Ukraine Invasion Updates

         This page collects the Critical Threats Project (CTP) and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) updates on the invasion of Ukraine. In late February 2022, CTP and ISW began publishing daily synthetic products covering key events related to renewed Russian aggression against Ukraine. These Ukraine Conflict Updates replaced the “Indicators and Thresholds for Russian Military Operations in Ukraine and/or Belarus,” which we maintained from November 12, 2021, through February 17, 2022.

This list also includes prominent warning alerts that CTP and ISW launched outside the crisis update structure. These products addressed critical inflection points as they occurred.

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• Maps on Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes
• Recent Updates
• February 2022 - July 2023 Updates
• Related Reads

Maps on Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes

This interactive map complements the static daily control-of-terrain maps that CTP and ISW produce with high-fidelity and, where possible, street level assessments of the war in Ukraine.

Click here to access the archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that produced daily by showing a dynamic frontline.

The Critical Threats Project and the Institute for the Study of War are publishing a summary of the methodology of our map for those who would like to learn more about the tradecraft for mapping conventional military operations from the open source.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        Previous versions of these static maps are available in our past publications. 

Recent Updates

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 6, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin met with US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff in Moscow on August 6, but concrete results from the meeting remain unclear. Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov claimed that the Witkoff-Putin meeting was "useful and constructive" and that Putin and Ushakov exchanged "signals" about Ukraine.[1] Ushakov stated that the Kremlin will refrain from issuing further statements about the negotiations until Witkoff has briefed US President Donald Trump about the results. Leading Russian negotiator and Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev also attended the meeting with Putin and Witkoff and called the negotiations "successful."[2] Trump characterized the negotiations as "highly productive" and stated that Witkoff and Putin made "great progress," and emphasized the importance of ending Russia's war in Ukraine.[3] Neither the Kremlin nor the White House has issued formal read-outs as of the time of this writing.

Trump may meet with Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in the coming weeks. White House Spokesperson Karoline Leavitt stated following the Putin-Witkoff meeting that Trump intends to meet with both Putin and Zelensky, and two people familiar with the matter told the New York Times (NYT) that Trump could hold a bilateral meeting with Putin followed by a trilateral meeting with Zelensky as soon as next week.[4]

Certain Russian commentators are attempting to stoke schisms within the Trump administration, likely as part of a wider effort to avoid US sanctions ahead of Trump's stated August 8 deadline for peace efforts in Ukraine. Russian state media and pro-Kremlin outlets amplified commentary from Russian State Duma deputies, largely framing Witkoff as a rational actor in US-Russia negotiations while portraying Trump as irrational. Russian State Duma Deputy Grigory Karasin stated on August 4 that he hoped that the results of Witkoff's meeting with Putin would be "specific, not emotional, like Trump's latest statements," and Russian media amplified Karasin's comment in reporting about the Witkoff-Trump meeting on August 6.[5] Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa claimed on August 6 that Trump sent Witkoff to "smooth over tensions" following Trump's recently issued "ultimatums" that Russia end the war or face US sanctions, and claimed that this smoothing over could negatively affect the image of the Trump administration.[6] Alexander "Sasha" Kots, a Russian milblogger who also serves on the Kremlin's Human Rights Council, accused Trump of "handing out" daily ultimatums and suggested that Witkoff will bring Trump a proposal that Trump "will perceive as a small victory."[7] The Kremlin has frequently attempted to sow divisions between Ukraine and its allies, as well as between the United States and Europe, as part of wider efforts to deter support for Ukraine.[8] The Kremlin appears to be employing similar informational tactics against the Trump administration to undermine ongoing US efforts to compel Putin to engage in meaningful negotiations to end the war. The Kremlin also likely aims to coerce unilateral concessions from the United States regarding the war, including fostering US-Russian economic deals in Russia's favor without Trump's stated preconditions of a ceasefire and negotiations for an enduring peace.

Russian officials and media continue to project an image of a strong and resilient Russian economy in anticipation of further US sanctions. Bloomberg reported on August 5 that Russia's oil revenue fell by approximately a third from July 2024 to July 2025 due to the global decline in crude oil prices and the appreciation of the ruble.[9] Bloomberg reported that the oil industries continue to account for roughly a third of Russia's budget and that the drop in oil revenues therefore increases pressure on Russia's already-strained federal budget. Russian State Duma deputies downplayed the impact of the fall in oil revenue on August 6, however. State Duma Defense Committee First Deputy Chairperson Alexei Zhuravlev claimed in an interview with the Russian outlet NEWS.ru that Russia would not stop the war in Ukraine even if it were "twice as expensive to fill oil tanks" and that the Russian government structured a reserve into its budget forecasts for 2025 such that even a $10 decrease in the price per barrel of oil would not impact the state budget.[10] State Duma Energy Committee First Deputy Chairperson Valery Selezne stated in an interview to Russian outlet OSN that Russia should take advantage of gas shortages in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan to increase Russian exports to Central Asia to protect the Russian domestic economy from the financial burden of potential tariffs against Russia — somewhat in opposition to Zhuravlev's claim that Russia's economy is impervious to changes in oil revenues.[11] State Duma Committee on Security and Anti-Corruption member Adalbi Shkhagoshev stated in a comment to Kremlin newswire TASS that further US sanctions against Russia will not affect the course of the war in Ukraine and that new sanctions would amount to economic war against Russia and its BRICS allies.[12]

Economic indicators suggest that the Russian economy is weaker than Russian officials project. The Russian Central Bank reported to TASS on August 6 that the Russian Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew by 1.4 percent in the first quarter of 2025, below the originally forecasted growth projection of two percent, and by 1.8 percent in the second quarter of 2025, close to the forecasted growth projection of 1.9 percent.[13] The Russian Central Bank claimed that there was a "slowdown in the growth rate of household and government consumption" in April 2025, which the bank did not forecast. UK outlet Express reported on August 6 that Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade data showed that the passenger car market fell by 24 percent from July 2024 to July 2025.[14] Consumer spending is a major driver of domestic economies, and a decline in purchases of a common item such as passenger vehicles suggests that consumers either face or fear economic instability that would inhibit such purchases. The Russian Central Bank is likely attempting to use reports of GDP growth as a sign of economic stability to project confidence to the domestic Russian populace who may be worried about the impact of the war and further Western sanctions on everyday life. Russian officials and the Central Bank are also likely attempting to discourage the West from levying additional sanctions against Russia or secondary sanctions against Russia's trading partners. Increased sanctions, especially against Russian oil exports, will further hinder Russia’s ability to fund its war in Ukraine. The sanctions remain critical — in tandem with continued Western defense assistance to Ukraine — to constraining Russian aggression.[15]

US President Donald Trump formally imposed an additional 25 percent tariff on India’s exports to the Unted States due to India’s ongoing economic cooperation with Russia. Trump signed an executive order on August 6 that will impose an additional 25 percent tariff on Indian exports to the United States, starting on August 31, given India’s continued purchases of Russian oil.[16] The executive order includes a modification provision in the event that India ceases purchases of oil from Russia or in the case of retaliation against the United States for this order. The executive order describes Russia as “an unusual and extraordinary threat” to US national security and foreign policy. India is one of the largest importers of Russian oil and has continued to purchase Russian military equipment since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.[17] ISW previously assessed that European and US sanctions appeared to be degrading Russia's revenues from third-country importers of Russian oil and that sanctions that target countries that purchase Russian oil will further hinder Russia's ability to finance its war in Ukraine.[18]

Russian forces likely advanced to the western outskirts of Kupyansk and secured positions from which they can threaten Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into the town. Geolocated footage published on August 6 indicates that Russian forces advanced south of Sobolivka (immediately west of Kupyansk) and likely seized Sobolivka and Myrne (immediately north of Sobolivka).[19] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are close to interdicting the H-26 Kupyansk-Shevchenkove highway (running east-west from Kupyansk and roughly one kilometer south of Sobolivka), the main Ukrainian GLOC supplying Kupyansk.[20] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces would likely leverage advances northwest of Kupyansk to support efforts to envelop Kupyansk and complicate Ukraine's ability to supply positions in the town and defend areas to the west.[21] Russian forces have at least three possible courses of action (COAs) following the potential future seizure of Kupyansk. Russian forces may continue to push west of Kupyansk toward Shevchenkove or northwest of Kupyansk toward Velykyi Burluk in order to support Russian efforts to establish a buffer zone in northern Kharkiv Oblast and advance toward Kharkiv City.[22] The Russian military command may instead reprioritize the seizure of the remainder of the east (left) bank of the Oskil River in the Borova and Lyman directions to support efforts to seize the remainder of Luhansk Oblast or set conditions for a future offensive on Ukraine's fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast from the northeast, respectively. The Russian military command may alternatively redeploy manpower from the Kupyansk direction to higher priority areas such as the Kostyantynivka, Pokrovsk, or Novopavlivka directions to facilitate Russia's long-standing objective of seizing the remainder of Donetsk Oblast. Russian advances in Sobolivka and Myrne appear to be consistent with Russia's recently demonstrated operational pattern of partially enveloping a settlement as opposed to trying to seize it using frontal assaults.[23] Russian forces are likely to use advances in these areas to support the envelopment of Kupyansk and pursue further advances west and northwest of Kupyansk.

The US State Department approved a $104 million Foreign Military Sale (FMS) to Ukraine. The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) announced on August 5 that the US State Department approved and notified US Congress of an FMS to Ukraine worth roughly $104 million for equipment, maintenance services, and long-term sustainment support for M777 howitzers.[24] The DSCA reported that UK defense manufacturer BAE Systems will be the principal contractor for this FMS.

A Russian servicemember recently executed a Ukrainian civilian in occupied Donetsk Oblast in clear violation of international law. The Ukrainian Prosecutor General’s Office reported on August 6 that it opened a case against a Russian servicemember who intentionally killed a Ukrainian man attempting to evacuate from Udachne, Donetsk Oblast, which Russian forces currently partially occupy.[25] The Ukrainian Prosecutor General published footage of the execution and reported that this is the third recorded incident of Russian forces executing civilians in occupied Donetsk Oblast thus far in 2025.[26] Russian soldiers and occupation authorities have notably committed extreme atrocities against civilians and soldiers in occupied Ukraine in Russia's pursuit to eradicate an independent Ukrainian language, culture, and identity.[27]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin met with US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff in Moscow on August 6, but concrete results from the meeting remain unclear.
• Trump may meet with Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in the coming weeks.
• Certain Russian commentators are attempting to stoke schisms within the Trump administration, likely as part of a wider effort to avoid US sanctions ahead of Trump's stated August 8 deadline for peace efforts in Ukraine.
• Russian officials and media continue to project an image of a strong and resilient Russian economy in anticipation of further US sanctions.
• US President Donald Trump formally imposed an additional 25 percent tariff on India’s exports to the Unted States due to India’s ongoing economic cooperation with Russia.
• Russian forces likely advanced to the western outskirts of Kupyansk and secured positions from which they can threaten Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into the town.
• The US State Department approved a $104 million Foreign Military Sale (FMS) to Ukraine.
• A Russian servicemember recently executed a Ukrainian civilian in occupied Donetsk Oblast in clear violation of international law.
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Chasiv Yar. Russian forces advanced in northern Kharkiv and western Zaporizhia oblasts and near Kupyansk, Lyman, Siversk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 5, 2025

Private and public Kremlin statements indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to demand the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts before he will initiate a peace agreement. Helping Ukraine inflict battlefield setbacks on Russian forces remains essential to efforts to persuade Putin to reevaluate his position on the war and negotiations. Reuters reported on August 5 that three Kremlin sources familiar with the matter stated that Putin's belief that Russia is winning and his doubts that US sanctions will have a significant impact on Russia are driving Putin's decision to continue his war against Ukraine.[1] Two of the sources claimed that Putin's war aims take precedence over his efforts to improve relations with the United States and US President Donald Trump. One source claimed that the recent Ukrainian-Russian peace talks in Istanbul were a Russian attempt to convince Trump that Putin was open to peace but noted that the talks were devoid of any real substance. One source claimed that "Putin cannot afford to end the war just because Trump wants it." A source described Trump's reported March 2025 offer — in which Trump purportedly proposed to lift all US sanctions against Russia, to "de jure" recognize Russian sovereignty over occupied Crimea, and to "de facto" recognize Russian control over the other parts of Ukraine that Russian forces occupied at the time — as a "fantastic chance," but stated that stopping a war is more difficult than starting one. Putin rejected that offer.

 The Kremlin insider sources likely leaked this information in an attempt to obfuscate Putin's actual, more extreme war aims. One of Reuters' sources stated that Putin does not see the logic in stopping Russian offensive operations, as Russian forces are making relatively more rapid advances on the battlefield.[2] The Kremlin sources implied that Putin would be willing to establish a ceasefire if Russia first occupied (or was given) the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts. Recent Kremlin statements, including from Putin himself, have repeatedly indicated that Putin remains committed to achieving his maximalist objectives that amount to full Ukrainian capitulation, however.[3] Putin claimed as recently as June 20 that "all of Ukraine is [Russia's]."[4] Russian State Duma Deputy Anatoly Wasserman said in an interview with Azerbaijani news outlet Minval published on August 3 that the stated goals of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine are "incompatible with the continued existence of Ukraine" as a sovereign state and that Russia alone will determine the end date for its war.[5] Kremlin newswire RIA Novosti published two op-eds on July 30 entitled "There is no other option: no one should remain alive in Ukraine" and "Noted: Ukraine will end very soon."[6] Kremlin insiders are likely speaking to Western media outlets in order to socialize Putin's demands to Western policymakers and audiences, frame Russia's demand for the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts as reasonable, and insinuate that there is a possibility for a full ceasefire and lasting peace should Ukraine and the West acquiesce to Putin's demands.

The Kremlin also likely intends for these leaks to Western media to advance its ongoing effort to break Ukrainian and Western morale. One Kremlin source told Reuters that the Russian General Staff recently told Putin that the front line in Ukraine will likely "crumble" in two to three months.[7] This source is likely providing an accurate reflection of the situation in the Kremlin and the Russian General Staff, as the Russian General Staff is almost certainly giving Putin a positive assessment of Russia's military campaign in Ukraine. The Russian military has a pervasive culture of lying and submitting overly positive reports to superiors, and this culture is likely also an issue at the upper echelon of the Russian military.[8] Deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin repeatedly claimed that Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov and then-Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu lied to Putin about issues in Russia's war effort.[9] The Russian General Staff significantly downplayed Ukraine's August 2024 incursion into Kursk Oblast to Putin, and Putin repeatedly falsely claimed that Russian forces encircled several groups of Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast — likely after being misinformed by the Russian General Staff.[10] Putin even appeared to scold  Gerasimov and current Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov on August 1, claiming that he recently pressed Belousov and Gerasimov to tell him "honestly" about the frontline in Ukraine.[11] Russian forces are continuing to advance in Ukraine only at a footpace, if more rapidly than previously, and the Kremlin sources' statement reflects the Russian General Staff's and Putin's confidence in continued gains rather than an objective assessment of prospects on the battlefield.

The Kremlin source likely leaked this information in order to project confidence in Russia's military capabilities and, in turn, to undermine Ukrainian and Western morale. The Kremlin routinely shifts its rhetorical efforts based on what Kremlin officials assess will be most impactful during particular geopolitical moments, such as the Kremlin's recent shift from feigning interest in good-faith peace negotiations in early 2025 to reiterating its commitment to Putin's long-standing war aims.[12] The Kremlin has been engaged in a significant effort since January 2025 to convince Trump that Putin was willing to conclude a peace agreement in the short term, but is now attempting to justify prolonging the war in hopes that Russia can militarily defeat Ukraine. The Kremlin likely assesses that projecting confidence in Russia's ability to militarily defeat Ukraine in Western media outlets will generate fear and distrust in Ukrainian and Western society, further degrading Ukraine's morale to continue defending against Russian aggression.

Putin has intentionally put himself in a position where he cannot present any peace settlement that falls short of his original war aims as a victory to the Russian military or people. One Kremlin source told Reuters that Putin does not feel that now is the time to end the war because Russian society and the Russian military would not understand such a decision.[13] The Kremlin has been engaged in a concerted multi-year effort to justify Putin’s maximalist war objectives as necessary for the existence of the Russian state and to garner societal support for a protracted war until Russia achieves such goals.[14] Russian state and independent polling from early 2025 suggested that most Russians support continuing the war in Ukraine, and the Kremlin is likely seizing on these sentiments, which it has actively fostered, to justify Putin's decision to continue the war.[15] Putin is also increasing Russian society's reliance on military spending by heavily investing in Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB), which now accounts for a significant portion of overall Russian domestic production.[16] ISW continues to assess that any sharp decrease in Russia’s defensive spending will likely depress the Russian economy in the medium term, furthering Putin’s incentive to continue a protracted war in Ukraine and instigate future military conflicts despite high Russian losses on the battlefield and critical constraints on its economy.[17] Putin has intentionally cultivated Russian society's commitment to his war aims and has not set conditions to take any off-ramps to accept a peace settlement that falls short of his original war aims.

Russia announced on August 4 that it will withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, likely as a rhetorical response to US President Donald Trump's August 1 announcement about the redeployment of US nuclear submarines toward Russia. Russia's INF Treaty withdrawal does not portend a shift in Russia's use of shorter- and intermediate-range missiles, however. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claimed on August 4 that the conditions for Russia's "unilateral moratorium" on the deployment of weapons banned under the INF Treaty are "disappearing" such that Russia "no longer considers itself bound" by the INF Treaty's restrictions.[18] The Russian MFA claimed that the Russian leadership will decide on response measures after analyzing the deployment of Western land-based intermediate-range missiles. The Russian MFA claimed that Russia has "proactively made efforts to maintain restraint" following the US suspension of the INF treaty in 2019. The Russian MFA claimed that Western states have built up "destabilizing" missiles in areas near Russia, creating a "strategic" threat to Russian security. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded to the MFA's announcement, stating that Russia is no longer "limited" in any way and that Russia has the right to take "appropriate measures."[19] Peskov claimed that the West should not expect any announcements about the deployment of Russian shorter- and intermediate-range missiles as this information is "sensitive."[20] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on August 4 on his English-language X (formerly Twitter) account that the Russian MFA's statement is the result of NATO states' "anti-Russian policy" and that "this is a new reality all [Russia's] opponents will have to reckon with."[21] Medvedev vaguely threatened that the West should "expect further steps" from Russia. Medvedev's August 4 threat on his English-language account is the latest in a string of recent nuclear threats against the West that are part of the Kremlin's wider reflexive control campaign that aims to push the West to make decisions that benefit Russia.[22]

Russia has long violated the INF Treaty and publicly flaunted its use of shorter- and intermediate-range missiles banned under the treaty. The United States suspended participation in the INF Treaty on February 1, 2019, and withdrew from the treaty on August 2, 2019, due to Russian violations of the treaty with Russia's development, testing, and deployment of intermediate-range 9M729 (SSC-8) missiles. Russia suspended its participation in the INF in response on February 2, 2019, but had not formally withdrawn from the treaty.[23] Russia conducted a strike against Ukraine using an Oreshnik ballistic missile (reportedly an experimental variant of the RS-26 missile, which has a range of 2,000 to 5,800 kilometers) in November 2024, and Putin publicly claimed on August 1 that Russia produced its first serial Oreshnik complex and missiles and that the missile system entered into service.[24] Russia has also routinely launched Iskander missiles, with a reported range of 400 to 500 kilometers, against Ukraine and permanently deployed Iskanders to Kaliningrad Oblast in 2018.[25] High-ranking Russian officials began to set conditions in the information space for Russia to permanently withdraw from the INF Treaty in June 2025, suggesting that the Kremlin had made the decision to withdraw previously.[26] The Kremlin is attempting to posture its withdrawal from the treaty as a response to Trump's August 1 announcement, however.

European and NATO allies announced that they will purchase over one billion euros worth of US weapons for Ukraine through a new NATO funding mechanism. Ukraine’s Minister of Defense (MoD), Denis Shmyhal, announced on August 4 that the United States and NATO launched the Prioritized Ukrainian Requirements List (PURL) initiative, which is a new mechanism that will allow NATO members and partners to finance the supply of American weapons and technology to Ukraine through voluntary contributions.[27] Dutch Defense Minister Ruben Brekelmans stated on August 4 that the Netherlands is allocating 500 million euros (roughly $570 million) to purchase American weapons systems, including Patriot components and missiles, through the PURL initiative.[28] NATO announced on August 5 that Denmark, Norway, and Sweden will finance a combined $500 million military aid package to purchase air defense systems, Patriot munitions, anti-tank systems, ammunition, and spare parts from the United States through the PURL initiative.[29]

A Ukrainian company recently launched a new reusable interceptor drone designed to down Russian Shahed-variant drones. Ukrainian Technary design bureau CEO Hennadii Suldin told Ukrainian defense technology outlet Defender Media on July 30 that Technary has developed a reusable Mongoose interceptor drone, designed to intercept Russian Shahed-variant drones.[30] Suldin stated that the Mongoose interceptor drone has a jet engine and an automatic homing system, which allows the drone to approach an enemy drone, fire a projectile into a drone’s engine or propeller, and then continue its mission or return for refueling. Suldin stated that the drone can lock onto a target from 800 meters and that the drone's auto-guidance system activates when the target is within a range of 150-200 meters. Suldin stated that the Mongoose interceptor drone can reach speeds of up to 300 to 310 kilometers per hour with a maximum flight altitude of 5,000 meters and a combat radius of 12 kilometers. Suldin estimated that a Mongoose interceptor drone could likely destroy 10 to 12 Shahed drones over its lifecycle and noted that the drone’s reusability can help overcome Ukraine’s currently constrained interceptor drone production capabilities. Suldin stated that Ukrainian forces will begin integrating prototypes of the Mongoose interceptor drone in the near future. Ukrainian outlet Militarnyi noted that the Mongoose interceptor drone is designed to combat high-speed aerial threats such as the Shahed-136.[31] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat told RBC-Ukraine on July 31 that Russian forces are launching new, jet-powered Shahed drones that fly at speeds of 500 kilometers or more.[32] ISW previously observed reporting that Geran-3 drones can reach speeds of up to 800 kilometers per hour.[33]

Key Takeaways:

• Private and public Kremlin statements indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to demand the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts before he will initiate a peace agreement.
• Helping Ukraine inflict battlefield setbacks on Russian forces remains essential to efforts to persuade Putin to reevaluate his position on the war and negotiations.
• The Kremlin insider sources likely leaked this information in an attempt to obfuscate Putin's actual, more extreme war aims.
• The Kremlin also likely intends for these leaks to Western media to advance its ongoing effort to break Ukrainian and Western morale.
• Putin has intentionally put himself in a position where he cannot present any peace settlement that falls short of his original war aims as a victory to the Russian military or people.
• Russia announced on August 4 that it will withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, likely as a rhetorical response to US President Donald Trump's August 1 announcement about the redeployment of US nuclear submarines toward Russia. Russia's INF Treaty withdrawal does not portend a shift in Russia's use of shorter- and intermediate-range missiles, however.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar. Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Siversk, and Toretsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 4, 2025

Kremlin officials are slowly organizing a coordinated response to US President Donald Trump's August 1 statement that the United States would redeploy two nuclear submarines closer to Russia. The Kremlin did not immediately employ a coordinated response on August 2 and 3 following Trump's initial announcement, but more Kremlin officials began to coalesce around similar rhetorical lines on August 4.[1] Kremlin officials utilized three main framings to respond to Trump's decision to redeploy the submarines — posing Trump's decision to redeploy the submarines as "emotional," discounting the threat that this decision poses to Russia, and posturing Russia as a more responsible international actor than the United States. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on August 4 that discussions of nuclear escalation are premature and a "very emotional" perception of the situation.[2] Peskov claimed that Russia is "very careful" about any statements related to nuclear issues and that Russia takes a "responsible position" in regard to nuclear rhetoric.[3] Russian Federation Council Committee on Foreign Affairs Chairperson Grigory Karasin responded to Trump by claiming that it is always better to be less emotional and more rational in foreign policy.[4] Russian State Duma Deputy Mikhail Matveev also characterized Trump as "emotional" in response to Trump's August 1 statement.[5] Russian State Duma Deputy Viktor Volodatsky claimed that Trump is attempting to intimidate Russia, but that the redeployment of US nuclear submarines near Russia is not a real threat to Russia, and Russian Senator Vladimir Dzhabarov similarly claimed that Trump is mistaken if he assesses that this redeployment will scare Russia.[6] Dzhabarov claimed that Russia is not threatening anyone.

These official Russian responses ignore the Kremlin's history of frequently leveraging nuclear saber-rattling to push the West to make decisions that benefit Russia. Trump explicitly acknowledged on August 1 that he redeployed the submarines in response to Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev's July 31 nuclear threats.[7] Medvedev alluded on July 31 to Russia's automatic or semi-automatic nuclear weapons control system, referred to as the "Dead Hand" or the "Perimeter."[8] The Kremlin regularly uses Medvedev to introduce nuclear threats into the Russian and international information spaces, but more senior Russian officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin himself, also often make similar vague allusions to Russia's nuclear weapons capabilities.[9] Putin has routinely invoked Russia's Oreshnik ballistic missile system to allude to the possibility that Russia could conduct a nuclear strike against the West, and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko claimed during a media engagement with Putin on August 1 that Trump cannot dictate rules to a nuclear power like Russia.[10]

The Kremlin also responded to Trump's August 1 announcement by trying to downplay Medvedev's role in Russian decision-making in order to obfuscate the role Medvedev plays in Putin's information efforts targeting the West. Peskov claimed on August 4 that Russian officials, including Medvedev, have different assessments on current events but that Russian President Vladimir Putin alone determines Russia's foreign policy.[11] Peskov claimed that Putin's position is the "main thing" of import. Peskov's attempt to separate Medvedev's views from Putin's ignores the way that Putin and other high-level officials in Putin's inner circle have themselves frequently used similar nuclear saber-rattling to threaten the West.[12] Medvedev himself does not drive Russian foreign policy decisions, but ISW continues to assess that his statements are very likely part of a top-down, concerted Kremlin informational strategy.[13] Putin would be able to censor Medvedev's statements if he chose to do so, especially considering the Kremlin's demonstrated ability to coordinate official statements and overall grip on the Russian information space, internet, and media. Medvedev's aggressive statements serve a specific purpose for Putin, however, as they push the West to see Putin's statements as more moderate and rational by comparison and create space for Putin to make greater demands or larger threats. Peskov's August 4 claims are trying to conceal the way that the Kremlin is likely approving and encouraging Medvedev's use of his platforms to make statements against the West.

Russian authorities continue to intensify the use of bribery charges, including to to scapegoat regional government officials responsible for Russia's border defense and target defense industry officials and critical information space actors. Russian independent outlet Mozhem Obyasnit (We Can Explain), citing Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) data, reported on August 4 that the number of bribery cases in Russia increased by roughly 52 percent in bribe-taking cases and 84 percent in bribe-giving cases since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. [14] The MVD data showed a 33 percent increase in bribe-taking cases and 11 percent in bribe-giving cases in the first half of 2025 alone. Russian anti-corruption expert Ilya Shumanov told Mozhem Obyasnit that Russian authorities have created new offenses with fixed fines of up to 10 million rubles (roughly $125,300) as part of efforts to crack down on corruption and are actively investigating several large-scale bribery cases in the defense industry. Mozhem Obyasnit noted that Russian authorities have detained former Tambov Oblast Governor Maksim Yegorov; Gleb Trifonov, the editor-in-chief of Baza, a Russian outlet reportedly affiliated with Russian law enforcement; the editor-in-chief of state-owned Ural regional information agency Ura.ru; and former Rosgvardia Deputy Head Viktor Stigunov in July 2025 alone.

The Kremlin has been particularly targeting high-ranking officials in border oblasts with corruption charges in order to punish them for their inability to repel Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024. Acting Kursk Oblast Governor Alexander Khinshtein claimed on August 4 that Russian authorities may soon decide to liquidate the state-owned Kursk Oblast Development Corporation (KODC) following a series of embezzlement charges against the organization.[15] Russian authorities previously detained and charged KODC executives and high-ranking regional officials in Kursk, Bryansk, and Belgorod oblasts with embezzling funds earmarked for the construction of defensive fortifications in Russia's border areas.[16] ISW continues to assess that the arrests of officials in border areas are part of a concerted Kremlin effort to scapegoat regional officials for failing to repel Ukraine's incursion, and the decision to liquidate the KODC is likely part of these scapegoat efforts.[17]

Key Takeaways:

• Kremlin officials are slowly organizing a coordinated response to US President Donald Trump's August 1 statement that the United States would redeploy two nuclear submarines closer to Russia.
• The Kremlin also responded to Trump's August 1 announcement by trying to downplay Medvedev's role in Russian decision-making in order to obfuscate the role Medvedev plays in Putin's information efforts targeting the West.
• Russian authorities continue to intensify the use of bribery charges, including to scapegoat regional government officials responsible for Russia's border defense and target defense industry officials and critical information space actors.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Siversk, Toretsk, and Velykomykhailivka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 3, 2025

Ukrainian forces struck an oil depot in Krasnodar Krai on August 3.[1] Geolocated imagery shows a fire at the Rosneft Kubannefteprodukt Oil Depot in Adler, Krasnodar Krai.[2] Krasnodar Krai Governor Veniamin Kondratyev acknowledged that a Ukrainian drone strike caused the fire and that the fire engulfed several fuel tanks at the depot.[3] A Ukrainian Telegram channel also published a photo on August 3 purportedly showing an oil refinery on fire in Kstovo, Nizhnyi Novgorod.[4] Nizhnyi Novgorod Oblast Governor claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian drone strike on the night of August 2 to 3.[5]

Russia is reportedly preparing to expand its use of occupied Ukraine to launch Shahed-type drone strikes against Ukraine. A Ukrainian Telegram channel reported on August 2 that satellite imagery of the airport in northern occupied Donetsk City from July 2025 shows that Russian authorities have partially cleared the fortifications on the runway and started construction work at the parking lots, possibly in preparation for the installation of fuel tanks.[6] Ukrainian open-source intelligence group CyberBoroshno reported that the satellite imagery suggests that Russian occupation authorities are building closed storage areas near the destroyed airport terminal and are preparing manual drone control points, warhead unloading areas, air surveillance posts, and a runway.[7] CyberBoroshno assessed that Russian occupation authorities are developing infrastructure at the airport to launch Shahed-type strike drones, Gerbera-type decoy drones, and possibly Geran (Shahed) jet-powered drones. Long-range drone launch sites closer to the frontline will reduce the reaction time for Ukrainian air defenses. Russian forces have been launching long-range strike drones from occupied Ukraine, and Russia's continued use of occupied Ukraine for such strikes will increasingly threaten Ukraine and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) states if Russia continues to occupy Ukrainian territory.

Russia appears to be trying to better protect its air bases after multiple years of Ukrainian strikes against the Russian rear. Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) First Deputy Commander-in-Chief Lieutenant General Alexander Maksimtsev claimed in an interview with the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) official newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda on August 1 that Russia is creating a new generation of the Voronezh early-warning radars, which Maksimtsev claimed will not have any blind spots, will guarantee full coverage for all unspecified important assets, and will be able to track ballistic missiles regardless of their flight trajectories.[8] Maksimtsev further claimed that Russian forces are planning to provide all Russian air bases with shelters to protect aircraft.[9] Maksimtsev claimed that Russia has been constructing such shelters at its main air bases for the last two years and is working to expand these shelters to all air bases. The UK MoD published geolocated imagery on July 29 indicating that Russia has launched a program to construct hardened aircraft shelters at air bases close to the Russia-Ukraine border and in occupied Ukraine, including at Millerovo Air Base in Rostov Oblast, Khalino Air Base in Kursk Oblast, and Hvardiiske Air Base in occupied Crimea.[10] ISW reported in mid-July 2025 that recent satellite imagery indicated that Russian forces were constructing hangar-style aircraft shelters at Khalino Air Base and Saky Air Base in occupied Crimea.[11] An open source account on X (formerly Twitter) posted additional satellite imagery from early June 2025 that indicated that Russian forces had started construction of aircraft shelters at 14 military sites, including Millerovo Air Base, Khalino Air Base, and Hvardiiske Air Base, and had likely expanded construction following Ukraine's June 1 Operation Spiderweb deep strikes.[12] Russian milbloggers have repeatedly complained throughout the war about the Russian military's failure to adapt to repeated successful Ukrainian strikes and refusal to construct protective shelters at air bases.[13]

Russian intelligence services appear to be reassessing and possibly innovating their sabotage operations in Europe. The Economist and Bloomberg, citing an upcoming report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), recently reported that instances of suspected Russian sabotage attacks and hybrid warfare incidents in Europe sharply escalated to 30 attacks in 2024; IISS also counted 11 suspected Russian-backed hybrid attacks in Europe between January and May 2025.[14] The Economist reported that IISS analysts assessed that the decreasing trend in the number of suspected sabotage attacks in 2025 could be due to the increased NATO presence in the Black Sea, Russia's attempts to posture itself as a good-faith negotiator during peace negotiation with the United States about the war in Ukraine, or concerns that the scale of Russian hybrid attacks in Europe may provoke NATO escalation.[15] US and European officials told Bloomberg that the decreasing trend could be due to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s desire to avoid antagonizing US President Donald Trump at the start of Trump's second term and early peace efforts in Ukraine, the reallocation of Russian General Staff's Main Directorate (GRU) resources to Ukraine, high-profile trials of saboteurs that are deterring future attacks, or the Moscow's attempts to tighten its control over and restrain the local proxies that Russia is using to conduct the attacks.[16] The official sources cautioned that the decreasing trend does not indicate that Russia has stopped its hybrid attacks or will not escalate them in the future, noting that Russian sabotage plots are more frequent in eastern European states than those in western Europe. IISS similarly warned that Russian intelligence services may be refining their tactics and reassessing the criminal networks in Europe with whom they partner, and that Russia may renew its hybrid campaign against Europe in the near future.[17]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed Lieutenant General Anatoliy Kryvonozhko as the Commander of the Ukrainian Air Force on August 3.[18] Kryvonozhko served as the acting head of the Ukrainian Air Force from August 2024 until he was appointed commander.[19] Zelensky stated that the Ukrainian Air Force is implementing a 20-year development plan to improve Ukrainian aviation.[20]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces struck an oil depot in Krasnodar Krai on August 3.
• Russia is reportedly preparing to expand its use of occupied Ukraine to launch Shahed-type drone strikes against Ukraine.
• Russia appears to be trying to better protect its air bases after multiple years of Ukrainian strikes against the Russian rear.
• Russian intelligence services appear to be reassessing and possibly innovating their sabotage operations in Europe.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed Lieutenant General Anatoliy Kryvonozhko as the Commander of the Ukrainian Air Force on August 3.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka directions.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 2, 2025

Ukraine conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against energy infrastructure in Russia on the night of August 1 to 2. Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) reported on August 2 that it conducted a drone strike against the Rosneft Ryazan Oil Refinery in Ryazan City, one of the four largest refineries in Russia.[1] The USF reported that the drone strike started a large-scale fire at the refinery and caused significant damage to its production facilities. The USF reported that the facility produces about 840,000 tons of TS-1 aviation kerosene per year — about 8.4 percent of Russia's total TS-1 production — and produces up to 17 million tons of oil per year, or 6.1 percent of Russia's total oil refining. Ryazan Oblast Governor Pavel Malkov claimed on August 2 that Russian air defenses and electronic warfare (EW) systems downed drones over the oblast and that drone debris fell on an unspecified enterprise.[2] The USF stated that it also conducted a drone strike against the Annanefteproduct oil depot in Anna, Voronezh Oblast, which can receive petroleum products from up to 50 railway tanks and handle up to 160,000 tons of light petroleum products per year.[3] Voronezh Oblast Governor Alexander Gusev claimed that falling drone debris started a fire at an unspecified building in the oblast.[4] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 2 that Ukrainian forces struck Rosneft's Novokuybyshevsk Oil Refinery near Samara City.[5] Geolocated footage published on August 2 shows a drone strike and subsequent explosion at the Novokuybyshevsk oil refinery.[6] Samara Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Fedorishchev claimed that falling drone debris killed one person in Kuybyshevsky Raion.[7] Ukrainian outlet Militarnyi reported on August 2 that Ukrainian drones struck the Likhaya-Zamchalovo traction power substation at a Russian rear supply base near Uglerodovsky, Rostov Oblast.[8] NASA Fire Information for Resource Management (FIRMS) data shows heat anomalies in the area.[9] Rostov Oblast Acting Governor Yury Slyusar claimed that an unspecified enterprise caught fire in Uglerodovsky.[10]

Ukrainian outlet Kyiv Post reported that its sources within Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated that an explosion disabled a section of Gazprom's Central Asia-Center pipeline in Volgograd Oblast that transports natural gas from Turkmenistan through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan into Russia.[11] The GUR sources did not specify the cause of the explosion. The pipeline reportedly supplies several Russian defense industrial enterprises.

Ukraine also conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against Russia's defense industrial base (DIB), drone launch sites, and air defense systems on the night of August 1 to 2. Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) stated on August 2 that it conducted a drone strike against the Elektropribor plant in Penza City, which manufactures equipment for digital networks in Russian military control systems and devices for aviation, armored vehicles, ships, and spacecraft.[12] The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko noted that Elektropribor specializes in producing secure telecommunications systems, cryptographic communications equipment, and printed circuit boards for the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS), Russian General Staff's Main Directorate (GRU), Federal Security Service (FSB), and the Russian space program.[13] Geolocated footage published on August 2 shows an explosion at the Elektropribor plant.[14] Kovalenko stated that Ukrainian forces also struck the Radiozavod enterprise in Penza City, which produces communications systems for the Russian military, including kits for armored vehicles, command and staff vehicles, and air defense systems.[15] Penza Oblast Governor Oleg Melnichenko claimed on August 2 that Ukrainian drones struck an unspecified enterprise in Penza City and that Russian authorities limited mobile internet in the oblast as a result of the strike.[16] The SBU stated that it also conducted a drone strike against the Primorsko-Akhtarsk Air Base in Krasnodar Krai, hitting Shahed-type drone storage and launch sites.[17] FIRMS data shows heat anomalies at the air base, and an open source account on X (formerly Twitter) noted that a significant number of Russia's best air defense equipment surrounds the air base.[18] Militarnyi reported that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against the Russian 3rd Radio Regiment's "Periscope-VM" radar system near occupied Feodosia, Crimea, and FIRMS data shows heat anomalies near the radar's location.[19] Geolocated footage published on August 2 shows a fire at a Russian radar base near Feodosia.[20]

The Kremlin has yet to employ a coordinated response to US President Donald Trump’s August 1 announcement that he ordered the deployment of two US nuclear submarines closer to Russia. The Kremlin, Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), and Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) did not directly respond to Trump's August 1 announcement, and ISW continued to only observe limited, dissonant responses from Russian state media and select Russian officials and milbloggers on August 2. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Zhuravlev attempted to discredit the credibility of Trump's announcement.[21] Kremlin newswire TASS published footage on August 2 showing the Knyaz Pozharsky Borei-A class nuclear submarine arriving at the Russian Northern Fleet’s main submarine base in Severnomorsk, Murmansk Oblast.[22] The Knyaz Pozharsky submarine entered service on July 24, 2025.[23] A Russian milblogger used the arrival of the submarine at Severnomorsk to claim that the Knyaz Pozharsky is far superior to American analogues and that the Russian Navy will put the Knyaz Pozharsky on combat duty in response to Trump’s deployment of nuclear submarines.[24] TASS amplified a claim from a senior research fellow of the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Latin America that Russia could deploy Oreshnik ballistic missile systems to other states, including those in Latin America and the Caribbean, to ensure Russia’s global military presence and the sovereignty of Russia’s allies.[25] The research fellow's August 2 claim parallels a Russian milblogger's August 1 call for Russian ships and submarines equipped with nuclear weapons to visit Cuba.[26] Both responses attempt to invoke the historical memory of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov parroted many of the same talking points that Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko made during a press event on August 1 that blamed Ukraine for the lack of progress in negotiations and signaled Russia's unyielding commitment to its longstanding demands. Lavrov claimed on August 1 that Ukrainian-Russian peace negotiations to end Russia's war in Ukraine are making progress and blamed Ukraine for slowing the speed of negotiations.[27] Lavrov claimed that Russia is waiting to receive a concrete response from Ukraine regarding Russia's proposal to establish online working groups. Lavrov also claimed that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is repeatedly shifting his demands for negotiations and a ceasefire. Lavrov signaled Russia's commitment to its long-standing war aims in Ukraine and Russia's demand that any peace settlement eliminate the "root causes" of the war. Lavrov's statements included many of the same phrases and nuances as Putin's and Lukashenko's August 1 statements and occurred on the same day as the Putin-Lukashenko press event, indicating that these narratives are part of top-down Kremlin instructions to Russian officials about how to frame the negotiations process.[28] Putin's, Lukashenko's, and Lavrov's statements represent Putin's official position about negotiations and his war aims. ISW continues to assess that Russia is uninterested in compromising on its long-standing demands that amount to nothing short of Ukraine's capitulation and continues to promote inflammatory rhetoric designed to undermine US-European cohesion.[29]

Indian oil refineries reportedly continue to import Russian crude oil despite US President Donald Trump’s imposition of 25 percent tariffs on India’s exports to the United States. Reuters reported on August 2 that sources in the Indian government stated that India will keep purchasing Russian oil. Reuters reported that Indian government sources stated that there are long-term oil contracts that prevent an immediate halt in Russian oil imports and that India's continued import of Russian oil has helped stave off a global surge in oil prices. Indian outlet ANI reported on August 2 that Indian oil refineries continue to source oil from Russian suppliers due to “price, grade of crude, inventories, logistics, and other economic factors.”[30] Indian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal stated that Russia and India have a "steady and time-tested partnership" and that India sources its energy needs based on "what is available in the markets and... prevailing global circumstances."[31] ISW previously assessed that European and US sanctions appeared to be degrading Russia's revenues from third-country importers of Russian oil and that sanctions that target countries that purchase Russian oil would further hinder Russia's ability to finance its war in Ukraine.[32] India is one of the largest importers of Russian oil, and continued third-state purchases of Russian oil in the face of Western sanctions will significantly limit the effectiveness of these economic measures to affect Russia's war effort.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against energy infrastructure in Russia on the night of August 1 to 2.
• Ukraine also conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against Russia's defense industrial base (DIB), drone launch sites, and air defense systems on the night of August 1 to 2.
• The Kremlin has yet to employ a coordinated response to US President Donald Trump’s August 1 announcement that he ordered the deployment of two US nuclear submarines closer to Russia.
• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov parroted many of the same talking points that Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko made during a press event on August 1 that blamed Ukraine for the lack of progress in negotiations and signaled Russia's unyielding commitment to its longstanding demands.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 1, 2025

US President Donald Trump ordered the deployment of two US nuclear submarines presumably closer to Russia in response to Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev's July 31 nuclear threats against the United States. Trump stated on August 1 that he ordered American military authorities to position two US nuclear submarines "in the appropriate regions" following Medvedev's "highly provocative statements."[i] Trump stated that he gave the order "just in case [the] foolish and inflammatory statements [from Medvedev] are more than just that." Trump previously stated on July 31 that Medvedev should "watch his words" and is "entering very dangerous territory."[ii] Medvedev responded to Trump on July 31 on both his English- and Russian-language Telegram accounts and threatened that Russia is "doing everything right" and will continue along its own path.[iii] Medvedev also alluded to Russia's automatic or semi-automatic nuclear weapons control system, referred to as the "Dead Hand" or the "Perimeter," in response to Trump. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio answered a journalist's question on July 31 about Medvedev's nuclear threat, stating that one cannot ignore Medvedev's statement.[iv] Rubio stated that Medvedev is not a "relevant decision maker," but he still has a role in the Russian government, so "his words are going to have impact" as a "provocateur."

