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September 26, 2023
Ukraine Invasion Updates
This page collects the Critical Threats Project (CTP) and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) updates on the invasion of Ukraine. In late February 2022, CTP and ISW began publishing daily synthetic products covering key events related to renewed Russian aggression against Ukraine. These Ukraine Conflict Updates replaced the “Indicators and Thresholds for Russian Military Operations in Ukraine and/or Belarus,” which we maintained from November 12, 2021, through February 17, 2022.
This list also includes prominent warning alerts that CTP and ISW launched outside the crisis update structure. These products addressed critical inflection points as they occurred.
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- Maps on Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes
- Recent Updates
- February 2022 - July 2023 Updates
- Related Reads
Maps on Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes
This interactive map complements the static daily control-of-terrain maps that CTP and ISW produce with high-fidelity and, where possible, street level assessments of the war in Ukraine.
Click here to access the archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that produced daily by showing a dynamic frontline.
The Critical Threats Project and the Institute for the Study of War are publishing a summary of the methodology of our map for those who would like to learn more about the tradecraft for mapping conventional military operations from the open source.
Previous versions of these static maps are available in our past publications.
Recent Updates
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 28, 2025
Ukrainian forces conducted a series of strikes against Russian military infrastructure and defense industrial base (DIB) facilities from June 26 to 28. Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reported on June 28 that the SBU conducted a drone strike that destroyed a Russian Pantsir-S1 air defense system and three combat helicopters — Mi-8, Mi-26, and Mi-28 — at the Kirovske Air Base in occupied Crimea on the night of June 27 and 28.[i] The SBU noted that the strike also caused a secondary explosion at the airfield. A local Crimean source reported on June 28 that the strike caused five to six explosions and likely damaged an ammunition depot, warehouses, and air defense facilities, and set at least one combat helicopter on fire.[ii] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 27 that Ukrainian Special Forces and the SBU struck the Marinovka Air Base in Volgograd Oblast on the night of June 26 and 27 and damaged four Su-34 aircraft and a technical maintenance facility.[iii] The Ukrainian General Staff is conducting ongoing battle damage assessments (BDA). An unspecified intelligence source told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne on June 28 that Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) conducted several drone strikes targeting facilities linked to the 120th arsenal of the Russian General Staff's Main Directorate (GRU) in Bryansk Oblast and that Ukrainian authorities are conducting BDA.[iv] An unspecified intelligence source reported on June 26 that the GUR conducted a drone strike against a fuel and lubricants depot located at the GRU's 1061st MTZ Center in Bryansk Oblast on the night of June 26 and 27.[v] Residents reported heavy gunfire and a series of explosions and noted that the oil depot was on fire.[vi]
Russia’s deployment of an experimental Grom-1 missile-bomb and likely efforts to increase its Shahed production are part of ongoing efforts to adapt Russian strike packages against Ukraine to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and cause maximum damage. Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Military Administration Head Serhiy Lysak reported on June 28 that Ukrainian air defenses downed a Russian Grom-1 hybrid missile-bomb on the outskirts of Dnipro City.[vii] A local Ukrainian air defender in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne on June 28 that Russian forces may have deployed an experimental KAB guided glide bomb as part of ongoing efforts to increase the range of KAB bombs.[viii] The local source stated that Russia has long used jet engines on the bomb to increase its range and likely used a bomb with a lighter warhead against Dnipro City to decrease the weight and increase the range of the bomb. The source also stated that Russian forces may have launched the bomb from a plane as close to Dnipro City as possible. Ukrainian political scientist and design engineer at satellite and rocket design enterprise Pivdnenne Design Office Oleksandr Kochetkov told Suspilne on June 28 that Russia created the Grom-1 as part of an effort to increase the range and accuracy of KAB bombs in order to preserve Russian aircraft that launch the bombs.[ix] Kochetkov stated that Grom-1 is a hybrid of a glide bomb and the Kh-38 air-to-air missile and uses the Kh-38 missile’s engine, which gives the bomb a range of 100 to 150 kilometers. Kochetkov noted that Russian forces used the Grom-1 possibly for the first time in August 2024 during a strike against Kostyantynivka, Donetsk Oblast, and that Russia is not yet mass producing Grom-1 missile-bombs.
Ukrainian outlet New Voice assessed on June 27 that satellite imagery from early October 2024 and June 2025 shows that Russia is expanding its Shahed factory in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) near Yelabuga, Republic of Tatarstan.[x] The imagery shows that Russia has built four new sites at the Alabuga SEZ spanning about 163 hectares between October 2024 and June 2025, and that another 30-hectare site is currently under construction. New Voice reported that the new construction includes dormitories for factory workers and that Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) previously assessed in June 2025 that laborers are Russia's main need to increase its drone production. New Voice noted that the GUR reported on June 21 that Russia produces up to 170 Shahed and decoy drones daily and that production rates may increase to 190 drones per day by the end of 2025. Japanese outlet NHK reported on June 19, citing unspecified Western and Russian diplomatic sources, that North Korea is “considering” sending 25,000 workers to drone production facilities at the Alabuga SEZ, and dormitory construction may be related to this possible influx of workers in the future.[xi]
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian forces conducted a series of strikes against Russian military infrastructure and defense industrial base (DIB) facilities from June 26 to 28.
- Russia’s deployment of an experimental Grom-1 missile-bomb and likely efforts to increase its Shahed production are part of ongoing efforts to adapt Russian strike packages against Ukraine to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and cause maximum damage.
- Ukrainian forces advanced near Lyman. Russian forces advanced near Novopavlivka.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 27, 2025
The Kremlin continues to downplay the social and economic costs of Russia's war in Ukraine and inflated military spending. Russian President Vladimir Putin told journalists on June 27, following the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) summit in Minsk, that sanctions cannot hurt Russia’s economy and that Russia's economic indicators are “satisfactory.”[1] Putin acknowledged that Russia’s economy is still contending with high inflation and that Russia’s economic growth in 2025 will be “much more modest to combat inflation.” Putin also claimed that Russia’s military budget is currently 6.3 percent of its GDP, or 13.5 trillion rubles (roughly $172 billion), and that Russia plans to steadily decrease defense spending beginning in 2026. Russia notably increased its defense budget by 25 percent between the 2024 and 2025 federal budgets and has been increasing its investments in Russia's defense industry throughout 2025.[2]
Putin’s statements likely seek to portray the Russian government as committed to social and civilian expenditures and to downplay recent indicators of the societal and economic toll of Russia’s war against Ukraine and corresponding prioritization of military-industrial sector investment. Russian officials previously claimed that the 2025-2027 federal budgets would prioritize civilian and social sector investments, despite the September 2024 draft budgets indicating Russia will spend roughly 41 percent of its annual expenditures in 2025 on national security and defense.[3] The Russian Finance Ministry more than tripled its budget deficit target for 2025 in May – from 0.5 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to 1.7 percent of GDP – after several months of staggeringly low oil and gas profits.[4] Russian Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina notably stated at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) on June 19 that Russia has exhausted many of its “free resources“ since the start of Russia‘s full-scale war against Ukraine, including Russia’s workforce, production and import substitution capacities, and reserves of the National Welfare Fund and Russia’s banking sector.[5] Russia’s military force generation strategy currently hinges on large recruitment and pension payouts, and it remains unclear how the Kremlin intends to fund these payments in the medium- to long-term, as Russia reportedly depleted the entire 2025 federal recruitment budget fund between January and March 2025.[6] Russia is also making significant financial investments in its domestic drone production capacity and committed 243 billion rubles (about $3 billion) to Russian drone companies between 2023 and 2024.[7] Any sharp decrease in Russia's defense spending will likely depress the Russian economy in the medium term, as Russia’s defense industrial base now accounts for a significant portion of overall Russian domestic production.
Putin also reiterated Kremlin narratives aimed at discrediting Ukraine and blaming the West and NATO for his decision to invade Ukraine. Putin claimed that Russia has agreed to conduct a third round of negotiations, is ready to meet with Ukraine in Istanbul, and has demonstrated its willingness to negotiate through prisoner of war (POW) and killed-in-action (KIA) exchanges.[8] Putin claimed that Ukraine is refusing to accept the bodies of some deceased servicemembers, an unsubstantiated claim that is part of an ongoing Russian information campaign depicting Ukraine as spoiling POW exchanges and KIA repatriations in order to provoke discontent and demoralize Ukrainian society and to discredit the Ukrainian government.[9] Putin reiterated Russia's long-term claim that NATO promised Russia it would never expand east and claimed that Russia was "crudely deceived."[10] Putin claimed that Western countries in opposition to Russia will "soon die" themselves. Putin also reiterated that Russia will only conclude its war against Ukraine on Russia’s terms and claimed that Russian defense spending is designed to achieve this goal. ISW has previously noted that Russia’s terms – the "denazification" and "demilitarization" of Ukraine, which Russia has demanded since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022 – amount to demands for regime change, the installation of a pro-Russian proxy government in Ukraine, and significant limitations on Ukraine's ability to defend itself against future Russian aggression.[11]
Open-source data suggests that Russia is increasingly investing in its defense industry and expanding its drone, infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), and aircraft production and shipbuilding capabilities – several of the key platforms that Russia would likely rely on in a future war with NATO. Data from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)-affiliated Center of Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-Term Forecasting published on June 26 indicates that Russia increased its industrial production by 2.6 percent between April and May 2025 and that the majority of this increase is due to a "sharp" increase in Russia's defense industrial output.[12] The center reported that Russia's monthly aircraft production rate increased by 16.9 percent in May 2025 compared to April 2025 and is 1.6 times greater than Russia's 2024 monthly production rates. The center reported that Russia increased its naval and aircraft production capacity by 16 percent between February and May 2025. The center's data suggests that Russia is attempting to expand its shipbuilding and aircraft production capacity, which are medium- to long-term efforts and likely part of Russia's ongoing force restructuring and regeneration efforts in preparation for a longer-term conflict with NATO.
Satellite imagery of select armored vehicle repair plants in Russia provides further evidence that Russia is increasing its ability to produce IFVs. A social media source tracking equipment at Russian military depots and repair facilities via satellite imagery reported on June 26 that Russia is now able to refurbish and produce more BMPs than before an unspecified time and that Russia's decreased use of armored vehicles and tanks since Winter 2024-2025 is allowing Russia to stockpile IFVs.[13] The source noted that the Kurganmashzavod remains the sole publicly known Russian facility capable of producing Soviet-era BMP-3 IFVs. The source stated that satellite imagery indicates that some Russian armor repair plants appear to have used most of their Soviet IFV stocks, although at least one production plant in Rubtsovsk, Altai Krai, appears to have dramatically improved its modernization capabilities. It remains unclear whether Russia is aiming to stockpile materiel in preparation for a larger offensive operation against Ukraine in the near to medium term or to reconstitute the Russian military in preparation for broader future conflict with NATO. Additional open-source intelligence indicates that Russia is successfully increasing its T-90M tank production capabilities, further underscoring Russia's ongoing investment in long-term tank and armored vehicle production capacity.[14]
Russia's ongoing efforts to expand drone production are having a more immediate impact on the frontline in Ukraine, although Russia will continue to benefit from enhanced drone production capabilities during any future conflict. Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov visited various Russian military industrial facilities in Novgorod Oblast on June 27, including a fiber-optic drone production site that produced Russia's first model of fiber-optic "Prince Vandal Novgorodsky" drones[15] The Russian government's press release of the visit reported that Russia is now capable of domestically producing hundreds of thousands of fiber-optic drones per month and fully satisfying the needs of the Russian Armed Forces. Manturov also visited a series of other defense companies in Novgorod Oblast, including companies that specialize in electronic components, and inspected the Intelligent Electronics-Valdai Innovative Scientific and Technological Center's new semiconductor materials science laboratory.[16] Manturov instructed the Ministry of Industry and Trade to examine the possibility of recapitalizing Novgorod Oblast's industrial development fund to support the production of high-tech products. ISW previously noted that Russian fiber optic production has allowed Russian forces to impose new battlefield dilemmas on Ukrainian forces starting in mid-2024 because these drones were resistant to electronic warfare (EW) interference, enable precision strikes on armored equipment, and are scalable due to their simplicity.[17]
Russian forces continue to implement tactical innovations that correspond with technological weapons system advancements. A Russian milblogger claimed on June 27 that Russian forces are increasingly utilizing Geran 2 and 3 drones – Russian analogues of the Iranian origin Shahed-136 – over guided glide bombs for short- to mid-range frontline strikes.[18] The milblogger noted that Russian forces began reprioritizing the use of Geran drones last winter when Russia began mass producing modernized Geran 2 drones with improved speed, range, and carrying capacities, and claimed that Russian forces are using these drones to target Ukrainian storage areas, command posts, and strongholds on the frontline and in the near rear. The milblogger noted that elements of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army [CAA] (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) have pioneered mass frontline use of Geran drones and that Russia's Central Grouping of Forces, operating largely in the Pokrovsk and Novopavlivka directions, will reportedly soon adopt the use of Geran 2 drones once Russian manufacturers further increase production rates. The milblogger assessed that Russian forces may be able to replace 500- and 1000-kilogram KAB glide bombs with Geran 3 drones if Russian developers are willing to compromise on the drone's range to account for an increased payload. The Russian milblogger’s analysis largely coheres with ISW's observations that Russian forces are increasingly using Shahed-like drones to strike Ukrainian targets along the frontline.[19] Russia's defense industrial base has thus far successfully increased Geran drone production rates and improved the Geran drone's precision and operability, which have enabled Russian forces to more readily deploy such drones along the frontline.[20]
Russia continues to use chemical weapons against Ukrainian forces and civilians in direct violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), of which Russia is a signatory. The Ukrainian Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security reported on June 27 that Ukrainian forces recorded 888 cases of Russian forces using chemical weapons in May 2025, including in grenades.[21] The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) published a report on June 26 confirming that environmental sample testing indicates that Russian forces used a first-person view (FPV) drone equipped with grenades containing chlorobenzalmalonodinitrile (CS) gas, a riot control agent (RCA) banned in modern warfare under the CWC, against Ukrainian forces near the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative boundary in June 2025.[22]
Key Takeaways:
- The Kremlin continues to downplay the social and economic costs of Russia's war in Ukraine and inflated military spending.
- Putin’s statements likely seek to portray the Russian government as committed to social and civilian expenditures and to downplay recent indicators of the societal and economic toll of Russia’s war against Ukraine and corresponding prioritization of military-industrial sector investment.
- Putin also reiterated Kremlin narratives aimed at discrediting Ukraine and blaming the West and NATO for his decision to invade Ukraine.
- Open-source data suggests that Russia is increasingly investing in its defense industry and expanding its drone, infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), and aircraft production and shipbuilding capabilities – several of the key platforms that Russia would likely rely on in a future war with NATO.
- Russia's ongoing efforts to expand drone production are having a more immediate impact on the frontline in Ukraine, although Russia will continue to benefit from enhanced drone production capabilities during any future conflict.
- Russian forces continue to implement tactical innovations that correspond with technological weapons system advancements.
- Russia continues to use chemical weapons against Ukrainian forces and civilians in direct violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), of which Russia is a signatory.
- Ukrainian forces advanced near Lyman. Russian forces advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast and near Kupyansk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 26, 2025
South Korean intelligence suggests that North Korea may deploy North Korean troops to Ukrainian territory, which would represent a significant battlefield inflection. Reuters, citing a South Korean lawmaker privy to intelligence from South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS), reported on June 26 that North Korea may deploy an unspecified number of additional North Korean forces to Russia to fight against Ukraine as early as July or August 2025 and that North Korea continues to arm Russia with artillery ammunition and missiles.[1] The South Korean lawmaker told Reuters that the NIS assessed that Russia may be preparing to initiate a large-scale assault against Ukraine in July or August 2025 and that North Korea is likely receiving technical advice from Russia on satellite launches and missile guidance systems in return. ISW has observed evidence of North Korean forces augmenting Russian forces in Kursk Oblast and North Korea supplying Russia with artillery ammunition and ballistic missiles.[2] Ukrainian forces maintain a limited presence in Kursk Oblast, so North Korean personnel participating in combat operations would most likely be fighting in Ukrainian territory.[3] The North Korean and Russian military commands authorizing the deployment of North Korean forces to Ukrainian territory would mark a significant battlefield inflection that may improve Russian forces' ability to sustain simultaneous offensive operations in multiple directions, which the Russian military has traditionally struggled to conduct.[4] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces compensated by conducting pulsing, more contained, offensive operations along different sectors of the frontline, but recent reporting indicates that Russian forces appear to be gradually advancing in at least three simultaneous large-scale offensive operations in the Borova-Lyman, Kostyantynivka, and Novopavlivka directions.[5] It is not possible to forecast the likely impact of North Korean support of this type without more information about the size and composition of the North Korean troop contingent that would be going to Ukraine, nor is it clear how rapidly new North Korean troops would become effective in operations alongside Russian troops in Ukraine.
US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met at the NATO summit on June 25 and discussed possible US sales of Patriot air defense systems to Ukraine and joint weapons production. Trump stated that he and Zelensky did not talk about a possible ceasefire in Ukraine during the meeting, but that Trump may talk to Russian President Vladimir Putin in the near future about a ceasefire.[6] Zelensky stated that he reiterated during the meeting that Ukraine supports the US position on a ceasefire.[7] Zelensky stated that he and Trump discussed the increase in the number of "massive" Russian strikes against Ukraine's civilian infrastructure and people, and Trump stated that the United States "should consider" selling Patriot air defense systems and missiles to Ukraine as Ukraine's supply is limited.[8] Trump and Zelensky agreed to continue talks about strengthening Ukraine's air defense with European partners. Trump and Zelensky also discussed possible joint production of drones and electronic warfare (EW) equipment.[9] Zelensky stated in April 2025 that Ukraine proposed to the United States that Ukraine purchase "30 to 50 billion" (likely USD) worth of air defense and weapons systems from the United States and that Ukraine is prepared to purchase these systems itself — either through direct payment to the United States or through the fund established by the US-Ukrainian minerals deal.[10] Zelensky had stated that Ukraine will consider the provision of at least 10 air defense systems to Ukraine as a "security guarantee." US Patriot air defense systems are vital to Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian ballistic missile strikes and will become increasingly important as Russia is reportedly increasing its production and stockpile of ballistic missiles, which would enable larger and more frequent ballistic missile strikes against Ukraine.[11] ISW continues to assess that a strong Ukrainian military backed by Western security guarantees remains the most vital component of a stable post-war European security architecture, guaranteeing a sustainable peace in Ukraine and deterring future Russian aggression.[12]
Kremlin officials continue to platform bellicose rhetoric aimed at undermining Western support for Ukraine and to demonstrate Russia's uncompromising position on Ukraine. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko claimed on June 25 at the Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) conference that the West is adopting "hostile policies and military planning...that could explode from any spark."[13] Glushko further claimed that new Western military aid packages "fuel" the war in Ukraine.[14] The Kremlin regularly promotes rhetoric that is designed to pressure the West into making decisions that benefit Russia, such as refraining from providing further assistance to Ukraine, in response to the fact that sustained Western aid has allowed Ukrainian forces to impose significant challenges on Russian forces in Ukraine and threatens Russia's ability to achieve its war aims.[15]
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin reiterated on June 26 Russia's long-standing demand that Ukraine commit to an official non-aligned status and claimed that NATO violated promises from the early 1990s to refrain from expanding eastward.[16] Russia has consistently demanded that Ukraine commit to a neutral, non-aligned status, which would require Ukraine to amend its constitution and NATO to fundamentally alter its open-door policy.[17] The Kremlin continues to signal its unyielding demands and disinterest in peace, further indicating that Russia will very likely continue to pursue efforts to prolong negotiations in an attempt to extract additional concessions and secure additional gains on the battlefield.[18] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin will continue to protract the negotiation process so long as Russian leadership maintains the position that Russian forces can outlast Ukraine's defense capabilities and Western support for Ukraine.[19]
Satellite imagery of select armored vehicle repair plants in Russia indicates that Russia continues to rely on refurbishing its Soviet-era stores of armored vehicles. A social media source tracking equipment at Russian military depots and repair facilities via satellite imagery shared on June 26 an updated analysis of Russian Armor Repair Plants (BTRZs) that repair damaged armored vehicles and refurbish stored vehicles and stated that most armored fighting vehicle (AFVs) that Russia is taking from storage are no longer in good enough condition to immediately deploy to the front without refurbishment, as Russia was able to do at the start of the war.[20] The source estimated that the 81st BTRZ in Armavir, Krasnodar Krai, which repairs and modernizes stored BTR-70/80 armored personnel carriers (APCs) and likely also repairs damaged BTRs from the battlefield, has likely been refurbishing up to 200 BTR-70/80/82 APCs annually since 2023.[21] The source estimated that the 144th BTRZ in Yekaterinburg, Sverdlovsk Oblast, which is the only BTRZ that refurbishes older BMD infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and also repairs BMP-2 and BMD-2 IFVs, has likely been annually refurbishing between 100 to 150 BMD-2 IFVs and BTR-D APCs since an unspecified year.[22]
The source estimated that the Arzamas Mechanical Plant in Arzamas, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, likely annually produces over 500 BTR-82 APCs but noted that satellite imagery showing a growing pile of hulls at the plant suggests that the plant is either increasing production rates or also does repairs of damaged BTRs.[23] The source noted that Arzamas’ production numbers are unclear but are likely high due to the high number of BTR-80/82s that Russian forces are losing in Ukraine and how quickly Russian forces are replenishing these vehicles.[24] The source also estimated that armored vehicle manufacturer Kurganmashzavod in Kurgan, Kurgan Oblast, likely annually produces 100 to 120 BMD-4M IFVs, roughly 360 BMP-3 IFVs, and 20 to 30 BTR-MDM APCs.[25]
Russia has maintained its offensive operations throughout the war by tapping into its Soviet-era stocks of armored vehicles to compensate for high loss rates, but this resource is finite and approaching a point of diminishing availability.[26] Russian forces have been increasingly using motorcycles and buggies in place of armored vehicles along the frontline in Ukraine due to high Russian vehicle losses in late 2023 and 2024.[27] The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) estimated in February 2025 that Russian forces lost over 3,700 IFVs and APCs in 2024 alone.[28] It remains unclear whether Russia's reliance on motorcycles and buggies will be sufficient to offset these losses in the medium- to long-term.
Ukraine and Russia conducted the seventh prisoner of war (POW) exchange, in accordance with the June 2 Istanbul agreements. Ukrainian officials and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed that Ukraine and Russia exchanged an unspecified number of severely wounded and sick POWs as well as those under 25 years old on June 26.[29] Ukrainian officials reported that Russia captured a majority of the released Ukrainian POWs in 2022.
Key Takeaways:
- South Korean intelligence suggests that North Korea may deploy North Korean troops to Ukrainian territory, which would represent a significant battlefield inflection.
- US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met at the NATO summit on June 25 and discussed possible US sales of Patriot air defense systems to Ukraine and joint weapons production.
- Kremlin officials continue to platform bellicose rhetoric aimed at undermining Western support for Ukraine and to demonstrate Russia's uncompromising position on Ukraine.
- Satellite imagery of select armored vehicle repair plants in Russia indicates that Russia continues to rely on refurbishing its Soviet-era stores of armored vehicles.
- Ukraine and Russia conducted the seventh prisoner of war (POW) exchange, in accordance with the June 2 Istanbul agreements.
- Ukrainian forces advanced near Novopavlivka. Russian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Toretsk.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 25, 2025
US President Donald Trump stated that Russia may have territorial ambitions beyond Ukraine — consistent with ISW's long-held assessments that Russia is preparing for a future conflict with NATO and setting conditions to justify future aggression against non-NATO former Soviet Union states. A reporter asked Trump during a press conference at the NATO summit on June 25 whether it is possible that Russian President Vladimir Putin has territorial ambitions beyond Ukraine, and Trump responded that "it's possible."[i] ISW has long assessed that Russia is preparing its military and society for a possible future conflict with NATO following the conclusion of the war in Ukraine, including by pursuing military reforms; integrating veterans into all levels of Russian local, regional, and federal governments; and setting rhetorical conditions to justify future aggression against NATO.[ii] ISW has observed the Kremlin leverage the same rhetoric that it used against Ukraine before the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022 to threaten NATO states.[iii] The Kremlin has also specifically weaponized the concept of "compatriots abroad" — Russian-speaking populations living outside of Russia, whom Russia claims it needs to protect—to justify aggression against former Soviet states in the past.[iv] The Kremlin has also promoted its concept of "Russkiy Mir" ("Russian World") — an amorphous ideological and geographic conception that includes all of the former territories of Kyivan Rus, the Kingdom of Muscovy, the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and the contemporary Russian Federation and which Putin uses to frame any territories a Russian regime ruled or claimed to have ruled as Russia's "historical territories."[v] The Kremlin has been setting informational conditions to justify potential aggression against Moldova and the Baltic states using the alleged need to protect its "compatriots abroad" and the claim that these countries are part of the "Russkiy Mir" — the same narratives that the Kremlin used to justify the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.[vi] Trump's statements therefore, cohere with ISW's fundamental assessment that Russia maintains territorial ambitions beyond Ukraine and will continue pursuing these ambitions unless Putin is forced to reconsider his theory of victory.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio correctly stated that Russia has not shown a willingness to move forward in peace negotiations. Rubio stated in an interview with Politico published on June 25 that Russia is trying to "achieve on the battlefield what [Russia is] demanding at the negotiating table" including "control over certain territories," but noted that this objective will be more difficult to achieve than Russia currently believes.[vii] Rubio stated that Russia has suffered over 80,000 killed-in-action (KIA) since January 2025 but that Putin nevertheless continues "feeding into the war machine" and that Russia has "not shown a willingness to move forward" in peace negotiations. Rubio's statements are consistent with ISW's assessments that Russia has been attempting to delay the negotiation process and protract the war in order to secure additional territorial gains.[viii] Russia's maximalist negotiating demands for Ukrainian territory, including significant amounts of territory that Russia does not currently occupy, represent an informational tactic intended to force territorial concessions to compensate for gains that Russia cannot achieve on the battlefield. ISW continues to assess that Russia is unwilling to engage in substantive negotiations to end the war in Ukraine in any way that falls short of acquiescing to Russia's maximalist demands, which have remained consistent since before the start of the full-scale invasion.[ix]
The Kremlin continues to leverage Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev's aggressive rhetoric to undermine Western support for Ukraine. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on June 25 on his social media accounts, including his English-language channels, that the EU is becoming a politicized, "Russophobic organization...that dreams of revenge against Russia."[x] Medvedev further accused the EU of becoming a militarized bloc that presents just as prominent a threat to Russia as NATO does, claiming that "Brussels today is Russia's true enemy" for arming Ukraine. Medvedev claimed that Ukrainian accession into the EU would endanger Russia and implied that Russia could destroy all of Ukraine to prevent this outcome. The Kremlin typically leverages Medvedev to amplify inflammatory rhetoric designed to stoke panic and fear among Western decision-makers and discourage Western provisions of aid to Ukraine.[xi] Kremlin officials and affiliates have repeatedly promoted narratives that the EU is essentially a military organization like NATO.[xii] The Kremlin most recently activated Medvedev to project nuclear proliferation threats following US strikes on Iran's nuclear program.[xiii] Medvedev's recent comments do not represent a serious rhetorical inflection, but rather a continuation of the Kremlin's informational campaign to undermine Western support for Ukraine.
Russian officials are promoting purposely vague rhetoric about the "root causes" of Russia's war against Ukraine in order to allow the Kremlin the flexibility to adapt its demands as it sees fit. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on June 24 that the "root causes" of the war are the alleged discrimination against Russian-speakers in Ukraine and NATO violations of its obligations to not expand closer to Russia, including claimed NATO plans to build bases in Crimea and British plans to build a base on the Sea of Azov.[xiv] Lavrov previously claimed in an interview in December 2024 that the two main "root causes" of the war are NATO's alleged violation of obligations to not advance eastward and "aggressive absorption" of areas near Russia's borders and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine.[xv] Kremlin officials have repeatedly demanded in recent months that any settlement to the war must "eliminate the root causes," but Lavrov's June 24 claim that these root causes include alleged NATO and UK plans to build bases in Crimea and along the Sea of Azov is unusually specific and likely aimed at further deterring Western support for Ukraine and portraying NATO as a threat to Russia.[xvi] The ambiguity of what Russian officials constitute as "root causes" of the war allows the Kremlin the flexibility to add specificity when it chooses and to adapt its demands of Ukraine in any potential peace settlement in the future.
Russia is reportedly accelerating its missile production capacity with sanctions evasion support from Belarus and the People's Republic of China (PRC). Ukrainian outlet Kyiv Independent reported on June 24 that Russia's state-owned Votkinsk Plant has hired 2,500 workers, built new facilities, and imported specialized manufacturing equipment as part of efforts to expand Russia's production of Iskander-M ballistic missiles, Iskander-K cruise missiles, Yars and Bulava intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and likely Oreshnik ballistic missiles since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.[xvii] The Kyiv Independent stated that an analysis of the plant's internal business operations shows that the plant sourced manufacturing equipment from companies in the PRC, Taiwan, and Belarus via private Russian intermediaries. The Kyiv Independent stated that it is unclear how many ICBMs the Votkinsk Plant is currently producing, but noted that internal documents indicate that Russia is investing in its ICBM arsenal and that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) ordered the Votkinsk Plant in March 2022 to fulfill a production contract for $13 million worth of parts for the Bulava ICBM by 2024. A senior official from Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) told the Kyiv Independent that Russia is preparing for a long war and is stockpiling various types of missiles. The Kyiv Independent, citing the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), stated that Russia increased its production of Iskander-M ballistic missiles from 250 in 2023 to 700 in 2024 and noted that its GUR source agreed with RUSI's assessment. The Kyiv Independent reported that it received GUR intelligence in early June 2025, indicating that Russia had stockpiled roughly 600 Iskander-M ballistic missiles and 300 Iskander-K cruise missiles — a stockpile that would last about two years, should Russia maintain its current pace of strikes against Ukraine. ISW recently observed reports indicating that Russia is actively expanding and stockpiling its production of T-90M tanks, and Russia's expansion and acceleration of missile production capacity further supports ISW's assessment that Russia is working to expand its defense industrial base (DIB) likely in preparation for a protracted war in Ukraine and a potential expanded future conflict with NATO.[xviii]
The United States signaled receptiveness to provisioning Ukraine with additional Patriot air defense systems—a particularly salient issue given reports of Russia's increased ballistic missile production. US President Donald Trump responded to a question during the NATO summit on June 25 on whether the United States planned to provide Ukraine with additional Patriot air defense systems by stating that the United States would "see if they can make some available."[xix] US Patriot air defense systems are vital to Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian ballistic missile strikes and will become increasingly important as Russia increases its production and stockpile of ballistic missiles, which would enable larger and more frequent ballistic missile strikes against Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that Ukraine's limited Patriot air defense systems are forcing Ukraine to make difficult decisions about which areas of Ukraine to protect.[xx]
NATO and Western officials reaffirmed their commitment to collective defense and security, to increasing defense spending in the face of increased Russian aggression, and to providing support to Ukraine. The NATO heads of state and government participating in the NATO summit in The Hague published a joint declaration on June 25.[xxi] The declaration reaffirmed NATO's commitment to collective defense, as defined in Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, and committed to investing five percent of gross domestic product (GDP) annually in core defense requirements and defense- and security-related spending by 2035. The declaration also reaffirmed NATO's commitment to supporting Ukraine and that NATO members will include direct contributions to Ukraine's defense and defense industry in their spending calculations. The declaration highlighted that Ukraine's security contributes to NATO's security. NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte told reporters on June 25 that NATO faces a long-term threat from Russia, especially because North Korea, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and Iran are supporting Russia's war effort against Ukraine, and that NATO must increase its defense spending.[xxii] Rutte emphasized in his plenary speech at the NATO summit the importance of Article 5 and the commitment to invest five percent of GDP into defense, stating that NATO will need to expand its DIB on both sides of the Atlantic.[xxiii] US President Donald Trump told reporters at the NATO summit that the United States is committed to Article 5.[xxiv] A large group consisting of members of the European Parliament, members of national parliaments, politicians, diplomats, military personnel, and subject matter experts sent an open letter to the heads of NATO countries calling for support of Ukraine, including calling for increased aid and air defense.[xxv]
Ukraine's European partners continue to allocate military aid to Ukraine and deepen cooperation with the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB). The Norwegian government announced on June 24 that it will allocate 6.5 billion Norwegian kroner (about $642 million) to drone procurement for Ukrainian forces from Ukrainian and European manufacturers.[xxvi] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov and Danish Defense Minister Troels Lund Poulsen signed a letter of intent on June 24 to begin efforts to establish the joint production of Ukrainian weapons in Denmark.[xxvii] The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that the Danish government allocated 500 million Danish kroner (about $78 million) to accelerate Ukrainian weapon production. UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced that the UK will provide a new package of 350 Advanced Short Range Air-to-Air Missiles (ASRAAMs), financed for the first time using £70 million (about $96 million) of funding from the interest on seized Russian assets through the Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration (ERA) framework.[xxviii] Starmer announced that UK Armed Forces engineers had adapted the ASRAAM missiles to be compatible with Ukraine's UK-supplied RAVEN ground-based air defense systems. Starmer stated that the UK will imminently deliver five new RAVEN air defense systems, bringing the total that Ukraine has to 13 systems.
Ukrainian forces likely conducted a long-range strike against a Russian military industrial enterprise in Rostov Oblast on June 24. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, who often reports on successful Ukrainian drone strikes, reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Russian Atlant-Aero plant in Taganrog, Rostov Oblast.[xxix] Kovalenko reported that the Atlant-Aero plant specializes in producing critical Russian combat drone components and control systems, including “Orion” drones, electronic warfare (EW) systems, and digital integration for first-person view (FPV) drones and loitering munitions. Russian sources posted footage of explosions in Taganrog and claimed that Russian air defenses repelled a drone strike near Taganrog and other areas of Rostov Oblast overnight.[xxx]
Key Takeaways:
- US President Donald Trump stated that Russia may have territorial ambitions beyond Ukraine – consistent with ISW's long-held assessments that Russia is preparing for a future conflict with NATO and setting conditions to justify future aggression against non-NATO former Soviet Union states.
- US Secretary of State Marco Rubio correctly stated that Russia has not shown a willingness to move forward in peace negotiations.
- The Kremlin continues to leverage Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev's aggressive rhetoric to undermine Western support for Ukraine.
- Russian officials are promoting purposely vague rhetoric about the "root causes" of Russia's war against Ukraine in order to allow the Kremlin the flexibility to adapt its demands as it sees fit.
- Russia is reportedly accelerating its missile production capacity with sanctions evasion support from Belarus and the People's Republic of China (PRC).
- NATO and Western officials reaffirmed their commitment to collective defense and security, to increasing defense spending in the face of increased Russian aggression, and to providing support to Ukraine.
- Ukraine's European partners continue to allocate military aid to Ukraine and deepen cooperation with the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB).
