5 hours ago

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 29, 2025

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

 

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

 

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

 

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:45 am ET on June 29. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 30 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

 

Russia conducted its largest combined strike series of the war on the night of June 28 to 29 by launching over 500 missiles and drones against Ukraine. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian launched a total of 537 strike vehicles, including 447 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[i] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched four Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles from the airspace above Tambov Oblast; seven Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Voronezh Oblast; 41 Kh-101/Iskander-K cruise missiles from Saratov, Kursk, and Bryansk oblasts; five Kalibr cruise missiles from the Black Sea; and three S-300 air defense missiles from Kursk Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 221 drones, one Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missile, 33 Kh-101/Iskander-K cruise missiles, and four Kalibr cruise missiles and that 225 drones and one Kh-101/Iskander-K cruise missile were "lost in location" or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck civilian infrastructure, including residences and educational facilities, in Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk, Cherkasy, and Mykolaiv oblasts and railway and industrial infrastructure in Lviv and Poltava oblasts.[ii] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky acknowledged that a Ukrainian F-16 fighter pilot died while repelling the strikes.[iii] Russia is continuing to use increasingly large numbers of drones in its overnight strike packages in order to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and enable subsequent cruise and ballistic missile strikes.[iv] The increases in Russia's strike packages in recent weeks are largely due to Russia's efforts to scale up its defense industrial production, particularly of Shahed and decoy drones and ballistic missiles.[v]

 

[strikes graphic]

 

Ukrainian forces were notably only able to shoot down one of the seven Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles and did not shoot down any of the four Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles during the June 28 to 29 strike series. Zelensky called on Ukraine to strengthen its air defenses and reiterated that Ukraine is ready to buy US air defense systems.[vi] US President Donald Trump recently spoke with Zelensky about possible US sales of Patriot air defense systems on June 25.[vii] Patriot systems are vital to Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian ballistic missile strikes, especially as Russia is reportedly increasing its production and stockpile of ballistic missile production capacity to enable larger and more frequent ballistic missile strikes against Ukraine.[viii]

 

Russia appears to be increasingly striking civilian areas in its large-scale strike packages. Kyiv City Military Administration Head Timur Tkachenko stated that Russia has changed its strike tactics in order to inflict as much damage to civilian areas as possible.[ix] Tkachenko noted that Russian missile and drone strikes heavily targeted Kyiv City three times in June 2025, launching a total of 285 drones and 65 missiles against the capital so far in June 2025 – a sharp increase from the 35 drones and one ballistic missile that Russian forces launched against Kyiv City in January 2025. Tkachenko noted that 42 civilians, including a child, have died due to Russian strikes against the capital since the start of June 2025 and that 234 people, including 11 children, have sustained injuries. Tkachenko reported that Russian forces are conducting "double tap" strikes against emergency responders and using cluster munitions with delayed detonations that threaten both civilians and rescue workers. ISW has observed Russian officials and milbloggers respond to recent large-scale and deadly Russian strikes against Kyiv City by calling on Russia to intensify its strikes.[x]

 

Satellite imagery and Russian government announcements indicate that Russia is trying to increase its aircraft production in the medium- to long-term. Finnish outlet Yle reported on June 28 that satellite imagery collected between mid-2024 and May 2025 shows that Russia has constructed or expanded at least five buildings at the Kazan Aviation Plant by 19,000 square meters.[xi] Yle reported that the plant produces and modernizes Russian strategic Tupolev aircraft, such as the Tu-160M, Tu-160M2, and Tu-22M3, as well as helicopters. Yle reported that Russian authorities plan to continue new construction until the end of 2026 to increase the plant's production capabilities. The Russian state United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) press service announced in January 2025 that officials had already built a new final assembly hall, upgraded manufacturing technology, and procured new equipment for the plant, such as computer numerical control machine tools, welding robots, and measurement and control systems.[xii] UAC reported that Russia intends for the Kazan plant to produce four Tu-214 aircraft by 2025, seven by 2026, 17 by 2027, and 28 annually by 2028. Russian regional outlet Evening Kazan reported in February 2025 that Russian officials plan to spend as much as 90 billion rubles (about $1.2 billion) on the plant's modernization.[xiii] Yle reported that the plant is struggling to keep pace with the modernization and increased aircraft production plans due to sanctions and Russia's ongoing labor shortages.[xiv] Yle reported that the plant only delivered two Tu-160M2s and two Tu-160Ms in 2024. The plant’s current annual production rate remains unclear, however, as the Tupolevs that the plant delivered in 2024 have likely been under construction for some time. Sanctions and parts and labor shortages will likely continue to slow Russia's aircraft production, even as Russia works to expand physical production capabilities.