The Kremlin continued its nuclear threats against the United States prior to the ordered deployment of US nuclear submarines on August 1 – demonstrating that Medvedev's threats are part of a wider Kremlin nuclear saber-ratting campaign. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko spoke to journalists on August 1 in a likely staged event to publicly promote the Kremlin's narratives and stances about its war in Ukraine.[v] Lukashenko criticized Trump's recent efforts to bring Russia to the negotiating table and find a way to end the war. Lukashenko claimed that Trump must act "carefully" and that it is not possible for Trump to "dictate the rules" during the ongoing military clash, "especially to a nuclear power" like Russia.[vi] Kremlin officials and their affiliates often use nuclear saber-rattling as part of their reflexive control campaign that aims to push the West to make decisions that benefit Russia.[vii] The Kremlin had also repeatedly used staged interactions with Lukashenko to deliver indirect nuclear threats.[viii] Medvedev's July 31 nuclear threats are also part of these reflexive control efforts, as Putin often leverages Medvedev to amplify inflammatory rhetoric designed to stoke panic and fear among Western decision-makers and discourage aid to Ukraine.[ix] ISW continues to assess that Medvedev's provocative and threatening statements are very likely part of a top-down, concerted Kremlin informational strategy.[x] Putin would be able to censor Medvedev's statements should Putin choose to do so, especially considering that the Kremlin coordinates official statements and controls the Russian information space, internet, and media.

Limited Russian milblogger responses to Trump's August 1 announcement criticized Trump, attempted to downplay the threat, or called on Russia to respond in kind. Russian milbloggers noted that Trump did not specify exactly where the US submarines were deploying, implying that Trump's statement could be a feint.[xi] One milblogger claimed that Trump's announcement is not leading to Trump's desired peace.[xii] Russian political scientist Sergei Markov claimed that Trump is "losing his sanity" and that Trump's announcement endorses Medvedev's allegation that Trump was moving closer to nuclear war.[xiii] Another milblogger called for Russian ships and submarines equipped with nuclear weapons to "pay a friendly visit to Cuba again."[xiv] Russian naval vessels, including a reportedly nuclear weapons-capable ship, made a port call in Cuba in June 2024, likely in order to invoke the historical memory of the Cuban Missile Crisis as part of Russia’s reflexive control campaign to instill fear in the West and push the West to make decisions that benefit Russia.[xv]

Putin reiterated on August 1 the same demands that he first laid out in June 2024 – further demonstrating Russia's uncompromising position and disinterest in negotiating to end its war against Ukraine. Putin stated during the press event with Lukashenko that the conditions that he laid out in his June 2024 speech to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) "certainly" remain the same.[xvi] Putin demanded in June 2024 that Ukrainian forces must begin to "completely withdraw" from Ukrainian-controlled territory in Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts (which the Kremlin illegally declared as annexed in September 2022) and that Ukraine officially abandons its goal to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) before Russia can agree to a ceasefire and peace negotiations.[xvii] Putin also reiterated on August 1 that the "main thing" in the peace process is the eradication of the war's causes, which Putin described as issues related to Russia's security, the use of the Russian language in Ukraine, and the conditions for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP).[xviii] Putin's claims about the alleged causes of the war mirror repeated calls from Kremlin officials in the past months about the need to eliminate the "root causes" of the war.[xix] Rubio stated on July 31 that the United States has not seen any progress or "sincere interest" from the Kremlin to end the war.[xx] Rubio stated that Trump must decide how much he wants to continue his efforts toward securing a ceasefire "if one of the two sides is not interested."

Putin attempted to frame peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine as making progress while blaming Ukraine for slowing the speed of negotiations. Putin claimed on August 1 that he assesses that peace negotiations with Ukraine are developing "positively overall" and that recent prisoner of war (POW) and killed in action (KIA) exchanges between Russia and Ukraine are evidence of this positive trajectory.[xxi] Putin claimed that Russia is willing to delay negotiations if Ukraine wants to do so in response to a recent statement by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky that Russia's war demands will not change until there is regime change in Russia.[xxii] Putin claimed that any disappointment regarding the speed or outcome of negotiations is a result of "excessive expectations." Putin stated that negotiations must happen in detailed conversations behind the scenes and not in public. Putin claimed that Russia and Ukraine have agreed to conduct negotiations "off-camera" in three working groups but that these groups have not started operating yet. Putin likely intends to leverage claims that Russia and Ukraine are meeting in private working groups to refute any future Western complaints that Russia is not participating in peace negotiations. Russia has sent several low-level delegations to prior rounds of negotiations in Istanbul, and these rounds have yet to result in any developments toward peace other than POW and KIA exchanges.[xxiii] Future working group meetings with a similarly low-level Russian delegation are unlikely to result in any significant developments since Putin almost certainly singularly dictates the parameters of Russia's negotiating position.

Putin reiterated on August 1 his long-standing claims that the current Ukrainian government is illegitimate and claimed that Zelensky's government has "clearly violated" Ukraine's constitution.[xxiv] Putin has long claimed that every pro-Western Ukrainian government since Ukraine's 2014 Euromaidan protests and the Revolution of Dignity are illegitimate, and Russian officials intensified claims in Spring 2024 that Zelensky's government specifically is illegitimate under the false pretense that the current Ukrainian government is violating the Ukrainian Constitution by delaying presidential elections until the end of martial law.[xxv] The Ukrainian Constitution prohibits the government from holding elections during martial law and times of external aggression, such as Russia's full-scale invasion.[xxvi] ISW has previously noted that Putin's false claims that the current Ukrainian government is unconstitutional and illegitimate are laying the groundwork for Russia to renege on any future peace agreement with Ukraine at a time of Russia's choosing in the future.[xxvii] ISW continues to assess that Putin is feigning interest in peace negotiations while Ukrainian officials, in contrast, continue to demonstrate genuine interest in peace – as evidenced by Zelensky's August 1 statement that he remains willing to meet with Putin and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha's July 31 statement that Ukraine wants to end the war in 2025.[xxviii]

Putin's and Lukashenko's August 1 statements underscore Putin's continued commitment to his theory of victory, which assumes that Russia can outlast Western support for Ukraine and will be able to seize the entirety of Ukraine through slow and costly advances.[xxix] Putin claimed that Russian forces are advancing along the entire frontline in eastern and southern Ukraine and that Russian forces are advancing "somewhere more, somewhere less."[xxx] Lukashenko claimed that Russian forces are on the offensive everywhere and that Russian forces are "not [advancing] quickly, but slowly." Lukashenko claimed that Putin told him that Russian forces are advancing slowly because Putin "feel[s] sorry for the [Ukrainian] people" -ignoring the degradation of Russian forces after three years of war and significant Ukrainian defensive operations. Putin's and Lukashenko's statements suggest that Putin continues to be content with the slow rate of advance that characterizes Russian offensive operations in Ukraine. ISW previously assessed that frontline Russian commanders appear content with Russian forces making advances at roughly a footpace, and Putin appears personally content with a slower rate of advance as well - likely due to his continued belief that Russia will be able to militarily defeat Ukraine in the long-term.[xxxi] Lukashenko also downplayed Russian casualties in Ukraine by claiming that Russia is not losing as many people as the Soviet Union did during the Second World War. The Soviet Union, which consisted of territories and peoples far beyond the modern-day Russian Federation, lost between nine and 11 million casualties during the Second World War.[xxxii]

Putin continues to posture himself as a well-informed, caring wartime leader. Putin claimed that he recently asked Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov and Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov to "honestly" tell him about the frontline situation in Ukraine.[xxxiii] Putin's reported demand for honesty from Belousov and Gerasimov may be a nod to Russian milbloggers' long-standing complaints that the Russian military command misinforms Putin about the frontline situation and that frontline Russian commanders submit falsely positive reports to their superiors.[xxxiv] Putin has historically attempted to respond to milblogger grievances and has routinely postured himself as a hyper-involved wartime leader to the Russian public.[xxxv]

Putin and Lukashenko highlighted recent Russian advances in Donetsk Oblast and articulated Russia's desire to seize Ukraine's fortress belt – which ISW continues to assess will constitute a multi-year long effort. Putin claimed that Russian forces recently seized Chasiv Yar, although Putin acknowledged that Russian forces are still clearing the town and that Ukrainian forces may counterattack into Chasiv Yar in the future.[xxxvi] Putin claimed that Chasiv Yar is "quite a large settlement," although 2022 census data states that Chasiv Yar had a pre-war population of 12,500 people.[xxxvii] Russian state media and milbloggers are attempting to oversell the seizure of Chasiv Yar as a significant development along the frontline, and Putin appears to be leaning into this effort.[xxxviii] Lukashenko further claimed that Chasiv Yar is "the road" to Kramatorsk, which Lukashenko called the center of Ukraine's defense (referring to Ukraine's fortress belt - a series of fortified cities that form the backbone of Ukraine’s defensive positions in Donetsk Oblast).[xxxix] Lukashenko claimed that Russian forces will "slowly gnaw" at, seize, and advance beyond Ukraine's fortress belt. Putin responded that Russian forces will "return" the fortress belt, which Putin claimed belongs to Russia. Lukashenko claimed that Ukraine should quickly ask Russia to negotiate an end to the war before Russia seizes the fortress belt. ISW has long assessed that Russian forces aspire to seize Ukraine's fortress belt, and Putin's statement marks the most recent high-level Russian confirmation of this intention.[xl]

Putin's desire to seize Ukraine's fortress belt indicates that he is willing to continue military operations in Ukraine long beyond Trump's stated August 8 deadline for peace in Ukraine and is ready to undertake complex, years-long operations. ISW previously noted that a Russian operation to seize Ukraine's fortress belt will be a significant undertaking, as Russian forces will have to seize Siversk and Lyman, advance through the Svyati Hori national park, and contend with the Siverskyi Donets River and Siverskyi Donets Donbas canal before Russian forces can even begin to threaten Slovyansk (the northern tip of the fortress belt).[xli] Russian forces are currently expanding their salient southwest of Kostyantynivka (the southern tip of the fortress belt) in order to support a future attack on or envelopment of Kostyantynivka and the wider fortress belt from the southwest, but seizing Kostyantynivka alone will likely be a months-long effort. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger recently noted that it took Russian forces 14 months to seize Chasiv Yar and that Kostyantynivka is roughly three times larger than Chasiv Yar - underscoring how long a frontal Russian assault into Kostyantynivka could last.[xlii] Russian forces attempted to encircle Ukraine's fortress belt in Spring 2022 but culminated while trying to conduct the over 55-kilometer-wide encirclement.[xliii] Russian forces have conducted several successful, smaller partial envelopments since seizing Avdiivka in February 2024, but Russian forces have yet to conduct a successful operational-level envelopment of a significant Ukrainian defensive line.[xliv] ISW previously noted that it is unlikely that the Russian military can sustain a multi-year and multi-axis operation against Ukraine's fortress belt alongside its other offensive operations in Ukraine, particularly after three and a half years of degrading combat operations.[xlv] Putin appears confident in the Russian military's and economy's strength and longevity, however, given his August 1 endorsement of seizing the fortress belt and Russia's current rate of advance in Ukraine.

Putin and Lukashenko projected military strength and economic stability as part of Putin's ongoing effort to convince Trump that sanctions and military support to Ukraine will not alter the outcome of the war in Ukraine and that Trump should abandon his efforts to resolve the war. Putin claimed that Russia produced its first serial Oreshnik ballistic missile complex and missiles, and that the Oreshnik system entered into service.[xlvi] Putin claimed that Russian and Belarusian specialists are working to identify future Oreshnik deployment locations by the end of 2025, and Lukashenko stated that Russia will station Oreshnik systems in Belarus in 2026. ISW assessed at the time of Russia's first Oreshnik launch in November 2024 that Russia is leveraging the Oreshnik system as part of a reflexive control campaign aimed at undermining Western resolve to militarily support Ukraine.[xlvii] Putin's and Lukashenko's August 1 statements about Oreshniks are similarly trying to posture military strength to convince Trump not to follow through with his threat of economic repercussions.

Lukashenko claimed on August 1 that Russia and Belarus have undertaken significant measures in recent years to offset the impact of Western sanctions and that the two countries will survive additional future sanctions.[xlviii] Lukashenko claimed that Russia is a "treasure trove" of minerals and technology and that Russia and Belarus will prove their capabilities to doubters (presumably referring to the West). Lukashenko claimed that "we [Russia and Belarus] have always been and will be" and that Russians and Belarusians should not worry about Western sanctions. Lukashenko's statements are the latest in the Kremlin's ongoing effort to posture economic stability to its foreign and domestic audiences and to discourage the West from levying additional sanctions against Russia by claiming that sanctions have no impact on the Russian economy.[xlix]

Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be transforming Russia into a Soviet-style police state, likely in preparation for expected anti-war sentiment in the Russian population as the Kremlin prolongs the war in Ukraine and prepares for a future war with NATO. Putin signed amendments on July 31 that introduce fines for “intentional” searches of “extremist” content on virtual private networks (VPNs) and ”violating the procedure” for using VPN services.[l] Putin also signed a law that expands the offenses for which Russian authorities can revoke acquired citizenship, including the “justification or propaganda of terrorism,” cooperation with a foreign state against the security of Russia, “unlawful influence” on Russia’s information space, and the implementation of decisions of “international organizations in which Russia does not participate.”[li] The Kremlin has vaguely defined "extremism," and the law about citizenship revocation similarly contains vaguely defined language. The Kremlin has and will exploit this vagueness to censor any information that it considers a threat, including anti-war and anti-regime sentiment.

The Russian government has been slowly consolidating control over the Russian population’s access to independent information throughout Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The Kremlin will likely ban WhatsApp and replace it with the Kremlin-controlled messaging platform MAX in the near future, and Kremlin officials will likely attempt to replace other independent communication platforms, such as Telegram, with state-controlled communication platforms.[lii] The Kremlin has also targeted media outlets that publish anti-war sentiment and counter the Kremlin's preferred narrative in the information space.[liii]

The Russian government is also slowly adapting its legal regime to increase the state's ability to repress and coerce Russians into conceding to state narratives and ideas, like the Soviet Union’s attempts at controlling the population. The Russian State Duma adopted in recent months legal definitions that allow Russia to criminally prosecute Kremlin opponents by classifying domestic opposition as a threat to Russian national security.[liv] The Russian government may be pursuing these informational and legal constraints in preparation for possible future societal backlash, as Putin appears willing to continue the war for years to come. The Kremlin's measures to cut Russian society off from the outside world are also part of efforts to indoctrinate Russians into an informal state ideology that, at its foundation, is anti-Western and anti-Ukrainian and to militarize Russian society ahead of a longer war in Ukraine and a possible future war with NATO.[lv]

Russia continues to field long-range drone innovations to facilitate its ongoing long-range strike campaign and impose greater civilian casualties on Ukraine. Business Insider reported on August 1 that Ukrainian mobile fire groups and domestically produced interceptor drones may be unable to effectively counter Russia's new high-speed Geran-3 drone (the Russian analogue of the Iranian Shahed-238).[lvi] Ukrainian columnist Vadym Kushnikov reported on July 31 that the Geran-3 is equipped with a high-power jet engine that enables the drone to reach speeds of up to 800 kilometers per hour and to function like a cruise missile in its ability to evade air defense systems.[lvii] The Ukrainian Air Force reported on July 30 that Russian forces launched eight jet-powered drones, possibly referring to Geran-3 drones, on the night of July 29 to 30, marking one of the first official Ukrainian reports noting Russia's use of jet-powered drones.[lviii] The Ukrainian Air Force did not specify whether Ukrainian forces downed any of the eight jet-powered drones, however. ISW previously assessed that Russian forces likely used a Geran-3 drone variant to strike Kyiv City on June 11 and that Russia may have first incorporated the Geran-3 drones into strike packages on January 8.[lix] Russia will likely increasingly rely on modified long-range drones, such as the Geran-3 drone, to continue innovating its long-range strike tactics designed to overwhelm Ukrainian air defense systems and strike densely populated cities in Ukraine's rear as part of efforts to inflict greater civilian casualties.

Russia's latest drone innovations underscore the critical importance of timely and reliable Western military assistance to Ukraine. Russian drone adaptations are attempting to reduce the effectiveness of Ukraine's air defense tactics and innovations, including the use of mobile fire groups and interceptor drones. Western-supplied air defense systems and F-16 fighter jets, which Ukraine has largely been using to intercept Russian long-range missile and drone strikes, will become even more important in the face of these Russian drone adaptations. [lx] Kushnikov reported that Russia is unable currently to mass produce the Geran-3 drones, given Russia's reliance on Iran and the People's Republic of China (PRC) for turbojet engine supplies.[lxi] Iran helped Russia scale its domestic production of the Iranian-supplied Shahed drones, and the PRC has been increasingly supplying components for Russia's Geran-type drones, suggesting that Russia will be able to procure the needed Iranian and PRC engines to scale up its production of the Geran-3 in the future and pose a greater threat to Ukraine.[lxii]

The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced that it will sell Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM) to Ukraine. The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced on July 31 that it awarded a contract worth $3.5billion to Raytheon to produce AMRAAM missiles, AMRAAM Telemetry Systems, initial and field spares, and other production engineering support activities.[lxiii] The DoD announced that the contract includes military sales to Ukraine and other US partners.

Key Takeaways:

• US President Donald Trump ordered the deployment of two US nuclear submarines presumably closer to Russia in response to Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev's July 31 nuclear threats against the United States.
• The Kremlin continued its nuclear threats against the United States before the ordered deployment of US nuclear submarines on August 1 – demonstrating that Medvedev's threats are part of a wider Kremlin nuclear saber-ratting campaign.
• Putin reiterated on August 1 the same demands that he first laid out in June 2024 – further demonstrating Russia's uncompromising position and disinterest in negotiating to end its war against Ukraine.
• Putin attempted to frame peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine as making progress while blaming Ukraine for slowing the speed of negotiations.
• Putin's and Lukashenko's August 1 statements underscore Putin's continued commitment to his theory of victory, which assumes that Russia can outlast Western support for Ukraine and will be able to seize the entirety of Ukraine through slow and costly advances.
• Putin and Lukashenko highlighted recent Russian advances in Donetsk Oblast and articulated Russia's desire to seize Ukraine's fortress belt, which ISW continues to assess as a multi-year effort.
• Putin and Lukashenko projected military strength and economic stability as part of Putin's ongoing effort to convince Trump that sanctions and military support to Ukraine will not alter the outcome of the war in Ukraine and that Trump should abandon his efforts to resolve the war.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be transforming Russia into a Soviet-style police state, likely in preparation for expected anti-war sentiment in the Russian population as the Kremlin prolongs the war in Ukraine and prepares for a future war with NATO.
• Russia continues to field long-range drone innovations to facilitate its ongoing long-range strike campaign and impose greater civilian casualties on Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Borova and Lyman. Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Siversk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 31, 2025

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on July 31 that Russian forces completed the seizure of Chasiv Yar, although available geolocated footage does not support claims that Russian forces have yet advanced to the western administrative boundary of the town. Geolocated footage published on July 31 shows that Russian forces recently raised flags in western and southern Chasiv Yar and indicates that Russian forces have likely seized most of the settlement.[1] The Russian MoD and numerous Russian milbloggers credited elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 299th VDV Regiment, with the seizure of Chasiv Yar.[2] Tactical Russian advances westward in Chasiv Yar do not constitute an operationally significant development in this area, however, as Russian forces have held most of northern and central Chasiv Yar since late January 2025 and began advancing in southwestern Chasiv Yar in mid-June 2025.[3] Russian forces have been within tube artillery range of Ukraine's main logistics route through the fortress belt since late January 2025 and have held positions along the T-0504 Bakhmut-Kostyantynivka highway for several months, and have yet to significantly threaten Ukrainian positions in Kostyantynivka. ISW has yet to observe geolocated footage showing Russian forces operating in the westernmost outskirts of Chasiv Yar, and Russian forces will have to push Ukrainian forces from positions in these outskirts in order to complete the seizure of the town.

Russian forces have taken 26 months to advance 11 kilometers from the western boundary of Bakhmut, which Russian forces seized in May 2023, to western Chasiv Yar.[4] Russian forces began an intensified effort to seize Chasiv Yar in April 2024 after slowly advancing to the settlement's eastern outskirts and seizing Ivanivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar) between May 2023 and March 2024.[5] A Ukrainian source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence estimated in February 2025 that Russia sustained roughly 4,880 casualties in Chasiv Yar itself between April 2024 and February 2025, although the total number of Russian casualties sustained remains unclear, and the tempo of Russian attacks in this area has varied significantly over the last 26 months.[6] Russian forces advanced into Chasiv Yar in early April 2024 during a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault, but have rarely used armored vehicles while fighting in the urban areas of the settlement.[7] Russian forces have significantly leveraged air strikes and infantry infiltration tactics to make gains in Chasiv Yar, and as a result have suffered significant personnel losses for disproportionately small territorial gains in the ruins of Chasiv Yar. ISW currently assesses that Russian forces have seized roughly 7.81 square kilometers of the roughly 10 square kilometers within Chasiv Yar's administrative boundaries.

Russian forces will likely complete the seizure of Chasiv Yar in the coming days, which will open several possible avenues for Russian forces to attack Ukraine's fortress belt — a series of fortified cities that form the backbone of Ukraine’s defensive positions in Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces in the Chasiv Yar direction are roughly six to eight kilometers from the northeastern outskirts of Kostyantynivka and could leverage the seizure of Chasiv Yar to conduct a frontal assault on the city. Russian forces currently appear to be attempting to envelop Kostyantynivka from the southwest, however, and therefore may wait to conduct a frontal assault against Kostyantynivka until Russian forces advance closer to the city from the south via the Toretsk direction. Russian forces have established an operational pattern of partially enveloping a settlement before beginning street-by-street frontal assaults, and Russian forces may continue this pattern in a future operation to seize Kostyantynivka.[8] Russian forces could also attack directly westward of Chasiv Yar through fields and small settlements toward Oleksiyevo-Druzhkivka and Druzhkivka in order to interdict the H-20 Kostyantynivka-Slovyansk highway and complicate Ukrainian egress routes and ground lines of communications (GLOCs) from Kostyantynivka, which would support long-standing Russian efforts to collapse and seize Ukraine's fortress belt.

Russian forces could also attempt to expand their salient northwest of Chasiv Yar toward Kramatorsk and Slovyansk. Russian forces may redeploy elements to attack along the E-40 Bakhmut-Slovyansk highway to set conditions to attack the fortress belt from the northeast. The Russian military command may pursue this avenue of advance if the Russian military command assesses that Russian forces will be able to seize and leverage new positions northeast of Slovyansk, such as near Siversk, to attack the fortress belt. Russian forces will have to contend with a series of tactical water features west and northwest of Chasiv Yar, which would likely complicate their ability to advance toward Kramatorsk and Slovyansk directly from Chasiv Yar and make advances from the Siversk-Lyman direction more attractive, particularly during the upcoming Fall 2025 muddy season. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger acknowledged on July 31 that Russian forces will likely be unable to reach Ukraine's fortress belt by the end of 2025, which is consistent with ISW's assessment that seizing the fortress belt would be a multi-year-long operational effort.[9] Seizing Chasiv Yar will open a series of operationally significant avenues of advance for Russian forces, although Russian forces must maintain their combat capabilities, avoid culmination, and advance in a series of other areas of Donetsk Oblast to fully exploit these opportunities in the medium term. Russian forces have historically struggled to transform tactical victories into wider operational successes.

Russia has launched a simultaneous kinetic and cognitive response to US President Donald Trump's efforts to end Russia's war in Ukraine. Russia has used strikes largely affecting civilian areas in Kyiv City as well as threats and other rhetorical efforts to signal to Trump that Russia will continue rejecting Trump's demand that the Kremlin meaningfully engage in negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched eight Iskander-K cruise missiles from Kursk City and 309 Shahed-type and decoy drones from Bryansk City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai on the night of July 30 to 31.[10] This strike package is significantly larger than the average Russian strike prior to May 2025. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces mainly targeted Kyiv City and that Ukrainian forces downed three Iskander-K cruise missiles and 288 drones. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that five cruise missiles and 21 drones struck 12 locations and that missile and drone debris struck 19 locations, primarily in Kyiv City. Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strike killed at least 11 people, injured at least 135 people in Kyiv City alone, and extensively damaged residential and civilian infrastructure in Kyiv City and Dnipropetrovsk, Poltava, Sumy, Kharkiv, and Mykolaiv oblasts.[11] Russia's ever-growing nightly strikes against Ukraine have been and remain a clear Russian rejection of Trump's calls for peace in Ukraine.

The Kremlin's nuclear threats and rhetorical efforts to delay peace negotiations are part of a broader cognitive campaign to undermine US-led efforts to end Russia's war in Ukraine. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev responded to a statement by US President Donald Trump on both his English- and Russian-language Telegram accounts on July 31 and threatened that Russia is "doing everything right" and will continue along its own path, presumably referring to the war in Ukraine and Russia's general anti-Western posturing.[12] Medvedev also alluded to Russia's automatic or semi-automatic nuclear weapons control system, referred to as the "Dead Hand" or the "Perimeter," in response to Trump. The Kremlin regularly uses Medvedev to inject inflammatory rhetoric, often including nuclear blackmail, into the information space to spread fear among Western decision-makers and discourage future military aid to Ukraine.[13] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Vershinin claimed that Russia is ready to continue negotiations with Ukraine but that discussions about a high-level Russo-Ukrainian meeting are "premature," in order to downplay the Trump administration's efforts to secure negotiations.[14] Kremlin newswire RIA Novosti published op-eds on July 30 entitled "There is no other option: no one should remain alive in Ukraine," and "Noted: Ukraine will end very soon," further showcasing the Kremlin's long-standing commitment to conquering all of Ukraine and increasingly aggressive rhetorical line in response to President Trump's efforts to compel Russia to engage constructively in the peace process.[15] ISW continues to assess that Russia remains fully committed to conquering Ukraine and protracting the negotiation process to buy time for further battlefield gains and extract concessions from Ukraine and the West.[16]

The People's Republic of China (PRC) is a decisive enabler of devastating long-range Russian strikes against the Ukrainian rear. A Russian milblogger claimed on July 30 that Russian forces launched up to 200 Geran-2 drones (the Russian iteration of the Iranian Shahed-136 drone) and Garpiya-A1 kamikaze drones (reportedly another Shahed drone variant that Russia produces with primarily PRC-produced components) in the strike against Kyiv City.[17] Reuters recently reported that PRC companies deliberately falsely label drone engines shipped to Russia for use in Garpiya drones as "industrial refrigeration units" to hide their actual military purpose, and Russia also uses PRC components in other Shahed-type drones, including a decoy and reconnaissance variant.[18] ISW has observed reports indicating that Russian defense manufacturer Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant Kupol increased its annual production of Garpiya-A1 drones from 2,000 to over 6,000, largely due to a steady supply of PRC-made L550E engines.[19] The PRC is an indispensable supplier for the broader Russian drone industry, as ISW has routinely assessed.[20] Russia will continue relying heavily on the PRC to support the expansion of its long-range strike capabilities and may incorporate more Garpiya drones in strike packages in the coming weeks and months as Russia seeks to conduct regular strikes consisting of up to 2,000 drones, likely by November 2025.[21]

European and US sanctions appear to be degrading Russian revenues from third-country importers of Russian oil. Bloomberg reported on July 28 that Indian oil refineries are diversifying crude oil imports and increasingly buying from Azerbaijan, Nigeria, and the United Arab Emirates after Europe intensified sanctions on Russian oil exports.[22] Bloomberg reported on July 29 that the Russian-backed Nayara Energy oil refinery in west India is struggling to receive crude imports and export processed fuels due to European sanctions.[23] Bloomberg reported that the Russian state oil company Rosneft owns 49.13 percent of Nayara Energy and that the oil refinery funds Russia’s war in Ukraine. Bloomberg reported that the refinery is currently operating at 70 to 80 percent of its capacity of 400,000 barrels per day. The European Union’s July 2025 18th sanctions package specifically targeted the Nayara Energy oil refinery and other facets of Russia’s oil revenue.[24] ISW previously assessed that the European sanctions package would likely degrade Russian oil revenues beyond what the Kremlin previously expected, posing a potential risk to the Russian federal budget and earmarked defense spending.[25] US sanctions that target countries that purchase Russian oil will further hinder Russia’s ability to fund its war in Ukraine.

Russia continues to look to its small coalition of international partners to lend legitimacy to its illegal occupation and annexation of Ukraine. Nicaraguan co-presidents Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo issued a statement to Russian President Vladimir Putin expressing support and "full recognition" of Russia's occupation and annexation of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts and characterized these regions as an "integral part" of Russia.[26] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev expressed gratitude for Nicaragua's support of Russia's occupation of Ukraine and described the recognition as "truly friendly."[27] The Nicaraguan statement largely mirrors the Kremlin's own justifications for its war in Ukraine and advances several Russian rhetorical lines falsely portraying the war as existential for Russia.[28] Russia's close partners have adopted similar rhetoric in support of Russia's war and occupation of Ukraine, including Venezuela and North Korea, which Russia uses to legitimize its continued aggression and occupation of Ukraine.[29] The UN General Assembly held a vote in October 2022 to condemn the Russian sham annexation referenda in newly occupied Ukraine in September 2022, and the only states to vote against the resolution were Russia, Belarus, North Korea, Syria, and Nicaragua.[30] Russia has pursued increasing cooperation with Nicaragua throughout the war and will likely further intensify relations in the wake of the July 30 statement.[31]

Ukrainian forces continue to innovate technical solutions to offset Russian strike adaptations. The Ukrainian National Guard's 1st Azov Corps announced on July 31 that it formed a dedicated "anti-Shahed" drone unit that will detect, triage, and down long-range Russian drones targeting Ukrainian deep rear areas, including with interceptor drones.[32] Ukraine's well-demonstrated ability to rapidly innovate and implement solutions that optimize flexibility within a theater characterized by a dramatically shortened innovation cycle remains integral to Ukraine's ability to effectively counter Russian innovations.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a law on July 31 designed to safeguard the independence of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAP).[33] The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada (parliament) passed the bill earlier on July 31, and Zelensky reiterated that ”Ukraine is a democracy” that listens to the voice of its population.[34] Zelensky submitted the draft law in response to public backlash against a law subordinating the NABU and SAP to the Ukrainian Prosecutor General that Zelensky signed on July 22.[35]

Key Takeaways:

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on July 31 that Russian forces completed the seizure of Chasiv Yar, although available geolocated footage does not support claims that Russian forces have yet advanced to the western administrative boundary of the town.
• Russian forces have taken 26 months to advance 11 kilometers from the western boundary of Bakhmut, which Russian forces seized in May 2023, to western Chasiv Yar.
• Russian forces will likely complete the seizure of Chasiv Yar in the coming days, which will open several possible avenues for Russian forces to attack Ukraine's fortress belt — a series of fortified cities that form the backbone of Ukraine’s defensive positions in Donetsk Oblast.
• Russia has launched a simultaneous kinetic and cognitive response to US President Donald Trump's efforts to end Russia's war in Ukraine.
• The Kremlin's nuclear threats and rhetorical efforts to delay peace negotiations are part of a broader cognitive campaign to undermine US-led efforts to end Russia's war in Ukraine.
• The People's Republic of China (PRC) is a decisive enabler of devastating long-range Russian strikes against the Ukrainian rear.
• European and US sanctions appear to be degrading Russian revenues from third-country importers of Russian oil.
• Russia continues to look to its small coalition of international partners to lend legitimacy to its illegal occupation and annexation of Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces continue to innovate technical solutions to offset Russian strike adaptations.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a law on July 31 designed to safeguard the independence of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAP).
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast and near Lyman and Velykomykhailivka. Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 30, 2025

US President Donald Trump specified a deadline of no later than August 8 for Russian President Vladimir Putin to engage in meaningful negotiations for an end to Russia’s war against Ukraine. Trump stated on July 29 that he is “disappointed” in Putin and clarified that his previous deadline for Russia to meaningfully engage in negotiations to end the war by August 7 to 9 will now fall 10 days from July 29, on August 8.[1] Trump stated that he has not received “any response” from Putin regarding Trump’s previously articulated 50-day and August 7 to 9 deadlines and assessed that Putin aims to seize “the whole” of Ukraine and “probably” wants to “keep the war going.” Trump stated that he will impose tariffs and secondary sanctions against Russia’s economic partners on August 8 to pressure Russia into negotiations if Putin again fails to agree to negotiations. US Department of State Spokesperson Tammy Bruce stated on July 29 that Trump may choose to levy tariffs and secondary sanctions sooner than the August 8 deadline, as Trump “pretty much [knows] what the situation [is].”[2]

Trump announced on July 30 that the United States will impose a 25 percent tariff and unspecified additional economic penalties on India due to India’s continued purchases of Russian military equipment and energy since the start of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine.[3] ISW previously noted that India continues to pursue military cooperation and a strategic economic relationship with Russia while it simultaneously deepens ties with Western states.[4] India has benefitted from cheap Russian energy since February 2022 and has become one of the largest importers of Russian oil, signing a 10-year energy deal in December 2024 to receive roughly 500,000 barrels of Russian oil daily.[5] India also continued to procure and commission Russian-built military equipment until late 2024 and likely seeks to reduce but not eliminate its reliance on Russia for military equipment.[6] India notably purchased five S-400 air defense systems from Russia in September 2018, but Russia reportedly delayed the delivery of these systems in March 2024 until 2026 to support Russia's own war effort.[7] Russia also leverages its relationship with India to access critical electronic components and machinery for the Russian defense industrial base (DIB).[8]

Kremlin officials continued to posture economic strength in response to US President Donald Trump's proposed economic measures targeting Russia and rejected Trump's efforts to end the war in Ukraine. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed in response to Trump's July 29 statements that the Russian economy has been operating under sanctions for "quite some time" and has developed "immunity" to further sanctions — effectively dismissing Trump."[9] Peskov's and other Kremlin officials' claims that Russia's economy is resilient and has been able to withstand sanctions and other economic measures throughout the war largely ignore Russia's reliance on its allies and partners, including the People's Republic of China (PRC), Iran, and North Korea, to support the Russian economy and defense industrial base (DIB).[10] Trump emphasized on July 30, for example, that the PRC is one of the largest buyers of Russian energy exports.[11] Russian Federation Council Chairperson Valentina Matviyenko claimed that Russia's war in Ukraine can only end after the elimination of the war's "root causes" — a common Kremlin reference to NATO expansion and Ukraine's alleged discrimination against Russian-speakers.[12] Russian State Duma Deputy from occupied Crimea Mikhail Sheremet claimed that the United States must engage with Russia "on equal terms" as Russia is a great power and that Russia is strong thanks to Russian President Vladimir Putin and the unity of Russia's population.[13] Sheremet claimed that Russia is not "servile" and will not betray its national interests.[14] Sheremet claimed that Trump's economic measures will not have the results that Trump expects but will instead hurt the global economy. Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Zhuravlev claimed that Trump's threats will not work with Russia and called on Russia to continue its "methodic" combat operations in Ukraine and not allow the United States to distract Russia from its war.[15] Duma International Affairs Committee Deputy Head Alexei Chepa claimed that Russia has consistently supported a ceasefire but that a ceasefire is only possible after establishing the "main conditions" of a peace agreement.[16] Chepa stated that Ukraine and the West are trying to secure a ceasefire in order to allow Ukraine to rearm, redeploy, and mobilize its forces to continue the war. Russia notably violated several Russian-imposed short-term frontline and strikes ceasefires in recent months, while accusing Ukraine of violating ceasefires to which both sides did not formally agree.[17] ISW continues to assess that Russia's previous attempts to manipulate ceasefires are an indicator of how Russia will likely exploit any future agreements.[18]

The Russian Presidential Administration reportedly issued guidance to Russian state and pro-Kremlin media outlets and commentators to promote narratives aimed at weakening the United States-European Union (EU) alliance. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on July 30 that the Russian Presidential Administration's Department of Public Projects issued a manual to Russian state and pro-Kremlin media outlets and pro-government voices with instructions about how to frame their coverage and commentary about the July 27 US–EU trade deal.[19] The manual reportedly instructed Russian media and commentators to discuss the US–EU trade agreement as "questionable" and a "defeat" for the EU, to amplify international commentary supporting these rhetorical points, and to portray Germany as suffering the most from the agreement. The manual reportedly also instructed Russian media and commentators to highlight commentary, including from US officials, about the benefits of the deal for the United States. Meduza noted that prominent Russian state and pro-Kremlin media outlets and bloggers have already begun reporting according to the manual, including by using direct quotes from the manual in their articles.[20] A political strategist reportedly working with the Russian Presidential Administration told Meduza that the Kremlin needs to show the domestic Russian populace how "bad" the European economic situation is to distract Russians from rising domestic prices and other economic struggles.[21] 

Russian officials are already amplifying the Russian Presidential Administration's talking points about the US–EU trade deal and likely intend to hinder US-European cooperation in support of Ukraine and collective European defense. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, and Russian Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) Head Leonid Slutsky all issued public statements since July 27 claiming that the US–EU trade deal is detrimental or humiliating for the EU, and Slutsky specifically criticized German Chancellor Frederich Merz.[22] The Kremlin has long attempted to drive wedges between the United States, Europe, and Ukraine as part of a wider reflexive control campaign aimed at deterring further Western support to Ukraine and efforts to bolster Europe's defensive capabilities.[23] The Kremlin likely aims to use these narratives to undermine ongoing US–European efforts to produce and purchase military equipment for Ukraine and to undermine the West's will to support Ukraine against Russia. The Kremlin also likely aims to leverage this rhetoric domestically by portraying European economies as struggling while falsely portraying the Russian economy as strong and resilient to Western sanctions.

The Kremlin continues to promote an informal state ideology centered on Russian nationalism that Russia may intend to use in justification of a protracted war in Ukraine and a future conflict against NATO. Kremlin newswire TASS reported on July 20 that it obtained a letter from Russian State Duma Deputy Vitaly Milonov appealing to the Russian Presidential Heraldic Council Master Herald Georgy Vilinbakhov to support an initiative that would create a special legal status for former state and historical symbols of Russia.[24] The Russian Presidential Heraldic Council advises the Russian president about heraldry, or the use and regulation of official state symbols such as coats of arms.[25] Milonov stated that the black-yellow-white imperial heraldic flag of the Russian Empire and the "Nikolaevsky flag of 1914" — possibly referring to the flag that the Russian Empire adopted in August 1914 after the outbreak of the First World War to emphasize the unity of Tsar Nicholas II and the people in the Russian Empire — are examples of symbols entitled to such legal status.[26] Milonov claimed that creating this legal status for historical Russian symbols would help protect Russian history from "manipulation." Milonov's initiative largely coheres with the Kremlin's wider efforts to create an informal state ideology that will shape and galvanize future generations in Russia and Russian-occupied Ukraine, likely to justify a protracted war in Ukraine and a future military conflict against NATO.[27] The Kremlin seeks to foster national exceptionalism and further isolate Russia from the West, including by portraying the West as the enemy with whom Russia is engaged in an existential conflict. Russian President Vladimir Putin and other Kremlin officials have repeatedly lauded the mythos of Russian history, including of the Russian Empire and the Second World War (referred to in Russia as the Great Patriotic War) to call for a return to Russia's strong traditional values based on Russia's "1,000-year-old statehood" and unity within Russian society.[28] The Kremlin has also used this mythos and ideology in an effort to persuade the Russian population that their increasingly social and economic sacrifices for Russia's war in Ukraine will result in Russia's victory.[29]

Russian forces continue to systematically violate the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to which it is a signatory. The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) reported on July 30 that it has documented over 10,000 instances of Russian forces using ammunition equipped with chemical agents, which the CWC prohibits, since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022.[30] The SBU noted that Russian forces frequently use ampoules filled with chloropicrin and aerosol grenades equipped with chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile (CS) and chloroacetophenone (CN) — both of which are types of riot control (RC) agents. The SBU stated that Russian forces most often use drones to drop chemical munitions on Ukrainian positions along the frontline in order to dislodge Ukrainian soldiers from fortified positions. The SBU recorded the largest number of incidents in Nikopol, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (southwest of Zaporizhzhia City and across the Kakhovka Reservoir from Russian positions in occupied Enerhodar, Zaporizhia Oblast). ISW has observed reports that Russian forces have coated Shahed-type drones in poisonous substances, likely as part of the Kremlin's efforts to inflict greater casualties on Ukrainian civilians.[31]

Key Takeaways:

• US President Donald Trump specified a deadline of no later than August 8 for Russian President Vladimir Putin to engage in meaningful negotiations for an end to Russia’s war against Ukraine.
• Kremlin officials continued to posture economic strength in response to US President Donald Trump's proposed economic measures targeting Russia and rejected Trump's efforts to end the war in Ukraine.
• The Russian Presidential Administration reportedly issued guidance to Russian state and pro-Kremlin media outlets and commentators to promote narratives aimed at weakening the United States–European Union (EU) alliance.
• Russian officials are already amplifying the Russian Presidential Administration's talking points about the US–EU trade deal and likely intend to hinder US–European cooperation in support of Ukraine and collective European defense.
• The Kremlin continues to promote an informal state ideology centered on Russian nationalism that Russia may intend to use in justification of a protracted war in Ukraine and a future conflict against NATO.
• Russian forces continue to systematically violate the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to which it is a signatory.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and Velykomykhailivka. Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 29, 2025

Kremlin officials decisively rejected US President Donald Trump's new deadline for Russia to negotiate an end to its war against Ukraine and reiterated Moscow's interest in continuing the war. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on his English-language X (formerly Twitter) account that Trump cannot dictate the timing of peace negotiations and that negotiations will end when Russia has achieved all of its war objectives — likely referring to Russia's original war aims, including regime change in Ukraine, changes to NATO’s open-door policy, and the reduction of Ukraine's military such that it cannot defend itself.[1] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov similarly claimed that Russia will continue its war against Ukraine in order to protect Russia's interests, despite Trump's July 28 announcement of the new 10- or 12-day deadline.[2] Peskov claimed that there is currently a slowdown in the process to normalize Russian-American relations, that the Kremlin remains interested in normalization, and that progress will require "impulses" from both sides.[3] Peskov claimed that the current state of Russian-American relations is hindering the process of negotiating an extension of the New START Treaty.[4] The Kremlin previously dangled the prospect of incentives that were unrelated to the war in Ukraine, such as bilateral arms control talks and economic projects, in order to extract concessions from the United States about the war in Ukraine.[5] Peskov's statements about the deterioration of Russian-American relations and New START are likely part of efforts to compel Trump to renounce his deadline for the sake of normalizing bilateral relations and pursuing increased cooperation. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is uninterested in negotiations to end the war and is instead trying to protract the war in Ukraine in order to make additional gains on the battlefield.[6]

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against civilian targets near the frontline and in the Ukrainian rear on July 28 and 29 that resulted in high casualties. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Rostov Oblast and occupied Crimea and 37 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[7] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defenses downed 32 drones over northern and eastern Ukraine. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that five drones and two missiles struck in three locations and that drone debris fell in two locations. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Military Administration Head Serhiy Lysak reported on July 29 that Russian forces conducted a missile strike against Kamyanske (west of Dnipro City), striking the city hospital, including a maternity ward.[8] Lysak reported that the strike killed four people, including a pregnant woman, and injured eight. Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration Head Ivan Fedorov and the Ukrainian State Penitentiary Service reported that Russian forces conducted an airstrike on July 28 against the Bilenkivksa Correctional Facility in Bilenke, Zaporizhia Oblast, with four guided glide bombs.[9] The Ukrainian State Criminal Executive Service reported that the strike killed 16 prisoners and injured nearly 100 people.[10] The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN OHCHR) reported that the July 28 strike against the correctional facility may amount to a serious violation of international humanitarian law.[11] The Ukrainian State Emergency Service reported on July 29 that Russian forces conducted a multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) strike against Novoplatonivka, Kharkiv Oblast (just north of Borova), and struck a group of civilians awaiting humanitarian assistance.[12] The State Emergency Service reported that the strike killed five civilians and injured three.

