Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 1, 2025

August 1, 2025, 8:30 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11 am ET on August 1. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 2 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

US President Donald Trump ordered the deployment of two US nuclear submarines presumably closer to Russia in response to Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev's July 31 nuclear threats against the United States. Trump stated on August 1 that he ordered American military authorities to position two US nuclear submarines "in the appropriate regions" following Medvedev's "highly provocative statements."[i] Trump stated that he gave the order "just in case [the] foolish and inflammatory statements [from Medvedev] are more than just that." Trump previously stated on July 31 that Medvedev should "watch his words" and is "entering very dangerous territory."[ii] Medvedev responded to Trump on July 31 on both his English- and Russian-language Telegram accounts and threatened that Russia is "doing everything right" and will continue along its own path.[iii] Medvedev also alluded to Russia's automatic or semi-automatic nuclear weapons control system, referred to as the "Dead Hand" or the "Perimeter," in response to Trump. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio answered a journalist's question on July 31 about Medvedev's nuclear threat, stating that one cannot ignore Medvedev's statement.[iv] Rubio stated that Medvedev is not a "relevant decision maker," but he still has a role in the Russian government, so "his words are going to have impact" as a "provocateur."

The Kremlin continued its nuclear threats against the United States prior to the ordered deployment of US nuclear submarines on August 1 – demonstrating that Medvedev's threats are part of a wider Kremlin nuclear saber-ratting campaign. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko spoke to journalists on August 1 in a likely staged event to publicly promote the Kremlin's narratives and stances about its war in Ukraine.[v] Lukashenko criticized Trump's recent efforts to bring Russia to the negotiating table and find a way to end the war. Lukashenko claimed that Trump must act "carefully" and that it is not possible for Trump to "dictate the rules" during the ongoing military clash, "especially to a nuclear power" like Russia.[vi] Kremlin officials and their affiliates often use nuclear saber-rattling as part of their reflexive control campaign that aims to push the West to make decisions that benefit Russia.[vii] The Kremlin had also repeatedly used staged interactions with Lukashenko to deliver indirect nuclear threats.[viii] Medvedev's July 31 nuclear threats are also part of these reflexive control efforts, as Putin often leverages Medvedev to amplify inflammatory rhetoric designed to stoke panic and fear among Western decision-makers and discourage aid to Ukraine.[ix] ISW continues to assess that Medvedev's provocative and threatening statements are very likely part of a top-down, concerted Kremlin informational strategy.[x] Putin would be able to censor Medvedev's statements should Putin choose to do so, especially considering that the Kremlin coordinates official statements and controls the Russian information space, internet, and media.

Limited Russian milblogger responses to Trump's August 1 announcement criticized Trump, attempted to downplay the threat, or called on Russia to respond in kind. Russian milbloggers noted that Trump did not specify exactly where the US submarines were deploying, implying that Trump's statement could be a feint.[xi] One milblogger claimed that Trump's announcement is not leading to Trump's desired peace.[xii] Russian political scientist Sergei Markov claimed that Trump is "losing his sanity" and that Trump's announcement endorses Medvedev's allegation that Trump was moving closer to nuclear war.[xiii] Another milblogger called for Russian ships and submarines equipped with nuclear weapons to "pay a friendly visit to Cuba again."[xiv] Russian naval vessels, including a reportedly nuclear weapons-capable ship, made a port call in Cuba in June 2024, likely in order to invoke the historical memory of the Cuban Missile Crisis as part of Russia’s reflexive control campaign to instill fear in the West and push the West to make decisions that benefit Russia.[xv]