 

Russia is also reportedly expanding its production of Sukhoi aircraft. UAC Head Vadim Badekha announced on June 25 that Russia intends to increase the production effectiveness of Sukhoi aircraft by 30 percent by 2030.[xv] Badekha stated that Russia is working to increase its Sukhoi production volumes beyond its 2024 production rate. Ukrainian military observer Oleksandr Kovalenko stated in May 2025 that Russia can currently produce a Sukhoi aircraft in one to two months.[xvi] ISW previously reported that UAC intends to lay off 1,500 managerial staff in Moscow and assessed that the Kremlin may be deprioritizing the aircraft industry to conserve funds and materials for drone and weapons production.[xvii] Badekha's June 25 statement and Yel's satellite imagery assessment indicate that Russia is likely attempting to balance allocating significant resources to drone production with the continued need to produce traditional systems.

 

Key Takeaways:

  • Russia conducted its largest combined strike series of the war on the night of June 28 to 29 by launching over 500 missiles and drones against Ukraine.
  • Russia appears to be increasingly striking civilian areas in its large-scale strike packages.
  • Satellite imagery and Russian government announcements indicate that Russia is trying to increase its aircraft production in the medium- to long-term.
  • Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Chasiv Yar.

 

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

 

  • Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
  • Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
  • Significant Activity in Belarus

 

 

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

 

Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on June 29.

 

Russian forces attacked in unspecified parts of Kursk Oblast on June 28 and 29.[xviii]

 

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Tetkino direction (southwest of Glushkovo).[xix]

 

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

 

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage posted on June 28 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced south of Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City).[xx]

 

Russian forces attacked in the Sumy direction, including north of Sumy City near Andriivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yablunivka, on June 28 and 29.[xxi] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked between Yablunivka and Khrapivshchyne (south of Yablunivka) and near Andriivka.[xxii]

 

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 119th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) and drone operators of the 11th Separate VDV Brigade are reportedly operating in northern Sumy Oblast.[xxiii] Drone operators of the 83rd Separate VDV Brigade are reportedly operating near Yablunivka.[xxiv]

 

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 29 but did not make confirmed advances.

 

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[xxv]

 

Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and toward Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on June 28 and 29.[xxvi]

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

 

Russian forces continued assaults in the Kupyansk direction on June 29 but did not advance.

 

Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk near Stroivka and Holubivka and toward Kutkivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and toward Pishchane on June 28 and 29.[xxvii]

 

Russian forces continued assaults in the Borova direction on June 29 but did not advance.

 

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zelenyi Hai; east of Borova near Kopanky and Nadiya; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and Tverdokhlibove and toward Novoserhiivka on June 28 and 29.[xxviii]

 

Russian forces continued assaults in the Lyman direction on June 29 but did not advance.

 

Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Ridkodub and Zelena Dolyna and toward Serednye and Shandryholove; northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka and Myrne; and east of Lyman near Torske and in the Serebryanske forest area on June 28 and 29.[xxix] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are repelling Ukrainian counterattacks near Ridkodub.[xxx]

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on June 29 but did not make confirmed advances.