- Ukrainian forces likely conducted a long-range strike against a Russian military industrial enterprise in Rostov Oblast on June 24.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova and Velyka Novosilka, and Russian forces recently advanced in Vovchansk and near Pokrovsk and Novopavlivka.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 24, 2025
NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte assessed that Russia is the largest existential threat to NATO members today and that Russia is preparing for a protracted war with NATO. Rutte stated on June 24 at the NATO summit at The Hague that Russia remains the most significant and direct threat to NATO, especially considering the support North Korea, the People's Republic of China (PRC), Iran, and Belarus provide Russia.[1] Rutte stated that Russia could attack NATO within three to seven years and is currently more prepared for a war than NATO. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in an interview with Sky News on June 24 that Russia would not be ready to attack NATO in the immediate future but could be ready for a war with NATO by 2030.[2] Zelensky stated that the war in Ukraine is currently constraining Russia's ability to train and reconstitute its forces and that any decrease in aid to Ukraine would benefit Russia. ISW continues to assess that Russia is preparing its military and society for a potential future war with NATO in the medium- to long-term.[3] Any future ceasefire or long-term pause in combat in Ukraine would free up Russian forces for redeployment to Russia's eastern border with NATO and allow Russia to rearm and reconstitute, whereby Russia may be able to pose a significant threat to NATO earlier than 2030.
The Kremlin continues efforts to augment Russian combat power by setting conditions to subsume forces from Russia's Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) allies under a Russian military command. The Russian State Duma ratified on June 24 a protocol that allows CSTO states to send their troops to other CSTO states' territory in the event of armed conflict, threats, crisis situations, and exercises; to respond to the consequences of emergencies; and to provide humanitarian aid.[4] The protocol now allows for the CSTO to transport troops one day after a decision from the CSTO Council — as opposed to after 30 days as the protocol stated previously. The protocol also introduces the concept of a "command of formations" that will command CSTO military forces sent to one CSTO state. This “command of formations” will likely be a Russian-dominated command. The CSTO Collective Security Council approved the protocol in November 2024.[5] ISW has long assessed that the Kremlin has been trying to subordinate the militaries of former Soviet states to the Russian Armed Forces to recreate a multinational combined army in the former Soviet space.[6] Western assessments of Russia's future combat power must take into account the forces of Russia's CSTO allies that Russia may use in future operations — not only those of Russia.
Russian forces are expanding their use of motorcycles along the frontline in Ukraine — a tactic that the Russian military may leverage in future wars beyond Ukraine, possibly including operations against NATO states. A servicemember in a Ukrainian brigade reported on June 24 that the threat of Russian motorcycle assaults is increasing along the frontline as Russian forces increasingly integrate motorcycles into assault tactics.[7] The servicemember stated that Russian motorcycle forces are no longer attacking along roads but mainly attacking through open fields and trying to bypass Ukrainian engineering barriers along the frontline. Ukraine-based open-source intelligence organization Frontelligence Insight provided additional information on June 23 about the tactical doctrine the Russian military is establishing for motorcycle usage.[8] Frontelligence Insight reported that Russian forces are mainly using motorcycles as a form of transport for attacking infantry to support diversion, reconnaissance, infiltration, and flanking support missions. Frontelligence Insight reported that Russian motorcyclists operate in squads of six to eight motorcycles with one or two riders on each motorcycle (between six and 16 personnel in total). Each squad reportedly has two to four portable electronic warfare (EW) systems and one device scanning for Ukrainian drones. Frontelligence Insight reported Russian forces are also leveraging motorcycles for casualty evacuation and logistics support. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported in May 2025 that Russian forces were mainly using motorcycles in tandem with armored vehicles.[9] Russian forces appear to be increasingly relying on motorcycles as a method of transport and advancement independent from tanks and armored vehicles in recent weeks, however.[10]
Frontelligence Insight reported that Russian forces have been training troops on motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) at ad hoc motocross tracks in Russia and occupied Ukraine as of Spring 2025.[11] Frontelligence Insight reported that Russian forces are also conducting more advanced training programs, including for drone evasion, and that the length of these courses varies between 16 hours to over a month. Frontelligence Insight reported that Russian forces are mainly using foreign-made motorcycles, primarily those manufactured in the People's Republic of China (PRC), and that volunteer organizations in Russia provide most of the motorcycles for frontline Russian units. Frontelligence Insight reported, citing internal documents from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), that Russia intends to equip over half of its infantry forces with motorcycles, ATVs, and buggies in the future. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will likely increasingly depend on motorcycles and other quicker unarmored vehicles, as slower-moving vehicles have become a hazard on the more transparent battlefield of Ukraine.[12] Russian efforts to integrate tactical innovations, such as motorcycle usage, among frontline units indicates that the Russian military is learning modern ground warfare lessons that it intends to leverage beyond the war in Ukraine.[13]
NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte highlighted NATO's plans to invest more in its own defense capabilities, including by investing in the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) — in line with US President Donald Trump's initiative for Europe to shoulder more of the burden of collective security. Rutte called on NATO states to invest in Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB), which Rutte assessed has an untapped potential of about $35 billion, in order to prevent NATO states from reducing their own stockpiles and to allow NATO states and allies to buy weapons from Ukraine in the future.[14] Rutte stated that NATO states will agree to introduce a baseline of allocating five percent of GDP toward defense spending during the NATO summit.[15] Rutte stated that NATO's new defense investment plan will include a five-fold increase in investments in NATO air defense capabilities and investments to produce "thousands" more tanks and armored vehicles and millions of artillery ammunition rounds.
Ukraine's European partners allocated military aid to Ukraine and financial support for drone production during the NATO summit on June 24. Dutch Defense Minister Ruben Brekelmans announced on June 24 that the Netherlands approved a new military aid package for Ukraine worth 175 million euros (about $203.4 million), which provides 100 drone detection radars and 20 Ermine partly unmanned vehicles for casualty evacuation and includes 80 million euros (about $93 million) toward the international drone coalition.[16] Brekelmans stated that the Netherlands also recently signed a contract worth 500 million euros (about $5.8 million) with Ukrainian drone manufacturers to fund the production of 600,000 drones.[17] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced on June 24 that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and United Kingdom (UK) Prime Minister Keir Starmer agreed to launch a new joint drone production initiative.[18] Umerov stated that the UK will produce Ukrainian-designed drones in the UK for three years as part of a project to support integration between the British and Ukrainian defense industries. Umerov stated that the UK and Ukraine will share the produced drones after the war in Ukraine ends and that the project will enable British defense companies to rapidly design and produce state-of-the-art drones at scale. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister for Digital Development Kateryna Chernohorenko, NATO Digital Staff Deputy Director Marco Criscuolo, and NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA) Director General Ludwig Descamps announced on June 24 that NATO will provide 37 million euros (about $43 million) for Ukrainian satellite communications, including satellite radio stations, trackers, and services.[19]
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 23 to 24 that resulted in over 100 civilian casualties. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 97 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[20] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 63 drones and that 15 drones were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck Dnipro City and Samara, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, damaging educational and medical facilities.[21] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Military Administration Head Serhiy Lysak reported that Russian forces struck a passenger train in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, killing at least 17 people and injuring at least 279.[22] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces also struck civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv City and Velykyi Bobryk, Sumy Oblast.[23] Russia's ongoing strike campaign against Ukraine in recent months has increasingly impacted civilian areas and infrastructure and Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) — underscoring the urgency of providing additional air support to Ukraine and strengthening Ukraine's air defense umbrella.
Key Takeaways:
- NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte assessed that Russia is the largest existential threat to NATO members today and that Russia is preparing for a protracted war with NATO.
- The Kremlin continues efforts to augment Russian combat power by setting conditions to subsume forces from Russia's Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) allies under a Russian military command.
- Russian forces are expanding their use of motorcycles along the frontline in Ukraine — a tactic that the Russian military may leverage in future wars beyond Ukraine, possibly including operations against NATO states.
- NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte highlighted NATO's plans to invest more in its own defense capabilities, including by investing in the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) — in line with US President Donald Trump's initiative for Europe to shoulder more of the burden of collective security.
- Ukraine's European partners allocated military aid to Ukraine and financial support for drone production during the NATO summit on June 24.
- Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 23 to 24 that resulted in over 100 civilian casualties.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Kherson City, and Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 23, 2025
The Kremlin continues to only diplomatically support Iran, showcasing the limitations in the Russian-Iranian strategic relationship. Russian President Vladimir Putin, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov, and Chief of the Russian General Staff's Main Directorate (GRU) Igor Kostykov met with Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi in Moscow on June 23.[1] Putin claimed that Russia’s position on the Israel-Iran conflict is well-known and that the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has raised Russia’s concerns at the United Nations (UN) Security Council. Putin also claimed that recent Israeli and American strikes against Iran were unprovoked and unjustified and that Russia is making every effort to help the Iranian people. Araghchi thanked Russia for its strong condemnation of the strikes against Iran and claimed that Iran regularly consults with Russia on issues of global security, as Russia and Iran’s relations have become "strategic in nature." Unspecified Iranian sources told Reuters on June 23 that Iran has not been impressed with Russia's support so far and wants Putin to do more to back Iran against Israel and the United States.[2] Reuters reported that an Iranian source stated that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei sent Araghchi to Moscow to deliver a letter from Khamenei to Putin requesting more assistance from Russia. ISW continues to assess that Russia is constrained in its ability to provide direct support to Iran due to its war in Ukraine and has likely resigned itself to providing diplomatic overtures for the time being.[3]
Russian officials are attempting to influence conversations about increasing NATO defense spending by misrepresenting Russia's ongoing efforts to restructure and expand Russia's military capabilities as a defensive reaction to NATO. Russian President Vladimir Putin met with graduates of Russia's military academies on June 23 and acknowledged that NATO member states will likely announce a significant increase in defense spending and efforts to increase NATO military capabilities at the upcoming summit on June 24 and 25.[4] Putin claimed that this meeting would clarify that NATO is the party provoking "global militarization" - not Russia. Putin stated that Russia will continue to take steps to strengthen Russia's security and develop the Russian Armed Forces to guarantee Russia's sovereignty. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko told the Russian state news agency RIA Novosti on June 23 in an article ahead of the upcoming NATO summit that the European Union (EU) is accelerating its militarization and that Russia will take all necessary measures and countermeasures, "including preemptive ones," to ensure Russia's security.[5] Grushko reiterated that Russia considers the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO to be a "direct threat" to Russia's security and stated that Russia is seeking "ironclad" guarantees that Ukraine will not join NATO, which Grushko stated includes repealing the 2008 Bucharest Summit Declaration that welcomed Ukraine's and Georgia's intention to join NATO.[6] ISW has previously reported that Russian officials leverage escalatory rhetoric and threats during key moments of Western debates on military assistance for Ukraine in order to scare Western leaders into inaction, and Russian officials are likely again attempting to leverage threats to dissuade NATO member states from supporting increased defense spending.[7]
Putin announced during his speech to the graduates on June 23 that Russia will complete some of its ongoing force restructuring efforts in 2025.[8] Putin stated that Russia is urgently working to increase the Russian Armed Forces' combat capabilities and reiterated that Russia is standing up the Unmanned Systems Forces as a new branch of the Russian military. Putin stated that Russia will complete the formation of the Moscow and Leningrad military districts (MMD/LMD) and will reorganize Russia's naval infantry brigades into divisions in 2025. Putin stated that Russia is also undertaking a long-term technical modernization effort in the army and navy, modernizing its Strategic Missile Forces, beginning serial production of Oreshnik ballistic missiles, and producing new ships and submarines for the Russian Navy. Former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced Russia's intention to form the MMD and LMD and reorganize Russia's naval infantry brigades into divisions in the medium-term in December 2022.[9] Russian officials had not previously provided a firm date for the completion of these efforts. ISW continues to assess that Russia's military reforms, particularly in the MMD and LMD in western Russia along its border with NATO, demonstrate Russia's longer-term preparation for a possible future conflict with NATO.[10] These military reforms come after Kremlin officials have repeatedly threatened NATO states, including the Baltic states and Finland.[11]
Putin also acknowledged his ongoing efforts to empower Russia's internal security services in order to safeguard regime stability and internal security. Putin stated during his speech to the graduates that the Russian government understands that protecting Russia from internal and external threats requires coordination between Russia's law enforcement agencies, special services, and other security agencies.[12] ISW reported in 2023 and early 2024 that the Kremlin was working to expand Rosgvardia's capabilities by allowing Rosgvardia to operate military equipment and subordinating special Russian units and some irregular units under Rosgvardia, particularly after the Wagner Group's armed rebellion in June 2023.[13] The Kremlin has been similarly expanding the Federal Security Service (FSB) force generation capabilities.[14]
Russian forces conducted a large-scale combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of June 22 to 23 that largely targeted Kyiv City and killed at least seven people and injured 28. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 352 drones, including up to 160 Shaheds, from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[15] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 11 Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Taganrog, Rostov Oblast, and Bryansk Oblast and five Iskander-K cruise missiles from Kursk Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed all five Iskander-K missiles and seven Iskander-M/KN-23 missiles and that three Iskander-M missiles were "locally lost." The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 146 drones and that 193 drones were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck Mykolaiv, Odesa, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[16] The strikes heavily targeted Kyiv City, with Ukrainian officials reporting that Russian forces struck residential buildings in the city and damaged the campus of the Ihor Sikorsky Kyiv Polytechnic Institute.[17] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky highlighted that Russia is targeting Ukrainian cities and civilians, noting that Russian forces damaged five apartment buildings in Kyiv City and hit a hospital in Bila Tserkva, Kyiv Oblast.[18] Russia has been increasingly targeting Kyiv City in its overnight drone and missile strikes.[19]
Ukraine's Western partners continue to allocate military aid to Ukraine and collaborate with the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB). Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on June 22 that Norway plans to allocate $400 million to purchase Ukrainian weapons for the Ukrainian military.[20] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on June 22 that Norway will focus on investing in drones.[21] Zelensky noted that Norwegian defense company Kongsberg Defense and Aerospace opened an office in Ukraine, and Umerov stated that Ukraine will collaborate with Kongsberg to develop joint projects related to air defense.[22] New Zealand announced on June 23 a package worth 16 million NZD (about $9.54 million) for Ukraine that allocates four million NZD (about $2.38 million) toward the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) fund, four million NZD toward the UK- and Latvia-led drone coalition, seven million NZD (about $4.17 million) worth of humanitarian aid, and one million NZD (about $596,500) for displaced Ukrainians.[23]
Key Takeaways:
- The Kremlin continues to only diplomatically support Iran, showcasing the limitations in the Russian-Iranian strategic relationship.
- Russian officials are attempting to influence conversations about increasing NATO defense spending by misrepresenting Russia's ongoing efforts to restructure and expand Russia's military capabilities as a defensive reaction to NATO.
- Putin also acknowledged his ongoing efforts to empower Russia's internal security services in order to safeguard regime stability and internal security.
- Russian forces conducted a large-scale combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of June 22 to 23 that largely targeted Kyiv City and killed at least seven people and injured 28.
- Ukraine's Western partners continue to allocate military aid to Ukraine and collaborate with the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB).
- Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast. Russian forces advanced near Kupyansk, Borova, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka and in Sumy Oblast.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 22, 2025
Russia condemned the recent US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities on June 22 amid reports that Iran's foreign minister will meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on June 23. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) condemned the US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities on June 22, claiming that the US strikes are a violation of the UN Charter and that the UN Security Council is obliged to respond, while urging officials to return to diplomatic channels.[1] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that that the world will descend into chaos if countries are allowed to interpret the right to self-defense in the UN Charter as they wish.[2] Lavrov claimed that the US strikes marked a new, dangerous escalation during a phone call with Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó on June 22.[3] CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) and Presidential Special Representative for Investment and Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries Kirill Dmitriev claimed on June 22 that Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi is en route to Moscow and will meet with Putin on June 23.[4] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev responded to the US strike in social media posts, including on his English-language channels, on June 22 by claiming that US President Donald Trump has started a new war.[5] Medvedev also claimed that the United States failed to destroy Iran's nuclear capabilities, that Iran will continue to work towards the production of nuclear weapons, and that several unspecified countries are ready to "directly supply" Iran with nuclear warheads. The Kremlin typically leverages Medvedev to amplify narratives intended to stoke panic and fear among Western decisionmakers, particularly through nuclear saber rattling.[6] Medvedev's veiled threats thus do not represent a significant rhetorical inflection. ISW continues to assess that Russia is constrained in its ability to provide direct support to Iran due to its war in Ukraine and has likely resigned itself to providing diplomatic overtures for the time being, showcasing the immediate limitations in the Russian-Iranian strategic relationship.[7]
Iran's possible decision to close the Strait of Hormuz will cause a significant spike in global oil prices, which would greatly economically and financially benefit Russia by reversing months of declining Russian oil revenue and allowing Russia to continue to finance its war against Ukraine in the medium term. Brent crude oil futures prices closed at $77.27 on June 20, marking an 11.4 percent rise from June 12 just prior to the Israeli strikes against Iran.[8] Iran’s Parliament voted on June 22 to close the Strait, but the final decision remains with Iran’s Supreme National Security Council and leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.[9] Oil prices will likely surge exponentially in the event that Iran closes the Strait of Hormuz, with varying reports predicting a spike to prices between $90 to $130 in a worst-case scenario.[10] Russia’s oil and gas revenue amounted to 11.1 trillion rubles ($120.3 billion) in 2024 and accounted for roughly 30 percent of Russia's total federal revenues. Russian oil revenue has been steadily decreasing through 2025 however, with May 2025 revenues notably 34 percent lower than in 2024.[11] The Russian Finance Ministry more than tripled its budget deficit target for 2025 in May from 0.5 percent of Global Domestic Product (GDP) to 1.7 percent of GDP after several months of staggeringly low oil and gas profits.[12] The Moscow Times stated on June 9 that, according to economists from the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, Russia’s high expenditures and low oil revenues could exhaust the National Wealth Fund (NWF) by 2026.[13] The Kremlin relies on the NWF and oil and gas revenues to finance its war in Ukraine, as the Russian government allocated 41 percent (roughly $178 billion) of Russia’s total 2025 federal budget towards National Security and Defense alone.[14] ISW previously assessed that Russia’s high losses on the battlefield and ongoing economic constraints could prevent Russia from continuing the war in Ukraine in the medium to long term, however a sustained surge in oil prices could keep Russia afloat economically.[15]
Russian forces have continued to pursue long-standing operational objectives on the battlefield in Ukraine throughout Spring and Summer 2025 and will likely remain committed to these objectives for the coming months. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi told journalists on June 22 that the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and continued Ukrainian counterattacks in northern Sumy Oblast prevented the Russian military from redeploying 60,000 troops from Kursk Oblast to reinforce offensive operations in the Lyman, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson directions in Spring 2025.[16] Syrskyi noted that Ukraine prevented Russia from significantly intensifying offensive operations in these directions. A prominent Russian milblogger acknowledged on June 22 that Russia's "summer offensive" has mainly consisted of the same grinding offensive operations that Russian forces began in late 2023.[17] The milblogger claimed that the situation along the frontline is unlikely to significantly change during Summer 2025 and noted that Ukrainian forces are conducting an organized defense throughout the frontline.
Russian forces are currently engaged in intense combat operations along most of the frontline in Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk, and Zaporizhia oblasts and appear to be prioritizing offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast - as they have since October 2023.[18] Russian forces intensified the tempo of offensive operations in early 2025 as the United States began to engage in efforts to mediate a resolution to the war in Ukraine, and Russian forces have sustained this intensified tempo over the last five months.[19] Russian forces previously struggled to conduct simultaneous large-scale offensive operations and compensated by conducting pulsing, more limited, offensive operations along different sectors of the frontline with one sector decreasing in intensity as another sector increases.[20] Russian forces currently appear to be advancing as part of at least three simultaneous large-scale offensive operations in the Borova-Lyman, Kostyantynivka, and Novopavlivka directions, however. Russian forces also appear to be allocating significant manpower to offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast, although Ukrainian forces appear to be slowing Russian gains in that area.[21] Russian forces have failed to make significant gains during this period of intensified offensive operations, however, due in part to the fact that Russian forces are largely relying on poorly trained infantry to make gains in the face of Ukraine's drone-based defense. The continuation of Russia's intensified offensive operations likely represents the extent of Russia's current offensive capacity, and Russia is unlikely to mount a distinct summer offensive operation.
Russia's intensified force generation efforts appear to be generating a reserve force that Russia will be able to leverage in Ukraine or against NATO in the future, despite current limitations on Russia's offensive capacity in Ukraine. Syrskyi stated on June 22 that the Russian military has approximately 695,000 troops stationed in Ukraine (including Russia's operational reserves) and that Russia has 13 divisions and an unspecified number of regiments and brigades (totaling roughly 121,000 troops) in its strategic reserve.[22] ISW previously noted that recent Kremlin statements indicate that the Russian military may be generating enough forces to replace personnel losses and reinforce the size of the Russian force grouping in Ukraine despite taking significant casualties in Ukraine.[23] Syrskyi's statements suggest that Russia is also recruiting enough forces to establish reserves not currently committed to combat, although it remains unclear if these forces are truly committable throughout the theater or if Russia intends to use the forces in a specific priority sector. Russian forces are unlikely to commit this entire reserve to the frontline in Ukraine in the near future, however. Russian forces already appear to have manpower advantage in their priority frontline areas and are mainly struggling with overcoming the 15-20 kilometer-wide contested "gray zone" that Russian and Ukrainian drone operations have created — something that a significant influx of manpower is unlikely to help address.
Russia may intend to withhold most of these forces from combat in Ukraine in preparation for a future war with a NATO member state. Syrskyi noted that Russia is preparing for a protracted war of attrition and that Russia will try to "exhaust" Ukraine with manpower advantage.[24] Syrskyi noted that Ukraine is maintaining defensive operations and conducting counterattacks in vulnerable areas of the frontline. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha reported on June 13 that Ukrainian intelligence suggests that Russia has started preparing strategic reserves, likely to use in combat operations "not only in Ukraine."[25] ISW previously assessed that the Russian military may be prioritizing recruitment as part of longer-term efforts to build out a post-war strategic reserve for a potential future conflict with NATO.[26] The Russian military command will likely continue to build up this reserve to use in the future against Ukraine or NATO if Russia can maintain force generation rates sufficient to replace losses in Ukraine while also building out this reserve.[27]
The Kremlin continues to promote rhetoric designed to undermine Ukrainian legitimacy and sovereignty, demonstrating its steadfast commitment to the complete destruction of Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin implied on June 22 that Ukraine was merely a construct created by Vladimir Lenin and a continuation of the Bolshevik policy on "indigenization."[28] Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky echoed Putin's sentiment by stating that the Soviet Union's decision to transfer control of Crimea Oblast from the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1954 was not a "reunification," as "there was no Ukraine, there was no statehood."[29] These statements ignore the fact that Russia committed to respecting Ukraine’s territorial integrity, including by recognizing Crimea as part of Ukraine, in 1994 in exchange for Ukraine’s return of Soviet nuclear weapons remaining in Ukraine after the USSR’s collapse.[30] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded to a question on June 22 as to why Putin often speaks about Ukraine's 2014 Revolution of Dignity as a "coup" by stating that this was the precursor to the war in Ukraine and that the West installed an illegitimate pro-Western government during this time.[31] Peskov underscored the claim that the resolution of the war in Ukraine must address the results of the "coup," which Peskov characterized as a "root cause" of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Peskov notably ignores that then-President Viktor Yanukovych fled Ukraine during the revolution, the Ukrainian parliament legally voted to remove Yanukovych, and that Ukraine held free and fair presidential elections in mid-2014.[32] ISW has reported extensively on the Kremlin's weaponization of the phrase "root cause" to allude to the unacceptable demands for regime change in Ukraine and altering of NATO's open-door policy.[33] The Kremlin's ongoing rhetorical campaign aimed at undermining Ukraine's legitimacy and sovereignty while continuing to call for the replacement of the current Ukrainian government further emphasizes that Russia maintains its maximalist goal of conquering Ukraine.
Kremlin officials are leveraging the Russian education system to indoctrinate children into the mythos of the Soviet Union's role in the Second World War and create a centralized state ideology that will shape generations in Russia and Russian-occupied Ukraine, likely to justify a protracted war in Ukraine and a future military conflict against the West. Putin met on June 22 with Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky, Moscow State Institute for International Relations (MGIMO) Rector Anatoly Torkunov, Scientific Director of the Institute of General History of the Russian Academy of Sciences Aleksandr Chubaryan, and the Minister of Education Sergei Kravtsov, who act as the editors-in-chief of the Russian Ministry of Education history textbooks for the fifth through eleventh grades, and discussed the presentation of the Second World War (referred to as the Great Patriotic War in Russia) in Russian history textbooks.[34] Putin claimed that Russian textbooks in the 1990s presented incongruous and "Russophobic" historical narratives or denied historical fact, especially about the Great Patriotic War and Russia's defeat of Nazism at significant national cost. Putin accused foreign governments of exploiting grant funding for textbooks to influence Russian historical narratives in the 1990s. Putin stated that Russia needs a unified history curriculum for children as young as preschool age. Kravtsov stated that all Russian state schools have adopted the unified history curriculum, which dedicates 30 percent of its content to the Great Patriotic War. Medinsky stated that the Ministry of Education edited the seventh-grade textbook to be "even more ideological" and reflect the fact that "there was no Ukraine, there was no statehood" before the Soviet Union. Kravtsov also stated that Russia will adopt a unified social studies textbook for the ninth through eleventh grades by September 2026. The Russian Ministry of Education will very likely distribute the new textbooks in Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories, as it did in 2023 with the unified tenth- and eleventh-grade history textbooks.[35] These textbooks describe the Ukrainian government as a "neo-Nazi state" and include a chapter justifying Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The new textbooks will also support ongoing Russian efforts to leverage traditional school programs with extracurricular "military-patriotic" organizations to militarize Russian students and ensure long-term regime loyalty and stability.[36] ISW has long reported on the Kremlin's efforts to centralize control over and expand youth educational and military patriotic programs, both in Russia and in occupied Ukraine, as part of Russia's long-term force generation efforts and multi-pronged efforts to militarize Russian society.[37]
Key Takeaways:
- Russia condemned the recent US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities on June 22 amid reports that Iran's foreign minister will meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on June 23.
- Iran's possible decision to close the Strait of Hormuz will cause a significant spike in global oil prices, which would greatly economically and financially benefit Russia by reversing months of declining Russian oil revenue and allowing Russia to continue to finance its war against Ukraine in the medium term.
- Russian forces have continued to pursue long-standing operational objectives on the battlefield in Ukraine throughout Spring and Summer 2025 and will likely remain committed to these objectives for the coming months.
- Russia's intensified force generation efforts appear to be generating a reserve force that Russia will be able to leverage in Ukraine or against NATO in the future, despite current limitations on Russia's offensive capacity in Ukraine.
- The Kremlin continues to promote rhetoric designed to undermine Ukrainian legitimacy and sovereignty, demonstrating its steadfast commitment to the complete destruction of Ukraine.
- Kremlin officials are leveraging the Russian education system to indoctrinate children into the mythos of the Soviet Union's role in the Second World War and create a centralized state ideology that will shape generations in Russia and Russian-occupied Ukraine, likely to justify a protracted war in Ukraine and a future military conflict against the West.
- Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Sumy oblast. Russian forces advanced near Novopavlivka.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 21, 2025
Russian President Vladimir Putin's long-term demands for full Ukrainian capitulation remain unchanged. Putin told Sky News Arabia on June 20 that Ukraine needs to accept neutrality, reject foreign alliances, and agree to nuclear non-proliferation before Russia and Ukraine can establish long-term peace.[i] Putin insisted that Kyiv recognize Russian control over the illegally annexed, partially occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts or risk future Russian aggression. Putin also claimed that Ukrainian leaders are being guided by the interests of "external parties" rather than national interest, reiterating a long-term Russian narrative accusing Ukraine of being controlled by the West and denying the Ukrainian government agency to make its own decisions and defend itself.[ii] Putin claimed that Ukraine deserves a "better fate" than to be used by other countries as a tool against Russia. Putin also stated that no future settlement can be reached unless Russia and Ukraine resolve "outstanding humanitarian issues." Russian officials had repeatedly issued the same pre-war demands that Russian officials presented at negotiations in Istanbul in 2022, which included recognition of occupied Ukraine as Russian territory and the "demilitarization" of Ukraine.[iii] ISW continues to assess that Russia is not interested in peace negotiations with Ukraine and remains committed to its pre-war demands, which amount essentially to the elimination of Ukraine as a sovereign country independent of Russian control.[iv]
Ukrainian officials responded to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s June 20 statements at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) and urged the international community to take more decisive action against Russia.[v] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky responded to Putin’s statement that Russia owns everywhere a "Russian soldier steps" and emphasized that Putin clearly laid out Russia’s intention to seize all of Ukraine during this speech. Zelensky noted that this ideology implies that Russia could also lay claim to Belarus, the Baltic states, Moldova, the Caucasus, and Central Asian countries like Kazakhstan.[vi] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha stated that Russian soldiers bring "only death, destruction, and devastation” wherever they step.[vii] Sybiha stated that the only way that Putin will accept peace would be if the West forced his hand through increased support for Ukrainian defense, severe economic sanctions, the recognition of Russia as a terrorist state, and complete diplomatic isolation. Sybiha called on the international community to push back against Putin’s continued aspirations toward new territorial gains. ISW has previously noted that Putin's theory of victory is based on the assumption that Russia can outlast Ukraine's will to fight and the Western coalition supporting Ukraine, and that reducing US military aid to Ukraine will neither lead to a sustainable peace in Ukraine nor compel Putin to reassess his theory of victory.[viii]
Kremlin officials appear to be reviving the false narrative that Ukraine intends to use a "dirty bomb" against Russia, likely in an attempt to influence Western discussions about providing additional military assistance to Ukraine. Putin responded to a question from the panel moderator at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) on June 20 about if Ukraine will use a dirty bomb (a conventional explosive laced with radioactive material that is not a nuclear weapon) against Russia and stated that it would be a "colossal mistake" and that Russia will respond proportionately to all threats.[ix] Putin underscored that Russia's response to Ukraine using a dirty bomb would be "catastrophic" for Ukraine but noted that there is no evidence that Ukraine intends to use a dirty bomb. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev seized on Putin's statement and claimed on June 21 that Russia would respond with a tactical nuclear weapon if Ukraine used a dirty bomb against Russia.[x] Russian officials previously intensified the "dirty bomb" narrative and nuclear blackmail in March and October 2022, and ISW assessed that Russian officials used this narrative to slow Western discussions of providing additional military assistance to Ukraine and to undermine Western resolve.[xi] Russian officials are likely reintroducing this narrative amid ongoing debates in the United States and Europe about further aiding Ukraine.
US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg met with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko in Minsk on June 21.[xii] The two discussed international developments and bilateral relations.[xiii] US Deputy Special Envoy to Ukraine John Coale announced on June 21 that the United States brokered a deal with Belarus to free 14 Belarusian political prisoners.[xiv] The meeting marks the first high-profile public meeting between senior US and Belarusian officials since 2020.[xv]
Russia continues to field modernized Shahed drones, expand domestic drone production capabilities, and innovate long-range strike tactics. Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy Beskrestnov told Ukrainian news agency UNIAN on June 20 that he estimates that Russia has increased its Shahed production capabilities sevenfold.[xvi] Beskrestnov noted that Russia is attempting to reduce its dependency on Iran by producing modernized Shahed drones with mostly Russian- and Chinese-made components and that Russia is equipping newer Shahed models with antennas that are more resistant to electronic warfare (EW) interference. Beskrestnov stated that Russian forces are constantly innovating Shahed tactics to improve strike accuracy and evade Ukrainian air defense systems and units. Beskrestnov reported that Russia is preparing to build another Shahed production facility in an unspecified location and forecasted that Russian strike packages may soon incorporate up to 800 Shaheds, compared to the 300 to 400 that Russia typically launches in nightly strikes against Ukraine.
Head of the Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor's Office Spartak Borisenko reported on June 20 that Russia is modernizing its Geran-2 drones (Russian-made analogue of the Iranian-made Shahed-136 drones).[xvii] Borisenko reported that Ukrainian authorities have observed downed Geran-2 drones with a modified four-cylinder two-stroke engine, increased warheads, and new antennas and fuel systems, which are different from the components that Russia used in Shahed drones as of April 2025. Borisenko noted that Russia now has two factories producing modernized Geran-2 drones that use both Russian and imported dual-purpose components. ISW has recently reported on data indicating that Russia is expanding its long-range drone production capabilities.[xviii]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and a Russian milblogger claimed on June 21 and 20 that Russian forces are increasingly utilizing Geran-2 drones for strikes along the frontline, marking a departure from the Russian forces' previous pattern of using long-range Shahed/Geran drones against Ukraine's rear and deep rear.[xix] The milblogger noted that Russian forces are using Geran-2 drones to strike targets five to seven kilometers from the frontline, which Russian forces used to strike with glide bombs or missiles. Russian forces' increased use of Shaheds to strike frontline and near-rear Ukrainian positions is another indicator of Russia's enhanced drone production capabilities.
The Russian government formally announced its intention to reassess Russia's territorial waters in the Baltic Sea over a year after the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published and subsequently deleted a similar proposal.[xx] The Russian government published a list of coordinates on June 20 that Russian officials intend to reassess Russia's territorial waters and suggested that Russia should adjust the maritime border coordinates in the Gulf of Finland in the zone of Jähi, Sommers, Gogland, Rodsher, Malyy Tyuters, and Vigrund islands, and near the northern delta of the Narva River. Sommers, Gogland, Rodsher, Malyy Tyuters, and Vigrund islands are under Russian control, while Russia and Finland share control over Jähi island. The northern delta of the Narva River is located between Russia and Estonia. The Russian MoD published a similar proposal on May 21, 2024, that suggested Russia reassess maritime border coordinates near Jähi, Sommers, Gogland, Rodsher, Malyy Tyuters, and Vigrund islands, the northern delta of the Narva River, and the islands and capes around Kaliningrad Oblast.[xxi] The Russian government's June 2025 proposal does not include the islands and capes around Kaliningrad Oblast. Russian officials denied that Russia planned to change its maritime borders in late May 2024, but the Russian government's June 2025 proposal suggests that Russia may attempt to reassess a smaller portion of its territorial waters, mainly in the Gulf of Finland.[xxii]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian President Vladimir Putin's long-term demands for full Ukrainian capitulation remain unchanged.
- Ukrainian officials responded to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s June 20 statements at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) and urged the international community to take more decisive action against Russia.
- Kremlin officials appear to be reviving the false narrative that Ukraine intends to use a "dirty bomb" against Russia, likely in an attempt to influence Western discussions about providing additional military assistance to Ukraine.
- US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg met with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko in Minsk on June 21.
- Russia continues to field modernized Shahed drones, expand domestic drone production capabilities, and innovate long-range strike tactics.
- The Russian government formally announced its intention to reassess Russia's territorial waters in the Baltic Sea over a year after the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published and subsequently deleted a similar proposal.
- Russian forces advanced near Novopavlivka and Velyka Novosilka.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 20, 2025
Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed that Russians and Ukrainians are one nation and all of Ukraine is effectively Russian as part of efforts to justify his continued conquest of Ukraine. Putin answered a question after his speech at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) on June 20 about why Russian forces are advancing beyond the territories in Ukraine that Russia has illegally annexed, claiming that he considers Russian and Ukrainian people to be "one people in reality" and that "Ukraine is [Russia's]."[i] Putin has repeatedly demonstrated that he does not consider Ukraine as an independent state with its own history, identity, and culture separate from Russia, as evidenced by his 2021 "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians" essay and his repeated false assertion that Russians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians are all part of one historical people.[ii]
ISW has previously noted that the Kremlin's ongoing information operation attempting to portray Russians and Ukrainians as one unified nation and culturally and historically homogeneous is one of its most significant information operations aimed at undermining Western support for Ukraine and justifying the war effort to the Russian people. Putin's commitment to this narrative underscores his ongoing commitment to destroying the Ukrainian state and subjugating the Ukrainian people.[iii]
Putin asserted that Russia will be able to achieve its goals through a protracted war in Ukraine. Putin claimed on June 20 that it would be better for Ukraine to stop fighting because the battlefield and geopolitical situation will only worsen for Ukraine, and that Ukraine will have to negotiate from a weaker position.[iv] Putin attempted to posture Russia as interested in engaging in negotiations to end the war, claiming that Russia is not seeking "Ukrainian capitulation," yet insisted that Ukraine recognize the "realities that have developed on the ground."[v] Kremlin officials often call for Ukraine to recognize the "realities on the ground" (a reference to the frontline in Ukraine) to allude to the idea that Russia is in a stronger negotiating position given the situation on the battlefield and to demand that Ukraine concede to Russia's unwavering demands.[vi]
Putin's claim that Ukraine must recognize the "realities on the ground" and should negotiate before the situation worsens also coheres with Putin's theory of victory, which assesses that Russian forces will be able to win a war of attrition by indefinitely sustaining gradual advances along the frontline despite the high costs of such creeping advances.[vii] Putin's statement ignores that the true "realities on the ground" show a complicated and hotly contested frontline situation in which Russian forces are slowly making marginal advances at the cost of significant manpower and materiel losses in the face of significant Ukrainian drone-based defenses.
