NATO airspace. Russia has been engaged in a years-long hybrid warfare campaign against Europe, including instances of EW interference and GPS jamming, sabotage missions, arson attacks, and attempted assassinations.[xxiv] Russia has been gradually expanding these hybrid efforts, and Russia's violation of Polish airspace is part of this campaign that aims, in part, to test NATO and NATO states' tactical and rhetorical reactions. The drone incursion likely also aims to gauge the level of domestic support in Poland and other NATO member states for NATO collective defense, particularly at a time when support for Ukraine is a sensitive topic in Poland's domestic information space. ISW continues to assess that Russia is engaged in a multipronged effort to prepare for a potential future Russia-NATO war, including by preparing its society, militarizing its youth, building up its military infrastructure on its western border, and spreading narratives that Russia may try to use to justify future aggression against NATO.[xxv] Efforts to test NATO's technical capabilities and political resolve are likely part of this multipronged campaign, and Russia appears to be growing bolder in terms of what sort of escalation it is willing to test.

Russia is likely also attempting to limit or deter Western military aid to Ukraine. Reuters reported that an unspecified senior military source stated that at least five of the drones' flight paths indicated that they were flying toward Rzeszów-Jasionka Airport in southeastern Poland, which is NATO's main arms supply hub for Ukraine.[xxvi] Russia may have aimed to strike the airport in order to obstruct the delivery of Western aid to Ukraine. Russia may also aim to damage popular support in Poland and Europe more broadly for continued aid provisions to Ukraine out of fear of provoking future Russian strikes. The Kremlin is likely trying to use the official Russian and Belarusian responses to the incursion to accelerate the spread of narratives within Poland itself that this was a Ukrainian provocation.[xxvii] Russia is likely trying to exploit ongoing domestic debates within Poland about support for Ukraine, and Russia notably conducted information operations to try to influence the May 2025 Polish presidential election.[xxviii]

Russian milbloggers amplified various narratives to refute Western reporting about the Russian violation of Polish airspace, many of which cohered with official Russian and Belarusian responses. While milbloggers generally offered various theories about the drone incursion, they largely coalesced around the narrative that Russia was not to blame. Many of the Russian milbloggers responded before the Kremlin, demonstrating the Kremlin's successes in coopting a large portion of the milblogger community and shaping the Russian information space such that the Kremlin's anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western narratives dominate. Russian milbloggers claimed that Polish authorities offered no evidence or weak evidence to prove that the drones were Russian.[xxix] One milblogger claimed that Ukrainian EW affected the Russian drones, forcing them to divert from their flight paths.[xxx] Milbloggers also alleged that the drones were Ukrainian or that the incursion was a Ukrainian provocation using Russian Gerbera drones that Russia previously launched against Ukraine in Spring 2025.[xxxi] Select milbloggers directly called for future Russian drone strikes against Poland, including against the Rzeszów-Jasionka Airport, claiming that these strikes would be justified due to Poland's prominent role in producing weapons for and supplying aid to Ukraine.[xxxii] One milblogger threatened Russian strikes on any defense industrial enterprises in Europe that are helping the Ukrainian war effort in the future.[xxxiii] Some milbloggers claimed that the Russian incursion was accidental, but that NATO's response was weak, so Russia should deliberately strike Poland in the future.[xxxiv]

Ukraine’s Western partners continue to pledge military and financial assistance to Ukraine. The Ukraine Defense Contact Group (Ramstein format) held a hybrid meeting on September 9, during which several of Ukraine's partners announced additional assistance packages for Ukraine.[xxxv] European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced on September 9 that the European Union (EU) will provide six billion euros (roughly $7 billion) from interest from frozen Russian assets to support Ukrainian drone production.[xxxvi] EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas announced on September 9 that the EU aims to fulfill its target of providing two million rounds of ammunition to Ukraine by October 2025 and stated that the EU has already provided 80 percent of this goal.[xxxvii] German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius announced on September 9 that Germany is in the process of supplying Ukraine with two Patriot air defense systems and will contribute 300 million euros (roughly $350 million) to an initiative to increase Ukrainian long-range strike drone production.[xxxviii] UK Defense Minister John Healey later announced on September 10 that the UK will produce "thousands" of Ukrainian-designed interceptor drones per month for Ukraine.[xxxix] Ukrainian Defense Minister Denys Shmyhal stated on September 10 that Poland will transfer 10,000 155mm artillery shells to Ukraine in the coming week.[xl]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian drones violated Polish airspace on the night of September 9 to 10 in what NATO and European officials have suggested was an intentional Russian incursion.
• The large number of Russian drones that violated Polish airspace suggests that this was likely an intentional Russian effort.
• At least some of the drones that violated Polish airspace were Gerbera decoy drones, and Russia may have been preparing for an incursion of this size into Polish airspace since Summer 2025.
• Russian officials denied that the drones came from Russia and attempted to deflect blame onto Ukraine.
• Belarusian officials attempted to deny any involvement in the Russian drone incursion despite evidence that the drones entered Polish airspace from the direction of Belarus.
• Russia is likely attempting to gauge both Poland's and NATO's capabilities and reactions in the hopes of applying lessons learned to future conflict scenarios with the NATO alliance.
• Russia is likely also attempting to limit or deter Western military aid to Ukraine.
• Russian milbloggers amplified various narratives to refute Western reporting about the Russian violation of Polish airspace, many of which cohered with official Russian and Belarusian responses.
• Ukraine’s Western partners continue to pledge military and financial assistance to Ukraine.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman and in the Dobropillya tactical area.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 9, 2025

Russian territorial gains have become less costly over the last four months compared to Spring 2025 as Russian forces are sustaining a lower casualty rate per square kilometer seized. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on September 9 that Russian forces have suffered 299,210 causalities since January 2025.[i] ISW assesses that Russian forces gained a total of 1,910.39 square kilometers of territory in Ukraine in May, June, July, and August 2025, and the Ukrainian General Staff's daily Russian casualty reports indicate that Russian forces suffered 130,160 casualties in that same time frame - averaging to 68 casualties per square kilometer seized  between May and August 2025. ISW assesses that Russian forces seized 2025. [ii] This means that Russian forces averaged roughly 71 casualties per square kilometer in May 2025; 70 casualties per square kilometer in June 2025; 75 casualties per square kilometer in July 2025; and 68 casualties per square kilometer in August 2025. Russian casualty rates per square kilometer gained have substantially decreased over the last four months compared to January through April 2025, when Russian forces were losing 99 casualties per square kilometer.[iii]

Russian casualty rates per square kilometer peaked in the first four months of 2025 as Russian forces fought to maintain the intensified pace of offensive operations they began in Fall 2024. Russian forces lost an estimated average of 59 casualties per square kilometer gained during the first four months of their intensified 2024 offensive campaign (between September and December 2024).[iv] Russian forces concentrated their offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast and counteroffensive operations in Kursk Oblast in Fall 2024 and made tactically significant advances in the Kursk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove (now Novopavlivka), and Velyka Novosilka (now Velykomykhailivka) areas.[v] Russian forces were still frequently using armored vehicles to advance during Fall 2024, which likely helped preserve some Russian lives.[vi] Russian forces were mainly advancing in small infantry assaults during Fall 2024 as they are as of August 2025, but Russian forces largely abandoned use of armored vehicles in late 2024 and early Spring 2025, and this change in tactics likely contributed to increased Russian casualty rates in the first few months of 2025.

Russian advances began to slow during the first four months of 2025 as Russian casualties remained consistent – resulting in a higher Russian casualty rate between January and April 2025. Russian forces suffered an average of 99 casualties per square kilometer gained in January, February, March, and April 2025.[vii] Russian advances significantly increased in March 2025 with the elimination of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast which coincided with the temporary cessation of US intelligence sharing with Ukraine, although Russian advances on average decreased between January, February, and April 2025. Russian gains also slowed as Russian forces came up against better-defended Ukrainian positions in and around larger towns such as Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk during Spring 2025. Russian gains slowed by 45 percent between January and April 2025 compared to gains between September and December 2024, although Russian casualty rates only deceased by 10 percent during those four months. Russian forces also began to more frequently use unarmored vehicles such as motorcycles and open-air buggies during this time and therefore began to suffer a higher killed-in-action (KIA) to wounded-in-action (WIA) ratio.[viii]

Russian forces began to make quicker gains in May 2025 and have sustained a faster rate of advance over the last four months as Russian casualties marginally decreased, although Russian forces continue to advance at footpace. Russian forces have mainly focused on advancing in western Donetsk Oblast and pushing into southeastern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast during Summer 2025. Russian forces are currently suffering an average of 68 casualties per square kilometer gained – indicating that Russian gains have become less costly in recent months as the frontline has become increasingly porous in key sectors in western Donetsk Oblast. ISW has previously noted that frontline positions change hands more frequently and Russian and Ukrainian forces are able to conduct infiltration missions into rear areas[ix] Other frontline to be more densely manned and likely require Russian forces to expend more casualties in order to advance, and the density of both Russian and Ukrainian manpower along the frontline likely varies significantly sector to sector. The more porous frontline areas have resulted in Russian forces making gains in the face of a more sparsely manned Ukrainian defense, allowing Russia to sustain fewer casualties. Russia's technological adaptations and significant investment in frontline unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) capabilities have also played a significant role in decreasing Russia's casualty rates and helping Russian forces exploit these new battlefield realities.

Russian casualty rates have likely decreased in Ukraine due to Russia's renewed emphasis on using UAVs to generate some effects of battlefield air interdiction (BAI), largely led by UAV operators of Russia's Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies. Russia’s recently formed UAV training and innovation program, the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies, has represented a turning point in Russia’s tactical UAV capabilities.[x] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reportedly established the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies in August 2024 and reportedly deployed Rubikon UAV units to Kursk Oblast in early 2025, where Rubikon fiber optic UAV operators played a significant role in eliminating the remnants of the Ukrainian salient.[xi] Rubikon reportedly develops, tests, and integrates advanced robotic systems in the Russian Armed Forces, and has an analytical center that develops proposals to improve the efficiency the Russia's unmanned systems.[xii] Russia began to proliferate Rubikon UAV units across the frontline in April and May 2025, and ISW has observed reports of Rubikon units operating in Kursk Oblast and throughout eastern Ukraine from northeastern Kharkiv Oblast to the Velykomykhailivka direction in western Donetsk Oblast.[xiii] This proliferation of Rubikon coincides with the comparative decrease in Russian casualties suffered per square kilometer gained between May and August 2025 and is likely a contributing factor.