Ukrainian forces appear to be intensifying a long-range strike campaign against Russian military industrial facilities and transport networks. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported on July 29 that Ukrainian forces struck a railway station and a Russian resource base in Salsk, Rostov Oblast.[13] Kovalenko stated that Russian forces use Salsk as a logistics hub to transfer resources, fuel, ammunition, and other cargo to frontline units in Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts and occupied Crimea. A Ukrainian reserve officer reported on July 29 that Ukrainian forces highly likely struck a train carrying fuel at the Salsk railway station.[14] Russian sources posted footage reportedly of fires at the Salsk railway station, and Russian officials claimed that Russian forces repelled drone strikes against Rostov Oblast overnight.[15]

Ukraine-based open-source intelligence organization Frontelligence Insight reported that July 29 was the third day in which Ukrainian drones struck Russian railway and industrial hubs and that Ukrainian drones have inflicted a “tangible” logistical setback on a railway line linking the military industrial hubs in Volgograd, Volgograd Oblast, and Rostov-on-Don, Rostov Oblast.[16] Frontelligence Insight reported that Ukrainian forces have recently targeted electrical substations, fuel tanks, and station buildings in Orlovsky, Rostov Oblast, and Zhutovo, Volgograd Oblast, both of which are located along a railway that connects Russian defense industrial facilities with occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.[17] Ukrainian forces have previously targeted Russian defense industrial, weapons storage, and oil production facilities that support and fund Russia’s war effort in Ukraine, and Ukrainian forces currently appear to be targeting the transportation lines between these hubs.[18]

Key Takeaways:

• Kremlin officials decisively rejected US President Donald Trump's new deadline for Russia to negotiate an end to its war against Ukraine and reiterated Moscow's interest in continuing the war.
• Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against civilian targets near the frontline and in the Ukrainian rear on July 28 and 29 that resulted in high casualties.
• Ukrainian forces appear to be intensifying a long-range strike campaign against Russian military industrial facilities and transport networks.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka and in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 28, 2025

US President Donald Trump announced a new deadline for Russian President Vladimir Putin to negotiate an end to Russia’s war against Ukraine no later than August 9. Trump stated on July 28 that he is “very disappointed” with Putin and will “reduce” his previously articulated 50-day deadline by which Putin must agree to peace negotiations.[i] Trump stated that he will make a new deadline of roughly “10 to 12 days from today [July 28]"  as Putin’s ongoing disinterest in peace negotiations leaves “no reason” for the United States to delay its response.[ii] Trump insinuated that he will more formally announce the new deadline on the evening of July 28 or on July 29. Trump's new deadline would expire between August 7 and 9. Trump previously stated on July 14 that Putin had 50 days (September 2) to conclude a peace agreement with Ukraine or face "severe” 100 percent secondary tariffs on its trade partners.[iii]

Kremlin officials continue to frame Russia as in direct geopolitical confrontation with the West in order to generate domestic support for the war in Ukraine and future Russian aggression against NATO. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed at a Russian youth forum on July 28 that “Russia is fighting alone against the entire West... for the first time in history” and that Russia “must rely on [itself].”[iv] Lavrov claimed that Russia has "no allies on the battlefield," unlike during the first and second World Wars. Lavrov’s claim that Russia is operating alone in its war in Ukraine ignores the current support that Russia receives from North Korea, Iran, and the People's Republic of China (PRC). North Korea has sent ballistic missiles, artillery shells, and North Korean troops to support Russia's war effort against Ukraine, and there are economic and political signs of a growing rapprochement between Russia and North Korea.[v] Iranian Shahed drones have played a key role in Russia‘s air campaigns against Ukrainian cities throughout the war, and Iran's assistance has allowed Russia to become self-sufficient in producing the Shahed-variants that Russian forces are increasingly leveraging in frontline strikes.[vi] Russia largely depends on the PRC for support in Russia's ongoing sanctions evasion schemes, and Chinese companies provide critical dual-use components and microelectronics for Russian military technology.[vii] Strengthening relationships between Russia, Iran, North Korea, and the PRC constitute a growing threat to Western security, and Russia is actively pursuing a global anti-Western alliance. Lavrov's statements also underscore the Kremlin's efforts to install an informal state ideology that perpetuates the idea that the West is in an existential conflict with Russia in order to foster unquestioning support of the Russian government.[viii]

Lavrov additionally claimed that Russia had “no alternative” to launching its war in Ukraine as Russia needed to protect Russian-language speakers in Ukraine, a routine narrative that Russian officials use to justify Russian aggression against Ukraine.[ix] Lavrov claimed that Russia must insist on its “legitimate” demand: “no drawing Ukraine into NATO, no expansion of NATO at all," and recognition of Russia's illegal annexation of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and Crimea. Lavrov's statements reinforce the Kremlin's commitment to its war goals in Ukraine to the Russian public, and specifically Russian youth. The Kremlin has devoted a significant amount of time and energy to generating domestic support for the war, and Russian state and independent polling suggest that most Russians support continuing the war in Ukraine until Russia achieves its war aims of Ukrainian "denazification," demilitarization, and neutrality.[x] Russian society's commitment to achieving Russia's war aims, which the Kremlin has worked hard to foster, will make it much harder for Russian President Vladimir Putin to present any peace agreement that falls far short of his stated aims as a victory to his domestic audience. Putin is unlikely to make any concessions in his war aims unless he is forced to do so by significant Ukrainian battlefield victories, as any negotiated end to the war that does not achieve all of Putin's objectives would call into question the success, and, potentially, wisdom of Russia's military campaign in Ukraine.

Key Takeaways:

• US President Donald Trump announced a new deadline for Russian President Vladimir Putin to negotiate an end to Russia’s war against Ukraine no later than August 9.
• Kremlin officials continue to frame Russia as in direct geopolitical confrontation with the West in order to generate domestic support for the war in Ukraine and future Russian aggression against NATO.
• Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman, Toretsk, Novopavlivka, and Velyka Novosilka directions.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 27, 2025

Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Siversk during a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault. Geolocated footage published on July 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Siversk during a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault.[1] The Ukrainian brigade that repelled the assault reported that Russian forces used six tanks, three armored personnel carriers (APCs), six MT-LB armored fighting vehicles (AFVs), an armored recovery vehicle, 12 civilian vehicles, two buggies, and 41 motorcycles.[2] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on July 26 that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian motorized assault comprised of up to 80 unspecified pieces of armored and motorized vehicles northeast of Siversk, and the July 27 geolocated footage likely shows one wave of the July 26 assault.[3] Russian forces have long attempted to seize Siversk and have consistently attacked along the front line in the Siversk direction since at least Summer 2024. Russian forces conducted a series of battalion-sized mechanized assaults in the Siversk direction in November and December 2024 but have otherwise largely conducted slow, grinding infantry assaults in this direction.[4] Russian forces re-intensified offensive operations in the Siversk direction in early Summer 2025, and Russian milbloggers began claiming in late June 2025 that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are operating in the eastern outskirts of Siversk.[5] Recent Russian advances northeast of Siversk indicate that Russian forces are within several kilometers of Siversk, and Russian forces may begin to launch more concerted attacks into the town in the near future.

Russian forces appear to be using armored vehicles more frequently in some tactical attacks after a decrease in the use of armor since Winter 2024-2025. Publicly available combat footage indicates that Russian forces have not conducted a company-sized or larger mechanized assault in Ukraine since April 2025 and have largely leveraged motorcycles and buggies to attack throughout Summer 2025.[6] Russian forces have recently marginally increased their use of armored vehicles against Ukrainian positions and have conducted a series of smaller platoon-sized mechanized assaults in Donetsk and Zaporizhia Oblast since early July 2025.[7] ISW has recently observed indications that Russia temporarily decreased its consumption of tanks and armored vehicles over the last six months, and that Russia appears to be slowly increasing its ability to refurbish Soviet-era armored vehicles while also replenishing armored vehicle supplies by not committing armored vehicles to highly attritional attacks.[8] Russian forces may be temporarily increasing their use of armor to test for weaknesses in Ukraine's drone-based defense in different frontline areas, or the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) may be able to sufficiently repair damaged frontline armor or resupply frontline Russian units with armor. Russian forces may have also recently increased their risk tolerance to use and lose armored vehicles, possibly as part of testing a new tactic or concept of operations, although it is unclear why Russian forces would recalculate this risk. ISW will continue to study the evolution of combat in Ukraine and provide an updated assessment of Russian armor usage.

The Kremlin reasserted its unchanged commitment to achieving its long-standing war aims in Ukraine that amount to nothing short of Ukraine's full capitulation, undermining Russia's diplomatic posturing. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on July 27 that Russia must first fulfill the tasks of its war in Ukraine before renewing bilateral relations with Ukraine.[9] Peskov claimed that Ukraine and the West have rejected Russia's proposals for dialogue. Kremlin officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, have continually rejected US, Ukrainian, and European overtures to progress the peace imitative through dialogue and comprehensive ceasefire agreements.[10] Russia unilaterally imposed short-term ceasefires in Spring 2025 that disproportionately benefited Russia during prominent political events that the Kremlin then weaponized to accuse Ukraine of ceasefire violations.[11] Russia has repeatedly articulated that it seeks regime change in Ukraine, a fundamental restructuring of NATO's open-door policy, and the reduction of Ukraine's military such that Ukraine cannot defend itself in the future. [12] ISW continues to assess that Russia aims to continue delaying the negotiation process so as to make additional gains on the battlefield and extract concessions from Ukraine and the West.

Ukrainian forces recently killed a Russian commander in the Velykyi Burluk direction. Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on July 26 that Ukrainian forces killed Russian Colonel Lebedev (first name not reported), commander of the 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) operating in the Velykyi Burluk direction.[13] ISW recently observed reports of the 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment redeploying likely from northwestern Belgorod Oblast to the Velykyi Burluk area.[14]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Siversk during a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault.
• Russian forces appear to be using armored vehicles more frequently in some tactical attacks after a decrease in the use of armor since Winter 2024-2025.
• The Kremlin reasserted its unchanged commitment to achieving its long-standing war aims in Ukraine that amount to nothing short of Ukraine's full capitulation, undermining Russia's diplomatic posturing.
• Ukrainian forces recently killed a Russian commander in the Velykyi Burluk direction.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk, Toretsk, and Novopavlivka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 25, 2025

Russian officials continue to delay high-level negotiations between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Russian President Vladimir Putin amid US calls for a meeting. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on July 25 that a meeting between Zelensky and Putin remains highly unlikely and stated that Russia and Ukraine must first develop agreements "through expert work.”[i] US President Donald Trump told reporters on July 25 that a meeting between Putin and Zelensky is “going to happen” and that the meeting should have “happened three months ago.”[ii] Russian officials have repeatedly postponed high-level meetings between Ukrainian and Russian leaders and refused to engage in constructive negotiations that seek concrete steps to end the war.[iii] ISW continues to assess that Russia is feigning interest in negotiations in order to buy time to make gains on the battlefield and extract concessions from Ukraine and the West — in stark contrast to Ukraine’s continued willingness to engage in negotiations to end the war.[iv]

Russian forces likely seized Novoekonomichne (northeast of Pokrovsk) and appear to be conducting limited sabotage and reconnaissance missions into Pokrovsk amid ongoing Russian efforts to envelop the town. Geolocated footage published on July 25 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into central Novoekonomichne and likely seized the settlement.[v] One Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions near the Kapitalna Mine just west of Novoekonomichne and just south of the mine.[vi] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced further northeast of Pokrovsk near Nykanorivka, Boikivka, and Zatyshok and south of Pokrovsk near Sukhyi Yar and Novoukrainka.[vii] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) recently participated in the seizure of Zvirove (southwest of Pokrovsk).[viii] Additional Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian infantry units and sabotage and reconnaissance groups advanced into and throughout Pokrovsk and into the outskirts of Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk), and one Russian milblogger claimed that several Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups temporarily advanced into central Pokrovsk.[ix] The Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that reports that Russian units are in Pokrovsk are premature, however, and ISW has not observed any indication that Russian forces maintain enduring positions in Pokrovsk.[x] Ukrainian forces are conducting limited counterattacks in the area, and additional geolocated footage published on July 25 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently retook positions west of Hrodivka (east of Pokrovsk).[xi]

The Russian military command appears to be leveraging elements of the 51st CAA to advance northeast of Pokrovsk and pressure Ukrainian positions in Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed that the 1st and 3rd battalions of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) participated in the seizure of Novoekonomichne.[xii] A Ukrainian reserve officer noted that elements of the 51st CAA appear to be the main force attacking northeast and east of Pokrovsk and that these forces maintain sufficient combat capabilities.[xiii] Elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade and other elements of the 51st CAA played a significant role in the seizure of Kurakhove in December 2024 and wider Russian advances in western Donetsk in Fall 2024 before redeploying to the area east of Pokrovsk in January and February 2025.[xiv] Elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade renewed frontline assaults in May 2025, likely after several months of rest and reconstitution, and have participated in several Russian advances northeast of Pokrovsk in recent months.[xv] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on July 21 that the Russian military command also redeployed elements of the 51st CAA's 1st and 9th motorized rifle brigades to the area north and northeast of Pokrovsk.[xvi]

Russian forces recently advanced into and northwest of Kupyansk. Geolocated footage published on July 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southern Holubivka (northeast of Kupyansk), likely seized the settlement, and advanced into northern Kupyansk.[xvii] Additional geolocated footage published on July 25 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southwestern Kindrashivka and southwest of Tyshchnkivka (both northwest of Kupyansk).[xviii] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced further within Kupyansk, southeast of Radkivka (north of Kupyansk), and northeast of Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk).[xix] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 121st Motorized Rifle Regiment (68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) seized Holubivka and that additional elements of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division are operating in Myrne (just northwest of Kupyansk).[xx] 

Russian forces will likely leverage advances northwest of Kupyansk to support the future envelopment of Kupyansk and complicate Ukraine's ability to supply positions in the town and defend west of the town in the future. Recent Russian advances in the Kupyansk direction cohere with the Russian military command’s long-standing operational objective of enveloping and eventually seizing Kupyansk.[xxi] The Russian military command may intend for Russian forces to interdict the H-26 Kupyansk-Shevchenkove highway in order to complicate Ukrainian logistics and Ukrainian egress routes from Kupyansk. The Russian military command may assess that further advances west of the Velyka Shapkivka-Palamarivka-Hechvolodivka line could complicate Ukraine's ability to fall back to defensive positions west of the town along the Kupyanka River in the future.

The Russian military command could pursue at least three courses of action (COAs) following a future seizure of Kupyansk. A possible future seizure of Kupyansk, which is unlikely in the short-term, would present the Russian military command with a decision point. Russian forces could either continue pushing west from Kupyansk, reprioritize Russian advances in the Borova and Lyman direction, or redeploy elements of the Moscow Military District (MMD) and LMD from the Kupyansk direction to higher priority directions, such as the Kostyantynivka, Pokrovsk, or Novopavlivka directions. Any of these three COAs would likely require months' worth of personnel and material to accomplish, although the exact timeline of Russia's ability to achieve the various objectives associated with these COAs is dependent on the level of US and Western military assistance Ukraine continues to receive. ISW continues to assess that US military assistance is arriving to a dynamic, not static, frontline characterized by ongoing Russian offensive operations aimed at achieving slow maneuver and Russia's long-standing objectives of seizing and subjugating Ukraine via military means.[xxii]

• COA 1: Russian forces could continue to push west of Kupyansk toward Shevchenkove or northwest of Kupyansk toward Velykyi Burluk in order to support Russian efforts to establish a buffer zone in northern Kharkiv Oblast and advance toward Kharkiv City. ISW previously assessed that Russian forces are likely attempting to connect operations near Vovchansk, Velykyi Burluk, and Dvorichna, possibly to facilitate Russian efforts to establish a buffer zone along the international border.[xxiii] Russian forces currently attacking Kupyansk from the north and east may reorient their attacks west, should Russian forces seize the town. Russian forces may attempt to advance along the P-07 Kupyansk-Shevchenkove highway toward Shevchenkove or push northwest along the T-2114 Dvorichna-Velykyi Burluk highway toward Velykyi Burluk as part of a long-term effort to establish and fortify a buffer zone along the northeast border of Ukraine. Russian advances toward Shevchenkove could complicate Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) connecting Kharkiv City and Ukraine's fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast and threaten the rear areas of Ukrainian forces defending near Velyki Burluk and on the west bank of the Oskil River southwest of Kupyansk.
• COA 2: The Russian military command may reprioritize seizing the remainder of the east (left) bank of the Oskil River in the Borova and Lyman directions. The seizure of Kupyansk could allow the Russian military command the opportunity to redeploy some elements of the Moscow Military District (MMD) and LMD from the Kupyansk direction to the Borova and/or Lyman directions. Russian units currently attacking north and east of Kupyansk could refocus their attention southward and push toward Borova along the P-79 Kupyansk-Borova highway. Russian forces are currently advancing toward the Oskil River north of Lyman and have formed a salient and geolocated footage indicates that Russian forces are roughly 12 kilometers from the Oskil River and roughly 22 kilometers from Oskil City in this area. The Russian military command may intend to converge these efforts in this area, assuming that Russian forces could advance roughly 35 kilometers south of their current positions near Zahryzove (northeast of Borova). Russian forces could then leverage their positions along the east bank of the Oskil River to push toward Lyman and Ukraine's fortress belt — a series of fortified cities that form the backbone of Ukraine’s defensive positions — from the north. A Russian offensive against Ukraine’s fortress belt from the north would require Russian forces to cross the Siverskyi Donets River – a challenging task that Russian forces may not be able to achieve, however.
• COA 3: The Russian military command may redeploy manpower from the Kupyansk direction to higher priority areas such as the Kostyantynivka, Pokrovsk, or Novopavlivka directions to facilitate Russia's long-standing objective of seizing the remainder of Donetsk Oblast. The Russian military command could redeploy Russian forces involved in the seizure of Kupyansk to reinforce degraded Russian units attempting to envelop Pokrovsk, which has been the Russian military command's priority sector since October 2023.[xxiv] The Russian command could reinforce Russian forces in the Kostyantynivka direction, who are attempting to create a possible salient to either envelop Ukraine's fortress belt or facilitate attacks against the fortress belt from the south.[xxv] The Russian military command could also redeploy forces from Kupyansk to the Novopavlivka direction, as ISW has noted that Russian forces could leverage advances into southwestern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast to support seizing the remainder of Donetsk Oblast.[xxvi] It is unclear if the Russian military command will redeploy elements from the MMD or LMD to western Donetsk Oblast, however as the Russian military has reportedly concentrated over 100,000 Russian forces in the Pokrovsk direction and elements of the Southern Military District (SMD), Eastern Military District (EMD), and Central Military District (CMD) are currently operating in western Donetsk Oblast.[xxvii] The Russian military command may opt to redeploy additional forces to western Donetsk Oblast, however, given that seizing the remainder of Donetsk Oblast remains one of Russia's primary battlefield priorities.[xxviii]

The Russian Central Bank lowered its key interest rate for the second time in two months, likely in an attempt to increase capital available to the Russian defense industrial base (DIB). The Russian Central Bank announced on July 25 that it had lowered its key interest rate from 20 to 18 percent.[xxix] The Central Bank lowered its annual average key rate forecast to between 18.8 and 19.6 percent in 2025 and between 12 and 13 percent in 2026. The Central Bank also lowered its target annual inflation rate to between 6 and 7 percent for 2025 and four percent for 2026. Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina stated on July 25 that the Central Bank chose to lower the key interest rate due to a faster than expected decrease in current inflationary pressures, including a deceleration of inflation, demand, and annual lending growth.[xxx] Nabiullina also stated that Russia is on its way back to the four percent target inflation rate and that the Central Bank’s ongoing monetary policy efforts are already producing favorable results in the Russian inflation rate.[xxxi] Russian opposition outlet The Bell assessed on July 21 that the Russian Central Bank may choose to lower the key interest rate due to an observed slowing growth rate of the Russian economy, prices, wages, and corporate lending.[xxxii] Growth in these factors would typically exacerbate inflation. The Central Bank may choose to further lower the key interest rate later in 2025. The Central Bank may have lowered its key interest rate as part of the Russian government’s efforts to make more capital available for the Russian DIB and lower the price of borrowing money for DIB producers. The Central Bank has largely leveraged monetary policy to cope with the economic consequences of Russia’s wartime economy and expanded the Russian money supply through military payouts, social projects, and investment in the DIB. Money supply expansion typically exacerbates inflation, and the Central Bank previously introduced a record key interest rate of 21 percent in October 2024 in an attempt to counter inflation due to wartime spending and a weakening ruble.[xxxiii] The reduction in the Russian inflation rate may be the result of these efforts, though it remains unclear whether Russian inflation will stabilize.

The Kremlin dismissed First Deputy Director-General of the Kremlin newswire TASS, Mikhail Gusman, likely in a continued effort to increase control over domestic media sources affecting Russian-Azerbaijani relations. Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin relieved Gusman on July 24 without any further explanation.[xxxiv] Reuters reported on July 25 that Gusman recently praised Azerbaijan for maintaining relations with different countries at an event hosted by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev.[xxxv] Russian authorities recently raided the offices of Baza, a Russian outlet reportedly affiliated with Russian law enforcement, and have been cracking down on media outlets that present stories that challenge the Kremlin's ideal narratives of the war in Ukraine.[xxxvi]

 Key Takeaways:

• Russian officials continue to delay high-level negotiations between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Russian President Vladimir Putin amid US calls for a meeting.
• Russian forces likely seized Novoekonomichne (northeast of Pokrovsk) and appear to be conducting limited sabotage and reconnaissance missions into Pokrovsk amid ongoing Russian efforts to envelop the town.
• Russian forces recently advanced into and northwest of Kupyansk.
• The Russian military command could pursue at least three courses of action (COAs) following a future seizure of Kupyansk.
• The Russian Central Bank lowered its key interest rate for the second time in two months, likely in an attempt to increase capital available to the Russian defense industrial base (DIB).
• The Kremlin dismissed First Deputy Director-General of the Kremlin newswire TASS Mikhail Gusman, likely in a continued effort to increase control over domestic media sources affecting Russian-Azerbaijani relations.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 24, 2025

Russia will likely implement new policies to augment Russia’s military administrative capacity to significantly expand the rate at which Russia can call up a larger volume of conscripts and reservists. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov introduced a bill to the Russian State Duma on July 22 that would change the Russian military conscription administrative process to a year-round cycle, as opposed to the current system which only processes conscripts during Russia’s semi-annual spring and fall cycles.[1]  Kartapolov claimed that that this change would streamline the work of military registration and enlistment offices, which would work year-round, and relieve emergency workload pressure that military registration and enlistment offices currently experience during the traditional semi-annual conscription selection periods in the spring and fall. This new system proposed in the bill does not institute new conscription cycles beyond Russia’s traditional spring and fall conscription cycle periods. Kartapolov added that new model would ensure a uniform load on military registration and enlistment offices and make the process more convenient for Russian citizens, as conscripts would be able to undergo their medical examination, obtain military occupational specialty (MOS) assignments, and complete other necessary procedures throughout the year without rushing during the traditional three-month conscription periods. Kartapolov claimed that the new model would not make the Russian military increase its conscription quotas, although the Kremlin has been increasing conscription classes over the past three years.[2]

The bill would likely mitigate bureaucratic bottlenecks that complicate Russia's force generation efforts during large-scale involuntary call-ups. Russia’s military conscription registration and enlistment centers that process mobilized and conscripted personnel currently only operate for six months of the year in spring and fall to support Russia’s semi-annual conscription cycles. These offices and administrative personnel rush to call up, evaluate, and process large number of military-aged men within the six months, reducing Russia’s ability to facilitate large-scale call-ups of reservists and conscripts outside of spring and fall. The law’s proposal to have these processing centers operate year-round would institute a permanent military administrative bureaucracy able to facilitate Russian reserve-callups year-round to permanently augment Russia’s ability to process large numbers of mobilized personnel, regardless of time of year. Keeping military processing centers and their staff working all year presents significant implications for the rate at which Russia can conduct mobilization, as the Russian military administration will have fewer constraints holding back the rate at which mobilized personnel can be processed and assigned to units.   

The Kremlin is setting other legal conditions to facilitate the streamlining of future larger conscriptions. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law on April 21 that simplified conscription procedures for military-aged men who were selected for semi-annual conscription but did not dispatch for compulsory military service.[3] The law specifies that conscripts who underwent conscription processes, such as medical commissions, but were not assigned to military service could be called up to military service within one year without needing to repeat the conscription procedures. The Russian military's transition to a year-round conscription structure coheres with Russia's broader strategic effort to augment and streamline its force generation capabilities – a move that will have far reaching implications for its war in Ukraine and a possible broader confrontation with NATO.

Russia has planned the gradual expansion of the Russian military since 2022, and the proposed changes to Russia’s personnel processing system are likely intended to support ongoing efforts to increase the size of the Russian military. Structural problems with Russia's mobilization capacity and bureaucratic ability to process mass quantities of conscripts at one time severely complicated Russia's partial involuntary reserve call-up in September 2022.[4] Then-Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced in December 2022 that Russian military leadership planned to significantly expand the Russian military, including plans to increase the size of the Russian Armed Forces and to create new formations.[5] Russian military expansion requires an increase in the number of servicemembers, and Russia is likely pursuing efforts to increase its bureaucratic capacity to process and conscript Russians into military service. Putin ordered the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to increase Russia‘s military to 2.38 million people in 2025.[6] Putin has signed annual decrees increasing the size of the Russian military by 137,000 in 2022 to 170,000 in 2023 and 180,000 in 2024.[7] The Kremlin has also executed other measures since 2022 to expand the Russian military, including by reopening Soviet-era military academies to rebuild the officer corps, lowering the age of conscription, digitalizing draft summonses, increasing fines for draft dodgers, lowering conscription and volunteer eligibility requirements, and recruiting prisoners and those with health issues.[8]

 The expansion of Russia’s administrative capacity to process conscripts and mobilized personnel would allow Russia to mobilize forces faster and more efficiently both during a protracted war in Ukraine and a possible future war against NATO. Russian citizens who have previously deferred or were ineligible for conscription may be eligible for conscription at a later day should Russian conscription legislation change. Kartapolov's July 22 bill for a permeant conscription bureaucracy that works year-round and the April 2025 law to simply conscription procedures will significantly reduce the bureaucratic hurdles that Russian authorities would face to process these citizens' renewed conscription more quickly. Russia's efforts to reduce the bureaucratic bottlenecks hindering the conscription process will affect Russia's force generation mechanisms in the war in Ukraine. Putin has so far been reluctant to conduct another partial involuntary reserve call-up due to the risk of severe societal backlash, but these reforms to Russia's conscription processes would allow Russian authorities to process another potential call-up in the future more smoothly and efficiently than the one in September 2022, getting soldiers from the military enlistment and registration offices to the frontline more quickly and thus mitigating societal backlash from poor bureaucratic procedures.[9] These reforms will also put the necessary administrative infrastructure in place year-round, allowing the Kremlin to conduct another call-up anytime of the year without having to mobilize additional bureaucratic resources that would slow down the conscription process.

Reductions in the bottlenecks in the Russian conscription process would also impact Russia's ability to wage future wars. ISW continues to assess that Russia's military reforms, including the restructuring of the Western Military District (WMD) into the Leningrad and Moscow military districts (LMD and MMD), demonstrate Russia's longer-term preparation for a possible future conflict with NATO.[10] Russia's ability to more quickly conduct large-scale call-ups will have significant implications for NATO and its ability to deter or even defend against future Russian aggression.

Kremlin officials continue to signal Russia's unwillingness to engage substantively in efforts to establish a lasting peace in Ukraine during the third round of bilateral talks in Istanbul. Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council Secretary Rustem Umerov stated on July 23 that the Ukrainian delegation outlined three key priorities at the third round of Istanbul negotiations: a full and unconditional ceasefire, including halting all strikes on civilian and critical infrastructure; organizing a summit between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, Russian President Vladimir Putin, US President Donald Trump, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, preferably by the end of August 2025; and the return of all Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs), civilians, and illegally deported children.[11] Umerov stated that the Russian delegation agreed to return POWs who have been in Russian captivity for more than three years, the seriously wounded, and young people and to exchange over 1,200 people.[12] Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky, who led the Russian delegation in Istanbul, stated that Russia's and Ukraine’s positions remain far apart and that Russia proposed continued negotiations at the working group level.[13] Medinsky claimed that Russia proposed to establish virtual working groups to handle political, humanitarian, and military issues and to discuss possible short-term humanitarian ceasefires, lasting between 24 to 48 hours, to collect dead and wounded soldiers from the battlefield.[14] Medinsky asserted that Russian and Ukrainian leaders - referring to Putin and Zelensky - cannot meet until Russia and Ukraine agree on a full peace settlement and a full ceasefire is in effect.[15] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov similarly claimed that Russia’s proposals were ”concrete and constructive” but maintained that a meeting between Putin and Zelensky before the end of August 2025 is unlikely due to the differences in the two sides' negotiation positions.[16] Russia's rejection of a presidential summit before a permanent peace settlement is a continuation of Kremlin efforts to dictate the terms and timing of peace negotiations, as Russia did in early 2025 by rejecting the Ukraine's and the United States' calls for a longer-term ceasefire to precede peace negotiations.[17] Russia's proposal to establish virtual working groups is likely part of efforts to posture itself as a proactive, engaged negotiator while not committing to any substantive measures to meaningfully progress the peace process.[18] ISW continues to assess that Russia remains committed to delaying the negotiation process so as to continue making gains on the battlefield and extract concessions from Ukraine and the West – in stark contrast to Ukraine's continued willingness to engage in the negotiation process to end the war.[19]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky submitted a draft bill to the Ukrainian parliament on July 24 aimed at bolstering the independence of Ukraine's anti-corruption agencies in response to public backlash against the controversial bill that Zelensky signed on July 22. Zelensky submitted to the Verkhovna Rada (parliament) draft law No. 13533, which is designed to safeguard the independence of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAP).[20] The bill would limit the Prosecutor General Office's ability to give instructions to SAP prosecutors and require that the deputy prosector general, who is also the head of SAP, approve all the Prosecutor General's Office's written administrative orders regarding SAP's activities.[21] The bill would additionally require NABU personnel with access to classified information to undergo a polygraph test within six months; prohibit most foreign travel for NABU employees during martial law; authorize NABU to receive more cases from other law enforcement bodies; enable SAP to transfer NABU cases that may jeopardize NABU's objectivity to other agencies; and authorize SAP prosecutors to give written instructions to NABU detectives and discipline NABU detectives who refuse these orders. NABU's and SAP's press services reported that the bill would restore all procedural powers and guarantees of independence and called on the Verkhovna Rada to adopt the bill.[22]

The US State Department approved two Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to Ukraine totaling $322 million. The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DCSA) announced on July 23 that the US State Department approved an FMS to Ukraine for Bradley infantry fighting vehicles and maintenance and repair equipment valued at $150 million, and that the agency has notified Congress.[23] The US State Department also approved an FMS to Ukraine valued at $172 million for equipment and services related to the HAWK Phase III missile system, including MIM-23 HAWK missile spare parts, five-ton cargo trucks, HAWK system spare parts, refurbishment and system overhaul of HAWK air defense fire units, tool kits, test and support equipment, and US Government and contractor technical assistance.[24]

 Ukraine and Russia conducted their ninth prisoner of war (POW) exchange on July 23, in accordance with agreements reached during the June 2 bilateral negotiations in Istanbul. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed that Ukraine and Russia exchanged 250 POWs each on July 23.[25] Zelensky stated that Ukraine has brought back more than 1,000 Ukrainian POWs since the beginning of the exchanges in accordance with the June 2 Istanbul agreements and noted that the majority of the Ukrainian POWs returned on July 23 had been in Russian captivity for more than three years.[26] The Russian MoD reported that Ukraine also returned two wounded Russian POWs on July 23.[27]

 Key Takeaways:

• Russia will likely implement new policies to augment Russia’s military administrative capacity to significantly expand the rate at which Russia can call up a larger volume of conscripts and reservists.
• Russia has planned the gradual expansion of the Russian military since 2022, and the proposed changes to Russia’s personnel processing system are likely intended to support ongoing efforts to increase the size of the Russian military.
• The expansion of Russia’s administrative capacity to process conscripts and mobilized personnel would allow Russia to mobilize forces faster and more efficiently both during a protracted war in Ukraine and a possible future war against NATO.
• Reductions in the bottlenecks in the Russian conscription process would also impact Russia's ability to wage future wars.
• Kremlin officials continue to signal Russia's unwillingness to engage substantively in efforts to establish a lasting peace in Ukraine during the third round of bilateral talks in Istanbul.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky submitted a draft bill to the Ukrainian parliament on July 24 aimed at bolstering the independence of Ukraine's anti-corruption agencies in response to public backlash against the controversial bill that Zelensky signed on July 22.
• The US State Department approved two Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to Ukraine totaling $322 million.
• Ukraine and Russia conducted their ninth prisoner of war (POW) exchange on July 23, in accordance with agreements reached during the June 2 bilateral negotiations in Istanbul.
• Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Kupyansk, Borova, Toretsk, and Novopavlivka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 23, 2025

Russia is weaponizing ongoing domestic protests in Ukraine to intensify rhetoric designed to undermine Ukraine's legitimacy and discourage Western support. The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada (parliament) passed Draft Law No. 12414 on July 22, which subordinates Ukraine's two main anti-corruption agencies – the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAP) – to the Ukrainian Prosecutor General.[i] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed the draft bill into law later in the evening on July 22.[ii] The bill's passage comes after the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) and Ukrainian Prosecutor General's Office conducted a raid against NABU offices on July 21 as part of investigations into employees allegedly suspected of collaborating with Russia after the NABU opened investigations into SBU personnel for extortion.[iii] Ukrainians began protesting the law on June 22 in multiple large cities and continued protesting on June 23, citing concerns about the NABU's and SAP's ability to operate independent of government influence.[iv] Zelensky stated that law No. 12414 is necessary to ensure that Ukraine's anti-corruption bodies can operate without Russian influence and that he will soon propose bills to the Verkhovna Rada to support the NABU's and SAP's independent operations.[v]

Kremlin officials, propagandists, and mouthpieces have weaponized these protests to advance existing Russian narratives designed to portray the Ukrainian government as corrupt and illegitimate in order to discourage continued Western support for Ukraine. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on July 23, for example, that Ukrainian authorities stole a significant amount of money from the United States and the European Union (EU).[vi] Russian State Duma deputies and pro-Kremlin mouthpieces spoke to Russian state media outlets about the protests in Ukraine, broadly claiming that Ukrainians protesting the law are protesting against the continuation of the war, the government writ large and Zelensky individually; that the Ukrainian government is corrupt; and that the law intends to protect Ukrainian officials who have been embezzling Western funds intended for military assistance.[vii] Some of these Russian figures claimed that the West should "replace" Zelensky – repeating longstanding Kremlin narratives undermining Ukraine's autonomy and agency and calling for regime change– and reiterated frequent accusations that Zelensky and the Ukrainian government are "neo-Nazis."[viii] Russian state media outlets, Russian ultranationalist milbloggers, and high-ranking Kremlin officials, including leading Russian negotiator Kirill Dmitriev, also broadly amplified reports and statements that directly or indirectly support these narratives.[ix]

The central theme of the Russian narratives surrounding the protests – the claim that Ukrainian officials embezzle Western military assistance – fails to reflect the reality that very little of the funds that the West has allocated to Ukraine are funds that Ukraine spends itself.[x] The vast majority of US funds allocated to Ukraine are spent within the United States, not Ukraine.[xi] Much of the US and European military assistance to Ukraine funds activities related to the war, including training Ukrainian forces and intelligence support for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Ukraine.[xii] The Russian claims about Ukrainian corruption aim to exploit ongoing policy discussions and deter additional Western aid to Ukraine.

The ongoing Ukrainian protests are notably not anti-war demonstrations, but Russian commentators are trying to paint them as protests against Zelensky and Ukraine's war effort in order to accomplish informational effects that will generate benefits for Russian forces on the battlefield. Russian President Vladimir Putin's articulated theory of victory relies on the assumption that Russia will be able to outlast Western assistance to Ukraine while continuing to make creeping gains on the battlefield.[xiii] The Kremlin has previously attempted to capitalize on international discourse pertaining to Ukraine to sow or exacerbate divisions between Ukraine, the United States, and Europe in order to undermine Western will to continue providing military assistance to Ukraine and therefore degrade Ukraine's ability to defend itself.[xiv] The Kremlin will likely continue its informational effort surrounding the ongoing protests in Ukraine to divide Ukraine from its allies, including by continuing to deliberately mischaracterize the nature of these protests to fit Russia's existing rhetorical lines. Russia likely hopes that the rhetorical effort it is pursuing to undermine Ukraine will lead to a weakened Ukrainian military, which Russia can more readily defeat on the battlefield.

Ukrainian and Russian delegations met on July 23 in Istanbul for the third round of bilateral negotiations. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky issued a decree on July 23 authorizing Ukrainian political and military officials to negotiate on Ukraine's behalf during the bilateral talks.[xv] Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council Secretary Rustem Umerov led the Ukrainian delegation, and Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky led the Russian delegation.[xvi] The Russian delegation is notably comprised of the same representatives as the May and June 2025 Istanbul negotiations. The Ukrainian delegation emphasized their focus on the return of prisoners of war (POWs) as well as deported Ukrainian children and the need for a meeting between Zelensky, US President Donald Trump, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Russian President Vladimir Putin to move toward more substantive negotiations to end the war.[xvii] ISW will report on the July 23 Ukrainian-Russian talks in more depth in the July 24 update as additional information becomes available.

Kremlin officials continue to undermine the negotiation process while reiterating Russia's commitment to achieving its original war aims. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on July 23 that Russia will achieve all of its goals in Ukraine - likely referring to Russia's original war aims, including regime change in Ukraine, changes to NATO’s open-door policy, and the reduction of Ukraine's military such that it cannot defend itself.[xviii] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on July 23 that no one expects the third round of Ukrainian-Russian talks in Istanbul to be an "easy road," that the talks will be "very difficult," and that both sides' draft memoranda are "diametrically opposed."[xix] Peskov claimed that Ukraine and Russia can only start to plan a bilateral presidential summit after completing work to coordinate their memoranda.[xx] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, in contrast, continued to demonstrate Ukraine's willingness to engage in the negotiation process, stating on July 23 that Ukraine is ready to work towards preparing for a presidential meeting to bring about an end to the war.[xxi] ISW continues to assess that Russia is deliberately delaying the negotiation process – including the possibility of a Zelensky-Putin meeting aimed at ending the war – in order to protract the war and make additional gains on the battlefield.[xxii]

Russia continues to diversify and bolster its security apparatus in an effort to centralize state power in a way that will worsen the already systematic abuse of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) and civilians in Russia and occupied Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on July 23 authorizing the Federal Security Service (FSB) to create autonomous pre-trial detention facilities (SIZO) to hold individuals accused of crimes under the FSB's jurisdiction.[xxiii] The decree will enter into force on January 1, 2026. The FSB is notably responsible for patrolling Russia's borders and serves law enforcement functions in Russia, suggesting that the FSB may leverage their new powers to target Russian citizens attempting to evade military registration or desert the Russian military. ISW has observed reports that the FSB uses various existing SIZO facilities to abuse and torture Ukrainian POWs and civilians.[xxiv] Putin's expansion of the FSB's powers aligns with the Kremlin's broader strategy of diversifying its security apparatus in order to tighten control of the Russian populace. The Kremlin has been implementing measures in recent years to expand both the FSB's and Rosgvardia's powers to detain and punish people in both Russia and occupied Ukraine.[xxv]

Key Takeaways:

• Russia is weaponizing ongoing domestic protests in Ukraine to intensify rhetoric designed to undermine Ukraine's legitimacy and discourage Western support.
• The ongoing Ukrainian protests are notably not anti-war demonstrations, but Russian commentators are trying to paint them as protests against Zelensky and Ukraine's war effort in order to accomplish informational effects that will generate benefits for Russian forces on the battlefield.
• Ukrainian and Russian delegations met on July 23 in Istanbul for the third round of bilateral negotiations.
• Kremlin officials continue to undermine the negotiation process while reiterating Russia's commitment to achieving its original war aims.
• Russia continues to diversify and bolster its security apparatus in an effort to centralize state power in a way that will worsen the already systematic abuse of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) and civilians in Russia and occupied Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy and in western Zaporizhia oblasts and near Borova.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 22, 2025

Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups reportedly recently advanced into southern Pokrovsk as Russian forces continue to pursue their operational objective of enveloping the town. Geolocated footage published on July 21 reportedly shows Russian forces engaging Ukrainian forces driving along the E50 Pokrovsk-Pavlohrad highway in southern Pokrovsk.[1] A source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence stated on July 21 that Russian sabotage groups of unspecified size advanced into Pokrovsk through Zvirove (southwest of Pokrovsk) "a couple days ago" and that Ukrainian forces are still searching for and destroying these Russian groups.[2] Ukrainian outlet Ukrainska Pravda reported on July 22 that Ukrainian military personnel operating in Pokrovsk confirmed that Russian sabotage elements entered the town on July 17 and that Ukrainian forces are conducting clearing operations.[3] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on July 18 that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group trying to penetrate Pokrovsk.[4] Geolocated evidence indicates that Russian forces are advancing close to Pokrovsk from the southwest. Geolocated footage published on July 21 indicates that Russian forces also recently marginally advanced east of Zvirove (southwest of Pokrovsk) after recently intensifying assaults south of Pokrovsk.[5] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced further northeast of Zvirove.[6] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Zvirove is a contested "gray zone."[7]

Ukrainian reports of Russian redeployments to the area and Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups entering Pokrovsk suggest that the Russian military is preparing to intensify assaults against the town in the near future. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on July 21 that the Russian military command recently redeployed elements of the Russian 1st and 9th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) to reinforce the Russian force grouping attacking north and northeast of Pokrovsk.[8] Mashovets stated that the Russian military command intends to leverage these units to intensify efforts to envelop Pokrovsk and that elements of the 2nd CAA (Central Military District [CMD]) have simultaneously intensified assaults south of Pokrovsk. ISW continues to assess that Russian advances northeast of Pokrovsk support the envelopment of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad (just east of Pokrovsk) by interdicting the T-0515 Pokrovsk-Dobropillya highway and complicating Ukrainian egress routes from Pokrovsk.[9] Russian forces have largely struggled to advance southeast, south, and southwest of Pokrovsk due to Ukrainian drone operations since late 2024. Russian forces reportedly advanced into the outskirts of Myrnohrad in late August 2024 for a short time, but Ukrainian forces later pushed them from the town.[10] Russian forces may continue efforts to advance northeast of Pokrovsk while intensifying attacks against the town from the south and southwest in an effort to force Ukrainian forces to withdraw under threat of envelopment.

Ukrainian and Russian delegations will meet on July 23 in Istanbul for the third round of bilateral negotiations, but Kremlin officials are already dismissing and undermining the upcoming talks. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on July 21 that Russian and Ukrainian representatives will meet in Istanbul for the next round of peace negotiations on July 23.[11] Zelensky stated that Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council Secretary Rustem Umerov will again lead the Ukrainian delegation, which will also include representatives from Ukrainian intelligence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Office of the President.[12] Zelensky noted that the Ukrainian delegation will focus on returning prisoners of war (POW) and deported Ukrainian children and announced that Russian and Ukrainian representatives have already begun discussing additional POW exchanges.[13] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that "there is no reason to count on any breakthroughs" in the upcoming talks and that emphasized that Russia intends to ensure its interests and fulfill the tasks that the Kremlin has set from the start of the war - likely referring to Russia's original war aims, such as regime change in Ukraine, changes to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) open-door policy, and the reduction of Ukraine's military such that it cannot defend itself.[14] Peskov stated that the Ukrainian and Russian delegations will need to discuss the draft memoranda that they exchanged during the second round of talks on June 2. Russia’s delay in exchanging its memorandum until the June 2 meeting and Peskov’s July 22 statements continue to indicate that Russia is deliberately trying to delay the negotiation process in order to protract the war and make additional gains on the battlefield.[15]

Russia’s reported long-term rearmament plans further indicate that the Kremlin is preparing for a potential future conflict with NATO. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov stated on July 22 that Russia plans to spend $1.1 trillion on rearmament by 2036 (or roughly $110 billion per year over the next ten years).[16] Budanov stated that Russia is further mobilizing its society and economy in preparation for a future large-scale war. Budanov noted that Russia’s restoration of the Moscow and Leningrad military districts (MMD/LMD) and ongoing efforts to form new divisions based on existing units and formations are indicative of Russia’s long-term plans. ISW has long assessed that Russia’s restoration of the MMD and LMD and ongoing efforts to restructure and expand the Russian Armed Forces are in preparation for a future large-scale conventional war against NATO.[17] Russian President Vladimir Putin recently claimed that Russia's 2025 military budget is 13.5 trillion rubles (roughly $172 billion) and that Russia plans to steadily decrease defense spending beginning in 2026.[18] It is unclear exactly how much Russia spends on military and defense industrial procurement, however, given ongoing Kremlin efforts to obscure its national budget from domestic and foreign audiences. It remains unclear exactly how Russia will spend and allocate this reported rearmament fund, and the Kremlin may view Russia’s rearmament as a separate budget line from Russia’s yearly military budget for Ukraine.