Putin reiterated on August 1 the same demands that he first laid out in June 2024 – further demonstrating Russia's uncompromising position and disinterest in negotiating to end its war against Ukraine. Putin stated during the press event with Lukashenko that the conditions that he laid out in his June 2024 speech to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) "certainly" remain the same.[xvi] Putin demanded in June 2024 that Ukrainian forces must begin to "completely withdraw" from Ukrainian-controlled territory in Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts (which the Kremlin illegally declared as annexed in September 2022) and that Ukraine officially abandons its goal to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) before Russia can agree to a ceasefire and peace negotiations.[xvii] Putin also reiterated on August 1 that the "main thing" in the peace process is the eradication of the war's causes, which Putin described as issues related to Russia's security, the use of the Russian language in Ukraine, and the conditions for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP).[xviii] Putin's claims about the alleged causes of the war mirror repeated calls from Kremlin officials in the past months about the need to eliminate the "root causes" of the war.[xix] Rubio stated on July 31 that the United States has not seen any progress or "sincere interest" from the Kremlin to end the war.[xx] Rubio stated that Trump must decide how much he wants to continue his efforts toward securing a ceasefire "if one of the two sides is not interested."

Putin attempted to frame peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine as making progress while blaming Ukraine for slowing the speed of negotiations. Putin claimed on August 1 that he assesses that peace negotiations with Ukraine are developing "positively overall" and that recent prisoner of war (POW) and killed in action (KIA) exchanges between Russia and Ukraine are evidence of this positive trajectory.[xxi] Putin claimed that Russia is willing to delay negotiations if Ukraine wants to do so in response to a recent statement by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky that Russia's war demands will not change until there is regime change in Russia.[xxii] Putin claimed that any disappointment regarding the speed or outcome of negotiations is a result of "excessive expectations." Putin stated that negotiations must happen in detailed conversations behind the scenes and not in public. Putin claimed that Russia and Ukraine have agreed to conduct negotiations "off-camera" in three working groups but that these groups have not started operating yet. Putin likely intends to leverage claims that Russia and Ukraine are meeting in private working groups to refute any future Western complaints that Russia is not participating in peace negotiations. Russia has sent several low-level delegations to prior rounds of negotiations in Istanbul, and these rounds have yet to result in any developments toward peace other than POW and KIA exchanges.[xxiii] Future working group meetings with a similarly low-level Russian delegation are unlikely to result in any significant developments since Putin almost certainly singularly dictates the parameters of Russia's negotiating position.

Putin reiterated on August 1 his long-standing claims that the current Ukrainian government is illegitimate and claimed that Zelensky's government has "clearly violated" Ukraine's constitution.[xxiv] Putin has long claimed that every pro-Western Ukrainian government since Ukraine's 2014 Euromaidan protests and the Revolution of Dignity are illegitimate, and Russian officials intensified claims in Spring 2024 that Zelensky's government specifically is illegitimate under the false pretense that the current Ukrainian government is violating the Ukrainian Constitution by delaying presidential elections until the end of martial law.[xxv] The Ukrainian Constitution prohibits the government from holding elections during martial law and times of external aggression, such as Russia's full-scale invasion.[xxvi] ISW has previously noted that Putin's false claims that the current Ukrainian government is unconstitutional and illegitimate are laying the groundwork for Russia to renege on any future peace agreement with Ukraine at a time of Russia's choosing in the future.[xxvii] ISW continues to assess that Putin is feigning interest in peace negotiations while Ukrainian officials, in contrast, continue to demonstrate genuine interest in peace – as evidenced by Zelensky's August 1 statement that he remains willing to meet with Putin and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha's July 31 statement that Ukraine wants to end the war in 2025.[xxviii]

Putin's and Lukashenko's August 1 statements underscore Putin's continued commitment to his theory of victory, which assumes that Russia can outlast Western support for Ukraine and will be able to seize the entirety of Ukraine through slow and costly advances.[xxix] Putin claimed that Russian forces are advancing along the entire frontline in eastern and southern Ukraine and that Russian forces are advancing "somewhere more, somewhere less."[xxx] Lukashenko claimed that Russian forces are on the offensive everywhere and that Russian forces are "not [advancing] quickly, but slowly." Lukashenko claimed that Putin told him that Russian forces are advancing slowly because Putin "feel[s] sorry for the [Ukrainian] people" -ignoring the degradation of Russian forces after three years of war and significant Ukrainian defensive operations. Putin's and Lukashenko's statements suggest that Putin continues to be content with the slow rate of advance that characterizes Russian offensive operations in Ukraine. ISW previously assessed that frontline Russian commanders appear content with Russian forces making advances at roughly a footpace, and Putin appears personally content with a slower rate of advance as well - likely due to his continued belief that Russia will be able to militarily defeat Ukraine in the long-term.[xxxi] Lukashenko also downplayed Russian casualties in Ukraine by claiming that Russia is not losing as many people as the Soviet Union did during the Second World War. The Soviet Union, which consisted of territories and peoples far beyond the modern-day Russian Federation, lost between nine and 11 million casualties during the Second World War.[xxxii]