Russian forces are also achieving ome BAI effects by using UAVs to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs). BAI is s. Russian forces are leveraging tactical UAVs to complicate Ukrainian defensive operations in we Donetsk Oblast, particularly in the Pokrovsk direction and Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.[xv] Russian forces began to systematically target Ukrainian GLOCs and other operationally significant targets with tactical first-person view (FPV) UAVs and loitering munitions across the entire frontline in early 2025 and have become increasingly effective at using these UAVs to interdict Ukrainian logistics. Russia interdiction efforts have almost certainly played a role in Russia's ability to make recent gains in the Lyman, Siversk, Kostyantynivka, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka directions.[xvi] Russian forces have not yet achieved the ability to conduct full BAI across all sectors of the front and have primarily concentrated such partial BAI efforts in western Donetsk Oblast.

Recent Russian UAV and counter-UAV innovations have contributed to these partial BAI effects. Russian forces have scaled the production of fiber optic UAVs that are more resistant to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference and have increased the tactical depth of their fiber optic UAVs to around roughly seven kilometers in early Spring 2025 and to around 20 kilometers in Summer 2025.[xviii] Russian forces are also using fiber optic UAVs to neutralize Ukrainian EW systems before launching other FPV UAV strikes.[xix] Russian forces are also testing UAV interceptors, thermal imaging sighting systems, and lasers in order to counter Ukrainian UAV operations - the backbone of Ukraine's defensive operations in the face of Russia's manpower advantage[xx] Infantry remains the main vector of movement and change on the battlefield, although Russia's and Ukraine's ongoing technological race continues to alter the effectiveness of infantry on an increasingly transparent battlefield.

Recent Russian polling suggests that support among the Russian population for the war remains high despite growing casualties and relatively slow advances on the battlefield. Independent Russian polling organization Levada Center reported on September 9 that polling from August 2025 shows that 78 percent of respondents support the Russian military's actions in Ukraine.[xxi] The August 2025 results cohere with previous Levada polling from between January and July 2025 showing that support for the war has remained relatively stable at 74 to 80 percent The August 2025 poll showed that 66 percent of respondents believed that Russia should move to peace talks now, whereas 27 percent stated that Russia should continue fighting. Levada reported that 39 percent stated that they think the war will continue for over a year (an increase of seven percent from January 2025) and that 20 percent stated that they think the war will end in six months to one year (a decrease of seven points from January 2025). Levada found that 58 percent of respondents stated that the war in Ukraine has affected their lives or the lives of their families in some way. Thirty percent of respondents who stated that the war has affected them cited the death of a loved one as the reason and 28 percent cited a relative's or friend's participation in the war as affecting them. The polling showed that 22 percent of respondents stated that the war in Ukraine has severely affected their lives, with 31 percent of these respondents being less well-off and 26 percent of them from rural areas.

Levada's August 2025 polling suggests that support for the war has remained stable and high since US President Donald Trump entered office in January 2025 and began efforts to end the war. The polling also shows that a majority of Russians support peace talks but are increasingly skeptical that the war will actually end in the near future. The fact that the majority of surveyed Russians stated that the war has affected their lives yet continue to support the war effort generally suggests that the high casualties that Russian forces have been incurring on the battlefield are not swaying Russian public opinion. The Kremlin hashand.[xxii] The Kremlin has undertaken widespread censorship efforts to limit and control the information that the population consumes about the war while spreading narratives claiming that Russian victory is inevitable but that the Russian population will need to make sacrifices in order to achieve such a victory.[xxiii]

Ukraine continues to strike Russian energy infrastructure. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported that the USF struck and severely damaged Transneft's Vtorovo oil pumping station in Penkino, Vladimir Oblast on September 7.[xxiv] Brovdi reported that the Vtorovo station pumped diesel fuel to the Moscow Ring Oil Product Pipeline. A Ukrainian open-source intelligence Telegram channel reported that satellite imagery collected on September 9 shows damage to at least two tanks at the pumping station.[xxv] Sources in Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) told Ukrainian outlets that at least four explosions in Zheleznodorozhnyy Raion, Penza City on the night of September 8 to 9 damaged and stopped the operation of two pipes of an unspecified main oil pipeline, which has a capacity of two million barrels per day.[xxvi] The GUR sources stated that two more regional gas pipelines sustained damage at the same location and that both pipelines supported the Russian military in Ukraine. Local Russian sources claimed that Transneft Druzhba (a subsidiary of Transneft that oversees the Russian section of the Druzhba oil pipeline) and Russian emergency and special services began scheduled exercises to "eliminate the consequences of man-made accidents at oil and gas facilities" in Zheleznodorozhnyy Raion on September 8.[xxvii] Ukrainian intelligence sources also reported to Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne that an explosion disabled the Kuibyshev-Lysychansk main oil pipeline in Krasnoarmeysky Raion, Saratov Oblast on the night of September 8 to 9.[xxviii] The pipeline reportedly supplies the Russian military and has an annual capacity of 82 million tons.

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a combined strike against three Russian command posts in and near occupied Donetsk City on September 8. Ukrainian military experts and Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that Ukrainian forces launched an unspecified number of missiles and drones against three command posts in and near occupied Donetsk City, largely targeting and striking the Topaz industrial plant.[xxix] The plant reportedly served as an army-level command post, and Ukrainian forces also struck command posts of the 41st Combined Arms Army (CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) and the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD). Geolocated footage indicates that the Ukrainian strike damaged the Topaz plant.[xxx]  The Russian military command has largely deployed elements of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division to the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka and Dobropillya tactical areas and elements of the 41st CAA to the Pokrovsk and Novopavlivka directions.

Russian State Duma officials are engaging in a top-down Kremlin-organized effort to threaten Finland. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov claimed on September 9 that Finland is becoming a "real hotbed of fascism faster than Ukraine" and that "nothing can be ruled out," p[xxxi] Kartapolov claimed that the current Finnish authorities' "incompetent" policies may lead to "some tragic consequences" and that Russia "know[s] how to protect [its] interests" and "is ready for any scenario." Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa similarly claimed on September 8 that Finnish authorities are responsible for the "hotbed of tension" on the Russian-Finnish border.[xxxii] Chepa claimed that Finland, which joined NATO in 2023 due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, will deploy weapons against Russia, which Chepa claimed will "expose [Finland] to danger" and create "new hotbeds of tension." Chepa stated that Russia "naturally...will not ignore this and will respond" to any such NATO actions. Chepa claimed that some European states opposed Finland's NATO membership because they "understood" that this would pose a threat of Russia's security, which Chepa claimed was one of the "root causes" of Russia's war against Ukraine.[xxxiii] Kartapolov's and Chepa's threats follow Russian Security Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev's September 8 threats against Finland that used language that directly mirrored the Kremlin's false justifications for its invasions of Ukraine.[xxxiv] Medvedev – like Chepa – also invoked the phrase "root causes" (which Kremlin officials often use to reiterate Russia's original war goals in Ukraine) to describe the situation in Finland. Medvedev’s threat against Finland was not unique but followed similar threats from Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Presidential Aide and former Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev in late 2023 and early 2025, respectively. Kartapolov's and Chepa's claims further demonstrate that these threats are a top-down, coordinated Kremlin approach intent on disseminating this narrative throughout the upper levels of the Russian government, possibly in order to justify future Russian aggression against a NATO member state.

Russian forces conducted a strike against a mobile pension dispersal point in Donetsk Oblast that killed and wounded dozens of mostly elderly civilians. Ukrainian officials, including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, reported on September 9 that Russian forces launched a guided glide bomb against Yarova, Donetsk Oblast while local government officials were distributing pensions to civilians.[xxxv] Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strike killed 24 civilians and injured 19 others. Russia's strike very likely constitutes a flagrant violation of the international legal principle of distinction that requires parties to always distinguish between combatants and civilians.[xxxvi]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian territorial gains have become less costly over the last four months compared to Spring 2025 as Russian forces are sustaining a lower casualty rate per square kilometer seized.
• Russian casualty rates per square kilometer peaked in the first four months of 2025 as Russian forces fought to maintain the intensified pace of offensive operations they began in Fall 2024.
• Russian advances began to slow during the first four months of 2025 as Russian casualties remained consistent – resulting in a higher Russian casualty rate between January and April 2025.
• Russian forces began to make quicker gains in May 2025 and have sustained a faster rate of advance over the last four months as Russian casualties marginally decreased, although Russian forces continue to advance at footpace.
• Russian casualty rates have likely decreased in Ukraine due to Russia's renewed emphasis on using UAVs to generate some effects of battlefield air interdiction (BAI), largely led by UAV operators of Russia's Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies.
• Recent Russian polling suggests that support among the Russian population for the war remains high despite growing casualties and relatively slow advances on the battlefield.
• Ukraine continues to strike Russian energy infrastructure.
• Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a combined strike against three Russian command posts in and near occupied Donetsk City on September 8.
• Russian State Duma officials are engaging in a top-down Kremlin-organized effort to threaten Finland.
• Russian forces conducted a strike against a mobile pension dispersal point in Donetsk Oblast that killed and wounded dozens of mostly elderly civilians.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Russian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 8, 2025

Russian Security Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev directly threatened Finland and used language that directly mirrors the Kremlin's false justifications for its invasions of Ukraine. Medvedev claimed in an opinion piece for Kremlin newswire TASS on September 8 that the "main thing" that Finland should not "forget" is that confrontation with Russia “could lead to the collapse of Finnish statehood forever.”[i] Medvedev claimed that Finland is historically tied to Nazi Germany and that Finnish authorities in the 1940s wanted to expand Finland's borders to include Eastern Karelia, Leningrad (modern-day St. Petersburg), and the Kola Peninsula – areas in modern-day Russia. Medvedev claimed that the current Finnish government is “Russophobic,” and that “the thirst for profit at the expense of Russia was installed in Finnish minds back in the days of Hitler.” Medvedev claimed that Finnish authorities historically attempted to erase the “historical and cultural identity” of ethnic Russians and to commit genocide against the Slavic population. Medvedev claimed that Finland joined NATO under the "guise" of defense but is actually preparing for war against Russia - ignoring the fact that Finland abandoned its long held military neutrality to join NATO in direct response to Russia's full-scale invasion of neighboring Ukraine in 2022. Medvedev claimed that NATO will use Finland as “a springboard for an attack" on Russia.