Russian authorities recently detained Bryansk Oblast Vice Governor Nikolai Simonenko and former Belgorod Oblast Vice Governor Rustem Zainullin, likely as part of the Kremlin’s continued efforts to scapegoat local officials for larger Russian border security failures following Ukraine's August 2024 Kursk Oblast incursion. Russian law enforcement officials told Kremlin newswire TASS on July 22 that Russian authorities detained Simonenko on abuse of power charges and searched Simonenko’s home and workplace as part of a larger criminal case investigating the embezzlement of funds allocated for the construction of defensive fortifications in Bryansk Oblast border areas.[19] Russian authorities similarly detained Zainullin for fraud on June 21 on suspicion of embezzling 32 million rubles (roughly $408,000) in funds allocated to constructing defensive fortifications in the Belgorod Oblast border area.[20] Russian authorities previously detained former Kursk Oblast Governor Alexei Smirnov on similar embezzlement charges in what ISW assessed to be a concerted Kremlin effort to use Kursk Oblast officials as scapegoats for Russia’s failure to repel the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast.[21] Russian President Vladimir Putin also notably dismissed Russian Minister of Transport and former Kursk Oblast Governor Roman Starovoit on July 7 just prior to Starovoit’s reported suicide.[22]

Russian authorities targeted a Telegram channel that revealed Russia’s role in the late December 2024 downing of an Azerbaijan Airlines plane as part of a wider campaign to censor Telegram channels that are critical of the Kremlin. Russian authorities conducted a raid on July 22 against the offices of Baza, a Telegram channel reportedly affiliated with Russian law enforcement, as part of an abuse of power investigation against Russian police officers who allegedly disclosed sensitive information to Baza.[23] Russian authorities reportedly held Baza editor-in-chief Gleb Trifonov and other Baza journalists for questioning, and the Russian Investigative Committee claimed that it detained Trifonov and a colleague on suspicions of bribery.[24] in January 2025, Baza published a transcript of a conversation between the pilots and ground controllers during the December 2024 downing of the Azerbaijan Airlines plane, disclosing that Russian authorities did not allow the plane to land in Russia even after the plane’s crew requested an emergency landing.[25] The Kremlin’s raid on Baza offices occurred after several smaller-scale incidents in recent weeks, including an Azerbaijani raid on the offices of Russian state-owned Sputnik propaganda outlet in Baku, which have inflamed Azerbaijani-Russian relations after Russian President Vladimir Putin refused to take responsibility for Russia's role in downing the plane.[26] Russian officials have been engaged in efforts throughout the war to censor critical Telegram channels and are likely using the investigation into police misconduct as a means of censoring and punishing Baza for its role in increasing tensions between Azerbaijan and Russia.

Russian forces recently executed a civilian in the Lyman direction. A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction posted footage on July 22 showing several men dressed in Russian military uniforms assaulting and shooting a civilian riding a bicycle on a street near Torske (east of Lyman).[27] The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) states that ”intentionally direct attacks against the civilian population or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities” constitutes a serious violation of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict within the established framework of international law.[28] This incident is indicative of the brutality with which Russia treats the Ukrainians living under Russian occupation.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups reportedly recently advanced into southern Pokrovsk as Russian forces continue to pursue their operational objective of enveloping the town.
• Ukrainian and Russian delegations will meet on July 23 in Istanbul for the third round of bilateral negotiations, but Kremlin officials are already dismissing and undermining the upcoming talks.
• Russia’s reported long-term rearmament plans further indicate that the Kremlin is preparing for a potential future conflict with NATO.
• Russian authorities recently detained Bryansk Oblast Vice Governor Nikolai Simonenko and former Belgorod Oblast Vice Governor Rustem Zainullin, likely as part of the Kremlin’s continued efforts to scapegoat local officials for larger Russian border security failures following Ukraine's August 2024 Kursk Oblast incursion.
• Russian authorities targeted a Telegram channel that revealed Russia’s role in the late December 2024 downing of an Azerbaijan Airlines plane as part of a wider campaign to censor Telegram channels that are critical of the Kremlin.
• Russian forces recently executed a civilian in the Lyman direction.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy and Zaporizhia oblasts and near Lyman, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 21, 2025

Russian forces conducted a large-scale series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 20 to 21 that included over 400 drones as Russia continues to launch significantly larger strike packages in June and July 2025 than in January to May 2025. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 426 Shahed-type strike drones and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched five Kh-46 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles from the airspace over Tambov Oblast; four Kalibr cruise missiles from the Black Sea; one Iskander-K cruise missile from Millerovo; and 14 Kh-101 cruise missiles from the airspace over Saratov Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down and suppressed 200 Shahed-type drones and 203 decoy drones that Ukrainian air defense fire and electronic warfare (EW) downed all the missiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that 23 strike drones hit three locations and that drone debris fell in 12 locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged civilian and critical infrastructure in Ivano-Frankivsk, Kyiv, and Kharkiv oblasts.[2] Kyiv City Military Administration Head Timur Tkachenko reported that the Russian strike damaged the entrance to a metro station in the city.[3] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that the Russian strikes injured 15 civilians and killed two.[4] Russia rarely launched over 200 drones per night between January and May 2025, and an overnight strike package consisting of over 400 drones — even if far below Russia's latest record high of 728 drones in one strike package — demonstrates the dramatic shift in Russia's ability to repeatedly launch larger-scale drone strikes in recent weeks since May 2025.

Ukraine's Western partners pledged additional military and financial assistance to Ukraine during a virtual meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein format) on July 21. Ukrainian Defense Minister Denys Shmyhal announced that Germany will transfer five Patriot air defense systems to Ukraine in the near future and that Germany will also send 200,000 Gepard shells to Ukraine.[5] German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius also confirmed that Germany will send five Patriot air defense systems and necessary interceptors to Ukraine.[6] Shmyhal stated that Canada will contribute an unspecified amount toward financing Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) via the "Danish model" (in which Ukraine's partners buy Ukrainian-manufactured weapons for the Ukrainian military) and allocated 20 million CAD ($14.6 million) to Ukrainian tank maintenance. Shmyhal stated that the Netherlands allocated 200 million euros (roughly $234 million) to fund Ukrainian production of interceptor drones to counter Russian Shahed-type drones and 125 million euros (roughly $146 million) for F-16 fighter jet maintenance. Shmyhal stated that Norway also allocated one billion euros (roughly $1.67 billion) to fund Ukrainian drone purchases in 2025, including 400 million euros (roughly $468 million) specifically to purchase drones from Ukraine's DIB.

British Defense Secretary John Healey announced during the Ukraine Defense Contact Group meeting on July 21 a "50-day drive" to arm Ukraine on the battlefield and help push Russian President Vladimir Putin to the negotiating table.[7] Healey noted that the group needs to seize on US President Donald Trump's threat to impose "severe" 100 percent secondary tariffs on Russia's trade partners if there is no peace settlement to end Russia's war in Ukraine within 50 days from July 14.[8] ISW has consistently assessed that only significant Russian battlefield setbacks, enabled by timely and sufficient Western military assistance to Ukrainian forces, will force Putin to reconsider Russia's ability to militarily defeat Ukraine and bring him to the negotiating table.[9] Such setbacks will not happen in a matter of weeks and will likely require several months or campaign seasons, assuming that the West commits to properly equipping and aiding Ukrainian forces to the point that Ukraine could successfully conduct such operations.

Ukrainian officials discussed Ukraine's increasing defense industrial capacity amid ongoing European aid announcements. Ukrainian Defense Minister Denys Shmyhal stated that Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) can accommodate an additional $6 billion in investments and that Ukraine could use these funds to produce more first-person view (FPV) and interceptor drones and long-range weapons.[10] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukraine intends to increase domestic defense production over the next six months.[11] Ukrainian Defense Procurement Agency Head Arzen Zhumadilov told Ukrainian television channel Kanal 24 that Ukraine has contracted with three companies, including one Ukrainian and one American company, to produce interceptor drones to counter Russian Shahed-type drones.[12] Zhumadilov stated that Ukraine's DIB currently has the capacity to produce eight to 10 million FPV drones per year but that the Ukrainian government will only be able to fund the procurement of four to 4.5 million drones in 2025 due to budgetary constraints.

Ukraine officially proposed a third round of negotiations with Russia amid speculation in the Ukrainian and Russian informational spaces. Russian officials continue to feign interest in good-faith negotiations, despite failing to propose or agree to a third round of negotiations. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on July 21 that Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council Secretary Rustem Umerov recently proposed conducting a third round of negotiations between Ukraine and Russia in Istanbul, Turkey.[13] A source told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne on July 21 that Ukrainian and Russian delegations could meet in Istanbul as early as July 22 or 23.[14] Unspecified sources cited by Kremlin newswire TASS confirmed that Ukraine proposed a third round of negotiations to Russia and stated that negotiations may be held on July 24 or 25.[15] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on July 21 that Russia is in favor of conducting a third round of negotiations with Ukraine, that the Kremlin would announce when a date had been set, and that Russia’s delegation to the third round of negotiations would be the same delegation that attended previous Istanbul negotiations in May and June 2025.[16] Russia and Ukraine last met in Istanbul on June 2 and only concluded agreements about prisoner of war (POW) exchanges due to Russia’s refusal to provide Ukrainian negotiators with a memorandum of its terms for a peace settlement in advance of negotiations.[17] The Kremlin has since repeatedly claimed interest in a third round of negotiations as Russian officials have reiterated in June and July 2025 Russia's long-standing demands that amount to Ukrainian capitulation.[18] Russia’s decision to send the same, mid-level negotiating team to the reported upcoming third round of negotiations indicates that Russia’s disinterest in peace negotiations is unchanged. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin remains dedicated to protracting peace negotiations to support continued offensive operations in Ukraine and extract additional concessions from Ukraine and the West.[19]

Key Takeaways

• Russian forces conducted a large-scale series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 20 to 21 that included over 400 drones as Russia continues to launch significantly larger strike packages in June and July 2025 than in January to May 2025.
• Ukraine's Western partners pledged additional military and financial assistance to Ukraine during a virtual meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein format) on July 21.
• British Defense Secretary John Healey announced during the Ukraine Defense Contact Group meeting on July 21 a "50-day drive" to arm Ukraine on the battlefield and help push Russian President Vladimir Putin to the negotiating table.
• Ukrainian officials discussed Ukraine's increasing defense industrial capacity amid ongoing European aid announcements.
• Ukraine officially proposed a third round of negotiations with Russia amid speculation in the Ukrainian and Russian informational spaces. Russian officials continue to feign interest in good-faith negotiations, despite failing to propose or agree to a third round of negotiations.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 20, 2025

Russian officials continue to publicly reiterate that Russia is uninterested in a near-term solution to ending the war in Ukraine that does not acquiesce to Moscow’s demands. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on July 20 that Russia is ready to "move quickly" with peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine but that Russia must achieve its goals, which Peskov claimed are “obvious” and “do not change.”[1] Kremlin officials have consistently claimed that any peace settlement must eliminate the alleged "root causes" of the war and repeated Russia's original war aims to "denazify" and "demilitarize" Ukraine – terms the Kremlin has used throughout the war to call for regime change in Ukraine, Ukrainian neutrality, changes to NATO's open-door policy, and the removal of Ukraine's ability to defend itself against future Russian aggression.[2] Peskov’s July 20 statements underline the Kremlin's continued uninterest in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine and efforts rather to prolong the war — as ISW continues to assess.[3]

German and Ukrainian officials assessed that Russia continues to expand its production of Shahed-type drones in order to launch even larger long-range drone strike packages that include up to 2,000 drones in a single night. Russian forces may be able to strike Ukraine with up to 2,000 drones in a single night by November 2025 should the current pattern of growth in nightly Russian drone usage continue. The head of the German Ministry of Defense's Planning and Command Staff, Major General Christian Freuding, assessed on July 19 that Russia plans to further increase its drone production capacity with the goal of launching 2,000 drones in one overnight strike package against Ukraine.[4] Freuding stated that Ukraine and its international partners must consider cost-effective ways of countering Russia's large strike packages, as traditional air defense methods, such as those that use expensive Patriot interceptors, are not well-suited as an anti-drone air defense strategy. Commander of the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces Major Robert Brovdi stated on July 4 that Russia could launch 1,000 drones in a single strike package due to increased production and stockpiles.[5] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) assessed on June 9 that Russian can produce roughly 170 Shahed-type drones per day and that Russia plans to increase production capacity to 190 drones per day by the end of 2025.[6] Russia has been rapidly increasing the number of Shahed-type strike drones and decoy drones in its overnight strike packages in recent weeks, with Russia's largest drone strike package thus far including 728 drones on the night of July 8 to 9.[7] Russia's increased production capacities in recent months have allowed Russia to dramatically increase its strike packages in a relatively short period of time. Russia rarely launched more than 200 drones per night between January and May 2025 but then increased the peak number of drones launched in one night from 250 in late May 2025 to over 700 in early July 2025. Russia’s use of one-way attack drones in nightly strike packages grew at an average monthly rate of 31 percent in both June and July 2025. ISW assesses that Russia may be able to launch up to 2,000 drones in one night by November 2025, should this current growth trend in drone usage continue. This forecast will be invalidated if the monthly Russian drone usage growth rate either increases or decreases from 31 percent. Russian forces will likely not be able to sustain such large strike packages every night but will likely launch large strike packages followed by days of smaller packages as they are now. Western investment in Ukraine's interceptor drone development and production remains critical for Ukraine's ability to counter large-scale Russian strike packages and protect its civilian population.

Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev reiterated demands for Russia to take responsibility for the December 2024 downing of an Azerbaijan Airlines plane, an incident that continues to create tension in the Russian-Azerbaijani relationship. Aliyev stated during a media forum on July 19 that he wants Russia to publicly acknowledge responsibility for downing the Azerbaijan Airlines plane in December 2024, punish those responsible, and compensate victims' families and Azerbaijan Airlines.[8] Aliyev stated that Azerbaijan knows "exactly what happened" and "can prove it" and that Azerbaijan has not received any response from Russian officials in the past seven months. Aliyev denied the possibility that a Ukrainian drone struck the plane and stated that Azerbaijan's Prosecutor General regularly requests Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin to provide updates on Russia's internal investigation into the downing. Aliyev stated that Azerbaijan is willing to wait 10 years for answers — a reference to the 10-year investigation into Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17, which pro-Russian proxies downed using a Buk missile system belonging to the Russian 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade over occupied Donetsk Oblast in July 2014.[9] Aliyev reiterated his support for Ukraine and stated that Ukraine should "never accept occupation." Russian-Azerbaijani relations have deteriorated over a number of smaller-scale incidents in July 2024 that have inflamed the unresolved disputes over the December 2024 downing.[10]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian officials continue to publicly reiterate that Russia is uninterested in a near-term solution to ending the war in Ukraine that does not acquiesce to Moscow’s demands.
• German and Ukrainian officials assessed that Russia continues to expand its production of Shahed-type drones in order to launch even larger long-range drone strike packages that include up to 2,000 drones in a single night. Russian forces may be able to strike Ukraine with up to 2,000 drones in a single night by November 2025 should the current pattern of growth in nightly Russian drone usage continue.
• Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev reiterated demands for Russia to take responsibility for the December 2024 downing of an Azerbaijan Airlines plane, an incident that continues to create tension in the Russian-Azerbaijani relationship.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Sumy and Zaporizhia oblasts and near Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Lyman and Novopavlivka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 18, 2025

The European Council of the European Union (EU) approved its 18th sanctions package on July 19, mainly targeting Russian oil revenues and sanctions evasion schemes.[1] The EU announced a landmark oil cap to contain Russian oil prices at 15 percent of the average market price that will automatically adjust semi-annually, and noted that the current price cap is set at $47.60 per barrel – well below the previous $60 per barrel cap.[2] The EU imposed a full transaction ban on any transactions related to the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines, which will prevent the completion, maintenance, and operation of the pipelines. The EU also ended Czechia's exemptions for Russian oil imports. The EU sanctioned an additional 105 vessels of the Russian shadow fleet, increasing the overall number of sanctioned tankers to 444. The EU sanctioned Russian and international companies managing the shadow fleet, an oil refinery in India in which the Russian state oil company Rosneft is a main shareholder, the captain of a shadow fleet vessel, a private operator of an international flag registry, and one entity in the Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) sector. The EU also imposed an import ban on refined petroleum products made from Russian crude oil and imported from any third country, with the exception of Canada, Norway, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Russian government reportedly accounted for some decrease in oil and gas revenue as part of Russia's upcoming national budget, although the EU oil cap and shadow fleet sanctions will likely further degrade Russian oil revenues beyond what the Kremlin previously expected.[3] The EU measures target both Russia’s current ability to sell oil at advantageous pricing and undermines Russia's long-term ability to sell oil to Europe. The EU noted that oil revenues constitute one-third of Russia’s overall revenue, and that recent declines in Russia’s oil revenues in combination with a decrease in market earning potential poses a risk to the Russian federal budget.

The EU's new sanctions target Russia’s ability to engage with international markets. The EU fully banned EU-based specialized financial messaging services from conducting transactions with 22 Russian banks, in addition to the 23 previously sanctioned Russian banks already subject to the ban.[4] The European Union lowered the threshold for sanctioning third-country financial, credit, and crypto-asset service providers that are connected to the Russian Central Bank’s System for Transfer of Financial Messages (SPFS) or generally supporting Russian sanctions evasion schemes. The EU banned any transaction with the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), its sub-funds and companies, and any companies investing in or owned by the RDIF. The EU also banned the sale, supply, transfer, and export of software management systems and banking and financial sector software to Russia. The EU sanctions target an existing vulnerability within the Russian banking and financial sector, decreasing Russia’s ability to maintain a strong presence in international trade and diversify its economy.

The EU's new sanctions package also targets actors directly supporting Russian military capabilities. The EU sanctioned three entities based in the People's Republic of China (PRC) and eight companies operating in Belarus that sell goods to the Russian military.[5] The EU also imposed a full transaction ban on Belarusian specialized financial messaging services and embargoed arms imports from Belarus. The EU tightened export restrictions on 26 entities involved in dual-use goods and technologies, including 11 entities in third countries other than Russia. The EU approved over 2.5 billion euros worth of other export bans on items that could support Russia's war effort, including computer numerical control machines and chemicals for propellants. The EU also sanctioned several individuals involved in indoctrinating Ukrainian children, crimes in occupied Ukraine, and spreading Russian propaganda.

Russian officials continued to falsely claim that sanctions do not have an impact on the Russian economy in response to the EU's new sanctions package. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that the EU's new sanctions package is illegal, that Russia has already gained immunity and adapted to life under restrictive measures, and that Russia will analyze the effects of the new package and minimize their effects.[6] Peskov added that each new sanctions package disadvantages those who authorized it. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev responded to the EU’s newest sanctions by claiming that the package will not change Russia’s position and that the Russian economy will survive and Russia will continue to fight Ukrainian forces.[7] Medvedev threatened to target Kyiv City and other Ukrainian cities with increasing force in response to the EU’s sanctions package. Medvedev claimed that Russia must learn to “hate” the EU and its “Russophobia” as much as Russia's ancestors did and that “how this ends for Europe is known.” CEO of the RDIF and Presidential Special Representative for Investment and Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries, Kirill Dmitriev, claimed that the EU’s newest sanctions package is hurting Europe more than Russia and limiting European energy supply by closing Russian markets to European companies.[8] Head of the Russian State Duma Committee on Financial Markets Anatoly Aksakov claimed that the new EU sanctions on Russia’s financial system are just a fluctuation in the air, as Russian banks have already been under restrictions from the EU.[9]

Select Russian officials are acknowledging the impact of sanctions on the Russian economy despite the Kremlin's efforts to disguise and dismiss such impacts. The Moscow Times reported on July 17 that Russian Energy Minister Sergei Tsivilev recently told the Russian Federation Council that Russian oil companies are struggling to procure parts to repair refineries due to Western sanctions.[10] Russian Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina notably stated at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) on June 19 that Russia has exhausted many of its “free resources“ since the start of Russia‘s full-scale war against Ukraine and needs to think of a new growth model.[11] Russia's Minister of Economic Development, Maxim Reshetnikov, stated at SPIEF that Russia is on the "brink of recession."[12] Russia's ongoing sanctions evasion schemes, including via the PRC, are a key aspect of the Kremlin's strategy to offset Western sanctions and relieve pressure on the Russian economy. Russia has created a network of actors to circumvent Western sanctions and is reconfiguring its economic policy and business models to withstand sanctions in the long term, although more extensive Western sanctions will complicate this effort. The EU's newest sanctions are a positive step, but wider Western compliance and enforcement are necessary to inflict maximum economic pressure on Russia.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed former Defense Minister Rustem Umerov as Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council on July 18.[13] Umerov stated that he will oversee the coordination of arms deliveries, joint production efforts, and defense partnerships, as well as advance Ukraine's negotiation track with Russia.[14]

The Kremlin continues to advance its long-term censorship efforts to assert greater control over the Russian online information space. First Deputy Chairperson of the Russian State Duma Committee on Information Policy Anton Gorelkin warned on July 18 that the popular WhatsApp messenger should prepare to leave the Russian market, as it is "highly likely" that it will fall under restrictive measures.[15] Gorelkin added that the Kremlin-controlled messaging platform MAX will become a replacement for WhatsApp's users. Russian State Duma Information Policy Committee member Anton Nemkin opined that WhatsApp's presence in Russia's digital space constitutes a breach in national security and proposed that Russia consider Telegram as an alternative, while admitting that MAX is the primary choice for replacing WhatsApp.[16] Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported that WhatsApp is the most popular messenger in Russia, with roughly 84 million daily users, and that two sources close to the Russian Presidential Administration stated that Russian authorities are almost guaranteed to ban WhatsApp.[17] Another source close to the Presidential Administration told Meduza that Russian authorities are likely to tolerate Telegram as it hosts many Kremlin-affiliated channels and the Kremlin has been able to establish an entire information infrastructure. WhatsApp is owned by Meta, which the Kremlin has designated as an extremist organization.[18] Russian President Vladimir Putin recently ordered the government to impose additional restrictions on the use of software from "unfriendly countries."[19]

ISW previously noted that the Kremlin planned to designate MAX as its national messenger and that the Kremlin may attempt to ban Telegram and other social media connected to the Western world in the medium- to long-term if the rollout of the new national messenger application is successful.[20] The Kremlin will very likely continue to implement increasingly repressive measures that aim to insulate and censor Russian citizens and promote the Kremlin's war efforts.

Key Takeaways:

• The European Council of the European Union (EU) approved its 18th sanctions package on July 19, mainly targeting Russian oil revenues and sanctions evasion schemes.
• Russian officials continued to falsely claim that sanctions do not have an impact on the Russian economy in response to the EU's new sanctions package.
• Select Russian officials are acknowledging the impact of sanctions on the Russian economy despite the Kremlin's efforts to disguise and dismiss such impacts.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed former Defense Minister Rustem Umerov as Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council on July 18.
• The Kremlin continues to advance its long-term censorship efforts to assert greater control over the Russian online information space.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Pokrovsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 17, 2025

Russia’s Central Bank continues efforts to maintain the facade of domestic economic stability by pursuing economic policies that will likely exacerbate Russia’s economic instability. Bloomberg reported on July 17, citing the Russian Central Bank's June 2025 monthly report, that Russia’s seasonally adjusted annual rate (SAAR) of inflation decreased to four percent in June 2025, in line with Russia’s four percent target inflation rate.[1] Bloomberg assessed the decrease in the SAAR of inflation as the first indicator that the Central Bank’s efforts to lower the inflation rate have been successful. The Russian Central Bank report cautioned that the official annual inflation rate remains at nine percent, but assessed that if the current trajectory continues, the inflation rate could hit the target of four percent sometime in 2026. The SAAR is a short-term measurement, however, and its decrease is unlikely to positively impact the Russian economy in the long term. The Russian Central Bank reported that the cost of interest-bearing instruments — financial assets that generate interest — significantly decreased in June 2025, and that investors expect an average key interest rate below 18 percent between August 2025 and October 2025. The Russian Central Bank's report claimed that a strong Russian ruble significantly contributed to the SAAR decrease. A strong ruble increases Russia’s purchasing power on the global market, which in turn decreases the ruble cost of imported goods such as machinery and technology, lowering input costs (expenses to produce goods or services) and inflationary pressure (that increases the price of goods and services over time) on firms that rely on imported components. A strengthened ruble softens the blow of Western sanctions as it makes parallel imports cheaper and keeps substitutes affordable. ISW assesses that secondary sanctions will likely further impact the Russian economy by undercutting Russian oil revenues and cheaper imports using the strengthened ruble, both of which are essential for the Kremlin's financing of its war against Ukraine. The Russian Central Bank reported two potential complicating factors in lowering the interest rate: the eventual waning of effects from earlier bouts of ruble strengthening that helped slow price growth in June 2025, and the ongoing rise in the cost of services, despite a stabilization of the exchange rate and cost of goods sensitive to credit.

Russia's unsustainably high payments to soldiers and the impacts of the resulting domestic labor shortage will likely further destabilize the Russian economy, regardless of the Kremlin's claims of economic stability. Russia’s strategy of incentivizing volunteer recruitment by offering large one-time payments to recruits and simultaneous efforts to rapidly expand its defense industrial base (DIB) since 2022 has required Russia to significantly increase payments to both sustain military recruitment and to augment the DIB’s labor force.[2] Russia has had to significantly increase the federal and regional one-time bonuses to incentivize Russians to sign military contracts rather than take other jobs, given high Russian casualty rates.[3] Competition between Russia’s DIB and civilian enterprises is raising the average salary for these positions and is raising prices in service industries writ large. These factors, coupled with labor shortages in the civilian and defense sectors, are likely contributing to the divergence between the cost of goods and services in the Central Bank’s report by limiting Russian economic growth, force generation efforts, and defense industrial production. ISW continues to assess that Russia cannot indefinitely replace its forces at the current casualty rate without an involuntary reserve mobilization, which Russian President Vladimir Putin has shown great reluctance to order, nor can it sustain increasingly high payments to recruits, which the Russian economy cannot afford.[4] Russia is effectively burning the candle at both ends by simultaneously loosening monetary policy to stimulate short-term growth, while expanding fiscal expenditure to feed the military effort. This strategy will likely adversely affect the Russian economy by weakening consumer purchasing power, devaluing the ruble in the medium- to long-term, and creating deeper macroeconomic instability.

Russian bankers are reportedly privately expressing concerns over a growing number of non-performing (late and unpaid) loans despite the Russian Central Bank's claims of economic stability. Bloomberg reported on July 17 that unspecified top executives at "some of Russia’s largest banks" have privately discussed seeking a state-funded bailout if the level of non-performing loans on their books continues to grow through 2025.[5] Bloomberg reported that it reviewed documents that indicate that three of Russia’s systemically important lenders (financial institutions whose potential failure could disrupt the broader financial system and economy) may need to recover funds lost from the non-performing loans. Bloomberg reported that non-performing loans issued by Russian banks have grown by 1.2 percent in 2025 and could rise to six or seven percent from their current rate of four percent by 2026. ISW is unable to independently verify Bloomberg's report about these unspecified large Russian banks and lenders, but has observed indications that Russian officials are growing concerned about economic stability in the wake of Russian Central Bank policy changes. Russian Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina previously downplayed the risk of systemic economic crisis, claiming that the Russian banking system has capital reserves of eight trillion rubles (about $102.5 billion).[6] Bloomberg reported that the Russian Central Bank has advised lenders to focus on restructuring credit with the borrowers and absorbing the bad loans, reflective of Russia’s risky and contradictory economic policies, rather than recognizing the full extent of sourcing loans.[7] The Russian Central Bank is therefore likely disinterested in bailing out Russian major banks - an action that could cause liquidity problems and, in the worst case, cause bank failure. Any failure of a major Russian bank would undercut Russian President Vladimir Putin’s long-standing narrative that neither the war in Ukraine nor Western sanctions are hurting the Russian economy.[8]

Reports that Ukrainian forces targeted Moscow City and St. Petersburg overnight on July 16 and 17 are likely overreacting to standard Russian statements about Ukraine's longstanding deep strike campaign aimed at degrading Russia's defense industrial base (DIB). The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces downed two Ukrainian long-range Neptune missiles and 308 aircraft-type drones overnight on July 16 to 17 over Bryansk, Orlov, Belgorod, Lipetsk, Oryol, Kursk, Smolensk, Voronezh, Moscow, Kaluga, Leningrad, and Tula oblasts.[9] Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin claimed that Russian forces downed three drones flying toward Moscow City, and Leningrad Oblast Governor Alexander Drozdenko claimed that Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems downed two drones over Kirovsky Raion.[10]

Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian DIB assets in areas around Moscow and St. Petersburg, including Smolensk and Tula oblasts, may be mischaracterized as targeting St. Petersburg and Moscow Oblast, respectively, due to their geographical proximity and the direction of flight. Tula Oblast Governor Dmitry Milyaev claimed that Russian forces downed seven drones over Tula Oblast.[11] Russian opposition outlet Astra and Ukrainian Center for Combatting Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported that the Shchekinoazot United Chemical Plant in Pervomaysky, Tula Oblast, suspended operations after at least four drones struck the facility and caused a fire.[12] Kovalenko noted that the chemical plant manufactures industrial chemical products, including ammonia, methanol, and urea, that support the production of explosives, solid rocket fuel, and synthetic materials.[13] Smolensk Oblast Governor Vasily Anokhin claimed on July 17 that Russian forces downed 14 drones in Smolensk Oblast.[14] Astra reported on July 17 that a drone may have struck Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec's 720th Flight Support Equipment Repair Plant in Roslavl, Smolensk Oblast.[15] It is unlikely that Ukrainian drones struck targets in either Moscow or Leningrad oblasts, given the lack of footage and Russian and Ukrainian official reporting that ISW typically observes accompanying successful strikes against Russian DIB assets, particularly those in or near major cities such as Moscow and St Petersburg. Ukrainian drone strikes in the direction of or against Moscow and Leningrad oblasts do not represent an inflection in Ukraine's long-range strike campaign, as Ukrainian forces regularly conduct strikes against legitimate military and DIB targets in these oblasts and oblasts between the Ukrainian border and Moscow and St. Petersburg cities. Ukraine's strike campaign differs from Russia's in that Ukrainian forces chiefly target legitimate military targets and avoid incurring disproportionate civilian casualties, whereas Russian strike packages are designed to maximize damage to civilian areas. The Kremlin previously employed an informational campaign that leveraged unsubstantiated claims of Ukrainian strikes to discredit Ukraine during temporary ceasefire periods and may recycle this campaign in an attempt to influence Western policy discussions regarding support for Ukraine.[16]

Ukraine and Russia conducted another exchange of the bodies of soldiers killed in action (KIA) on July 17, in accordance with agreements reached during negotiations in Istanbul on June 2. The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War (POWs) reported that Russia released the bodies of 1,000 deceased Ukrainian soldiers and that Ukrainian authorities will examine and identify the bodies.[17] Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky stated that Ukraine released the bodies of 19 deceased Russian soldiers.[18] Kremlin newswires TASS and RIA Novosti claimed that a source close to the Russian negotiation team reported that Russia is prepared to exchange the bodies of 3,000 deceased Ukrainian soldiers in accordance with Russian President Vladimir Putin's previous statement and that the July 17 exchange is the first exchange involving these 3,000 bodies.[19] ISW has previously observed Ukrainian reports that Russian authorities included the bodies of Russian soldiers KIA in previous KIA exchanges, likely to artificially inflate the number of bodies Russia claims to return to Ukraine and undermine the efficacy of this confidence-building measure.[20]

The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada approved the appointment of former Ukrainian Minister of Economy Yulia Svyrydenko as Ukraine's new prime minister, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed former Justice Minister Olha Stefanishyna as a special representative to the United States. The Rada supported Svyrydenko's new Cabinet of Ministers on July 17, including former Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal as defense minister; former Digital Transformation Minister Mykhailo Fedorov as first deputy prime minister; former Deputy Minister of Economics Tara Kachka as the deputy prime minister for European integration; former Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko as the justice minister; former Environmental Protection and Natural Resources Minister Svitlana Hrynchuk as the energy minister, and former First Deputy Minister of Economy Oleksiy Sobolev as the minister of economy.[21] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha and Internal Affairs Minister Ihor Klymenko remain in their positions. Zelensky appointed Stefanishyna as the Ukrainian presidential special representative for the development of cooperation with the United States.[22]

 Key Takeaways:

• Russia’s Central Bank continues to posture Russian economic stability and growth to maintain the facade of economic stability by pursuing economic policies that will likely exacerbate Russia’s economic instability.
• Russia's unsustainably high payments to soldiers and impacts of the resulting domestic labor shortage will likely further destabilize the Russian economy, regardless of the Kremlin's efforts to posture stability.
• Russian bankers are reportedly privately expressing concerns over a growing number of non-performing loans despite the Russian Central Bank's claims of economic stability.
• Reports that Ukrainian forces targeted Moscow City and St. Petersburg overnight on July 16 and 17 are likely overreacting to standard Russian statements about Ukraine's longstanding deep strike campaign aimed at degrading Russia's defense industrial base (DIB).
• Ukraine and Russia conducted another exchange of the bodies of soldiers killed in action (KIA) on July 17, in accordance with agreements reached during negotiations in Istanbul on June 2.
• The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada approved the appointment of former Ukrainian Minister of Economy Yulia Svyrydenko as Ukraine's new prime minister, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed former Justice Minister Olha Stefanishyna as a special representative to the United States.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Borova.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 16, 2025

The Kremlin is recycling several longstanding informational narratives, including nuclear threats, in a renewed effort to break the United States away from Ukraine and the NATO alliance. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov reaffirmed on July 16 that all provisions of Russia's nuclear doctrine, including the responsibility of nuclear countries to not "incite" non-nuclear states, remain in effect and that nuclear states must "answer" for "inciting" non-nuclear states.[1] Russia updated its nuclear doctrine in Fall 2024 to include a clause stipulating that Russia will consider aggression against it by a non-nuclear state with the support or participation of a nuclear power as a joint attack on Russia, likely in an effort to deter Western support for Ukraine during critical Western policy discussions in late 2024.[2] Peskov claimed that "Europeans maintain a rabid militaristic attitude towards Moscow" in response to a question regarding the US President Donald Trump-led effort to provide increased military aid to Ukraine via NATO member states.[3] Peskov also called on the international community to pressure Ukraine into bilateral negotiations with Russia ­­­­­­­­­­— a reversal of Western calls to pressure Russia into meaningful bilateral negotiations to end the war — likely to falsely portray Russia as willing to negotiate while undermining Ukraine's credibility.[4] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on July 15 that Russia's war in Ukraine is aimed at eliminating "the threats that NATO has created" on Russia's borders.[5] The Kremlin is employing the same rhetorical lines that it has continuously used throughout the war to deter Western support for Ukraine, but has shifted its objective from preventing new support for Ukraine to reversing recent support and breaking the United States away from its transatlantic allies, likely in response to President Trump‘s recent demonstration of the United States' reinvigorated commitment to arming Ukraine and supporting NATO. Trump reaffirmed in late June 2025 that the United States will uphold NATO's Article 5 collective defense clause and recently demanded that Russia agree to a ceasefire agreement by September 2 or risk stringent US secondary tariffs.[6] The Kremlin is prioritizing informational campaigns aimed at undermining NATO unity and stoking discontent between the United States and its European allies in order to degrade Ukraine's defense capabilities and achieve its longstanding war aims that amount to Ukraine's capitulation.

Western officials provided additional details about the new US-led effort to arm Ukraine. US President Donald Trump responded on July 15 to a question about when the first Patriot air defense systems will arrive in Ukraine as part of this effort.[7] Trump stated that the US Patriot missile systems are “already being shipped” to Ukraine from Germany and that NATO member states will pay for “everything,” referring to future US military deliveries to Ukraine. Unspecified US officials told the New York Times (NYT) on July 15 that nearly all weapons that NATO member states are expected to purchase for Ukraine from the United States — including Patriot air defense systems, unspecified missiles, and ammunition —  are ”immediately available” to send to Ukraine.[8] An unnamed NATO representative told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne that the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) fund will coordinate NATO purchases of US weapons for Ukraine.[9] The representative also stated that Germany, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Finland have confirmed participation in this US-led effort, in addition to these states' existing commitments to the NSATU fund, the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein format), and various bilateral and multilateral agreements with Ukraine.

Russian forces conducted a large series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on July 15 to 16, heavily targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile from occupied Crimea and 400 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk and Kursk cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea on the night of July 15 and 16.[10] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 198 Shahed-type drones and that 145 decoy drones were "lost" or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that the Russian strike package largely targeted Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; Kharkiv Oblast; and Vinnytsia City, Vinnystia Oblast, and Ukrainian officials reported that the strikes also damaged civilian, industrial, and energy infrastructure in Mykolaiv and Odesa oblasts.[11] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that the Russian strikes mainly damaged energy infrastructure and that authorities were working to restore power to Kryvyi Rih.[12] Dnipropetrovsk Oblast officials and Ukraine's Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile each against both Kryvyi Rih and Odesa Oblast.[13] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces only launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile overnight, and Odesa Oblast officials did not report a ballistic missile strike in the oblast, so it is unclear whether Russian forces launched two ballistic missiles overnight.[14] Ukrainian Center for Combatting Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported that Russian forces continue targeting Ukrainian cities with large drone swarms.[15]

The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada (parliament) accepted the resignation of Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal on July 16, dissolving the current Ukrainian government. Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Deputy Oleksiy Honcharenko reported that the Verkhovna Rada will vote on the composition of the new government on July 17.[16] Zelensky announced that he nominated Shmyhal to be the new Ukrainian defense minister and subordinated the Ministry of Strategic Industries to the Ministry of Defense (MoD).[17]

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin is recycling several longstanding informational narratives, including nuclear threats, in a renewed effort to break the United States away from Ukraine and the NATO alliance.
• Western officials provided additional details about the new US-led effort to arm Ukraine.
• Russian forces conducted a large series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on July 15 to 16, heavily targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure.
• The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada (parliament) accepted the resignation of Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal on July 16, dissolving the current Ukrainian government.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and near Borova, Lyman, and Novopavlivka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 15, 2025

Kremlin officials dismissed US President Donald Trump's demand that Russia agree to a ceasefire agreement in Ukraine within 50 days while promoting claims that Russia can withstand economic pressure and remains committed to achieving its war aims. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov told Kremlin newswire TASS on July 15 that Russia views any attempt to make demands of Russia, "especially ultimatums," as "unacceptable."[1] Ryabkov noted that Russia is ready to negotiate and prefers a diplomatic solution to its war in Ukraine, but will continue to pursue its war aims militarily if the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) do not take Russia's demands seriously. Ryabkov stated that Russia's position is "unshakable." Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov echoed Ryabkov's statements, claiming that Russia is ready to participate in a third round of Ukraine-Russia bilateral negotiations but blamed Ukraine for the lack of progress towards the next round of talks.[2] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev posted on his English-language X (formerly Twitter) account, claiming that "Russia didn't care" about Trump's "ultimatum."[3] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov expressed confidence that Russia will be able to cope with US tariffs, as Russia is already "coping" with prior sanctions.[4] A Just Russia Party Leader and Duma Deputy, Sergei Mironov, claimed that potential tariffs will not affect the course or goals of Russia's war in Ukraine.[5] Russian President Vladimir Putin has yet to officially respond to Trump and is likely attempting to identify which narratives could convince Trump not to follow through with secondary tariffs in early September 2025.

Russian President Vladimir Putin's theory of victory continues to drive his unwillingness to compromise on his pre-war demand for Ukraine's capitulation. Reuters, citing three unspecified sources close to the Kremlin, reported on July 15 that Putin intends to continue the war in Ukraine until the West concedes to his demands, is unfazed by US President Donald Trump's threats of secondary tariffs, and may expand his territorial demands as Russian forces continue their advances on the battlefield.[6] Reuters' sources noted that Putin is resolved to continue his war, as he believes Russia can endure any further economic hardship that the West imposes. One source told Reuters that Putin believes that none of Russia's diplomatic engagements thus far have included detailed discussions on a peace plan for Ukraine, so Putin "will continue until he gets what he wants." The sources told Reuters that Putin's demands for a potential settlement are the same as his demands from 2021 and at the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022 - demands that the Kremlin has repeatedly cited throughout over three years of war.[7] ISW continues to assess that Putin holds a theory of victory that posits that Russia can achieve its war aims by continuing to make creeping gains on the battlefield indefinitely and outlasting Western support for Ukraine and Ukraine's ability to defend itself.[8] Western economic pressure, combined with sustained Western military support to Ukraine, is necessary to enable Ukrainian forces to inflict battlefield losses on Russia to force Putin to reassess his calculation and engage substantively in peace negotiations to end the war.[9]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced new appointments within the Ukrainian government. On July 14, Zelensky announced that he nominated current Economic Minister Yulia Svyrydenko as prime minister and noted that Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal's robust experience would be well suited for the role of defense minister.[10] Shmyhal later resigned from his position as prime minister on July 15.[11] Zelensky has yet to formalize these reassignments with an official decree as of this writing.

 Key Takeaways:

• Kremlin officials dismissed US President Donald Trump's demand that Russia agree to a ceasefire agreement in Ukraine within 50 days while promoting claims that Russia can withstand economic pressure and remains committed to achieving its war aims.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin's theory of victory continues to drive his unwillingness to compromise on his pre-war demand for Ukraine's capitulation.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced new appointments within the Ukrainian government.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Borova, and Toretsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 14, 2025

US President Donald Trump announced large-scale and rapid military aid supplies to Ukraine via the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and possible future secondary tariffs against Russia. Trump stated on July 14 during a meeting with NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte that the United States will impose "severe" 100 percent secondary tariffs on Russia's trade partners if there is no peace settlement to end Russia's war in Ukraine within 50 days.[i] Trump also announced that the United States will send "billions of dollars' worth" of military equipment and weapons to NATO, that NATO will pay for the US weapons, and that NATO will "quickly distribute" these weapons to Ukrainian forces. Rutte stated that NATO will supply Ukraine with "massive" amounts of military equipment, including air defenses, missiles, and ammunition. Trump answered a question about whether the United States was providing Patriot air defense batteries or just missiles, stating that the United States will send "everything…a full complement with the batteries." Trump stated that some Patriot systems will arrive in Ukraine "within days" as unspecified NATO states give Ukraine their own Patriot systems, after which the United States will replace those systems. Trump stated that an unspecified state has "17 Patriots ready to be shipped" and that a "big portion of the 17 will go to the war zone" in Ukraine "very quickly." It is unclear if Trump was referring to 17 Patriot launchers or batteries.

Trump is acting upon the reality that successful US efforts to bring Russian President Vladimir Putin to the negotiating table require that economic instruments be coupled with Western military support to allow Ukraine to increase pressure on Russia on the battlefield. Trump stated that the Russian economy is doing "very poorly" and that Russia is using its assets for war, not trade.[ii] Trump stated that Russia is wasting money and people on its war. Rutte stated that Russian forces have suffered 100,000 deaths since January 1, 2025. ISW continues to assess that Russia's battlefield losses are the key driver of Russia's economic woes as Russia suffers from the consequences of increased and unsustainable war spending, growing inflation, significant labor shortages, and reductions in Russia's sovereign wealth fund.[iii] Increased pressure on Russian forces on the battlefield would risk Putin's efforts to balance butter and guns and could force Putin to face hard choices sooner than he would like. Forcing Putin either to make unpopular decisions or to face a scenario in which Russia cannot continue the war at the current tempo could bring Putin to the negotiating table, ready to offer concessions to end the war on terms acceptable to Ukraine and the United States.