 

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Serebryanka (northeast of Siversk) and east of Siversk.[xxxi]

 

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Serebyranka and Hryhorivka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Vyimka on June 28 and 29.[xxxii] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on June 29 that Russian forces conducted an unsuccessful attack with three infantry fighting vehicles and three motorcycles toward Serebyranka.[xxxiii]

 

The chief of staff of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Siversk direction reported that Russian forces are deploying single infantrymen equipped with an anti-tank mine to destroy Ukrainian shelters.[xxxiv] The chief of staff stated that Russian forces recently took advantage of poor weather conditions to increase the number of assaults when Ukrainian drones could not fly. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups have already approached the outskirts of Siversk.[xxxv]

 

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Serebryanka, and elements of the 6th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd AC) are reportedly operating near Verkhnokamyanske.[xxxvi]

 

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction.


Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated published on June 28 and 29 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in central Chasiv Yar and southeast of Bila Hora (south of Chasiv Yar).[xxxvii]

 

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and toward Bila Hora on June 28 and 29.[xxxviii]

 

Order of Battle: Elements of the 217th and 331st airborne (VDV) regiments (both of the 98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[xxxix]

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on June 29 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; northeast of Toretsk near Dachne; northwest of Toretsk near Rusyn Yar, Popiv Yar, Poltavka, and Yablunivka; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka; and southwest of Toretsk near Leonidivka on June 28 and 29.[xl]

 

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on June 28 that Russian forces appear to be attacking in the “Dobropillya direction” (northwest of Toretsk and northwest of Pokrovsk)and that elements of the Russian 68th AC (Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 20th and 150th motorized rifle divisions (both of the 8th CAA, SMD) are attacking in three operational directions[xli] ISW has observed reports of elements of the 68th AC operating near Malynivka and Myrne (east of Pokrovsk), elements of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division operating near Yablunivka and Malynivka, and elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division operating toward Katerynivka (northwest of Toretsk). The Russian military command may intend to leverage the Russian salient between Pokrovsk and Toretsk to envelop Pokrovsk from the northeast and north or to bypass Ukrainian defenses in Kostyantynivka from the southwest and west. Russian forces operating in the salient between Toretsk and Pokrovsk would have to cross the Kazennyi Torets River in order to advance toward Dobropillya, which may present an obstacle to the Russian advance depending on the river’s water level.

 

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) reportedly continue to operate near Yablunivka and Rusyn Yar.[xlii]

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on June 29 but did not make any confirmed advances.

 

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on June 28 that Russian forces advanced in southeastern Razine, northwest of Malynivka, and in northern Novotoretske (all northeast of Pokrovsk).[xliii]

 

Russian forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk near Malynivka, Koptieve, and Myrne and toward Razine and Volodymyrivka; east of Pokrovsk near Promin, Myrolyubivka, Hrodivka, and Yelyzavetivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Hrodivka, Sukhyi Yar, and Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Udachne, and Kotlyne on June 28 and 29.[xliv]

 

The commander of a Ukrainian drone crew operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on June 29 that Russian forces have recently increased their drone use.[xlv]

 

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion are reportedly operating near Novotoretske.[xlvi] Drone operators of the 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) and "Vega" Spetsnaz Detachment (24th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade, Russian General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) reportedly continue to operate in the Pokrovsk direction.[xlvii]

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on June 29 but did not make any confirmed advances.

 

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on June 28 that Russian forces advanced to Myrne (south of Novopavlivka).[xlviii] Another Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) advanced north and southeast of Zirka (south of Novopavlivka).[xlix]

 

Russian forces attacked southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove, Troitske, and Oleksiivka and south of Novopavlivka near Myrne, Zaporizhzhia, Komar, Yalta, Dniproenerhiya, and Vesele on June 28 and 29.[l]

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on June 29 but did not make confirmed advances.