Medvedev's September 8 claims about Finland's alleged persecution of ethnic Russians, destruction of Russian culture, ties to Nazism, and threat to Russia's security directly parallel claims that the Kremlin has used to justify its invasions of Ukraine in 2014 and 2022. Medvedev claimed that the "root causes" of the current state of Russian-Finnish relations go back to the Second World War.[ii] Medvedev's use of the phrase "root causes" mirrors that which Kremlin officials have repeatedly invoked to justify Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Kremlin officials have claimed that any future peace settlement in Ukraine must eliminate the "root causes" of the war, which Kremlin oers.[iii]

Medvedev's threat against Finland is not unique but rather part of an ongoing Kremlin effort to threaten NATO states and justify future Russian aggression. Russian Presidential Aide and former Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev similarly claimed on March 13 that Finland tried to "exterminate" the Slavic population and that the West is "again turning [Finland] into a springboard" for aggression against Russia.[iv] Russian President Vladimir Putin threatened Finland in December 2023, claiming that NATO "dragged" Finland into the alliance and that "there will be problems" with Finland.[v] Russian officials have been increasingly invoking narratives about Finland's historic ties to Russia, and Russian information operations targeting Finland have long covered topics such as Finland's history as a Nazi ally during the Second World War, Finnish intent to gain lost territories, and the West's preparations to use Finland to threaten northwestern Russia.[vi]  The Kremlin has been employing the same playbook that it used against Ukraine towards NATO states, such as Finland and the Baltics, to set informational conditionaggression.[vii]

Russia continues to expand its defense industrial base (DIB) and take measures to safeguard defense industrial enterprises against long-range Ukrainian strikes. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi reported on September 7 that Russia plans to produce 2,500 high-precision missiles, including Iskander cruise and ballistic missiles and Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles in 2025.[viii] Skibitskyi noted that the GUR has observed a significant increase in Russian drone production, especially Geran (Russian analogues of the Iranian Shahed drone), Garpiya (Shahed analogues with components from the Peoples' Republic of China [PRC]), and first-person view (FPV) drones, and that Ukrainian military intelligence indicates that the Russian military has a rearmament plan for 2026 to 2037. Skibitskyi reported that most of the "powerful" Russian defense enterprises are located 750 kilometers or further away from the Ukrainian border and that only 25 percent at within the 250-to-500-kilometer range. Skibitskyi stated that Ukraine has not observed signs that Russia is relocating defense industrial enterprises but that Russia is building its new defense industrial enterprises 1,500 to 2,000 kilometers from the Ukrainian border. Skibitskyi stated that Russia has diversified its defense industrial production such that more than 100 enterprises can be involved in the production of one type of weapon. The construction of defense industrial enterprises far from the Ukrainian border are attempts to protect the DIB from long-range Ukrainian strikes, and Russia's diversification of its production line likely aims to prevent Ukrainian strikes from interrupting the entire production process.

Russia is also reportedly increasing its production of FPVs with fiber optic cables, which Russian forces have successfully leveraged in recent months to achieve some effects of battlefield air interdiction (BAI) in Ukraine. Ushkuynik Scientific and Production Center General Director Alexey Chadayev claimed on September 6 that Russia produces more than 50,000 fiber optic drones every month.[ix] Chadayev claimed that Russia's fiber optic drone production doubled in 2025. Chadayev claimed that Russia has established production in three unspecified regions, with more than one factory in each region. The proliferation of Russia's use of fiber optic drones, which are resistant to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) and jamming, has given Russian forces important advantages on the battlefield.[x] Fiber optic drones, which Russia has been able to scale up in 2025 due the drone's simplicity, have enabled Russian forces to conduct precision strikes against Ukrainian armored equipment, ground lines of communication (GLOCs), troop movements, and EW systems. Russia's use of fiber optic drones has also allowed Russian forces to improve their ability to interdict Ukrainian GLOCs in forested areas, such as the Serebryanske forest area.

The Kremlin appears set to institutionalize its long-held practice of torturing and abusing Ukrainian civilian prisoners and prisoners of war (POWs).  Russian President Vladimir Putin submitted a bill to the Russian State Duma on September 8 that would denounce the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.[xi]  The convention calls for internationalters and prisons.[xii] The bill's explanatory note cited Russia's lack of representation in the Council of Europe's Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment since 2023 as the reason for the denouncement.ssian State Duma Chairperson Vyacheslav Volodin claimed that the Duma will consider the bill as a “matter of priority,” signifying that the bill will likely pass the Duma and that Russia will likely withdraw from the convention in the near future.[xiv] Russia, however, has already been barring international inspectors from its prisons holding Ukrainian civilian prisoners and POWs - likely to cover up Russia's s and torture of Ukrainians.[xv] ISW has also observed numerous indications that the Russian military command is endorsing war crimes on the battlefield, including the execution of Ukrainian POWs.[xvi] Russia’s denouncement of the convention and likely subsequent withdrawal will further formalize these already systemic practices and prevent international efforts to expose them.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian Security Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev directly threatened Finland and used language that directly mirrors the Kremlin's false justifications for its invasions of Ukraine.
• Medvedev's threat against Finland is not unique but rather part of an ongoing Kremlin effort to threaten NATO states and justify future Russian aggression.
• Russia continues to expand its defense industrial base (DIB) and take measures to safeguard defense industrial enterprises against long-range Ukrainian strikes.
• Russia is also reportedly increasing its production of FPVs with fiber optic cables, which Russian forces have successfully leveraged in recent months to achieve some effects of battlefield air interdiction (BAI) in Ukraine.
• The Kremlin appears set to institutionalize its long-held practice of torturing and abusing Ukrainian civilian prisoners and prisoners of war (POWs).
• Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Lyman. Russian forces advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 7, 2025

Russia launched its largest combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine of the war to date on the night of September 6 to 7 with 823 total projectiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 810 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Bryansk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast, Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske and Cape Chauda, Crimea.[i] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched nine Iskander-from Kursk Oblast and four Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defenses downed or suppressed 747 drones and four Iskander-K cruise missiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that nine missiles and 54 strike drones struck 33 locations throughout Ukraine and that drone and missile debris fell on eight locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged civilian and residential infrastructure in Kyiv, Sumy, Dnipro, and Zaporizhzhia cities; Kremenchuk, Poltava Oblast; Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; Slovyansk, Donetsk Oblast; and Chernihiv and Cherkasy oblasts.[ii]  Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that the Russian strikes injured 44 civilians across Ukraine, primarily targeted Kyiv City, and lasted over 7.5 hours.yiv City Military Administration Head Timur Tkachenko reported that Russian strikes killed two civilians and injured 20 others in Kyiv City.[iv]  Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko reported and published footage showing that Russian forces struck Ukraine’s Cabinet of Ministers building within Kyiv City for the .[v] ISW continues to assess that Russia's ongoing large-scale strikes underscore Ukraine's need for continued Western support for Ukraine's interceptor drone program and for the continued supply of Western air defense systems, especially US-provided Patriot systems.[vi]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) attempted to deny that Russian forces struck civilian infrastructure across Ukraine or the Cabinet of Ministers building within Kyiv City. The Russian MoD claimed on September 7 that Russian forces struck drone facilities and airbases in Ukraine.[vii] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces struck two industrial enterprises on the outskirts of Kyiv City but did not conduct any strikes against any other objects within Kyiv City. Several Russian milbloggers amplified the MoD's narrative that Russian forces did not strike the Cabinet of Ministers building within Kyiv City.[viii] Tat Russian forces hit civilian targets in Ukraine despite ample footage, imagery, and Ukrainian official reports to the contrary.[ix] ISW coonths.[x]

Russian drone strike packages against Ukraine will likely continue to expand as long as Russia is able to increase its long-range strike drone production. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Colonel Andriy Yusov stated on September 5 that Russia can currently produce 2,700 Shahed-type strike drones per month and an unspecified "significant" number of decoy drones.[xi] The GUR indicated in June 2025 that Russia could produce an average of 170 Shahed-type strike and decoy drones per day (about 5,100 per month) and planned to increase production to 190 drones per day (about 5,700 per month) by the end of 2025.[xii] Ukrainian officials have previously warned that Russia intends to increase its strike packages to include over 1,000 drones per day in Fall 2025, and Russia's use of over 800 drones in the September 6 to 7 strike package is a significant increase toward this goal.[xiii] Russia's strike packages against Ukraine will only continue to increase in size as long as Russia is able to continue expanding its Shahed-type drone production unimpeded. More frequent larger-scale Russian strikes will threaten to devastate Ukraine's electrical grid and energy infrastructure ahead of and during the coming winter season.

Russia is continuing to expand its long-range strike drone production in part due to support from the People's Republic of China (PRC). Russia has significantly scaled up its domestic production of Shahed-type drones, including Gerans (Russian Shahed analogues), Garpiyas (Shahed analogues with PRC components), and Gerberas (decoy Shahed varian.[xiv] Russia primarily produces Shahed-type drones at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (ASEZ) in the Republic of Tatarstan and recently opened a at the Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant where Russia already produces Garpiya drones.[xv] Russia has recently significantly invested in developing the ASEZ's drone factory; supporting the plant's infrastructure; and recruiting women, children, and foreigners to work at the ASEZ.[xvi] Russia is increasingly relying on the PRC for its drone components and would not be able to sustain the pace or mass of its Shahed-type drone production without these components. A recent investigation by the Ukraine-based, open-source intelligence organization Frontelligence Insight found that the ASEZ alone depends on the PRC for at least 41 components to produce its long-range strike drones, including engines, electronic and mechanical components, batteries, antennas, radios, carbon fire, carburetors, and telecommunications components.[xvii] Frontelligence Insight assessed that many of the drones that Russia claims to have produced domestically are only assembled domestically given the high number of PRC-produced parts in these drones. Russia also opened a dedicated logistics center at the ASEZ to receive and process cargo trains directly from the PRC, likely in an effort to streamline the delivery of PRC-produced components for drone production at the ASEZ.[xviii]

Russia's latest strikes against Ukraine further demonstrate that Russian President Vladimir Putin . Russia has consistently intensified its strike packages and capabilities since the beginning of its full-scale invasion in 2022 and has notably accelerated its strikes campaign following the Ukraine-Russia bilateral talks in Istanbul on May 15, 2025, launching 16 combined strikes consisting of over 400 air targets since the talks.[xix] Russia's September 6 to 7 strike is the fifth combined strike of over 500 drones and missiles since the August 15 US-Russia summit in Alaska. Putin has repeatedly rejected Ukrainian and US efforts to establish ceasefires on the battlefield and continues to insist that Russia cannot agree to a ceasefire until there is a peace agreement.[xx] Putin has also made no effort to prepare Russian society or the Russian information space for an end to the war that results in less than Ukrainian capitulation to all of Russia's original war demands.[xxi] A Russian milblogger claimed on September 7 that the size of the latest overnight strike demonstrates Russia's "unyielding will" and shows that Russia continues to "politely ignor[e]" US President Donald Trump's repeated condemnation of Russian strikes.[xxii] The milblogger claimed that negotiations are entering a period of "empty talk."[xxiii]