Trump noted that Russia has been delaying negotiations to end the war and that the recent intensification of Russia's overnight drone and missile strikes demonstrates that Russia is not interested in peace – in line with ISW's longstanding assessment of Kremlin intentions. Trump stated that he is "disappointed" in Putin and that Trump has thought that a peace settlement was close "about four times."[iv] Trump noted that Russian strikes are hitting residences in Ukrainian cities and that it will take Ukraine "years" to rebuild its damaged energy infrastructure. Trump stated that Russian strikes against Ukrainian cities show that Russia's "talk does not mean anything" and that the United States needs to see actions and results, not just "talk." Rutte added that the recent intensification of Russia's overnight drone and missile strikes is not aimed at pursuing military goals but trying to create panic in Ukraine. ISW has repeatedly assessed in recent months that the Kremlin was pursuing various methods as part of wider efforts to delay the negotiation process and prolong the war in order to secure additional territorial gains on the battlefield.[v]

Trump said that European security benefits US interests and noted that Europe is committed to helping Ukraine defend itself. Trump stated that "having a strong Europe is a very good thing" and that Europe thinks supporting Ukraine is important.[vi] Rutte stated that Trump's July 14 announcements are building on the June 2025 NATO summit in The Hague, in which NATO decided to "keep Ukraine strong" and increase Europe's defense industrial production. The joint declaration from the NATO summit highlighted that Ukraine's security contributes to NATO's security.[vii] Axios on July 13 cited a source stating that Trump told French President Emmanuel Macron following the call that Putin "wants to take all of [Ukraine]."[viii] ISW continues to assess that a Russian victory in the war that results in the conquest of all of Ukraine would bring combat experienced Russian forces up to NATO's borders from the Black Sea to the Arctic Ocean such that the United States would need to move large numbers of US forces and commit a significant proportion of its fleet of stealth aircraft to Europe.[ix]

Additional US military aid to Ukrainian forces will arrive at a dynamic, not static, frontline characterized by ongoing Russian offensive operations aimed at achieving slow maneuver and by Ukrainian counterattacks in key frontline areas. Russian forces intensified offensive operations throughout the theater in February and March 2025 and have maintained pressure along the entire frontline over the last six months. Russian forces have established or are actively establishing at least eight salients that Russian forces could leverage in mutually reinforcing tactical- and operational-level envelopments along the frontline. Recent Russian attacks in the Velykyi Burluk direction indicate that the Russian military command intends to create a salient from which Russian forces can threaten Ukrainian forces in the rear of the Vovchansk and northern Kupyansk directions.[x] Russian forces have also developed salients aimed at forcing Ukrainian troops to withdraw from frontline towns and settlements under threat of envelopment in the Kupyansk, Borova, Lyman, Siversk, Kostyantynivka, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka directions over the last year. ISW assessed in late January 2025 that Russian forces were developing and disseminating a doctrinal method of advance throughout the theater that aims to conduct slow envelopments of frontline settlements at a scale that is reasonable for Russian forces to conclude before culminating, and Russian patterns of advance over the last six months are consistent with this assessment.[xi] The Russian military command's apparent decision to bypass the Ukrainian fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast and attempts at a multi-year operation to envelop the southern half of the fortress belt further underscores Russia's commitment to this new doctrinal method.[xii]

Russian forces' ability to advance deep enough into Ukraine's defenses to establish these salients indicates that the Russian military command has improved its ability to seize on opportunities to advance, but the rate of Russian advances has not increased beyond foot pace. The Russian military command appears to have improved its ability and increased its willingness to plan and conduct multi-year operational-level efforts. Russian forces have been pursuing the envelopment of Kupyansk since at least January 2024, although Russian forces did not make notable advances towards this goal until July 2024.[xiii] Russian forces have thus been pursuing the envelopment of Kupyansk for at least 18 months and have advanced roughly 454 square kilometers since July 1, 2024 (roughly 1.2 square kilometers per day over the last year). Russian forces have also aimed to push Ukrainian forces from the east (left) bank of the Oskil River in the Borova and Lyman directions since late 2023 or early 2024 and only began making significant advances north of Lyman in early January 2025.[xiv] Russian forces have advanced roughly 15 to 17 kilometers west of the Zherebets River over the last six months as part of efforts to establish the Russian salient north of Lyman. Russian forces renewed offensive operations in the Toretsk area in mid-June 2024 and have focused on expanding their salient south and southwest of Kostyantynivka over the last nine months. Russian efforts south and southwest of Kostyantynivka also reinforce and have coincided with the ongoing Russian effort to envelop Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. Russian forces have advanced roughly 617 square kilometers in the Kostyantynivka direction and roughly 1,394 square kilometers in the Pokrovsk direction since November 1, 2024 - an average of 2.4 square kilometers and 5.5 square kilometers per day for the last nine months, respectively. The renewed Russian offensive in Toretsk in June 2024 also coincided with intensified Russian mechanized activity and armor usage throughout western Donetsk Oblast in summer and fall 2024. Russian forces have since leveraged several envelopments to seize Vuhledar, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka and are currently establishing the southern and eastern flanks of a future Russian effort to envelop Novopavlivka. Russian forces have advanced roughly 1,057 square kilometers in western Donetsk Oblast since January 2, 2025, or an average of 5.5 square kilometers per day for the last seven months.          

ISW previously assessed that Russian forces have advanced at a rate of roughly 14 to 15 square kilometers per day over the past six months, indicating that Russian gains are spread across the frontline and not concentrated in a single frontline area.[xv] Russian forces have largely relied on infantry to advance in Ukraine since Russia's initial push at the start of its full-scale invasion, and Russian forces have failed to restore their ability to conduct the kind of mechanized maneuver that would enable more rapid Russian gains. Three and a half years of war have only further degraded Russia's ability to conduct armored assaults, due in part to significant Russian armored vehicle losses in 2023 and early 2024 and the loss of the more elite, well-trained servicemembers that comprised Russia's pre-war professional military cadre. Russian forces have thus far been able to offset the personnel losses they incur during these advances, although high Russian casualty rates are perpetuating a cycle of loss that further incentivizes Russia to rely on poorly trained and equipped infantry to make advances. This cycle, in turn, is limiting Russia's rate of advance in Ukraine.

Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast near Hulyaipole – the first tactically significant activity in this area of the frontline since the Summer 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive. Geolocated footage published on July 14 indicates that elements of the Russian 1466th Motorized Rifle Regiment and the 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (both subordinated to the 127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) recently seized Malynivka (west of Hulyaipole).[xvi] Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov and a Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) also participated in the seizure.[xvii] Russian forces intensified activity in the Hulyaipole direction in early May 2025 and advanced into Malynivka in late June.[xviii]

The Russian military command likely intends to seize on recent advances in western Donetsk Oblast in order to advance westward into Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia oblasts. Russian forces made a series of tactically significant advances along the H-15 Kurakhove-Zaporizhzhia City highway in mid-June 2025, especially southeast of Novopavlivka near Bahatyr and Odradne and south of Novopavlivka near Komar.[xix] Russian forces have gradually advanced further west from Bahatyr and north from Komar over the last month and advanced roughly 20 kilometers from Bahatyr to Novokhatske (southwest of Novopavlivka) between June 14 and July 14, or about 670 meters a day on average in the past month.[xx] Geolocated evidence indicates that Russian forces have made marginal advances into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast in the direction of Novopavlivka, but Russian forces have mainly concentrated their advances westward toward Velykomykhailivka and Havrylivka (both southwest of Novopavlivka).[xxi] The Russian military command also recently redeployed elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) and the "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies from the Kursk direction to western Donetsk Oblast, indicating that the Russian military command is taking some steps to reinforce the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces, possibly ahead of a future push into southern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[xxii] The Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces currently oversees the frontline from the Novopavlivka through the eastern Zaporizhia direction and would likely command the forces involved in a Russian offensive into southern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.

Russian forces may leverage advances in western Donetsk Oblast to launch an offensive operation toward Pokrovske, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, in pursuit of Russia's long-standing desire to seize Zaporizhzhia City. Russian forces have established a wide and mostly level frontline in the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk-Zaporizhia oblast border area that spans from Malynivka (east of Hulyaipole) to Zelenyi Hai (southwest of Novopavlivka) from which Russian forces could attack toward Hulyaipole, Velykomykhailivka, and Havrylivka. The Russian military command may intend to attack westward through Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia oblasts if Russian commanders assess that most of Ukraine's frontline defensive fortifications are oriented east to west against attacks from the south, rather than north to south against attacks from the east. Russian forces may attempt to leverage the H-15 Kurakhove-Zaporizhzhia City highway to make rapid advances and establish convenient supply routes from occupied Donetsk City. Russian forces advancing westward from Zelenyi Hai will have to ford several rivers, including the Haichur, Solona, Verkhnya Tersa, and Vovcha rivers.[xxiii] Russian forces will also need to cross the T-0408 Preobrazhenka-Novomykolaivka and T-0401 Pokrovske-Hulyaipole highways and seize several towns whose pre-war populations are comparable to that of Chasiv Yar, which Russian forces have still yet to seize despite ongoing offensive efforts since May 2024.[xxiv] Russian forces are extremely unlikely to advance rapidly across the roughly 150 kilometers from their current positions in Novokhatske to Zaporizhzhia City given the current rate of Russian advances, and Russian forces would likely have to engage in a multi-year-long offensive effort to advance to Zaporizhzhia City from the west. Russian forces will likely also attempt to advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City from Kamyanske (roughly 35 kilometers south of Zaporizhzhia City) but will likely face significant Ukrainian defenses. Russian forces will also likely struggle to seize Zaporizhzhia City due to the city’s size and near certainty that Ukrainian forces will seriously defend the regional capital. Russian forces have not taken a city this size since the initial push at the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in early 2022. This assessment provides one possible avenue the Russian military command may take to achieve its reported objective to seize significant areas of southern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and the remainder of Zaporizhia Oblast in 2026.[xxv]

Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in key areas of the front to slow Russian advances and are inflicting significant costs on the Russian military, however. Ukrainian forces conducted a series of limited counterattacks into advancing Russian forces in the Kostyantynivka and Pokrovsk directions in February and March 2025, which forced Russian units to regroup and slowed Russian advances in these areas.[xxvi] Ongoing successful Ukrainian counterattacks and defensive operations in the Kostyantynivka and Pokrovsk directions appear to have forced the Russian military command to reevaluate its plan for attacking Kostyantynivka, prompting the recent prioritizing of Russian advances that bypass the Ukrainian fortress belt from the southwest. Ukrainian forces are also successfully counterattacking in the Kupyansk, Lyman, and Siversk directions and have retaken limited positions in these directions in recent days.[xxvii] Ukrainian forces reportedly enveloped some Russian positions in northern Sumy Oblast because of recent counterattacks.[xxviii]

Ukraine's drone-based defense remains a key feature of Ukraine's ability to constrain Russian advances. Ukrainian drone operators have created a 15-to-20 kilometer kill zone along the frontline that is currently helping prevent rapid Russian advances and inflicting significant manpower and materiel losses on Russia. The Economist recently assessed that Russia has suffered between 900,000 and 1.3 million personnel casualties since February 24, 2022, including between 190,000 and 350,000 killed-in-action (KIA), and Ukrainian drone operators have inflicted a significant number of these losses.[xxix] Russian adaptations aimed at countering Ukrainian drones, including intensified usage of motorcycles, are likely also contributing to increased KIA to wounded-in-action (WIA) ratios in Russian units, as Russian forces attacking on motorcycles are poorly protected from drones.[xxx] Ukrainian counterattacks and drone operators have thus far succeeded in keeping Russian advances to a slow crawl, although the Kremlin thus far appears willing to accept these high costs for further gains.

Forcing Putin to abandon his current theory of victory and agree to end the war on reasonable terms requires Ukrainian forces to stop Russian advances and begin to retake operationally significant areas. Western aid provided in support of this effort is essential to hastening an end to the war. Ukrainian forces have been successful in holding Russian advances along the frontline to a foot pace while inflicting significant casualties on Russian forces. Putin has demonstrated throughout the past year, however, that he believes in a theory of victory that posits that indefinite Russian gains – no matter how slow or how costly – will allow Russia to achieve his goals in Ukraine.[xxxi] Putin's theory assumes that the Russia can outlast and overcome Western military assistance to Ukraine and that Ukrainian forces will be unable to liberate any significant territory that Russian forces seize. Putin is operating under the assumption that Ukraine will not be able to acquire and sustain the manpower and materiel required to prevent creeping but indefinite Russian advances or to contest the initiative and conduct counteroffensive operations at some scale to liberate territory. Western military aid to Ukraine's ground forces is required to enable Ukrainian forces to stop Russian advances and then push Russian forces back in critical areas. Such successes will invalidate Putin's assumptions that Russian forces can continue gradual advances indefinitely and that Russian forces will be able to hold any territory they seize. Only significant Ukrainian battlefield gains will prompt changes in his calculus and force Putin to discard his efforts to prolong the war, come to the negotiating table, and agree to a peace settlement on acceptable terms to bring about Trump's desired just and lasting end to the war.

Timely and reliable Western military assistance to Ukraine coupled with increased economic pressure is necessary to bring about an end of the war on terms satisfactory for the United States, Europe, and Ukraine. Well-provisioned Ukrainian forces have previously demonstrated their ability to prevent Russian forces from making even marginal gains and to retake significant territory despite Russian manpower and materiel advantages.[xxxii] Western military aid to Ukraine will enable Ukrainian forces to maintain, if not increase, their ability to inflict the significant materiel and personnel losses on the battlefield that are straining Russia's economy. Western provisions of air defense systems to Ukraine will protect Ukraine's people and enable Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) to flourish and increasingly meet Ukraine's long-term national security needs. Ukraine's DIB has proven critical for maintaining Ukraine's drone-based defenses that are limiting Russian forces to creeping advances at high costs, and the West will continue to benefit from Ukrainian innovations and industrial capacity in the long-term. Economic pressure, in the form of both Western sanctions and enduring labor shortages and demographic issues brought on by losses in Ukraine, will further strain the Russian economy and reduce the funds available to Moscow for its protracted war effort.

Putin remains committed to his original war aims over 1,200 days into his full-scale invasion and is trying to avoid making concessions at any cost, including those that would risk the long-term security of the Russian state and the stability of Putin's regime.[xxxiii] Putin is deliberately protracting the war in Ukraine, believing that time is on Russia's side. Putin has chosen not to enact socially unpopular policies that would boost Russia's war effort in a sustainable way and continues to bet that the West will abandon Ukraine long before he must. The Trump administration has set the stage to seize on this critical moment, via both military aid to Ukraine and expanded economic pressure on Russia, to exploit Russia's weaknesses and negotiate a deal that maximizes US, European, and Ukrainian interests.

Key Takeaways:

• US President Donald Trump announced largescale and rapid military aid supplies to Ukraine via NATO and possible future secondary tariffs against Russia.
• Trump is acting upon the reality that successful US efforts to bring Russian President Vladimir Putin to the negotiating table require that economic instruments be coupled with Western military support to allow Ukraine to increase pressure on Russia on the battlefield.
• Trump noted that Russia has been delaying negotiations to end the war and that the recent intensification of Russia's overnight drone and missile strikes demonstrates that Russia is not interested in peace – in line with ISW's longstanding assessment of Kremlin intentions.
• Trump said that European security benefits US interests and noted that Europe is committed to helping Ukraine defend itself.
• Additional US military aid to Ukrainian forces will arrive at a dynamic, not static, frontline characterized by ongoing Russian offensive operations aimed at achieving slow maneuver and by Ukrainian counterattacks in key frontline areas.
• Russian forces' ability to advance deep enough into Ukraine's defenses to establish these salients indicates that the Russian military command has improved its ability to seize on opportunities to advance, but the rate of Russian advances has not increased beyond foot pace.
• Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast near Hulyaipole – the first tactically significant activity in this area of the frontline since the Summer 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive.
• The Russian military command likely intends to seize on recent advances in western Donetsk Oblast in order to advance westward into Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia oblasts.
• Russian forces may leverage advances in western Donetsk Oblast to launch an offensive operation toward Pokrovske, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, in pursuit of Russia's long-standing desire to seize Zaporizhzhia City.
• Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in key areas of the front to slow Russian advances and are inflicting significant costs on the Russian military, however.
• Forcing Putin to abandon his current theory of victory and agree to end the war on reasonable terms requires Ukrainian forces to stop Russian advances and begin to retake operationally significant areas. Western aid provided in support of this effort is essential to hastening an end to the war.
• Timely and reliable Western military assistance to Ukraine coupled with increased economic pressure is necessary to bring about an end of the war on terms satisfactory for the United States, Europe, and Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Lyman and Novopavlivka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy and Zaporizhia oblasts and near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Hulyaipole.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 13, 2025

A German official confirmed that Germany is interested in purchasing Patriot air defense systems from the United States on behalf of Ukraine. The head of the German Ministry of Defense's Planning and Command Staff, Major General Christian Freuding, announced on July 12 that German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius and US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth spoke several weeks ago about Germany's desire to purchase two Patriot air defense systems.[i] Freuding stated that US President Donald Trump and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz also spoke about the potential purchase in recent days and that Pistorius will travel to Washington, D.C. on July 14 for additional discussions. Freuding stated that Germany has opened a Patriot interceptor production line and that Germany will produce the first European-made Patriot interceptors in late 2026 or early 2027. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on July 10 announced Germany's willingness to purchase two Patriot air defense systems on Ukraine's behalf.[ii]

 Recent satellite imagery suggests that Russia is constructing protective structures at some of its air bases following Ukraine's Operation Spider Web on June 1. Ukraine-based open-source intelligence organization Frontelligence Insight reported that satellite imagery collected on July 7 shows that Russian forces have constructed roughly 10 reinforced bunkers with soil coverings, 12 concrete bunker-type structures without soil coverings, and eight hangar-style buildings on the aprons at Khalino Air Base in Kursk Oblast.[iii] Planet Labs satellite imagery collected on June 27 of Khalino Air Base also shows reinforced hangars, supporting Frontelligence's assessment. Frontelligence reported that satellite imagery collected on July 9 shows that Russian forces have constructed two concrete bunker-style structures at Saky Air Base in occupied Crimea, and Planet Labs satellite imagery collected on July 7 also shows concrete aircraft shelters.[iv] Frontelligence reported that satellite imagery collected on July 9 shows no construction efforts at Dzhankoi Air Base in occupied Crimea, however. Frontelligence reported that recent satellite imagery shows bomber wreckage still present at Belaya Air Base in Irkutsk Oblast and Olenya Air Base in Murmansk Oblast – two of the air bases that Ukrainian forces struck during Operation Spider Web. Russian officials and milbloggers have blamed Russian leadership for failing to defend Russian military infrastructure from Ukrainian drone strikes throughout Russia's full-scale invasion.[v] Russia may be starting to construct protective structures at its air bases after three years of war in response to Operation Spider Web.

Key Takeaways:

• A German official confirmed that Germany is interested in purchasing Patriot air defense systems from the United States on behalf of Ukraine.
• Recent satellite imagery suggests that Russia is constructing protective structures at some of its air bases following Ukraine's Operation Spider Web on June 1.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and Novopavlivka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 12, 2025

Russia launched another large-scale drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of July 11 to 12 — the third combined strike with over 500 drones and missiles in July alone. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 339 Shahed-type drones and 258 decoy drones (597 drones total) from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Millerovo, Rostov Oblast.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 26 Kh-101 cruise missiles from the airspace over Saratov Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 319 Shahed-type drones and 25 Kh-101 cruise missiles and that 258 drones were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged critical electrical networks and administrative and civilian infrastructure in Chernivtsi, Cherkasy, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Lviv, Sumy, and Volyn oblasts.[2] Ukraine’s State Emergency Service reported that Russian strikes killed two civilians in Chernivtsi City and injured 14.[3] Kyiv Oblast Military Administration Head Mykola Kalashnyk reported that Ukraine’s Clean Sky program, which uses interceptor drones to defend Kyiv Oblast against nightly Russian long-range drone strikes, downed over 50 drones during Russia’s overnight strike.[4] ISW continues to assess that Russia's ongoing large-scale strikes are intended to degrade Ukrainian and Western morale and underscore Ukraine's need for continued Western support for Ukraine's interceptor drone program and for the continued supply of Western air defense systems, especially US-provided Patriot systems.[5]

Russian forces recently advanced from the international border toward Velykyi Burluk in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast — likely in an effort to connect Russian operations near Vovchansk with those near Dvorichna, possibly to facilitate Russian efforts to establish a buffer zone along the international border. Geolocated footage published on July 12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Milove (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[6] Elements of the Russian 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and the 72nd Motorized Rifle Division (44th Army Corps [AC], LMD) first advanced into central Milove in early July 2025.[7] Elements of the 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment defended against limited Ukrainian attacks into northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast in March and April 2025, and elements of the 72nd Motorized Rifle Division participated in retaking Kursk Oblast and attacking into northern Sumy Oblast in Spring and early Summer 2025.[8] Some elements of the 72nd Motorized Rifle Division are reportedly continuing to operate in northern Sumy Oblast, although the Russian military command appears to have recently redeployed other elements of the division and the 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment to the Velykyi Burluk direction.[9]

This area of the international border between the Vovchansk and Kupyansk direction has been largely inactive over the last two years of the war, and the redeployment of elements of a regiment and a division to the area indicates that the Russian military command may be preparing to launch a more concerted offensive operation in this area. Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Shamshyn stated on July 8 that Russian forces have intensified their attacks near Milove and are leveraging artillery and drone support to strike Ukrainian positions in the area.[10] Russian milbloggers claimed on July 12 that Russian forces are shelling Khatnie (southwest of Milove) and Velykyi Burluk in order to facilitate further advances toward Khatnie and Ambarne (south of Milove).[11] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces are also attacking near Chuhunivka (northwest of Milove).[12] Russian and Ukrainian sources previously suggested in January 2025 that Russian forces intended to advance to Velykyi Burluk from the northwest near Vovchansk and the southeast near Dvorichna, and ISW noted at the time that Russian forces could spend six months to a year attempting to advance toward Velykyi Burluk from these areas before they could truly threaten the settlement.[13] Russian forces have failed to make any substantive advances toward Velykyi Burluk from Vovchansk or Dvorichna over the last six months, and the Russian military command appears to be activating another avenue of advance toward the settlement.

Russian forces have advanced roughly five kilometers from the international border over the last 10 days and appear to maintain positions roughly 16 kilometers northeast of Velykyi Burluk. Russian forces will likely attempt to widen their salient northeast of Velykyi Burluk and seize Khatnie before attacking further toward the settlement. Russian forces will also have to contend with water features in the area, including the Velykyi Burluk River that runs along the Shevchenkove-Mykhailivka-Velykyi Burluk line. This line of settlements situated along the river could pose a significant challenge for Russian troops should Ukrainian forces choose to defend here. The Russian military command almost certainly must further reinforce the units in this area if it intends to conduct an organized offensive operation against Velykyi Burluk, and Russia may reinforce this effort more rapidly if Russian forces are able to advance quickly in this previously inactive area. A Russian seizure of Velykyi Burluk would complicate Ukraine's defenses in the Vovchansk and Dvorichna directions, as Russian forces would likely be able to operate tube artillery from close enough to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and strike frontline and near rear Ukrainian positions in both directions. The collapse of Ukraine's defense in the Vovchansk and Dvorichna areas would allow Russian forces to establish their envisioned buffer zone to defend Belgorod Oblast from Ukrainian shelling in at least one area of northern Kharkiv Oblast.[14] The Vovchansk-Velykyi Burluk-Dvorichna line could also serve as a significant defensive line within a Russian buffer zone in northern Kharkiv Oblast if Russian forces are able to join their advances from these three directions in the medium- to long-term.

Ukraine signed several strategic agreements with Western defense companies to bolster Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) during the Ukraine Recovery Conference in Rome. Ukrainian Minister of Strategic Industries Herman Smetanin reported on July 12 that Ukraine secured five agreements in the defense sector with international partners on July 11 and 12.[15] Ukraine signed agreements with D&M Holding Company, an American defense manufacturer that specializes in ammunition and primers, to launch a joint production of special chemicals in the United States needed for ammunition production, including gunpowder. Ukraine also concluded agreements with the Italian Ministry of Defense to promote cooperation between unspecified Ukrainian and Italian defense companies to address demands for components and raw materials;  the Italian Industries Federation of Aerospace, Defense, and Security (AIAD) to establish cooperation initiatives in aviation with unspecified Italian companies and to create a joint working group and integrate joint research and production initiatives with the Ukrainian Council of Gunsmiths; and the Italian company IDV, which specializes in armored vehicle production, to establish the joint development and possible production of military equipment.

Key Takeaways:

• Russia launched another large-scale drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of July 11 to 12 — the third combined strike with over 500 drones and missiles in July alone.
• Russian forces recently advanced from the international border toward Velykyi Burluk in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast — likely in an effort to connect Russian operations near Vovchansk with those near Dvorichna, possibly to facilitate Russian efforts to establish a buffer zone along the international border.
• Ukraine signed several strategic agreements with Western defense companies to bolster Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) during the Ukraine Recovery Conference in Rome.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 11, 2025

US President Donald Trump announced on July 10 that the United States will sell NATO weapons, including air defense systems and interceptors, that NATO can then give to Ukraine. Trump stated in an interview with NBC News that the United States will sell NATO an unspecified number and type of American-made weapons, including Patriot air defense systems and interceptors, that NATO will then give to Ukraine.[1] Axios reported on July 11 that sources stated that NATO allies discussed the possibility of the United States using NATO as an intermediary to sell weapons to Ukraine at the most recent NATO Summit on June 24 to 25, and that these weapons could include both air defense support as well as offensive weaponry.[2] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on July 10 that Ukraine requested 10 Patriot air defense systems and additional interceptors, and that Germany is ready to purchase two Patriot systems from the United States for Ukraine, and that Norway is willing to purchase another one.[3] It remains unclear how many Patriot air defense systems or other weapons the United States will sell to NATO. ISW continues to assess that US-provided Patriot systems and interceptors are critical for Ukraine’s ability to defend against Russian long-range overnight strikes and protect its civilian population, particularly against Russian ballistic missiles.[4]

Ukraine’s European allies continue to provide additional aid and pursue joint production initiatives with Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB). The Ukrainian Ministry of Finance announced on July 11 that the United Kingdom (UK) approved a 1.7-billion-pound (roughly $2.3 billion) loan to finance improving Ukraine’s air defense capabilities.[5] The European Commission and Ukraine’s Ministry of Digital Transformation announced that Europe and Ukraine will partner in the BraveTech EU Initiative, which will work to accelerate the European DIB’s innovation cycle.[6] The European Commission reported that the BraveTech EU Initiative will expand on existing European Defense Fund (EDF) projects and will expand relationships between Ukrainian and European defense companies beginning in Fall 2025. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on July 10 that Ukraine signed an agreement with NATO Command Transformation allowing Ukrainian personnel to attend the Joint NATO-Ukraine Analysis, Training, and Education Center (JATEC).[7]

Ukraine continues to expand its production and innovation of interceptor drones for use against Shahed-type drones. Kyiv City Military Administration Head Timur Tkachenko announced on July 11 that Kyiv City will allocate 260 million hryvnia ($6.2 million) to Ukraine’s Clean Sky program aimed at using interceptor drones to defend Kyiv against nightly Russian long-range drone strikes.[8] Tkachenko stated that the program will fund additional equipment, the creation of an interceptor drone training center, and several mobile interceptor drone units. Tkachenko stated that the project has downed 550 Russian drones over Kyiv City in the last four months. Kyiv Oblast Military Administration Head Mykola Kalashnyk estimated that the project has downed almost 650 drones over Kyiv Oblast more broadly.[9] Ukrainian Minister of Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov stated that interceptor drones are downing dozens of Russian long-range drones each night.[10] Ukraine’s interceptor drones will play a critical role in lowering the cost of defense against nightly Russian drone and missile strikes, although US-provided Patriot air defense systems remain the only system capable of downing Russian ballistic missiles.

Ukrainian intelligence assesses that Russian forces are unlikely to realize the Kremlin's goal of seizing the entirety of Donetsk Oblast by the end of 2025, which is consistent with ISW's ongoing assessment of Russia's offensive capabilities. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov assessed on July 11 that Russia’s goal of seizing all of Donetsk Oblast by the end of 2025 is “not realistic.”[11] Budanov stated that the Russian military command has also tasked Russian forces with advancing into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and establishing another 10-kilometer-deep buffer zone in the oblast. Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Colonel Pavlo Palisa stated on June 5 that Russia intends to seize and occupy the full extent of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts by September 1, 2025.[12] The Economist assessed on July 9 that it would take Russian forces until February 2028 to seize the remainder of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts (which Russia has illegally annexed) at their current rate of advance.[13] Russian efforts to seize Donetsk Oblast, enter Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and establish a 10-kilometer-deep buffer zone will likely exacerbate existing constraints in the Russian military by further extending the already degraded Russian Southern and Central groupings of forces that have been engaged in near constant combat operations in Donetsk Oblast since October 2023. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are taking very high casualties in return for disproportionately small gains in pursuit of their political and territorial ambitions.[14] It remains unclear on what basis the Russian military command imagined that it could seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast by September 2025.

Kremlin officials continue to justify the Kremlin's ongoing censorship efforts and appear to be seizing on Russia's hypercontrolled information space to push the Kremlin's informal state ideology. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told Russian business magazine Expert on July 11 that the "situation that [Russia is] in" geopolitically and in relation to the increasing speed of information necessitates military censorship and that the Russian government is "justified" in its ongoing efforts to eliminate media outlets that are critical of the Kremlin.[15] Peskov praised the Russian media’s increase in positive “patriotic” content that generates feelings of loyalty to and pride in Russia. Peskov stated that he believes that the “patriotic” trend will continue and that the Kremlin will take into account the "mistakes" of the past when outlets, such as Russian opposition outlet Meduza, were allowed to criticize Russia broadly. Peskov stated that Russia will demand a "softer" informational policy in the future and that this will allow a number of "neutral" outlets to emerge. The Kremlin is unlikely to take an impartial view of the neutrality of media outlets in the future, however. Peskov stated in September 2024 that Russian media will shift to “freedom of information” if Russia emerges from this period of “acute inflammation,” referring to its war in Ukraine and the geopolitical situation.[16] The refusal to acknowledge that Russia is, in fact, engaged in a major war is part of the Kremlin's general efforts to shape and distort the Russian information space.

Peskov’s recent statements signal that the Kremlin has not abandoned its wartime efforts to censor and centralize control over the Russian information space and is setting conditions to continue censorship efforts post-war. The Kremlin has been engaged in a wide censorship campaign aimed at controlling the narrative of the full-scale invasion since 2022. Russian officials have limited access to foreign websites and platforms, attempted to eliminate access to opposition media, and arrested administrators of Telegram channels that were publicly critical of Russian political and military leadership over the last three years.[17] The Kremlin appears to be setting conditions for long-term control of the information space as it attempts to leverage social media and traditional news outlets to create future generations less likely to question Kremlin decision-making and narratives. The Kremlin is currently establishing an informal state ideology that promotes Russian nationalism, perpetuates the idea that the West unfairly and unjustly seeks to collapse the Russian state, and mythologizes veterans of the Russian military.[18] The Kremlin's efforts to encourage “patriotic” media are only one avenue through which the Kremlin is encouraging military service and loyalty to the Russian government throughout Russian society amid ongoing efforts to expand extracurricular youth military-political organizations and military education programs in Russian schools.[19]

Key Takeaways:

• US President Donald Trump announced on July 10 that the United States will sell NATO weapons, including air defense systems and interceptors, that NATO can then give to Ukraine.
• Ukraine’s European allies continue to provide additional aid and pursue joint production initiatives with Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB).
• Ukraine continues to expand its production and innovation of interceptor drones for use against Shahed-type drones.
• Ukrainian intelligence assesses that Russian forces are unlikely to realize the Kremlin's goal of seizing the entirety of Donetsk Oblast by the end of 2025, which is consistent with ISW's ongoing assessment of Russia's offensive capabilities.
• Kremlin officials continue to justify the Kremlin's ongoing censorship efforts and appear to be seizing on Russia's hypercontrolled information space to push the Kremlin's informal state ideology.
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Kupyansk, Lyman, and Novopavlivka. Russian forces advanced in northern Sumy and western Zaporizhia oblasts, and near Kupyansk, Lyman, and Toretsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 10, 2025

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio expressed frustration following a June 10 meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov about Russia's lack of progress towards ending the war in Ukraine.[i] Rubio stated after the meeting with Lavrov that he conveyed US President Donald Trump's frustration with Russia's insufficient "flexibility" to end the war.[ii] Rubio stated that he and Lavrov shared ideas about "a new or different approach" from Russia and that there must be a "roadmap moving forward" about how the war can end. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claimed that Rubio and Lavrov discussed their "mutual intention" to find a solution to the war.[iii] Kremlin officials' public statements continue to demonstrate that Russia remains committed to achieving its original war goals in Ukraine and is not interested in good faith negotiations to end the war, however. Russian MFA Spokesperson Maria Zakharova reiterated on July 9 Russia's original war demands for Ukrainian regime change and "demilitarization."[iv] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on July 10 that Russia prefers to achieve its war goals through peaceful and diplomatic means but that the war continues and the "realities on the ground" are changing every day.[v] Kremlin officials often call for Ukraine to recognize the "realities on the ground" (a reference to the frontline in Ukraine) to allude to the idea that Russia is in a stronger negotiating position given the battlefield situation and to demand that Ukraine concede to Russia's unwavering demands amounting to complete capitulation to Russia.[vi]

The Kremlin continues efforts to use its diplomatic engagements with the United States in an effort to divert attention from the war in Ukraine and toward the potential restoration of US-Russian relations. The Russian MFA readout of the Rubio-Lavrov meeting heavily emphasized Rubio and Lavrov's reported discussions about bilateral US-Russian issues unrelated to the war in Ukraine, including the restoration of US-Russian contacts, economic and humanitarian cooperation, direct air traffic, and diplomatic missions.[vii] The Russian MFA's readout concluded that the United States and Russia will continue dialogue about a "growing range of issues of mutual interest." Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov claimed on July 10 there has been no "slowdown in progress" in developing US-Russian relations.[viii] ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin attempted to use economic incentives unrelated to the war in Ukraine and the prospect of US-Russian arms control talks to extract concessions from the United States about the war in Ukraine.[ix] ISW also recently assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin unsuccessfully attempted to use Iranian nuclear negotiations and offers to mediate the Israel-Iran war to pose himself to Trump as an effective negotiator as part of efforts to secure concessions on the war in Ukraine.[x] The Kremlin is likely attempting to push the United States to suspend its diplomatic efforts to end the war in Ukraine in exchange for developing US-Russian bilateral relations and economic opportunities.

The Economist assessed that it would take Russia about 89 years to seize all of Ukraine at its current relatively accelerated rate of advance, which has fluctuated throughout the war and is unlikely to remain constant.[xi] The Economist published an analysis on July 9 about the ongoing Russian Summer 2025 offensive campaign, which the Economist assessed started on May 1. The Economist found that Russia has seized an average of about 15 square kilometers per day during this offensive effort -- roughly the area of the Los Angeles International Airport -- cohering with ISW's own assessment of the Russian rate of advance since May 2025.[xii] ISW assesses that Russian forces seized a total of 498.53 square kilometers in May 2025 and 466.71 square kilometers in June 2025, averaging about 15.8 square kilometers per day in May and June 2025. The Economist assessed that it would take Russian forces 89 years to seize the remainder of Ukraine at this rate of advance and until February 2028 to seize the remainder of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts, which Russia has illegally annexed. The Russian rate of advance of 15.8 square kilometers per day is unusually high compared to the Russian rate of advance in Winter 2024-2025 and Spring 2025, and is unlikely to remain constant. The rate of Russian advances in Ukraine has significantly varied throughout the war depending on multiple factors, including the number of active Russian offensive operations on various sectors of the front, the time of year and associated weather and terrain conditions, and Russian and Ukrainian forces' respective staffing levels and materiel stocks.[xiii] The Russian rate of advance will very likely continue to fluctuate in the coming months with the onset of the autumn rains and muddy terrain that affect maneuverability, as it has in the prior three years of war.[xiv]

Russia continues to expend staggeringly high amounts of manpower for its disproportionately small gains. The Economist used a modelling system that factors in "trends in war intensity, territory shifts, and credible open-source and intelligence assessments of losses" to assess Russian personnel casualties.[xv] The Economist used this model to estimate that Russia has suffered between 900,000 and 1.3 million personnel casualties since February 24, 2022, including between 190,000 and 350,000 killed-in-action (KIA). The Economist also estimated that Russia may have suffered about 31,000 KIA since May 1 in its Summer 2025 offensive and that Russia has gained about 0.038 square kilometers of territory (or about nine acres) per KIA soldier since about July 2024. Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Pavlo Palisa previously stated that Russia was sustaining roughly 167 KIA and wounded in action (WIA) per square kilometer of advance as of June 4, or about 0.0059 square kilometers or 1.45 acres per WIA or KIA soldier.[xvi] Russian forces will likely continue to burn through personnel in ongoing summer offensive operations that aim to seize the remainder of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts and advance into Dnipropetrovsk and Sumy oblasts.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg in Rome on July 9.[xvii] Zelensky noted that the discussion largely centered around arms supplies, strengthening Ukraine's air defense, and joint weapons production and localization against the backdrop of increased Russian strikes. Zelensky and Kellogg also discussed possible harsher US sanctions on Russia and those who support its energy and banking sector.

The United States reportedly resumed some military aid shipments to Ukraine. The Associated Press (AP) and Reuters, citing two US officials, reported on July 9 that the United States resumed military aid deliveries to Ukraine, including shipments of 155mm artillery shells and Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) rockets.[xviii] The officials did not specify the quantity of weapons in the resumed shipments or whether a new shipment has already arrived in Ukraine.

Ukraine’s Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine. The United Kingdom (UK) announced on July 10 a defense agreement with Ukraine that includes additional military assistance and joint defense production.[xix] The agreement will provide Ukraine with over five thousand air defense interceptors from Belfast-based Thales Air Defense, a subsidiary of the French defense company Thales Group.[xx] The UK will also commit an additional £283 million (roughly $384 million) in bilateral assistance for Ukraine over the 2025-2026 financial year, including £10.5 million (roughly $14 million) for the Ukrainian Governance Reform Program and £1 million (roughly $1.3 million) for Ukraine‘s Green Transition Office. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz stated on July 10 that Germany is prepared to purchase Patriot air defense systems for Ukraine from the United States.[xxi] The Czech Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on July 9 that the Czech government approved an F-16 training program for up to eight Ukrainian pilots, aiming to provide 150 hours of flight training per pilot by 2026.[xxii]

Russia launched another large-scale missile and drone strike against Ukraine on the night of July 9 to 10 that heavily targeted Kyiv City, resulting in civilian casualties and significant damage to civilian infrastructure. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 397 Shahed-type strike drones and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Millerovo, Rostov Oblast – of which about 200 were Shahed-type drones.[xxiii] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched eight Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Bryansk Oblast, six Kh-101 cruise missiles from Saratov Oblast airspace; and four S-300 air defense missiles at ground targets from Kursk Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 178 total projectiles, including 164 drones, all eight Iskander-M ballistic missiles, and all six Kh-101 cruise missiles, and that 204 drones and missiles were "lost" or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that the main targets of the Russian strike series were Kyiv City and Kyiv Oblast and that Russian strikes also damaged Chernihiv, Sumy, Poltava, Kirovohrad, and Kharkiv oblasts.[xxiv] Kyiv City and Kyiv Oblast officials reported that the Russian strikes damaged residential, medical, educational, commercial, and transport infrastructure, killing at least two civilians and injuring 26.[xxv]

[strikes graphic

Russia's strike tactics, coupled with the increased scale and concentrated targeting of Russia's recent strike packages, aim to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and are resulting in significant damage. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger stated that Russian forces are employing new strike tactics, which involve targeting massive strike packages against one or two main target cities.[xxvi] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian air defenses protecting the cities are unable to repel such large-scale and concentrated strike packages. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reiterated that Russian forces are launching drones and missiles from different directions and at different altitudes, which complicates Ukrainian air defense measures.[xxvii] Ihnat noted that Ukrainian forces are working to destroy Russian reconnaissance drones that use repeaters to fly deep into Ukraine's rear and that relay real-time targeting data to Russian forces. ISW previously observed reports of Russian forces adapting their strike tactics by launching missiles and drones from varying directions and altitudes.[xxviii] Russia continues to use these tactics while increasing the size of its strike packages and targeting particular cities to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and increase damage. ISW continues to assess that Russia's large-scale strike packages in recent weeks aim to maximize damage against Ukraine, are disproportionately affecting civilian areas, and support wider Russian efforts to degrade Ukrainian morale.[xxix] Russia's recent large-scale strike packages underscore Ukraine's need for both continued Western support to Ukraine's interceptor drone development and production capabilities and for the contribution of Western air defense systems like US Patriots. Ukraine requires both indigenous and partner-provided air defense integrated into its wider air defense umbrella in order to secure its cities.

Russian President Vladimir Putin dismissed Deputy Foreign Minister and Presidential Special Representative to the Middle East and Africa Mikhail Bogdanov on July 9.[xxx] Kremlin newswire TASS, citing unnamed sources, claimed that Putin released Bogdanov from his duties at Bogdanov's request for unspecified personal reasons.[xxxi] Bogdanov was heavily involved in the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)'s efforts to provide military support to the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in exchange for a Russian Red Sea naval base, as the Critical Threats Project's Africa File previously assessed.[xxxii] Sudan provides an alternative base for Russian efforts to project power into the Mediterranean and Red Seas and provide logistic support for its military operations across Africa given its bases in Syria are in jeopardy after the fall of the Assad regime.[xxxiii] Putin may have dismissed Bogdanov in favor of a replacement who can better manage the situation in the MENA region following the fall of Assad.