Putin continues to posture himself as a well-informed, caring wartime leader. Putin claimed that he recently asked Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov and Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov to "honestly" tell him about the frontline situation in Ukraine.[xxxiii] Putin's reported demand for honesty from Belousov and Gerasimov may be a nod to Russian milbloggers' long-standing complaints that the Russian military command misinforms Putin about the frontline situation and that frontline Russian commanders submit falsely positive reports to their superiors.[xxxiv] Putin has historically attempted to respond to milblogger grievances and has routinely postured himself as a hyper-involved wartime leader to the Russian public.[xxxv]

Putin and Lukashenko highlighted recent Russian advances in Donetsk Oblast and articulated Russia's desire to seize Ukraine's fortress belt – which ISW continues to assess will constitute a multi-year long effort. Putin claimed that Russian forces recently seized Chasiv Yar, although Putin acknowledged that Russian forces are still clearing the town and that Ukrainian forces may counterattack into Chasiv Yar in the future.[xxxvi] Putin claimed that Chasiv Yar is "quite a large settlement," although 2022 census data states that Chasiv Yar had a pre-war population of 12,500 people.[xxxvii] Russian state media and milbloggers are attempting to oversell the seizure of Chasiv Yar as a significant development along the frontline, and Putin appears to be leaning into this effort.[xxxviii] Lukashenko further claimed that Chasiv Yar is "the road" to Kramatorsk, which Lukashenko called the center of Ukraine's defense (referring to Ukraine's fortress belt - a series of fortified cities that form the backbone of Ukraine’s defensive positions in Donetsk Oblast).[xxxix] Lukashenko claimed that Russian forces will "slowly gnaw" at, seize, and advance beyond Ukraine's fortress belt. Putin responded that Russian forces will "return" the fortress belt, which Putin claimed belongs to Russia. Lukashenko claimed that Ukraine should quickly ask Russia to negotiate an end to the war before Russia seizes the fortress belt. ISW has long assessed that Russian forces aspire to seize Ukraine's fortress belt, and Putin's statement marks the most recent high-level Russian confirmation of this intention.[xl]

Putin's desire to seize Ukraine's fortress belt indicates that he is willing to continue military operations in Ukraine long beyond Trump's stated August 8 deadline for peace in Ukraine and is ready to undertake complex, years-long operations. ISW previously noted that a Russian operation to seize Ukraine's fortress belt will be a significant undertaking, as Russian forces will have to seize Siversk and Lyman, advance through the Svyati Hori national park, and contend with the Siverskyi Donets River and Siverskyi Donets Donbas canal before Russian forces can even begin to threaten Slovyansk (the northern tip of the fortress belt).[xli] Russian forces are currently expanding their salient southwest of Kostyantynivka (the southern tip of the fortress belt) in order to support a future attack on or envelopment of Kostyantynivka and the wider fortress belt from the southwest, but seizing Kostyantynivka alone will likely be a months-long effort. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger recently noted that it took Russian forces 14 months to seize Chasiv Yar and that Kostyantynivka is roughly three times larger than Chasiv Yar - underscoring how long a frontal Russian assault into Kostyantynivka could last.[xlii] Russian forces attempted to encircle Ukraine's fortress belt in Spring 2022 but culminated while trying to conduct the over 55-kilometer-wide encirclement.[xliii] Russian forces have conducted several successful, smaller partial envelopments since seizing Avdiivka in February 2024, but Russian forces have yet to conduct a successful operational-level envelopment of a significant Ukrainian defensive line.[xliv] ISW previously noted that it is unlikely that the Russian military can sustain a multi-year and multi-axis operation against Ukraine's fortress belt alongside its other offensive operations in Ukraine, particularly after three and a half years of degrading combat operations.[xlv] Putin appears confident in the Russian military's and economy's strength and longevity, however, given his August 1 endorsement of seizing the fortress belt and Russia's current rate of advance in Ukraine.