Ukraine contimilitary and oil infrastructure in Russia on the night of September 6 to 7. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 7 that Ukrainian forces, including elements of the Unmanned Systems Forces (USF), struck an near Naitopovichi, Bryansk .[xxiv] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that this oil production station is part of the Steel Horse oil pipeline, which has a pumping capacity of . Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces Commander Major Robert “r” Brovdi reported that the facility is important for the transport of petroleum products to Russia from Belarusian refineries, especially the Mozyr and Novopolatsk refinerie The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) reported on September 7 that the SSO and a pro-Ukrainian resistance group conducted an unspecified attack against the Ilsky Oil Refinery in Krasnodar Krai. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Ilsky Oil Refinery processes 6.42 million tons of oil annually.[xxvii] The Ukrainian SSO reported that the attack destroyed the ELOU-AT-6 oil complex, which is the Refinery's primary oil refining complex.[xxviii] Geolocated footage published on September 7 shows a smoke plume rising from the Ilsky Oil Refinery.[xxix] The Krasnodar Krai operational headquarters claimed on September 7 that drone debris fell on the Ilsky Oil Refinery and caused a fire at one of the processing units.[xxx] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported on September 7 that Ukrainian forces successfully struck Russian military warehouses in Kursk Oblast but are clarifying the damage.[xxxi]

Key Takeaways:

• Russia launched its largest combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine of the war to date on the night of September 6 to 7 with 823 total projectiles.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) attempted to deny that Russian forces struck civilian infrastructure across Ukraine or the Cabinet of Ministers building within Kyiv City.
• Russian drone strike packages against Ukraine will likely continue to expand as long as Russia is able to increase its long-range strike drone production.
• support from the People's Republic of China (PRC).
• Russia's latest strikes against Ukraine further demonstrate that Russian President Vladimir Putin is disinterested in ending his war in Ukraine and stopping the killing.
• Ukraine continued its attacks against military and oil infrastructure in Russia on the night of September 6 to 7.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka and Dobropillya tactical areas. Russian forces advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 6, 2025

Ukrainian officials warned that the Russian military command is regrouping and reinforcing its troops in western Donetsk Oblast, likely ahead of a major offensive operation. Ukrainian Dnipro Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Oleksiy Belskyi reported that the Russian military command is concentrating significant forces in Donetsk Oblast and that the most intense fighting is occurring in the Pokrovsk direction.[1] Belskyi stated that Russian forces are now accumulating significant numbers of drones and heavy armored vehicles in the area after failing to seize Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad during Summer 2025. The Ukrainian 7th Army Corps reported that the Russian military command recently redeployed experienced naval infantry units to the Pokrovsk direction, indicating that Russia is preparing to re-intensify assaults in the area.[2] The Ukrainian 7th Army Corps reported that Russian forces began leveraging infiltration tactics with small teams with the aim of getting as close as possible to Ukrainian drone and artillery positions, overextending Ukrainian forces, gaining footholds in forward positions, and expanding the contested "gray" zone. The Ukrainian 7th Army Corps noted that Russian forces intensified offensive operations on the flanks of Pokrovsk using armored and motorized vehicles in an effort to interdict ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and envelop Pokrovsk. The Ukrainian 7th Army Corps reported that the Russian military command remains committed to seizing Ukraine's fortress belt, which consists of Slovyansk-Kramatorsk-Druzhkivka-Kostyantynivka and forms the backbone of Ukrainian forces' defense in Donetsk Oblast. A senior non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Siversk direction reported that Russian forces are conducting troop rotations in the area and that Ukrainian forces anticipate that Russian forces will soon conduct intensified offensive operations.[3] The NCO noted that the Russian military command is pressuring Russian units to advance during Fall 2025, given that Russian forces did not achieve their given objectives during Summer 2025. The deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Kramatorsk direction also reported that Russian forces are building up their force presence in preparation for future assault operations in the Kramatorsk area and that the Russian military command has deployed unspecified naval infantry units to the area.[4]

A Ukrainian servicemember reported on September 5 that the Russian military command recently redeployed five to six unspecified naval infantry brigades to the Dobropillya direction alongside a tank regiment, an infantry regiment, and two motorized rifle brigades.[5] The Ukrainian servicemember reported that the Russian military command also recently redeployed elements of the 70th Motorized Rifle Division (18th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) to Chasiv Yar. A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on September 6 that elements of the 76th VDV Division, including its 237th VDV Regiment, are redeploying from Sumy Oblast to an unspecified location.[6] ISW recently observed reports that the Russian military command redeployed several units from Kursk Oblast, including elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) to the Dobropillya area and elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla), and 11th Separate VDV Brigade to unspecified areas of Donetsk Oblast.[7] ISW has also observed additional reports that the Russian military command redeployed elements of the 70th Motorized Rifle Division from Kherson Oblast to Bakhmut, possibly to reinforce Russian offensive efforts near Kostyantynivka or Siversk.[8] The Russian military command's reported decision to redeploy more forces to the Dobropillya area suggests that Russia may continue to focus on offensive efforts northeast of Pokrovsk.

Russian forces are also attempting to interdict key Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in western Donetsk Oblast in order to complicate Ukrainian logistics and enable further Russian advances during future offensive efforts in Donetsk Oblast. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on September 6 that Russian forces are attempting to interdict Ukrainian logistics in order to complicate Ukraine's ability to defend and launch counterattacks along the frontline.[9] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are attempting to identify gaps in Ukraine's defensive lines and exploit compromised Ukrainian positions. A senior non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Siversk direction stated that Russian drone operators have recently been loitering drones along Ukrainian GLOCs in the brigade's area of responsibility (AoR) and waiting to strike Ukrainian personnel.[10] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have intensified first person view (FPV) drone strikes against the E-40 Izyum-Slovyansk highway, presumably from positions in the Lyman direction, and are successfully disrupting Ukrainian logistics.[11] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces have struck 10 Ukrainian military vehicles traveling along the E-40 highway in the last few days and that Russian drone strikes may force Ukraine to pursue alternative logistics routes to supply Ukrainian positions along the fortress belt. Additional Russian milbloggers posted footage of damaged Ukrainian vehicles along the highway and claimed that Russian forces are also using Lancet drones to strike these vehicles.[12] Russian forces have previously leveraged interdiction efforts in order to create vulnerabilities in frontline Ukrainian positions that Russian forces can then exploit in infantry and mechanized assaults.[13] Russian forces have historically relied on glide bomb strikes, and now increasingly drone strikes, to raze frontline settlements and towns to the ground in order to destroy any possible Ukrainian defensive positions and force Ukrainian forces to retreat, enabling less costly Russian advances.[14]

Recent geolocated footage indicates that Russian forces have likely advanced into northwestern Kupyansk following the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)'s efforts to falsely portray limited infiltrations as enduring advances. Geolocated footage published on September 5 shows a Ukrainian drone strike against a Russian position in a building in northwestern Kupyansk, indicating that Russian forces have likely established forward positions within northwestern Kupyansk.[15] This footage differs from recent footage that the Russian MoD released, attempting to lend legitimacy to inflated claims of Russian advances. The Russian MoD published footage on September 3 showing individual Russian soldiers out in the open and holding Russian flags at four points within northern, northwestern, and western Kupyansk, and the MoD claimed that Russian forces had seized about half of Kupyansk.[16] The footage did not show indications that Russian forces actually held any areas in Kupyansk. However, it indicated that these soldiers likely infiltrated the town to film this footage. The Russian MoD attempted to portray these limited and temporary infiltrations into Kupyansk as consolidated territorial gains, however.[17] Both Russian and Ukrainian sources rejected the MoD's footage.[18]

ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin appears to be attempting to exploit mapping methodologies used throughout the war to advance an ongoing informational effort intended to portray Russian victory in Ukraine as inevitable and push Ukraine to concede to Russia.[19] The September 5 footage of the Ukrainian drone strike in northwestern Kupyansk is more consistent with the actual establishment of forward positions.[20] Russian forces typically send small fireteam sized groups of personnel on assaults in order to gain positions behind the Ukrainian frontline, after which they can accumulate larger groups and establish enduring positions for further assaults. The September 5 footage of Ukrainian forces conducting a drone strike against a Russian-held building is consistent with this pattern of Russian advances and previous footage that ISW has routinely used to assess further Russian advances. ISW's maps have distinguished between the Russian "forward line of own troops" (FLOT), which the US Army has defined as the most forward observed positions of forces in any operation at a specific time, and areas that Russian forces control.[21] ISW recently introduced a new feature — “Assessed Infiltration Events in Ukraine” — to help distinguish between areas where Russian or Ukrainian forces conducted assessed infiltration missions but have not advanced and do not control the territory. ISW will continue to monitor tactics and operations observed on the battlefield and refine its mapping methodology accordingly.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian officials warned that the Russian military command is regrouping and reinforcing its troops in western Donetsk Oblast, likely ahead of a major offensive operation.
• Russian forces are also attempting to interdict key Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in western Donetsk Oblast in order to complicate Ukrainian logistics and enable further Russian advances during future offensive efforts in Donetsk Oblast.
• Recent geolocated footage indicates that Russian forces have likely advanced into northwestern Kupyansk following the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)'s efforts to falsely portray limited infiltrations as enduring advances.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Lyman and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Lyman, Pokrovsk, and Velykomykhailivka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 5, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected the legitimacy of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and said that it is impossible to conclude a peace agreement with the current Ukrainian government, effectively eliminating the possibility of serious peace negotiations. Putin said on September 5 at the Eastern Economic Forum that he "do[es] not see much point" in negotiating with Ukraine, as it will be "impossible" to reach an agreement with Ukraine.[1] Putin falsely claimed that even if Russia and Ukraine conclude a peace agreement, Ukraine must lift martial law and hold presidential elections ahead of a national referendum to codify the agreement, and that the Ukrainian Constitutional Court must then make a decision on the referendum. Putin claimed that Ukraine lacks the "political will" to make an agreement at all, however, and that the Ukrainian Constitutional Court is non-functional as Zelensky is still in power, effectively reiterating his false claims that Zelensky and the current Ukrainian government are illegitimate. Putin and other Kremlin officials have repeatedly rejected the legitimacy of Zelensky and his government, deliberately misreading the Ukrainian constitution.[2] Putin’s statement is part of his continued effort to portray Zelensky and other Ukrainian officials as partners with whom Russia cannot negotiate or sign a final peace agreement.[3] ISW has long assessed that Putin is uninterested in meaningful negotiations to end the war and instead sought to delay or prolong negotiations, and his September 5 statements are now attempting to justify Russia's refusal to negotiate at all.[4] Putin is attempting to make peace negotiations impossible and falsely deflecting the blame onto Ukraine.