Putin and other Kremlin officials are using the guise of "buffer zones" to expand Russia's territorial demands in Ukraine. Putin claimed that Russian forces are "ending up" in territories beyond the four oblasts that Russia has illegally annexed in accordance with the "logic of military actions," then recalled the saying "where the foot of a Russian soldier steps, that is [Russia's]."[viii] Putin stated that he does not rule out Russia seizing Sumy City "in principle" but claimed that Russia is not pursuing this objective at the moment.[ix] Putin claimed that Russian actions in northern Sumy Oblast are due to Ukraine's shelling of Russian border areas. Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik claimed on June 19 in an interview with Kremlin newswire TASS at SPIEF that a "buffer zone" should be 20 to 30 kilometers deep to protect occupied Luhansk Oblast from Ukrainian fiber optic drone strikes.[x] First Deputy Chairperson of the Russian State Duma Defense Committee Alexei Zhuravlev called on June 18 for Russia to create a buffer zone into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast up to the Dnipro River in order to protect occupied Donetsk Oblast from Ukrainian HIMARS strikes.[xi]
Kremlin officials previously justified the Russian offensive into northern Kharkiv Oblast as an effort to protect Belgorod City from Ukrainian shelling and MLRS strikes.[xii] Pasechnik's and Zhuravlev's envisioned buffer zones would extend into eastern Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts – two oblasts that Russia has not illegally annexed yet. Russian officials have recently made similar calls for Russia to expand its territorial ambitions, asking Putin to seize Sumy City and calling for Russia to take control of the part of the Dnipro River that passes through Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[xiii] Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Colonel Pavlo Palisa also stated on June 5 that Russia likely seeks to create a buffer zone along the northern Ukrainian-Russian border by the end of 2025 and intends to occupy the entirety of Ukraine on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River, including eastern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and all of Kharkiv Oblast, by the end of 2026.[xiv]
The Kremlin continues to demonstrate that it will not be satisfied with the seizure of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and will use the guise of buffer zones to justify its territorial ambitions beyond these four oblasts.
The Kremlin continues to prioritize maintaining the facade of economic stability by pursuing economic policies that will likely exacerbate Russia's economic instability. Putin claimed during SPIEF on June 20 that Russia's debt is not growing and refuted claims that Russia's economy is declining.[xv] Putin claimed that the idea that Russia's economy is only tied to raw materials and is dependent on hydrocarbon exports is "outdated," but that Russia aims to increase its non-oil and gas exports.[xvi] Putin claimed that inflation in Russia decreased to 9.6 percent as of June 16 and that he expects inflation to fall to seven percent by the end of 2025.[xvii] Putin used his speech to focus on reductions in the poverty level in Russia.[xviii] Putin also highlighted Russia's low unemployment rate, claiming that the rate has stabilized around 2.3 percent since October 2024. Putin did not speak about Russia's labor shortages that are causing this low employment rate, however, in contrast to his 2024 SPIEF speech in which he acknowledged that Russia was suffering from labor shortages and highlighted the need for skilled migrant labor to increase Russia's economic growth.[xix] Putin may be attempting to gloss over his ongoing efforts to leverage migrants to mitigate ongoing labor shortages amid increasing anti-migrant sentiments in Russia.[xx]
The Kremlin has repeatedly attempted to posture the Russian economy as strong and stable, claiming in recent months that inflation was between nine and 10 percent when the actual figure was likely closer to 20 percent.[xxi] Putin's June 20 claim that Russian inflation is 9.6 percent is likely also false. ISW has observed reports that domestic consumers in Russia continue to face rising prices for staple food items, such as potatoes and butter.[xxii] Putin also failed to acknowledge the growing detrimental effects of high interest rates of 20 percent on the Russian industrial sector. Russian steel company Severstal head, Alexander Shevelev, warned on June 19 that metallurgical production facilities are at risk of shutting down due to low consumer demand and high interest rates.[xxiii] Russian Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina notably stated at SPIEF on June 19 that Russia's economy grew at a high rate for two years because Russia was using "free resources," including Russia’s workforce, production capacity, import substitution, the liquid assets of the National Welfare Fund, and the banking system’s capital reserve, but that Russia has exhausted many of these resources and needs to think of a new growth model.[xxiv] ISW previously assessed in early June 2025 that the Russian government was likely pressuring Nabiullina to lower Russia’s key interest rate to reduce the impact of high interest rates on the Russian budget and civilian industries.[xxv]
Putin's efforts to frame the Russian economy as stable and growing are part of his efforts to balance social support programs with Russia's military needs and maintain his support among the Russian population despite the growing economic costs of his war in Ukraine.[xxvi] ISW continues to assess that Kremlin efforts to pressure the Central Bank into prematurely lowering the key interest rate to maintain the facade of economic stability may backfire and contribute to elevated levels of inflation.[xxvii]
Putin is attempting to obfuscate the reality that increased investment in Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) has come at the cost of Russia's civilian economic sectors. Putin stated during his speech at SPIEF that Russia's gross domestic product (GDP) has increased by over four percent annually over the last two years, but claimed that Russia's GDP growth is not solely due to Russia's oil and gas or defense industrial sectors.[xxviii] Putin claimed that Russia's agricultural, construction, logistics, financial, and information technology (IT) sectors have also expanded over the last two years. ISW reported in September 2024 that Russia's 2025 federal budget allocated 13.5 trillion rubles ($145 billion) toward "National Defense" expenditures and another 3.5 trillion rubles ($37 billion) toward "National Security," meaning that Russia committed about 41 percent of its 2025 expenditures to defense and security expenses.[xxix] Russia allocated 6.4 trillion rubles ($69 billion) to its 2025 "Social Policy" budget in comparison, which underscores the disparity between Russia's investment in its defense industrial sectors compared to its civilian sectors.
Putin highlighted Russia's DIB growth during his speech and called for further integration of civilian and defense industrial sectors in order to facilitate greater innovation and increase dual-use goods production.[xxx] Putin claimed that Russia's DIB has increased its output "many times over" and is "mastering" new equipment and weapons. Putin called for Russia to move away from dividing companies between the defense industrial and civilian sectors of the economy and to quickly implement innovations from the civilian sector into Russia's defense and security. Putin called for Russia to decrease the time between formulating an idea and its implementation and called for Russian military commanders and heads of defense industrial enterprises to be more involved in production decision-making processes. Putin pointed to drones, which Putin called the most effective means to destroy expensive military equipment, as an area where Russia can increase efficiency to ensure Russia's security and solve problems in Russia's DIB. Putin framed Russia's investments in artificial intelligence (AI) as purely focused on economic development and civilian sectors during his speech at SPIEF, although Russia is already working to integrate greater AI and machine learning (ML) capabilities into drones along the frontline.[xxxi] Russia undertook a concerted campaign to centralize Russian drone units and drone production efforts in late 2024, but Putin appears to be acknowledging that Russia's new drone production and testing mechanisms must retain a rapid innovation cycle.[xxxii]
Open-source intelligence suggests that Russia is increasing its T-90M tank production capabilities. Georgia-based open-source intelligence organization Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT) reported on June 20 that an unnamed "reliable analytical source" stated that Russia's annual production rate of T-90M tanks was roughly 280 T-90M tanks as of 2024.[xxxiii] The CIT noted that Russia has been undertaking systemic efforts to increase tank production since before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and estimated that pre-war production rates and Russia's transition to a constant production schedule since 2022 have likely allowed Russia's primary tank manufacturer Uralvagonzavod to produce 60 to 70 T-90M new tanks in 2022; 140 to 180 new tanks in 2023; and 250 to 300 new tanks in 2024. The CIT noted that Russia is currently using fewer tanks and armored vehicles on the battlefield in Ukraine and that Russia's armored vehicle and tank loss rates have been decreasing since late 2024, which is consistent with a recent assessment from a social media source tracking equipment at Russian military depots via satellite imagery.[xxxiv] The CIT assessed that Russia will likely be able to maintain its current armor levels throughout the Russian military for "at least several more years," assuming that Russia's tank production and consumption rates remain at their current levels.
ISW previously assessed that Russia's 2023 and 2024 vehicle loss rates were unsustainable in the medium- to long-term, given the limitations of Russia's defense industrial capacity and Soviet-era weapons and equipment stocks.[xxxv] Ongoing Russian efforts to offset and limit tank and armored vehicle losses by increasingly relying on motorcycles, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and other motorized vehicles may enable Russia to sustain its war effort in Ukraine in the medium term.[xxxvi]
Ukraine and Russia conducted the sixth prisoner of war (POW) exchange in accordance with the June 2 Istanbul agreements. Ukrainian officials and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed that Ukraine and Russia exchanged an unspecified number of severely wounded and sick POWs on June 20.[xxxvii]
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed Brigadier General Hennadii Shapovalov as Commander of the Ukrainian Ground Forces on June 19.[xxxviii] Shapovalov most recently served as the Ukrainian representative to the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) center in Germany and served as the Commander of Ukraine's Southern Operational Command in 2024.[xxxix]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed that Russians and Ukrainians are one nation and all of Ukraine is effectively Russian as part of efforts to justify his continued conquest of Ukraine.
- Putin asserted that Russia will be able to achieve its goals through a protracted war in Ukraine.
- Putin and other Kremlin officials are using the guise of "buffer zones" to expand Russia's territorial demands in Ukraine.
- The Kremlin continues to prioritize maintaining the facade of economic stability by pursuing economic policies that will likely exacerbate Russia's economic instability.
- Putin is attempting to obfuscate the reality that increased investment in Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) has come at the cost of Russia's civilian economic sectors.
- Open-source intelligence suggests that Russia is increasing its T-90M tank production capabilities
- Ukraine and Russia conducted the sixth prisoner of war (POW) exchange in accordance with the June 2 Istanbul agreements.
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed Brigadier General Hennadii Shapovalov as Commander of the Ukrainian Ground Forces on June 19.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Siversk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 19, 2025
The West has failed to convince Russian President Vladimir Putin to reevaluate his theory of victory in Ukraine in the past year. Putin’s public statements indicate that he continues to assess that Russian forces will be able to win a war of attrition by sustaining gradual advances along the frontline indefinitely. Putin articulated a theory of victory during the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in June 2024 that assumes that Russian forces will be able to continue gradual creeping advances indefinitely, prevent Ukraine from conducting successful operationally significant counteroffensive operations, and win a war of attrition against Ukrainian forces.[1] Putin's assessment that gradual Russian gains will allow Russia to achieve his goals in Ukraine is predicated on the assumption that Ukrainian forces will be unable to liberate any significant territory that Russian forces seize and that the Russian military will be able to sustain offensive operations that achieve gradual tactical gains regardless of heavy losses. Putin's discussion with foreign media at SPIEF on June 19, 2025, demonstrated that Putin still maintains this theory of victory one year later.[2] Putin claimed that Russian forces have a "strategic advantage" in all areas of the front. Putin claimed that Russian forces are advancing along the entire frontline every day and that even if Russian forces advance less on some days, they are "still advancing." Putin claimed that the "situation has changed" since the March 2022 Ukrainian-Russian negotiations in Istanbul and that the terms Russia proposed in 2022 are "much softer" than the terms Russia demands today. Putin threatened that the situation may worsen for Ukraine if Ukraine does not make significant concessions and agree to a peace settlement on Russia's terms and called on Ukraine's partners to "point to the realities of today" to push Ukraine toward a settlement. Putin reiterated that Russia is prepared to achieve its war goals militarily if it is not able to achieve these goals diplomatically. Putin has repeatedly indicated that Russia's war aims include regime change in Ukraine, the installation of a pro-Kremlin proxy government in Kyiv, significant limitations of Ukraine's ability to defend itself against future Russian aggression, Ukrainian neutrality, and NATO's abandonment of its open-door policy.[3]
Other Kremlin officials also rearticulated Putin's theory of victory on June 19. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded to a question in a June 19 interview with Kremlin-affiliated outlet Izvestia about what Russia should do since "international institutions do not work" and diplomacy fails to meet Russia's expectations of ensuring peace on Russia's terms.[4] Peskov claimed that Russia must be patient and take a "consistent" position — a call for Russia to not waver from its long-held demands as time will produce Russia's desired outcome. Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo similarly claimed on June 19 that "Russia is a country with which is better not to fight because time...is on [Russia's] side."[5]
Putin's theory of victory is predicated on critical assumptions about Ukraine's capabilities and continued Western support for Ukraine — conditions that the West can still change. Putin's theory assumes that Russian forces will be able to leverage their advantages in manpower and materiel to overwhelm Ukrainian forces and that Ukrainian forces will be unable to liberate any operationally- or strategically-significant territory that Russian forces seize.[6] Russian forces are taking disproportionately large manpower losses for marginal tactical gains that are unsustainable in the medium- to long-term, but Putin's theory assumes that the Russian military will be able to maintain the theater-wide initiative and sustain offensive operations that achieve gradual tactical gains longer than the West is willing to provide security assistance to Ukraine and longer than Ukraine's economy and population are able to mobilize for the war effort. ISW continues to assess that Russia will face a number of challenges in its economy and defense industrial base (DIB) in the medium-term that will impede Russia's ability to sustain a prolonged war in Ukraine.[7] Continued rising oil prices following Israeli strikes against Iran may increase Russian revenue from oil sales and improve Russia's ability to sustain its war effort, but only if the price of oil remains high and if Russian oil does not come under additional international sanctions.[8] Increased Western military aid and economic instruments can enable Ukrainian forces to maintain pressure on the battlefield and exacerbate Russia's economic issues, leveraging Russia's weaknesses to achieve a strong negotiating position for Ukraine and the West and extract critical concessions from Russia to bring about a lasting and just end to the war.
Putin continued Russia's reflexive control campaign that aims to deter Western provisions of military aid to Ukraine and NATO rearmament but appears to be adapting this campaign for different audiences. Putin claimed during his June 19 meeting with foreign journalists at SPIEF that Russia does not consider NATO rearmament (in line with US President Donald Trump's objective for Europe to shoulder more of the burden for collective security) to be a threat as Russia is able to ensure its own security and is constantly improving the Russian military and Russia's defensive capabilities.[9] Putin claimed that "whatever NATO does" will create threats, but that Russia will suppress all the threats that arise. Putin claimed that the idea that Russia is going to attack NATO states in Europe is "nonsense" - despite Kremlin statements threatening the Baltic states and Finland and Russian military preparations for a conflict with NATO in the future.[10] Putin also claimed during the June 19 meeting that Germany's possible supply of Taurus missiles to Ukraine will not impact the course of military operations in Ukraine but will cause "serious damage" to German-Russian relations.[11] Kremlin officials have made similar demonstrably untrue claims about Western weapons' inability to change the situation on the battlefield in the past.[12]
Putin's statements are part of the Kremlin's ongoing reflexive control campaign that aims to push the West to make decisions that benefit Russia, such as by refraining from providing further assistance to Ukraine or stopping efforts to increase NATO's defensive capabilities.[13] Putin's claims about Taurus missiles and threats from NATO differ from previous Kremlin statements along these lines, however. Kremlin officials have recently framed European efforts to increase their defense capabilities as a threat to Russian national security, in contrast to Putin's June 19 claim.[14] Putin used his June 2024 meeting with foreign journalists at SPIEF to threaten that Russia might supply long-range weapons to unspecified Western adversaries to try to push the West to not lift restrictions on Ukraine's use of Western-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russia — a more direct and aggressive threat than Putin's June 2025 claims that Germany's supply of weapons to Ukraine would damage bilateral German-Russian relations.[15] Putin may be trying different variations of Russia's wider reflexive control campaign that cater specifically to new audiences.
Putin explicitly stated that he will not sign a peace agreement with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Putin stated that he is willing to negotiate with Zelensky but claimed that Zelensky is illegitimate and that Russia will only sign legal agreements with "legitimate" authorities.[16] Putin reiterated his false claims that there is no legal mechanism in the Ukrainian Constitution or law to extend the term of a Ukrainian president under martial law, and Putin deliberately misrepresented the Ukrainian Constitution and law to bolster his claims. Putin also claimed that all Zelensky-appointed Ukrainian government bodies are illegitimate, alleging that if the president is illegitimate then "the entire system of power becomes illegitimate." Ukraine's Constitution and Ukrainian law explicitly state that Ukraine cannot hold elections while martial law is in place and that Ukrainian authorities cannot lift martial law while "the threat of attack or danger to the state independence of Ukraine and its territorial integrity" remains.[17] Putin's recent statement that he is willing to negotiate with Zelensky is meaningless as Putin indicated that he will not sign a legal peace agreement with the Ukrainian government. Putin and other Kremlin officials have frequently and falsely accused Zelensky and other facets of the Ukrainian government of being illegitimate with this misrepresentation of Ukrainian law since May 2024, and the Kremlin has described every Ukrainian government since 2014 as illegitimate.[18] Russian officials have occasionally proposed other Ukrainian officials and entities are possible legitimate authorities with which Russia can legally negotiate and sign a peace agreement, but Putin's statement accusing the whole government under Zelensky of also being illegitimate suggests that Russia would also not recognize an agreement signed by any member of the current Ukrainian government.[19] ISW continues to assess that these information operations are part of an effort to set informational conditions for Russia to renege on any future peace agreement Russia may sign with Ukraine at a time of Russia's choosing.[20]
Putin used his meeting with international journalists to reinject longstanding Kremlin rhetorical lines into the media space, as ISW previously forecasted.[21] Putin reiterated his theory of victory, reflexive control narratives, and false claims of Zelensky's illegitimacy in a question-and-answer session with international journalists, including from Western media outlets, on June 19.[22] Putin also reiterated boilerplate rhetoric accusing the West of provoking the war in Ukraine by violating the Minsk accords. The Kremlin has historically used these narratives to justify its aggression against Ukraine and deter Western states from providing further assistance to Ukraine.[23] Peskov stated on June 18 that Putin wanted to speak directly with international journalists in order to "accurately" portray Putin's and Russia's point of view to Western audiences.[24] Putin likely aims to re-amplify these narratives to reinforce his efforts to deter further Western assistance to Ukraine at a critical time in debates about future military assistance for Ukraine.
Russian officials appear to be struggling to posture Russia's economic strength amid increasing signs of a slowing Russian economy. Russian Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina stated at SPIEF on June 19 that Russia's economy grew at a high rate for two years because Russia was using "free resources," including Russia’s workforce, production capacity, import substitution, the liquid assets of the National Welfare Fund, and the banking system’s capital reserve.[25] Nabiullina stated that Russia has exhausted many of these resources and needs to think of a new growth model. Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov acknowledged that the Russian economy is "cooling," but claimed that more positive trends are on the horizon and that Russia's current economic model is working.[26] The Moscow Times claimed that, according to Russia's Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat), Russia's unemployment rate has dropped to a historic low of just 2.3 percent and that mass emigration and military drafting of men have exacerbated labor shortages.[27] The Moscow Times further noted that, according to Rosstat, the liquid assets of Russia's sovereign wealth fund has decreased threefold to 2.8 trillion rubles (roughly $35.7 billion) since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[28] Russia's Minister of Economic Development Maxim Reshetnikov stated that Russia is on the "brink of recession" and noted that Russia's strict monetary policy is hindering the ability of industries outside of the defense industrial base (DIB) to attract investments.[29] ISW observed recent reporting that the Kremlin is trying to promote social optimism at SPIEF rather than its traditional focus on foreign investment, and Russian official statements about Russian economic issues are complicating these efforts.[30] These Russian economic officials may be attempting to temper some of the Kremlin's expectation-setting among domestic Russian audiences about the impacts of a prolonged war effort in Ukraine without completely contradicting official Kremlin rhetoric that Russia can wage protracted war against Ukraine indefinitely.
Ukraine and Russia conducted the fifth prisoner of war (POW) exchange in accordance the June 2 Istanbul agreements, amid reports that Russia artificially inflated the number of bodies released to Ukraine in previous killed in action (KIA) exchanges. Ukrainian officials and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed that Ukraine and Russia exchanged an unspecified number of severely wounded and sick POWs on June 19.[31] The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of POWs reported that Russia captured most of the released Ukrainian POWs in 2022 during the battle for Mariupol.[32] Ukrainian Interior Affairs Minister Ihor Klymenko reported that Russia has been including the bodies of Russian soldiers among Ukrainian bodies in previous killed in action (KIA) exchanges to deliberately complicate Ukrainian efforts to identify the bodies of fallen Ukrainian soldiers.[33] Russia may have sought to artificially inflate the number of bodies released to Ukraine and undermine the mutually agreed upon confidence-building measures to which Russia and Ukraine agreed on June 2.
Key Takeaways:
- The West has failed to convince Russian President Vladimir Putin to reevaluate his theory of victory in Ukraine in the past year. Putin’s public statements indicate that he continues to assess that Russian forces will be able to win a war of attrition by sustaining gradual advances along the frontline indefinitely.
- Putin's theory of victory is predicated on critical assumptions about Ukraine's capabilities and continued Western support for Ukraine – conditions that the West can still change.
- Putin continued Russia's reflexive control campaign that aims to deter Western provisions of military aid to Ukraine and NATO rearmament but appears to be adapting this campaign for different audiences.
- Putin explicitly stated that he will not sign a peace agreement with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.
- Putin used his meeting with international journalists to reinject longstanding Kremlin rhetorical lines into the media space, as ISW previously forecasted.
- Russian officials appear to be struggling to posture Russia's economic strength amid increasing signs of a slowing Russian economy.
- Ukraine and Russia conducted the fifth prisoner of war (POW) exchange in accordance the June 2 Istanbul agreements, amid reports that Russia artificially inflated the number of bodies released to Ukraine in previous killed in action (KIA) exchanges.
- Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast. Russian forces advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, and Novopavlivka.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 18, 2025
Russian forces conducted an at least platoon-sized mechanized assault in the Toretsk direction on June 17. Geolocated footage published on June 17 shows that Russian forces conducted a mechanized assault west of Yablunivka (west of Toretsk) with at least three armored vehicles and four motorized vehicles, likely all-terrain vehicles (ATVs).[1] Ukrainian military observer Yuriy Butusov reported on June 18 that Russian forces conducted a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault near Kostyantynivka and that Ukrainian forces destroyed 15 pieces of heavy equipment and eight motorized vehicles.[2] Russian forces have been conducting mechanized assaults less frequently since Winter 2024–2025, likely due to Ukrainian drone capabilities and Russia's dwindling supply of armored vehicles.[3] ISW recently observed reports indicating that Russia's consumption of Soviet-era tank stores is slowing.[4] Russian forces have become increasingly reliant on civilian vehicles, ATVs, and motorcycles for assaults, and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) began efforts in April 2025 to formally integrate motorcycle usage into offensive operations.[5] Russian mechanized assaults in the Toretsk direction may indicate that the Russian military command intends to prioritize this sector of the front. ISW will continue to monitor this area of the frontline for additional evidence of mechanized assaults.
The Kremlin likely aims to use the ongoing St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) to support ongoing efforts to consolidate control over the information space and prepare Russian society for a prolonged war effort. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on June 18 that it obtained a document from the Russian Presidential Administration instructing Russian state and pro-Kremlin media outlets on which events to cover at SPIEF on June 18 to 21.[6] The events that Russian media should reportedly focus on include the presentation of a new civilian vehicle from a Russian car manufacturer, flag-raising ceremonies for fishing vessels, ceremonies connecting a village and factory in Tambov Oblast to gas networks, and events hosted by organizations subordinate to the Presidential Administration. The document reportedly instructs journalists to focus on events from the "Znanie" (Knowledge) Society, the board of which Presidential Administration Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko heads; the "Russia-Land of Opportunities" non-profit organization, which runs the Kremlin's "Time of Heroes" program placing veterans in federal, regional, and local government positions; and presentations of books about war, economics, and disinformation. A political strategist who has worked for the Russian Presidential Administration told Meduza that Russian news coverage of SPIEF previously focused on foreign investment and high-profile foreign guests, but that the Kremlin now aims to project social optimism and the "appearance that everything is moving forward." The Kremlin may have also limited internet access around SPIEF in order to better control the information space. Russian opposition media reported that Russians in and around St. Petersburg began experiencing internet outages overnight on June 17 to 18.[7] Russian authorities previously disconnected large swaths of Russia from mobile internet using the Sovereign Internet system during Victory Day celebrations on May 9 under the guise of ensuring security but likely aimed to limit reports, footage, and imagery of Ukrainian strikes that could destroy the facade of Russian victory.[8] Russian authorities may be employing similar measures during SPIEF as part of efforts to forward the Kremlin's social optimism messaging.
The Kremlin also aims to use SPIEF to promote Kremlin narratives to Western audiences. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on June 18 that Russian President Vladimir Putin will meet with journalists from different countries, including "unfriendly" countries and the Global South, in order to accurately convey Putin's and Russia's point of view to Western audiences.[9] Peskov claimed that Putin will hold a question-and-answer session with journalists about global events and Russian domestic and foreign policy.[10] Peskov did not specify which journalists will attend the meeting with Putin. Russian state media has historically platformed pro-Kremlin media sources and journalists from other countries in efforts to legitimize and spread ongoing Kremlin rhetoric internationally.[11] Putin likely aims to use this meeting to promote Kremlin narratives to support Russian foreign policy objectives, including deterring Western support for Ukraine and supporting Russian efforts to improve bilateral relations with the United States.
Ukraine's Western partners continue to supply Ukraine with military aid and announce new sanctions packages against Russia. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney announced on June 17 that Canada will provide Ukraine with two billion CAD (roughly $1.4 billion) for the purchase of helicopters, drones, armored vehicles, and ammunition and will lend Ukraine 2.3 billion CAD (roughly $1.6 billion) for the reconstruction of Ukrainian infrastructure.[12] Canada is providing Ukraine with the loan through the G7 Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration Loans mechanism, which will finance and repay the loan using future profits from seized Russian assets.[13] Canadian Foreign Minister Anita Anand announced on June 17 that Canada is imposing sanctions against 77 Russian individuals, 39 entities, and 201 vessels in Russia's shadow fleet and sanctioning the trade of goods, including those related to chemical and biological weapons, dual-use industrial goods and technologies, and Russian coal and metal exports.[14] The European Union (EU) and United Kingdom (UK) recently announced additional sanctions against Russia’s financial, military-industrial, and energy sectors.[15]
The Kremlin continues to crack down on critical Russian milbloggers as part of its years-long effort to censor and control the Russian information space. Kremlin newswire TASS reported on June 18 that its law enforcement sources stated that Russian authorities detained Mikhail Polynkov, the administrator of the "Soldatskaya Pravda" Telegram channel.[16] TASS's sources claimed that Russian authorities opened a criminal case against Polynkov for abandoning his military unit. Russian state media outlet RBK reported that Polynkov's lawyer stated that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) detained Polynkov and took him to the 517th Military Investigative Department of the Russian Investigative Committee but that the charges against Polynkov were still unclear.[17] Polynkov reported his detention on his Telegram channel on June 18 and implied that Russian authorities may have detained him due to his previous posts criticizing Russian propagandist Vladimir Solovyov's stance on Israel and Iran.[18] Russian milbloggers and opposition outlets noted that Polynkov was a member of the Russian Strelkov Movement, which advocates for the release of imprisoned former officer and ardent ultranationalist Igor Girkin.[19] The Russian Strelkov Movement claimed on June 18 that Polynkov's arrest was due to his efforts to search for Russian servicemembers who are missing in action (MIA), suggesting that Russian authorities may have detained Polynkov over concerns he would expose the scale of Russian losses.[20] The Kremlin has been engaged in a wide censorship campaign against the Russian information space since 2022, including by arresting the administrators of Telegram channels that were publicly critical of Russian political and military leadership.[21]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian forces conducted an at least platoon-sized mechanized assault in the Toretsk direction on June 17.
- The Kremlin likely aims to use the ongoing St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) to support ongoing efforts to consolidate control over the information space and prepare Russian society for a prolonged war effort.
- The Kremlin also aims to use SPIEF to promote Kremlin narratives to Western audiences.
- Ukraine's Western partners continue to supply Ukraine with military aid and announce new sanctions packages against Russia.
- The Kremlin continues to crack down on critical Russian milbloggers as part of its years-long effort to censor and control the Russian information space.
- Russian forces advanced in northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts and near Chasiv Yar and Toretsk.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 17, 2025
Russian forces conducted the third largest combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion on the night of June 16 to 17. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 440 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles from the airspace over Tambov Oblast, 16 Kh-101 cruise missiles from the airspace over Saratov Oblast, four Kalibr cruise missiles from the Black Sea, nine Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from the airspace over Belgorod and Bryansk oblasts, and one Kh-31P anti-radar missile from an unspecified location. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 239 drones, one Kh-47M2 missile, 15 Kh-101 missiles, and seven Kh-59/59 missiles and that 163 drones, one Kh-47M2 missile, one Kh-59/69 missile, and one Kh-31P missile were "lost" or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported that the Shahed and decoy drones targeting Kyiv City flew from different directions, including along the Dnipro River and from the east and west.[2] Ihnat and Kyiv City Mayor Vitaliy Klitschko stated that Ukrainian authorities found remnants of cluster munitions at the site of missile explosions, and a Ukrainian source posted footage reportedly showing a Russian missile with cluster munitions striking Kyiv City overnight.[3] Ukrainian officials reported that the strikes hit residential areas and civilian infrastructure in Kyiv City and Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Odesa, Sumy, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[4] Ukrainian officials reported civilian casualties in Kyiv and Odesa cities and Chernihiv Oblast.
The June 16-17 strike series heavily targeted Kyiv City and hit residential areas in the capital, as Russian officials and milbloggers called on Russia to intensify its strikes against Ukraine. Kyiv City officials reported that Russian forces launched 175 drones, over 14 cruise missiles, and at least two ballistic missiles against the city overnight.[5] Kyiv Mayor Vitaly Klitschko reported that the strikes killed at least 15 people in the city and injured at least 114.[6] Ukrainian officials stated that a Russian ballistic missile hit a nine-story apartment building in Solomianskyi Raion, collapsing the entrance to the building and destroying 30 apartments.[7] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck other civilian and residential infrastructure across Kyiv City.[8] The United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (UN HRMMU) reported on June 17 that Russian forces struck at least 30 locations across seven raions in Kyiv City.[9] The UN HRMMU reported that the last strike against Kyiv City with comparable or higher civilian casualties was the July 8, 2024, strike that killed at least 32 civilians and injured 85, including at the Kyiv City Okhmatdyt Children's Hospital.[10] First Deputy Chairperson of the Russian State Duma Defense Committee Alexey Zhuravlev advocated on June 17 that Russia should intensify its strikes against Ukraine to prevent Ukraine from regrouping and receiving additional Western aid.[11] A Russian milblogger called for Russia to expand and multiply its strikes as long as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is president.[12]
Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu announced that North Korea would send 6,000 sappers and military engineers to help with reconstruction efforts in Kursk Oblast. Shoigu met with North Korean dictator Kim Jong-Un in Pyongyang on June 16 during Shoigu's second visit to North Korea in June 2025.[13] Shoigu stated that Kim agreed to send 1,000 North Korean sappers and 5,000 North Korean military construction workers to demine and reconstruct Kursk Oblast. ISW previously observed reports that North Korean military personnel and "technical advisers" were operating in occupied Donetsk Oblast, including near occupied Donetsk City and Mariupol.[14] Russia may deploy North Korean sappers and engineers to occupied Ukraine in engineering and support roles in the future.
The European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK) announced sanctions packages against Russia on June 16 and 17.[15] The UK sanctioned additional parts of Russia’s financial, military-industrial, and energy sectors, including Russia’s shadow fleet and its operating companies.[16] The UK also sanctioned two UK residents accused of helping to supply Russia with over $120 million worth of electronics. The EU Council renewed its sanctions package that targets the import of products from occupied Crimea into the EU and the export of goods and technology to transport, telecommunications, energy, oil, gas, and mineral companies in Crimea.[17]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian forces conducted the third largest combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion on the night of June 16 to 17.
- The June 16-17 strike series heavily targeted Kyiv City and hit residential areas in the capital, as Russian officials and milbloggers called on Russia to intensify its strikes against Ukraine.
- Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu announced that North Korea would send 6,000 sappers and military engineers to help with reconstruction efforts in Kursk Oblast.