Putin and Lukashenko projected military strength and economic stability as part of Putin's ongoing effort to convince Trump that sanctions and military support to Ukraine will not alter the outcome of the war in Ukraine and that Trump should abandon his efforts to resolve the war. Putin claimed that Russia produced its first serial Oreshnik ballistic missile complex and missiles, and that the Oreshnik system entered into service.[xlvi] Putin claimed that Russian and Belarusian specialists are working to identify future Oreshnik deployment locations by the end of 2025, and Lukashenko stated that Russia will station Oreshnik systems in Belarus in 2026. ISW assessed at the time of Russia's first Oreshnik launch in November 2024 that Russia is leveraging the Oreshnik system as part of a reflexive control campaign aimed at undermining Western resolve to militarily support Ukraine.[xlvii] Putin's and Lukashenko's August 1 statements about Oreshniks are similarly trying to posture military strength to convince Trump not to follow through with his threat of economic repercussions.

Lukashenko claimed on August 1 that Russia and Belarus have undertaken significant measures in recent years to offset the impact of Western sanctions and that the two countries will survive additional future sanctions.[xlviii] Lukashenko claimed that Russia is a "treasure trove" of minerals and technology and that Russia and Belarus will prove their capabilities to doubters (presumably referring to the West). Lukashenko claimed that "we [Russia and Belarus] have always been and will be" and that Russians and Belarusians should not worry about Western sanctions. Lukashenko's statements are the latest in the Kremlin's ongoing effort to posture economic stability to its foreign and domestic audiences and to discourage the West from levying additional sanctions against Russia by claiming that sanctions have no impact on the Russian economy.[xlix]

Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be transforming Russia into a Soviet-style police state, likely in preparation for expected anti-war sentiment in the Russian population as the Kremlin prolongs the war in Ukraine and prepares for a future war with NATO. Putin signed amendments on July 31 that introduce fines for “intentional” searches of “extremist” content on virtual private networks (VPNs) and ”violating the procedure” for using VPN services.[l] Putin also signed a law that expands the offenses for which Russian authorities can revoke acquired citizenship, including the “justification or propaganda of terrorism,” cooperation with a foreign state against the security of Russia, “unlawful influence” on Russia’s information space, and the implementation of decisions of “international organizations in which Russia does not participate.”[li] The Kremlin has vaguely defined "extremism," and the law about citizenship revocation similarly contains vaguely defined language. The Kremlin has and will exploit this vagueness to censor any information that it considers a threat, including anti-war and anti-regime sentiment.

The Russian government has been slowly consolidating control over the Russian population’s access to independent information throughout Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The Kremlin will likely ban WhatsApp and replace it with the Kremlin-controlled messaging platform MAX in the near future, and Kremlin officials will likely attempt to replace other independent communication platforms, such as Telegram, with state-controlled communication platforms.[lii] The Kremlin has also targeted media outlets that publish anti-war sentiment and counter the Kremlin's preferred narrative in the information space.[liii]

The Russian government is also slowly adapting its legal regime to increase the state's ability to repress and coerce Russians into conceding to state narratives and ideas, like the Soviet Union’s attempts at controlling the population. The Russian State Duma adopted in recent months legal definitions that allow Russia to criminally prosecute Kremlin opponents by classifying domestic opposition as a threat to Russian national security.[liv] The Russian government may be pursuing these informational and legal constraints in preparation for possible future societal backlash, as Putin appears willing to continue the war for years to come. The Kremlin's measures to cut Russian society off from the outside world are also part of efforts to indoctrinate Russians into an informal state ideology that, at its foundation, is anti-Western and anti-Ukrainian and to militarize Russian society ahead of a longer war in Ukraine and a possible future war with NATO.[lv]