Putin and other Russian officials continue efforts to degrade Western unity and deter Western support for Ukraine, including undermining potential postwar security guarantees. Putin also stated at the Eastern Economic Forum that Russia will consider any foreign troops in Ukraine to be legitimate targets if the war in Ukraine continues.[5] Putin claimed that he "simply do[es] not see any point" in deploying foreign troops to Ukraine after the war because Russia will "respect those security guarantees" that Russia and Ukraine develop. Putin's statement threatening to strike foreign military assets in Ukraine is an attempt to provoke fear in the West about a possibility that European states are not considering. European member states of the Coalition of the Willing have consistently reiterated that any peacekeeping contingents that deploy to Ukraine will only do so after the conclusion of a long-term peace deal and even then would only operate in unspecified rear areas rather than on the frontline.[6] The Kremlin is also intensifying its effort to deter Western states from taking actions unfavorable to Russia writ large, including supporting Ukraine. Russian Security Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev accused Finland on September 5 of senselessly "interfering" in Ukraine and reiterated that Russia cannot accept security guarantees for Ukraine if Russia feels its opinions are not considered.[7] Medvedev also accused Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland of increasing military activity along the Russian border and urged Russia to increase its border protection in response to Finland's accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and increased military activity in the Baltics.[8] Putin's accusations ignore Russia's own electronic warfare (EW) jamming operations that have significantly affected the Baltics and other states along Russia's western border in recent months, including jamming the GPS of planes carrying government officials.[9] Putin and other Russian officials continue to reject Western security guarantees for Ukraine and to aggressively posture against NATO allies in an effort to dissuade European states from supporting Ukraine, including through post-war guarantees, and to demand that Russia have a veto over any Western security guarantees for Ukraine.[10]

Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian military and energy infrastructure in Russia and occupied Ukraine. The Ukrainian General Staff and Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) reported that elements of the Unmanned Systems Forces (USF), Special Operations Forces (SSO), and Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) struck the Ryazan Oil Refinery on the night of September 5.[11] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the strikes hit the ELOU-AVT-6 primary oil refining unit, which has an estimated oil refining capacity of six million tons per year out of the Ryazan Oil Refinery's entire refining capacity of 17.1 million tons of oil per year.[12] Geolocated footage published on September 4 shows a fire at the Ryazan Oil Refinery's ELOU-AVT-6 and AVT-4 refining units.[13] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Ryazan Oil Refinery is one of the four largest oil refineries in Russia and produces gasoline, diesel, jet fuel, liquified gases, and other petroleum products.[14] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Ukrainian SSO also struck an S-400 air defense system in Kaluga Oblast and that preliminary reports indicate that the strikes damaged a Russian command and staff vehicle and a control point. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) struck a Russian military warehouse containing ammunition and drones in occupied Luhansk City.

Russian-Azerbaijani relations continue to deteriorate. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on September 4 that Azerbaijan could help restore bilateral relations with Russia by releasing 13 Russian citizens in Azerbaijani detention.[15] Azerbaijani authorities detained Russian citizens and conducted a raid on ethnic Azerbaijanis in Yekaterinburg in June 2025 after Russian law enforcement conducted a raid on the regional headquarters of Russian state-owned propaganda outlet Sputnik in Baku.[16] The Russian MFA issued a separate statement on September 4 rejecting reports that Russia had not compensated Azerbaijan for the December 2024 Azerbaijani Airlines Plane crash, which was likely the result of Russian air defenses shooting down the passenger plane.[17] The Russian MFA stated that a Russian insurance company had made insurance payments to the families of those killed in the December 2024 Azerbaijan Airlines plane crash. The Azerbaijani MFA responded to Zakharova's September 4 statement and stated that it is wrong for Zakharova to portray the detentions of Russian citizens as the reason for deteriorating bilateral relations and to place the release of the Russian citizens as a condition for improving bilateral relations.[18] The Azerbaijani MFA named Russia's failure to take responsibility for shooting down the Azerbaijan Airlines Flight 8243 as the reason for deteriorating bilateral relations. The Azerbaijani MFA also criticized the Russian MFA's September 5 statement that Russian insurance companies paying individual families satisfies Azerbaijan's demand that the Russian Government compensate Azerbaijan for the lost aircraft.[19] The Russian MFA responded to the Azerbaijani MFA on September 5 and rejected the Azerbaijani MFA's claim that Zakharova had named the release of the 13 detained Russian citizens as a condition to improving relations but emphasized that this release would help normalize bilateral relations.[20] The Russian MFA claimed that the investigation into the December 2024 plane crash is still ongoing. Bilateral Russian-Azerbaijani relations have deteriorated since the December 2024 plane crash and faced further strain due to the mutual detentions in the summer of 2024.[21]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected the legitimacy of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and said that it is impossible to conclude a peace agreement with the current Ukrainian government, effectively eliminating the possibility of serious peace negotiations.
• Putin and other Russian officials continue efforts to degrade Western unity and deter Western support for Ukraine, including undermining potential postwar security guarantees.
• Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian military and energy infrastructure in Russia and occupied Ukraine.
• Russian-Azerbaijani relations continue to deteriorate.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Siversk. Russian forces advanced near Lyman and Pokrovsk and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 4, 2025

The British and French-led Coalition of the Willing and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met in Paris to discuss possible future security guarantees for Ukraine that aim to ensure a just and lasting peace on September 4.[1] The heads of state and leaders of 35 countries and international organizations participated, including French President Emmanuel Macron, Finnish President Alexander Stubb, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, and US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff.

Macron stated that a strong Ukrainian military must be at the center of any postwar security guarantees. Macron stated that any security guarantees would need to involve commitments to rebuild and bolster the Ukrainian military.[2] Macron reported that the meeting participants agreed that the Coalition of the Willing's primary objective in any potential negotiations is to ensure that Russia does not impose any limits on the size or capabilities of the Ukrainian military.[3] Macron stated that Ukraine's allies must seek to provide Ukraine with the means to restore its military in order to deter and resist future Russian aggression.

Macron stated that 26 states formally agreed to form a "reassurance force" as part of security guarantees for postwar Ukraine. Macron stated that 26 unspecified states agreed to send ground forces to Ukraine or to provide assets to support at sea or in the sky.[4] Macron stated that the forces will be ready to deploy to Ukraine the day after Ukraine and Russia reach a ceasefire or peace agreement in the future. Macron noted that the foreign troops would not deploy to the frontline but to still undecided areas behind the front to prevent future Russian aggression.[5] Macron stated that the United States has been involved in every stage of the security guarantee process and that the Coalition of the Willing will finalize US support for European-led security guarantees in the coming days. France and the UK have previously indicated their willingness to deploy troops to postwar Ukraine.[6] Reuters reported on September 4 that a German government spokesperson stated that Germany will decide on its military engagement "in due course when the framework is clear," including the kind and extent of US involvement and the result of the peace negotiation process.[7]

The Kremlin continues to explicitly reject any foreign troops on Ukrainian territory as part of postwar security guarantees. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova stated on September 4 that Russia will not discuss "any security foreign intervention" in Ukraine "in any form, in any format."[8] Zakharova claimed that such a foreign troop deployment is "fundamentally unacceptable." Zakharova similarly said on August 18 that Russia "categorical[ly] reject[s]" "any scenario that envisages the appearance in Ukraine of a military contingent with the participation of NATO countries," and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on August 27 that Russia takes a "negative view" of European proposals of security guarantees for Ukraine and will perceive European force deployments to postwar Ukraine as an expansion of NATO's presence.[9] These repeated Kremlin rejections of Western security guarantees are part of Russia's calls for it to have a veto over any Western security guarantees for Ukraine.[10] Russia also previously tried to impose severe restrictions on the size of the Ukrainian military in the 2022 Istanbul draft peace agreement, and Russia has indicated that it continues to view the 2022 Istanbul draft treaty as the basis for any future peace settlement.[11] Russia has repeatedly demonstrated that it remains committed to achieving its original war aims, including the reduction of Ukraine's military such that Ukraine cannot defend itself against future Russian attacks.[12]

The Coalition of the Willing also outlined ways for states that are unable to deploy ground, sea, or air assets to participate in security guarantees for postwar Ukraine. Zelensky stated after the meeting that the Coalition of the Willing can also support a strong Ukrainian military with weapons provisions, training, and financing for Ukraine's weapons production.[13] Zelensky stated that states that do not have their own forces can contribute to the security guarantees financially, including by financing Ukrainian weapons production. Starmer stated that he welcomed announcements from unspecified Coalition of the Willing partners that they plan to supply Ukraine with long-range missiles.[14] Czech Prime Minister Petr Fiala emphasized that security guarantees are necessary in order to deter Russian aggression and that the Coalition of the Willing is in agreement that Ukraine needs continued defense aid to ensure a just and lasting peace.[15] Fiala announced that Czechia will begin training Ukrainian F-16 pilots on subsonic aircraft and simulators as part of Czechia's aid package to Ukraine. Fiala stated that Czechia will continue to supply Ukraine with ammunition.

The Coalition of the Willing discussed additional sanctions against Russia with US President Donald Trump as part of coordinated Western efforts to deny Russia funding for its war against Ukraine. Reuters reported that a White House official stated that US President Donald Trump spoke with the leaders of the Coalition of the Willing after the meeting and that Trump called on them to stop buying Russian oil as this helps fund Russia's war machine.[16] The White House official stated that Trump also called for European leaders to put economic pressure on the People's Republic of China (PRC) for its involvement in Russia's war effort. Macron confirmed that the coalition spoke with Trump about sanctions and stated that the parties agreed to work more closely on future sanctions, especially those targeting Russia's gas and energy sectors and the PRC.[17] Macron stated that Europe and the United States will impose additional sanctions against Russia if Moscow continues to refuse peace negotiations.