Key Takeaways:

• US Secretary of State Marco Rubio expressed frustration following a June 10 meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov about Russia's lack of progress towards ending the war in Ukraine.
• The Kremlin continues efforts to use its diplomatic engagements with the United States in an effort to divert attention from the war in Ukraine and toward the potential restoration of US-Russian relations.
• The Economist assessed that it would take Russia about 89 years to seize all of Ukraine at its current relatively accelerated rate of advance, which has fluctuated throughout the war and is unlikely to remain constant.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg in Rome on July 9.
• The United States reportedly resumed some military aid shipments to Ukraine.
• Ukraine’s Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine.
• Russia launched another large-scale missile and drone strike against Ukraine on the night of July 9 to 10 that heavily targeted Kyiv City, resulting in civilian casualties and significant damage to civilian infrastructure.
• Russia's strike tactics, coupled with the increased scale and concentrated targeting of Russia's recent strike packages, aim to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and are resulting in significant damage.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin dismissed Deputy Foreign Minister and Presidential Special Representative to the Middle East and Africa Mikhail Bogdanov on July 9.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Borova, Toretsk, and Novopavlivka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 9, 2025

Russian forces conducted the largest combined drone and missile strike of the war so far on the night of July 8 to 9 with 741 total drones and missiles — an about 34 percent increase from the previous record high of 550 Russian drones and missiles launched on the night of July 3 to 4.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 728 Shahed-type strike and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[2] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched seven Kh-101/Iskander-K cruise missiles from Engels Raion, Saratov Oblast and from Kursk Oblast, and six Kh-47M2 Khinzhal aeroballistic missiles from Lipetsk Oblast airspace. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 718 of the drones and missiles, including seven Kh-101/Iskander-K missiles shot down, 296 Shahed-type drones shot down, and 415 drones “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian strikes primarily targeted Lutsk, Volyn Oblast, and Ukrainian officials reported that the strikes damaged a warehouse, private enterprise, and civilian areas in Lutsk.[3] Ukrainian officials reported that the strikes also hit residential areas, an enterprise, and civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv, Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovohrad, Mykolaiv, Sumy, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, and Zhytomyr oblasts.[4] Kyiv Oblast Military Administration Head Mykola Kalashnyk reported that the July 8 to 9 Russian strike was one of the largest strikes targeting Kyiv Oblast and that the strikes lasted for over seven hours.[5] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukrainian forces used interceptor drones to repel the strike and downed "tens" of drones.[6]

The New York Times reported on July 9 that military analysts estimate that Russia will be able to routinely launch over 1,000 drones per strike package by Fall 2025, echoing a recent warning from Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces Commander Major Robert Brovdi that Russia could escalate its strike packages to include over 1,000 Shahed-type drones per day.[7] Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy "Flash" Beskrestnov estimated on June 20 that Russia has increased Shahed production sevenfold and forecasted that Russian strike packages may soon incorporate up to 800 Shaheds — a forecast that is in line with the July 8 to 9 Russian strike package.[8] ISW previously reported that Russia is significantly expanding its long-range drone production capabilities for modified Geran-2 drones (the Russian-made analogue of the Iranian-origin Shahed-136 drones), including by opening production lines with companies in the People's Republic of China (PRC).[9]

The continued increase in the size of strike packages is likely intended to support Russian efforts to degrade Ukrainian morale in the face of constant Russian aggression. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported that Russian forces used over 400 decoy drones in this strike package in order to overwhelm Ukrainian air defense.[10] Russian forces have equipped their decoy long-range drones with warheads and have also modified their strike drones with warheads designed to inflict a wide spread of damage, indicating that Russian forces aim to maximize damage against areas in Ukraine writ large — which disproportionately affects civilian areas.[11]  Ukrainian Ground Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vitaly Sarantsev stated in an interview with the Washington Post on July 9 that recent Russian strikes against Ukrainian military registration and enlistment offices seek to disrupt Ukrainian force generation efforts.[12] Sarantsev stated that Russia aims to sow fear among Ukrainians and create the perception that it is dangerous to go to recruitment and enlistment offices. ISW assessed in previous years that Russia has used strike packages targeting civilian areas to generate a morale effect in Ukraine, as seems to be the case with the most recent strikes.[13]

The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) found that Russian forces and pro-Russian separatists engaged in illegal military activity in Ukraine between 2014 and 2022. The ECHR found Russian forces and pro-Russian separatists guilty of a pattern of human rights abuses during conflicts in eastern Ukraine and in the first months of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine between May 2014 and September 2022, including indiscriminate military attacks, torture, summary executions, the use of rape as a weapon of war, and the illegal deportation of Ukrainian children.[14] The ECHR noted that Russia ceased to be a member of the European Convention as of September 16, 2022, and that Russia remains culpable for actions prior to this date. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov rejected the ECHR's findings as “null and void” and insignificant.[15] ISW has previously assessed that Russia perpetuates a systemic pattern of conflict-related human rights abuses, including the consistent deportation and indoctrination of Ukrainian children, torture of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) and civilians, the use of chemical weapons on the battlefield, and indiscriminate military actions that disproportionately affect civilians. These abuses have continued well beyond September 2022 and remain a core part of Russia's military culture, style of offensive operations, and policy of occupation to this day.[16]

 The ECHR also determined on July 9 that Russia is responsible for the downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 (MH17) in 2014, which killed 298 passengers and crew, including Dutch nationals.[17] The ECHR concluded that Russia had not followed proper safety measures when firing the missile and did not conduct an “effective investigation” in the aftermath of the event.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted the largest combined drone and missile strike of the war so far on the night of July 8 to 9 with 741 total drones and missiles — an about 34 percent increase from the previous record high of 550 Russian drones and missiles launched on the night of July 3 to 4.
• The continued increase in the size of strike packages is likely intended to support Russian efforts to degrade Ukrainian morale in the face of constant Russian aggression.
• The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) found that Russian forces and pro-Russian separatists engaged in illegal military activity in Ukraine between 2014 and 2022.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova and Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Novopavlivka, and Velyka Novosilka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 8, 2025

US President Donald Trump announced on July 7 that the United States would resume weapons deliveries to Ukraine as discussions about provisions of additional air defense systems and interceptors are reportedly ongoing. Trump stated on July 7 that the United States will send more weapons to Ukraine to help Ukraine defend itself.[1] Trump stated that the United States is "going to see if [it] can make some [Patriot interceptors] available." Politico reported that two sources stated that shipments of US military aid to Ukraine could resume over the "coming weeks."[2] Chief Pentagon Spokesperson Sean Parnell stated on July 7 that Trump directed the US Department of Defense (DoD) to send additional defensive weapons to Ukraine to ensure that Ukraine can defend itself while the United States works to secure a "lasting peace."[3] Axios reported on July 8 that sources stated that Trump told Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky that he wants to help Ukraine's air defenses and promised to immediately send 10 Patriot interceptors and help to find other means of supply.[4] Axios' sources reportedly stated that Trump suggested that Germany should sell one of its Patriot batteries to Ukraine and that the United States and Europe would split the costs of the purchase. Axios reported that US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has identified Patriot batteries in Germany and Greece that the US could finance and send to Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that US-provided Patriot systems and interceptors are critical for Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian long-range overnight strikes, particularly against Russian ballistic missiles.[5]

The Kremlin continues to leverage Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev's aggressive rhetoric to undermine support for US military aid to Ukraine, likely as part of a top-down, concerted Kremlin informational effort. Medvedev responded on July 8 on his Russian- and English-language channels to US President Donald Trump's statements about resuming weapons supplies to Ukraine, claiming that Russia should continue "business as usual."[6] Medvedev claimed that Russia will "push forward" to achieve its war goals and "reclaim [its] land." Medvedev's July 8 statements aim to present Western military aid to Ukraine as futile in the face of an alleged inevitable Russian victory. The West should not disregard all of Medvedev's statements as hyperbole or fringe, however. Russian President Vladimir Putin often leverages Medvedev to amplify inflammatory rhetoric designed to stoke panic and fear among Western decision-makers and discourage aid to Ukraine.[7] Medvedev's statements are part of a wider Kremlin reflexive control campaign against the West. Medvedev's provocative and at times threatening statements are very likely part of a top-down, concerted Kremlin informational strategy. Putin would be able to censor Medvedev's statements should Putin choose to do so, especially considering the coordination within the Kremlin on official statements and the Kremlin's overall grip on the Russian information space, internet, and media. Medvedev's continued use of his platform to make aggressive statements that specifically target the United States and Europe suggests that the Kremlin is approving and encouraging this effort. Medvedev's aggressive statements serve a specific purpose for Putin, as they push the West to see Putin's statements as more moderate and rational by comparison and open space for Putin to make greater demands or larger threats.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast amidst a series of ongoing counterattacks. Geolocated footage published on July 8 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern and northeastern Kindrativka (north of Sumy City).[8] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on July 7 that Ukrainian forces advanced between Kindrativka and Kostyantynivka (north of Kindrativka) and east of Oleksiivka (east of Kindrativka) and entered Novomykolaivka (northeast of Oleksiivka).[9] A Russian milblogger claimed on July 8 that Ukrainian forces entered Kindrativka from the northwest and Oleksiivka from the northeast.[10] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces seized central and northern Kindrativka and have cut off Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) along the C-191502 Novomykolaivka-Volodymyrivka road. The milblogger claimed that the Russian military command deployed elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) to Kindrativka to support Russian personnel retreating from the settlement. The milblogger claimed that the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) is fighting to establish a foothold south of Oleksiivka, but that recent Ukrainian advances are complicating this effort.

Russian advances in northern Sumy Oblast slowed between late May and early June 2025, and Ukrainian forces began counterattacking and regaining territory in mid-June. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on June 14 that Ukrainian forces retook Andriivka (southeast of Kindrativka), and Ukrainian forces advanced in other areas of northern Sumy Oblast throughout late June 2025.[11] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on July 8 that fighting remains intense in the North Slobozhansk (Kursk and northern Sumy oblasts) direction and that Ukrainian forces are restoring positions in this direction and maintaining positions in Kursk and Belgorod oblasts.[12] The Russian military command redeployed some drone and elite naval infantry units from the Kursk and Sumy directions to other higher-priority sectors of the frontline in Donetsk Oblast in May and June 2025, and the command may further deprioritize the offensive in northern Sumy Oblast if Ukrainian forces continue to complicate further Russian advances.[13] Russia could also reinforce its frontline units in northern Sumy Oblast in the near future in order to continue advancing toward Sumy City, however.

Russia continues to expand its domestic drone production capacity amid the ever-growing role of tactical drones in frontline combat operations and Russia's increasingly large nightly long-range strike packages against Ukraine. Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin claimed on July 8 that Russia has already more than tripled its planned overall drone production volumes for 2025.[14] Mishustin credited this increase to state financial support for drone producers and innovators, including civilian companies. Ukraine-based open-source intelligence organization Frontelligence Insight stated on July 8 that Russian forces have launched 28,743 total Shahed variant drones (Shahed-136/131 and Geran 2) since the beginning of the full-scale invasion and that Russian forces launched 10 percent of this total (2,736 drones) in June 2025 alone.[15] Frontelligence Insight assessed that Russia produced an average of 60.5 Geran drones per day, or roughly 1,850 drones per month, between February and April 2025. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on July 8 that Russian forces launched 1.6 times more missiles and drones against Ukraine in June 2025 than in May 2025.[16] Increased Russian long-range drone production is enabling Russia's increasingly large nightly strikes against Ukraine and has also enabled Russian forces to integrate Gerans into strikes against frontline Ukrainian positions.[17] Russian forces are continuing to integrate drones into frontline combat operations to strike frontline and near rear Ukrainian positions and to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in tandem with Russian MLRS and artillery systems.

Ongoing Russian cooperation with Chinese companies is facilitating Russia's increasing domestic drone production. Documents analyzed by Bloomberg, including memos from Russian drone manufacturer Aero-HIT and unspecified Russian officials between late 2022 and June 2025, indicate that the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) has cooperated with Chinese companies to increase Russia's drone manufacturing capacity and subvert Western sanctions for drone components since the start of Russia’s war against Ukraine in February 2022.[18] Bloomberg reported that a Russian delegation visiting China in May 2023 established a joint venture with a Chinese university to form the Aero-HIT drone production facility in Khabarovsk, Khabarovsk Krai. Bloomberg reported that Aero-HIT submitted a 7.1-billion-ruble (roughly $90 million) funding request to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) in June 2025, which stated that Aero-HIT has partnered with Chinese engineers since early 2023. Aero-HIT memos reviewed by Bloomberg state that Aero-HIT's plant can produce up to 10,000 drones per month in 2025 and plans for further production increases. Bloomberg reported that Aero-HIT's relationship with Chinese engineers is crucial to Aero-HIT's ability to manufacture at scale its “Veles” first-person view (FPV) drone, which Russian forces have used significantly in Kherson Oblast.[19] Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy "Flash" Beskrestnov stated on July 7 that Ukrainian forces recently observed a new type of Chinese wi-fi router on Chinese radio modems installed on Russian “Gerber” drones.[20] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported to Radio Svoboda on July 7 that 60 to 65 percent of the components in Russian-produced Geran-type drones (the Russian analogue of the Iranian Shahed drone) are of Chinese origin.[21] Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reported on July 4 that Ukrainian investigators discovered components manufactured at the Chinese Suzhou Ecod Precision Manufacturing Company in Russian Geran-type drones recovered in Kyiv City.[22]

Russian milblogger complaints suggest that the Russian military command is struggling to supply frontline units with drones despite increased drone production, possibly indicating how Russia's centralization and bureaucracy are degrading the effectiveness of Russian drone operations and slowing the Russian innovation cycle. A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor claimed on July 8 that the Russian military command is prioritizing drone supplies to several specialized drone units and that the standards for equipping regular drone units are far below the units' actual needs.[23] Another Russian milblogger complained that the Russian military command is creating a small number of specialized drone units with unlimited support instead of creating drone units in all regiments and brigades.[24] The milblogger claimed that the specialized drone units produce results, but that the other units are left severely under resourced. The milblogger claimed that the Russian military command supplies only 20 drones per month to non-specialized units and that these units have to instead rely on volunteer drone supplies.[25] Another milblogger complained that the Russian military has warehouses full of drones but that only "elite" units receive these supplies.[26] Russia's Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies, to which the Russian MoD reportedly prioritizes supplies and staffing, appears to be Russia's effort to selectively reorganize and centralize unmanned systems detachments and assets.[27] ISW continues to assess that the Russian MoD is attempting to replicate Ukraine's drone programs via Russia's Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) and Rubikon Center, but that Russia's tendency towards centralization and bureaucratic ineptitude is leading to obstacles in this process.[28]

 Key Takeaways:

• US President Donald Trump announced on July 7 that the United States would resume weapons deliveries to Ukraine as discussions about provisions of additional air defense systems and interceptors are reportedly ongoing.
• The Kremlin continues to leverage Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev's aggressive rhetoric to undermine support for US military aid to Ukraine, likely as part of a top-down, concerted Kremlin informational effort.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast amidst a series of ongoing counterattacks.
• Russia continues to expand its domestic drone production capacity amid the ever-growing role of tactical drones in frontline combat operations and Russia's increasingly large nightly long-range strike packages against Ukraine.
• Ongoing Russian cooperation with Chinese companies is facilitating Russia's increasing domestic drone production.
• Russian milblogger complaints suggest that the Russian military command is struggling to supply frontline units with drones despite increased drone production, possibly indicating how Russia's centralization and bureaucracy are degrading the effectiveness of Russian drone operations and slowing the Russian innovation cycle.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast, and Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar and Toretsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 7, 2025

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated the Kremlin's rejection of a ceasefire and unchanged demands, including demilitarization and regime change in Ukraine. Lavrov gave an interview to Hungarian outlet Magyar Nemzet published on July 7 and claimed that a settlement to the war must eliminate the "root causes" of the war, which Lavrov again defined as NATO's expansion and Ukraine's alleged discrimination against Russian-speakers.[i] Lavrov claimed that Russia is against a ceasefire as Ukraine and its allies would use the pause to regroup and reconstitute Ukraine's military. Lavrov explicitly highlighted Russia's demands for Ukraine's demilitarization and "denazification" (a phrase Russia uses to demand regime change in Ukraine), and these demands are notably Russia's original war goals. Lavrov also demanded international recognition of Russia's illegal annexation of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and Crimea – including the areas of these four oblasts that Russian forces do not currently occupy – and called for a future settlement to include sanctions relief and the return of frozen Russian assets. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin remains uninterested in good-faith peace negotiations and any settlement to the war that does not acquiesce to its demands.[ii]

Russia is leveraging its "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies to improve its theater-wide drone capabilities, including in priority frontline areas in Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian servicemembers operating in the Kostyantynivka direction told the New York Times in an interview published on July 7 that the recent arrival of drone operators of the Rubikon Center – Russia's recently formed drone training and innovation center – represented a "turning point" in Russia's tactical drone capacity.[iii] Russia reportedly deployed Rubikon drone units to Kursk Oblast in early 2025, where Rubikon drone operators equipped with fiber optic drones played a significant role in eliminating the remaining Ukrainian salient.[iv] Ukrainian servicemembers reported that Russia redeployed Rubikon units to the Kostyantynivka area in Spring 2025, which has allowed Russian forces to significantly complicate Ukrainian logistics in the area. Russian and Ukrainian use of the fiber optic drones that Rubikon introduced en masse in Kursk Oblast has played a key role in creating the 15- to 20-kilometer-wide kill zones between frontline Russian and Ukrainian positions.

Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy "Flash" Beskrestnov stated in May 2025 that the  Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) oversees Rubikon and prioritizes supplying and staffing the center.[v] Beskrestnov stated that Rubikon is organized into four parts: the center for unmanned systems and robotic ground complexes development; the center for teaching instructors to train military personnel to use innovative unmanned solutions; the center for analytics; and frontline combat units. Beskrestnov stated that Rubikon units operate various types of drones, including Lancet loitering munitions, Molniya strike drones, fiber optic drones, and long-range first-person view (FPV) drones, and that some units receive special training to operate against Ukrainian aircraft. Beskrestnov noted that some Rubikon units are still operating in the Sumy-Kursk direction, but that Russia redeployed various units to eastern Ukraine, mainly to Donetsk Oblast. The Russian MoD is reportedly forming five unmanned systems detachments under Rubikon to support combat operations in the five Russian groupings of forces operating in Ukraine.[vi]

ISW has observed reports of Rubikon units operating in Kursk Oblast and throughout eastern Ukraine from the Borova direction in eastern Kharkiv Oblast to the Velyka Novosilka direction in western Donetsk Oblast.[vii] ISW has not observed reports of Rubikon units operating in western Zaporizhia or Kherson oblasts as of this report, indicating that the MoD is likely still expanding Rubikon. ISW previously assessed that Rubikon appears to be the central thrust of the MoD's initiative to establish the educational and drone development infrastructure necessary for the establishment of Russia's new Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) and an effort to selectively reorganize and centralize unmanned systems detachments and assets.[viii]

Russian forces have yet to reach parity with Ukraine's innovative and deeply integrated drone program, however. The Russian MoD is currently attempting to replicate Ukraine's drone programs via Russia's USF and Rubikon Center, but Russia's tendency towards centralization and bureaucratic ineptitude will likely lead to obstacles in this process. ISW previously assessed that Russia's centralization and restructuring efforts may degrade the effectiveness of Russian drone operations and slow the Russian unmanned systems innovation cycle.[ix] Russia's efforts should not be dismissed, however, as a sufficiently trained and organized class of Russian drone operators spread across the frontline and integrated with Russian ground units in the future represents a long-term threat not only to Ukraine, but also to NATO.

Russian forces appear to be reprioritizing offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction over the Kostyantynivka direction after several weeks of unsuccessful activity aimed at advancing toward Kostyantynivka. Geolocated footage published on July 6 and 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Novoekonomichne (east of Pokrovsk) and in southern Novoekonomichne during a platoon-sized mechanized assault.[x] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced northwest of Koptieve, west of Myrne (both northeast of Pokrovsk), and southwest of Myrolyubivka (east of Pokrovsk).[xi] Russian forces appear to be refocusing their attention on the area northeast of Pokrovsk in the direction of Dobropillya (northwest of Pokrovsk) after renewing assaults in this area in May 2025.[xii] ISW recently assessed that these advances support both the envelopment of Pokrovsk and the establishment of a salient to allow Russian forces in the longer term to try to envelop Kostyantynivka and Ukraine's wider fortress belt — a series of fortified cities that form the backbone of Ukraine’s defensive positions.[xiii] Russian forces have not made significant gains in the area west of Toretsk toward Kostyantynivka since early June 2025, and the Russian military command is likely temporarily deprioritizing that effort in favor of more opportunistic advances in the Pokrovsk direction.[xiv] One Russian milblogger noted that Russian forces previously unsuccessfully attempted to advance into Novoekonomichne from the east near Malynivka, but that Russian forces were able to advance into the settlement from the south.[xv] Russian forces have struggled to advance into Novoekonomichne over the last two months in the face of ongoing Ukrainian defensive operations and counterattacks in the area.[xvi] Russian forces will likely attempt to leverage these gains to advance toward Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk and northeast of Novoekonomichne) and force Ukrainian forces to withdraw from Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) under threat of encirclement before refocusing on the Kostyantynivka direction.

Russian Minister of Transport and former Kursk Oblast Governor Roman Starovoit reportedly recently committed suicide after Russian President Vladimir Putin removed Starovoit from his position, likely due in part to the Ministry of Transport's role in Russian failures that enabled Ukraine's Operation Spider Web in June 2025. Russian President Vladimir Putin dismissed Starovoit on July 7.[xvii] The Russian Investigative Committee claimed that unspecified actors found Starovoit's body on July 7 in his car with a gunshot wound and that Starovoit's preliminary cause of death is suicide.[xviii] Deputy Head of the Ministry of Transport's Property Management Department Andrei Korneichuk also reportedly died on July 7 at the Ministry of Transport in Moscow of a heart attack.[xix] Ukraine's Operation Spider Web was able to transport drones into Russia and strike major Russian military airfields by storing the drones in cargo containers transported throughout the country.[xx] Putin appointed Deputy Minister of Transport Andrei Nikitin to replace Starovoit as the acting minister, and Nikitin emphasized during his July 7 meeting with Putin that the ministry is taking measures to monitor cargo moving in Russia and to identify unmanned systems – suggesting that Putin is laying part of the blame for Operation Spider Web on the Ministry of Transport.[xxi]

Putin may have planned to punish Starovoit by arresting him on charges related to his time as the governor of Kursk Oblast in order to avoid acknowledging the Kremlin's failure to prevent Operation Spider Web. Russian business outlet Kommersant reported that former Kursk Oblast Governor Alexei Smirnov, whom Russian authorities arrested in April 2025 on fraud charges, testified against Starovoit in the case on the theft of at least one billion rubles (about $12.7 million) allocated for the construction of defensive structures on the Russian-Ukrainian border in Kursk Oblast.[xxii] Smirnov's arrest was likely part of a wider Kremlin effort to scapegoat Kursk Oblast officials for Russia's failure to respond to Ukraine's August 2024 incursion into Kursk Oblast, and Starovoit was the governor of Kursk Oblast before Smirnov from October 2018 to May 2024.[xxiii] Putin has been unwilling to acknowledge Russia's failures in preventing Operation Spider Web and may have planned to use charges related to the defense of Kursk Oblast to punish Starovoit.

Ukrainian forces continue to conduct long-range strikes against Russia's defense industrial base (DIB). The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 7 that Ukrainian forces, including elements of the Unmanned Systems Forces, conducted a drone strike against the Russian Krasnozavodsk Chemical Plant in Moscow Oblast on the night of July 6 to 7.[xxiv] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that the plant produces pyrotechnics, ammunition, and thermobaric warheads for Shahed-type drones. Geolocated footage published on July 7 shows smoke and fires at the Krasnozavodsk Chemical Plant.[xxv] Ukrainian intelligence sources told Ukrainian outlet Suspline that Ukrainian forces also struck the Ilsky Oil Refinery in Krasnodar Krai on July 7 and damaged a technical workshop and the refinery itself.[xxvi] The sources stated that the Ilsky Oil Refinery processes and stores hydrocarbon raw materials and is directly involved in the Russian DIB. Head of Ukraine's Center for Combatting Disinformation Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko previously reported that the Ilsky Oil Refinery has an annual refining capacity of roughly 6.6 million tons; specializes in producing fuel, mazut, bitumen, and gas oil; and supplies Russian forces, particularly in southern Russia and occupied Ukraine.[xxvii]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated the Kremlin's rejection of a ceasefire and unchanged demands, including demilitarization and regime change in Ukraine.
• Russia is leveraging its "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies to improve its theater-wide drone capabilities, including in priority frontline areas in Donetsk Oblast.
• Russian forces have yet to reach parity with Ukraine's innovative and deeply integrated drone program, however.
• Russian forces appear to be reprioritizing offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction over the Kostyantynivka direction after several weeks of unsuccessful activity aimed at advancing toward Kostyantynivka.
• Russian Minister of Transport and former Kursk Oblast Governor Roman Starovoit reportedly recently committed suicide after Russian President Vladimir Putin removed Starovoit from his position, likely due in part to the Ministry of Transport's role in Russian failures that enabled Ukraine's Operation Spider Web in June 2025.
• Putin may have planned to punish Starovoit by arresting him on charges related to his time as the governor of Kursk Oblast in order to avoid acknowledging the Kremlin's failure to prevent Operation Spider Web.
• Ukrainian forces continue to conduct long-range strikes against Russia's defense industrial base (DIB).
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 6, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be trying to increase volunteer recruitment among the Russian population, likely due to waning domestic support for the Kremlin's crypto-mobilization efforts. Putin attended the "Everything for Victory" forum hosted by the People's Front (Narodnyi Front, formerly the All-Russia People's Front) on July 6 in Moscow City.[1] The People's Front is a Russian Ministry of Defense- (MoD) and state-backed political coalition of non-governmental organizations and political parties largely led by United Russia. Putin created the People's Front in 2011 when he was prime minister. The People’s Front monitors the implementation of Putin’s decrees and has increasingly served as a military assistance initiative, providing aid to Russian servicemembers fighting in Ukraine through its "Everything for Victory" program. The organization also includes the "Kulibin Club" drone and electronic warfare (EW) production initiative, which develops and tests technology for the Russian military. Putin claimed during his address to the forum that the People's Front has become a mass public movement due to "the overwhelming majority of Russian citizens" who wish to defend "the life principles and values" passed down from previous generations and that the Russian military enjoys "universal, nationwide support" among the Russian population.[2] Putin highlighted the contributions that the organization has made to Russian forces in Ukraine, such as supplying 110,000 drones and more than 14,000 vehicles. Putin is likely attempting to shore up public support for the People's Front and the war to increase voluntary recruitment among Russian citizens. Putin's focused messaging on the Russian populace's alleged "overwhelming" support for Russian forces fighting in Ukraine suggests that the Kremlin is trying to combat issues with voluntary recruitment and societal support for the war. ISW has observed indications that the Kremlin is struggling to maintain its voluntary recruitment rates.[3] ISW continues to assess that Putin remains averse to declaring another partial mobilization out of fear of domestic discontent and remains committed to promoting crypto-mobilization efforts.[4]

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 5 to 6, including a "double-tap strike" against emergency responders. Recent adaptations to Russian long-range drone technologies and strike tactics suggests that Russian strikes against civilian targets are very likely intentional. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on July 6 that Russian forces launched 157 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea, and four S-300 air defense missiles from Kursk Oblast.[5] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 177 drones and that 19 were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck civilian, energy, and military infrastructure in Kharkiv, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Poltava, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[6] Ukraine’s Ground Forces reported that Russian forces targeted a Ukrainian military registration and enlistment office in Kremenchuk, Poltava Oblast - the third such strike since June 30.[7] Russian strikes against Ukrainian military registration and enlistment offices likely aim to disrupt Ukrainian recruitment efforts.[8]

Ukraine’s State Emergency Service reported on July 6 that Russian forces conducted two double-tap strikes targeting Ukrainian

Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be trying to increase volunteer recruitment among the Russian population, likely due to waning domestic support for the Kremlin's crypto-mobilization efforts. Putin attended the "Everything for Victory" forum hosted by the People's Front (Narodnyi Front, formerly the All-Russia People's Front) on July 6 in Moscow City. The People's Front is a Russian Ministry of Defense- (MoD) and state-backed political coalition of non-governmental organizations and political parties largely led by United Russia. Putin created the People's Front in 2011 when he was prime minister. The People’s Front monitors the implementation of Putin’s decrees and has increasingly served as a military assistance initiative, providing aid to Russian servicemembers fighting in Ukraine through its "Everything for Victory" program. The organization also includes the "Kulibin Club" drone and electronic warfare (EW) production initiative, which develops and tests technology for the Russian military. Putin claimed during his address to the forum that the People's Front has become a mass public movement due to "the overwhelming majority of Russian citizens" who wish to defend "the life principles and values" passed down from previous generations and that the Russian military enjoys "universal, nationwide support" among the Russian population. Putin highlighted the contributions that the organization has made to Russian forces in Ukraine, such as supplying 110,000 drones and more than 14,000 vehicles. Putin is likely attempting to shore up public support for the People's Front and the war to increase voluntary recruitment among Russian citizens. Putin's focused messaging on the Russian populace's alleged "overwhelming" support for Russian forces fighting in Ukraine suggests that the Kremlin is trying to combat issues with voluntary recruitment and societal support for the war. ISW has observed indications that the Kremlin is struggling to maintain its voluntary recruitment rates. ISW continues to assess that Putin remains averse to declaring another partial mobilization out of fear of domestic discontent and remains committed to promoting crypto-mobilization efforts.

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 5 to 6, including a "double-tap strike" against emergency responders. Recent adaptations to Russian long-range drone technologies and strike tactics suggests that Russian strikes against civilian targets are very likely intentional. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on July 6 that Russian forces launched 157 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea, and four S-300 air defense missiles from Kursk Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 177 drones and that 19 were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck civilian, energy, and military infrastructure in Kharkiv, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Poltava, and Zaporizhia oblasts. Ukraine’s Ground Forces reported that Russian forces targeted a Ukrainian military registration and enlistment office in Kremenchuk, Poltava Oblast - the third such strike since June 30. Russian strikes against Ukrainian military registration and enlistment offices likely aim to disrupt Ukrainian recruitment efforts.

Ukraine’s State Emergency Service reported on July 6 that Russian forces conducted two double-tap strikes targeting Ukrainian emergency responders during overnight drone strikes against Kharkiv City and after shelling against Kherson City on the morning of July 6. Russia’s recent drone technological adaptations and strike tactics, such as accumulating drones near a target before simultaneously striking, have increased Russia's ability to precisely coordinate strikes and hit intended targets. Russia's recent overnight strikes series have increasingly resulted in civilian casualties, and Russia is very likely intentionally targeting Ukrainian civilians, including with "double tap" strikes likely meant to kill first responders and strikes against military registration and enlistment offices.

Russian Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) has stopped reporting on the number of deaths in Russia, likely as part of Kremlin efforts to conceal Russia's losses from the war in Ukraine. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on July 5 that Rosstat did not report demographic data in its January to May 2025 “Socioeconomic Situation in Russia” report. Electoral statistics researcher Dmitry Kobak reported in late June 2025 that Rosstat refused to fulfill his request for data pertaining to 2024 male excess mortality and monthly deaths by date of death. ISW previously assessed that Rosstat is concealing population data in an attempt to obfuscate Russia’s ongoing demographic problems, and the omission of demographic data in Rosstat's reports likely also aim to obscure the Russian military's high personnel loss rates.

Key Takeaways:
• Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be trying to increase volunteer recruitment among the Russian population, likely due to waning domestic support for the Kremlin's crypto-mobilization efforts.
• Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 5 to 6, including a "double-tap strike" against emergency responders. Recent adaptations to Russian long-range drone technologies and strike tactics suggests that Russian strikes against civilian targets are very likely intentional.
• Russian Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) has stopped reporting on the number of deaths in Russia, likely as part of Kremlin efforts to conceal Russia's losses from the war in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova. Russian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka.

emergency responders during overnight drone strikes against Kharkiv City and after shelling against Kherson City on the morning of July 6.[9] Russia’s recent drone technological adaptations and strike tactics, such as accumulating drones near a target before simultaneously striking, have increased Russia's ability to precisely coordinate strikes and hit intended targets.[10] Russia's recent overnight strikes series have increasingly resulted in civilian casualties, and Russia is very likely intentionally targeting Ukrainian civilians, including with "double tap" strikes likely meant to kill first responders and strikes against military registration and enlistment offices.

 Russian Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) has stopped reporting on the number of deaths in Russia, likely as part of Kremlin efforts to conceal Russia's losses from the war in Ukraine. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on July 5 that Rosstat did not report demographic data in its January to May 2025 “Socioeconomic Situation in Russia” report.[11] Electoral statistics researcher Dmitry Kobak reported in late June 2025 that Rosstat refused to fulfill his request for data pertaining to 2024 male excess mortality and monthly deaths by date of death.[12] ISW previously assessed that Rosstat is concealing population data in an attempt to obfuscate Russia’s ongoing demographic problems, and the omission of demographic data in Rosstat's reports likely also aim to obscure the Russian military's high personnel loss rates.[13]

 Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be trying to increase volunteer recruitment among the Russian population, likely due to waning domestic support for the Kremlin's crypto-mobilization efforts.
• Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 5 to 6, including a "double-tap strike" against emergency responders. Recent adaptations to Russian long-range drone technologies and strike tactics suggests that Russian strikes against civilian targets are very likely intentional.
• Russian Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) has stopped reporting on the number of deaths in Russia, likely as part of Kremlin efforts to conceal Russia's losses from the war in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova. Russian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 5, 2025

Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Pokrovsk and may attempt to advance further toward Dobropillya as part of a mutually reinforcing effort to envelop Pokrovsk and bypass Ukraine's fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast from the west in the coming months. Geolocated footage published on July 4 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Koptieve and Shevchenko Pershe and advanced to southeastern Razine (all northeast of Pokrovsk).[1] Russian forces have recently seized on opportunistic advances northeast of Pokrovsk, following their focus on advances along the Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka T-0504 highway since early 2025.[2] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on June 28 that Russian forces appear to be attacking in the “Dobropillya direction” (northwest of Toretsk and Pokrovsk) and that elements of the Russian 68th Army Corps (AC) (Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 20th and 150th motorized rifle divisions (both of the 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are attacking in the area.[3] ISW previously assessed that the Russian military command may intend to leverage the Russian salient between Pokrovsk and Toretsk to envelop Pokrovsk from the northeast and north or to bypass Ukrainian defenses in Kostyantynivka from the southwest and west.[4]

The Russian units conducting these assaults have been engaged in combat since they redeployed to reinforce the Russian force grouping operating east of Pokrovsk in February and March 2025.[5] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on July 3 that elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC) and 150th Motorized Rifle Division have been operating near Novotoretske (north of Razine) and Novoekonomichne (south of Razine) after seizing Malynivka in mid-June 2025 and recently seizing Koptieve (all northeast of Pokrovsk).[6] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic AC, SMD) are also operating northeast of Pokrovsk.[7] Ukrainian forces have been degrading these Russian units, and it is unclear whether the Russian military command intends to leverage the same units to push further north and west of Razine or if Russia may attempt to reinforce these units with additional redeployments. These Russian units will have to cross the Kazenyi Torets River to advance west of Razine, which may present another obstacle to the Russian advance depending on the river’s water level.

Russian advances west and northwest of Razine most immediately support the envelopment of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad — an operational objective that Russian forces have been pursuing over the last 18 months. ISW forecasted in December 2024 that Russian forces would need to make significant advances in the direction of Rodynske (west of Razine) to envelop Pokrovsk from the northeast, and the Russian forces' recent advances near Razine cohere with this assessment.[8] The commander of a Ukrainian National Guard artillery reconnaissance battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on July 5 that Russian forces are focusing their attacks between Malynivka, Novoolenivka, and Popiv Yar (all northeast of Pokrovsk) in an effort to interdict Ukrainian logistics into Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) and Pokrovsk.[9] The Ukrainian commander noted that Russian forces are constantly conducting assaults with motorcycles and buggies. Russian milbloggers claimed on July 4 and 5 that Russian forces are trying to complicate Ukrainian logistics in the area by damaging a bridge near Shakhove (east of Dobropillya), interdicting Ukrainian forces' ground lines of communication (GLOCs) near Udachne, and along the railway line near Kotlyne.[10]

Russian forces have largely struggled to advance southeast, south, and southwest of Pokrovsk in the face of Ukrainian drones since late 2024 and have essentially held close to the same positions in these areas since January 2025. The Russian military command may be prioritizing advances northeast of Pokrovsk in an effort to establish a stronghold in Rodynske, which could enable Russian forces to either attack Pokrovsk directly or advance toward Novooleksandrivka (northwest of Pokrovsk) with the aim of interdicting the Pokrovsk-Pavlohrad M-30 highway and forcing Ukrainian forces to withdraw from Pokrovsk under the threat of envelopment Russian forces could also advance north of Udachne or Kotlyne (both southwest of Pokrovsk) in order to interdict the M-30 highway if they can overcome Ukrainian defensive positions in the area, which currently seems uncertain.

Further Russian advances toward Dobropillya would indicate that Russian forces are placing a tactical prioritization on advancing west of Ukraine's fortress belt — a series of fortified cities that form the backbone of Ukraine’s defensive positions — and forcing Ukrainian forces to withdraw from the fortress belt under pressure of envelopment rather than conduct a head-on assault against the fortress belt. Russian forces have thus far struggled to break out of Toretsk and make significant advances from Chasiv Yar or north of the Kleban Byk Reservoir (northwest of Toretsk), which has likely complicated the Russian military command's original plan for an operation against Kostyantynivka (northwest of Toretsk) and the wider fortress belt. The Russian military command may be adjusting its plan, and Russian forces may attempt to create a salient in the fields and small settlements between Dobropillya and Kostyantynivka in order to bypass the fortress belt from the west. Russian forces would likely have to cross the Kazenyi Torets River in several places and would have to be able to sufficiently supply troops on the west (right) bank in order to maintain such a salient. Russian forces would likely also have to seize the settlements along the Pokrovsk-Oleksandrivka (north of Dobropillya) line in order to fully interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to the fortress belt. It is unclear whether the Russian Central Grouping of Forces, which is currently in charge of activity in the Pokrovsk direction, is capable of conducting such an operation with the degraded forces currently at its disposal. Russian forces are likely reaching higher levels of exhaustion and degradation after well over a year of intensified offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction. Such an operation would likely be a multi-year effort with significant personnel losses and hard-fought gains, although Russian forces have proven willing to undertake such long-term operations.[11]

Such an operation would be consistent with Russia's recent tactics and operational concepts designed to advance by leveraging smaller partial envelopments to seize territory instead of attempting rapid, deep operational-level penetrations of Ukraine's defense — which Russian forces currently do not have the means to conduct. ISW previously assessed that the Russian military command appears to be developing and disseminating a doctrinal method for advances throughout the theater that aims to leverage creeping partial envelopments of frontline towns and settlements to force Ukrainian withdrawals, based on Russian forces operational pattern demonstrated in its seizures of Avdiivka in February 2024 and Vuhledar in October 2024[12] Russian forces have demonstrated an ability to plan and execute limited campaigns in a designated area of operations to exert and sustain maximum pressure and to mitigate the risk of overextending their forces while forcing Ukrainian forces to withdraw under threat of tactical encirclement. The Russian military command is likely implementing the same doctrinal method used to seize Avdiivka and Vuhledar in its attempts to seize Pokrovsk and possibly Ukraine's fortress belt.

Ukrainian forces continue to demonstrate their ability to conduct long-range strikes that target Russia's defense industrial base (DIB). The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 5 that Ukrainian Forces, including elements of the Unmanned Systems Forces, conducted a strike against the Russian Joint Stock Company VNIIR-Progress Plant in Cheboksary, Chuvashia Republic, on the night of July 4 to 5.[13] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that the plant produces the "Kometa" adaptive antenna arrays, which are used in Shahed drones, Iskander-K cruise missiles, KAB guided bombs, and other high-precision weapons. Geolocated footage published on July 4 shows that a Ukrainian drone struck the VNIIR-Progress Plant.[14] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on July 5 that the Ukrainian drone strike caused a fire at the plant.[15] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian Forces, including elements of the Unmanned Systems Forces, also conducted a strike against the Borisoglebsk Airfield, Voronezh Oblast, and struck a KAB guided glide bomb warehouse and combat training aircraft.[16] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian forces base Su-34 fighter-bombers, Su-35M fighter jets, and Su-30SM fighter jets at the Brisoglebsk Airfield. NASA Fire Information for Resource Management (FIRMS) data for July 5 shows satellite-detected heat anomalies at Borisoglebsk Airfield, including in the central part of the airport and the logistical section.[17]

Ukraine's Western partners continue to allocate aid to Ukraine and collaborate with the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB). Ukraine’s Ministry of Economy announced on July 4 that Ukraine and South Korea launched a new Economic Innovation Partnership Program (EIPP) in which South Korea will allocate $10 million for the implementation of infrastructure projects in Ukraine over the next four years.[18] Ukraine’s Ministry of Economy reported that the initiative includes provisions for strategic consultations, development projects, and feasibility studies aimed at long-term economic cooperation between Ukraine and South Korea in the public and private sectors. Ukraine’s Minister of Strategic Industry Herman Smetanin announced on July 4 that Ukraine signed an agreement with Denmark that will allow Ukrainian defense industrial companies to export production to Denmark, increasing the scale and supply of Ukrainian weapons in a location where Russian forces are unable to strike Ukrainian defense industrial facilities.[19] The Danish Ministry of Defense (MoD) similarly announced on June 29 that Denmark is allocating 67 million euros (roughly $79 million) to accelerate the establishment of Ukrainian defense industrial companies in Denmark.[20]

European intelligence services continue to report that Russia is intensifying its deployment of chemical agents in Ukraine in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to which Russia is a signatory. Dutch Defense Minister Ruben Brekelmans reported on July 4 that Dutch and German intelligence agencies have evidence that Russian forces are frequently employing banned chemical agents in Ukraine.[21] Brekelmans stated that Russian forces are intensifying their use of chemical agents, including using drones to drop choking agents into Ukrainian trenches to force Ukrainian soldiers into the line of fire. The Dutch and German intelligence agencies reported that Russian forces are normalizing and standardizing the use of chemical agents, such as tear gas and chloropicrin, along the frontline and that Russia is investing in chemical weapons research.[22]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Pokrovsk and may attempt to advance further toward Dobropillya as part of a mutually reinforcing effort to envelop Pokrovsk and bypass Ukraine's fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast from the west in the coming months.
• Russian advances west and northwest of Razine most immediately support the envelopment of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad — an operational objective that Russian forces have been pursuing over the last 18 months.
• Further Russian advances toward Dobropillya would indicate that Russian forces are placing a tactical prioritization on advancing west of Ukraine's fortress belt - a series of fortified cities that form the backbone of Ukraine’s defensive positions - and forcing Ukrainian forces to withdraw from the fortress belt under pressure of envelopment rather than conduct a head-on assault against the fortress belt.
• Such an operation would be consistent with Russia's recent tactics and operational concepts designed to advance by leveraging smaller partial envelopments to seize territory instead of attempting rapid, deep operational-level penetrations of Ukraine's defense, which Russian forces currently do not have the means to conduct.
• Ukrainian forces continue to demonstrate their ability to conduct long-range strikes that target Russia's defense industrial base (DIB).
• Ukraine's Western partners to continue to allocate aid to Ukraine and collaborate with the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB).
• European intelligence services continue to report that Russia is intensifying its deployment of chemical agents in Ukraine in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to which Russia is a signatory.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Siversk. Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Siversk, and Pokrovsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 4, 2025

Russian forces conducted the largest combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion on the night of July 3 to 4, primarily targeting Kyiv City. Russian forces have conducted 10 of the largest strikes in the war since January 2025. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 330 Shahed drones and 209 Shahed-type and other decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched one Kh-47M2 "Kinzhal" aeroballistic missile from the airspace over Lipetsk Oblast, six Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Bryansk Oblast, and four Iskander-K cruise missiles from Kursk and Voronezh oblasts. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed two Iskander-K cruise missiles and 268 drones, and that 208 drones were "lost" or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that nine missiles and 63 drones struck eight locations throughout Ukraine and that Kyiv City was the primary target of the strikes. The Ukrainian General Staff and the Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated that the Russian strikes injured at least 20 people in Kyiv City.[2] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that the Russian strikes injured at least 23 people in total.[3] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential and civilian infrastructure in Kirovohrad, Poltava, Odesa, and Kyiv oblasts.[4] Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski confirmed that the Russian strike against Kyiv City damaged a consular building at the Polish Embassy.[5] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha reported that the Russian strike against Odesa City damaged the People's Republic of China (PRC) consulate.[6] Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reported on July 4 that Ukrainian investigators discovered components manufactured at the Chinese Suzhou Ecod Precision Manufacturing Company in Russian Geran-type drones (Russian analogue of the Iranian Shahed drone) recovered in Kyiv City.[7]

US Patriot air defense systems remain critical to Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian ballistic missile strikes. ISW continues to assess that US aid to Ukraine, particularly Patriot air defense systems and interceptors, is critical to Ukraine's ability to protect its defense industrial base (DIB), safeguard the capabilities it obtains from its partners in the face of long-range Russian strikes, and defend its civilian population.[8] US-provided air defense systems are vital to Ukraine's DIB and will support Ukraine's efforts to increase self-sufficiency and protect civilian lives.