Russia continues to field long-range drone innovations to facilitate its ongoing long-range strike campaign and impose greater civilian casualties on Ukraine. Business Insider reported on August 1 that Ukrainian mobile fire groups and domestically produced interceptor drones may be unable to effectively counter Russia's new high-speed Geran-3 drone (the Russian analogue of the Iranian Shahed-238).[lvi] Ukrainian columnist Vadym Kushnikov reported on July 31 that the Geran-3 is equipped with a high-power jet engine that enables the drone to reach speeds of up to 800 kilometers per hour and to function like a cruise missile in its ability to evade air defense systems.[lvii] The Ukrainian Air Force reported on July 30 that Russian forces launched eight jet-powered drones, possibly referring to Geran-3 drones, on the night of July 29 to 30, marking one of the first official Ukrainian reports noting Russia's use of jet-powered drones.[lviii] The Ukrainian Air Force did not specify whether Ukrainian forces downed any of the eight jet-powered drones, however. ISW previously assessed that Russian forces likely used a Geran-3 drone variant to strike Kyiv City on June 11 and that Russia may have first incorporated the Geran-3 drones into strike packages on January 8.[lix] Russia will likely increasingly rely on modified long-range drones, such as the Geran-3 drone, to continue innovating its long-range strike tactics designed to overwhelm Ukrainian air defense systems and strike densely populated cities in Ukraine's rear as part of efforts to inflict greater civilian casualties.

Russia's latest drone innovations underscore the critical importance of timely and reliable Western military assistance to Ukraine. Russian drone adaptations are attempting to reduce the effectiveness of Ukraine's air defense tactics and innovations, including the use of mobile fire groups and interceptor drones. Western-supplied air defense systems and F-16 fighter jets, which Ukraine has largely been using to intercept Russian long-range missile and drone strikes, will become even more important in the face of these Russian drone adaptations. [lx] Kushnikov reported that Russia is unable currently to mass produce the Geran-3 drones, given Russia's reliance on Iran and the People's Republic of China (PRC) for turbojet engine supplies.[lxi] Iran helped Russia scale its domestic production of the Iranian-supplied Shahed drones, and the PRC has been increasingly supplying components for Russia's Geran-type drones, suggesting that Russia will be able to procure the needed Iranian and PRC engines to scale up its production of the Geran-3 in the future and pose a greater threat to Ukraine.[lxii]

The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced that it will sell Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM) to Ukraine. The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced on July 31 that it awarded a contract worth $3.5billion to Raytheon to produce AMRAAM missiles, AMRAAM Telemetry Systems, initial and field spares, and other production engineering support activities.[lxiii] The DoD announced that the contract includes military sales to Ukraine and other US partners.

Key Takeaways:

• US President Donald Trump ordered the deployment of two US nuclear submarines presumably closer to Russia in response to Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev's July 31 nuclear threats against the United States.
• The Kremlin continued its nuclear threats against the United States before the ordered deployment of US nuclear submarines on August 1 – demonstrating that Medvedev's threats are part of a wider Kremlin nuclear saber-ratting campaign.
• Putin reiterated on August 1 the same demands that he first laid out in June 2024 – further demonstrating Russia's uncompromising position and disinterest in negotiating to end its war against Ukraine.
• Putin attempted to frame peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine as making progress while blaming Ukraine for slowing the speed of negotiations.
• Putin's and Lukashenko's August 1 statements underscore Putin's continued commitment to his theory of victory, which assumes that Russia can outlast Western support for Ukraine and will be able to seize the entirety of Ukraine through slow and costly advances.
• Putin and Lukashenko highlighted recent Russian advances in Donetsk Oblast and articulated Russia's desire to seize Ukraine's fortress belt, which ISW continues to assess as a multi-year effort.
• Putin and Lukashenko projected military strength and economic stability as part of Putin's ongoing effort to convince Trump that sanctions and military support to Ukraine will not alter the outcome of the war in Ukraine and that Trump should abandon his efforts to resolve the war.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be transforming Russia into a Soviet-style police state, likely in preparation for expected anti-war sentiment in the Russian population as the Kremlin prolongs the war in Ukraine and prepares for a future war with NATO.
• Russia continues to field long-range drone innovations to facilitate its ongoing long-range strike campaign and impose greater civilian casualties on Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Borova and Lyman. Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Siversk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued limited attacks in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on July 31 and August 1.[lxiv]

Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike targeting defense industrial enterprises and military infrastructure in Rostov Oblast on the night of July 31 to August 1. Russian milbloggers and opposition outlets reported on August 1 that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against Taganrog and Petrushino, Rostov Oblast, damaging the 325th Air Repair Plant, the base of the 708th Military Transport Aviation Regiment (both located on the Taganrog-Central Air Base), the Taganrog Ship Repair Plant, and the Rodionovskaya oil pumping station.[lxv]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 31 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced northwest of Andriivka (north of Sumy City).[lxvi]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Novokostyantynivka (north of Sumy City) and in northeastern Myropillya (northeast of Sumy City).[lxvii]

Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City near Kindrativka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka on July 31 and August 1.[lxviii] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Andriivka, Kindrativka, and Varachyne (all north of Sumy City) and Yunakivka, Yablunivka, and Sadky (all northeast of Sumy City).[lxix]

A Russian milblogger reportedly associated with the Russian Northern Group of Forces claimed that Russian forces are constructing defenses in Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City) and Sadky.[lxx]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Pysarivka and Khotin (both north of Sumy City).[lxxi] Elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating near Novokostyantynivka, and elements of the 1443rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (formed during the 2022 partial reserve call-up) are reportedly operating near Varachyne.[lxxii]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 1 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized the west (right) bank of the Vovcha River in Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) and advanced near Tykhe (east of Vovchansk) and Buhruvatka (west of Vovchansk).[lxxiii]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on July 31 and August 1.[lxxiv]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 68th and 69th motorized rifle divisions (both of the 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and of the 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], LMD) are reportedly operating in Vovchansk.[lxxv] Drone operators of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Bati Detachment (204th Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment) are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[lxxvi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on August 1 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Milove (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[lxxvii]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Milove and toward Khatnie on August 1.[lxxviii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Milove and Khatnie.[lxxix]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 1 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along the P-07 Kupyansk-Shevchenkove highway southwest of Stepova Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[lxxx]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself, north of Kupyansk near Holubivka and Zapadne and toward Kolodyazne, northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka and Krasne Pershe and toward Dvorichanske, and east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on July 31 and August 1.[lxxxi]

Kupyansk Military Administration Head Andriy Besedin reported on August 1 that Russian forces have intensified shelling of Kupyanska Hromada and that Ukrainian forces have observed Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups operating near Kupyansk.[lxxxii]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 31 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently recaptured Hrekivka (southeast of Borova).[lxxxiii]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on July 31 that Russian forces advanced southwest of Lozova (northeast of Borova).[lxxxiv]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 1 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the eastern outskirts of Torske (east of Lyman).[lxxxv]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Karpivka (north of Lyman), southwest of Zelena Dolyna (north of Lyman), toward Shandryholove (southwest of Zelena Dolyna), and in central Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman).[lxxxvi]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman toward Shandryholove and Koroviy Yar; north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Karpivka, and Zelena Dolyna; northeast of Lyman near Myrne and Kolodyazi; east of Lyman near Dibrova and Torske; and southeast of Lyman in the Serebryanske forest area and toward Yampil on July 31 and August 1.[lxxxvii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Torske.[lxxxviii]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 31 and August 1 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced near the Donetska Railway northeast of Siversk and northwest of Ivano-Darivka (southeast of Siversk).[lxxxix]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Siversk.[xc]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, southeast of Siversk toward Vyiimka, and south of Siversk toward Zvanivka on July 31 and August 1.[xci]

A Russian milblogger claimed on August 1 that Russian forces have accumulated sufficient forces in the Siversk direction to attack south of Serebryanka and toward Siversk itself.[xcii]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 6th and 7th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Siversk direction, including in Serebryanka.[xciii] Elements of the 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are reportedly operating near Ivano-Darivka.[xciv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on August 1 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked toward Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and Bila Hora on July 31 and August 1.[xcv]

Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky stated on July 31 that Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Chasiv Yar.[xcvi] Russian sources continued to claim on August 1 that Russian forces seized Chasiv Yar.[xcvii] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces intend to advance toward Kramatorsk after seizing Chasiv Yar to prevent Ukrainian forces from strengthening their defensive positions in the area.[xcviii]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction also stated on August 1 that Russian forces have not seized Chasiv Yar.[xcix] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces have been fighting to seize Chasiv Yar for over a year with significant personnel losses. The spokesperson stated the Russian military command forced the commander of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division to participate in an assault operation in Chasiv Yar as punishment for his forces' inability to seize the settlement. The spokesperson noted that Ukrainian forces have observed that Russian forces have used less equipment in the past year and are now using cheaper equipment, such as motorcycle and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs).

Order of Battle: A Russian source claimed that elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division, 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th AC, Leningrad Military District [LMD]), and 88th Hispaniola Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) participated in the claimed seizure of Chasiv Yar.[c] Another Russian source claimed that elements of the 11th Separate VDV Brigade, 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, SMD), and unspecified Chechen Akmat units supported the claimed seizure of Chasiv Yar.[ci] Elements of the 217th VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in southern Chasiv Yar.[cii] Drone operators of the 78th Sever-Akhmat Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[ciii]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 24 and 28 indicates that Russian forces advanced northwest of Dyliivka (north of Toretsk).[civ]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk), southeast of Rusyn Yar, northwest of Poltavka, and northeast of Oleksandro-Kalynove (all three northwest of Toretsk).[cv]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; northeast of Toretsk near Krymske; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; northwest of Toretsk near Rusyn Yar, Katerynivka, Poltavka, Volodymyrivka, Popiv Yar, and Oleksandro-Kalynove and toward Stepanivka; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on July 31 and August 1.[cvi]

A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction stated on August 1 that Russian forces are attempting to infiltrate Ukrainian defenses in small groups and move behind Ukrainian lines instead of conducting frontal assaults.[cvii] Unspecified Russian security agencies claimed on August 1 that Russian forces have established fire control over almost all parts of Kostyantynivka (southwest of Chasiv Yar) and are conducting the largest number of strikes against the western part of the city.[cviii]

Order of battle: Elements of the Russian 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) and snipers of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka (Toretsk) direction.[cix] Elements of the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Ivanopillya (northwest of Toretsk).[cx]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: The Telegraph and Ukrainian media outlet Hromadske reported on July 30 and 31 that Russian forces advanced north of Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk).[cxi] Hromadske reported that Russian forces seized the coal mine east of Rodynske. The Telegraph reported that Russian troops seized Rodynske on July 27, but Ukrainian officials and servicemembers told Hromadske that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Rodynske though Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are entering the settlement.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Rodynske and west of Zatyshok (northeast of Pokrovsk).[cxii] A Russian milblogger refuted claims of Russian advances in Pokrovsk and stated that Russian forces did not advance into Pokrovsk from Zvirove (southwest of Pokrovsk).[cxiii]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Razine, Novoekonomichne, Zatyshok, and Mayak; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Myrnohrad, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, Molodetske, and Udachne and toward Novopidhorodne on July 31 and August 1.[cxiv]