Russian bankers continue to express concerns over the increasingly stagnant Russian economy. Sberbank CEO and Former Russian Minister of Economic Development and Trade, German Gref, claimed on September 4 that the Russian Central Bank will likely lower its key interest rate to 14 percent by the end of 2025, but that this would not be enough to revive the Russian economy.[18] Gref called on the Central Bank to lower the key interest rate to 12 percent or less to stimulate economic growth. The Central Bank already lowered its key interest rate twice in the last three months, from a record high of 21 percent down to 20 percent in June 2025 and to 18 percent in July 2025 - likely as part of a premature effort to maintain the facade of economic stability.[19] Gref acknowledged that the Russian economy is in a ”cooling period” and that Sberbank lowered its forecast for growth in corporate lending from nine to 11 percent to seven to nine percent. Gref added that the Russian ruble will likely weaken by the end of 2025. Russia has been leveraging the strengthened ruble to soften the blow of Western sanctions as parallel imports are cheaper and substitutes are affordable, and the Central Bank used the strengthened ruble to justify lowering its key interest rate in Summer 2025.[20] The Russian economy is already struggling with gasoline price spikes, labor shortages, and wage inflation from increased payments to sustain military recruitment and to augment the defense industrial base's (DIB) labor force.[21] Gref’s proposal to lower the key interest rate even further to 12 percent would flood the Russian economy with money and likely weaken consumer purchasing power, devalue the ruble in the medium-to long-term, and create further macroeconomic instability in Russia.[22]

Key Takeaways:

• The British and French-led Coalition of the Willing and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met in Paris to discuss possible future security guarantees for Ukraine that aim to ensure a just and lasting peace on September 4.
• Macron stated that a strong Ukrainian military must be at the center of any postwar security guarantees.
• Macron stated that 26 states formally agreed to form a "reassurance force" as part of security guarantees for postwar Ukraine.
• The Kremlin continues to explicitly reject any foreign troops on Ukrainian territory as part of postwar security guarantees.
• The Coalition of the Willing also outlined ways for states that are unable to deploy ground, sea, or air assets to participate in security guarantees for postwar Ukraine.
• The Coalition of the Willing discussed additional sanctions against Russia with US President Donald Trump as part of coordinated Western efforts to deny Russia funding for its war against Ukraine.
• Russian bankers continue to express concerns over the increasingly stagnant Russian economy.
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Kupyansk and Siversk and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Russian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Velykomykhailivka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 3, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin explicitly stated that he does not consider Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to be the legitimate president of Ukraine, invalidating the very basis of any future peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia. Putin spoke to journalists in Beijing on September 3 and falsely claimed that the Ukrainian Constitution has "no ways to extend the powers of the president" and that Zelensky's "powers are over" now that his five-year term limit "passed" in 2024.[i] Putin described Zelensky rather as the "current head of the administration" and claimed that a meeting with Zelensky would therefore be "a road to nowhere." Putin claimed that a bilateral meeting is nonetheless possible, but that Zelensky should come to Moscow. Putin has repeatedly flaunted an inaccurate reading of the Ukrainian Constitution to falsely claim that Zelensky is not the legitimate president of Ukraine – claims that ISW has repeatedly shown to be inaccurate.[ii] ISW continues to assess that Putin's claims of Zelensky's illegitimacy demonstrate Putin's disinterest in a peace settlement and set conditions for Russia to renege on any future peace agreement Putin should sign with Zelensky at a time of Russia's choosing in the future.[iii] Kremlin newswire TASS reported in May 2024 that the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) put Zelensky on Russia's wanted list for unspecified reasons, a report that puts a very different color on Putin's ostensible invitation to Zelensky to come to Moscow, considering that Putin has said he does not recognize Zelensky's legitimacy.[iv]

Putin himself is responsible for Ukraine's inability to legally hold the referendums and elections for which Putin is calling. Putin claimed that Ukrainian authorities should hold a referendum, including to decide on "territorial issues," "if they want to be legitimate and fully participate in the settlement process."[v] Putin correctly noted that Ukrainian law does not allow Ukrainian authorities to hold elections during martial law, but claimed that Ukraine "must" lift martial law. Ukrainian law states that Ukrainian authorities cannot lift martial law while "the threat of attack or danger to the state independence of Ukraine and its territorial integrity" remains.[vi] Ukrainian authorities are unable to hold the referendums and elections Putin is calling for until, at a minimum, Russia agrees to a ceasefire – which Putin has repeatedly refused to do.[vii] It is standard practice for peace processes to include ceasefires or armistices before the final stages of negotiations toward a war termination agreement. Putin, instead, is trying to force Ukraine to first make concessions and agree to Russia's demands before the implementation of the theater-wide, longer-term ceasefire that would actually allow Ukraine to lift martial law and hold referendums and elections as Putin claims he wants. Putin's statement that Ukraine cannot, in fact, make the concessions he is demanding under the conditions he is imposing is a further indication that Putin is completely unserious about negotiations.

Putin and other high-ranking Kremlin officials continue to explicitly and publicly state that they are committed to achieving Russia's original war aims through military means. Putin stated in Beijing that Russia will have to "solve all the tasks" surrounding Russia's war in Ukraine by "armed means" if current peace efforts fail.[viii] Putin claimed that the "overwhelming majority" of his Russian military commanders are "in favor of Russia achieving all of its goals outlined at the beginning of the [war]." Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov claimed on September 3  that lasting peace in Ukraine requires international legal recognition of the "new territorial realities" that emerged after the referendums in occupied  Crimea and Russian-occupied areas of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts – a reference to the illegal referendums Russia held in Crimea in 2014 and parts of the four oblasts in 2022 in which Russia claimed that Ukrainian citizens overwhelmingly voted to join Russia and that Russia uses to legitimize its claim to all of the territory of these five areas.[ix] Lavrov reiterated Russia's demands that any future peace settlement must "eradicate" the "root causes" of the war. Lavrov repeated Kremlin claims that these "root causes" include the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) post-Cold War expansion; NATO's efforts to include Ukraine in the alliance; and alleged Ukrainian violations of human rights in Ukraine, including the supposed persecution of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers and the purported destruction of the Russian language, culture, traditions, "canonical Orthodoxy," and Russian-language media. Lavrov reiterated Russian demands that Ukraine must be "neutral, non-aligned, and non-nuclear."

Putin's and Lavrov's statements make clear that Russia remains committed to the demands it made in 2021 and 2022 when Russia issued its prewar ultimatums to NATO and launched the full-scale invasion.[x] Putin's reference to Russian military commanders' support for a protracted war is an attempt to deflect responsibility for the decision about continuing the war from Putin onto his military subordinates. Putin has notably been intentionally cultivating Russian society’s commitment to achieving Russia's original war aims through a protracted war, and Putin has not sought to prepare Russian society to accept a peace settlement other than total Ukrainian capitulation.[xi]

Putin underscored his continued commitment to his theory of victory, a belief that Putin first outlined in June 2024, on September 3. Putin claimed that Russian forces are successfully advancing "in all directions," although at "different speeds."[xii] Putin claimed that Ukrainian forces are unable to conduct large-scale offensive operations and are only "holding the existing line." Putin has maintained a theory of victory that posits that Russian forces will be able to sustain gradual tactical gains regardless of the losses incurred, that Russia can outlast Western support for Ukraine, and that Ukraine will be unable to regain significant territory or launch effective counteroffensives.[xiii] Putin remains committed to achieving his goals on the battlefield through a protracted war and is uninterested in genuine peace efforts.

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko continues to publicly deepen Belarusian integration into Russia. Lukashenko stated on September 2 that Belarus and Russia are "working together on all fronts" and that they are “one country in principle,” likely referencing the Union State Treaty of Russia and Belarus.[xiv] The Union State framework establishes a political union between Belarus and Russia with a Kremlin-dominated federated government with a common set of federal laws and institutions for Belarusians and Russians to be governed as a single polity.[xv] The Kremlin has long pursued its strategic efforts to de facto annex Belarus through the framework of the Union State Treaty.[xvi]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) attempted to use footage showing a small-scale infiltration mission to lend legitimacy to inflated claims by Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov on August 30 that Russian forces had seized roughly half of Kupyansk.[xvii] The Russian MoD posted footage on September 3 that it claimed confirms that Russian forces control roughly half of Kupyansk.[xviii] The Russian MoD claimed that the footage shows Russian forces in central Kupyansk. The drone footage shows lone Russian servicemembers walking with a Russian flag. The geolocations of the MoD's footage indicate that the individual soldiers were operating at four points in northern, northwestern, and central Kupyansk.[xix] Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces killed the Russian soldiers in the footage, indicating that Russian forces do not maintain positions in these areas of the town. A Ukrainian army corps operating in the Kupyansk direction reported that Russian forces changed into civilian clothing to enter Kupyansk and that Ukrainian forces killed the Russian soldiers involved in filming the MoD's footage.[xx] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko also stated that soldiers from a Ukrainian brigade operating in the area reported that Ukrainian forces killed a Russian soldier in the footage.[xxi] Kovalenko noted that Russian forces are attacking Kupyansk's northern flank. The commander of a Ukrainian drone regiment operating in the area similarly reported that Russian soldiers are changing into civilian clothing and infiltrating into Kupyansk to film footage with a Russian flag.[xxii] The commander stated that Ukrainian forces control the situation in Kupyansk and are blocking Russian forces on the northwestern outskirts. The commander stated that Ukrainian forces have taken several tens of Russian soldiers who have infiltrated Kupyansk in civilian clothing prisoner in the past week and a half. The Russian MoD's footage shows one Russian servicemember starting to run away from the street after unfurling the flag for a few seconds – in line with Ukrainian reporting that Russian forces lack enduring positions and do not control the area. It would also be unprecedented for Russian forces to make an advance this deep into an urban area without more significant, objective corroborating evidence.

The Russian MoD's claims about Kupyansk have failed to convince large parts of the Russian milblogger community, even Kremlin-affiliated and coopted milbloggers. One Russian milblogger blamed the command of the Russian 6th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) for lying to the Western Grouping of Forces and subsequently the Russian MoD about battlefield successes in Kupyansk.[xxiii] The milblogger claimed that sources "in the know" were "bewildered" by Gerasimov's August 30 claim.[xxiv] The milblogger claimed that the MoD's September 1 footage is questionable, particularly as the drone footage filmed the lone Russian soldiers from afar and for a short period of time – unlike previous MoD footage celebrating Russian settlement seizures that showed multiple Russian soldiers up close for minutes at a time.[xxv] Another Russian milblogger cautioned that Russian forces do not control all of the areas that the Russian MoD claimed Russian forces seized.[xxvi] The milblogger claimed that "pairs" of Russian soldiers may be in the area alongside Ukrainian forces. The milblogger acknowledged that it is unclear how to portray the situation accurately on a map. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that it was "curious" that the MoD's footage showed "practically no destruction" in Kupyansk.[xxvii] The milblogger attempted to reason that Russian forces may have pushed Ukrainian forces back using small group tactics without large-scale clashes. The milblogger acknowledged that Russian forces may not have completely cleared the area.