US President Donald Trump acknowledged Russian President Vladimir Putin's unwillingness to end the war in Ukraine on July 3 as Kremlin officials continue to demonstrate a critical lack of interest in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine. Trump correctly assessed on July 4 that Putin is “not there” and not “looking to stop” military actions against Ukraine and reiterated his “disappointment” with his July 3 phone call with Putin.[9] Trump stated on July 3 that he did not make any progress “at all” with Putin and that he is “not happy” with Putin.[10] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on July 4 that Putin told Trump that Russia is willing to achieve its objectives for the war against Ukraine through diplomatic negotiations, but will continue military actions, as a diplomatic option that satisfies Russia’s objectives has not yet been presented.[11] Russian forces conducted the largest combined strike of the war thus far on the night of July 3 and 4, following the phone call between Trump and Putin.[12] Putin's and Peskov’s statements indicate that Russia has not abandoned its original objectives for its war against Ukraine.[13] ISW continues to assess that Russia’s terms – the "denazification" and "demilitarization" of Ukraine, which Russia has demanded since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022 – amount to demands for regime change, the installation of a pro-Russian proxy government in Ukraine, and significant limitations on Ukraine's ability to defend itself against future Russian aggression.[14]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and US President Donald Trump discussed diplomatic efforts and joint work supporting Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) during a phone call on July 4. Zelensky stated that he spoke with Trump about increased Russian strikes against Ukraine's civilian population and noted that he and Trump discussed strengthening air defense and increasing protection of Ukrainian airspace.[15] ISW previously reported that Russia is increasingly prioritizing long-range drone and missile production, stockpiling ballistic missiles, and targeting densely populated cities far from the frontline as part of a cognitive warfare effort to weaken Ukrainian resolve and to undermine Western support for Ukraine.[16] Zelensky stated that his and Trump's teams agreed to meet to discuss enhancing Ukraine's air defense and protection. Zelensky stated that he and Trump also discussed prospects for joint defense industrial base (DIB) production and the Ukrainian defense industry’s capabilities. Zelensky stated that he advocated for the development of new projects regarding drones and related technologies, and both leaders discussed mutual purchases and investments.

Ukraine and Russia conducted the eighth prisoner of war (POW) exchange since Ukrainian and Russian officials met in Istanbul and agreed to a series of exchanges on June 2. Ukrainian officials and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed on July 4 that Ukraine and Russia exchanged an unspecified number of severely wounded and sick POWs, POWs under 25 years old, and some civilians.[17] Ukrainian officials reported that Russia captured most of the released Ukrainian POWs and civilians in 2022.[18] Kremlin newswire TASS, citing an unnamed source, claimed that Russia received two civilians from Kursk Oblast in addition to the POWs and noted that each side exchanged the same number of POWs.[19]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted the largest combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion on the night of July 3 to 4, primarily targeting Kyiv City. Russian forces have conducted 10 of the largest strikes in the war since January 2025.
• US Patriot air defense systems remain critical to Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian ballistic missile strikes.
• US President Donald Trump acknowledged Russian President Vladimir Putin's unwillingness to end the war in Ukraine on July 3 as Kremlin officials continue to demonstrate a critical lack of interest in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and US President Donald Trump discussed diplomatic efforts and joint work supporting Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) during a phone call on July 4.
• Ukraine and Russia conducted the eighth prisoner of war (POW) exchange since Ukrainian and Russian officials met in Istanbul and agreed to a series of exchanges on June 2.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Chasiv Yar and Velyka Novosilka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 3, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected US President Donald Trump's call for a quick peace in Ukraine during a phone call with Trump on July 3.[i] Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov claimed on July 3 that Trump once again raised the issue of a quick end to Russia's war in Ukraine and that Putin claimed that Russia continues its efforts for a negotiated end to the war. Ushakov claimed, however, that Putin reiterated that Russia "will achieve its goals" and "eliminat[e] the root causes" that led to the war and that "Russia will not back down from these goals," essentially emphasizing that Russia will continue its war on its own terms. Ushakov claimed that Putin and Trump discussed the possibility of a third round of Ukrainian–Russian negotiations in Istanbul and agreed that peace negotiations will continue in a bilateral format at an unspecified date. Ushakov claimed that Putin and Trump did not discuss the recent US decision to halt military aid shipments to Ukraine but discussed bilateral economic projects, including in the energy and space spheres.

Putin's stated commitment to his goals in Ukraine, including eliminating the so-called "root causes" of the war directly contradicts his claim that Russia supports meaningful negotiations to end the war. Putin and other Kremlin officials have repeatedly referred to the need for any future peace settlement to eliminate the alleged "root causes" of the war to allude to Russia's unwavering demands for regime change in Ukraine, Ukrainian neutrality, and changes to NATO's foundational open-door policy.[ii] ISW continues to assess that Russia remains uninterested in good-faith peace negotiations to end the war. Putin's statement that Russia will not back down from its goals further demonstrates Putin's willingness to prolong the war in Ukraine and achieve his goals through military means should Russia be unable to force Ukraine to capitulate through diplomatic means — in direct contrast to Trump's calls for a speedy end to the war. The Kremlin has continually indicated in recent weeks that there are no plans yet for a third round of bilateral negotiations in Istanbul, so it is unclear if or when bilateral Ukrainian–Russian negotiations will resume.[iii] ISW continues to assess that Russia will likely leverage any future negotiations to try to extract concessions from Ukraine and the United States while Russian forces continue efforts to secure additional gains on the battlefield through creeping and highly attritional advances. Russia previously exploited peace talks with Ukraine in Istanbul to obfuscate its own uninterest in meaningful negotiations, and any future Ukrainian–Russian negotiations on anyone's terms but Kyiv's are very unlikely to bring about Trump's desired expeditious end to the war and just and lasting peace.

Details about the recent US suspension of aid to Ukraine remain unclear. Journalists for National Public Radio (NPR) and the Economist stated on July 2 and 3 that the United States halted aid shipments to Ukraine in Poland that included 30 PAC-3 interceptors for Patriot air defense systems; 8,496 155mm high explosive howitzer munitions; 142 AGM-114 Hellfire air-to-ground missiles; 252 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) rockets; 25 missiles for Stinger man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS); 125 AT-4 grenade launchers; and 92 AIM air-to-air missiles.[iv] The Economist reported on July 3 that the Pentagon turned around planes carrying air defense interceptors and other US military aid to Ukraine on June 30 and July 1, suspending deliveries.[v] US Department of State Spokesperson Tammy Bruce stated on July 3 that Trump has indicated his "remaining commitment" to US provisions of Patriot interceptors to Ukraine.[vi] Bruce stated that the United States "hasn't paused" sending weapons to Ukraine but that the recent suspension is "one aspect, one situation, one event that has been changed." Chief Pentagon Spokesperson Sean Parnell stated on July 2 that the US Department of Defense (DoD) “paused” weapons shipments to Ukraine to conduct a “capability review” to ensure that US military aid aligns with the DoD’s defense priorities while preserving US military readiness.[vii] Parnell stated that DoD recommendations about military aid to Ukraine are consistent with US President Donald Trump’s stated goal of ending the war in Ukraine.

A Ukrainian strike killed the deputy commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy in Kursk Oblast, and an unknown actor may have assassinated a high-ranking Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) official in Moscow City. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) acknowledged on July 3 that Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy Major General Mikhail Gudkov died on July 2 during combat operations in the Kursk Oblast border area.[viii] Gudkov previously served as commander of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), and Russian President Vladimir Putin promoted him to deputy commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy in March 2025.[ix] Primorsky Krai Governor Oleg Kozhemyako reported on July 3 that Captain Second Rank Nariman Shikhaliev died alongside Gudkov.[x] Gudkov's obituary from the "Typhoon" All-Russian Organization of Naval Infantry stated that Ukrainian forces launched a missile strike against the command post of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade near Korenevo, Kursk Oblast, on July 2, killing over 10 servicemembers, including Gudkov and several senior officers.[xi] Ukrainian military observer Yuriy Butusov reported that the strike killed Gudkov's deputy and 20 other Russian servicemembers.[xii] Radio Svoboda stated that "unconfirmed official reports" suggest that a Ukrainian HIMARS strike killed Gudkov.[xiii] Telegram channel Nexta additionally claimed on July 3 that there are unconfirmed reports that Alexei Komkov, head of the FSB's Fifth Directorate, which is officially tasked with overseeing operational information and international relations, died after a car exploded in central Moscow City.[xiv] ISW cannot confirm the death of Komkov or the actor responsible for the reported car explosion in Moscow City.

Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reportedly assassinated the former occupation mayor of Luhansk City. Kremlin newswire TASS reported on July 3 that former occupation mayor of Luhansk City Manolis Pilavov died in an explosion in occupied Luhansk City.[xv] Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported on July 3 that sources stated that the SBU killed Pilavov by detonating an explosive device.[xvi] Pilavov was the occupation mayor of Luhansk City from 2014 to 2023.

Ukraine’s Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine, but the United States remains the only Ukrainian partner that can provide certain critical weapons systems – especially air defenses -- at scale and quickly. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on July 3 that Ukraine signed a memorandum on a long-term strategic partnership with US autonomous system engineering company Swift Beat, agreeing to produce hundreds of thousands of interceptor drones in 2025 that are capable of shooting down Russian Shahed drones and to expand production further in 2026.[xvii] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov also announced on July 1 that Ukraine is launching a joint arms production program with its international Ramstein format partners to produce weapons for the Ukrainian military in Ukraine and abroad.[xviii] Swedish Defense Minister Pål Jonson stated on July 3 that Sweden is allocating an additional 1.5 billion Swedish kroner (roughly $156 million) to purchase over 10 new Archer artillery barrels, augment long-range strike and underwater capabilities, and support unspecified logistical support for Ukraine.[xix] The Latvian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on July 2 that Belgium and Turkey joined the UK- and Latvian-led international drone coalition.[xx] The Latvian MoD also announced on July 1 that it approved the transfer of 42 Patria armored personnel carriers (APCs) and other military equipment to Ukraine.[xxi] UK defense and security enterprise Prevail Partners announced on July 2 that it launched a joint partnership with Ukrainian drone manufacturer Skyeton International to increase production of long-range drones as part of efforts to supply drones to Ukraine and provide the UK with modern military equipment.[xxii] Unspecified German security forces told German media outlet Die Welt on July 1 that Germany signed a contract to finance the production of over 500 Antonov-196 (AN-196) ”Lyutyi” long-range drones for Ukraine.[xxiii] ISW continues to assess that US aid to Ukraine, particularly Patriot air defense systems and interceptors, is critical to Ukraine's ability to protect its defense industrial base (DIB) and safeguard the capabilities it obtains from its partners in the face of long-range Russian strikes.[xxiv] Such US-provided systems are required soh that Ukraine's DIB can grow to be largely self-sufficient and able to sustain Ukraine's materiel requirements with domestic production.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected US President Donald Trump's call for a quick peace in Ukraine during a phone call with Trump on July 3.
• Putin's stated commitment to his goals in Ukraine, including eliminating the so-called "root causes" of the war directly contradicts his claim that Russia supports meaningful negotiations to end the war.
• Details about the recent US suspension of aid to Ukraine remain unclear.
• A Ukrainian strike killed the deputy commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy in Kursk Oblast, and an unknown actor may have assassinated a high-ranking Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) official in Moscow City.
• Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reportedly assassinated the former occupation mayor of Luhansk City.
• Ukraine’s Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine, but the United States remains the only Ukrainian partner that can provide certain critical weapons systems – especially air defenses -- at scale and quickly.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova and Siversk and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, and Velyka Novosilka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 2, 2025

The United States paused weapons supplies to Ukraine, including critical air defense interceptors, artillery shells, missiles, and rockets. Western media outlets reported that sources stated on July 2 that the US pause on weapons supplies to Ukraine will affect dozens of PAC-3 interceptors for Patriot air defense systems, dozens of Stinger man-portable air defense systems, thousands of 155mm high explosive howitzer munitions, over 100 Hellfire air-to-ground missiles, over 250 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) rockets, dozens of grenade launchers, and dozens of AIM air-to-air missiles.[i] Familiar sources told Politico on July 1 that the United States decided in early June 2025 to withhold some of the aid that the United States promised Ukraine under the Biden administration but that the decision is only now taking effect.[ii] Politico reported that the halted weapons come from two different streams of Biden administration-era support — weapons from drawdowns of current US stockpiles that the US Department of Defense (DoD) received money to replenish, and the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, in which the United States funds the purchase of weapons for Ukraine from US defense firms. White House Deputy Press Secretary Anna Kelly stated on July 1 that US authorities made the decision following a DoD review of US military support to states around the world.[iii] Six defense officials, congressional officials, and other sources told NBC that the Pentagon ordered the pause after a review of US munitions stockpiles.[iv] NBC's defense and congressional sources stated that the United States could hold up the weapons flow to Ukraine until the assessment of US stockpiles is complete but that the United States could extend the pause of military assistance to Ukraine even longer if the weapons are in short supply or if the United States needs to supply them to other parts of the world.

The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) stated on July 2 that continued deliveries of previously allocated US defense packages are critically important, particularly in order to strengthen Ukraine's air defense.[v] The Ukrainian MFA emphasized that any delay in supporting Ukraine's defense capabilities will encourage Russia to continue its war — and not seek peace. The Ukrainian MFA stated that US-Ukrainian consultations about defense supplies are ongoing at all levels and that Ukraine will speak with the United States about finding mutually beneficial solutions to strengthen Ukraine's defense capabilities.

The decision to suspend military aid to Ukraine will likely force Ukrainian forces to continue to husband materiel, although the exact timing of the planned deliveries that the United States paused remains unclear at this time. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated that Ukraine had not received any official notifications about any suspension or revision to the delivery schedules of the agreed US military aid prior to the US announcement.[vi] The New York Times (NYT) reported that US officials stated that the United States had not scheduled to ship the affected munitions to Ukraine for several months, but the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported that US weapons shipments already in Poland were halted as of July 1.[vii] A Trump administration official told Politico that the administration had not requested any further aid but that there is enough aid left over from the Biden administration to last Ukraine "several more months."[viii] The deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion told the Washington Post in an article published on July 2, however, that Ukrainian forces already have to concentrate on holding positions and conserving resources rather than advancing.[ix] Ukrainian forces have had to husband critical materiel, including air defense interceptors, GMLRS rockets, and artillery shells, during previous suspensions of US aid. Ukraine's European partners are increasing their efforts to provide Ukraine with military assistance and the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) continues its efforts to become self-sufficient, but only the United States can provide certain weapons systems at scale and quickly.[x] Ukrainian forces very likely will have to conserve materiel again should the United States continue to suspend weapons deliveries.

The suspension of US aid to Ukraine will likely accelerate Russian gains on the battlefield, as previous US aid suspensions have in the past. Delays in US military aid in Fall 2023 and Winter-Spring 2024 set conditions for Russian forces to make more accelerated battlefield gains than Russian forces had previously been able to make.[xi] Russian forces significantly intensified offensive operations near Avdiivka, Donetsk Oblast in mid-January 2024 and concentrated significant manpower and materiel to their effort to seize the settlement in mid-February 2024 amid the protracted debate in the US (from October 2023 until April 2024) about passing supplemental aid for Ukraine. Ukrainian forces also faced significant artillery constraints during the Russian offensive against Avdiivka, allowing Russian forces to attack under less pressure from Ukrainian counterbattery fire. Russian forces sustained a high tempo of offensive operations after seizing Avdiivka in order to push as far west as possible, and Russian forces subsequently launched offensive operations in Spring 2024 intended to seize Pokrovsk when the suspension of US assistance was still greatly constraining Ukrainian materiel supplies.[xii] ISW assesses that Russian forces advanced roughly three kilometers per day between the suspension of US aid to Ukraine on December 6, 2023 and the resumption of aid on April 24, 2024, much of which was in Donetsk Oblast — as compared to the six months prior to the December 2023 aid suspension when Russian forces actually lost a total of roughly 203 square kilometers at a rate of 1.1 square kilometers lost per day (due to Ukraine’s gains during the 2023 counteroffensive, which was enabled by the US and other allies surging military aid to Ukraine).

Russian forces also notably intensified offensive operations in Kursk Oblast following the suspension of US intelligence sharing in early March 2025.[xiii] Russian forces, augmented by North Korean forces, had been trying to push Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast through slow, grinding advances since the start of Ukraine's incursion in August 2024. The Trump administration suspended US intelligence sharing with Ukraine on March 5, and Russian forces intensified offensive operations to expel Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast on March 6 and 7.[xiv] Ukrainian sources reportedly stated at the time that Russian forces started making more rapid advances in Kursk Oblast on March 5 and that the suspension of US intelligence sharing impacted Ukrainian operations in Kursk Oblast the most. Kremlin officials at the time announced their intention to take advantage of the suspension of US military aid and intelligence sharing to "inflict maximum damage" to Ukrainian forces "on the ground."[xv] Russian forces very likely exploited the US suspension of aid and intelligence sharing in March 2025 to accelerate Russia’s ongoing counteroffensive operation in Kursk Oblast. ISW assesses that Russian forces advanced at a rate of about 31 square kilometers per day in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast between the suspension of US intelligence sharing with Ukraine on March 3, 2025 and the resumption of intelligence sharing on March 11, 2025 — as opposed to a rate of advance of about 19 square kilometers per day in the six months prior to the intelligence sharing suspension.

The suspension of US aid to Ukraine will reinforce Russian President Vladimir Putin's theory of victory that posits that Russia can win the war of attrition by making slow, creeping advances and outlasting Western support for Ukraine. Putin articulated a theory of victory in June 2024 — and has emphasized this same theory of victory since — that assumes that Russian forces will be able to continue gradual, creeping advances indefinitely and win a war of attrition against Ukrainian forces.[xvi] Putin's theory assumes that Russia will be able to outlast pledged Western security assistance and that Ukraine will not acquire and sustain the manpower and materiel needed to prevent these gradual Russian gains or to contest the initiative and conduct counteroffensive operations to liberate Ukrainian territory. The latest US suspension of aid will strengthen Putin's belief that time is on Russia's side and his commitment to delaying negotiations toward a peace settlement and protracting the war.

Russia remains unlikely to make operational-level breakthroughs in the near future. Future Russian gains — even relatively accelerated advances following the suspension of US aid — will likely remain gradual and creeping and result in disproportionally high losses as Russian forces still have not restored operational maneuver to the increasingly transparent battlefield. ISW has observed geolocated evidence to assess that Russian forces gained roughly 498 square kilometers in May 2025 and roughly 466 square kilometers in June 2025, and Russian gains in January to April 2025 ranged from roughly 175 to 590 square kilometers per month. These Russian gains are remarkably smaller than the 1,265 square kilometers per day that ISW assesses Russian forces were gaining at the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in March 2022.

Russia appears, however, to be preparing to undertake likely months- and years-long offensive campaigns — demonstrating the Russian military command's acceptance of continued slow, gradual advances and Putin's belief in his theory of victory. The Russian military command has recently prioritized efforts to attack Ukraine's fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast, a campaign that is likely to take Russia years to achieve at Russian forces’ current tempo.[xvii] Russian forces may not be able to achieve these objectives by themselves. CNN reported on July 2 that a Ukrainian intelligence assessment stated that North Korea will likely send an additional 25,000 to 30,000 soldiers to Russia in the coming months and that there is a "great possibility" that the North Korean forces will augment Russian forces in Ukraine, including "during large-scale offensive operations."[xviii]

Kremlin officials are responding to the US military aid suspension by publicly flouting Putin's theory of military victory as successful — in direct opposition to US President Donald Trump's stated goal of bringing Russia to the negotiating table and achieving a lasting and just peace. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on July 2 in response to the suspension of US military aid that the "fewer weapons that are supplied to Ukraine, the closer the end of the [Russian invasion of Ukraine] is."[xix] Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev, who has been heavily involved in diplomatic and rhetorical efforts vis-à-vis Ukraine and the United States, stated that the suspension "raises questions about the West's ability to continue supporting Ukraine."[xx] Russian State Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Zhuravlev suggested that the US military aid suspension will degrade Ukraine's ability to "hold out" against Russian offensive operations and claimed that the United States will not be able to "hide" any future arms deliveries to Ukraine from Russia.[xxi] These Russian statements underscore how the Kremlin perceives Putin's theory of victory as it relates to Western — particularly American — military assistance to Ukraine and flout the Kremlin's goal of coercing the United States and other Western states into ceasing military assistance to Ukraine.[xxii] The Kremlin is capitalizing on the US aid suspension to intensify its messaging that Europe should also cease weapons supplies to Ukraine. Putin had a phone call with French President Emmanuel Macron on July 2, the first Putin-Macron call in nearly three years, and used the call to reiterate boilerplate Kremlin narratives aimed at discouraging further Western military assistance to Ukraine.[xxiii] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova also criticized continued European military assistance to Ukraine.[xxiv] The Kremlin's messaging about the suspension of US military aid to Ukraine is yet another indicator that Russia remains committed to achieving its war goals by force and is uninterested in meaningful peace negotiations to end the war.[xxv] These senior Russian officials’ statements indicate that suspending US military aid to Ukraine very likely will not compel Russia to conduct meaningful negotiations with Ukraine as President Trump desires, but rather embolden Moscow to continue protracting Russia’s war.

The Kremlin is also using the US aid suspension as a basis to continue rhetorical attacks against European defensive efforts that are in line with Trump's initiative for Europe to shoulder more of the burden for collective defense. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko claimed on July 2 that the European Union's (EU) increased defense spending and development of its DIB show that the EU is becoming an “aggressive military bloc” that Russia will have to defend itself against.[xxvi] Grushko claimed that the EU carries out NATO's tasks and that the two organizations are deeply linked. Zakharova also claimed that the EU is turning into a military bloc and is "pumping" Ukraine with weapons.[xxvii] Russian Ambassador to Norway Nikolay Korchunov told the Russian state news agency RIA Novosti in an interview published on June 30 that Norway is trying to benefit from the "militarization" of Europe and is "pumping up" the Ukrainian military.[xxviii] Korchunov claimed that Norway is intensifying NATO military exercises on Norwegian territory near the Russian border and that Norway's militarization will increase tension and escalation risks in the Arctic and destabilize European security. Russian officials continue to mischaracterize increased NATO defense spending that is aimed at deterring war in Europe by building defense capabilities in response to Russia’s ongoing efforts to restructure and expand Russia’s military capabilities.[xxix] The Kremlin's efforts to deter Western military assistance to Ukraine and European rearmament efforts are part of its wider cognitive warfare efforts that aim to shape Western decision-making and erode the West's will to act against Russian interests and resist Russia.[xxx]

The US decision to suspend military aid to Ukraine will particularly degrade Ukraine's ability to defend against Russia's enhanced long-range missile and drone strike capabilities that have inflicted significant civilian casualties — in sharp contrast to President Trump's stated objective of stopping civilian casualties in Ukraine. US provisions of Patriot air defense systems and interceptors have been critical for Ukraine's ability to defend against Russia's missile strikes, particularly those with ballistic missiles.[xxxi] Russia's long-range strikes have increasingly targeted densely populated cities far from the frontline.[xxxii] Russia has recently prioritized expanding its long-range drone and missile production and stockpiling its ballistic missiles, enabling Russia to conduct larger, more effective combined missile and drone strike series against Ukraine.[xxxiii] Russia has notably conducted five of its largest combined strikes against Ukraine throughout the full-scale invasion between March and June 2025 and is launching an increasingly high number of Shahed and decoy drones that overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses, allowing more Russian missiles to hit their targets.[xxxiv] Russia has also recently adapted its strike tactics to inflict maximum damage to civilians, including by deploying cluster munitions with delayed detonations, and Shahed drones equipped with capsules of chemical weapons and conducting "double tap" strikes that maximize casualties of civilian first responders.[xxxv] Russia will very likely continue to increase the size of its combined strikes against Ukraine as Russia remains committed to accelerating its missile and drone production. The US suspension of critical Patriot interceptor supplies to Ukraine will likely impact Ukraine's ability to protect its critical, industrial, and civilian infrastructure. Russian forces exploited pauses in US military aid to Ukraine in late 2023 and early 2024 to conduct large-scale combined strikes designed to exhaust Ukraine's degraded air defense umbrella that was suffering from the lack of Western aid.[xxxvi] A dwindling supply of Patriot interceptors will force Ukraine to continue to make difficult defense prioritization decisions.

Key Takeaways:

• The United States paused weapons supplies to Ukraine, including critical air defense interceptors, artillery shells, missiles, and rockets.
• The decision to suspend military aid to Ukraine will likely force Ukrainian forces to continue to husband materiel, although the exact timing of the planned deliveries that the United States paused remains unclear at this time.
• The suspension of US aid to Ukraine will likely accelerate Russian gains on the battlefield, as previous US aid suspensions have in the past.
• The suspension of US aid to Ukraine will reinforce Russian President Vladimir Putin's theory of victory that posits that Russia can win the war of attrition by making slow, creeping advances and outlasting Western support for Ukraine.
• Kremlin officials are responding to the US military aid suspension by publicly flouting Putin's theory of military victory as successful — in direct opposition to US President Donald Trump's stated goal of bringing Russia to the negotiating table and achieving a lasting and just peace.
• The Kremlin is also using the US aid suspension as a basis to continue rhetorical attacks against European defensive efforts that are in line with Trump's initiative for Europe to shoulder more of the burden for collective defense.
• The US decision to suspend military aid to Ukraine will particularly degrade Ukraine's ability to defend against Russia's enhanced long-range missile and drone strike capabilities that have inflicted significant civilian casualties — in sharp contrast to President Trump's stated objective of stopping civilian casualties in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast. Russian forces advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and near Toretsk and Novopavlivka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 1, 2025

A Russian occupation official claimed that Russian forces seized the entirety of Luhansk Oblast for the second time during Russia's full-scale invasion, but Russian milbloggers denied this claim. Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik claimed on June 30 that Russian forces seized all of Luhansk Oblast.[1] Russian milbloggers denied Pasechnik's claim, however, stating that Russian forces have not cleared Nadiya and Novoyehorivka (both east of Borova).[2] One milblogger claimed that some border areas are still contested "gray zones."[3] Then-Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu claimed on July 3, 2022, that Russian forces captured all of Luhansk Oblast, but Ukrainian forces were subsequently able to regain positions in Luhansk Oblast during the Fall 2022 Kharkiv counteroffensive.[4] Ukrainian forces made advances in Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts during the Fall 2022 counteroffensive and disrupted Russian plans to resume efforts to drive on the northern edge of the "fortress belt" in Donetsk Oblast.[5] Russian forces have since failed to retake significant swathes of territory that Ukrainian forces liberated in the Kharkiv counteroffensive, including Kupyansk, Borova, Izyum, and Lyman. Russian forces intensified offensive operations in the Kupyansk, Borova, and Lyman directions in early 2024 and have continued attempts to advance toward these three settlements over the last one and a half years.[6] ISW assessed in late November 2024 that Russian forces had seized roughly 99 percent of Luhansk Oblast, and Russian forces have struggled in the seven months to seize the last one percent.[7]

The Russian military command is modernizing Russian training grounds to include motorcycle tracks and reportedly intends to purchase up to 200,000 Chinese-made motorcycles for the Russian military. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published footage on June 27 and 28 showing Russian officials visiting the Novosibirsk Higher Military Command School and a new military training ground in Krasnodar Krai and highlighted that Russia is creating motorcycle training programs at these facilities.[8] Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov and Russian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Andrei Mordvichev discussed improving Russia's ability to train forces and generate new officers at the Novosibirsk Higher Military Command School, and Belousov ordered Mordvichev to equip the school with motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) to help train cadets in modern tactics. Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov stated that the Krasnodar Krai training ground has a modern driving range for motorcycles, ATVs, and quad bikes and noted that Russia has modernized over 200 training centers to account for the new tactics that Russian forces are using in Ukraine. The Russian military command has been working to formalize motorcycle tactics and training throughout the Russian military in recent months.[9]

Russian sources continue to speculate on the Russian MoD's ability to formalize and further improve Russian motorcycle usage, however. A Russian Telegram channel claimed on June 13 that Mordvichev pioneered the use of motorcycles and ATVs in late 2024 in order to facilitate further Russian advances toward Pokrovsk.[10] The Telegram channel stated that the Russian force grouping in the Pokrovsk direction developed formal norms for using motorcycles by June 2025 and that the Russian military command is attempting to replicate these norms in other frontline areas. The Telegram channel reiterated that Russian servicemembers receive most of their motorcycles from volunteer organizations or purchase motorcycles independently, but noted that Mordvichev intends for the Russian MoD to centrally provide motorcycles for troops and establish a motorcycle stockpile. The Telegram channel, citing unspecified sources in the Russian military, stated that Russia purchased over 40,000 Chinese-made motorcycles in 2024 and that Russian forces have received 20,000 of these motorcycles. One Russian military source told the channel that the Russian MoD intends to purchase 120,000 motorcycles, 30,000 ATVs, and 12,000 buggies by the end of 2025. Another source in the Russian MoD stated that the MoD intends to purchase up to 200,000 motorcycles and 60,000 other types of light vehicles — likely in 2025. The Telegram channel stated that Mordvichev also intends to hire a group of instructors to teach troops how to best operate motorcycles and that some of these instructors may be former Wagner Group members.

A Russian milblogger and former Storm Z instructor complained on June 30 that Russian motorcycles and ATVs are vulnerable to Ukrainian first-person view (FPV) drone strikes and that Russian motorcycle assaults result in higher killed-in-action (KIA) to wounded-in-action (WIA) ratios, however.[11] The milblogger noted that motorcycle assaults could be more successful should Russian forces use motorcycles in tandem with significant air, drone, and electronic warfare (EW) support. Motorcycle usage has allowed Russian forces to marginally improve their ability to dodge Ukrainian drones in contested "gray zones" along the frontline, but Russia's rate of advance has yet to increase beyond a foot pace despite efforts to integrate faster-moving vehicles into assault tactics.

Ukrainian forces continue to strike defense industrial enterprises in Russia's rear. Sources within Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne on July 1 that SBU drones struck the “Kupol” Electromechanical Plant in Izhevsk, Republic of Udmurtia.[12] The SBU sources reported that the drones traveled 1,300 kilometers to the target and that at least two drones struck two factory buildings, causing a fire. The SBU sources reported that the plant produces Tor and Osa air defense systems and Garpiya long-range strike drones. Geolocated footage published on July 1 shows a drone striking the plant, causing an explosion.[13] Republic of Udmurtia Head Alexander Brechalov acknowledged on July 1 that Ukrainian drones struck an enterprise in Izhevsk, starting a fire.[14] Russian milbloggers largely responded to the strike by continuing to call for Russian authorities to strengthen air defenses to protect the defense industrial base in the Russian rear.[15]

 The Ukrainian military command continues to transition to a corps structure and improve its training system. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on July 1 that the Ukrainian command will assign training battalions to the newly created army corps and that the training battalions will operate as part of unit training centers.[16] Syrskyi announced that Deputy Chief of Staff of the Ukrainian General Staff Major General Ihor Skybyuk will oversee the training. Syrskyi announced a prohibition on accumulations of Ukrainian forces and means and tent camps, likely in response to recent Russian strikes against Ukrainian concentrations in the Ukrainian rear.[17] Syrskyi stated that Ukrainian authorities are building structures to protect training areas from strikes. Syrskyi noted that Ukrainian forces will undergo more training to counter Russian strike drones.

 Russian-Azerbaijani relations continue to deteriorate over a number of smaller-scale incidents in recent days, inflaming unresolved disputes over the December 2024 Russian shoot down of an Azerbaijan Airlines plane. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) protested on July 1 against Azerbaijan's "unfriendly actions" that the Russian MFA claimed are "deliberate" steps to dismantle bilateral relations.[18] The Russian MFA claimed that the recent detention of ethnic Azerbaijanis in Yekaterinburg was lawful and that Baku's accusations against Russian law enforcement agencies are an interference in Russia's internal affairs. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov accused Baku of taking actions that are "not in line" with the "spirit and character" of Russian-Azerbaijani relations.[19] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev spoke on the phone on July 1 and discussed the detentions in Yekaterinburg.[20] Russian milbloggers largely criticized Azerbaijan for deliberately trying to undermine its relationship with Russia and claimed that Azerbaijani authorities and media are trying to play up the detention of ethnic Azerbaijanis in Russia to galvanize Azerbaijani society against Russia.[21] Azerbaijani-Russian relations deteriorated in late 2024 when Russia refused to take full responsibility for the December 25, 2024, downing of an Azerbaijan Airlines passenger plane, likely shot in mid-air by Russian air defense before crashing in Kazakhstan.[22]

 An investigation by the Center for Human Rights in Armed Conflict found that Russian forces were responsible for a 2022 strike that killed Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in occupied Donetsk Oblast, as ISW assessed at the time. The Center for Human Rights in Armed Conflict reported on June 26 that Russian forces conducted the July 28, 2022, strike against a barracks at the Volnovaska Penal Colony near Olenivka, Donetsk Oblast that killed Ukrainian POWs.[23] The Center for Human Rights in Armed Conflict reported that available evidence disproves the Russian claim that Ukrainian forces struck the barracks with HIMARS rockets. The report found that Lyubivka (roughly four kilometers east of Olenivka) was the likely launch site of the strike. The Center for Human Rights in Armed Conflict reported that the Russian military — likely a group affiliated with the Russian General Staff — planned and organized the strike and likely coordinated with the Federal Service in Executing Punishments (FSIN). ISW assessed at the time of the strike that Russian forces were responsible for the killing of 53 Ukrainian POWs at the Russian-controlled prison.[24]

 Key Takeaways:

• A Russian occupation official claimed that Russian forces seized the entirety of Luhansk Oblast for the second time during Russia's full-scale invasion, but Russian milbloggers denied this claim.
• The Russian military command is modernizing Russian training grounds to include motorcycle tracks and reportedly intends to purchase up to 200,000 Chinese-made motorcycles for the Russian military.
• Ukrainian forces continue to strike defense industrial enterprises in Russia's rear.
• The Ukrainian military command continues to transition to a corps structure and improve its training system.
• Russian-Azerbaijani relations continue to deteriorate over a number of smaller-scale incidents in recent days, inflaming unresolved disputes over the December 2024 Russian shoot down of an Azerbaijan Airlines plane.
• An investigation by the Center for Human Rights in Armed Conflict found that Russian forces were responsible for a 2022 strike that killed Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in occupied Donetsk Oblast, as ISW assessed at the time.
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces advanced near Toretsk and Novopavlivka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 30, 2025

High-ranking Kremlin statements, including from Russian President Vladimir Putin, continue to demonstrate Russia's wider territorial ambitions in Ukraine beyond Crimea and the four oblasts that Russia has illegally annexed. Russian President Vladimir Putin held a meeting on June 30 on the socioeconomic development of occupied Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts during which he frequently referred to occupied Ukraine as “Donbas and Novorossiya.”[1] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded on June 30 to a June 27 statement by Odesa City Mayor Gennadiy Trukhanov that Odesa City is not a “Russian” city and has its own history, claiming that the history of Odesa City is "inextricably linked" with Russia.[2] Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky claimed on June 30 that Russians and Ukrainians are "one people" with a "historical homeland" and referenced the "ancient Russian lands on both sides of the Dnipro (River), Novorossiya, and Crimea."[3]

Putin's, Peskov's, and Medinsky's June 30 statements are only the latest statements from high-ranking Kremlin officials indicating the extent of Russia's territorial ambitions. Putin reiterated at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) on June 20 that he considers the Russian and Ukrainian people to be "one people in reality" and that "Ukraine is [Russia's]."[4] Kremlin officials have routinely labelled Odesa City as a "Russian" city, including Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov most recently on June 9.[5] Kremlin officials have also repeatedly referenced "Novorossiya," which Russian officials have defined as all of eastern and southern Ukraine.[6] Medinsky's reference to the "ancient Russian" lands on "both sides of the Dnipro" also coheres with Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo's April 2025 call for Russia to completely control the areas of the Dnipro River that pass through Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.[7] Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Colonel Pavlo Palisa stated in early June 2025 that Russia intends to occupy the entirety of Ukraine on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River and seize Odesa Oblast by the end of 2026.[8] Putin and other Kremlin officials have consistently indicated that they do not believe that Ukraine is an independent state with its own history, identity, and culture separate from Russia.[9] Russian officials' ongoing commitment to these narratives demonstrates the Kremlin's continued objective of destroying the Ukrainian state and subjugating the Ukrainian people.

The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN OHCHR) issued its December 2024-May 2025 report detailing Ukrainian civilian casualties, systemic Russian mistreatment of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs), and limited Ukrainian mistreatment of Russian POWs. The UN OHCHR reported that 968 Ukrainian civilians died and 4,807 sustained injuries from conflict-related violence from December 1, 2024, to May 31, 2025 — a 37 percent increase compared to the same time period last year.[10] The UN OHCHR assessed that the vast majority of these civilian casualties resulted from Russian military operations to seize territory along the front, the use of explosives in urban areas, and the increased use of short-range combat drones. The UN OHCHR reported that it had recorded credible allegations of the execution of 106 Ukrainian POWs by Russian forces between late August 2024 and May 2025, with 35 of these executions likely occurring between December 2024 and May 2025. The report stated that most of these executions occurred in areas where Russian forces were advancing in Donetsk and Kursk oblasts. The UN OHCHR reported that interviews with Ukrainian POWs released from Russian captivity confirmed Russia's "widespread and systematic" practices of torture. The report states that the UN verified the execution of one Russian soldier rendered hors de combat by a Ukrainian soldier in late 2024. The UN OHCHR stated that it has verified the execution of 26 persons hors de combat, including Russian POWs, by Ukrainian forces since February 2022, but that all but one of these executions occurred in 2022 or early 2023. The UN OHCHR stated that interviewed POWs held in Ukrainian captivity reported torture and ill-treatment, but noted that most of these acts occurred in transit places before arrival at official internment locations. Russian state media largely misrepresented the UN OHCHR report by ignoring assessments about Russia's widespread execution and systemic mistreatment of Ukrainian POWs and reporting only on the assessments about Ukrainian mistreatment of Russian POWs.[11] Russian state media similarly misrepresented the UN OHCHR's previous reports.[12]

The Kremlin is poised to launch a new "national messenger" application affiliated with Kremlin-controlled social media site VKontakte (VK) as part of ongoing efforts to censor Russian citizens and isolate them from the global internet. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on June 24 approving the creation of a national messenger application that will allow Russian citizens to virtually access government services and documents.[13] The decree orders that the application combine the functions of a social media messenger application with government services and documents and that it be available by Fall 2025. Russian citizens would not be able to have an anonymous social media presence on this national messenger application. VK announced its "Max" digital platform and messenger application in March 2025, and Russian officials have acknowledged that Max could serve as the basis for the new "national messenger" application.[14] The Kremlin has reportedly been planning to partner with VK to launch a national messenger since at least Fall 2024.[15] A source familiar with VK's plans told Russian news organization Vedomosti in March 2025 that Max could become an analogue to the Chinese WeChat application.[16] A Max representative told Vedomosti on June 30 that one million users have registered with the beta-version of Max over the last "several weeks."[17] Russian State Duma Information Technology (IT) Committee First Deputy Chairperson Anton Gorelkin claimed on June 5 that Russia will not ban Telegram in connection with the launch of Max, although the Kremlin may attempt to ban Telegram and other social media connected to the Western world in the medium- to long-term if the roll out of the new national messenger application is successful.[18]

Azerbaijani authorities raided the offices of Russian state-owned propaganda outlet Sputnik in Baku as Russian-Azerbaijani relations have deteriorated recently after a raid against ethnic Azerbaijanis in Russia. Azerbaijani outlet Qafqazinfo reported on June 30, citing the Azerbaijani Ministry of Internal Affairs, that local police raided the office of Sputnik in Baku.[19] Local Azerbaijani outlets claimed that Azerbaijani authorities detained two Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) agents during the raid on Sputnik's Baku office.[20] The Azerbaijani Ministry of Internal Affairs stated that Sputnik had continued working in Azerbaijan via "illegal financing" despite the revocation of its official accreditation in February 2025.[21]  The raid on the Sputnik office in Baku comes after a recent raid by Russian security forces in Yekaterinburg that resulted in the detention of nine Azerbaijani citizens accused of contract killings in the early 2000s and left two Azerbaijanis dead.[22] The Azerbaijani Ministry of Culture cancelled all cultural events that Russia organized in Azerbaijan, and Azerbaijani officials cancelled planned trips to Moscow in response to the Yekaterinburg raid.[23] Continued Azerbaijani restraints on Russian state media or cultural events in Azerbaijan would likely further deteriorate bilateral relations and undermine Russia's influence in the south Caucasus, particularly as the Kremlin uses its media presence and cultural soft power abroad to further its objectives in the former Soviet space.[24]

Key Takeaways:

• High-ranking Kremlin statements, including from Russian President Vladimir Putin, continue to demonstrate Russia's wider territorial ambitions in Ukraine beyond Crimea and the four oblasts that Russia has illegally annexed.
• The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN OHCHR) issued its December 2024-May 2025 report detailing Ukrainian civilian casualties, systemic Russian mistreatment of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs), and limited Ukrainian mistreatment of Russian POWs.
• The Kremlin is poised to launch a new "national messenger" application affiliated with Kremlin-controlled social media site VKontakte (VK) as part of ongoing efforts to censor Russian citizens and isolate them from the global internet.
• Azerbaijani authorities raided the offices of Russian state-owned propaganda outlet Sputnik in Baku as Russian-Azerbaijani relations have deteriorated recently after a raid against ethnic Azerbaijanis in Russia.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk and Novopavlivka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 29, 2025

Russia conducted its largest combined strike series of the war on the night of June 28 to 29 by launching over 500 missiles and drones against Ukraine. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian launched a total of 537 strike vehicles, including 447 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[i] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched four Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles from the airspace above Tambov Oblast; seven Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Voronezh Oblast; 41 Kh-101/Iskander-K cruise missiles from Saratov, Kursk, and Bryansk oblasts; five Kalibr cruise missiles from the Black Sea; and three S-300 air defense missiles from Kursk Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 221 drones, one Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missile, 33 Kh-101/Iskander-K cruise missiles, and four Kalibr cruise missiles and that 225 drones and one Kh-101/Iskander-K cruise missile were "lost in location" or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck civilian infrastructure, including residences and educational facilities, in Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk, Cherkasy, and Mykolaiv oblasts and railway and industrial infrastructure in Lviv and Poltava oblasts.[ii] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky acknowledged that a Ukrainian F-16 fighter pilot died while repelling the strikes.[iii] Russia is continuing to use increasingly large numbers of drones in its overnight strike packages in order to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and enable subsequent cruise and ballistic missile strikes.[iv] The increases in Russia's strike packages in recent weeks are largely due to Russia's efforts to scale up its defense industrial production, particularly of Shahed and decoy drones and ballistic missiles.[v]

[strikes graphic]

Ukrainian forces were notably only able to shoot down one of the seven Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles and did not shoot down any of the four Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles during the June 28 to 29 strike series. Zelensky called on Ukraine to strengthen its air defenses and reiterated that Ukraine is ready to buy US air defense systems.[vi] US President Donald Trump recently spoke with Zelensky about possible US sales of Patriot air defense systems on June 25.[vii] Patriot systems are vital to Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian ballistic missile strikes, especially as Russia is reportedly increasing its production and stockpile of ballistic missile production capacity to enable larger and more frequent ballistic missile strikes against Ukraine.[viii]

Russia appears to be increasingly striking civilian areas in its large-scale strike packages. Kyiv City Military Administration Head Timur Tkachenko stated that Russia has changed its strike tactics in order to inflict as much damage to civilian areas as possible.[ix] Tkachenko noted that Russian missile and drone strikes heavily targeted Kyiv City three times in June 2025, launching a total of 285 drones and 65 missiles against the capital so far in June 2025 – a sharp increase from the 35 drones and one ballistic missile that Russian forces launched against Kyiv City in January 2025. Tkachenko noted that 42 civilians, including a child, have died due to Russian strikes against the capital since the start of June 2025 and that 234 people, including 11 children, have sustained injuries. Tkachenko reported that Russian forces are conducting "double tap" strikes against emergency responders and using cluster munitions with delayed detonations that threaten both civilians and rescue workers. ISW has observed Russian officials and milbloggers respond to recent large-scale and deadly Russian strikes against Kyiv City by calling on Russia to intensify its strikes.[x]

Satellite imagery and Russian government announcements indicate that Russia is trying to increase its aircraft production in the medium- to long-term. Finnish outlet Yle reported on June 28 that satellite imagery collected between mid-2024 and May 2025 shows that Russia has constructed or expanded at least five buildings at the Kazan Aviation Plant by 19,000 square meters.[xi] Yle reported that the plant produces and modernizes Russian strategic Tupolev aircraft, such as the Tu-160M, Tu-160M2, and Tu-22M3, as well as helicopters. Yle reported that Russian authorities plan to continue new construction until the end of 2026 to increase the plant's production capabilities. The Russian state United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) press service announced in January 2025 that officials had already built a new final assembly hall, upgraded manufacturing technology, and procured new equipment for the plant, such as computer numerical control machine tools, welding robots, and measurement and control systems.[xii] UAC reported that Russia intends for the Kazan plant to produce four Tu-214 aircraft by 2025, seven by 2026, 17 by 2027, and 28 annually by 2028. Russian regional outlet Evening Kazan reported in February 2025 that Russian officials plan to spend as much as 90 billion rubles (about $1.2 billion) on the plant's modernization.[xiii] Yle reported that the plant is struggling to keep pace with the modernization and increased aircraft production plans due to sanctions and Russia's ongoing labor shortages.[xiv] Yle reported that the plant only delivered two Tu-160M2s and two Tu-160Ms in 2024. The plant’s current annual production rate remains unclear, however, as the Tupolevs that the plant delivered in 2024 have likely been under construction for some time. Sanctions and parts and labor shortages will likely continue to slow Russia's aircraft production, even as Russia works to expand physical production capabilities.