- The European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK) announced sanctions packages against Russia on June 16 and 17.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 16, 2025
Ukraine and Russia conducted an exchange that included the bodies of soldiers killed in action (KIA), on June 16 in accordance with agreements reached during talks in Istanbul on June 2. Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of POWs reported on June 16 that Russia returned 1,245 bodies to Ukraine.[i] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on June 16 that Ukraine repatriated 6,000 bodies in the last week.[ii] Umerov stated that this is the final stage of the Istanbul framework for KIA repatriations. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russia returned 1,248 bodies and received 51 bodies from Ukraine on June 16.[iii] Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky claimed that Russia returned a total of 6,060 bodies and received 78 bodies from Ukraine over the last week.[iv] The Russian MoD claimed that Russia is ready to return an additional 2,239 KIA bodies to Ukraine.[v] Ukrainian Internal Affairs Minister Ihor Klymenko reported that Russia mixed Russian KIA bodies with Ukrainian KIA bodies during a previous repatriation exchange, possibly in order to intentionally increase the number of bodies that Russia was transferring to Ukraine or out of negligence.[vi] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on June 16 that Russia proposed exchanging kidnapped Ukrainian children held in Russia for Russian POWs held in Ukraine, which Zelensky emphasized is "beyond international law."[vii]
Ukraine's Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) reported that the Kremlin is spreading narratives about the POW and KIA exchanges in order to sow panic in Ukraine and discredit Ukraine in the international community – in line with ISW’s recent assessments. The SZRU reported on June 16 that Russian President Vladimir Putin personally decided to launch an information campaign depicting Ukraine as spoiling the POW exchanges and KIA repatriations in order to provoke discontent and demoralize Ukrainian society and to discredit Ukraine in the international community.[viii] The SZRU reported that the campaign leverages pro-Kremlin sources, including Russian milbloggers, and pro-Russian media sources in Europe to project emotionally charged content, manipulate statistical data, and portray delays in exchanges and repatriations as the deliberate actions of the Ukrainian authorities. The SZRU reported that the campaign will culminate in the final days of the POW exchanges, which are set for June 20. ISW assessed in early June 2025 that the Kremlin was baselessly accusing Ukraine of failing to conduct POW exchanges and KIA repatriations and was promoting narratives that vilify Ukraine in order to socialize Russian domestic audiences ahead of Russia's possible rejection of any peace agreement in the future and to discredit Ukraine on the international stage.[ix] Russia has previously launched similar discreditation campaigns against Ukraine that aimed to destabilize Ukraine internally, such as the "Maidan-3" information operation, which Ukrainian intelligence reported in early 2024 sought to sow panic and discontent among Ukrainians and drive a wedge between Ukrainian society and military and political leadership.[x]
Russia’s consumption of its Soviet-era tank stores appears to be slowing, possibly due to Russia's increasing transition to using motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) on the battlefield. A social media source tracking equipment at Russian military depots via satellite imagery shared an updated assessment of smaller Russian tank and armored vehicle storage facilities on June 15 and assessed that Russia still has 46 percent of its pre-war tank reserves, 42 percent of its pre-war infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) reserves, and 48 percent of its pre-war armored personnel carrier (APC) reserves as of a recent unspecified date.[xi] The source stated that imagery of eight Russian military depot appears to show that Russia has emptied most of the depots of their vehicle reserves and assessed that Russia will likely deplete its remaining tank and armored vehicle reserves by the end of 2025.[xii] The social media source assessed in late December 2024 that Russia had 47 percent of its pre-war tank reserves, 52 percent of its pre-war IFV reserves, and 45 percent of its pre-war APC reserves remaining in storage.[xiii] (The source noted on June 15 that they updated their previous assessments of Russia’s pre-war reserves and found that Russia had 241 more tanks, 174 more IFVs, and 687 more APCs before the full-scale invasion than the source previously assessed, which likely accounts for the increase in Russian APCs stores from 45 percent in the December 2024 assessment to 48 percent in June 2024.[xiv]) The social media source also stated that satellite imagery analysis indicates a ”dramatic” increase in ”almost all” types of equipment deployed to a Russian military base near Petrozavodsk, Republic of Karelia, located roughly 373 kilometers from the international border with Finland.[xv] Russia may have additional armored vehicles and tanks in covered storage that are not visible in satellite imagery. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on April 27 that a senior Finnish military official stated that Russia is sending "almost none" of its newly produced tanks to the frontline in Ukraine but is stockpiling the."[xvi]
The social media source's data suggests that Russia's consumption of Soviet-era tank stocks has slowed in recent months, an observation consistent with ISW’s study of recent battlefield combat footage which shows that Russian forces are increasingly using motorcycles and buggies in place of armored vehicles along the frontline in Ukraine. Russian forces have been increasingly using unarmored civilian vehicles, mainly motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), throughout the theater in Ukraine since late Fall 2024.[xvii] ISW previously noted that Russia's increased use of motorcycles is an adaptation in response to pervasive Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian armored vehicles and the unsustainable armored vehicle losses that Russian forces suffered in late 2023 and 2024.[xviii] Ukrainian drone operations have significantly complicated how to tactically employ tanks, as large and slow-moving armored vehicles and tanks are vulnerable to drones. Russian forces appear to be leveraging faster-moving motorcycles and buggies to advance through the contested "gray zones" that Ukrainian and Russian drone operators have created along the frontline. Russia's adaption has succeeded in granting Russian forces marginal tactical gains at the expense of significant infantry losses.[xix] ISW previously assessed that Russian armored vehicle losses are unsustainable and are undermining Russia’s ability to sustain a protracted high-intensity war , but it remains unclear if Russia’s increased reliance on motorcycles and buggies will be sufficient to offset these losses in the medium- to long-term.[xx]
Russia continues to set conditions to pose a long-term strategic threat to the United States and its Western allies even after the end to Russia's war in Ukraine. Swedish news outlet SVT reported on June 16 that Planet Labs satellite imagery collected in May 2025 shows that Russia is developing and upgrading at least five nuclear facilities in western Russia and Belarus.[xxi] The satellite images show recently constructed test sites, fencing, loading quays, and storage and communications infrastructure at Russian nuclear bases in Kaliningrad Oblast and Novaya Zemlya, Arkhangelsk Oblast as well as at the Gadzhiyevo Submarine Base and a supporting facility at Olenya Bay, Murmansk Oblast. The satellite imagery also shows upgrades to fencing and railway infrastructure at a military base in Asipovichy, Belarus.[xxii] Swedish Defense Minister Pål Jonson told SVT that Swedish defense services have been tracking these construction efforts, which indicate continued Russian investment in its nuclear capabilities.[xxiii] ISW observed reports in March 2025 that satellite imagery showed that construction work on hangars for Iskander ballistic missiles in Asipovichy was in its final stage, and the New York Times reported in May 2024 that satellite imagery indicated that Belarus had been constructing facilities that could house nuclear warheads at a base 12 kilometers away from the Iskander storage site in Asipovichy.[xxiv]
Key Takeaways:
- Ukraine and Russia conducted an exchange that included the bodies of soldiers killed in action (KIA), on June 16 in accordance with agreements reached during talks in Istanbul on June 2.
- Ukraine's Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) reported that the Kremlin is spreading narratives about the POW and KIA exchanges in order to sow panic in Ukraine and discredit Ukraine in the international community – in line with ISW’s recent assessments.
- Russia’s consumption of its Soviet-era tank stores appears to be slowing, possibly due to Russia's increasing transition to using motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) on the battlefield.
- Russia continues to set conditions to pose a long-term strategic threat to the United States and its Western allies even after the end to Russia's war in Ukraine.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova and in Zaporizhia Oblast, and Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk, Toretsk, and Novopavlivka.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 15, 2025
Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to portray Russia as an effective and necessary international partner for the United States amid ongoing Iran-Israel tensions. US President Donald Trump stated on June 14 that he and Putin spoke by phone for about an hour about the ongoing Israel-Iran strikes and spent “much less” time talking about Ukraine than Iran.[1] Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov stated on June 14 that Putin and Trump mainly spoke about military escalation in the Middle East.[2] Ushakov claimed that Putin expressed concern over the escalation of tensions between Iran and Israel and offered Russia’s assistance in negotiating a peace settlement. Trump stated that he reminded Putin that the war against Ukraine must end during the call.[3] Putin is likely attempting to distract from his ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine by offering to help the United States mediate the situation in the Middle East.[4]
Russia conducted a large drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of June 14 to 15, primarily targeting Poltava Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles from Astrakhan Oblast, one Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missile from Kursk Oblast, four Iskander-K cruise missiles from Rostov Oblast, and four Kalibr cruise missiles from the Black Sea region.[5] Russian forces also launched 183 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed two Kinzhal missiles, three Iskander-K missiles, three Kalibr missiles, and 111 drones, and that 48 drones were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that the strikes mainly targeted energy, agricultural, and civilian infrastructure in Poltava Oblast.[6] Poltava Oblast Military Administration Head Volodymyr Kohut stated that Russian forces launched drones and missiles at energy and agricultural infrastructure facilities in Kremenchuk, Poltava Oblast, and at civilian infrastructure in Chutivskyi, Poltava Oblast.[7] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces targeted an oil refinery in Poltava Oblast.[8]
Russia repatriated the bodies of over 1,000 Ukrainian citizens on June 15, in accordance with the June 2 Ukrainian–Russian bilateral talks in Istanbul. The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War (POWs) reported on June 15 that Russia returned another 1,200 bodies of Ukrainian citizens, including military personnel.[9] ISW cannot independently verify whether the Ukrainian bodies released by Russia were of those killed in action or in captivity. Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on June 15 that Ukrainian authorities will work to identify the repatriated bodies.[10] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on June 14 that Ukrainian officials expect to continue conducting POW exchanges with Russia during the week of June 16–23.[11]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to portray Russia as an effective and necessary international partner for the United States amid ongoing Iran-Israel tensions.
- Russia conducted a large drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of June 14 to 15, primarily targeting Poltava Oblast.
- Russia repatriated the bodies of over 1,000 Ukrainian citizens on June 15, in accordance with the June 2 Ukrainian–Russian bilateral talks in Istanbul.
- Russian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Kupyansk, Siversk, Chasiv Yar, and Toretsk.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 14, 2025
Russian forces continue to make marginal territorial gains east of Novopavlivka as Russian forces attempt to advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and toward the settlement from three tactical directions. Geolocated footage published on June 13 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Horikhove (east of Novopavlivka) and likely seized the settlement.[1] An assault detachment commander in the Russian 80th Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) told Kremlin newswire TASS on June 14 that the regiment participated in the advance into Horikhove.[2] ISW previously noted that Russian forces are currently engaged in a multi-pronged effort to advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and Russian forces appear to be attacking from three tactical directions: east, southeast, and south of Novopavlivka.[3] The Russian 41st CAA appears to be the main formation operating east of Novopavlivka.[4] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 80th Tank Regiment also recently advanced west of Kotlyarivka (east of Novopavlivka).[5] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 74th and 137th motorized rifle brigades (41st CAA) are also attacking near Kotlyarivka and Muravka (northeast of Novopavlivka) and that additional elements of the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade are attacking Horikhove from the north.[6] Russian forces intensified offensive operations southwest of Pokrovsk between Solone and Bohdanivka in the direction of the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative boundary in March and April 2025 and recently advanced to the administrative boundary within seven kilometers east of Novopavlivka.[7]
Russian forces also recently advanced into southeasternmost Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, just southeast of Dachne (southeast of Novopavlivka) to support Russian attacks east of the settlement, although Ukrainian forces appear to be counterattacking in the area. Geolocated footage published on June 12 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in eastern Oleksiivka (southeast of Novopavlivka).[8] Elements of the Russian 51st CAA (formerly the 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) seized Kurakhove in December 2024, and elements of the 51st CAA and the Eastern Grouping of Forces have slowly advanced west toward the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative boundary over the last five and a half months.[9] Russian milbloggers recently credited elements of the 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) with recently seizing Novoukrainka (west of Oleksiivka) and advancing into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[10] Russian forces appear to be attempting to advance along the Kurakhove-Novopavlivka T-0428 highway toward Novopavlivka from the southeast.
Recent Russian advances near Komar (south of Novopavlivka) are also part of Russia's ongoing offensive aimed at seizing Novopavlivka. Mashovets stated on June 14 that elements of the 36th CAA (Eastern Military District [EMD]) and the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) recently seized Fedorivka (south of Komar) and that elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) recently advanced from Odradne and Bahatyr toward Zaporizhzhia (all south of Novopavlivka).[11] Mashovets recently noted that the Russian military command redeployed the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade from the Kursk direction back to the Komar area, underscoring an apparent Russian effort to reinforce the Russian force grouping in this area.[12] Russian sources recently credited elements of the Russian 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet) and 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA) with seizing Komar, although one Russian milblogger denied that elements of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade participated in the seizure of Komar.[13] Russian forces appear to be attempting to advance north into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and toward Novopavlivka and Ivanivka (southwest of Novopavlivka) along both sides of the Mokri Yaly River north of Velyka Novosilka, as ISW previously assessed.[14]
Ukrainian forces continue to conduct long-range strikes against Russia's defense industrial base. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 14 that Ukrainian forces struck the Nevinnomyssk Azot Plant in Stavropol Krai on the night of June 13 to 14, which is one of the key manufacturers of basic components for Russian explosives, ammunition, and rocket fuel.[15] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported that the Nevinnomyssk Azot plant annually produces up to a million tons of ammonia and over a million tons of ammonium nitrate — a key component for explosives and artillery shells.[16] Kovalenko also noted that the plant synthesizes melamine, acetic acid, methanol, and potassium nitrate — all of which can be used to produce land mines, reactive charges, and grenades. Stavropol Krai Governor Vladimir Vladimirov claimed on June 14 that drone debris fell near the industrial zone in Nevinnomyssk.[17] Russian milbloggers posted footage showing a large fire at an industrial zone in Nevinnomyssk on June 14.[18] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces struck several of the Novokuybyshevsk Petrochemical Company's facilities in Samara Oblast on the night of June 13 to 14 and that the facilities produce explosive material components for the Russian military.[19] Kovalenko reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Novokuybyshev Catalyst Plant in Samara Oblast, which produces catalysts used for oil refineries that produce aviation and rocket fuel as well as diesel. Kovalenko noted that the plant repurposes catalytic material for fuel, lubricants, and explosives.[20] Ukrainian officials announced that they are assessing the damage in the aftermath of the strikes.
Ukraine and Russia conducted a fourth round of prisoner of war (POWs) exchanges on June 14, in accordance with the June 2 Ukrainian-Russian bilateral talks in Istanbul. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed on June 14 that Russia and Ukraine exchanged an unspecified number of wounded POWs, as well as POWs younger than 25 years of age.[21] Zelensky noted that Russia captured a majority of the exchanged Ukrainian POWs in 2022. Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of POWs reported on June 14 that Russia returned 1,200 bodies of Ukrainian citizens, a majority of which were military personnel.[22] ISW cannot independently verify whether the Ukrainian bodies released by Russia were of those killed in action or in captivity. Zelensky stated that Russia and Ukraine expect to continue conducting exchanges until June 20 or 21.[23]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian forces continue to make marginal territorial gains east of Novopavlivka as Russian forces attempt to advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and toward the settlement from three tactical directions.
- Ukrainian forces continue to conduct long-range strikes against Russia's defense industrial base.
- Ukraine and Russia conducted a fourth round of prisoner of war (POWs) exchanges on June 14, in accordance with the June 2 Ukrainian-Russian bilateral talks in Istanbul.
- Ukrainian forces advanced near Novopavlivka. Russian forces advanced near Toretsk and Novopavlivka.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 13, 2025
Russian officials largely condemned the June 13 Israeli strikes against Iran, as Russian President Vladimir Putin continued to offer to facilitate negotiations on Iran's nuclear program. Putin had separate phone calls with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on June 13.[i] The Kremlin claimed that Putin condemned Israel's strikes as violations of the UN Charter and international law. Putin reportedly stated that Russia supports efforts to resolve the situation about Iran's nuclear program and noted that Russia has already suggested initiatives aimed at finding a "mutually acceptable agreement." The Kremlin claimed that Putin emphasized to Netanyahu the importance of returning to the negotiation process and resolving issues about Iran's nuclear program through political and diplomatic means. Putin reportedly told Netanyahu that Russia is willing to mediate talks between Iran and Israel.
The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) condemned Israel's strikes against Iran and notably claimed that "unprovoked military strikes against a sovereign UN member state, its citizens, sleeping peaceful cities, and nuclear energy infrastructure facilities are categorically unacceptable."[ii] The Russian MFA claimed that these Israeli strikes against Iran undermined and set back efforts to find solutions to "eliminate any suspicions and prejudices regarding Iran's peaceful nuclear energy." The Russian MFA blamed Western states for provoking anti-Iranian "hysteria" in the International Atomic Energy Assocation (IAEA), referencing a June 10 resolution that the United States and E3 (United Kingdom, Germany, and France) proposed to declare Iran as noncompliant with its nuclear safeguarding obligation s.[iii] The Russian MFA issued travel advisories for Russian citizens for Israel and Iran.[iv] The Russian Embassy in Iran called on Russian citizens and "compatriots" in Iran to avoid military facilities and refrain from photographing or videoing "any part of Iran," and the Russian Embassy in Israel called for Russians in Israel to leave the country.[v]
Other Kremlin officials condemned Israel and the West for the strikes and advocated for a political and diplomatic Israeli-Iranian settlement.[vi] First Deputy Chairperson of the Russian State Duma Defense Committee Alexei Zhuravlev claimed that Russia's ties with Iran, including military ties, can become closer if necessary.[vii] Zhuravlev claimed that Russia has provided Iran with air defense systems and praised Iran's military technology, including technology that Russia helps Iran develop. Zhuravlev criticized the West for perpetuating "global injustice" and inequality and claimed that Russia's war in Ukraine is aimed at fighting this injustice.[viii] ISW will report further on the Russian reaction to the Israeli strikes against Iran in the upcoming Adversary Entente Task Force Update.
Oil price increases following Israeli strikes against Iran may increase Russian revenue from oil sales and improve Russia's ability to sustain its war effort in Ukraine. Brent crude oil futures prices rose by over five percent to $74.47 per barrel on June 13 following the Israeli strikes against Iran.[ix] Russia's oil and gas earnings accounted for roughly 30 percent of total federal revenues in 2024, underscoring the significant role oil and gas revenues play in financing Russian government spending.[x] ISW previously assessed that compounding economic constraints on Russia are increasingly hindering Russia's ability to sustain a prolonged war effort in Ukraine.[xi] Russia may be able to leverage sudden upticks in oil prices to weather economic challenges and finance a protracted war in Ukraine, assuming the price of oil remains high (such as over $60 per barrel). Russian President Vladimir Putin has previously signaled concern about reduced oil prices, suggesting that any reduction in the oil price would likely risk destabilizing Russia's economy.[xii]
The Kremlin is continuing efforts to prepare the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) for a protracted war with Ukraine and potential future war with NATO. Russian President Vladimir Putin opened the June 12 round of government discussions about the Russian State Rearmament Program for 2027-2036 that focused on the modernization and improvement of Russian air defense, space, drone, and robotic systems.[xiii] Putin claimed that Russia’s air defense systems have downed over 80,000 air targets since February 2022 - 7,500 of which Putin claimed were operational-tactical and cruise missiles. Putin claimed that almost all of these missiles were Western-manufactured. Putin claimed that the war in Ukraine has demonstrated Russia’s need for a "universal air defense system" capable of intercepting all projectiles regardless of their type. Putin’s statements regarding the need for enhanced Russian air defense systems are likely in part a response to Ukraine’s “Operation Spider Web,” in which Ukrainian forces demonstrated an ability to achieve operational surprise and launch drones against airbases in Russia's deep rear, highlighting the inability of air defenses in these areas to repel short-range Ukrainian first-person view (FPV) drone strikes.[xiv]
It is unclear how Russia intends to finance these large-scale modernization efforts. Russia’s DIB struggled to fulfill domestic and foreign contractual obligations even before the West implemented sanctions against Russia in response to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.[xv] .[xvi] Increased oil prices as a result of Israeli strikes against Iran may help Russia finance some of these efforts should oil prices remain high in the medium- to long-term. The Kremlin is likely employing lessons learned in Russia’s war against Ukraine to inform adaptations of Russia’s military and preparing Russia’s DIB for a protracted war against Ukraine and a potential confrontation with NATO.[xvii]
Russia released the bodies of killed in action (KIA) Ukrainian to Ukraine on June 13. The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War (POWs) reported on June 13 that Russia returned 1,200 bodies of Ukrainian citizens, a majority of which were military personnel.[xviii]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian officials largely condemned the June 13 Israeli strikes against Iran, as Russian President Vladimir Putin continued to offer to facilitate negotiations on Iran's nuclear program.
- Oil price increases following Israeli strikes against Iran may increase Russian revenue from oil sales and improve Russia's ability to sustain its war effort in Ukraine.
- The Kremlin is continuing efforts to prepare the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) for a protracted war with Ukraine and potential future war with NATO.
- Russia released the bodies of killed in action (KIA) Ukrainian servicemembers to Ukraine on June 13.
- Ukrainian forces advanced near Toretsk. Russian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Velkya Novosilka.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 12, 2025
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces have sustained over one million casualties since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022, over half of which occurred since January 2024.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 12 that Russian forces have sustained 628,000 casualties since January 2024.[2] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported a breakdown of Russian casualty rates since 2022: Russian forces reportedly sustained 106,720 casualties in 2022 (average of 340 casualties per day); 253,290 casualties in 2023 (average of 693 casualties per day); and 430,790 casualties in 2024 (average of 1,177 casualties per day).[3]
Russian forces have reportedly sustained an average of 1,286 casualties per day between January and early June 2025 in exchange for marginal territorial gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces had already sustained over 200,000 casualties in 2025 as of June 4, 2025.[4] Ukrainian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) news agency ArmyInform reported on June 5 that an unnamed NATO official stated that Russian forces are sustaining an average casualty rate of 1,140 personnel per day.[5] Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Pavlo Palisa stated on June 4 that Russia is sustaining roughly 167 casualties per square kilometer of advance.[6] The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on June 11 that Russian forces seized more territory in May 2025 than any other month since the end of 2022.[7] ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have seized roughly 1,935 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory thus far in 2025 as of June 12, 2025ISW continues to assess that the Russian military command is willfully taking disproportionately large manpower losses for marginal territorial gains across the theater and that these losses are unsustainable in the medium-term and unlikely to result in significant, rapid gains.[8] Russian forces continue to burn through personnel in their ongoing efforts to seize the remainder of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts; advance in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts; and establish buffer zones in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts[9]
Russian forces recently advanced across the western Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border northwest of Kurakhove as part of a multi-pronged effort to advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Geolocated footage published on June 11 indicates that Russian forces advanced along the T-0428 Kurakhove-Novopavlivka highway and crossed the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border northwest of Novoukrainka (northwest of Kurakhove).[10] This advance indicates that Russian forces likely seized Novoukrainka, Zelenyi Kut, Oleksiivka, and Bahatyr (all along the T-0428 highway west and northwest of Kurakhove). Russian milbloggers credited infantry elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) with advancing across the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border near Novoukrainka and claimed that elements of this brigade are also fighting near Zelenyi Kut and Oleksiivka.[11] Milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced further south of Novoukrainka, though ISW has not observed geolocated footage to support this claim.[12] Russian forces are likely attempting to advance toward the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border from at least two directions: from the east along the Novomykolaivka-Novoukrainka line with elements of the Central Grouping of Forces, including from the 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 90th Tank Division, and 55th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both 41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]); and from the south from the Velyka Novosilka direction with elements of the Eastern Grouping of Forces.[13] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on June 11 that unspecified elements of the Eastern Grouping of Forces reached the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border in an unspecified area, likely in the Velyka Novosilka direction.[14]
Russian forces are likely attempting to level the frontlines in the Novopavlivka and Kurakhove directions to advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Russian forces first crossed the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border northwest of Horikhove (northwest of Ukrainka and southeast of Novopavlivka) as of June 9 and will likely seek to secure further advances to level the current salients near Horikhove and Novoukrainka.[15] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also seek to even out the frontline near Udachne (northeast of Novopavlivka along the T-0406 Pokrovsk-Mekhova highway) and Muravka (southeast of Udachne and north of Horikhove).[16] Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vyacheslav Voloshyn reported on June 12 that Russian forces conducted 46 assaults in the Novopavlivka direction (likely inclusive of activity west and northwest of Kurakhove) in the past day and that this is the most active Russian forces have been in this area of the frontline since the start of the full-scale invasion.[17] Voloshyn reported on June 11 that Russian forces are using motorcycles in assaults to try to advance quickly and make it difficult for Ukraine to reinforce the area.[18] Kremlin officials and Russian commentators have framed Russian efforts to advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast as efforts to create a ”buffer zone,” indicating that Russia continues to have wider territorial ambitions in Ukraine beyond the areas it has illegally annexed.[19] A Ukrainian captain operating in the area told the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) in an article published on June 11 that reaching the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border has symbolic importance for Russia and that Russian forces have been incurring high personnel casualties during assaults in open fields in recent months in pursuit of informational objectives.[20]
The Ukrainian forces continue to demonstrate their ability to conduct successful long-range strikes that target Russia's defense industrial base (DIB). The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 12 that Ukrainian forces, including elements of the Unmanned Systems Forces, conducted a strike on the night of June 11 to 12 against the Rezonit Plant in the Zubovo Technopark in Zubovo, Moscow Oblast.[21] The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported that the Rezonit Plant produces navigation systems for artillery systems, printed circuit boards, and other microelectronics necessary for Russian naval weaponry and missiles, including Kalibr and Kh-101 cruise missiles, Iskander cruise and ballistic missiles, and Lancet and Kub loitering munitions.[22] NASA Fire Information for Resource Management (FIRMS) data for June 12 shows satellite-detected heat anomalies in Zubovo, which is consistent with the Ukrainian reports of a strike against the Zubovo Technopark.
Ukraine and Russia exchanged prisoners of war (POWs) again on June 12, in accordance with agreements the parties previously reached during talks in Istanbul on June 2. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed that Ukraine and Russia exchanged an unspecified number of seriously wounded POWs on June 12.[23] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov stated on June 12 that the exchange included Ukrainian POWs who defended Mariupol and spent more than three years in Russian captivity.[24] Zelensky and Budanov reported that Ukraine expects another round of POW exchanges soon. The Russian MoD and Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (VGTRK) correspondent Yevgeny Poddubny claimed on June 12 that Russia is ready to conduct daily POW exchanges in accordance with the schedule that Russia and Ukraine agreed upon in Istanbul but accused Ukraine of being unwilling to reciprocate.[25] Russian authorities have recently weaponized POW exchanges and baselessly accused Ukraine of failing to repatriate the bodies of killed in action (KIA) soldiers following the Istanbul talks in order to discredit Ukraine and distract from Russia's own abuses of Ukrainian soldiers and repeated refusals to cooperate in confidence-building measures.[26]
Southeastern European countries reiterated their support for Ukraine on June 11, including Serbia signaling its willingness to improve bilateral relations with Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky hosted the fourth Ukraine-Southeast Europe Summit in Odesa City on June 11, which included Moldovan President Maia Sandu, Montenegrin President Jakov Milatović, Romanian President Nicușor Dan, Bulgarian Prime Minister Rossen Jeliazkov, Croatian President Andrej Plenković, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, Albanian Speaker of Parliament Elisa Spiropali, North Macedonian Deputy President Izet Mexhiti, and Slovenian Deputy Prime Minister Tanja Fajon.[27] Most of the participants issued a declaration condemning Russia’s war against Ukraine, and called for continued military, humanitarian, and diplomatic assistance to Ukraine, the full withdrawal of Russian forces and equipment from Ukraine, and Ukrainian membership in NATO and the European Union (EU). Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic notably attended the June 11 summit, marking his first official visit to Ukraine, but did not sign the concluding declaration.[28] Vucic articulated Serbia's willingness to invest in reconstruction efforts in one or two Ukrainian cities or oblasts.[29] Vucic emphasized that Serbia will continue to support Ukraine's territorial integrity and provide humanitarian aid. Russian officials and pro-Kremlin mouthpieces expressed outrage at Vucic's statements and attendance at the summit and attempted to downplay Vucic's support of Ukraine by claiming that Vucic only attended the summit due to external pressure.[30] Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee Deputy Head Alexei Chepa stated that Vucic's statements left a "bitter aftertaste" for Russia.[31]
Germany pledged to supply Ukraine with additional financial and materiel support, including air defense systems. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on June 12 that Ukraine secured a three-year agreement to receive an unspecified number of IRIS-T air defense systems from Germany.[32] German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius expressed his intent to provide Ukraine with an additional 1.9 billion euros (approximately $2.2 billion) in 2025, including to support Ukraine's long-range weapon capabilities.[33] Pistorius' pledge of an additional 1.9 billion euros of support follows the previously agreed upon amount of seven billion euros (approximately $8.1 billion) — bringing German support to a total of nine billion euros (approximately $10.4 billion) should the German Bundestag approve these proposals.
Key Takeaways:
- The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces have sustained over one million casualties since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022, over half of which occurred since January 2024.
- Russian forces have reportedly sustained an average of 1,286 casualties per day between January and early June 2025 in exchange for marginal territorial gains.
- Russian forces recently advanced across the western Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border northwest of Kurakhove as part of a multi-pronged effort to advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.
- Russian forces are likely attempting to level the frontlines in the Novopavlivka and Kurakhove directions to advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.
- The Ukrainian forces continue to demonstrate their ability to conduct successful long-range strikes that target Russia's defense industrial base (DIB).
- Ukraine and Russia exchanged prisoners of war (POWs) again on June 12, in accordance with agreements the parties previously reached during talks in Istanbul on June 2.
- Southeastern European countries reiterated their support for Ukraine on June 11, including Serbia signaling its willingness to improve bilateral relations with Ukraine.
- Germany pledged to supply Ukraine with additional financial and materiel support, including air defense systems.
- Ukrainian forces advanced near Toretsk. Russian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Siversk and Kurakhove.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 11, 2025
US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth stated on June 10 that the United States intends to reduce its budget for the purchase of weapons for Ukraine in 2026.[i] Hegseth did not specify the extent of the planned cutbacks. Hegseth stated that "a negotiated, peaceful settlement" is in the best interest of Ukraine, Russia, and the United States but that "the word victory," as well as the path to victory and to peace, have not been clearly defined.
Reducing US military aid to Ukraine will neither lead to a sustainable peace in Ukraine nor compel Russian President Vladimir Putin to reassess his theory of victory. Putin's theory of victory posits that the Russian military can sustain creeping, incremental advances on the battlefield longer than Ukrainian forces can defend and longer than the West is willing to support Ukraine.[ii] ISW continues to assess that Western military aid, particularly that which only the United States can provide rapidly and at scale, remains crucial in enabling Ukrainian forces to make decisive gains on the battlefield and pressuring Putin to reassess his theory of victory.[iii] Battlefield gains that change Putin's calculus would force Russia to engage in constructive negotiations to ensure a peaceful resolution to the war. A reduction in US aid to Ukraine risks giving Russia greater advantages on the battlefield and would likely embolden Putin to continue his war and strengthen his belief that Russia can conquer Ukraine, which is incompatible with US President Donald Trump's stated goal of ensuring an enduring peace in Ukraine.
The Kremlin continues to attack Ukraine using rhetoric presenting an anachronistic reading of Ukraine's history, denying the existence of an independent Ukrainian language and culture, and discrediting the Ukrainian government. Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky claimed to the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) in an interview published on June 11 that the war in Ukraine is a war between two countries with a shared language and culture and likened the war to "a conflict between two brothers."[iv] Medinsky's statement is consistent with other Kremlin rhetoric attempting to portray Ukraine as lacking an independent identity and statehood from Russia — reflective of Russia's war goals that seek Ukraine's complete capitulation to Russia and the installation of a pro-Russian puppet government.[v] Russian State Duma Chairperson Vyacheslav Volodin also reiterated Kremlin rhetorical lines falsely claiming that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is illegitimate and only the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada is legitimate.[vi] The Ukrainian Constitution bars the government from holding elections when martial law is in effect, and the Ukrainian government legally cannot abolish martial law while Russia continues to attack Ukraine.[vii] ISW continues to assess that Russia is very likely promoting such narratives to set conditions for Russia to withdraw from any future peace agreements with Ukraine at a time of Russia's choosing and to support Russia's long-standing demand that Ukraine acquiesce to regime change and the installation of a pro-Russian proxy government.[viii]
Russian officials are also attempting to rhetorically split Ukraine from its Western partners and advocating for an escalation of Russian strike tactics in Ukraine as part of wider efforts to intimidate the West into weakening its support for Ukraine. Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky told the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) on June 11 that it is impossible to fight a protracted war against Russia and that Russia always defeats its enemies in protracted wars, citing Russia's 21-year-war with Sweden in the 18th century.[ix] Medinsky claimed that Russia will be "forced to respond" if "Ukraine keeps being driven by the national interests of others." Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov claimed in an interview with Kremlin newswire TASS published on June 9 that European states are the main obstacle to peace in Ukraine and are pushing Ukraine to continue military operations against Russia.[x] Volodin claimed on June 11 that Germany's military support for Ukraine is the reason that Russia has conflict with Germany.[xi] Russian State Duma Defense Committee First Deputy Chairperson Alexei Zhuravlev separately called for Russia to strike Ukraine with a second Oreshnik intermediate-range nuclear-capable ballistic missile and implied that Russia may launch an Oreshnik against Ukraine soon.[xii] Kremlin officials periodically threaten escalation with the West while accusing the West of escalating the war in Ukraine by providing Ukraine with military aid in an effort to prevent the West from giving further assistance to Ukraine, which plays into Putin's theory of victory.[xiii]
Russian officials continue to promote anti-NATO and anti-Western rhetoric, likely as part of the Kremlin's continued efforts to prepare Russian society for a potential future war against NATO. Ryabkov claimed in the TASS interview published on June 9 that NATO expansion is an "acute problem" and a "root cause" of the contradictions between the United States and Russia, and that it will be impossible to resolve the war in Ukraine without solving the problem of NATO.[xiv] Ryabkov stated that the Kremlin demanded a legally binding, long-term guarantee from the United States and NATO in December 2021 that NATO would not expand further nor deploy long-range weapons near the NATO-Russia border.[xv] Ryabkov reiterated that the Kremlin's position on this matter remains unchanged and called for NATO to reduce the size of the NATO contingent in Eastern Europe. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova overstated on June 11 NATO defensive measures in Eastern Europe and claimed that NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte is trying to intimidate the population of NATO countries by saying that Russia is a threat to NATO.[xvi] Russian officials have long used anti-Western and anti-NATO rhetoric to justify and consolidate domestic support for a protracted war against Ukraine and to prepare the Russian domestic audience for a potential future conflict against NATO.[xvii]
Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian military and defense industrial targets in the Russian rear. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against the Tambov Gunpowder Plant in Kotovsk, Tambov Oblast, the Buturlinovka Airfield in Voronezh Oblast, and an ammunition depot subordinated to Russia's 106th Airborne (VDV) Division in Kursk Oblast overnight on June 10 to 11.[xviii] The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko noted that the Tambov Gunpowder Plant, a subsidiary of Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec, produces gunpowder for small arms, artillery, and rocket rounds as well as colloxylin (a form of nitrocellulose used for explosives), and is a main supplier of explosives for the Russian military.[xix] Geolocated footage published on June 11 shows a large fire and secondary explosions at the Tambov plant, and additional footage from Russian sources shows drones reportedly flying in the area.[xx] Geolocated footage published on June 11 shows a Ukrainian airstrike against a Russian base in Kulbaki, Kursk Oblast, where Russian forces reportedly stored electronic warfare (EW) systems, drone jammers, and other electronics.[xxi] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 6 that Ukrainian forces struck command posts of the 72nd Motorized Rifle Division (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), including its 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment, near Kulbaki.[xxii]
Ukraine and Russia exchanged the bodies of killed in action (KIA) soldiers on June 11, in accordance with agreements previously reached during talks in Istanbul. The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War (POWs) reported that Russian authorities returned the bodies of 1,212 Ukrainian soldiers.[xxiii] Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky claimed that Ukrainian authorities returned the bodies of 27 Russian soldiers.[xxiv] Russian authorities have baselessly accused Ukraine of failing to repatriate the bodies of KIA soldiers following the Istanbul talks and have notably weaponized similar exchanges involving prisoners of war (POWs) to discredit Ukraine and distract from Russia's own abuses of Ukrainian soldiers.[xxv]
Key Takeaways:
- Reducing US military aid to Ukraine will neither lead to a sustainable peace in Ukraine nor compel Russian President Vladimir Putin to reassess his theory of victory.
- The Kremlin continues to attack Ukraine using rhetoric presenting an anachronistic reading of Ukraine's history, denying the existence of an independent Ukrainian language and culture, and discrediting the Ukrainian government.
- Russian officials are also attempting to rhetorically split Ukraine from its Western partners and advocating for an escalation of Russian strike tactics in Ukraine as part of wider efforts to intimidate the West into weakening its support for Ukraine.
- Russian officials continue to promote anti-NATO and anti-Western rhetoric, likely as part of the Kremlin's continued efforts to prepare Russian society for a potential future war against NATO.
- Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian military and defense industrial targets in the Russian rear.
- Ukraine and Russia exchanged the bodies of killed in action (KIA) soldiers on June 11, in accordance with agreements previously reached during talks in Istanbul.