The Kremlin appears to be trying to exploit the mapping methodologies that have become widespread throughout the war, including from open source intelligence (OSINT) sources like ISW. Russian officials and milbloggers have repeatedly claimed that footage showing Russian forces holding flags was evidence of Russian seizures of settlements.[xxviii] These Russian information operations seek to assert Russian territorial control by having soldiers infiltrate areas and ostentatiously wave flags.[xxix] The Russian MoD has even been adapting these methods to be more convincing, moving from amplifying footage of flags that Russian forces hung in settlements using drones to promoting footage showing actual Russian soldiers holding the flags.[xxx]

Russia has previously benefited from confusion that maps depicting limited Russian raids or infiltration missions have generated in the information space, such as Russia's recent limited sabotage and reconnaissance groups penetration near Dobropillya, which Russian forces were unable to actually consolidate and exploit. ISW’s Assessed Russian Advances map layer does not differentiate between enduring Russian positions and limited raids or infiltration missions. ISW has deliberately distinguished between the Russian “forward line of own troops” (FLOT) and areas that ISW assesses that Russian forces control, however. (ISW uses the US Army doctrinal term FLOT to indicate the most forward observed positions of forces in any kind of operation at a specific time.) The Kremlin's "flag raising" tactics are meant to support wider informational efforts to posture a Russian victory in Ukraine as inevitable and to push Ukraine to concede to Russia's maximalist demands sooner rather than later. Informational efforts like the one surrounding Kupyansk are also meant to reinforce Putin's theory of victory – the belief that Russian forces will be able to continue gradual advances indefinitely, prevent Ukraine from conducting counteroffensive operations, and win a war of attrition.[xxxi] ISW is combating these Russian information operations by introducing a new feature - the "Assessed Infiltration Events in Ukraine" feature - to visualize geolocated points where Russian or Ukrainian forces conducted assessed infiltration missions but have not advanced and do not control the territory.

Russia launched another large-scale combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of September 2 to 3 — the fourth combined strike of over 500 drones and missiles since the August 15 US-Russia summit in Alaska. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 16 Kalibr cruise missiles from the Black Sea and eight Kh-101 cruise missiles from the airspace over Saratov Oblast and Krasnodar Krai.[xxxii] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russia also launched 502 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defenses downed 430 drones, 14 Kalibr cruise missiles, and seven Kh-101 cruise missiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that three missiles and 69 drones struck 14 locations throughout Ukraine and that drone debris fell on 14 locations. Ukrainian officials, including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the Ukrainian State Emergency Service, reported that Russian drones and missiles struck civilian, energy, transportation, and residential infrastructure in Chernihiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Khmelnytskyi, Kharkiv, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Lviv, and Sumy oblasts.[xxxiii] Zelensky noted that Russian forces are increasingly launching drone strikes against Ukraine during the daytime.[xxxiv] Zelensky also stated that Russia’s drone and missile strike campaign is intentionally targeting Ukrainian civilian energy infrastructure ahead of the winter season in an effort to undermine Ukrainian morale.[xxxv] ISW continues to assess that Russia used the lead-up to the August 15 Alaska summit to stockpile drones and missiles and conducted more limited strikes against Ukraine before the summit to falsely present itself as a good-faith negotiator to the Trump administration.[xxxvi] Russia will likely continue to escalate its strikes against Ukraine in the coming weeks to leverage its replenished missile and drone stockpiles and degrade Ukrainian energy infrastructure ahead of the coming winter.[xxxvii]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin explicitly stated that he does not consider Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to be the legitimate president of Ukraine, invalidating the very basis of any future peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia.
• Putin himself is responsible for Ukraine's inability to legally hold the referendums and elections for which Putin is calling.
• Putin and other high-ranking Kremlin officials continue to explicitly and publicly state that they are committed to achieving Russia's original war aims through military means.
• Putin underscored his continued commitment to his theory of victory, a belief that Putin first outlined in June 2024, on September 3.
• Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko continues to publicly deepen Belarusian integration into Russia.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) attempted to use footage showing a small-scale infiltration mission to lend legitimacy to inflated claims by Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov on August 30 that Russian forces had seized roughly half of Kupyansk.
• The Russian MoD's claims about Kupyansk have failed to convince large parts of the Russian milblogger community, even Kremlin-affiliated and coopted milbloggers.
• The Kremlin appears to be trying to exploit the mapping methodologies that have become widespread throughout the war, including from OSINT sources like ISW.
• Russia launched another large-scale combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of September 2 to 3—the fourth combined strike of over 500 drones and missiles since the August 15 US-Russia summit in Alaska.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 2, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin leveraged a meeting with Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico to pretend to offer marginal concessions to US demands while continuing to refuse to meet actual US demands and while blaming Europe and the United States for provoking Russian aggression. Putin claimed to Fico in Beijing on September 2 that Russia has never opposed Ukraine joining the European Union, although Russia remains opposed to Ukraine joining NATO.[i] Putin reiterated his claim that the Western-backed "coup” in Ukraine in 2014 (referring to Ukraine’s democratically-organized Revolution of Dignity) provoked Russia to invade Ukraine in 2014 and 2022 and denied that Russia has any future plans to attack another European country. Putin suggested that Russia could be open to operating the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) with the United States and Ukraine in the future if "favorable circumstances" arise. Putin is likely presenting these very limited and tangential concessions in order to feign interest in peace negotiations to the Trump Administration, roughly two weeks after US President Donald Trump reiterated on August 21 his desire for direct and serious peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine.[ii]

Kremlin officials continue to deny White House statements about the prospect of a bilateral Ukrainian-Russian or trilateral US-Ukrainian-Russian meeting in the near future. Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov, who was present at the Alaska Summit, claimed on September 2 that the United States and Russia have planned another round of consultations and that many issues remained unresolved.[iii] Ushakov claimed that the ongoing US-Russian dialogue is primarily related to the “Ukrainian conflict” and that it is too early to discuss bilateral relations. Ushakov denied on September 1 that the United States and Russia agreed on a bilateral Ukrainian-Russian meeting.[iv] Ushakov’s statements reflect the Kremlin’s continued unwillingness to organize a bilateral meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and reject US President Donald Trump’s August 18 statements that officials were planning a bilateral meeting between Zelensky and Putin with a subsequent meeting between Trump, Zelensky, and Putin.[v]

Russia continues to feel the economic impacts of secondary sanctions against Russian oil-and-gas importers and of recent Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil refineries. Bloomberg reported on September 2 that sources who received offers from Russian crude oil exporters stated that Russian exporters are offering Urals crude to Indian importers at a discount of $3 to $4 per barrel, compared to Brent, on a delivered basis for cargo shipments in late September to October 2025.[vi] Bloomberg reported that sources stated that Russian exporters were offering Indian importers a discount of around $2.50 a barrel during the week of August 24 to 30 and a discount of $1 in July 2025. Russia is likely offering Indian importers discounted crude oil to ensure that India continues to purchase crude from Russia despite Western secondary sanctions against India, including a 50 percent US tariff against Indian exports to the United States.[vii] Russia is currently selling crude oil below market price, which will decrease the incoming flow of foreign funds into the Russian economy and deplete Russia's primary source of wealth unless Russia significantly increases its export of crude oil.

Russia and occupied Ukraine are also facing acute gasoline shortages due to Ukrainian strikes.[viii] The Kherson Oblast occupation administration claimed on September 2 that some gas stations in occupied Kherson Oblast are experiencing shortages of AI-92 and AI-95 (premium) gasoline and that gasoline prices are increasing due to shortages.[ix] Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Head Oleksiy Kharchenko reported that occupied Luhansk Oblast is also experiencing shortages of AI-92 and AI-95 gasoline and that the Luhansk Oblast occupation administration claimed that the shortage is due to a reduction in gasoline supply and a simultaneous increase in demand.[x] Kurilsky Municipal Okrug Head Konstantin Istomin reported on August 25 that Russian authorities suspended the sale of A-92 gasoline to residents in the Kuril Islands, Sakhalin Oblast.[xi] The Kremlin extended on August 14 a temporary ban on processed gasoline exports for all exporters through September 2025 and for non-producers through October 2025, a move that seeks to blunt a domestic price surge for gasoline due to Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil refineries.[xii]

North Korea is reportedly planning to send about 6,000 more troops to Russia, likely to serve in supporting roles in the Russian rear. South Korea's Yonhap News Agency reported on September 2 that South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) assessed to the South Korean Parliamentary Intelligence Committee that North Korea is planning to send roughly 6,000 additional soldiers to Russia and that roughly 1,000 North Korean military engineers have already arrived in Russia in the "rear front as reserve forces."[xiii] Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu announced on June 16 that North Korea would send 6,000 sappers and military engineers to help with reconstruction efforts in Kursk Oblast.[xiv] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi reported on August 12 that North Korea had agreed to send additional troops to Russia to support reconstruction efforts in Kursk Oblast.[xv] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on August 31 that North Korean sappers will soon operate in the Sudzha and Guyevo areas in Kursk Oblast and that Russian commanders received orders to prepare subordinates for the upcoming North Korean deployments to prevent friendly fire incidents or other "misunderstandings."[xvi] The milblogger assessed that North Korean forces are unlikely to conduct combat operations against Ukraine and will likely conduct tasks in the rear, including serving as cooks and cleaners, to free up other Russian personnel for infantry assaults. ISW continues to assess that it is unclear whether North Korean troops will deploy to Ukrainian territory, which would mark a significant inflection, but that North Korean troops operating in Russian border areas would still allow more Russian forces to be deployed to the battlefield in Ukraine.[xvii]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin leveraged a meeting with Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico to pretend to offer marginal concessions to US demands while continuing to refuse to meet actual US demands and while blaming Europe and the United States for provoking Russian aggression.
• Kremlin officials continue to deny White House statements about the prospect of a bilateral Ukrainian-Russian or trilateral US-Ukrainian-Russian meeting in the near future.
• Russia continues to feel the economic impacts of secondary sanctions against Russian oil-and-gas importers and of recent Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil refineries.
• North Korea is reportedly planning to send about 6,000 more troops to Russia, likely to serve in supporting roles in the Russian rear.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and near Lyman and Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 1, 2025

Kremlin officials continue to deny White House statements about the prospect of a bilateral Ukrainian-Russian or trilateral US-Ukrainian-Russian meeting in the near future. Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov stated on September 1 that “there was no agreement” on a bilateral meeting between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Russian President Vladimir Putin, or a trilateral meeting between US President Donald Trump, Zelensky, and Putin.[1] Ushakov stated on August 16, after the US-Russian Alaska summit, that he did not know when Trump and Putin would meet again and that the leaders had not discussed the prospect of a trilateral meeting.[2] US President Donald Trump stated on August 18, however, that he was planning a bilateral meeting between Zelensky and Putin with a subsequent meeting between Trump, Zelensky, and Putin.[3] Ushakov’s reiteration of Russia’s refusal to commit to Trump's desired bilateral and trilateral meetings undermines Trump’s ongoing diplomatic efforts to achieve a peace settlement in Ukraine.