 

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on June 28 and 29 that Russian forces advanced northwest of Shevchenko (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[li]

 

Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko and toward Maliivka; west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Rivnopil on June 28 and 29.[lii]

 

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 57th and 60th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly attacking toward Maliivka.[liii] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Maliivka.[liv] Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (GRU) and the 16th Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Defense Regiment (EMD) are reportedly operating in the Shakhtarske (Velyka Novosilka) direction.[lv]

 

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Malynivka (east of Hulyaipole) on June 28 and 29 but did not advance.[lvi]

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 29 but did not advance.

 

Russian forces conducted offensive operations southwest of Orikhiv near Kamyanske on June 28 and 29.[lvii]

 

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported that Russian forces aim to seize Kamyanske in order to conduct artillery strikes against Stepnohirsk (north of Kamyanske) and to advance toward the southern outskirts of Zaporizhzhia City (northwest of Kamyanske).[lviii] Voloshyn stated that Russian forces are concentrating infantry on the southern front in Ukraine, so Russian forces will continue constant assault operations at high intensity in the future.[lix] Voloshyn stated that the Russian military command deployed an unspecified, newly formed regiment to an unspecified area of the Southern Military District's (SMD) area of responsibility (AoR), but that the newly created unit does not consist of enough personnel to conduct serious, large-scale offensive operations.

 

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv direction.[lx]

 

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported any ground activity in the Kherson direction on June 29.

 

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[lxi] Elements of the “Omerzitelnaya Vosmerka” drone group (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating in occupied Crimea.[lxii]

 

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

 

See topline text.

 

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

 

Nothing significant to report.

 

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.


[i] https://t.me/kpszsu/37314

[ii] https://suspilne dot media/cherkasy/1052849-na-cerkasini-cerez-ataku-rf-u-nic-na-29-cervna-e-troe-travmovanih/; https://t.me/cherkaskaODA/14317; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/29/zrosla-kilkist-postrazhdalyh-vnaslidok-raketno-dronovogo-udaru-rf-po-smili/; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26043; https://t.me/onyshchuksvitlana/23136; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/29/travmovano-zhinku-v-ivano-frankivskij-ova-rozpovily-pro-naslidky-nichnoyi-ataky-rosiyan/ ; https://suspilne dot media/ivano-frankivsk/1054125-armia-rf-atakuvala-frankivsinu-krilatimi-raketami-v-oblasti-pracuvali-pidrozdili-ppo/; https://t.me/kozytskyy_maksym_official/22276 ; https://suspilne dot media/lviv/988143-nicnij-obstril-sahedami-na-lvivsini-prolunali-vibuhi/; https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=4127996704142578&id=100007968666779&rdid=8WbT1UipUhJI8xGT#; https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/14979 ; https://suspilne dot media/mykolaiv/1054115-u-mikolaevi-prolunala-serisia-vibuhi-so-vidomo/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/29/mykolayiv-atakuvaly-balistykoyu-ta-shahedamy/; https://t.me/poltavskaoda/28568 ; https://suspilne dot media/poltava/1054123-u-kremencuckomu-rajoni-na-poltavsini-vnaslidok-ataki-odnogo-iz-pidpriemstv-stalasa-pozeza/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/29/poltavshhyna-vnochi-zaznala-kombinovanogo-udaru-zs-rf/; https://t.me/poltavskaOVA/24187; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1BmrTwL7TG/ ; https://suspilne dot media/ternopil/1054239-zbili-raketi-i-bezpilotnik-naslidki-nicnoi-ataki-na-ternopilsini/; https://suspilne.media/poltava/1054249-vnaslidok-masovanoi-ataki-v-nic-na-29-cervna-zaznav-poskodzen-vokzal-poltava-pivdenna/

 

[iii] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14920

[iv] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-9-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060125

[v] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-30-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-14-2025; https://isw.pub/ForceGen061125

[vi] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14920

[vii] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062625

[viii] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-26-2025

[ix] https://t.me/astrapress/85083

[x] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061725

[xi] https://yle dot fi/a/74-20170067; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/russia-expands-kazan-aviation-plant-producing-tu-160-bombers/