- Ukrainian forces advanced near Borova. Russian forces advanced near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 10, 2025
Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be switching between rhetoric focused on Russian ethnic nationalism and Russian multinationalism, but remains committed to promoting anti-Western sentiment and the militarization of Russia's youth. Putin held a meeting with the Security Council on June 10 that largely focused on the unification of the peoples of Russia and the use of military-patriotic youth programs and Russian government initiatives to promote Russian patriotism.[1] Putin highlighted the work of the "Movement of the First," a Russian youth movement aimed at promoting military-patriotic education in Russia and occupied Ukraine, and "Yunarmiya" ("The Youth Army"), a movement that is responsible for instilling pro-war sentiments in Russian children and teenagers. Putin also highlighted the Russian state-mandated weekly lessons in schools that often include lectures by soldiers from the war in Ukraine. Putin platformed BRICS, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) — Russian-dominated organizations that Putin and other Kremlin officials have repeatedly postured as the foundation of Putin's envisioned anti-Western and anti-NATO Eurasian security architecture.[2] Putin stated that Russia must respond to challenges that promote interethnic and interreligious conflict in Russia and highlighted the "unity of the peoples of Russia." Putin recently began forwarding an unofficial ideology formulated on Russian nationalism that positions Russia in opposition to the West, which marked a notable departure from Putin's usual rhetoric promoting the multiethnic and multireligious makeup of Russia's population.[3] Putin's remarks at the June 10 Security Council meeting appear to be a return to this rhetoric about the diversity of Russia and Russian civic nationalism. Putin appears committed, however, to promoting anti-Western and pro-war sentiments, especially in Russian youth, likely as part of efforts to prepare Russian society for a protracted war in Ukraine and possible future conflict with NATO. Putin's June 10 statements about harmony and unity in Russia indicate that he likely remains hesitant to fully commit to a nationalist ideology centered around ethnic Russians, as this risks fragmenting Russia's multiethnic population. ISW continues to assess that Putin must work to balance appeasing the influential xenophobic and ultranationalist community, which is a key constituency for Putin, with the need to leverage migrants to offset immediate economic and force generation challenges and long-term demographic decline.[4]
Russia is reportedly working to increase the number of North Korean labor migrants in Russia, likely to support Russia's workforce and to directly join the Russian military. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov reported on June 7 that Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu agreed during his recent visit to North Korea to work to bring more North Korean migrants to work in Russia.[5] This reported agreement is a violation of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2397, to which Russia is a signatory and which prohibits North Korea from sending its citizens abroad for work and mandated that all UN member states expel all North Koreans "earning income" abroad by December 2019.[6] Russia vetoed in March 2024 an annual UNSC resolution extending a monitoring panel tracking adherence to UN sanctions against North Korea.[7] Budanov stated that Russia is likely looking to North Koreans to replace migrants from Central Asia. Budanov stated that many North Korean laborers in Russia will likely sign military contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). ISW assessed in February 2025 that Russia was creating opportunities for North Korean migrants to go to Russia to join the Russian workforce or the Russian military.[8] Russia and North Korea have been overtly increasing their defense cooperation through mutual defense treaties, the transfer of military technology and materiel, and the deployment of North Korean forces to fight alongside Russian forces in Kursk Oblast.[9] Russia and North Korea appear to be trying to engage in more covert ways to create pathways through which North Koreans can enter Russia’s military recruitment pipeline.
Ukraine and Russia conducted the second round of prisoner of war (POW) exchanges on June 10, in accordance with agreements the parties reached in Istanbul on June 2. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the Russian MoD confirmed that Ukraine and Russia exchanged an unspecified number of wounded POWs.[10] Zelensky noted that this exchange marked the first stage of the exchange of seriously wounded POWs, and that Russia and Ukraine are expected to continue POW exchanges.
Key Takeaways:
- Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be switching between rhetoric focused on Russian ethnic nationalism and Russian multinationalism, but remains committed to promoting anti-Western sentiment and the militarization of Russia's youth.
- Russia is reportedly working to increase the number of North Korean labor migrants in Russia, likely to support Russia's workforce and to directly join the Russian military.
- Ukraine and Russia conducted the second round of prisoner of war (POW) exchanges on June 10, in accordance with agreements the parties reached in Istanbul on June 2.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Borova, Lyman, and Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk and Toretsk.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 9, 2025
Russian forces recently advanced to the Dnipropetrovsk-Donetsk administrative border as Kremlin officials continued to demonstrate that Russia has wider territorial ambitions in Ukraine beyond Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and Crimea. Geolocated footage published on June 9 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced to the Dnipropetrovsk-Donetsk administrative border northwest of Horikhove (southeast of Novopavlivka).[1] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on June 9 that Russia's Central Grouping of Forces seized more territory in unspecified areas of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[2] Russian milbloggers claimed on June 8 and 9 that Russian forces, including elements of the 90th Tank Division (41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]), are fighting near and across the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border.[3] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on June 9 that Russia has begun an offensive into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast "within the framework of the creation of a buffer zone" in Ukraine.[4] First Deputy Chairperson of the Russian State Duma Defense Committee Alexei Zhuravlev claimed that Dnipropetrovsk Oblast is now within the "sphere of interests" of the Russian military.[5] Chairperson of the Federation Council Committee on Constitutional Legislation and State Building Andrei Klishas claimed that Russia's offensive into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast indicates the beginning of Russia's "denazification" of the oblast - a reference to Russia's longtime demand for regime change in Ukraine.[6] Chairperson of the Duma Defense Committee Dmitry Sablin claimed that Russia will "definitely take" Dnipro City and other unspecified Ukrainian cities if Ukraine "does not make peace on [Russia's] terms."[7] Russian officials are likely setting information conditions to illegally declare Dnipropetrovsk Oblast annexed, as ISW has previously assessed.[8] Kremlin officials have repeatedly signaled that Russia maintains territorial ambitions beyond the four oblasts that Russia has already illegally annexed, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov notably repeated a longstanding Kremlin claim that Odesa City is a "Russian" city as recently as June 9.[9] Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Colonel Pavlo Palisa stated on June 5 that Russia likely seeks to occupy the entirety of Ukraine on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River, including parts of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and to seize Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts by the end of 2026.[10] ISW continues to assess that Russia is not interested in peace negotiations with Ukraine and that Russia is preparing for a protracted war in order to make further battlefield gains.[11]
ISW continues to assess that current Russian tactical activity in the vicinity of southeastern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast is a continuation of ongoing Russian offensive efforts in southwestern Donetsk Oblast — not the beginning of a new major offensive operation to seize operationally significant territory in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[12] ISW will continue to assess the situation in southeastern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and update its assessment.
The Kremlin appears to be dangling the prospect of bilateral arms control talks with the United States to extract preemptive concessions from the United States about the war in Ukraine. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded on June 9 to a question about Russia ending its moratorium on the deployment of land-based missiles prohibited under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty by claiming that Russia retains "freedom of action" - mirroring Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov's June 7 claim that Russia's "unilateral moratorium" on the deployment of such missiles is nearing its "logical conclusion."[13] Ryabkov claimed on June 9 that Russia and United States need a "reliable ... military-political foundation" in order to resume arms control talks and that the United States must be willing to respect Russia's "fundamental interests" in order to normalize bilateral relations.[14] Ryabkov claimed that the United States' actions regarding the war in Ukraine could demonstrate the seriousness of the United States' intentions to improve relations with Russia. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov further claimed on June 9 that Russia will be ready to resume strategic stability talks with the United States when the discussions will be on equal footing.[15] Kremlin officials appear to be asserting that Russia's willingness to engage in arms control talks with the United States in the future is contingent on Russia gaining preemptive concessions from the United States about the war in Ukraine. Russia notably violated the INF Treaty by developing, testing, and deploying intermediate-range missiles, leading the United States to suspend its participation in the treaty in February 2019.[16] ISW assessed in early 2025 that Russia was using economic incentives that are unrelated to the war in Ukraine to extract concessions from the United States about the war in Ukraine, and Russia's use of incentives related to arms control talks appear to be the latest iteration of this overall effort.[17]
Western security officials continue to assess that Russia is preparing for a protracted confrontation with NATO. NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte stated on June 9 that intelligence assesses that Russia will produce 1,500 tanks, 3,000 armored vehicles, and 200 Iskander missiles in 2025.[18] It is unclear whether these vehicle production assessments are only referring to Russia's production of new vehicles or also include vehicles from Russia's Soviet-era stockpiles that Russia is refurbishing. Rutte stated that Russia is cooperating with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), North Korea, and Iran and that Russia is reconstituting its forces with Chinese technology. Rutte announced that NATO states' defense ministers agreed on June 5 to increase air and missile defense spending by 400 percent in order to protect against large-scale drone and missile strikes like those that Russia is launching against Ukraine. Rutte also stated that Russia could be capable of launching military operations against NATO within five years. ISW assesses that Russia does not need to reconstitute its forces to pre-2022 levels before posing a threat to NATO states and could launch military operations against a NATO state before 2030.
Russian forces conducted the largest combined missile and drone strike of the war overnight on June 8 and 9. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 499 projectiles, including 479 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[19] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched four Kh-47M2 "Kinzhal" aeroballistic missiles from Tambov Oblast; 10 Kh-101 cruise missiles from Saratov Oblast; three Kh-22 cruise missiles and two Kh-31P anti-radar missiles from airspace over the Black Sea; and one Kh-35 anti-ship cruise missile from occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 277 Shahed and decoy drones and that 183 drones "lost" or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down all 10 Kh-101 cruise missiles, all four Kh-47M2 Kinzhal missiles, two Kh-22 cruise missiles, both of the Kh-31P anti-radar missiles, and the one Kh-35 cruise missile. Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strikes hit Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Poltava, Kyiv, Rivne, and Volyn oblasts, damaging civilian infrastructure.[20]
Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yurii Ihnat stated on June 9 that Russian forces continue to adapt their strike packages against Ukraine, using large numbers of drones to overwhelm Ukrainian air defense systems and distract from subsequent cruise and ballistic missile launches.[21] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that the June 8 to 9 strike series was part of Russia’s response to Ukraine’s ”Operation Spider Web” long-range drone strike series against Russian air bases on June 1.[22] ISW has notably observed a significant increase in the scale of Russia's drone and missile strike packages against Ukraine prior to ”Operation Spider Web."[23]
Ukrainian forces continue to conduct drone strikes against Russian military and defense industrial targets that are involved in Russia's long-range drone and missile strikes against Ukraine. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 9 that Ukrainian forces, including elements of the Special Operations Forces, struck Savasleyka Airbase in Nizhny Novgorod Oblast where Russian forces base MiG-31K fighter jets that carry Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles.[24] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that preliminary information indicated that Ukrainian forces hit two aircraft, which the Ukrainian General Staff assesses are likely a MiG-31 fighter jet and a Su-30/34 fighter jet. The Ukrainian General Staff also reported on June 9 that Ukrainian forces, including elements of the Unmanned Systems Forces, struck the All-Russian Research Institute of Relay Engineering (VNIIR)-Progress enterprise in Cheboksary, Chuvashia Republic with at least two drones, causing a large-scale fire.[25] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that VNIIR-Progress manufactures navigation equipment, including unified planning and correction modules (UMPK) for glide bombs. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko added that VNIIR-Progress also makes electromechanical drives, hydraulic systems, and control units for heavy military equipment, including howitzers and Iskander missiles, and satellite navigation modules that Russian forces use in Shahed drones and Iskander-M, Kalibr, Kh-101, and Kh-69 cruise missiles.[26] Geolocated footage published on June 9 shows smoke at the VNIIR-Progress plant.[27] Chuvashia Republic Head Oleg Nikolaev claimed on June 9 that two drones fell on the VNIIR-Progress facility, temporarily suspending operations.[28]
Ukraine and Russia on June 9 conducted the first round of the prisoner of war (POW) exchanges that the parties agreed to during the latest bilateral talks in Istanbul on June 2 as Russian officials continued to baselessly accuse Ukraine of failing to repatriate the bodies of killed in action (KIA) soldiers. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated on June 9 that Ukraine and Russia exchanged an unspecified number of POWs as part of the first round of POW exchanges.[29] Zelensky stated that further exchanges will continue in several stages over the coming days and that the two sides are currently exchanging wounded POWs and prisoners under 25 years of age. Russian officials, including Chairperson of the Russian Federation Council's Committee on Foreign Affairs Grigory Karasin, continued to baselessly accuse Ukraine on June 9 of refusing to exchange the bodies of KIA Ukrainian soldiers.[30] Zelensky stated on June 8 that Russia’s failure to deliver its promised list of over 1,000 Ukrainian POWs and servicemembers are hampering Ukrainian efforts to repatriate KIA Ukrainians.[31] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Andriy Yusov stated on June 9 that Ukrainian officials expect to receive more information regarding a potential KIA exchange over the coming days.[32]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian forces recently advanced to the Dnipropetrovsk-Donetsk administrative border as Kremlin officials continued to demonstrate that Russia has wider territorial ambitions in Ukraine beyond Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and Crimea.
- The Kremlin appears to be dangling the prospect of bilateral arms control talks with the United States to extract preemptive concessions from the United States about the war in Ukraine.
- Western security officials continue to assess that Russia is preparing for a protracted confrontation with NATO.
- Russian forces conducted the largest combined missile and drone strike of the war overnight on June 8 and 9.
- Ukrainian forces continue to conduct drone strikes against Russian military and defense industrial targets that are involved in Russia's long-range drone and missile strikes against Ukraine.
- Ukraine and Russia on June 9 conducted the first round of the prisoner of war (POW) exchanges that the parties agreed to during the latest bilateral talks in Istanbul on June 2 as Russian officials continued to baselessly accuse Ukraine of failing to repatriate the bodies of killed in action (KIA) soldiers.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Lyman. Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Novopavlivka, and Kurakhove.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 8, 2025
Kremlin officials and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on June 8 that Russian forces reached the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border and are conducting offensive operations into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast — an oblast that Russia has not illegally declared as annexed. The Russian MoD claimed on June 8 that elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) reached the western border of Donetsk Oblast and are continuing to develop an offensive in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[i] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on June 8 that Russian forces “began an offensive” in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and threatened that those who do not acknowledge current "realities of war" on the battlefield during negotiations will "receive new realities on the ground."[ii] Kremlin officials have repeatedly claimed that any negotiations to end the war must consider the "realities on the ground" (a reference to the current frontline in Ukraine) to demand that Ukraine concede to Russia's demands under threat of further Russian demands.[iii] A Russian milblogger claimed on June 8 that Russian forces reached the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border northwest of Horikhove (southeast of Novopavlivka) and advanced southeast of Muravka (northeast of Novopavlivka), west of Kotlyarivka (east of Novopavlivka), and west and southwest of Bohdanivka (southeast of Novopavlivka).[iv] ISW has not observed geolocated evidence of these claimed advances near the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border as of this writing. ISW forecasted in November 2024 that the Russian military command could advance to the southeasternmost part of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and to envelop these Ukrainian positions in support of Russia's wider campaign to seize all of Donetsk Oblast.[v]
Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated on June 8 that fighting continued in the Novopavlivka direction but only in Donetsk Oblast.[vi] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the area stated that Russian forces did not cross the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border.[vii] Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported that Ukrainian General Staff Representative Andriy Kovalev stated that claims that Russian forces crossed the border are "Russian disinformation" and not true. NASA Fire Information for Resource Management (FIRMS) data shows satellite-detected heat and infrared anomalies along the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border, and satellite imagery collected on June 7 and 8 shows the appearance of new artillery craters near the border in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. FIRMS data and artillery craters near the border indicate artillery missions in the area and are not inconsistent with official Ukrainian statements about continued fighting in Donetsk Oblast east of the border. ISW assesses that current Russian tactical activity in the vicinity of southeastern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast is a continuation of ongoing Russian offensive efforts in southwestern Donetsk Oblast — not the beginning of a new major offensive operation to seize operationally significant territory in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. ISW will continue to assess the situation in southeastern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and update its assessment.
Russian officials have repeatedly signaled that the Kremlin has wider territorial ambitions in Ukraine, including in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Artem Zhoga, the former commander of the 80th ”Sparta” Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) and current presidential representative to the Ural Federal Okrug, claimed on June 8 that the 90th Tank Division is "closing the strategic gates to the Dnipro [River]."[viii] Zhoga's reference to the Dnipro River is consistent with other Russian officials' calls for Russia to seize territory near the river in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Russian officials have called for Russia to control the areas of the Dnipro River that pass through Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and routinely invoke the Kremlin's concept of "Novorossiya," which Russian officials have defined as all of eastern and southern Ukraine.[ix] ISW observed reported in May 2025 that Russia was setting conditions to establish permanent control over the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), suggesting that Russia may plan to occupy and annex Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[x] Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Colonel Pavlo Palisa also stated on June 5 Russia intends to occupy the entirety of Ukraine on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River, including eastern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, by the end of 2026.[xi]
Russia continued to baselessly accuse Ukraine of failing to repatriate the bodies of killed in action (KIA) soldiers on June 8 — part of the Kremlin's efforts to undermine mutually agreed upon confidence-building measures with Ukraine. Russian First Deputy Chief of Information of the General Staff's Main Directorate (GRU) Lieutenant General Alexander Zorin claimed on June 8 that Russia delivered the bodies of 1,212 KIA Ukrainians to an exchange point in accordance with purported agreements made during the June 2 Ukrainian-Russian talks in Istanbul.[xii] Zorin baselessly claimed that no exchange took place on June 7 because Ukraine did not respond to Russia’s messages about the exchange, that Russia continues to wait for confirmation from Ukrainian officials, and that Ukraine is postponing the exchange.[xiii] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov stated on June 8 that authorities in Ukraine and Russia received notice on June 3 — the day following the most recent bilateral talks in Istanbul — that the prisoner of war (POW) and KIA exchanges that Ukraine and Russia agreed upon in Istanbul would occur during at a future date during the week of June 9 to 16.[xiv] GUR Spokesperson Andriy Yusov stated on June 7 that Ukraine and Russia have not yet established the exact date of the KIA exchange and that Ukraine is still preparing for the repatriation exchange.[xv] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin's unwillingness to engage in good faith in lower-level confidence-building measures designed to facilitate larger peace negotiations further demonstrates Russia's disinterest in peace negotiations.[xvi]
The Kremlin appears to have orchestrated a concerted media campaign that aimed to use the purportedly agreed-upon KIA exchange in order to discredit Ukraine and promote Russia's justifications for its war to both domestic and international audiences. Zorin made his claims during a press conference for domestic Russian and foreign journalists in front of refrigerated transport trucks reportedly holding the bodies of Ukrainian KIA servicemembers.[xvii] Yusov stated that Russian officials filmed the videos of the refrigerated trucks and held the press conference for journalists on Russian territory far from the agreed upon exchange location, however.[xviii] Journalists from Russian and international media outlets, including Russian Ministry of Defense-run TV network Zvezda, Russian state media TV channel Channel One (Perviy Kanal), Kremlin-affiliated outlet Izvestia, Hezbollah-affiliated Al Mayadeen TV outlet, and Qatari-owned Al Araby al Jadeed TV outlet, attended the press conference.[xix] Kremlin newswire TASS amplified footage of an Al Mayadeen journalist claiming that Ukraine's alleged refusal to accept the KIA bodies shows the "Nazi nature" of the Ukrainian authorities and footage of an Al Araby journalist claiming that Russia continues to fulfill the commitments it made in Istanbul.[xx] Russian officials likely invited foreign and domestic news outlets to the press conference in order to promote to both foreign and domestic audiences the Russian narratives that Ukraine is spoiling confidence-building measures and peace negotiations and to posture the international community, particularly the Middle East, as supporting Russia's justifications for its full-scale invasion and demands of regime change in Kyiv.[xxi]
Russian officials appear to be setting conditions to withdraw from international arms control treaties, likely as part of preparation for a potential future war with NATO. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov claimed in an interview with Kremlin newswire TASS published on June 7 that Russia’s “unilateral moratorium” on the deployment of land-based missiles prohibited under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty is nearing its “logical conclusion," suggesting that Russia may openly deploy such missiles in the future.[xxii] Ryabkov also claimed that the United States and its Western allies did not appreciate or reciprocate Russia’s "restraint" following the United States' withdrawal from the INF Treaty in 2019. Ryabkov's claim that Russia has continued to abide by the INF Treaty since the US withdrawal are false. The United States suspended its participation in the INF Treaty on February 1, 2019 and withdrew from the treaty in August 2019 due to Russia's development, testing, and deployment of intermediate-range 9M729 (SSC-8) missiles in violation of the treaty.[xxiii] Russia suspended its participation in the INF Treaty in response to the US suspension on February 2, 2019. Ryabkov’s allegations of Russia's continued adherence to the treaty are likely part of the Kremlin’s ongoing efforts to falsely portray itself as a genuine participant in de-escalation efforts and to portray the West and NATO as threats to Russia's security. The Kremlin may leverage the war in Ukraine to renounce its participation in other international arms control treaties as it prepares for a larger confrontation with the West.
Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a chemical plant in Tula Oblast on June 8. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, who often reports on successful Ukrainian drone strikes against Russia, implied on June 8 that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against the Azot chemical plant in Novomoskovsk, Tula Oblast.[xxiv] Kovalenko stated that the plant produces explosives for artillery shells, bombs, and missiles. Russian opposition outlet Astra published footage on June 8 reportedly showing fires at the plant after reported drone strikes.[xxv] Tula Oblast Governor Dmitry Milyaev claimed on June 8 that a Ukrainian drone crashed on the territory of the Azot plant, causing a fire.[xxvi] Ukrainian forces previously conducted a drone strike against the Azot plant on May 24.[xxvii]
Key Takeaways:
- Kremlin officials and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on June 8 that Russian forces reached the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border and are conducting offensive operations into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast — an oblast that Russia has not illegally declared as annexed.
- Russian officials have repeatedly signaled that the Kremlin has wider territorial ambitions in Ukraine, including in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.
- Russia continued to baselessly accuse Ukraine of failing to repatriate the bodies of killed in action (KIA) soldiers on June 8 — part of the Kremlin's efforts to undermine mutually agreed upon confidence-building measures with Ukraine.
- The Kremlin appears to have orchestrated a concerted media campaign that aimed to use the purportedly agreed-upon KIA exchange in order to discredit Ukraine and promote Russia's justifications for its war to both domestic and international audiences.
- Russian officials appear to be setting conditions to withdraw from international arms control treaties, likely as part of preparation for a potential future war with NATO.
- Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a chemical plant in Tula Oblast on June 8.
- Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 7, 2025
Russia baselessly accused Ukraine of failing to conduct a prisoner of war (POW) exchange and to repatriate the bodies of killed in action (KIA) soldiers on June 6 — part of Kremlin efforts to undermine mutually agreed upon confidence building measures with Ukraine. Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky, Russian First Deputy Chief of Information of the General Staff's Main Directorate (GRU) Alexander Zorin, and Russian Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Fomin claimed on June 7 that Russia was prepared to exchange severely wounded and sick POWs, POWs under the age of 25, and 6,000 bodies of KIA soldiers on June 6 as Russia and Ukraine agreed to during the most recent bilateral talks in Istanbul on June 2.[1] Zorin further claimed that Russian representatives waited for Ukrainian representatives on the border of Belarus to work out the technicalities involved in exchanging the bodies, but that Ukrainian representatives never arrived, and Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova and Deputy Chairperson of the Federation Council Committee on International Affairs Andrei Klimov claimed that Ukraine refused to repatriate the KIA bodies. The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of POWs refuted Russian officials' claims and clarified that Ukraine and Russia have not yet agreed upon a date for the repatriation of the bodies and that the two parties are still finalizing lists for the POW exchange.[2] The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of POWs reiterated that Ukraine remains fully committed to engaging constructively to ensure the successful implementation of the KIA repatriation and POW exchange. The Kremlin remains committed to promoting narratives that vilify Ukraine, likely to socialize its domestic audience ahead of Russia's possible rejection of any peace agreement in the future and to discredit Ukraine on the international stage. The Kremlin's unwillingness to engage in good faith in lower-level confidence building measures designed to facilitate larger peace negotiations further demonstrates Russia's disinterest in peace negotiations.
Russian officials continue efforts to deflect blame away from Russia and onto Western states for the lack of progress toward a peace settlement. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov accused European states of becoming the main obstacle to negotiating peace in Ukraine, as European states seek to disrupt negotiations on June 6.[3] Ryabkov also claimed that German Chancellor Friedrich Merz opposes peace in Ukraine and is trying to convince US President Donald Trump to return the United States to "the path of escalation" in the war.[4] Ryabkov claimed that the United States is aware that Russia will not stray — even in the face of threats of more sanctions — from its position on the need to eliminate the alleged "root causes" of the war (a phrase which Kremlin officials have repeatedly used to call for regime change in Ukraine and changes to NATO's open-door policy and other unilateral American concessions which the Trump administration described as being “too much“).[5] ISW continues to assess that Russia is uninterested in meaningful negotiations with Ukraine and is very likely setting information conditions to protract or possibly expand the war.[6]
US President Donald Trump signaled on June 6 that he could be willing to increase sanctions against Russia. Russia's economic struggles, however, have been and will continue to be driven by Russian military losses on the battlefield. Maximum US economic pressure against Russia is not possible without continued military sales to Ukraine. Trump stated to reporters on June 6 that he would be willing to "use [The Sanctioning Russia Act of 2025, a bill in the US Senate] if it's necessary" and impose additional sanctions on Russia if Russia demonstrates that it will not "make a deal" or stop fighting.[7] The Sanctioning Russia Act of 2025 has wide bipartisan support in the US Senate and has 82 cosponsors as of June 7.[8]
Any increased economic pressure against Russia — while a positive policy development — by itself is insufficient to force Russian President Vladimir Putin to the negotiating table or change Putin’s theory of victory. The continuation of Western military aid to Ukraine remains pivotal to the execution of a pressure campaign against Russia that could force Putin to recalculate his theory of victory.[9] Putin's theory of victory rests on the assumption that the Russian military can sustain creeping, incremental advances on the battlefield longer than Ukrainian forces can defend and longer than the West is willing to support Ukraine. Putin's strategy will very likely continue to guide his decision to refuse to engage substantively with the United States and Ukraine in peace negotiations. Achieving a peace in Ukraine that is acceptable for US interests necessitates sustained Russian battlefield losses or a significant Russian battlefield setback. The United States must continue equipping Ukrainian soldiers as Russia’s battlefield losses remain the key driver of Russia's current materiel, manpower, and economic problems. Western aid, particularly of weapons systems that only the United States can provide at scale and quickly, would allow Ukrainian forces to better defend their positions, slow Russian advances, and inflict even more serious losses on the Russian military. Higher and even more unsustainable Russian casualty rates on the battlefield, particularly when they are disproportionate to the territorial gains they generate, would risk Putin's efforts to balance "butter and guns" and maintain domestic support.
Key Takeaways:
- Russia baselessly accused Ukraine of failing to conduct a prisoner of war (POW) exchange and to repatriate the bodies of killed in action (KIA) soldiers on June 6 – part of Kremlin efforts to undermine mutually agreed upon confidence building measures with Ukraine.
- Russian officials continue efforts to deflect blame away from Russia and onto Western states for the lack of progress toward a peace settlement.
- US President Donald Trump signaled on June 6 that he could be willing to increase sanctions against Russia. Russia's economic struggles, however, have been and will continue to be driven by Russian military losses on the battlefield. Maximum US economic pressure against Russia is not possible without continued military sales to Ukraine.
- Any increased economic pressure against Russia – while a positive policy development – by itself is insufficient to force Russian President Vladimir Putin to the negotiating table or change Putin’s theory of victory.
- Ukrainian forces advanced near Toretsk. Russian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Kupyansk, Novopavlivka, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 6, 2025
A senior Ukrainian official reported that the Russian military intends to seize half of Ukraine by the end of 2026. Russian forces are highly unlikely to be able to make such large advances in such a narrow time frame, given Russia’s current offensive capabilities and assuming that the flow of Western aid to Ukraine continues. Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Colonel Pavlo Palisa told reporters on June 5 that Russia likely seeks to seize the full extent of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts by September 1, 2025, and create a buffer zone along the northern Ukrainian-Russian border by the end of 2025.[1] Palisa also stated that Russia intends to occupy the entirety of Ukraine on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River and seize Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts by the end of 2026, depriving Ukraine of access to the Black Sea. Western sources published a map on June 4 and 6 that Palisa reportedly presented to US officials and journalists.[2] The map suggests that Russia intends to seize roughly 222,700 additional square kilometers of Ukrainian territory and hold a total of 336,300 square kilometers by the end of 2026 – almost double the roughly 162,000 total square kilometers that Russia held as of the first month of Russia's initial full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The total area of Ukraine is roughly 603,500 square kilometers.
Palisa’s map of purported Russian operational objectives suggests that Russian forces will attempt to seize and leverage positions in Zaporizhia and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts to support concurrent efforts to seize the remainder of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts prior to September 1, 2025. Palisa’s map suggests that the Russian military command does not intend for Russian forces to seize Zaporizhzhia City by September 1. Palisa’s map suggests that Russian forces seek to leverage these positions to eventually seize Zaporizhzhia City, which is consistent with the Russian government’s formal territorial demands for all Zaporizhia Oblast.[3]
It remains unclear on what basis the Russian military may be able to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast within the next three months or even advance the 50 to 80 kilometers from the current Russian frontline to the administrative boundaries of Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces have spent the last 15 months advancing between 30 and 50 kilometers from the outskirts of Avdiivka to their current positions northeast and southwest of Pokrovsk, a far slower rate of advance than the one necessary to seize all of Donetsk Oblast by September 1. The rate of Russian advance as depicted by the map also appears to assume that Russian forces will be able to fight through the Kostyantynivka-Kramatorsk-Slovyansk fortress belt – a series of fortified cities that form the backbone of Ukraine’s defensive positions in Donetsk Oblast – at a rate never demonstrated by Russian forces at any point during Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russian forces have not fought through a comparable town since Russian forces engaged in a year-long and pyrrhic effort to seize Bakhmut that ended in May 2023.[4]
Palisa’s assessment posits that Russian forces would then sequentially attempt to seize the remainder of Kherson Oblast and create a “buffer zone” along the international border in northern Ukraine by the end of 2025. Palisa’s map suggests that Russian forces would attempt to ford the Dnipro River, retake the remainder of Kherson Oblast, marginally advance further in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and establish a defensible buffer zone along the international border in Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv oblasts by the end of 2025.[5] The Russian military command would likely have to redeploy significant Russian forces from other areas of the frontline to accomplish these objectives, assuming Ukraine’s international partners continue supporting Ukraine.
Russian forces would struggle to seize the remainder of Kherson Oblast, as it would require crossing the Dnipro River, establishing a lodgement on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River, seizing Kherson City, and then advancing further west and north to the oblast's administrative borders. Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces have successfully conducted cross-river operations at scale across the Dnipro River since Russia’s withdrawal to east (left) bank Kherson Oblast in November 2022, and the establishment of significant Ukrainian defenses in west bank Kherson Oblast since liberating this area will only further hamper Russia’s ability to seize the remainder of Kherson Oblast.[6]
A series of intensified, simultaneous Russian offensives into northern Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv oblasts would spread Russia’s manpower and materiel along the entire thousand-kilometer-long frontline and likely exacerbate existing constraints. Russia’s reported operational objectives through the end of 2025 are consistent with long-standing Russian demands that Ukraine concede the illegally annexed Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and Crimea, however.[7]
The Russian military command’s purported objectives for 2026 extend far beyond Russia’s formal territorial demands and aim to seize a significant part of central Ukraine and most of southern and eastern Ukraine. Palisa’s map suggests that Russian forces intend to seize the entirety of Ukraine on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River, which includes the rest of unoccupied Zaporizhia Oblast, and all of Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, and Poltava oblasts; and half of Kyiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. Palisa's map suggests that Russian forces also intend to seize parts of southern Ukraine west of the Dnipro River, including most of Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts. Russian forces will have to seize nine currently unoccupied oblast capitals – Zaporizhzhia, Odesa, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Dnipro, Kharkiv, Sumy, Chernihiv, and Poltava cities – with an estimated pre-war population of over 5.6 million people.[8] Russia has not captured an oblast capital city since March 2022, when Russian forces seized Kherson City and subsequently lost it eight months later. This goal would require Russian forces to advance over 300 kilometers from the furthest point of the international border to Kyiv City within the next 18 months.
Russia’s purported military campaign plans for 2025 and 2026 are consistent with long-standing Russian territorial objectives and recent statements by pro-Kremlin voices in the information space. Kremlin officials have repeatedly demanded that Russia create a “buffer zone” along the international border in northern Ukraine to defend Russian cities in Bryansk, Kursk, and Belgorod oblasts against Ukrainian drone and artillery strikes and ground operations.[9] Kremlin officials also routinely invoke the Kremlin’s concept of “Novorossiya” – which Russian officials have defined as all of eastern and southern Ukraine – to justify ever-expanding Russian territorial ambitions in eastern and southern Ukraine.[10] Russian officials have previously characterized Kharkiv and Odesa cities as “Russian” cities.[11] Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov told Kremlin newswire TASS on May 31 that Ukraine risks losing Zaporizhzhia, Dnipro, Sumy, Kharkiv, Odesa, and Mykolaiv cities if Ukraine refuses a peace settlement in the near future.[12]
Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo stated in April 2025 that the "return" of the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River to Russia is "fundamentally important" and an "absolute priority.”[13] Saldo called for Russia to completely control the areas of the Dnipro River that pass through Kherson, Zaporizhia, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts – a call for Russia to not only gain control over parts of Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts that Russian forces do not currently occupy but to control parts of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, which Russia has not formally claimed or illegally annexed. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev recently reiterated his previous calls for Russia to occupy most of Ukraine as a buffer zone – apart from a relatively small area of Volyn and Lviv oblasts along Poland’s border – and leave Ukraine as a rump state, which underscores the extent of long-term Russian territorial objectives in Ukraine.[14] Palisa’s map does not suggest whether Russia may have military plans to seize additional territory of Ukraine beyond 2026, but it is unlikely that Russian President Vladimir Putin would be satisfied with seizing slightly more than half of Ukraine if Russian forces could fulfill their purported 2026 plans.
The Russian military is likely unable to achieve its purported 2026 objectives, given the significant manpower and materiel losses Russian forces have sustained over the last three years of war and the Russian forces’ inability to achieve operational maneuver on the battlefield. Putin’s theory of victory depends on the Western alliance backing Ukraine, abandoning Ukraine as a necessary condition to bring about this scale of advance.[15] Russian forces have thus far failed to restore operational maneuver on the battlefield in Ukraine and conduct the kind of rapid, mechanized maneuver necessary to make operationally significant breakthroughs of Ukrainian defensive lines, and have not done so since 2022.[16] Western sources estimated that Russia has suffered almost one million casualties and lost well over 10,000 tanks and armored vehicles over the last three years of war.[17] Russian forces would also be pursuing complicated offensive operations in the face of mined gray zones, Ukrainian defensive lines, Ukrainian drones, and populated Ukrainian towns and cities along a thousand-kilometer-long frontline. Any operational plan that would require the Russian command to spread its limited offensive capabilities along the entire frontline to make significant advances from Odesa to Chernihiv oblasts would likely exacerbate Russian combat power shortage issues and undermine the Russian military’s ability to achieve its objectives.[18]
Russian forces would only be able to achieve these reported operational objectives if the situation along the frontline changes dramatically in the near future, such as Russia suddenly restoring operational maneuver or the sudden collapse of Ukrainian defensive lines. ISW previously assessed that delays in Western aid provision to Ukraine in 2023 and 2024 provided Russian forces with sufficient leverage to regain the battlefield initiative and make operationally significant gains, and that the Kremlin is currently engaged in an effort aimed at convincing the West that Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable and that the West should abandon supporting Ukraine.[19] Russia's only real hope of winning its war in Ukraine is to convince the West to abandon Ukraine, and Putin is therefore seeking to prevent the future supply of Western military aid to Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that Western aid remains vital to Ukraine's ability to defend itself against Russian aggression and is crucial for ensuring a just and enduring peace in Ukraine and long-term security in Europe.[20] Russia is very unlikely to seize half of Ukraine if the international coalition continues supporting Ukraine.