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to demonstrate his unwillingness to compromise on his unwavering demands for Ukraine’s full capitulation. Putin claimed on September 1 at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin, People's Republic of China (PRC), that the “crisis” in Ukraine arose from the Western-provoked "coup” in Ukraine in 2014 (referring to Ukraine’s democratically organized Revolution of Dignity), not "as a result of Russia's attack on Ukraine."[4] Putin also claimed that the war in Ukraine stemmed from the West’s constant attempts to bring Ukraine into NATO, which Putin claimed would pose a direct threat to Russian security. Putin claimed that the 2014 "coup" eliminated the political leadership of Ukraine that did not support Ukrainian membership in NATO. Putin claimed that peace in Ukraine can only be sustainable and long-term if the settlement eliminates the ”root causes” of the war, which Kremlin officials have repeatedly defined as Ukraine's alleged discrimination against Russian-speakers in Ukraine and NATO expansion.[5] The Kremlin has often used this "root causes" narrative to call for the replacement of the current Ukrainian government with a Russian puppet government, Ukraine’s commitment to neutrality, and the revocation of NATO's Open Door Policy.[6] Putin's claim that the 2014 "coup" "eliminated" Ukrainian leaders is also a reference to the Kremlin's repeated narrative that the current Ukrainian government is illegitimate and should not be in power.[7] Putin is reiterating these Kremlin narratives in his own voice, indicating that Putin maintains his original war goals.

The Kremlin likely timed the publication of a video address by former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych to coincide with Putin's SCO speech in order to lend legitimacy to Putin's demand for regime change in Ukraine. Russian state media published a video message on September 1 of Yanukovych claiming that he worked to bring Ukraine closer to the EU during his presidency and that his ultimate goal was Ukraine's EU accession.[8] Yanukovych blamed Ukraine's EU partners for behaving "incorrectly" during Ukrainian-EU negotiations and criticized the EU for not understanding the difficulties of Ukraine's economic situation. Yanukovych also claimed that he has always opposed Ukraine's membership in NATO, which he alleged would have been a "catastrophe" and "a direct road to civil war." Yanukovych's last public media appearance was in July 2022, when he called on Ukrainians to surrender to Russia.[9] The timing of the filming of Yanukovych's video address is unknown, but he opened by stating that Putin "is absolutely correct" – seemingly in response to Putin's remarks about Ukraine at the SCO summit, indicating this was likely a choreographed information effort. The publication of Yanukovych's video on Russian state media was likely intentionally timed to coincide with Putin's remarks. The Kremlin may be setting conditions to claim that Yanukovych is the legitimate leader of Ukraine – not Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Such claims are false, however, as Yanukovych fled Ukraine on his own accord after the Revolution of Dignity, and Ukraine has held several democratic elections since.

Putin's demands for regime change in his SCO speech are not new, but rather the reiteration of his pre-war demands that he has been pursuing throughout the war. Putin referenced the alleged "coup" in both his 2021 "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians" essay and his speech launching the full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022.[10] Yanukovych was also notably in Belarus in March 2022, possibly as part of Kremlin efforts to reestablish him as the president of Ukraine.[11] Putin's reiteration of this same demand demonstrates how Putin's unwillingness to pull back from his original war aims is the key contributor to the lack of progress toward peace since the US-Russian summit in Alaska in August 2025.

The Russian military command reportedly redeployed relatively "elite" naval infantry and airborne (VDV) forces to Donetsk Oblast from northern Sumy Oblast and the Kherson direction. A Ukrainian drone unit operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that the Russian military command redeployed several units from Kursk Oblast, including elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), to reinforce Russian offensive operations toward Dobropillya.[12] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Group of Forces claimed on August 18 that the Russian command redeployed elements of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment and the 155th and 40th naval infantry brigades from northern Sumy Oblast to another unspecified direction.[13] An OSINT analyst on X (formerly Twitter) reported on August 30 that the Russian command redeployed elements of the 40th and 155th naval infantry brigades (both of the Pacific Fleet) and likely elements of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) to Donetsk Oblast.[14] The OSINT analyst also stated that there are reports that elements of the 11th Separate VDV Brigade and 76th VDV Division were "spotted nearby" in Donetsk Oblast after the Russian military command "urgently" deployed these elements to ”the hottest direction.” The OSINT source noted that the exact axis of attack of the redeployed VDV elements is still unclear. The Russian command also reportedly redeployed elements of the 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) from Kherson Oblast to Bakhmut, possibly to reinforce Russian offensive efforts in Kostyantynivka or Siversk.[15] ISW previously observed reports that elements of the 40th and 155th naval infantry brigades, 11th Separate VDV Brigade, and 76th VDV Division were operating in northern Sumy Oblast as of late August 2025.[16] ISW previously observed reports that elements of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment were operating in northern Sumy Oblast as of August 11.[17] ISW previously observed reports in November 2024 that the 11th VDV Brigade formed a special battalion staffed by North Korean troops for combat operations in Kursk Oblast, and ISW assessed at the time that North Korean troops training in Russia were likely training with elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade and 11th VDV Brigades.[18]

The reported redeployments suggest that the Russian Fall 2025 offensive will focus on efforts to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast, particularly in the Dobropillya, Pokrovsk, and Kostyantynivka areas. The Russian command’s redeployment of forces from northern Sumy Oblast to Donetsk Oblast suggests that Russia is deprioritizing its offensive operations in Sumy Oblast. Russian forces have intensified efforts to envelop Pokrovsk, advance toward Dobropillya, and bypass Ukraine’s Donetsk Oblast fortress belt from the west.[19] These efforts have resulted in significant manpower losses, likely requiring the Russian military command to redeploy forces to the area.[20] Russia’s Fall 2024 offensive also focused on offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction - demonstrating Russia's slow progress in achieving its objectives on the battlefield at tremendous human and material costs.[21]

Likely Russian GPS jamming affected a plane carrying European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on September 1. The Associated Press (AP) reported on September 1 that European Commission spokesperson Adrianna Podestà confirmed that a plane carrying von der Leyen suffered problems from GPS jamming while flying to Bulgaria and noted that Bulgarian authorities suspect “blatant” Russian interference.[22] Podestà stated that von der Leyen’s plane landed safely at Plovdiv Airport in central Bulgaria after flying from Warsaw, Poland. The Financial Times (FT) reported on September 1 that the pilot flying von der Leyen’s plane landed the plane using paper maps, and a knowledgeable official source confirmed that GPS in the airport’s vicinity “went dark.”[23] Bulgarian Air Traffic Services Authority stated that there has been a notable increase in GPS jamming since February 2022 and that there have been issues with spoofing more recently. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed in response to a question from FT that their "information is incorrect.”[24] ISW previously observed reports that Russian electronic warfare (EW) interference significantly impacted flights in the Baltics, Poland, and Finland, particularly in early 2024.[25] Russia notably likely jammed the satellite signal of a Royal Air Force (RAF) jet transporting then-UK Defense Secretary Grant Shapps, his staff, and select journalists back to the UK from Poland in March 2024.[26] The latest reports of likely Russian GPS jamming indicate that Russia is continuing its hybrid operations in Europe, and Russia could continue to target Western political and military officials as part of these operations. Von der Leyen has notably been leading discussions with European and US officials about possible European troop deployments as part of security guarantees for Ukraine after the war.[27]

Ukraine reportedly conducted its first strike with its domestically produced FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile on August 30 against occupied Crimea. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on August 31 that Ukrainian forces conducted a Neptune missile strike against a Russian border post near occupied Voloshyne, Crimea, on August 30.[28] Sources in Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) told Ukrainian outlet Militarnyi on August 31 that Ukrainian forces used a Flamingo cruise missile – not a Neptune missile –  to strike the Russian border post.[29] ISW previously reported on August 31 that Ukrainian forces conducted this strike with a Neptune missile based on available evidence at the time.[30] Astra amplified Militarnyi’s reporting on September 1.[31] The Associated Press (AP) reported on August 21 that Ukraine launched mass production of its new Flamingo cruise missiles, which have a range of up to three thousand kilometers and can carry warheads up to 1,150 kilograms.[32]

Ukrainian authorities reportedly collected new evidence of Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov endorsing war crimes against Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs). The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) reported on September 1 that Kadyrov stated in a speech that he ordered Chechen military commanders to shoot Ukrainian soldiers on the battlefield instead of taking them prisoner.[33] The SBU added that Kadyrov also ordered Chechen soldiers to place Ukrainian POWs on the roofs of military facilities in Grozny, Republic of Chechnya, to act as human shields against Ukrainian drone strikes. Kadyrov’s statements endorsing war crimes are in line with March 2025 claims by Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander Apty Alaudinov that Russian forces used the same color of identification tape as Ukrainian forces during a covert attack behind Ukrainian positions in Kursk Oblast, which may constitute acts of perfidy, a war crime under the Geneva Convention.[34] There has been a sharp increase in credible reports and footage of Russian forces executing Ukrainian POWs throughout 2024 and 2025, and ISW continues to assess that Russian military commanders are either complicit in or directly enabling their subordinates to conduct systemic executions in direct violation of international law.[35]

Key Takeaways:

• Kremlin officials continue to deny White House statements about the prospect of a bilateral Ukrainian-Russian or trilateral US-Ukrainian-Russian meeting in the near future.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to demonstrate his unwillingness to compromise on his unwavering demands for Ukraine’s full capitulation.
• The Kremlin likely timed the publication of a video address by former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych to coincide with Putin's SCO speech in order to lend legitimacy to Putin's demand for regime change in Ukraine.
• Putin's demands for regime change in his SCO speech are not new, but rather the reiteration of his pre-war demands that he has been pursuing throughout the war.
• The Russian military command reportedly redeployed relatively "elite" naval infantry and airborne (VDV) forces to Donetsk Oblast from northern Sumy Oblast and the Kherson direction.
• The reported redeployments suggest that the Russian Fall 2025 offensive will focus on efforts to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast, particularly in the Dobropillya, Pokrovsk, and Kostyantynivka areas.
• Likely Russian GPS jamming affected a plane carrying European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on September 1.
• Ukraine reportedly conducted its first strike with its domestically produced FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile on August 30 against occupied Crimea.
• Ukrainian authorities reportedly collected new evidence of Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov endorsing war crimes against Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs).
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces advanced near Kupyansk and Novopavlivka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Previous Updates

• August 2025
• July 2025
• June 2025
• May 2025
• April 2025
• March 2025
• February 2025
• January 2025
• December 2024
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• October 2024
• September 2024
• August 2024
• July 2024
• June 2024
• May 2024
• April 2024
• March 2o24
• February 2024
• January 2024
• December 2023
• November 2023
• October 2023
• September 2023
• August 2023
• July 2023
• June 2023
• May 2023
• April 2023
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• February 2023
• January 2023
• December 2022
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• August 2022
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• February 2022