Russia is also reportedly expanding its production of Sukhoi aircraft. UAC Head Vadim Badekha announced on June 25 that Russia intends to increase the production effectiveness of Sukhoi aircraft by 30 percent by 2030.[xv] Badekha stated that Russia is working to increase its Sukhoi production volumes beyond its 2024 production rate. Ukrainian military observer Oleksandr Kovalenko stated in May 2025 that Russia can currently produce a Sukhoi aircraft in one to two months.[xvi] ISW previously reported that UAC intends to lay off 1,500 managerial staff in Moscow and assessed that the Kremlin may be deprioritizing the aircraft industry to conserve funds and materials for drone and weapons production.[xvii] Badekha's June 25 statement and Yel's satellite imagery assessment indicate that Russia is likely attempting to balance allocating significant resources to drone production with the continued need to produce traditional systems.

Key Takeaways:

• Russia conducted its largest combined strike series of the war on the night of June 28 to 29 by launching over 500 missiles and drones against Ukraine.
• Russia appears to be increasingly striking civilian areas in its large-scale strike packages.
• Satellite imagery and Russian government announcements indicate that Russia is trying to increase its aircraft production in the medium- to long-term.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Chasiv Yar.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 28, 2025

Ukrainian forces conducted a series of strikes against Russian military infrastructure and defense industrial base (DIB) facilities from June 26 to 28. Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reported on June 28 that the SBU conducted a drone strike that destroyed a Russian Pantsir-S1 air defense system and three combat helicopters — Mi-8, Mi-26, and Mi-28 — at the Kirovske Air Base in occupied Crimea on the night of June 27 and 28.[i] The SBU noted that the strike also caused a secondary explosion at the airfield. A local Crimean source reported on June 28 that the strike caused five to six explosions and likely damaged an ammunition depot, warehouses, and air defense facilities, and set at least one combat helicopter on fire.[ii] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 27 that Ukrainian Special Forces and the SBU struck the Marinovka Air Base in Volgograd Oblast on the night of June 26 and 27 and damaged four Su-34 aircraft and a technical maintenance facility.[iii] The Ukrainian General Staff is conducting ongoing battle damage assessments (BDA). An unspecified intelligence source told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne on June 28 that Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) conducted several drone strikes targeting facilities linked to the 120th arsenal of the Russian General Staff's Main Directorate (GRU) in Bryansk Oblast and that Ukrainian authorities are conducting BDA.[iv] An unspecified intelligence source reported on June 26 that the GUR conducted a drone strike against a fuel and lubricants depot located at the GRU's 1061st MTZ Center in Bryansk Oblast on the night of June 26 and 27.[v] Residents reported heavy gunfire and a series of explosions and noted that the oil depot was on fire.[vi]

Russia’s deployment of an experimental Grom-1 missile-bomb and likely efforts to increase its Shahed production are part of ongoing efforts to adapt Russian strike packages against Ukraine to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and cause maximum damage. Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Military Administration Head Serhiy Lysak reported on June 28 that Ukrainian air defenses downed a Russian Grom-1 hybrid missile-bomb on the outskirts of Dnipro City.[vii] A local Ukrainian air defender in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne on June 28 that Russian forces may have deployed an experimental KAB guided glide bomb as part of ongoing efforts to increase the range of KAB bombs.[viii] The local source stated that Russia has long used jet engines on the bomb to increase its range and likely used a bomb with a lighter warhead against Dnipro City to decrease the weight and increase the range of the bomb. The source also stated that Russian forces may have launched the bomb from a plane as close to Dnipro City as possible. Ukrainian political scientist and design engineer at satellite and rocket design enterprise Pivdnenne Design Office Oleksandr Kochetkov told Suspilne on June 28 that Russia created the Grom-1 as part of an effort to increase the range and accuracy of KAB bombs in order to preserve Russian aircraft that launch the bombs.[ix] Kochetkov stated that Grom-1 is a hybrid of a glide bomb and the Kh-38 air-to-air missile and uses the Kh-38 missile’s engine, which gives the bomb a range of 100 to 150 kilometers. Kochetkov noted that Russian forces used the Grom-1 possibly for the first time in August 2024 during a strike against Kostyantynivka, Donetsk Oblast, and that Russia is not yet mass producing Grom-1 missile-bombs.

Ukrainian outlet New Voice assessed on June 27 that satellite imagery from early October 2024 and June 2025 shows that Russia is expanding its Shahed factory in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) near Yelabuga, Republic of Tatarstan.[x] The imagery shows that Russia has built four new sites at the Alabuga SEZ spanning about 163 hectares between October 2024 and June 2025, and that another 30-hectare site is currently under construction. New Voice reported that the new construction includes dormitories for factory workers and that Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) previously assessed in June 2025 that laborers are Russia's main need to increase its drone production. New Voice noted that the GUR reported on June 21 that Russia produces up to 170 Shahed and decoy drones daily and that production rates may increase to 190 drones per day by the end of 2025. Japanese outlet NHK reported on June 19, citing unspecified Western and Russian diplomatic sources, that North Korea is “considering” sending 25,000 workers to drone production facilities at the Alabuga SEZ, and dormitory construction may be related to this possible influx of workers in the future.[xi]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces conducted a series of strikes against Russian military infrastructure and defense industrial base (DIB) facilities from June 26 to 28.
• Russia’s deployment of an experimental Grom-1 missile-bomb and likely efforts to increase its Shahed production are part of ongoing efforts to adapt Russian strike packages against Ukraine to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and cause maximum damage.
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Lyman. Russian forces advanced near Novopavlivka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 27, 2025

The Kremlin continues to downplay the social and economic costs of Russia's war in Ukraine and inflated military spending. Russian President Vladimir Putin told journalists on June 27, following the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) summit in Minsk, that sanctions cannot hurt Russia’s economy and that Russia's economic indicators are “satisfactory.”[1] Putin acknowledged that Russia’s economy is still contending with high inflation and that Russia’s economic growth in 2025 will be “much more modest to combat inflation.” Putin also claimed that Russia’s military budget is currently 6.3 percent of its GDP, or 13.5 trillion rubles (roughly $172 billion), and that Russia plans to steadily decrease defense spending beginning in 2026. Russia notably increased its defense budget by 25 percent between the 2024 and 2025 federal budgets and has been increasing its investments in Russia's defense industry throughout 2025.[2]

Putin’s statements likely seek to portray the Russian government as committed to social and civilian expenditures and to downplay recent indicators of the societal and economic toll of Russia’s war against Ukraine and corresponding prioritization of military-industrial sector investment. Russian officials previously claimed that the 2025-2027 federal budgets would prioritize civilian and social sector investments, despite the September 2024 draft budgets indicating Russia will spend roughly 41 percent of its annual expenditures in 2025 on national security and defense.[3] The Russian Finance Ministry more than tripled its budget deficit target for 2025 in May – from 0.5 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to 1.7 percent of GDP – after several months of staggeringly low oil and gas profits.[4] Russian Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina notably stated at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) on June 19 that Russia has exhausted many of its “free resources“ since the start of Russia‘s full-scale war against Ukraine, including Russia’s workforce, production and import substitution capacities, and reserves of the National Welfare Fund and Russia’s banking sector.[5] Russia’s military force generation strategy currently hinges on large recruitment and pension payouts, and it remains unclear how the Kremlin intends to fund these payments in the medium- to long-term, as Russia reportedly depleted the entire 2025 federal recruitment budget fund between January and March 2025.[6] Russia is also making significant financial investments in its domestic drone production capacity and committed 243 billion rubles (about $3 billion) to Russian drone companies between 2023 and 2024.[7] Any sharp decrease in Russia's defense spending will likely depress the Russian economy in the medium term, as Russia’s defense industrial base now accounts for a significant portion of overall Russian domestic production.

Putin also reiterated Kremlin narratives aimed at discrediting Ukraine and blaming the West and NATO for his decision to invade Ukraine. Putin claimed that Russia has agreed to conduct a third round of negotiations, is ready to meet with Ukraine in Istanbul, and has demonstrated its willingness to negotiate through prisoner of war (POW) and killed-in-action (KIA) exchanges.[8] Putin claimed that Ukraine is refusing to accept the bodies of some deceased servicemembers, an unsubstantiated claim that is part of an ongoing Russian information campaign depicting Ukraine as spoiling POW exchanges and KIA repatriations in order to provoke discontent and demoralize Ukrainian society and to discredit the Ukrainian government.[9] Putin reiterated Russia's long-term claim that NATO promised Russia it would never expand east and claimed that Russia was "crudely deceived."[10] Putin claimed that Western countries in opposition to Russia will "soon die" themselves. Putin also reiterated that Russia will only conclude its war against Ukraine on Russia’s terms and claimed that Russian defense spending is designed to achieve this goal. ISW has previously noted that Russia’s terms – the "denazification" and "demilitarization" of Ukraine, which Russia has demanded since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022 – amount to demands for regime change, the installation of a pro-Russian proxy government in Ukraine, and significant limitations on Ukraine's ability to defend itself against future Russian aggression.[11]

Open-source data suggests that Russia is increasingly investing in its defense industry and expanding its drone, infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), and aircraft production and shipbuilding capabilities – several of the key platforms that Russia would likely rely on in a future war with NATO. Data from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)-affiliated Center of Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-Term Forecasting published on June 26 indicates that Russia increased its industrial production by 2.6 percent between April and May 2025 and that the majority of this increase is due to a "sharp" increase in Russia's defense industrial output.[12] The center reported that Russia's monthly aircraft production rate increased by 16.9 percent in May 2025 compared to April 2025 and is 1.6 times greater than Russia's 2024 monthly production rates. The center reported that Russia increased its naval and aircraft production capacity by 16 percent between February and May 2025. The center's data suggests that Russia is attempting to expand its shipbuilding and aircraft production capacity, which are medium- to long-term efforts and likely part of Russia's ongoing force restructuring and regeneration efforts in preparation for a longer-term conflict with NATO.

Satellite imagery of select armored vehicle repair plants in Russia provides further evidence that Russia is increasing its ability to produce IFVs. A social media source tracking equipment at Russian military depots and repair facilities via satellite imagery reported on June 26 that Russia is now able to refurbish and produce more BMPs than before an unspecified time and that Russia's decreased use of armored vehicles and tanks since Winter 2024-2025 is allowing Russia to stockpile IFVs.[13] The source noted that the Kurganmashzavod remains the sole publicly known Russian facility capable of producing Soviet-era BMP-3 IFVs. The source stated that satellite imagery indicates that some Russian armor repair plants appear to have used most of their Soviet IFV stocks, although at least one production plant in Rubtsovsk, Altai Krai, appears to have dramatically improved its modernization capabilities. It remains unclear whether Russia is aiming to stockpile materiel in preparation for a larger offensive operation against Ukraine in the near to medium term or to reconstitute the Russian military in preparation for broader future conflict with NATO. Additional open-source intelligence indicates that Russia is successfully increasing its T-90M tank production capabilities, further underscoring Russia's ongoing investment in long-term tank and armored vehicle production capacity.[14]

Russia's ongoing efforts to expand drone production are having a more immediate impact on the frontline in Ukraine, although Russia will continue to benefit from enhanced drone production capabilities during any future conflict. Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov visited various Russian military industrial facilities in Novgorod Oblast on June 27, including a fiber-optic drone production site that produced Russia's first model of fiber-optic "Prince Vandal Novgorodsky" drones[15] The Russian government's press release of the visit reported that Russia is now capable of domestically producing hundreds of thousands of fiber-optic drones per month and fully satisfying the needs of the Russian Armed Forces. Manturov also visited a series of other defense companies in Novgorod Oblast, including companies that specialize in electronic components, and inspected the Intelligent Electronics-Valdai Innovative Scientific and Technological Center's new semiconductor materials science laboratory.[16] Manturov instructed the Ministry of Industry and Trade to examine the possibility of recapitalizing Novgorod Oblast's industrial development fund to support the production of high-tech products. ISW previously noted that Russian fiber optic production has allowed Russian forces to impose new battlefield dilemmas on Ukrainian forces starting in mid-2024 because these drones were resistant to electronic warfare (EW) interference, enable precision strikes on armored equipment, and are scalable due to their simplicity.[17]

Russian forces continue to implement tactical innovations that correspond with technological weapons system advancements. A Russian milblogger claimed on June 27 that Russian forces are increasingly utilizing Geran 2 and 3 drones – Russian analogues of the Iranian origin Shahed-136 – over guided glide bombs for short- to mid-range frontline strikes.[18] The milblogger noted that Russian forces began reprioritizing the use of Geran drones last winter when Russia began mass producing modernized Geran 2 drones with improved speed, range, and carrying capacities, and claimed that Russian forces are using these drones to target Ukrainian storage areas, command posts, and strongholds on the frontline and in the near rear. The milblogger noted that elements of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army [CAA] (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) have pioneered mass frontline use of Geran drones and that Russia's Central Grouping of Forces, operating largely in the Pokrovsk and Novopavlivka directions, will reportedly soon adopt the use of Geran 2 drones once Russian manufacturers further increase production rates. The milblogger assessed that Russian forces may be able to replace 500- and 1000-kilogram KAB glide bombs with Geran 3 drones if Russian developers are willing to compromise on the drone's range to account for an increased payload. The Russian milblogger’s analysis largely coheres with ISW's observations that Russian forces are increasingly using Shahed-like drones to strike Ukrainian targets along the frontline.[19] Russia's defense industrial base has thus far successfully increased Geran drone production rates and improved the Geran drone's precision and operability, which have enabled Russian forces to more readily deploy such drones along the frontline.[20]

Russia continues to use chemical weapons against Ukrainian forces and civilians in direct violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), of which Russia is a signatory. The Ukrainian Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security reported on June 27 that Ukrainian forces recorded 888 cases of Russian forces using chemical weapons in May 2025, including in grenades.[21] The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) published a report on June 26 confirming that environmental sample testing indicates that Russian forces used a first-person view (FPV) drone equipped with grenades containing chlorobenzalmalonodinitrile (CS) gas, a riot control agent (RCA) banned in modern warfare under the CWC, against Ukrainian forces near the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative boundary in June 2025.[22]

 Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin continues to downplay the social and economic costs of Russia's war in Ukraine and inflated military spending.
• Putin’s statements likely seek to portray the Russian government as committed to social and civilian expenditures and to downplay recent indicators of the societal and economic toll of Russia’s war against Ukraine and corresponding prioritization of military-industrial sector investment.
• Putin also reiterated Kremlin narratives aimed at discrediting Ukraine and blaming the West and NATO for his decision to invade Ukraine.
• Open-source data suggests that Russia is increasingly investing in its defense industry and expanding its drone, infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), and aircraft production and shipbuilding capabilities – several of the key platforms that Russia would likely rely on in a future war with NATO.
• Russia's ongoing efforts to expand drone production are having a more immediate impact on the frontline in Ukraine, although Russia will continue to benefit from enhanced drone production capabilities during any future conflict.
• Russian forces continue to implement tactical innovations that correspond with technological weapons system advancements.
• Russia continues to use chemical weapons against Ukrainian forces and civilians in direct violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), of which Russia is a signatory.
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Lyman. Russian forces advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast and near Kupyansk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 26, 2025

 South Korean intelligence suggests that North Korea may deploy North Korean troops to Ukrainian territory, which would represent a significant battlefield inflection. Reuters, citing a South Korean lawmaker privy to intelligence from South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS), reported on June 26 that North Korea may deploy an unspecified number of additional North Korean forces to Russia to fight against Ukraine as early as July or August 2025 and that North Korea continues to arm Russia with artillery ammunition and missiles.[1] The South Korean lawmaker told Reuters that the NIS assessed that Russia may be preparing to initiate a large-scale assault against Ukraine in July or August 2025 and that North Korea is likely receiving technical advice from Russia on satellite launches and missile guidance systems in return. ISW has observed evidence of North Korean forces augmenting Russian forces in Kursk Oblast and North Korea supplying Russia with artillery ammunition and ballistic missiles.[2] Ukrainian forces maintain a limited presence in Kursk Oblast, so North Korean personnel participating in combat operations would most likely be fighting in Ukrainian territory.[3] The North Korean and Russian military commands authorizing the deployment of North Korean forces to Ukrainian territory would mark a significant battlefield inflection that may improve Russian forces' ability to sustain simultaneous offensive operations in multiple directions, which the Russian military has traditionally struggled to conduct.[4] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces compensated by conducting pulsing, more contained, offensive operations along different sectors of the frontline, but recent reporting indicates that Russian forces appear to be gradually advancing in at least three simultaneous large-scale offensive operations in the Borova-Lyman, Kostyantynivka, and Novopavlivka directions.[5] It is not possible to forecast the likely impact of North Korean support of this type without more information about the size and composition of the North Korean troop contingent that would be going to Ukraine, nor is it clear how rapidly new North Korean troops would become effective in operations alongside Russian troops in Ukraine.

US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met at the NATO summit on June 25 and discussed possible US sales of Patriot air defense systems to Ukraine and joint weapons production. Trump stated that he and Zelensky did not talk about a possible ceasefire in Ukraine during the meeting, but that Trump may talk to Russian President Vladimir Putin in the near future about a ceasefire.[6] Zelensky stated that he reiterated during the meeting that Ukraine supports the US position on a ceasefire.[7] Zelensky stated that he and Trump discussed the increase in the number of "massive" Russian strikes against Ukraine's civilian infrastructure and people, and Trump stated that the United States "should consider" selling Patriot air defense systems and missiles to Ukraine as Ukraine's supply is limited.[8] Trump and Zelensky agreed to continue talks about strengthening Ukraine's air defense with European partners. Trump and Zelensky also discussed possible joint production of drones and electronic warfare (EW) equipment.[9] Zelensky stated in April 2025 that Ukraine proposed to the United States that Ukraine purchase "30 to 50 billion" (likely USD) worth of air defense and weapons systems from the United States and that Ukraine is prepared to purchase these systems itself — either through direct payment to the United States or through the fund established by the US-Ukrainian minerals deal.[10] Zelensky had stated that Ukraine will consider the provision of at least 10 air defense systems to Ukraine as a "security guarantee." US Patriot air defense systems are vital to Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian ballistic missile strikes and will become increasingly important as Russia is reportedly increasing its production and stockpile of ballistic missiles, which would enable larger and more frequent ballistic missile strikes against Ukraine.[11] ISW continues to assess that a strong Ukrainian military backed by Western security guarantees remains the most vital component of a stable post-war European security architecture, guaranteeing a sustainable peace in Ukraine and deterring future Russian aggression.[12]

Kremlin officials continue to platform bellicose rhetoric aimed at undermining Western support for Ukraine and to demonstrate Russia's uncompromising position on Ukraine. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko claimed on June 25 at the Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) conference that the West is adopting "hostile policies and military planning...that could explode from any spark."[13] Glushko further claimed that new Western military aid packages "fuel" the war in Ukraine.[14] The Kremlin regularly promotes rhetoric that is designed to pressure the West into making decisions that benefit Russia, such as refraining from providing further assistance to Ukraine, in response to the fact that sustained Western aid has allowed Ukrainian forces to impose significant challenges on Russian forces in Ukraine and threatens Russia's ability to achieve its war aims.[15]

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin reiterated on June 26 Russia's long-standing demand that Ukraine commit to an official non-aligned status and claimed that NATO violated promises from the early 1990s to refrain from expanding eastward.[16] Russia has consistently demanded that Ukraine commit to a neutral, non-aligned status, which would require Ukraine to amend its constitution and NATO to fundamentally alter its open-door policy.[17] The Kremlin continues to signal its unyielding demands and disinterest in peace, further indicating that Russia will very likely continue to pursue efforts to prolong negotiations in an attempt to extract additional concessions and secure additional gains on the battlefield.[18] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin will continue to protract the negotiation process so long as Russian leadership maintains the position that Russian forces can outlast Ukraine's defense capabilities and Western support for Ukraine.[19]

 Satellite imagery of select armored vehicle repair plants in Russia indicates that Russia continues to rely on refurbishing its Soviet-era stores of armored vehicles. A social media source tracking equipment at Russian military depots and repair facilities via satellite imagery shared on June 26 an updated analysis of Russian Armor Repair Plants (BTRZs) that repair damaged armored vehicles and refurbish stored vehicles and stated that most armored fighting vehicle (AFVs) that Russia is taking from storage are no longer in good enough condition to immediately deploy to the front without refurbishment, as Russia was able to do at the start of the war.[20] The source estimated that the 81st BTRZ in Armavir, Krasnodar Krai, which repairs and modernizes stored BTR-70/80 armored personnel carriers (APCs) and likely also repairs damaged BTRs from the battlefield, has likely been refurbishing up to 200 BTR-70/80/82 APCs annually since 2023.[21] The source estimated that the 144th BTRZ in Yekaterinburg, Sverdlovsk Oblast, which is the only BTRZ that refurbishes older BMD infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and also repairs BMP-2 and BMD-2 IFVs, has likely been annually refurbishing between 100 to 150 BMD-2 IFVs and BTR-D APCs since an unspecified year.[22]

The source estimated that the Arzamas Mechanical Plant in Arzamas, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, likely annually produces over 500 BTR-82 APCs but noted that satellite imagery showing a growing pile of hulls at the plant suggests that the plant is either increasing production rates or also does repairs of damaged BTRs.[23] The source noted that Arzamas’ production numbers are unclear but are likely high due to the high number of BTR-80/82s that Russian forces are losing in Ukraine and how quickly Russian forces are replenishing these vehicles.[24] The source also estimated that armored vehicle manufacturer Kurganmashzavod in Kurgan, Kurgan Oblast, likely annually produces 100 to 120 BMD-4M IFVs, roughly 360 BMP-3 IFVs, and 20 to 30 BTR-MDM APCs.[25]

Russia has maintained its offensive operations throughout the war by tapping into its Soviet-era stocks of armored vehicles to compensate for high loss rates, but this resource is finite and approaching a point of diminishing availability.[26] Russian forces have been increasingly using motorcycles and buggies in place of armored vehicles along the frontline in Ukraine due to high Russian vehicle losses in late 2023 and 2024.[27] The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) estimated in February 2025 that Russian forces lost over 3,700 IFVs and APCs in 2024 alone.[28] It remains unclear whether Russia's reliance on motorcycles and buggies will be sufficient to offset these losses in the medium- to long-term.

 Ukraine and Russia conducted the seventh prisoner of war (POW) exchange, in accordance with the June 2 Istanbul agreements. Ukrainian officials and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed that Ukraine and Russia exchanged an unspecified number of severely wounded and sick POWs as well as those under 25 years old on June 26.[29] Ukrainian officials reported that Russia captured a majority of the released Ukrainian POWs in 2022.

 Key Takeaways:

• South Korean intelligence suggests that North Korea may deploy North Korean troops to Ukrainian territory, which would represent a significant battlefield inflection.
• US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met at the NATO summit on June 25 and discussed possible US sales of Patriot air defense systems to Ukraine and joint weapons production.
• Kremlin officials continue to platform bellicose rhetoric aimed at undermining Western support for Ukraine and to demonstrate Russia's uncompromising position on Ukraine.
• Satellite imagery of select armored vehicle repair plants in Russia indicates that Russia continues to rely on refurbishing its Soviet-era stores of armored vehicles.
• Ukraine and Russia conducted the seventh prisoner of war (POW) exchange, in accordance with the June 2 Istanbul agreements.
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Novopavlivka. Russian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Toretsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 25, 2025

US President Donald Trump stated that Russia may have territorial ambitions beyond Ukraine — consistent with ISW's long-held assessments that Russia is preparing for a future conflict with NATO and setting conditions to justify future aggression against non-NATO former Soviet Union states. A reporter asked Trump during a press conference at the NATO summit on June 25 whether it is possible that Russian President Vladimir Putin has territorial ambitions beyond Ukraine, and Trump responded that "it's possible."[i] ISW has long assessed that Russia is preparing its military and society for a possible future conflict with NATO following the conclusion of the war in Ukraine, including by pursuing military reforms; integrating veterans into all levels of Russian local, regional, and federal governments; and setting rhetorical conditions to justify future aggression against NATO.[ii] ISW has observed the Kremlin leverage the same rhetoric that it used against Ukraine before the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022 to threaten NATO states.[iii] The Kremlin has also specifically weaponized the concept of "compatriots abroad" — Russian-speaking populations living outside of Russia, whom Russia claims it needs to protect—to justify aggression against former Soviet states in the past.[iv] The Kremlin has also promoted its concept of "Russkiy Mir" ("Russian World") — an amorphous ideological and geographic conception that includes all of the former territories of Kyivan Rus, the Kingdom of Muscovy, the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and the contemporary Russian Federation and which Putin uses to frame any territories a Russian regime ruled or claimed to have ruled as Russia's "historical territories."[v] The Kremlin has been setting informational conditions to justify potential aggression against Moldova and the Baltic states using the alleged need to protect its "compatriots abroad" and the claim that these countries are part of the "Russkiy Mir" — the same narratives that the Kremlin used to justify the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.[vi] Trump's statements therefore, cohere with ISW's fundamental assessment that Russia maintains territorial ambitions beyond Ukraine and will continue pursuing these ambitions unless Putin is forced to reconsider his theory of victory.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio correctly stated that Russia has not shown a willingness to move forward in peace negotiations. Rubio stated in an interview with Politico published on June 25 that Russia is trying to "achieve on the battlefield what [Russia is] demanding at the negotiating table" including "control over certain territories," but noted that this objective will be more difficult to achieve than Russia currently believes.[vii] Rubio stated that Russia has suffered over 80,000 killed-in-action (KIA) since January 2025 but that Putin nevertheless continues "feeding into the war machine" and that Russia has "not shown a willingness to move forward" in peace negotiations. Rubio's statements are consistent with ISW's assessments that Russia has been attempting to delay the negotiation process and protract the war in order to secure additional territorial gains.[viii] Russia's maximalist negotiating demands for Ukrainian territory, including significant amounts of territory that Russia does not currently occupy, represent an informational tactic intended to force territorial concessions to compensate for gains that Russia cannot achieve on the battlefield. ISW continues to assess that Russia is unwilling to engage in substantive negotiations to end the war in Ukraine in any way that falls short of acquiescing to Russia's maximalist demands, which have remained consistent since before the start of the full-scale invasion.[ix]

The Kremlin continues to leverage Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev's aggressive rhetoric to undermine Western support for Ukraine. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on June 25 on his social media accounts, including his English-language channels, that the EU is becoming a politicized, "Russophobic organization...that dreams of revenge against Russia."[x] Medvedev further accused the EU of becoming a militarized bloc that presents just as prominent a threat to Russia as NATO does, claiming that "Brussels today is Russia's true enemy" for arming Ukraine. Medvedev claimed that Ukrainian accession into the EU would endanger Russia and implied that Russia could destroy all of Ukraine to prevent this outcome. The Kremlin typically leverages Medvedev to amplify inflammatory rhetoric designed to stoke panic and fear among Western decision-makers and discourage Western provisions of aid to Ukraine.[xi] Kremlin officials and affiliates have repeatedly promoted narratives that the EU is essentially a military organization like NATO.[xii] The Kremlin most recently activated Medvedev to project nuclear proliferation threats following US strikes on Iran's nuclear program.[xiii] Medvedev's recent comments do not represent a serious rhetorical inflection, but rather a continuation of the Kremlin's informational campaign to undermine Western support for Ukraine.

Russian officials are promoting purposely vague rhetoric about the "root causes" of Russia's war against Ukraine in order to allow the Kremlin the flexibility to adapt its demands as it sees fit. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on June 24 that the "root causes" of the war are the alleged discrimination against Russian-speakers in Ukraine and NATO violations of its obligations to not expand closer to Russia, including claimed NATO plans to build bases in Crimea and British plans to build a base on the Sea of Azov.[xiv] Lavrov previously claimed in an interview in December 2024 that the two main "root causes" of the war are NATO's alleged violation of obligations to not advance eastward and "aggressive absorption" of areas near Russia's borders and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine.[xv] Kremlin officials have repeatedly demanded in recent months that any settlement to the war must "eliminate the root causes," but Lavrov's June 24 claim that these root causes include alleged NATO and UK plans to build bases in Crimea and along the Sea of Azov is unusually specific and likely aimed at further deterring Western support for Ukraine and portraying NATO as a threat to Russia.[xvi] The ambiguity of what Russian officials constitute as "root causes" of the war allows the Kremlin the flexibility to add specificity when it chooses and to adapt its demands of Ukraine in any potential peace settlement in the future.

Russia is reportedly accelerating its missile production capacity with sanctions evasion support from Belarus and the People's Republic of China (PRC). Ukrainian outlet Kyiv Independent reported on June 24 that Russia's state-owned Votkinsk Plant has hired 2,500 workers, built new facilities, and imported specialized manufacturing equipment as part of efforts to expand Russia's production of Iskander-M ballistic missiles, Iskander-K cruise missiles, Yars and Bulava intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and likely Oreshnik ballistic missiles since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.[xvii] The Kyiv Independent stated that an analysis of the plant's internal business operations shows that the plant sourced manufacturing equipment from companies in the PRC, Taiwan, and Belarus via private Russian intermediaries. The Kyiv Independent stated that it is unclear how many ICBMs the Votkinsk Plant is currently producing, but noted that internal documents indicate that Russia is investing in its ICBM arsenal and that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) ordered the Votkinsk Plant in March 2022 to fulfill a production contract for $13 million worth of parts for the Bulava ICBM by 2024. A senior official from Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) told the Kyiv Independent that Russia is preparing for a long war and is stockpiling various types of missiles. The Kyiv Independent, citing the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), stated that Russia increased its production of Iskander-M ballistic missiles from 250 in 2023 to 700 in 2024 and noted that its GUR source agreed with RUSI's assessment. The Kyiv Independent reported that it received GUR intelligence in early June 2025, indicating that Russia had stockpiled roughly 600 Iskander-M ballistic missiles and 300 Iskander-K cruise missiles — a stockpile that would last about two years, should Russia maintain its current pace of strikes against Ukraine. ISW recently observed reports indicating that Russia is actively expanding and stockpiling its production of T-90M tanks, and Russia's expansion and acceleration of missile production capacity further supports ISW's assessment that Russia is working to expand its defense industrial base (DIB) likely in preparation for a protracted war in Ukraine and a potential expanded future conflict with NATO.[xviii]

The United States signaled receptiveness to provisioning Ukraine with additional Patriot air defense systems—a particularly salient issue given reports of Russia's increased ballistic missile production. US President Donald Trump responded to a question during the NATO summit on June 25 on whether the United States planned to provide Ukraine with additional Patriot air defense systems by stating that the United States would "see if they can make some available."[xix] US Patriot air defense systems are vital to Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian ballistic missile strikes and will become increasingly important as Russia increases its production and stockpile of ballistic missiles, which would enable larger and more frequent ballistic missile strikes against Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that Ukraine's limited Patriot air defense systems are forcing Ukraine to make difficult decisions about which areas of Ukraine to protect.[xx]

NATO and Western officials reaffirmed their commitment to collective defense and security, to increasing defense spending in the face of increased Russian aggression, and to providing support to Ukraine. The NATO heads of state and government participating in the NATO summit in The Hague published a joint declaration on June 25.[xxi] The declaration reaffirmed NATO's commitment to collective defense, as defined in Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, and committed to investing five percent of gross domestic product (GDP) annually in core defense requirements and defense- and security-related spending by 2035. The declaration also reaffirmed NATO's commitment to supporting Ukraine and that NATO members will include direct contributions to Ukraine's defense and defense industry in their spending calculations. The declaration highlighted that Ukraine's security contributes to NATO's security. NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte told reporters on June 25 that NATO faces a long-term threat from Russia, especially because North Korea, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and Iran are supporting Russia's war effort against Ukraine, and that NATO must increase its defense spending.[xxii] Rutte emphasized in his plenary speech at the NATO summit the importance of Article 5 and the commitment to invest five percent of GDP into defense, stating that NATO will need to expand its DIB on both sides of the Atlantic.[xxiii] US President Donald Trump told reporters at the NATO summit that the United States is committed to Article 5.[xxiv] A large group consisting of members of the European Parliament, members of national parliaments, politicians, diplomats, military personnel, and subject matter experts sent an open letter to the heads of NATO countries calling for support of Ukraine, including calling for increased aid and air defense.[xxv]

Ukraine's European partners continue to allocate military aid to Ukraine and deepen cooperation with the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB). The Norwegian government announced on June 24 that it will allocate 6.5 billion Norwegian kroner (about $642 million) to drone procurement for Ukrainian forces from Ukrainian and European manufacturers.[xxvi] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov and Danish Defense Minister Troels Lund Poulsen signed a letter of intent on June 24 to begin efforts to establish the joint production of Ukrainian weapons in Denmark.[xxvii] The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that the Danish government allocated 500 million Danish kroner (about $78 million) to accelerate Ukrainian weapon production. UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced that the UK will provide a new package of 350 Advanced Short Range Air-to-Air Missiles (ASRAAMs), financed for the first time using £70 million (about $96 million) of funding from the interest on seized Russian assets through the Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration (ERA) framework.[xxviii] Starmer announced that UK Armed Forces engineers had adapted the ASRAAM missiles to be compatible with Ukraine's UK-supplied RAVEN ground-based air defense systems. Starmer stated that the UK will imminently deliver five new RAVEN air defense systems, bringing the total that Ukraine has to 13 systems.

Ukrainian forces likely conducted a long-range strike against a Russian military industrial enterprise in Rostov Oblast on June 24. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, who often reports on successful Ukrainian drone strikes, reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Russian Atlant-Aero plant in Taganrog, Rostov Oblast.[xxix] Kovalenko reported that the Atlant-Aero plant specializes in producing critical Russian combat drone components and control systems, including “Orion” drones, electronic warfare (EW) systems, and digital integration for first-person view (FPV) drones and loitering munitions. Russian sources posted footage of explosions in Taganrog and claimed that Russian air defenses repelled a drone strike near Taganrog and other areas of Rostov Oblast overnight.[xxx]

Key Takeaways:

• US President Donald Trump stated that Russia may have territorial ambitions beyond Ukraine – consistent with ISW's long-held assessments that Russia is preparing for a future conflict with NATO and setting conditions to justify future aggression against non-NATO former Soviet Union states.
• US Secretary of State Marco Rubio correctly stated that Russia has not shown a willingness to move forward in peace negotiations.
• The Kremlin continues to leverage Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev's aggressive rhetoric to undermine Western support for Ukraine.
• Russian officials are promoting purposely vague rhetoric about the "root causes" of Russia's war against Ukraine in order to allow the Kremlin the flexibility to adapt its demands as it sees fit.
• Russia is reportedly accelerating its missile production capacity with sanctions evasion support from Belarus and the People's Republic of China (PRC).
• NATO and Western officials reaffirmed their commitment to collective defense and security, to increasing defense spending in the face of increased Russian aggression, and to providing support to Ukraine.
• Ukraine's European partners continue to allocate military aid to Ukraine and deepen cooperation with the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB).
• Ukrainian forces likely conducted a long-range strike against a Russian military industrial enterprise in Rostov Oblast on June 24.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova and Velyka Novosilka, and Russian forces recently advanced in Vovchansk and near Pokrovsk and Novopavlivka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 24, 2025

NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte assessed that Russia is the largest existential threat to NATO members today and that Russia is preparing for a protracted war with NATO. Rutte stated on June 24 at the NATO summit at The Hague that Russia remains the most significant and direct threat to NATO, especially considering the support North Korea, the People's Republic of China (PRC), Iran, and Belarus provide Russia.[1] Rutte stated that Russia could attack NATO within three to seven years and is currently more prepared for a war than NATO. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in an interview with Sky News on June 24 that Russia would not be ready to attack NATO in the immediate future but could be ready for a war with NATO by 2030.[2] Zelensky stated that the war in Ukraine is currently constraining Russia's ability to train and reconstitute its forces and that any decrease in aid to Ukraine would benefit Russia. ISW continues to assess that Russia is preparing its military and society for a potential future war with NATO in the medium- to long-term.[3] Any future ceasefire or long-term pause in combat in Ukraine would free up Russian forces for redeployment to Russia's eastern border with NATO and allow Russia to rearm and reconstitute, whereby Russia may be able to pose a significant threat to NATO earlier than 2030.

 The Kremlin continues efforts to augment Russian combat power by setting conditions to subsume forces from Russia's Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) allies under a Russian military command. The Russian State Duma ratified on June 24 a protocol that allows CSTO states to send their troops to other CSTO states' territory in the event of armed conflict, threats, crisis situations, and exercises; to respond to the consequences of emergencies; and to provide humanitarian aid.[4] The protocol now allows for the CSTO to transport troops one day after a decision from the CSTO Council — as opposed to after 30 days as the protocol stated previously. The protocol also introduces the concept of a "command of formations" that will command CSTO military forces sent to one CSTO state. This “command of formations” will likely be a Russian-dominated command. The CSTO Collective Security Council approved the protocol in November 2024.[5] ISW has long assessed that the Kremlin has been trying to subordinate the militaries of former Soviet states to the Russian Armed Forces to recreate a multinational combined army in the former Soviet space.[6] Western assessments of Russia's future combat power must take into account the forces of Russia's CSTO allies that Russia may use in future operations — not only those of Russia.

 Russian forces are expanding their use of motorcycles along the frontline in Ukraine — a tactic that the Russian military may leverage in future wars beyond Ukraine, possibly including operations against NATO states. A servicemember in a Ukrainian brigade reported on June 24 that the threat of Russian motorcycle assaults is increasing along the frontline as Russian forces increasingly integrate motorcycles into assault tactics.[7] The servicemember stated that Russian motorcycle forces are no longer attacking along roads but mainly attacking through open fields and trying to bypass Ukrainian engineering barriers along the frontline. Ukraine-based open-source intelligence organization Frontelligence Insight provided additional information on June 23 about the tactical doctrine the Russian military is establishing for motorcycle usage.[8] Frontelligence Insight reported that Russian forces are mainly using motorcycles as a form of transport for attacking infantry to support diversion, reconnaissance, infiltration, and flanking support missions. Frontelligence Insight reported that Russian motorcyclists operate in squads of six to eight motorcycles with one or two riders on each motorcycle (between six and 16 personnel in total). Each squad reportedly has two to four portable electronic warfare (EW) systems and one device scanning for Ukrainian drones. Frontelligence Insight reported Russian forces are also leveraging motorcycles for casualty evacuation and logistics support. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported in May 2025 that Russian forces were mainly using motorcycles in tandem with armored vehicles.[9] Russian forces appear to be increasingly relying on motorcycles as a method of transport and advancement independent from tanks and armored vehicles in recent weeks, however.[10]

Frontelligence Insight reported that Russian forces have been training troops on motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) at ad hoc motocross tracks in Russia and occupied Ukraine as of Spring 2025.[11] Frontelligence Insight reported that Russian forces are also conducting more advanced training programs, including for drone evasion, and that the length of these courses varies between 16 hours to over a month. Frontelligence Insight reported that Russian forces are mainly using foreign-made motorcycles, primarily those manufactured in the People's Republic of China (PRC), and that volunteer organizations in Russia provide most of the motorcycles for frontline Russian units. Frontelligence Insight reported, citing internal documents from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), that Russia intends to equip over half of its infantry forces with motorcycles, ATVs, and buggies in the future. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will likely increasingly depend on motorcycles and other quicker unarmored vehicles, as slower-moving vehicles have become a hazard on the more transparent battlefield of Ukraine.[12] Russian efforts to integrate tactical innovations, such as motorcycle usage, among frontline units indicates that the Russian military is learning modern ground warfare lessons that it intends to leverage beyond the war in Ukraine.[13]

 NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte highlighted NATO's plans to invest more in its own defense capabilities, including by investing in the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) — in line with US President Donald Trump's initiative for Europe to shoulder more of the burden of collective security. Rutte called on NATO states to invest in Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB), which Rutte assessed has an untapped potential of about $35 billion, in order to prevent NATO states from reducing their own stockpiles and to allow NATO states and allies to buy weapons from Ukraine in the future.[14] Rutte stated that NATO states will agree to introduce a baseline of allocating five percent of GDP toward defense spending during the NATO summit.[15] Rutte stated that NATO's new defense investment plan will include a five-fold increase in investments in NATO air defense capabilities and investments to produce "thousands" more tanks and armored vehicles and millions of artillery ammunition rounds.

 Ukraine's European partners allocated military aid to Ukraine and financial support for drone production during the NATO summit on June 24. Dutch Defense Minister Ruben Brekelmans announced on June 24 that the Netherlands approved a new military aid package for Ukraine worth 175 million euros (about $203.4 million), which provides 100 drone detection radars and 20 Ermine partly unmanned vehicles for casualty evacuation and includes 80 million euros (about $93 million) toward the international drone coalition.[16] Brekelmans stated that the Netherlands also recently signed a contract worth 500 million euros (about $5.8 million) with Ukrainian drone manufacturers to fund the production of 600,000 drones.[17] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced on June 24 that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and United Kingdom (UK) Prime Minister Keir Starmer agreed to launch a new joint drone production initiative.[18] Umerov stated that the UK will produce Ukrainian-designed drones in the UK for three years as part of a project to support integration between the British and Ukrainian defense industries. Umerov stated that the UK and Ukraine will share the produced drones after the war in Ukraine ends and that the project will enable British defense companies to rapidly design and produce state-of-the-art drones at scale. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister for Digital Development Kateryna Chernohorenko, NATO Digital Staff Deputy Director Marco Criscuolo, and NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA) Director General Ludwig Descamps announced on June 24 that NATO will provide 37 million euros (about $43 million) for Ukrainian satellite communications, including satellite radio stations, trackers, and services.[19]

 Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 23 to 24 that resulted in over 100 civilian casualties. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 97 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[20] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 63 drones and that 15 drones were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck Dnipro City and Samara, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, damaging educational and medical facilities.[21] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Military Administration Head Serhiy Lysak reported that Russian forces struck a passenger train in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, killing at least 17 people and injuring at least 279.[22] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces also struck civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv City and Velykyi Bobryk, Sumy Oblast.[23] Russia's ongoing strike campaign against Ukraine in recent months has increasingly impacted civilian areas and infrastructure and Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) — underscoring the urgency of providing additional air support to Ukraine and strengthening Ukraine's air defense umbrella.

 Key Takeaways:

• NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte assessed that Russia is the largest existential threat to NATO members today and that Russia is preparing for a protracted war with NATO.
• The Kremlin continues efforts to augment Russian combat power by setting conditions to subsume forces from Russia's Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) allies under a Russian military command.
• Russian forces are expanding their use of motorcycles along the frontline in Ukraine — a tactic that the Russian military may leverage in future wars beyond Ukraine, possibly including operations against NATO states.
• NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte highlighted NATO's plans to invest more in its own defense capabilities, including by investing in the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) — in line with US President Donald Trump's initiative for Europe to shoulder more of the burden of collective security.
• Ukraine's European partners allocated military aid to Ukraine and financial support for drone production during the NATO summit on June 24.
• Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 23 to 24 that resulted in over 100 civilian casualties.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Kherson City, and Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka.

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