Russian forces conducted the second-largest series of missile and drone strikes of the war overnight on June 5 to 6. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on June 6 that Russian forces launched 452 projectiles, including 407 Shahed and mock drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[21] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched six Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Kursk and Voronezh oblasts; 36 Kh-101 cruise missiles from airspace over Saratov Oblast and the Caspian Sea; two Iskander-M cruise missiles from occupied Dzhankoy, Crimea; and one Kh-31P anti-radar missile from airspace over the Black Sea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 406 drones and missiles, including 199 Shahed and decoy drones, of which 169 were "lost" or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW); four Iskander-M/KN-23 missiles, and an additional two of these missiles were lost and did not reach their targets; 30 Kh-101 cruise missiles; and two Iskander-K cruise missiles.
Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strikes hit 19 locations, including civilian infrastructure, high-rise buildings, and energy infrastructure in Kyiv, Lviv, Ternopil, Chernihiv, and Kremenchuk cities and elsewhere in Kyiv, Volyn, Sumy, Poltava, Khmelnytskyi, and Cherkasy oblasts.[22] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that these Russian strikes injured at least 49 civilians and killed at least three.[23] The Ukrainian Attorney General's Office reported that Russian strikes against Kyiv City alone killed at least three and injured 22.[24] Russian forces notably conducted their largest strike series of the war with 479 total drones and missiles less than a week prior, on the night of May 31 to June 1.[25]
Ukrainian forces continue efforts to innovate and expand their air defense umbrella to counter Russian strike packages. Ukrainian Deputy Strategic Industries Minister Anna Hvozdiar reported that Ukrainian forces are testing drones to intercept other strike drones and that Ukrainian forces have downed over 160 Shahed drones over Kyiv Oblast since February 2024 using these interceptors.[26] Russian forces have recently been adapting their strike packages and drone strike packages to effectively penetrate and overwhelm Ukraine's air defense umbrella and inflict maximum damage, and attempting to combat Ukraine's drone and counter-drone capabilities.[27]
Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Russian military facilities, airfields, and defense industrial base (DIB) facilities overnight on June 5 to 6. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck Engels Air Base in Saratov Oblast and at Dyagilevo Air Base in Ryazan Oblast, damaging at least three fuel and lubricant tanks at Engels and causing a fire and secondary explosions in the area.[28] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that it is still clarifying the damage at Dyagilevo Air Base but that there are reports of a large fire in the area. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko published footage showing fires at an oil depot in Engels and the Dyagilevo Air Base.[29] Saratov Oblast Governor Roman Busargin and other Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian drones struck an industrial enterprise in Engels and caused a fire.[30] Kovalenko reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the JSC Progress Plant in Michurinsk, Tambov Oblast, which produces stabilization and control systems for missile, artillery, and aviation systems.[31] Kovalenko also implied that Ukrainian forces struck an unspecified Russian military facility in Bryansk Oblast.[32] A geolocated image shows a large fire with possibly secondary detonations at the Bryansk International airport near Oktyabrskoye.[33] Russian opposition media, citing sources in the Russian Ministry of Emergency Services, reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Mi-8 combat helicopter and damaged a Mi-35 combat helicopter parked at the Bryansk airport.[34] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces downed 174 drones over Russia and occupied Ukraine overnight, including an unspecified number of drones in Bryansk, Saratov, Ryazan, and Kursk oblasts.[35]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 6 that Ukrainian forces conducted strikes against Russian military command posts of the 72nd Motorized Rifle Division (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), including its 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment, near Kulbaki, Kursk Oblast.[36]
Russia's Central Bank lowered its key interest rate for the first time since September 2022, likely prematurely due to increased Kremlin pressure to project economic stability. The Russian Central Bank announced on June 6 that it had lowered its key interest rate from a 22-year high of 21 percent to 20 percent.[37]
ISW has observed reports of rising tensions between Kremlin officials and the Central Bank, namely between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina, over Russia's compounding economic constraints related to sanctions and labor shortages that very likely factored into the Central Bank's decision.[38] The Kremlin intensified pressure on Nabiullina to lower the key interest rate from 21 percent and maintain the facade that Russia's economy is stable. Putin postured the Russian economy as "stable and reliable" in December 2024, soon after Nabiullina raised the key interest rate to 21 percent – the highest since 2003 – in October 2024 to combat rising inflation rates and blamed Nabiullina for mishandling rising interest rates.[39] ISW observed unverified reports in March 2025 of a federal audit of the Central Bank, and Russian officials indicated in the days leading up to the announcement that they "expect" the Central Bank to lower the key interest rate.[40]
The Kremlin has repeatedly claimed that the Russian inflation rate hovered around nine to 10 percent, when the actual figure is likely closer to 20 percent as of March 2025.[41] The Kremlin's efforts to pressure the Central Bank into prematurely lowering its key interest rate to maintain the facade of economic stability will likely drive further economic instability and contribute to elevated levels of inflation.
Key Takeaways:
- A senior Ukrainian official reported that the Russian military intends to seize half of Ukraine by the end of 2026. Russian forces are highly unlikely to be able to make such large advances in such a narrow time frame, given Russia’s current offensive capabilities and assuming that the flow of Western aid to Ukraine continues.
- The Russian military command’s purported objectives for 2026 extend far beyond Russia’s formal territorial demands and aim to seize a significant part of central Ukraine and most of southern and eastern Ukraine.
- Russia’s purported military campaign plans for 2025 and 2026 are consistent with long-standing Russian territorial objectives and recent statements by pro-Kremlin voices in the information space.
- The Russian military is likely unable to achieve its purported 2026 objectives, given the significant manpower and materiel losses Russian forces have sustained over the last three years of war and the Russian forces’ inability to achieve operational maneuver on the battlefield. Putin’s theory of victory depends on the Western alliance backing Ukraine, abandoning Ukraine as a necessary condition to bring about this scale of advance
- Russian forces conducted the second-largest series of missile and drone strikes of the war overnight on June 5 to 6.
- Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Russian military facilities, airfields, and defense industrial base (DIB) facilities overnight on June 5 to 6.
- Russia's Central Bank lowered its key interest rate for the first time since September 2022, likely prematurely due to increased Kremlin pressure to project economic stability.
- Russian forces recently advanced in Belgorod and Sumy oblasts and near Lyman and Velyka Novosilka.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 5, 2025
Russian forces are reportedly sustaining an average of 1,140 casualties per day and suffering disproportionately high personnel casualties for marginal, grinding territorial gains. Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) news agency ArmyInform reported on June 5 that an unnamed NATO official stated that Russian forces are sustaining an average casualty rate of 1,140 personnel per day, of whom nearly 975 are killed in action (KIA) – a much higher number of killed than the standard one-to-three KIA-to-wounded-in-action (WIA) ratio.[1] The NATO official noted that Russian forces suffered approximately 160,000 casualties from January to April 2025 and that Russian losses remain high despite a slight decrease in May 2025 "due to a slowdown in the pace of hostilities." Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on May 13 that Russian forces suffered about 177,000 casualties since January 1, 2025 (an average daily casualty rate of 1,351).[2] This daily casualty rate is lower than the record high average daily casualty rate of 1,523 that Russian forces reportedly suffered in November 2024, but Russian forces are still expending quantities of manpower that are disproportionate to their marginal territorial gains.[3] Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Pavlo Palisa stated on June 4 that Russia seized only 0.4 percent of Ukraine's total territory in 2024 and just 0.2 percent thus far in 2025, which is largely consistent with ISW's assessment of Russian advances in 2024 and 2025, respectively.[4] Palisa stated that Russia is suffering roughly 167 casualties per square kilometer of advance. ISW continues to assess that Russia's disproportionately large manpower and materiel losses for marginal territorial gains across the theater are unsustainable in the medium-term and unlikely to result in significant and rapid gains.[5]
The Kremlin continues efforts to falsely portray Russia as willing to engage in good-faith negotiations to end the war in Ukraine, despite Russia’s repeated refusal to offer any concessions. Russian President Vladimir Putin used his first phone call to Pope Leo XIV on June 5 to falsely claim that Ukraine is escalating the war, whereas Russia is interested in achieving a resolution to the war in Ukraine through "political and diplomatic means."[6] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on June 5 that Putin thanked the Pope for the Vatican’s willingness to contribute to a peaceful resolution to the war in Ukraine.[7] Putin notably did not propose any Russian concessions or indicate that the Kremlin has relented any of its demands of Ukraine that amount to Ukraine's full capitulation. The Kremlin readout claimed that Putin instead told the Pope that any potential resolution must eliminate the war’s "root causes," reiterating a long-standing Kremlin rhetorical line aimed at falsely blaming Ukraine for Russia's invasion. Senior Russian officials have repeatedly defined these root causes as NATO's alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward and Ukraine's alleged violations of the rights of Russian-speaking minorities in Ukraine.[8] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev notably claimed on June 3 that Russia seeks a ”swift victory” in Ukraine and the ”complete destruction” of Ukraine’s government, indicating that the Kremlin remains uninterested in good faith peace negotiations and a near-term resolution to the war that does not acquiesce to its demands.[9] Putin’s conversation with the Pope is likely part of the Kremlin’s ongoing effort to protract negotiations by falsely portraying Russia as interested in meaningful peace negotiations and improve Russia’s negotiating position by making additional battlefield gains.
Ukraine's allies and partners continued to provide military aid to Ukraine during the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein format) on June 4 and 5. Dutch Defense Minister Ruben Brekelmans stated on June 4 that the Netherlands will allocate a package worth 400 million euros (roughly $457 million) to strengthen Ukraine's military security.[10] The package will consist of more than 100 vessels, including patrol boats, transport boats, interceptors, and special operations ships; more than 50 naval drones; weapons systems; sensors; spare parts; and training for Ukrainian specialists. Luxembourg's Defense Minister Yuriko Backes stated on June 5 that Luxembourg will increase its military aid to Ukraine by 50 percent by the end of 2025.[11] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on June 4 that Belgium announced a long-term initiative to provide annual aid in the amount of one billion euros (roughly $1.1 billion) until 2029 and that Belgium will transfer a mine-clearing ship to Ukraine.[12] Umerov stated that Canada allocated $45 million for drones, electronic warfare (EW) equipment, IT solutions, and an unspecified number of Bison and Coyote armored personnel carriers (APCs).[13] Umerov stated that Norway will allocate $7 billion worth of aid to Ukraine in 2025, including $700 million for drones, with a focus on supporting the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB), and $50 million to the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) Trust Fund.[14] Umerov stated that Belgium, Sweden, Italy, Turkey, and Estonia joined the EW Coalition, and Swedish Defense Minister Pal Jonson stated that Sweden will co-chair the coalition with Germany.[15] Umerov stated on June 5 that Denmark, Sweden, Canada, Norway, and Iceland will initially contribute 428 million euros (roughly $489 million) to develop the "Danish model" in which Ukraine's partners buy Ukrainian-manufactured weapons for the Ukrainian military and that Ukraine's partners expect to contribute 1.3 billion euros (roughly $1.5 billion) to the "Danish model" in 2025.[16] Umerov stated that a portion of the funds will come from profits from frozen Russian assets.
Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced on June 5 the launch of a new initiative for joint production of Ukrainian weapons in Ramstein states in order to supply weapons to the Ukrainian military and to increase Ramstein states' industrial capacity.[17] Umerov announced the temporarily named "Ramstein Investments in the Defense Industry" initiative that will allow Ukrainian companies to invest in production in Ramstein partner states and vice versa .[18] Umerov noted that the needs of the Ukrainian military take priority, so everything produced at such enterprises under the initiative will go to the Ukrainian military as long as the war continues.[19] Umerov stated that an unspecified western European company announced the production of modern anti-Shahed missiles in Ukraine; that the UK will produce Lightweight Multirole Missiles (LMM) and launchers with Ukraine; that German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall will build Lynx armored fighting vehicles in Ukraine; and that Ukrainian enterprises are already producing ammunition under Norwegian and Finnish licenses.
North Korea reaffirmed its support for Russia's war effort in Ukraine during Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu's visit to North Korea on June 4. North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un reaffirmed North Korea's "unconditional support" for Russia's war effort in Ukraine and commitment to implementing the bilateral Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership during the visit.[20] ISW will report further on this meeting and Russian-North Korean cooperation in its upcoming Adversary Entente Task Force update.
Russian authorities cracked down on a publication that has previously speculated about several Russian command changes. Russian law enforcement sources told Russian state news agency TASS that authorities detained three employees of the state-owned Ural regional information agency Ura.ru on June 5 after searching the publication's editorial office in Yekaterinburg.[21] TASS and Russian state outlet RBC claimed that the investigation may be due to Ura.ru allegedly receiving funding from an organization designated as a foreign agent and that journalists allegedly bribed a law enforcement officer to obtain sensitive internal reports.[22] Ura.ru has notably reported on several Russian military command changes ahead of official announcements in previous years, including Leningrad Military District (LMD) and Central Military District (CMD) changes during Russia's war in Ukraine.[23]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian forces are reportedly sustaining an average of 1,140 casualties per day and suffering disproportionately high personnel casualties for marginal, grinding territorial gains.
- The Kremlin continues efforts to falsely portray Russia as willing to engage in good-faith negotiations to end the war in Ukraine, despite Russia’s repeated refusal to offer any concessions.
- Ukraine's allies and partners continued to provide military aid to Ukraine during the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein format) on June 4 and 5.
- Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced on June 5 the launch of a new initiative for joint production of Ukrainian weapons in Ramstein states in order to supply weapons to the Ukrainian military and to increase Ramstein states' industrial capacity.
- North Korea reaffirmed its support for Russia's war effort in Ukraine during Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu's visit to North Korea on June 4.
- Russian authorities cracked down on a publication that has previously speculated about several Russian command changes.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Hulyaipole and in western Zaporizhia. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and near Kupyansk, Lyman, and Toretsk.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 4, 2025
The Kremlin is fixating on recent train derailments in Russia in order to further long-standing Kremlin narratives claiming that Ukraine is an illegitimate negotiating partner that is uninterested in peace, likely to distract the broader information space from recent Kremlin officials' statements about Russia's own disinterest in a negotiated settlement. Russian President Vladimir Putin held a meeting with members of the Russian government on June 4 and discussed the May 31 collapse of two railway bridges in Kursk and Bryansk oblasts.[i] The meeting included a staged statement from a children's doctor who promoted the Kremlin's longstanding justifications for its initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and full-scale invasion in 2022. Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin claimed during the meeting that Ukrainian special services "without a doubt" conducted an operation to down railway bridges in Kursk and Bryansk oblasts on May 31, but did not present concrete evidence to link the collapsed bridges to Ukraine. Putin claimed that the train derailments confirm that the "already illegitimate" Ukrainian government that previously "seized power" is "gradually degenerating into a terrorist organization." Putin questioned if Russia can negotiate with "terrorists" and questioned why Russia should agree to Ukraine's proposed 30-day or longer ceasefires, claiming that Ukraine will use the ceasefires to continue to receive Western weapons provisions, mobilize military personnel, and prepare "other terrorist acts." Putin claimed that the Ukrainian government "does not need peace at all" and values power over peace. Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov stated that Putin later emphasized Ukraine's alleged "terrorism" during a phone call on June 4 with US President Donald Trump.[ii] Ushakov repeated Putin's claim that Ukraine has "degenerated into a terrorist organization."
Kremlin officials have long alleged that the current Ukrainian government is "illegitimate," and Putin previously questioned on March 27 how Russia can negotiate with Ukraine as "neo-Nazi formations" are allegedly ruling the country.[iii] Putin has also repeatedly used questions about Ukrainian force generation and Western weapons deliveries to reject Ukraine's previous ceasefire proposals.[iv] Putin's June 4 claims that the Ukrainian government is a "terrorist organization" with which Russia cannot negotiate, and which will exploit any longer-term ceasefire, is the latest iteration of this Kremlin effort to justify delaying the negotiation process and prolonging the war by attacking Ukraine's sovereignty as a legitimate negotiating partner. The Kremlin is likely link its messaging surrounding the train derailments and Ukraine's alleged perpetuation of "terrorism" in order to distract from Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev's claim on June 3 that Russia needs the negotiations in Istanbul to result in Russia's "swift victory and the complete destruction" of the Ukrainian government and not a "compromise[d] peace on someone else's delusional terms."[v]
Putin also used his June 4 phone call with Trump to further falsely portray Ukraine as an illegitimate negotiating partner that is uninterested in peace. Ushakov stated that Putin talked with Trump about the May 31 train derailments in Russia, the June 1 Ukrainian strikes against Russian military air bases, and the June 2 Ukrainian-Russian negotiations in Istanbul.[vi] Putin alleged to Trump that Ukraine was responsible for the train derailments. Ushakov claimed that Russia "did not succumb" and attended the Istanbul negotiations despite Ukraine's "provocations." Putin's statements to Trump are also likely aimed at distracting from Russia's own disinterest in negotiations and continued preparations for a prolonged war effort so as to avoid possible future US sanctions by painting Ukraine as a bad actor.[vii]
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to express Ukraine's willingness to negotiate with Russia to establish a just and lasting peace. Zelensky stated on June 4 that the Ukrainian delegation to Istanbul has not received a response to the ceasefire proposal it presented during the June 2 Ukrainian-Russian talks.[viii] Zelensky also proposed that Ukraine and Russia implement a comprehensive ceasefire until Russian President Vladimir Putin meets with Zelensky in order to demonstrate a mutual commitment to de-escalation.[ix] Zelensky stated that Ukraine is ready to negotiate with Russia any day and that Russia can choose the location of negotiations. Zelensky said that he is willing to meet with Putin even without a ceasefire in order to prove Ukraine's willingness to negotiate.
Ukrainian and Western officials and open-source analysts continue to clarify the battlefield damage resulting from Ukraine's "Operation Spider Web" long-range drone strike series against Russian air bases on June 1. Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) published new footage on June 4 from Operation Spider Web showing Ukrainian drones approaching the wings, sides, tops, and underbellies of Russian fixed-wing aircraft at various airfields.[x] The SBU reported that the footage shows first-person view (FPV) drones striking A-50 airborne early warning and control (AWACS) aircraft, Tu-95 and Tu-160 strategic bombers, Tu-22 supersonic bombers, An-12 transport aircraft, and Il-78 aerial refueling tankers at Belaya Air Base in Irkutsk Oblast; Olenya Air Base in Murmansk Oblast; Dyagilevo Air Base in Ryazan Oblast; and Ivanovo Air Base in Ivanovo Oblast. Some of the clips in the video show aircraft on fire. The SBU stated that Ukrainian drones struck 41 Russian aircraft. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the SBU stated that Russia will be unable to restore half of the Russian aircraft that Ukraine struck or that it will take Russia years to restore them.[xi] A senior NATO official reported to Ukrainian news outlet Suspilne that Operation Spider Web damaged 40 Russian aircraft and confirmed that the operation destroyed 10 to 13 aircraft.[xii] The official also stated that Russia may respond to the loss of its strategic bombers, which Russia uses to launch cruise missiles against Ukraine, by adjusting strike packages to include more drones and ballistic missiles and fewer cruise missiles. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported that a NATO official stated that Russian forces previously used the destroyed aircraft to launch over 3,000 cruise missiles that have struck critical infrastructure and civilian targets in Ukraine since February 2022.[xiii]
Maxar satellite imagery collected on June 4 indicates that Ukrainian drone strikes destroyed at least two Tu-22 bombers and three Tu-95 bombers at Belaya Airbase (see embedded imagery below). Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) group AviVector posted satellite imagery on June 4 that indicates that Ukrainian drones destroyed four Tu-95MS bombers and one An-12 transport aircraft at Olenya Airbase.[xiv] AviVector assessed that Ukrainian forces destroyed seven Tu-95MS bombers, four Tu-22M3 bombers, and one An-12 transport aircraft and likely damaged a Tu-95MS bomber at Olenya and Belaya airbases.
Ukrainian special services reportedly used artificial intelligence (AI) to direct drones during Operation Spider Web. The SBU stated on June 4 that it used "autonomous artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms and manual operator intervention" to conduct the June 1 strikes against Russian air bases.[xv] The SBU stated that some drones lost signal during flight and switched to performing their missions using AI along a preplanned route. ISW recently assessed that Russia and Ukraine have demonstrated some integration of limited AI capabilities into drone operations but have not deployed them at scale on the battlefield.[xvi] Promises of an immediate AI and machine learning (ML) drone revolution are premature as of June 2025, even in the wake of Operation Spider Web, given that both Russian and Ukrainian forces will need to allocate more time, testing, and investment to deploy these drones on the frontlines en masse.
Ukraine’s Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) announced on June 4 that the UK will invest a total of £350 billion (roughly $474 billion) to provide Ukraine with 100,000 drones in 2025 — a tenfold increase from the 10,000 drones that the UK provided Ukraine with in 2024.[xvii] The UK MoD stated that the UK has already provided Ukraine with 140,000 rounds of artillery ammunition in 2025. The UK will also allocate an additional £247 million (roughly $335 million) for the training of Ukrainian forces in the UK through the Interflex training project and will contribute £40 million (roughly $52 million) to materiel procurement efforts within the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) mission.[xviii] German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius announced during a meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein format) on June 4 that the first Ukrainian long-range weapons system produced in Ukraine with German financial backing could enter service with the Ukrainian military within ”just a few weeks.”[xix]
Key Takeaways:
- The Kremlin is fixating on recent train derailments in Russia in order to further long-standing Kremlin narratives claiming that Ukraine is an illegitimate negotiating partner that is uninterested in peace, likely to distract the broader information space from recent Kremlin officials' statements about Russia's own disinterest in a negotiated settlement.
- Putin also used his June 4 phone call with Trump to further falsely portray Ukraine as an illegitimate negotiating partner that is uninterested in peace.
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to express Ukraine's willingness to negotiate with Russia to establish a just and lasting peace.
- Ukrainian and Western officials and open-source analysts continue to clarify the battlefield damage resulting from Ukraine's "Operation Spider Web" long-range drone strike series against Russian air bases on June 1.
- Ukrainian special services reportedly used artificial intelligence (AI) to direct drones during Operation Spider Web.
- Ukraine’s Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Toretsk.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 3, 2025
Kremlin officials publicly acknowledged that Russia seeks the “complete destruction” of Ukraine, indicating Moscow’s disinterest in good faith peace negotiations and a near-term resolution to the war. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on June 3 in posts on his Russian- and English-language Telegram channels that Russia needs the negotiations in Istanbul to result in Russia's "swift victory [in Ukraine] and the complete destruction" of the Ukrainian government and not a "compromise[d] peace on someone else's delusional terms."[i] Medvedev stated that Russia's June 2 Istanbul memorandum was in line with these goals and threatened that Russia will "explode" everything and "disappear" anyone who opposes Russia in response to the June 1 long-range Ukrainian drone strikes against Russia. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on June 3 that Russia's Istanbul memorandum is aimed at "eliminating the root causes" of the war in Ukraine and that people should not expect "immediate decisions" from Istanbul.[ii] Peskov stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin is interested in a future trilateral meeting with US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, but that Putin wants to hold this meeting after all of the technical details are worked out as part of a future ceasefire or long-term peace agreement.[iii]
Russian state media has previously cautioned the Russian public against expecting any significant results from ongoing Ukrainian–Russian negotiations, although Russian officials continue to falsely project interest in good faith peace negotiations to US and Western officials.[iv] Russian officials have recently engaged with the United States in a series of bilateral meetings and as part of ongoing US efforts to mediate an end to the war in Ukraine, but Russian officials have yet to demonstrate a willingness to compromise on any of their long-standing demands to bring about peace in Ukraine.[v] ISW noted on June 2 that Russia's Istanbul memorandum reflects the Kremlin's long-standing public demands for Ukraine to make significant territorial and political concessions while Russia offers no concessions of its own.[vi] ISW continues to assess that Russia remains committed to pursuing demands that amount to nothing short of Ukraine's full capitulation and that Russia will continue to pursue this objective so long as Putin believes Russia can militarily defeat Ukraine.
Ukraine struck the Kerch Strait Bridge on June 3 for the third time since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reported that SBU agents mined the underwater support pillars of the Kerch Strait Bridge and detonated the equivalent of 1,100 kilograms of TNT at 0444 on June 3.[vii] The SBU reported that the operation took several months to plan and execute and stated that this is the third time that Ukraine has conducted an operation against the bridge. The SBU reported that the structural integrity of the bridge is in critical condition. The SBU released an image of the bridge which indicates that the explosion did not damage the roadway, though the force of the explosion threw structural elements onto the roadway. Geolocated footage published on June 3 shows an explosion at the base of the Kerch Strait Bridge.[viii] Russian opposition outlets Sota and Astra and Russian milbloggers circulated footage indicating that Ukraine conducted a naval drone strike against the bridge around 1500 on June 3, though it is unclear if the strike caused damage to the structure.[ix] Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated that damage to the Kerch Strait Bridge undermines Russia’s ability to resupply Russian units and facilities in Crimea.[x] The Kerch Strait Bridge is a critical Russian logistics route, and Russian forces heavily defend the bridge with layered air defense, anti-sabotage measures, and personnel who monitor surface and underwater activity.[xi] Russian sources claimed that authorities temporarily halted traffic across the bridge, but later claimed that traffic resumed.[xii] Russian state media and the Russian government have not responded to the strike as of this publication.
Western officials and open-source analysts continue to clarify the battlefield damage following the Ukrainian long-range drone strike series (Operation Spider Web) on June 1. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yurii Ihnat told Ukrainian outlet Ukrainska Pravda on June 2 that Ukrainian officials estimated about 10 to 12 of Russia's 19 Tu-160 bombers and 36 of Russia's 57 Tu-95 bombers were operational prior to Ukraine’s June 1 strikes on Russian airbases.[xiii] Bloomberg reported on June 2 that a senior Western official stated that Ukrainian special services likely destroyed or damaged at least seven Tu-95 bombers and four Tu-22 bombers during the June 1 strike.[xiv] Bloomberg also assessed that Russia will likely struggle to repair and replace aircraft damaged in the June 1 strike as its strategic aviation fleet relies on critical Western components that Russia has failed to source in the wake of Western sanctions. The New York Times (NYT) reported on June 3 that Western officials and military analysts assessed that Ukrainian special services likely destroyed or damaged six Tu-95 bombers, four Tu-22M bombers, and one A-50 airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft, and that Ukrainian special services may have destroyed or severely damaged up to 20 Russian strategic aircraft during the strike.[xv] Ukraine-based open-source intelligence organization Frontelligence Insight assessed on June 3 that satellite imagery and open-source analysis indicate that Ukrainian special services likely destroyed or damaged 11 bombers of various types and one An-12 transport aircraft.[xvi] Frontelligence noted that publicly available satellite imagery has yet to confirm reporting that Ukrainian special services destroyed or damaged over 20 bombers. Ukrainian military observer Tatarigami and journalists from the Telegraph and Insider stated on June 3 that Ukrainian special services shared a video of Ukrainian drones striking at least two A-50 airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft and that Ukraine may release this video soon.[xvii] ISW has not observed the video’s publication as of the time of this report but will continue to monitor for additional information.
Russia continues to produce and stockpile missiles and drones to strike Ukraine, demonstrating Russia's continued commitment to winning the war through military means. Ukrainian outlet New Voice (NV) reported on June 3, citing Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), that Russian forces had stockpiled over 13,000 ballistic, cruise, and other missiles as of mid-May 2025, including: almost 600 Iskander-M ballistic missiles, over 100 Kinzhal hypersonic ballistic missiles, almost 300 Kh-101 cruise missiles, over 400 Kalibr cruise missiles, up to 300 Kh-22/32 cruise missiles, about 700 Oniks cruise missiles and Zirkon anti-ship missiles, about 60 North Korean-produced KN-23 ballistic missiles, and about 11,000 S-300/400 air defense missiles.[xviii] NV reported that the GUR also estimated that Russia can produce roughly 150–200 missiles per month, including: 60 to 70 Iskander-Ms, 10 to 15 Kinzhals, 20 to 30 Kh-101s, 25 to 30 Kalibrs, up to 10 Kh-32s, and 20 to 30 total Oniks and Zirkon missiles. Russia had been launching increasingly large strike packages against Ukraine containing missiles prior to June 1, and Ukraine's June 1 strikes targeting Russian airfields and bombers will degrade Russia's ability to conduct further large air-launched cruise missile strikes against Ukraine. Ihnat told Ukrainska Pravda that the June 1 strikes did not destroy all of Russia's strategic bombers and that Russia retains the ability to strike Ukraine with missiles launched from strategic bombers.[xix] Ihnat noted that roughly half of all Russian long range strike drones launched against Ukraine are decoys, while the other half are real Shahed drones. Shahed drones have long dominated Russian strike packages, and Russian forces have recently been using more ground-launched ballistic missiles than air-launched cruise missiles. ISW continues to assess that Russian efforts to increase domestic drone and missile production and ongoing adaptation of strikes packages are likely part of a broader effort to prepare for a long war in Ukraine and possibly a future war against NATO.[xx]
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced a series of Ukrainian military command changes on June 3. Zelensky appointed former Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi as the Commander of Ukraine’s Joint Forces Command.[xxi] Zelensky appointed Drapatyi as the Commander of Ukrainian Ground Forces on November 29, 2024, and Drapatyi recently submitted his resignation in response to a June 1 Russian missile strike on a Ukrainian training unit.[xxii] The position of Ukrainian Joint Forces Commander has been vacant since February 26, when Zelensky appointed then Joint Forces Commander Major General Andriy Hnatov as Chief of the Ukrainian General Staff.[xxiii] Zelensky and Umerov also announced on June 3 that they appointed Brigadier General Oleh Apostol as Commander of the Ukrainian Air Assault Forces, Major General Ilhor Skybiuk as Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Major Robert Brovdi (callsign "Madyar") as Commander of the Unmanned Systems Forces, and Colonel Vadym Sukharevskyi as Deputy Commander of Operational Command "East."[xxiv] Sukharevskyi previously served as Commander of Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces.[xxv]
Key Takeaways:
- Kremlin officials publicly acknowledged that Russia seeks the “complete destruction” of Ukraine, indicating Moscow’s disinterest in good faith peace negotiations and a near-term resolution to the war.
- Ukraine struck the Kerch Strait Bridge on June 3 for the third time since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
- Western officials and open-source analysts continue to clarify the battlefield damage following the Ukrainian long-range drone strike series (Operation Spider Web) on June 1.
- Russia continues to produce and stockpile missiles and drones to strike Ukraine, demonstrating Russia's continued commitment to winning the war through military means.
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced a series of Ukrainian military command changes on June 3.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced near Kurakhove.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 2, 2025
Ukrainian and Russian delegations met in Istanbul on June 2 and only reached agreements about prisoner of war (POW) exchanges. Russia's refusal to give Ukraine its memorandum with its terms for a peace settlement before the meeting ensured that the meeting was largely unproductive and further protracted the negotiation process. The Ukrainian and Russian delegations met in Istanbul for roughly one hour.[1] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov, who led the Ukrainian delegation in Istanbul, stated that Ukraine proposed a 90-day ceasefire, the release of all prisoners of war (POWs), the return of Ukrainian children whom Russian authorities have abducted, and another round of Ukrainian-Russian talks between June 20 and 30 to prepare for a meeting between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Russian President Vladimir Putin.[2] The Russian delegation appears to have rejected Ukraine's proposal for a 90-day ceasefire. The Ukrainian and Russian delegations agreed to conduct an "all for all" exchange of seriously ill and wounded POWs and POWs aged 18 to 25, which the Russian delegation later claimed would involve at least 1,000 total POWs.[3] The delegations also agreed to exchange the bodies of dead servicemembers in a “6,000 for 6,000” format. Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky, who led the Russian delegation, stated that Russia proposed a two-to-three-day ceasefire on unspecified areas of the front to allow both sides to retrieve bodies from the battlefield.[4] Medinsky stated that Ukraine and Russia will create permanent medical commissions to conduct regular exchanges of seriously wounded POWs without having to wait for ”political decisions."[5] Umerov noted that Russia first gave its memorandum with its terms for a peace settlement to Ukraine during the meeting and that Ukraine will study the document for a week before deciding on further action.[6] Umerov stated on May 28 that Ukraine, in contrast, had already presented its memorandum to Russia — well ahead of the June 2 talks.[7] ISW continues to assess that Russia is trying to disrupt the peace process and prolong the war in order to make additional battlefield gains.[8]
Ukrainian and Russian media published the major points of both sides' memorandums on June 1 and 2, respectively. Ukranian outlet Suspilne published the full text of Ukraine's memorandum on June 1, which reflected Umerov's statements about Ukraine's proposals during the June 2 Ukrainian-Russian talks.[9] Ukraine's memorandum calls for:
- A complete and unconditional ceasefire in the sky, on land, and at sea as a precondition to peace negotiations;
- Confidence building measures, including the return of all Ukrainian children and civilians and the exchange of all POWs;
- The goal of negotiations to be a permanent, lasting peace agreement, as part of which Ukraine receives reliable security guarantees and maintains its territorial integrity and ability to join any security alliance, including NATO;
- And for Russia and Ukraine to continue negotiations after the June 2 Istanbul meeting, work towards confidence building measures, and prepare for a future Zelensky-Putin meeting.
Kremlin newswire TASS published photos of Russia's memorandum following the Ukrainian-Russian talks on June 2.[10] Russia's memorandum is divided into three sections: the first section defines Russia's demands for the "final settlement" of the war; the second section proposes two different sets of pre-conditions that Russia would accept as part of a ceasefire; and the third section outlines Russia's ideal timeline for negotiations. The first section of Russia's memorandum lists demands that Ukraine should concede to as part of a long-term peace agreement, including:
- International recognition of Russia's occupation of all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and Crimea and the complete withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from these oblasts;
- Indefinite Ukrainian commitment to neutrality (a promise to never join military alliances and coalitions), a ban on future foreign military deployments and infrastructure in Ukraine, termination of all of Ukraine's existing security agreements, and a permanent ban on Ukraine having nuclear weapons;
- And protection of the "full rights, freedoms, and interests" of Russians and Russian-speaking populations in Ukraine and legislation against the "glorification and propaganda of Nazism."
The second section of Russia's memorandum demands that Ukraine and Russia pursue one of two paths toward a ceasefire. The first path requires Ukraine to completely withdraw from the unoccupied areas of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts up to an unspecified distance beyond the oblasts' borders. The second path requires Ukraine to agree a different set of Russian demands, including:
- Ban redeployments of all its units, except as part of withdrawals from Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts;
- End all Ukrainian force generation efforts, begin demobilization, end martial law, and organize presidential elections within 100 days of ending martial law, and elect a new government;
- And terminate all foreign military assistance, including the supply of satellite imagery and intelligence, and ban all foreign military deployments to Ukraine.
The third section of Russia's memorandum recommends that Russia and Ukraine sign a longer-term ceasefire agreement after exchanging the bodies of dead servicemembers and a two-to-three-day general ceasefire to retrieve bodies from the battlefield. The memorandum demands that Ukraine completely withdraw from Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts within 30 days of the beginning of the ceasefire and that Ukraine elect a new government before Russia and Ukraine sign a formal peace agreement.