[xii] https://ruavia dot su/tu-214-2024-year-end-review/

[xiii] https://www.evening-kazan dot ru/obshhestvo/news/kazanskiy-aviazavod-zaklyuchil-kontrakt-na-postavku-23-samoletov-tu-214

[xiv] https://yle dot fi/a/74-20170067; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/russia-expands-kazan-aviation-plant-producing-tu-160-bombers/

[xv] https://tass dot com/defense/1980677

[xvi] https://www.unian dot net/weapons/rossiyskie-samolety-ekspert-rasskazal-o-proizvodstve-rf-v-2025-godu-13021011.html#goog_rewarded

[xvii] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-june-27-2025

[xviii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26050; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26030; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26027

[xix] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94681; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30579

[xx] https://t.me/dva_majors/74335; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1939036149760364909

[xxi] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26050; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26030; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26027; https://t.me/tass_agency/322986; https://t.me/wargonzo/27574;

[xxii] https://t.me/brigada_83/1858; https://t.me/voin_dv/15730; https://t.me/wargonzo/27574; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170714

[xxiii] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94675; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30565; https://t.me/voin_dv/15733

[xxiv] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30565 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15730; https://t.me/voin_dv/15732

[xxv] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170714

[xxvi] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26050; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26030; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26027; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30582

[xxvii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26030 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26027 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26050; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12945

[xxviii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26050 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26030 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26027 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12945

[xxix] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26050 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26030 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26027 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12945

[xxx] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37905

[xxxi] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37904

[xxxii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26050; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26030 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26027; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12945

[xxxiii] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12945

[xxxiv] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/29/syly-oborony-rozpovily-pro-taktyku-zastosuvannya-vorogom-orkiv-odnorazok/

[xxxv] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37904

[xxxvi] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37904

[xxxvii] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1939283655412883505; https://t.me/rodnaya98vdd/1594; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1939253416947310955; https://t.me/shtrihgroupgumka/615

 

 

[xxxviii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26050; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26030; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26027; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12945

[xxxix] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30565

[xl] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26050 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26030 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12945 ; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/20875 ;

[xli] https://t.me/osirskiy/1200

[xlii] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13970

[xliii] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31919

[xliv] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26050 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26030 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26027 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31919 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170627

[xlv] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/29/dron-na-optovolokni-yak-zmiya-v-travi-u-zsu-rozpovily-yak-protystoyat-zgrayam-vorozhyh-bpla/

[xlvi] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13970

[xlvii] https://t.me/sashakots/54598 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/74344

[xlviii] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65481

[xlix] https://t.me/voin_dv/15729

[l] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26050 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26030 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26027 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/29/tretya-shturmova-ne-daye-okupantam-ni-vtekty-ni-shovatysya/; https://t.me/ab3army/5686

[li] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170642 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27574 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15719

[lii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26050 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26030 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26027

[liii] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170755 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15729 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15731

[liv] https://t.me/voin_dv/15731

[lv] https://t.me/voin_dv/15724 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15721

[lvi] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26050; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26030 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26027; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02KjF9FuQVkZ8BpjNt6FmjmGJnjnafM3tfm264GdULLHwPBAyRoaPmppqJNMwxLPWRl

[lvii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26050 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26030; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26027; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02KjF9FuQVkZ8BpjNt6FmjmGJnjnafM3tfm264GdULLHwPBAyRoaPmppqJNMwxLPWRl

[lviii] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/29/u-zsu-poyasnyly-chomu-rosiyany-zhadayut-zahopyty-kamyanske-na-zaporizhzhi/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JFvyCBahZ_k

[lix] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/29/my-yih-takozh-znyshhymo-rosiyany-zavodyat-na-pivden-dodatkovi-syly-pro-yaki-ranishe-zgaduvav-putin/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JFvyCBahZ_k

[lx] https://t.me/mod_russia/54262

[lxi] https://t.me/dva_majors/74379

[lxii] https://t.me/tass_agency/322979

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