Three Ukrainian officers operating in the Pokrovsk direction told Hromadske that Ukrainian forces continue to eliminate Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups within Pokrovsk.[cxv] A Ukrainian officer told Hromadske that Russian forces are bypassing Ukrainian positions and advancing as far as possible into the Ukrainian near rear without coming into contact with Ukrainian forces.[cxvi] Hromadske reported that Ukrainian sappers recently captured nine Russian soldiers nine kilometers from Dobropillya (north of Pokrovsk) in Ukraine's near rear. Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov told Hromaske that Russian forces are trying to enter Rodynske and the area around Pokrovsk in small groups but that Ukrainian forces are quickly eliminating the Russian groups. Syrskyi told Zelensky on July 31 that there is intense fighting near Pokrovsk and Dobropillya and that Ukrainian forces are defending against Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups that aim to gain a foothold in the settlements.[cxvii] The Telegraph reported that Russian use of fiber-optic drones has, in part, enabled recent Russian advances near Pokrovsk.[cxviii] The Telegraph also reported that Russian forces are utilizing drone swarms to poke holes in Ukrainian anti-drone netting and to loiter near netted tunnel exits. The Telegraph reported that Russian forces ambushed Ukrainian forces on the T-0515 Pokrovsk-Dobropillya road near Rodynske on June 27 and established fire control over the sector of the road in the area.[cxix] The Telegraph reported that Ukrainian forces attribute relatively more rapid Russian advances near Pokrovsk to the arrival of Russian drone units to the area from Kursk Oblast, likely referring to elements of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies that previously operated in Kursk Oblast and recently began operating in Donetsk Oblast.[cxx] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are attempting to bypass Rodynske.[cxxi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on August 1 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove, Dachne, and Zelenyi Kut and south of Novopavlivka near Zaporizhzhia, Zirka, and Tovste and toward Filiya on July 31 and August 1.[cxxii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Dachne.[cxxiii]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly operating near Dachne.[cxxiv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on August 1 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Piddubne, Voskresenka, and Myrne, and toward Oleksandrohrad and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Maliivka, Vilne Pole, and Novosilka on July 31 and August 1.[cxxv]

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 305th Artillery Brigade (5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Ternove (southwest of Velykomykhailivka).[cxxvi] Drone operators of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Oleksandrohrad.[cxxvii]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on August 1 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Novopil, Temyrivka, and Zelene Pole on July 31 and August 1.[cxxviii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Polohy (Hulyaipole) direction.[cxxix]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 1 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Plavni (west of Orikhiv).[cxxx]

Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk and Plavni and southwest of Orikhiv near Kamyanske and Mali Shcherbaky on July 31 and August 1.[cxxxi] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novodanylivka (south of Orikhiv) and Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv).[cxxxii]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 108th and 247th airborne (VDV) regiments (both 7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Plavni and Stepnohirsk.[cxxxiii] Drone operators of the Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Bilohirya (southeast of Orikhiv) and Novoandriivka (southwest of Orikhiv).[cxxxiv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kherson direction on August 1 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of the Kherson direction on July 31 and August 1.[cxxxv]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[cxxxvi]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 31 to August 1. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 72 Shahed-type drones and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[cxxxvii] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed or suppressed 44 drones and that 28 Russian drones struck nine locations. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces primarily targeted Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, and Kyiv oblasts. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes killed three people, injured 12, and damaged civilian infrastructure in Kyiv City and Donetsk and Kharkiv oblasts.[cxxxviii]

The death toll from the Russian strikes against Kyiv City on the night of July 30 to 31 continues to rise. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that the strikes killed at least 31 people, including five children (the youngest of whom was 2 years old), and injured at least 159.[cxxxix]

Kharkiv City Mayor Ihor Terekhov reported that the Russian forces conducted 103 strikes against Kharkiv City in July 2025, mostly with Shahed-type drones.[cxl] Terekhov stated that Russian forces continued to use tactics of launching large strike packages from low altitudes to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses. Terekhov stated that Russian forces first launch glide bombs and then Shahed-type drones against the same targets, and that Russian forces conduct "double tap" strikes against emergency workers. Terekhov stated that Russian strikes in July 2025 injured 164 people and killed one and damaged eight of Kharkiv City's nine raions. Terekhov stated that Russia conducted strikes against Kharkiv Oblast on 16 days during July 2025 and against Kharkiv City on 10 days of the month.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Belarusian state news agency BELTA reported on August 1 that Belarusian Special Operations Forces (SSO) Commander Vadim Denisenko claimed that Belarus will create a new airborne assault brigade in southern Belarus.[cxli] Denisenko claimed that the Belarusian forces had already formed one battalion of the brigade. Denisenko stated that the SSO will create a rocket artillery regiment in 2025 and is completing the creation of an anti-aircraft missile regiment.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.