Russia's memorandum reflects the Kremlin's long-standing public demands for Ukraine to make significant territorial and political concessions while Russia offers no concessions of its own. Russia's memorandum is imbued with its long-standing demand that any peace settlement address Russia's perceived "root causes" of the war - namely the eastern expansion of NATO since the early 1990s and Ukraine's supposed discrimination against Russian-speakers and Russian culture.[11] The Kremlin has called for the "denazification" and "demilitarization" of Ukraine since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022, and ISW has previously noted that these terms amount to demands for regime change, the installation of a pro-Russian proxy government in Ukraine, and significant limitations on Ukraine's ability to defend itself against future Russian aggression.[12] Kremlin officials have consistently demanded regime change in Ukraine and falsely claimed that all pro-Western Ukrainian governments since Ukraine's 2014 Revolution of Dignity have been "illegitimate."[13] Putin and other Kremlin officials have repeatedly argued that Russia should not conclude or respect any agreements with the current "illegitimate" Ukrainian government, and ISW has previously noted that any peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine must include Russia's explicit recognition of the current Ukrainian government.[14] The current Ukrainian government is legitimate, however, and continues to abide by the Ukrainian Constitution, such that Russia's demand that Ukraine elect a new government before concluding a long-term peace agreement is simply another demand for regime change.
Putin demanded during a speech on June 14, 2024 that Ukrainian forces must begin to "completely withdraw" from Ukrainian-controlled territory in Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts (which the Kremlin illegally declared as annexed in September 2022) and that Ukraine officially abandons its goal to join NATO before Russia can agree to a ceasefire and peace negotiations.[15] ISW noted that Russia occupied roughly 75 percent of the four oblasts as of June 14, 2024, and Russia now occupies 79.8 percent of the four oblasts as of June 2, 2025. Ukraine currently controls the remaining twenty percent of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, which totals approximately 21,616 square kilometers of territory. The remaining twenty percent of the four oblasts is also home to five major cities (Kherson and Zaporizhzhia cities and Kramatorsk, Kostyantynivka, and Slovyansk) with a combined pre-war population of over 1.3 million people – not accounting for the thousands of people who live in the smaller towns and populated settlements throughout these oblasts.[16] Russian forces have not demonstrated the capacity to seize cities of this size since early 2022, and the Russian military is almost certainly incapable of conducting a successful offensive operation to seize one of these cities after three years of war and degradation. ISW continues to assess that Russia remains committed to pursuing demands that amount to nothing short of Ukraine's full capitulation and that Russia will continue to pursue this objective so long as Putin believes Russia can militarily defeat Ukraine.[17]
The Russian delegation dismissed Russia's systemic kidnapping of Ukrainian children. Ukrainian Presidential Office Head Andriy Yermak reported that the Ukrainian delegation gave Russia the names of "hundreds" of kidnapped Ukrainian children that Russia must return to Ukraine.[18] Medinsky claimed that the Ukrainian list contained 331 names yet downplayed this list as not "thousands" or "millions" of children but "dozens."[19] Medinsky claimed that Russia returns Ukrainian children when Russian authorities can locate the children's parents or other legal representatives and that Russia does not kidnap Ukrainian children but "saves" them.[20] Medinsky's statement downplays the true extent of Russia's pre-war preparations, legal mechanisms, and various schemes to hide and justify the forced deportation, forced assimilation, and militarization of Ukrainian children.[21] Ukraine has verified Russia's deportation of at least 19,456 Ukrainian children, and only 1,345 deported Ukrainian children have been returned to Ukraine as of June 2.[22] Yale’s Humanitarian Research Lab placed the number of deported children closer to 35,000 as of March 19, 2025.[23] Kremlin Children’s Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova (against whom the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant in March 2023 for her role in abducting Ukrainian children) claimed that Russia had “accepted” a stark 700,000 Ukrainian children between February 2022 and July 2023.[24] The United Nations (UN) Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide explicitly forbids the forcible transfer of children from one group to another group for the purpose of destroying, in whole or in part, a national or ethnic group, and considers these violations as constituent acts of genocide.[25]
Russian forces appear to be intensifying efforts to widen the frontline in northern Sumy Oblast along three axes of advance north and northeast of Sumy City. Geolocated footage published on June 2 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Andriivka (north of Sumy City) and northeast of Yablunivka (northeast of Sumy City).[26] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recently seized Oleksiivka, Novomykhailivka, and Kindrativka (all north of Sumy City) and advanced into northern Andriivka and west of Yablunivka and Kostyantynivka.[27] Russian forces have recently intensified ground assaults north of Sumy City toward Andriivka and northeast of Sumy City toward Yunakivka and toward Myropillya.[28] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on June 2 that elements of the Russian 18th Motorized Rifle Division (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are fighting along the Kostyantynivka-Kindrativka line and along the Volodymyrivka-Oleksiivka line (all north of Sumy City).[29] Mashovets stated that elements of the 104th, 234th, and 237th airborne (VDV) regiments (all of the Russian 76th VDV Division) are operating along the Loknya-Yunakivka line and west of Loknya (all northeast of Sumy City). Mashovets previously reported that Russian forces recently redeployed elements of the 752nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) and 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th AC, LMD) from the Lyman and Chasiv Yar directions respectively in order to reinforce the Russian force grouping in northern Sumy Oblast.[30]
Russian officials have long called for the establishment of a buffer zone into northern Sumy Oblast and have recently intensified efforts to set informational conditions to justify renewed offensive operations toward Sumy City.[31] Russian forces are likely attempting to advance to the Khotin-Khrapivshchyna line (south to southeast of Andriivka and Yunakivka) to within roughly 12 to 15 kilometers of Sumy City, which would place Russian forces within tube artillery range of the entirety of Sumy City. Russian forces likely intend to leverage intensified drone and artillery strikes against the city to support further advances toward Sumy City and likely aspire to conduct an offensive operation to seize the city in the future. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are highly unlikely to be able to seize Sumy City in the near- to medium-term, as Russian forces have not seized a Ukrainian city with a pre-war population greater than 100,000 since July 2022.[32]
Open-source analysts continue to clarify the battlefield damage following the Ukrainian long-range drone strike series on June 1. Open-source analysts on X assessed that available imagery published on June 2 indicates that Ukrainian special services likely destroyed or damaged four Tu-95 bombers and three Tu-22M3 bombers at Belaya Air Base in Irkutsk Oblast and one A-50 airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft at Ivanovo Air Base in Ivanovo Oblast.[33] Open-source analysts on X claimed that available video footage published on June 1 and 2 indicates that Ukrainian special services destroyed or damaged five Tu-95 bombers and one An-22 transport aircraft at Olenya Air Base in Murmansk Oblast.[34] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, who often reports on successful Ukrainian drone operations in Russia, reported on June 2 that Ukrainian forces destroyed at least 13 Russian fixed-wing aircraft and damaged over 40 aircraft in total during the strike.[35] Ukrainian military observer Tatarigami stated on June 2 that Russia has not built new Tu-95 or Tu-22M3 since 1991 and that Russia only had 70 to 90 Tupolev aircraft before the June 1 strike series.[36] ISW will continue to monitor for additional satellite imagery confirmation of Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian air bases.
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian and Russian delegations met in Istanbul on June 2 and only reached agreements about prisoner of war (POW) exchanges. Russia's refusal to give Ukraine its memorandum with its terms for a peace settlement before the meeting ensured that the meeting was largely unproductive and further protracted the negotiation process.
- Ukrainian and Russian media published the major points of both sides' memorandums on June 1 and 2, respectively.
- Russia's memorandum reflects the Kremlin's long-standing public demands for Ukraine to make significant territorial and political concessions while Russia offers no concessions of its own.
- The Russian delegation dismissed Russia's systemic kidnapping of Ukrainian children.
- Russian forces appear to be intensifying efforts to widen the frontline in northern Sumy Oblast along three axes of advance north and northeast of Sumy City.
- Open-source analysts continue to clarify the battlefield damage following the Ukrainian long-range drone strike series on June 1.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Velyka Novosilka. Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Chasiv Yar, and Toretsk.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 1, 2025
Ukraine conducted a large-scale and simultaneous series of drone strikes against multiple air bases in Russia on June 1. Sources within Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) told various media outlets that the SBU conducted widespread first-person view (FPV) drone strikes that struck four air bases in Russia.[1] The SBU sources reported that Ukrainian forces struck Belaya Air Base in Irkutsk Oblast; Olenya Air Base in Murmansk Oblast; Dyagilevo Air Base in Ryazan Oblast; and Ivanovo Air Base in Ivanovo Oblast. The SBU sources confirmed that Ukrainian drone operators struck 41 Russian strategic aircraft, including A-50 long-range radar detection aircraft and Tu-95 and Tu-22M3 strategic bombers – fixed-wing aircraft that Russia uses to detect Ukrainian air defenses and launch cruise missiles against Ukraine. The SBU reported that the operation inflicted roughly $7 billion worth of damage on Russia.[2] The SBU sources confirmed that the SBU facilitated drone strikes by transporting the FPV drones to Russia at an unspecified time; storing the FPV drones in trucks carrying cargo units with retractable roofs; parking the trucks near the Russian air bases; and remotely opening the truck roofs and launching the FPVs. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed that the operation used 117 drones and destroyed 34 percent of Russia's strategic cruise missile carriers.[3] Zelensky stated that Ukrainian authorities withdrew the people who "assisted" Ukraine with the operation from Russia before the operation.[4] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted FPV drone strikes against air bases in Irkutsk, and Murmansk oblasts, causing several aircraft to catch fire.[5] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled all strikes against air bases in Ivanovo, Ryazan, and Amur oblasts and that Russian authorities reportedly linked Russian opposition outlet Mediazona reported that Ukrainian authorities planned to conduct FPV drone strikes against an air base in Amur Oblast, and Russian sources claimed that a truck carrying FPV drones near the Ukrainika Air Base in Amur Oblast caught fire before Ukrainian forces could launch the drones.[6]
Ukraine continues to innovate its drone technology and tactics to achieve operational surprise and successfully target Russian military infrastructure in the rear. The SBU was reportedly able to launch the FPV drones close to the targeted Russian air bases, which likely enabled the FPV drones to evade Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems and deny Russian air defenders enough time to detect the drones.[7] The SBU innovative use of semi-trucks to launch the FPV drones directly in Russian territory enabled Ukrainian drone operators to strike targets deep in Russia's rear and conduct the first drone strike during the war against a target in Siberia. The SBU's tactics to use FPV drones and not aircraft-type long-range drones also allowed drone operators to maintain operational surprise to inflict maximum damage and minimize Russia's response window.
Ukraine's drone strike operation against strategic Russian aircraft may at least temporarily constrain Russia's ability to conduct long-range drone and missile strikes into Ukraine. Ukraine's June 1 operation targeted aircraft that Russia uses to launch cruise missiles against Ukraine and airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) systems that Russia uses to identify Ukrainian air defense systems and coordinate Russian fighter jet targeting.[8] Russia regularly deploys Tu-95 and Tu-22M3 to launch Kh-101/Kh-555 and Kh-59/69 cruise missiles against Ukraine.[9] The downing of Russian A-50 aircraft has previously temporarily constrained Russian aviation activities over Ukraine.[10] The June 1 Ukrainian drone operation will force Russian officials to consider redistributing Russia's air defense systems to cover a much wider range of territory and possibly deploying mobile air defense groups that can more quickly react to possible similar Ukrainian drone strikes in the future.[11]
Russia will likely struggle to replace the aircraft that Ukrainian forces damaged and destroyed. Forbes reported in September 2023 that a single A-50 aircraft costs roughly $500 million, and the Kyiv Independent reported on June 1 that Russia has fewer than 10 A-50s in operation.[12] Ukrainian military observer Yuriy Butusov stated on June 1 that Ukrainian forces destroyed some strategic aircraft that Russia does not currently produce.[13] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russia no longer produces chassis for the Tu-95 and Tu-22 bombers and noted that the chassis are impossible to replace.[14] The Economist reported on June 1 that Russia likely has fewer than 90 operational Tu-22, Tu-95, and Tu-160s in total.[15] Ukrainian sources have recently noted that Russia is increasingly using Sukhoi aircraft — and not strategic bombers — to launch cruise missiles.[16] Russia likely turned to Sukhoi aircraft so as to not risk their strategic bombers, suggesting that Russia is concerned about its limited quantities of strategic bombers.
Russian officials and milbloggers continue to blame Russian leadership for failing to defend Russian military infrastructure from Ukrainian drone strikes — a widespread complaint throughout the war after successful Ukrainian strikes. Russian State Duma Deputy and former Deputy Commander of the Southern Military District (SMD) retired Lieutenant General Andrei Gurulev (who has previously criticized the Russian MoD and whom the Duma subsequently voted to remove from his position on the Duma Defense Committee) blamed Russian special services for not sufficiently protecting the air bases and allowing the trucks to move close to the targets.[17] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian senior military leadership continues to disregard the need to protect military facilities and has been relying on the fact that many critical military infrastructure facilities are located far from Ukraine.[18] Milbloggers claimed that this attitude has repeatedly led to "massive” failures and Ukraine's ability to violate Russia’s borders and airspace.[19] Milbloggers specifically criticized the Russian military command‘s decision to store strategic aircraft in open-air facilities with insufficient defenses.[20] Milbloggers have repeatedly complained about the Russian military's failure to adapt to repeated successful Ukrainian strikes against Russia and to learn from wartime mistakes.[21]
Russian state media and milbloggers attempted to frame Ukraine's strikes against legitimate Russian military targets as undermining Russia's nuclear stability and as grounds for a Russian nuclear response — mirroring the Kremlin's repeated nuclear saber-rattling throughout the war that has aimed to prevent Western support for Ukraine. Moscow-based state media outlet Moskovsky Komsomolets amplified claims from Russian political scientist Sergei Markov that the Ukrainian strikes against the air bases in Russia are grounds for the use of nuclear weapons under Russia's nuclear doctrine because the strikes targeted Russia's strategic nuclear potential.[22] Many Russian milbloggers, including Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers, made similar claims about Russia's doctrinal nuclear use and explicitly called for Russia to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine in response to the strikes.[23] Russia has attempted to use nuclear rhetoric throughout the war in order to influence the West to limit aid to Ukraine or limit Ukraine's ability to develop its own strike capabilities.[24] Russian President Vladimir Putin signed Russia's updated nuclear doctrine in November 2024 after the United States greenlit Ukraine's long-range strikes into Russia, and ISW assessed that these doctrinal updates were part of Russia's efforts to push Western decision makers to shy away from providing additional support to Ukraine.[25] ISW continues to assess that Russia's changes to its nuclear doctrine did not represent a substantial change in Russia's nuclear posture, doctrine, or the threat of the employment of nuclear weapons and that Russian nuclear use in Ukraine remains unlikely.[26] Ukraine has notably previously destroyed Russian strategic bombers and conducted long-range strikes against Russian air bases that house strategic bombers and strategic bomber production enterprises.[27]
Russian officials blamed Ukraine for the collapse of two bridges and subsequent train derailments in western Russia on May 31, likely as part of efforts to justify the recent launch of Russian offensive operations in Sumy Oblast and the Kremlin's disinterest in peace negotiations to end the war. Two railway bridges in Bryansk and Kursk oblasts collapsed on the night of May 31, causing two trains to derail.[28] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko responded to the derailments, stating that Russia may be conducting false flag operations to disrupt the peace process and prolong the war.[29] Russian officials and milbloggers largely blamed Ukraine for the collapsed bridges but did not provide any evidence to support these claims.[30] Russian State Duma Deputy Andrei Kolesnik claimed that Russia should respond harshly and not limit its response to the train derailments.[31] Chairperson of the Federation Council Committee on Constitutional Legislation and State Building Andrei Klishas claimed that the derailments indicate that a "terrorist group" controls Ukraine, which Klishas claimed has turned into a "terrorist enclave" without borders or legitimate authorities.[32] Klishas called for Russia to create a "vast" buffer zone in Ukraine to protect Russia from Ukrainian attacks and for Russia to "denazify" and "demilitarize" Ukraine and "reestablish" the Ukrainian state (a reference to Russia's original war aims to replace the current legitimate Ukrainian government with a pro-Russian proxy government and to prevent Ukraine from being able to defend itself in the future). A Russian milblogger responded to Klishas, claiming that Russia should establish a "buffer zone" that extends to western Ukraine and that Ukraine should exist as a rump state with its capital in Lviv City.[33] The milblogger's claim mirrored Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev's recent call for Russia to control a buffer zone encompassing nearly all of Ukraine, apart from a relatively small part of Volyn and Lviv oblasts.[34]
Ukrainian authorities recently reported that Russia has deployed 125,000 personnel to the borders of Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts — two oblasts in which Russian forces are conducting offensive operations that Russian officials have framed as part of efforts to create buffer zones in Ukraine.[35] ISW continues to assess that Russian offensive efforts in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts demonstrate that the Kremlin's territorial ambitions are not limited to the seizure of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and that Russia is attempting to delay negotiations and prolong the war in order to make additional battlefield gains.[36] Russian officials appear to be claiming that Ukraine is responsible for the train derailments at least partly in order to justify Russia's recent launch of offensive operations in Sumy Oblast as necessary and defensive in nature. Russian officials may be trying to frame Ukraine as the party that is not interested in peace negotiations and to justify Russia's prolongation of the war in order to achieve its original war goals.
Russian forces conducted their largest combined drone and missile strike of the war that included over 400 drones against Ukraine on the night of May 31 to June 1. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched three Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Kursk and Voronezh oblasts and four Kh-101 and Iskander-K air and ground-based cruise missiles from unspecified directions.[37] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 472 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Kransnodar Krai. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed three Kh-101/Iskander-K missiles and 213 drones over northern, eastern, southern, western, and central Ukraine and that 172 drones were "lost" or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW). Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, and Odesa oblasts and damaged civilian and military infrastructure.[38]
Ukrainian forces were notably unable to down any of the three ballistic missiles that Russia launched overnight.[39] Ukrainian forces have struggled to intercept ballistic missiles due to the limited supply of US-made Patriot air defense systems and interceptors.[40] ISW continues to assess that Russia's ballistic missile strikes are forcing Ukraine to make difficult decisions about which areas of Ukraine to protect with its limited Patriot systems.[41] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yurii Ihnat stated on May 24 that Ukrainian forces are struggling to use Patriot air defense systems to down modified Russian Iskander-M ballistic missiles due to recent Russian improvements, including enhancements that enable the missile to change trajectory and perform maneuvers rather than flying in a straight line.[42] The Economist reported on May 25 that Ukrainian government sources estimate that the Kremlin has a stockpile of 500 ballistic missiles.[43]
Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Mykhailo Drapatyi submitted his resignation following a Russian missile strike on a Ukrainian training unit on June 1. Ukraine's Ground Forces reported that a Russian missile strike on a training unit in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on June 1 killed 12 and wounded over 60 servicemembers.[44] Drapatyi stated on June 1 that he submitted a request to resign from his position due to a personal sense of responsibility for the death of Ukrainian servicemembers.[45] Drapatyi stated that his decision to resign came as the result of being unable to ensure the proper execution of his orders and that Ukraine‘s military is disadvantaged by a command culture that is unwilling to accept personal responsibility for and learn from battlefield failures. Drapatyi stated that he must take responsibility and resign, as his efforts to root out this attitude among Ukraine’s Ground Forces failed.
Russian forces continue to adapt their strike packages in an effort to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses. Russia launched its highest number of drones in the war on the night of May 31 to June 1. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on June 1 that Russia is increasing the number of drones per strike each week.[46] The Economist recently reported that Russia is able to produce approximately 100 Shaheds per day, and Russia's increasingly large drone strike packages are a direct result of this increased production.[47] Ukrainian forces reportedly were unable to down 67 out of 355 drones on the night of May 25 to 26, and Ukrainian forces reportedly were unable to down 87 out of 472 Russian drones on the night of May 31 to June 1, indicating that the Russian tactic of using huge numbers of drones is proving effective.[48]
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky established a delegation to participate in peace negotiations to end the war as Russian officials continue to flout their own proposed negotiation mechanisms. Zelensky issued a decree on June 1 authorizing Ukrainian political and military officials to negotiate on Ukraine’s behalf at the upcoming bilateral Ukrainian-Russian talks in Istanbul on July 2.[49] Ukrainian Minister of Defense Rustem Umerov will lead the delegation, whose other members include deputies and representatives from the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Ukrainian Navy and Air Force, the Verkhovna Rada’s Human Rights Commissioner’s Office, Ukraine's Security Service (SBU), Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), Ukraine's Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU), the Office of the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ Chief of Staff and Office of the President, and the Ukrainian General Staff. Zelensky explicitly authorized the delegation to negotiate a peace settlement with Russia and Ukraine’s Western partners. US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg told Fox News on May 31 that the Russia has failed to deliver a memorandum with its terms for a peace settlement and that Russian President Vladimir Putin failed to deliver the memorandum to US President Donald Trump during Putin's proposed timeline.[50] Zelensky also stated on June 1 that Russia had yet to present its memorandum to US, Ukrainian, or Turkish officials.[51]
Key Takeaways:
- Ukraine conducted a large-scale and simultaneous series of drone strikes against multiple air bases in Russia on June 1.
- Ukraine continues to innovate its drone technology and tactics to achieve operational surprise and successfully target Russian military infrastructure in the rear.
- Ukraine's drone strike operation against strategic Russian aircraft may at least temporarily constrain Russia's ability to conduct long-range drone and missile strikes into Ukraine.
- Russia will likely struggle to replace the aircraft that Ukrainian forces damaged and destroyed.
- Russian officials and milbloggers continue to blame Russian leadership for failing to defend Russian military infrastructure from Ukrainian drone strikes — a widespread complaint throughout the war after successful Ukrainian strikes.
- Russian state media and milbloggers attempted to frame Ukraine's strikes against legitimate Russian military targets as undermining Russia's nuclear stability and as grounds for a Russian nuclear response – mirroring the Kremlin's repeated nuclear saber-rattling throughout the war that has aimed to prevent Western support for Ukraine.
- Russian officials blamed Ukraine for the collapse of two bridges and subsequent train derailments in western Russia on May 31, likely as part of efforts to justify the recent launch of Russian offensive operations in Sumy Oblast and the Kremlin's disinterest in peace negotiations to end the war.
- Russian forces conducted their largest combined drone and missile strike of the war that included over 400 drones against Ukraine on the night of May 31 to June 1.
- Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Mykhailo Drapatyi submitted his resignation following a Russian missile strike on a Ukrainian training unit on June 1.
- Russian forces continue to adapt their strike packages in an effort to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses.
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky established a delegation to participate in peace negotiations to end the war as Russian officials continue to flout their own proposed negotiation mechanisms.
- Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Toretsk.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 31, 2025
Russian officials' public statements continue to demonstrate that Russia maintains wider territorial goals in Ukraine beyond the four oblasts that Russia has illegally declared as annexed. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov told Kremlin newswire TASS on May 31 that Ukraine risks losing Zaporizhzhia, Dnipro, Sumy, Kharkiv, Odesa, and Mykolaiv cities if Ukraine refuses a peace settlement and claimed that every day that Ukraine delays a diplomatic solution to the war worsens the conditions for Ukraine.[1] Russia may illegally declare Dnipropetrovsk, Sumy, Kharkiv, Odesa, and Mykolaiv oblasts annexed, especially should Russian forces launch offensive operations to seize these regional centers. Russia notably did not — and still does not — occupy Zaporizhzhia City when the Kremlin annexed Zaporizhia Oblast in September 2022. Kartapolov’s statement indicates that Russia maintains territorial ambitions beyond Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts — in line with Russian officials' calls for Russia to seize Sumy City, claims that Kharkiv and Odesa cities are "Russian" cities, and increasing rhetoric about Russia's alleged historical ties to "Novorossiya" (which Russian officials have defined as all of eastern and southern Ukraine).[2] Kartopolov's statement also indicates that the Kremlin continues to assess that Russian forces will be able to fight a protracted war against Ukraine to achieve these territorial goals and is not interested in good-faith negotiations to achieve a diplomatic settlement to the war. ISW continues to assess that Russian President Vladimir Putin holds a theory of victory that assumes that the Russian military will be able to continue gradual, creeping advances in Ukraine indefinitely.[3]
The Kremlin is continuing efforts to prepare Russian society and the Russian defense industry base (DIB) for a protracted war with Ukraine and potential future war with NATO. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on May 30 allowing the Russian government to revoke the rights of shareholders of defense industrial enterprises in the event that the enterprise fails to fulfill state defense orders during martial law.[4] The decree enables the Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade to appoint a management company to act as the sole executive body of the enterprise in order to fulfill contractual obligations to the Russian government. The decree applies to civilian aviation and shipbuilding companies, military development and production companies, and government subcontractors. Putin is likely setting legal conditions to allow the Russian government to commandeer elements of Russia's economy and DIB should the Kremlin introduce full martial law in order to transition the country to a full wartime footing. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is preparing Russian society and economy for a protracted war in Ukraine, indicating that Russia is not interested in engaging in good faith negotiations to reach a diplomatic settlement to its war in Ukraine.[5]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian officials' public statements continue to demonstrate that Russia maintains wider territorial goals in Ukraine beyond the four oblasts that Russia has illegally declared as annexed.
- The Kremlin is continuing efforts to prepare Russian society and the Russian defense industry base (DIB) for a protracted war with Ukraine and potential future war with NATO.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk and Toretsk and in western Zaporizhia. Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 30, 2025
Russian officials continue to signal the Kremlin's uncompromising position ahead of proposed talks in Istanbul on June 2, suggesting that the upcoming Istanbul meeting is very unlikely to yield substantive results in support of an enduring peace in Ukraine. Russian Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN) Vasily Nebenzya claimed during a UN Security Council meeting on May 30 that Russia is prepared to fight Ukraine for as long as necessary and that Ukraine can either accept peace, presumably on Russia's terms, or face inevitable battlefield defeat.[1] Nebenzya stated that the United States recently "opened its eyes" to the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine and reiterated Russian President Vladimir Putin's demands that the West stop arming Ukraine and that Ukraine cease force generation efforts as preconditions to a ceasefire.[2] CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) and Presidential Special Representative for Investment and Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries Kirill Dmitriev also called for officials to eliminate the conflict‘s "root causes" in an English-language post to X on May 30.[3] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov previously defined the root causes of the war in Ukraine as NATO's eastward expansion following the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991 and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against Russian speakers and Russian culture.[4] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on May 29 that Russia’s delegation to the proposed bilateral discussion in Istanbul on June 2 will be the ”same” as Russia's delegation at previous talks held in Istanbul on May 15 and 16.[5] Russia sent a low-level delegation led by Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky and consisting of Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin, Chief of the Russian General Staff's Main Directorate (GRU) Igor Kostykov, and Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Fomin to the May 15-16 Istanbul talks.[6]
Russian officials' decision to reiterate long-standing demands and send the same low-level delegation to the next Istanbul meeting indicates that Russia remains disinterested in engaging in good-faith negotiations. ISW continues to assess that Russia remains dedicated to protracting peace negotiations to support continued offensive operations in Ukraine and extract additional concessions from Ukraine and the West.[7]
Russian officials are pocketing major US concessions and continuing to make further demands of Ukraine and the West. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on May 30 that Kremlin officials are encouraged by the Trump administration's understanding of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s concerns about further eastward expansion of NATO and that Russia has previously shared these concerns with the United States during closed-door negotiations.[8] Peskov stated that the US position on further NATO expansion is "very appealing" to Russia, given that the United States continues to play a mediating role in negotiations to end the war.
US officials previously indicated a willingness to consider Russia’s objections to Ukraine’s possible future NATO membership – a long-standing Russian demand that officials frequently claim to be a "root cause" of the war in Ukraine – in exchange for Russia making concessions on other demands.[9] Peskov’s statement indicates that Russian officials assess that the United States supports Russia's demand for NATO to alter its foundational open-door policy.[10] Such a commitment would effectively grant Russia a veto over elements of the NATO charter, disproportionally benefit Russia’s desired postwar security posture, and undermine US President Donald Trump‘s stated objectives of achieving a just and lasting peace in Ukraine. Russian officials are pocketing US concessions regarding negotiations and potential postwar security arrangements and are failing to make any comparable concessions, such as relinquishing Russia’s claim to currently unoccupied Ukrainian territory like Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts.
Key Takeaways:
- Russian officials continue to signal the Kremlin's uncompromising position ahead of proposed talks in Istanbul on June 2, suggesting that the upcoming Istanbul meeting is very unlikely to yield substantive results in support of an enduring peace in Ukraine.
- Russian officials are pocketing major US concessions and continuing to make further demands of Ukraine and the West.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Novopavlivka, and Kurakhove.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 29, 2025
Russian officials continue to dictate the terms and timing of peace negotiations with Ukraine and are attempting to obfuscate the current state of negotiations. Russian officials are setting conditions to falsely accuse Ukraine of delaying negotiations. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on May 28 that Russia is prepared to present its memorandum on terms for peace negotiations during the next bilateral meeting with Ukraine and suggested that Russian and Ukrainian representatives should meet in Istanbul on June 2.[i] Lavrov claimed that Russia's memorandum proposes how to "reliably" overcome the Russia's perceived "root causes" of the war in Ukraine. Lavrov has previously defined the root causes of the war in Ukraine as NATO's eastward expansion following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against Russian speakers and Russian culture.[ii] Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky, who led the last Russian delegation in Istanbul, claimed on May 28 that he spoke with Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov and proposed a date for Russia and Ukraine to exchange their memoranda.[iii] Umerov responded to the Russian proposal on May 28 and stated that Ukraine is ready for a ceasefire and further negotiations and that Ukraine has already presented its memorandum to Russia.[iv] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on May 29 that Russia has not received a copy of Ukraine's memorandum and that Ukraine has not responded to Lavrov's proposal, however.[v]
Russia is forcing Ukraine to make concessions on the timing, terms, and location of negotiations. Russian President Vladimir Putin initially suggested on the night of May 10 to 11 "resuming" the 2022 bilateral peace negotiations in Istanbul but later rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's invitation for an in-person, one-on-one meeting in Istanbul.[vi] Ukraine's willingness to attend the May 15 to 16 talks in Istanbul with Russian officials was itself a significant concession, as holding the talks in Istanbul fit into Putin's narrative that the current talks are a resumption of the 2022 Istanbul Protocols in which Russia demanded that Ukraine effectively capitulate to Russia.[vii] US President Donald Trump previously suggested that Russia and Ukraine could move peace talks to the Vatican, but Russian officials rejected this offer and continue to suggest meetings in Istanbul.[viii] Putin unilaterally announced Easter and Victory Day ceasefires in April and May 2025, and Russia is now again unilaterally imposing timelines and terms on Ukraine.[ix] Ukraine, the United States, and European states have repeatedly called for Russia to agree to a renewable ceasefire in Ukraine before Russia and Ukraine begin negotiations for an enduring peace, calls that the Kremlin has repeatedly rejected. Russian officials are instead demanding that negotiations address both a ceasefire and long-term peace agreement in Ukraine. Russian forces will continue to press along the frontline until Ukraine accepts Russia's terms or they are no longer able to do so, and Russian officials will attempt to leverage any additional battlefield gains to extract additional concessions from Ukraine and the West during negotiations.
ISW previously assessed that Russian forces are leveraging the fact that Ukraine and Russia set no concrete deadlines for the next steps in the peace process in order to delay the process altogether and prolong the war. Medinsky stated after the May 16 Ukrainian-Russian talks in Istanbul that the two delegations agreed to "write...down in detail" the terms for peace and present a memorandum for a possible future ceasefire in the future, but did not specify a deadline.[x] Putin told journalists on May 19 that Russia would present Ukraine with a "memorandum" detailing conditions and timing for a future peace treaty as the two countries move toward conducting bilateral negotiations, but also did not specify a deadline.[xi] Lavrov claimed on May 23 that Russia would present its memorandum to Ukraine as soon as Russia and Ukraine completed their large-scale prisoner of war (POW) exchange on May 25.[xii] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha stated on May 23 that Ukraine expected Russia to present a draft proposal for an unconditional ceasefire agreement after the third and final POW exchange on May 25.[xiii] US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg told Fox News on May 27 that the United States received Ukraine’s memorandum of conditions and timelines for a potential peace treaty and is waiting for Russia to submit its version to begin reconciling the two countries’ positions.[xiv] Russian officials appear to be withholding their memorandum and may attempt to withhold the memorandum until the June 2 meeting. Russian officials may assess that Ukraine will refuse to attend the June 2 meeting if Russia does not provide its memorandum in advance as Ukraine has done and likely intend to seize on Ukraine's refusal to blame Ukraine for stalling peace negotiations.
Western reporting indicates that the People's Republic of China (PRC) is increasing drone deliveries to Russia while reducing sales to Ukrainian and Western buyers, further demonstrating China's increasingly overt support for Russia's war effort in Ukraine. Bloomberg reported on May 29 that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky recently stated that the PRC stopped selling DJI Mavic quadcopter drones, which Russian and Ukrainian forces have used for surveillance and strike missions, to Ukraine and other European countries while continuing to sell the quadcopters to Russia.[xv] Zelensky stated that Russia has domestic DJI Mavic production lines, and that "Chinese representatives" are present at these production facilities. An unnamed European official told Bloomberg that Zelensky's statements are consistent with European assessments and stated that the PRC appears to have reduced deliveries of some drone components to Western buyers while simultaneously increasing deliveries to Russia. ISW has observed recent reporting that Russian forces are fielding Chinese-made equipment, that the PRC is likely aware of and choosing not to stop Russian military recruitment efforts of PRC citizens, and that Russia has established joint production lines with PRC manufacturers for Shahed-like long range strike drones, underscoring the extent of the PRC's support for Russia's war effort.[xvi]
A Ukrainian defense manufacturer and official announced that Ukraine has fielded a long-range drone with sophisticated artificial intelligence (AI). Forbes reported on May 26 that Ukrainian startup company Strategy Force Solutions Chief Technology Officer "Andrii" stated that Ukrainian forces fielded the company's artificial intelligence (AI) powered "mothership" drone – the GOGOL-M – on autonomous missions against Russian military targets for the first time.[xvii] The GOGOL-M mothership drone can reportedly deploy two first-person-view (FPV) drones with automated target acquisition and strike capabilities, and the mothership drone reportedly has a range of 300-kilometers for one-way operations and a range of 100-kilometers to return for reuse.[xviii] The GOGOL-M mothership and compatible FPV drones reportedly use Strategy Force Solutions' SmartPilot system that leverages a combination of advanced sensors and AI to self-orient and execute predefined missions autonomously. The mothership and FPV drones notably do not rely on global positioning systems (GPS), thereby optimizing their electronic warfare (EW) resistance. "Andrii" told Forbes that Strategy Force Solutions is able to produce up to 50 GOGOL-M mothership drones and up to 400 compatible FPV drones per month. Ukrainian Digital Transformation Minister Mykhailo Fedorov confirmed on May 29 that Ukraine fielded the GOGOL-M mothership drone for the first time.[xix]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian officials continue to dictate the terms and timing of peace negotiations with Ukraine and are attempting to obfuscate the current state of negotiations. Russian officials are setting conditions to falsely accuse Ukraine of delaying negotiations.
- Russia is forcing Ukraine to make concessions on the timing, terms, and location of negotiations.
- ISW previously assessed that Russian forces are leveraging the fact that Ukraine and Russia set no concrete deadlines for the next steps in the peace process in order to delay the process altogether and prolong the war.
- Western reporting indicates that the People's Republic of China (PRC) is increasing drone deliveries to Russia while reducing sales to Ukrainian and Western buyers, further demonstrating China's increasingly overt support for Russia's war effort in Ukraine.
- A Ukrainian defense manufacturer and official announced that Ukraine has fielded a long-range drone with sophisticated artificial intelligence (AI).
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kurakhove and Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and near Kupyansk, Borova, Lyman, and Pokrovsk.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 28, 2025
Western insider reporting about Kremlin demands to end the war in Ukraine continues to align with repeated public statements from Kremlin officials outlining Russia's demands, indicating that Russia's goal of Ukrainian capitulation and destruction of NATO remains unchanged. Reuters reported on May 28 that three Russian sources familiar with the peace negotiations stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin wants Western states to submit a "written" pledge stipulating that NATO will not expand eastward; Ukrainian neutrality; sanctions relief; the unfreezing of Russian assets in the West; and unspecified protections for Russian speakers in Ukraine.[1] Kremlin officials have repeatedly used allegations that the Ukrainian government is discriminating against Russian-speakers in Ukraine to justify Russia's calls for Ukrainian regime change and the installation of a pro-Kremlin puppet regime.[2] Russia's demands for a ban on NATO expansion, Ukrainian neutrality, and regime change are the same demands that Russia issued before the war in 2021 and when Putin launched his full-scale invasion in February 2022.[3]
Kremlin officials have consistently and publicly called for the demands that Reuter's insider sources outlined. Russia has demanded since the outbreak of the full-scale invasion that Ukraine commit to a neutral, non-aligned status, which would require Ukraine to change its constitution and NATO to change its "open-door" policy.[4] Russian officials have also repeatedly claimed that any future peace settlement must eliminate the "root causes" of the war, which Russian officials have previously defined as NATO's alleged violation of unofficial commitments not to expand into eastern Europe and along Russia's borders in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s, and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine.[5] Kremlin officials explicitly highlighted the "root causes" of the war and Russia's demands for Ukrainian neutrality again on May 28.[6] ISW continues to assess that these demands are part of the Kremlin's efforts to force the West into surrendering Ukraine and breaking the NATO security alliance.[7]
Putin reportedly maintains his demand that Ukraine cede all of the four oblasts that Russia has illegally annexed but not fully occupied, even as Kremlin officials have signaled that Russia has territorial ambitions beyond these four oblasts. A Reuters source reportedly stated that Putin is less inclined now to make territorial compromises and continues to demand the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts — including the areas that Russian forces do not currently occupy.[8] The source stated that "Putin has toughened his position" about territory. Putin first demanded in June 2024 that Ukraine cede all of the four oblasts, and Russian officials have often reiterated this demand since.[9] The Washington Post reported on May 27 that Ukrainian military intelligence assesses that the Russian military command has deployed 125,000 personnel to the borders of Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts — two oblasts that Russia has not illegally annexed.[10] Russian forces have been conducting offensive operations aimed at creating a buffer zone in Kharkiv Oblast since May 2024.[11] Russian forces also recently launched attacks to create a buffer zone in northern Sumy Oblast, with Russian officials calling for Russia to seize Sumy City, likely to set conditions for Russia to annex the oblast.[12] Russia will likely struggle to seize the entirety of the four illegally annexed oblasts, especially as the seizure of the heavily fortified fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast and the forcing of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast will require significantly larger force groupings than the forces currently deployed in eastern and southern Ukraine. The Russian military command would have solely concentrated its efforts on seizing all of the four oblasts if the Kremlin's territorial ambitions were truly limited to the four oblasts, but the deployment of significant forces to attack in Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts suggests that Russia intends to increase its territorial demands. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin maintains significant territorial ambitions in southern and eastern Ukraine, and Russian officials within Putin's innermost circle have even called for Russia to take control of most of the country.[13]
Putin continues to demonstrate his willingness to achieve his war aims militarily through a prolonged war in Ukraine during which Russian forces would continue to only make gradual, creeping advances. One of Reuters' sources reportedly stated that Putin will try to use military victories to show Ukraine and Europe that "peace tomorrow will be even more painful" if Putin is unable to secure his desired terms in a peace deal.[14] The source stated that Putin would take advantage of any tactical battlefield opportunities to advance further into Ukraine and that Putin believes that Russia can fight for years in the face of any sanctions or other economic measures the West might place on Russia in the future. ISW has long assessed that Putin holds a theory of victory that assumes that Russian forces will be able to continue gradual, creeping advances indefinitely and to outlast and overcome Western military aid to Ukraine and Ukraine's own efforts to mobilize.[15]
Russia will likely be able to continue its current tactics that are resulting in gradual, creeping advances as long as Russia is able to replenish its losses on the frontline. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on May 28 that almost 175,000 people have arrived at military units and that more than 14,000 people have joined volunteer units since the start of 2025, for a total of roughly 1,285 people per day.[16] Medvedev also reiterated Putin's May 13 claim that 50,000 to 60,000 people voluntarily join the Russian military per month.[17] Putin's claimed recruitment rate is notably higher than Medvedev's, and ISW cannot independently verify these claims. Reports from the Ukrainian General Staff about Russia's daily losses indicate that Russian suffered a daily loss rate of 1,550 per day in January 2025; 1,261 in February 2025; 1,312 in March 2025; 1,219 in April 2025; and 1,140 between May 1 and May 28.[18] Medvedev's May 28 claim that 175,000 soldiers have joined Russian military units since January 2025 indicates that Russia is replenishing its units at about a one-for-one ratio to its loss rate. ISW continues to assess that Ukrainian forces, supported by Western aid, can inflict higher personnel loss rates on the battlefield that could push Putin to make difficult decisions and force Putin to engage in good-faith negotiations to end the war.[19]
The Kremlin continues to promote its long-standing false narratives that the threat of NATO expansion forced Russia to invade Ukraine in 2022, and that NATO continues to threaten Russia's security. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed that Russia is alarmed by the accumulation of NATO troops along Russia's border and that NATO's eastern expansion and discussions to bring Ukraine into the alliance triggered Russia into launching its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[20] Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov claimed that NATO has deployed 34,200 troops on its "eastern flank" — which runs from Finland to Turkey — since February 2022.[21] Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed in June 2024 that Russia had deployed over 700,000 Russian soldiers to Ukraine, in contrast.[22] NATO had not significantly progressed Ukraine's path to membership in the years since the 2008 Bucharest Declaration, in which NATO promised Ukraine and Georgia paths to membership but took no formal steps toward Ukrainian membership in late 2021 and 2022.[23] Putin explicitly admitted in December 2024 that former US President Joseph Biden offered in 2021 to postpone consideration of Ukraine's membership to NATO for 10 to 15 years — demonstrating that Ukraine's NATO membership was not an immediate prospect and undermining the Kremlin's attempts to blame NATO for Russia's 2022 invasion.[24] ISW continues to assess that Putin did not invade Ukraine in 2022 because he feared NATO but because he believed that NATO was weak and aimed to destroy the alliance.[25]
The Kremlin continues to promote Russian President Vladimir Putin's envisioned Eurasian security architecture — a Russian-led bloc aimed at countering the West and NATO. Putin gave a video address at the 13th International Meeting of High Representatives Responsible for Security Issues on May 28 and advocated for the creation of his desired Eurasian security architecture based on Russia-dominated international organizations, including the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).[26] Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Head Sergei Naryshkin claimed at the meeting that Russia cannot be "weak" and that Eurasian and global security are dependent on Russia's strength — placing Russia at the center of this security architecture.[27] Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov attended a CSTO defense ministers meeting on May 28 where he criticized NATO's defensive posture in Central and Eastern Europe and claimed that the West does not just threaten Russia but all CSTO member states in an effort to unify CSTO members around Russia's anti-NATO sentiments.[28]
Russia and Belarus reduced the scope of the September 2025 Zapad-2025 joint Russian-Belarussian military exercise and relocated the main maneuver away from Belarus's western borders, likely to promote a veneer of cooperation and distract from Russia's limited military capacity outside of the Ukraine theater. Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin announced in an English-language social media post on May 28 that Belarusian officials decided to reduce the scope of the Zapad-2025 joint military exercise and relocate the main maneuver away from the western border of Belarus towards central Belarus.[29] Khrenin claimed that Belarusian authorities made this decision to demonstrate Belarus' readiness for de-escalation, dialogue, and peace. Belarussian authorities would not have been able to make this decision independently without Russia. Russia and Belarus are attempting to posture themselves as unthreatening, reasonable, and cooperative to the West. Belarusian officials previously claimed that at least 13,000 personnel would participate in the Zapad-2025 exercise, and Russia and Belarus likely had to downsize the joint exercise as most of its forces are fighting in Ukraine.[30] ISW observed elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (Moscow Military District [MMD]), 20th Combined Arms Army (CAA, MMD), and 6th CAA (Leningrad Military District [LMD]), as well as roughly 4,000 Airborne (VDV) personnel, including from the 7th, 76th, 98th, and 106th VDV divisions participated in the Zapad-2021 joint exercise.[31] Significant elements of these formations are currently fighting in the war in Ukraine.[32] Russian officials unexpectedly canceled the Zapad-2023 exercise, very likely due to Russia's equipment and manpower requirements for the war in Ukraine.[33]
Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to forward an unofficial Russian ideology formulated on Russian nationalism and to try to unify Russian society in support of Russia's war in Ukraine. The Kremlin published a video message from Putin on May 28 for Border Guards Day, addressing Russian border guards.[34] Putin claimed that Russian border guards have developed their "legendary traditions" throughout Russia's "1,000-year history" since the times of Ancient Rus' (Kyivan Rus), a medieval state based in Kyiv. Putin's reference to Ancient Rus' is part of the Kremlin's years long attempts to claim that the modern Russian state is directly tied to Kyivan Rus and to claim that Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians are one people who descended from Kyivan Rus.[35] Putin similarly referred to Russia's 1,000-year history on May 22, and Putin's continued promotion of Russian nationalism is a notable departure from his usual rhetoric promoting a civic Russian identity and nationalism based on ethnic and religious diversity.[36]
Putin also attempted to use his May 28 speech in honor of border guards to justify the use of Russian conscripts to defend Kursk Oblast. Putin used the mythos of the Second World War to glorify the role of border guards to "defend the interests of the Fatherland" and claimed that border guards have "repeatedly demonstrated themselves" in the war in Ukraine.[37] Putin claimed that he is confident that border guards will continue to repel threats to Russia and attempts to cross the state border. Putin and other Russian officials have repeatedly promised the Russian population that conscripts, whose military service is mandated by Russian law, will not be deployed to fight in Ukraine.[38] Conscripts made up a significant part of the forces that initially met the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast, however, leading to discontent among the Russian population.[39] The Kremlin has historically responded to issues surrounding the deployment of conscripts in combat zones with great concern, and Putin is likely attempting to use narratives about Kyivan Rus and the "Fatherland" to justify Russia's use of conscripts in Kursk Oblast.[40]
Ukrainian forces conducted a series of long-range drone strikes targeting Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) on May 27 and 28. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 28 that Ukrainian Special Forces and Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) struck the Kronshtadt drone factory in Dubna, Moscow Oblast.[41] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the plant specializes in producing drone ground-control systems for the Orion, Inokhodets, Molniya, Grom, Termin, Helios, and Sirius drones. Geolocated footage shows drones striking the Kronshtadt plant.[42] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the SBU also struck the Raduga plant in Dubna, which manufactures cruise missiles, including Kh-101/55 missiles, Kh-69 missiles, and Kh-59MK missiles.[43] Geolocated footage shows a drone strike against the Raduga plant.[44] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Angstrem plant in the Elma Technological Park in Zelenograd, Moscow Oblast, which is one of Russia's largest microchip manufacturing plants.[45] Geolocated footage shows Russian air defense systems downing a Ukrainian drone over Zelenograd, a drone striking the technological park, and the aftermath of the drone strikes against the technological park.[46] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, who often reports on successful Ukrainian drone strikes against Russia, reported on May 28 that Elma Park is a critical hub for Russian import substitution.[47] Kovalenko also reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Dubna Machine Building Plant (DMZ), which produces drones, avionics, and control systems. A Russian insider source claimed that the DMZ also assembles Kh-101, Kh-5, and Kh-59 cruise missiles.[48] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against the Murom Instrument Plant, which produces ignition devices, on the night of May 27 in Vladimir Oblast.[49] The Ukrainian General Staff also confirmed earlier reports that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against the Dmitrievsky Chemical Plant in Kineshma, Ivanovo Oblast on May 26.[50]
Ukraine’s Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz stated on May 28, following a meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Berlin, that Germany will finance a “significant” portion of Ukraine’s Starlink satellite systems operation costs.[51] The German Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on May 28 that Germany would supply Ukraine with ammunition, small arms, and air defense and land weapon systems and invest five billion euros (roughly $5.6 billion) in Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB).[52] The German MoD stated that Germany would support more robust cooperation between German and Ukrainian defense industrial companies. Merz stated on May 28 that Germany would help finance Ukrainian production of long-range weapons.[53]
Ukrainian authorities recently identified a Russian servicemember responsible for the execution of two Ukrainian prisoners of war (POW) in January 2025. Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reported on May 28 that Ukrainian officials and military counterintelligence identified a Russian soldier of the 40th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) suspected of executing two Ukrainian POWs on January 9, 2025, near Guyevo, Kursk Oblast (southwest of Sudzha).[54] There has been a sharp increase in credible reports and footage of Russian forces executing Ukrainian POWs throughout 2024 and 2025.[55] ISW continues to assess that Russian military commanders are either complicit in or directly enabling their subordinates to conduct systemic executions in direct violation of international law.[56]
Key Takeaways:
- Western insider reporting about Kremlin demands to end the war in Ukraine continues to align with repeated public statements from Kremlin officials outlining Russia's demands, indicating that Russia's goal of Ukrainian capitulation and destruction of NATO remains unchanged.
- Putin reportedly maintains his demand that Ukraine cede all of the four oblasts that Russia has illegally annexed but not fully occupied, even as Kremlin officials have signaled that Russia has territorial ambitions beyond these four oblasts.
- Putin continues to demonstrate his willingness to achieve his war aims militarily through a prolonged war in Ukraine during which Russian forces would continue to only make gradual, creeping advances.
- The Kremlin continues to promote its long-standing false narratives that the threat of NATO expansion forced Russia to invade Ukraine in 2022, and that NATO continues to threaten Russia's security.
- The Kremlin continues to promote Russian President Vladimir Putin's envisioned Eurasian security architecture — a Russian-led bloc aimed at countering the West and NATO.
- Russia and Belarus reduced the scope of the September 2025 Zapad-2025 joint Russian-Belarussian military exercise and relocated the main maneuver away from Belarus's western borders, likely to promote a veneer of cooperation and distract from Russia's limited military capacity outside of the Ukraine theater.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to forward an unofficial Russian ideology formulated on Russian nationalism and to try to unify Russian society in support of Russia's war in Ukraine.
- Ukrainian forces conducted a series of long-range drone strikes targeting Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) on May 27 and 28.
- Ukraine’s Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine.
- Ukrainian authorities recently identified a Russian servicemember responsible for the execution of two Ukrainian prisoners of war (POW) in January 2025.
- Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 27, 2025
The Kremlin is setting conditions to establish permanent control over the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), suggesting that Russia plans to illegally occupy and annex additional territory in Ukraine. Greenpeace's Ukraine service reported on May 27 that satellite imagery from early February 2025 to May 23, 2025, shows that Russia has laid 90 kilometers of powerlines near the Sea of Azov in occupied Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts.[1] Greenpeace reported that these new powerlines are the first observed indications that Russia is acting upon its long-held plans to connect the ZNPP to the Russian power grid.[2] Russian state nuclear energy operator Rosatom Head Alexei Likhachev claimed on May 21 that Rosatom had developed a plan to bring the ZNPP to "full capacity," suggesting that Russia intends to bring the ZNPP's reactors out of their current cold shutdown state.[3] Likhachev claimed in May 2024 to agree with the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) assessment that restarting the ZNPP was currently "impossible" and that the first condition for restarting the ZNPP must be to ensure its security, either with a security guarantee or after the frontline had shifted away from the ZNPP.[4]
US President Donald Trump's April 2025 seven-point peace proposal to Ukraine included a provision for Ukraine to regain control over the ZNPP with US involvement, and the proposed Ukraine-European peace plan also contained this provision.[5] Russian officials have repeatedly rejected giving up control over the ZNPP, however.[6] Russian officials have also increased their rhetoric, invoking Russia's alleged historical ties to "Novorossiya," which Russian officials have defined as all of eastern and southern Ukraine, and Russian occupation authorities have recently called for Russia to control areas of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast near the Dnipro River that Russia has not yet illegally annexed.[7] The Russian definition of Novorossiya notably includes the area directly across from the ZNPP on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River. Russia's efforts to connect the ZNPP to the Russian power grid suggest that Russia wants to maintain its control over the ZNPP and operate it safely as Russia likely expects to significantly push the frontline away from the plant or plans to occupy and annex Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.
Russian officials are likely leveraging the fact that Ukraine and Russia set no concrete deadlines for the next steps in the peace process in order to delay the process altogether and prolong the war. US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg told Fox News on May 27 that the United States had received Ukraine’s list of conditions and timelines for a potential peace treaty and is now waiting for Russia to submit its version to begin reconciling the two countries’ positions.[8] Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky stated after the May 16 Ukrainian-Russian talks in Istanbul that the two delegations agreed to "write...down in detail" and present their versions for a possible future ceasefire, but did not specify a deadline.[9] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on May 27 that Russia is preparing its version of the memorandum.[10] Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov stated on May 27 that the success of peace negotiations will depend on the participants’ willingness to address the war’s ”root causes,” reiterating long-standing Russian demands that amount to full Ukrainian capitulation.[11] The Kremlin is likely leveraging the lack of a deadline to prolong negotiations in an attempt to extract more concessions and improve Russia’s negotiating position by making battlefield advances.
Putin continues to use orchestrated public engagements to forward the Kremlin's effort to create a militarized Russian society united against the West that supports a prolonged war in Ukraine and possible future conflict with NATO. Putin met with the supervisory board of the state-formed "Russia-Land of Opportunities" non-profit organization on May 27 and spoke with participants of the organization's programs during a highly scripted event.[12] Putin claimed that many foreigners see Russia as a "stronghold" of traditional spiritual and moral values. Putin claimed that Soviet citizens' "spirit of devotion to their people" formed the basis of the Soviet victory in the Second World War and stated that the "internal mobilization" of each Russian citizen and Russian society as a whole is the most important thing right now for Russia. Putin stated that the future of a state depends on its independence, sovereignty, and self-sufficiency; that Russia will not exist if it is not sovereign; and that "passion within society" is important for Russian sovereignty.
The general director of "Russia-Land of Opportunities," Andrei Betin, highlighted that Putin named 2025 the "Year of the Defender of the Fatherland" and noted that many Russian servicemembers who are fighting in Ukraine participate in the non-profit's programs. Putin spoke during the meeting with an active duty Russian servicemember, who proposed creating additional programs that allow Russian military personnel to work with the non-profit so that the servicemembers "will say that Russia remembers [them], Russia has not forgotten [them]." Putin claimed that the Russian government is working to create conditions for the "self-realization" of Russian servicemembers returning home from the war. Putin highlighted how many graduates of the organization's programs have gone on to become leaders and politicians in the federal, regional, and municipal government, specifically noting that many participants of the non-profit's "Leaders of Russia. Politics" program have won State Duma elections since 2020 and forecasting that more participants of the program will run in the 2026 Duma elections.
Putin and other Kremlin officials have recently focused their rhetoric on Russia's strong "traditional and moral values" and used the mythos of the Second World War to call for unity within Russian society – likely as part of an ongoing effort to foster anti-Western sentiment in Russian society and prepare the Russian population for a prolonged war in Ukraine and a possible future conflict with NATO.[13] Putin's support for programs aimed at reintegrating Russian veterans into society suggests that the Kremlin fears political instability and the emergence of an independent veterans-based civil society – as ISW has assessed.[14] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is engaged in a campaign to create a new cadre of militarized, loyal elites to unify Russian society against the perceived threat of the West, including by co-opting Russian veterans to participate in the 2026 State Duma elections.[15]
The European Union (EU) Council approved the first phase of the European Commission’s ReArm Europe/Readiness 2030 plan. The EU Council announced on May 27 that it adopted a regulation establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) financial instrument to facilitate common defense procurement efforts between interested EU member states with the goal of boosting Europe's defense industrial production capacity.[16] The EU will provide up to 150 billion euros (roughly $170 billion) to member states. The package will benefit Ukraine by allowing Ukraine to join common procurement efforts and make military purchases with EU companies. Ukraine is eligible to receive financing through SAFE to purchase materiel, including ammunition; artillery systems; ground combat capabilities and their support systems; critical infrastructure protection; air defense systems; maritime surface and underwater capabilities; drone and anti-drone systems; Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISTAR) systems; space assets protection; artificial intelligence (AI); and electronic warfare (EW) systems. The EU's five-part ReArm Europe Plan is vital for Europe's short- and long-term security and in line with US President Donald Trump's calls for Europe to shoulder more of its own defense requirements.[17]
Ukraine's Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine. The Swedish Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on May 26 that Sweden’s government recently approved 4.8 billion Swedish kronor (roughly $499 million) worth of funding to procure materiel to support Ukraine’s defense capabilities.[18] The package allocates 480 million Swedish kronor (roughly $50 million) to the Ukraine Defense Contact Group; over one billion Swedish kronor (roughly $104 million) to the Danish procurement model that allows foreign states to buy Ukrainian-produced materiel for the Ukrainian military; 418 million Swedish kronor (roughly $43 million) for equipment procurement to support of the development of Ukraine’s ground combat capabilities; 550 million Swedish kronor (roughly $57.1 million) and 546 million Swedish kronor (roughly $56.7 million) for the Czech and Estonian ammunition initiatives, respectively; and over one billion Swedish kronor (roughly $104 million) for air defense and long-range drone procurement for Ukraine.
Key Takeaways:
- The Kremlin is setting conditions to establish permanent control over the Russian-occupied Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), suggesting that Russia plans to illegally occupy and annex additional territory in Ukraine.
- Russian officials are likely leveraging the fact that Ukraine and Russia set no concrete deadlines for the next steps in the peace process in order to delay the process altogether and prolong the war.
- Putin continues to use orchestrated public engagements to forward the Kremlin's effort to create a militarized Russian society united against the West that supports a prolonged war in Ukraine and possible future conflict with NATO.
- The European Union (EU) Council approved the first phase of the European Commission’s ReArm Europe/Readiness 2030 plan.
- Ukraine's Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar. Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Kupyansk, and Pokrovsk.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 26, 2025
Russian forces conducted one of their largest drone and missile strikes of the war against Ukraine on the night of May 25 to 26 after three nights of record strikes. The May 25-26 strike is now the second largest combined strike of the war, after Russian forces conducted the largest combined strike on the night of May 24 to 25. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched nine Kh-101 cruise missiles from the airspace over Saratov Oblast and 355 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down all nine Kh-101 missiles and 233 drones over northern, eastern, southern, western, and central Ukraine and that 55 drones were "lost." Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strikes targeted Chernihiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kharkiv, Odesa, and Kyiv oblasts.[2] Ukrainian officials stated that the strikes caused civilian casualties and damaged civilian infrastructure and private residences.
Russia has launched three of its largest strike packages against Ukraine over the last three days, including its two largest combined strikes, and eight of the largest strikes of the war since January 2025.[3] Russian strikes against Ukraine continue to disproportionately impact civilians and civilian infrastructure.[4] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on May 26 that Russia launched over 900 drones against Ukraine over the last three days and that intensified Russian strikes have a significant political meaning.[5] Zelensky stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin is choosing to continue the war rather than engage in meaningful peace negotiations and that there is no evidence that Russia is considering a diplomatic end to the war.[6] Russia may be increasing strikes against Ukraine as part of a cognitive warfare effort to weaken Ukrainian resolve and to undermine Western support for Ukraine.
Russia's increased missile stockpiling, drone production, and drone adaptations demonstrate Russia's commitment to achieving its war goals through military means in a protracted war in Ukraine. The Economist reported on May 25 that Ukrainian government sources estimate that the Kremlin has a stockpile of 500 ballistic missiles.[7] The Economist also reported that Russia is increasing its production of Shahed drones and can currently produce approximately 100 Shaheds a day — roughly four to five times their assessed daily production rate in late 2024.[8] Ukrainian military intelligence told the Economist that Russia plans to increase its production to 500 drones a day by an unspecified future deadline. Ukrainian drone engineers reported that Russia is actively innovating and adapting its Shahed drones to circumvent Ukrainian air defenses, including by using artificial intelligence (AI) and Ukrainian internet and mobile internet networks for navigation to prevent Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. A Ukrainian officer told the Economist that Russian drones are flying at an altitude of 2,000 to 2,500 meters, which is out of range of the small-caliber guns and shoulder-fired missiles that Ukrainian mobile air defense crews use. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated on May 25 that Russian forces recently set a new Shahed flight altitude record of 4,900 meters.[9] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yurii Ihnat stated on May 26 that Russia is increasing its production of both Shahed and decoy drones and that Russian forces are flying drones at higher altitudes.[10] Ihnat reported on May 25 that Russian forces have also resumed their use of Kh-22 cruise missiles after temporarily using fewer cruise missiles in their strike packages.[11] Increasingly large Russian strike packages are consistent with reports that Russia is significantly increasing its domestic Shahed drone, decoy drone, and missile production and storage capabilities. Russia's efforts to increase domestic drone and missile production and ongoing adaptations of these strike packages are likely part of a broader Russian effort to prepare for a protracted war in Ukraine and possibly a future war with NATO.[12]
Ukrainian intelligence continues to assess that the Kremlin is committed to its war aim of achieving complete Ukrainian capitulation and is preparing for a potential future conflict with NATO — in line with ISW's assessments. Ukraine's Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) Head Oleh Ivashchenko stated in an interview with Ukrainian outlet Ukrinform published on May 26 that Russia's strategic plans to gain full control over Ukraine remain unchanged.[13] Ivashchenko stated that the entire Ukrainian intelligence community agrees that Russia is trying to take control over all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts. Ivashchenko stated that Russia also has a long-term goal to establish influence over all post-Soviet states and that Russia will need two to four years after the end of hostilities in Ukraine to restore the Russian military's combat capabilities. Ivashchenko noted that Russia's ability to rearm its military after the end of its war in Ukraine will depend on Western sanctions. ISW continues to assess that Russia remains committed to pursuing demands that amount to nothing short of Ukraine's full surrender and that Russia will continue to pursue this objective so long as Putin believes Russia can militarily defeat Ukraine.[14] ISW also continues to assess that the Russian government and military are preparing for a possible future conflict with NATO.[15] Russian authorities recently renewed their years-long narrative rejecting the legality of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, likely to set conditions for Russia to deny the independence and sovereignty of other former Soviet states in the future.[16]
Ukrainian intelligence also assessed that Russia is facing a number of critical constraints in its economy and on the battlefield — in line with ISW's ongoing assessments. Ivashchenko stated that Russia's sovereign wealth fund has fallen from its pre-war level of about $150 billion to about $38 billion and that Russia's gold and foreign currency reserves are also decreasing.[17] Ivashchenko noted that Russia is suffering from serious labor shortages, which are causing problems in the Russian economy, and that Russian authorities are trying to avoid paying the financial incentives that Russia is offering new military recruits. Ivashchenko stated that roughly 80 percent of the equipment that Russian forces are using is refurbished from Russia's Soviet-era stockpiles and that only about 20 percent of the equipment is modern. Ivashchenko's statements are in line with ISW's ongoing assessment that Russia will face a number of materiel, manpower, and economic issues in the near to medium-term if Ukrainian forces continue to inflict damage on Russian forces on the battlefield at the current rate.[18] Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) will struggle to sustain Russia's current equipment and ammunition burn rates in the future, and Putin has mismanaged Russia's economy, which is suffering from increased and unsustainable war spending, growing inflation, significant labor shortages, and reductions in Russia's sovereign wealth fund.
Russia's own defense industrial production limitations are pushing Russia to rely on its allies and partners and to find cheap solutions to adapt to Ukraine's drone and counter-drone capabilities. Ivashchenko highlighted North Korea's contribution of six million artillery shells, 120 M1989 Koksan self-propelled artillery systems, and 120 M1991 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) to Russia since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion.[19] Ivashchenko stated that the People's Republic of China (PRC) is supplying machines, chemicals, gunpowder, components, and aviation equipment to at least 20 Russian defense industrial enterprises and that 80 percent of the critical electronics in Russian drones are Chinese made. Ivashchenko stated that Belarus is producing ammunition for Russia and that the Belarusian and Russian DIBs are largely integrated. Russian forces have increasingly supplied frontline units with motorcycles and Chinese- and Russian-made buggies for use in assaults — a response to Ukrainian drone advantages on the battlefield and an effort to offset significant armored vehicle losses.[20] Russia's recent extensive modifications to its long-range Shahed and decoy drones demonstrate that Russia is trying to adapt to Ukraine's successful countermeasures that have been effectively repelling Russia's drone strikes.[21] Russian forces had previously used Shahed drones to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses so as to allow Russian missiles to hit their targets, but Russia's recent modifications to the drones suggest that Russia is attempting to restore the Shahed as an effective weapon itself.[22] Russia is likely focusing on adapting the Shaheds, increasing their production rate, and launching them in increasingly large quantities as the drones are relatively cheap and can be mass produced — unlike costly missiles that Russia can only produce at a relatively much lower rate. Russia is learning lessons about how to adapt its drone and missile strike packages to most effectively penetrate a large air defense umbrella and deplete air defense missile stockpiles, and Russia will carry these lessons into any future conflict.
Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent demand for Russian forces to create a "buffer zone" along the Russia-Ukraine international border, in addition to Russia's ongoing efforts to seize the remainder of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, ignores Russia's constraints and underscores Putin's intention to increase his territorial demands. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on May 26 that the Russian military command recently redeployed elements of the 752nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) and 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) to reinforce the Russian force grouping attacking into northern Sumy Oblast.[23] Mashovets stated that elements of the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade are operating near Volodymyrivka (north of Sumy City) and in Gordeevka (just north of Volodymyrivka in Russia). Elements of the Russian 752nd Motorized Rifle Regiment have been operating in the Borova and Lyman directions since at least mid-2024.[24] ISW has observed elements of the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade engaged in combat in the Bakhmut-Chasiv Yar direction — a priority direction for the Russian military — since mid-2023 and observed reports of the brigade operating in Chasiv Yar as recently as May 6.[25] ISW has not observed additional reports of these units operating in northern Sumy Oblast but will cover any future reports about these units.
ISW previously noted that Russian forces' inability to penetrate Ukrainian defenses west and southwest of Chasiv Yar is undermining Russia's ability to prepare for major offensive operations against Kostyantynivka and the wider Ukrainian fortress belt.[26] Redeploying forces away from Chasiv Yar suggests that the Russian military command may intend to delay its offensive operation against Kostyantynivka and supports ISW's ongoing assessment that Russia does not currently have sufficient operational reserves to intensify offensive operations in several different directions simultaneously.[27] The Russian military command's decision to redeploy units away from this effort suggests that the Russian military may try to simultaneously continue advances in Donetsk Oblast and establish a buffer zone in northern Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv oblasts, however. The Russian military command may assess that Russian forces have a greater chance of significant advances in northern Sumy Oblast than near Chasiv Yar. Putin recently orchestrated a meeting with Russian officials to float the idea of creating an at least 25-kilometer-wide buffer zone in northern Sumy Oblast, and Putin ordered Russian forces to establish a buffer zone in northern Kharkiv Oblast in May 2024.[28] ISW previously assessed that Putin likely intends to leverage buffer zones in northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts to justify expanding his claims over Ukrainian territory beyond Russia's long-standing claims over Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts.[29]
Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Russian defense industrial enterprises in the Republic of Tatarstan and Ivanovo and Tula oblasts on May 25 and 26. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, who often reports on successful Ukrainian drone strikes against Russia, implied on May 26 that Ukrainian drones struck the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Yelabuga, Republic of Tatarstan, and the Dmitrievsky Chemical Plant in Kineshma, Ivanovo Oblast.[30] Russian opposition outlet Astra and Ukrainian outlet Militarnyi published footage on May 25 showing Russian air defenses appearing to defend against Ukrainian drone strikes near the Alabuga SEZ.[31] Astra reported on May 26 that at least two drones struck a warehouse at the Dmitrievsky Chemical Plant and that sources in the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations reported that the warehouse sustained damage.[32] The Ivanovo Oblast Operational Headquarters claimed on May 26 that a drone strike damaged a utility building in Kineshma.[33] Geolocated footage published on May 26 shows an explosion near the Scientific-Production Association (SPLAV) in Tula City, which manufactures multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), grenade launchers, ammunition, and guided and unguided missiles for the Russian military.[34] Astra also reported that Ukrainian drones on May 25 struck the Shcheglovsky Val Plant in Tula Oblast, which develops guided weapons, air defense systems, and small arms and produces vehicles for Pantsir-S and Pantsir-S1 air defense system.[35]
The Kremlin's ongoing cognitive warfare effort aimed at preventing future Western military assistance to Ukraine is rooted in fear and the acknowledgement that Russia's only real hope in defeating Ukraine is by isolating Ukraine from its allies. German Chancellor Friederich Merz stated on May 26 that the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and France no longer impose "any range restrictions" on Ukraine's ability to use the long-range weapons that these countries have provided and noted that Ukraine can target military positions in Russia.[36] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded to Merz and stated that such "potential decisions" would be "quite dangerous" and "run counter to attempts at a [peace] settlement."[37] Pro-Kremlin voices and Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers amplified similar sentiments, with some calling on Russia to respond and others claiming that Russia will achieve its war aims militarily.[38] Peskov's statement is part of a prolonged Russian effort to persuade Western states to cease military support for Ukraine, which Russian President Vladimir Putin himself has explicitly named as a condition for engaging in negotiations for a full ceasefire.[39] Russia's only real hope of winning its war in Ukraine is to convince the West to abandon Ukraine, and the Kremlin likely fears the impacts of continued Western military assistance on Ukraine's military capabilities.[40] Allowing Ukraine to target military warehouses and airbases in Russia also threatens Russia's ability to continue its long-range strike campaign against Ukraine, particularly as Russia seeks to demoralize Ukrainian society through increasingly large and frequent strike packages that disproportionately affect civilian areas.
Key Takeaways:
- Russian forces conducted one of their largest drone and missile strikes of the war against Ukraine on the night of May 25 to 26, after three nights of record strikes. The May 25-26 strike is now the second largest combined strike of the war, after Russian forces conducted the largest combined strike on the night of May 24 to 25.
- Russia's increased missile stockpiling, drone production, and drone adaptations demonstrate Russia's commitment to achieving its war goals through military means in a protracted war in Ukraine.
- Ukrainian intelligence continues to assess that the Kremlin is committed to its war aim of achieving complete Ukrainian capitulation and is preparing for a potential future conflict with NATO — in line with ISW's assessments.
- Ukrainian intelligence also assessed that Russia is facing a number of critical constraints in its economy and on the battlefield — in line with ISW's ongoing assessments.
- Russia's own defense industrial production limitations are pushing Russia to rely on its allies and partners and to find cheap solutions to adapt to Ukraine's drone and counter-drone capabilities.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent demand for Russian forces to create a "buffer zone" along the Russia-Ukraine international border, in addition to Russia's ongoing efforts to seize the remainder of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, ignores Russia's constraints and underscores Putin's intention to increase his territorial demands.
- Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Russian defense industrial enterprises in the Republic of Tatarstan and Ivanovo and Tula oblasts on May 25 and 26.
- The Kremlin's ongoing cognitive warfare effort aimed at preventing future Western military assistance to Ukraine is rooted in fear and the acknowledgement that Russia's only real hope in defeating Ukraine is by isolating Ukraine from its allies.
- Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Vovchansk, Lyman, and Toretsk.
Previous Updates
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