Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 4, 2025

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30 am ET on August 4. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 5 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Kremlin officials are slowly organizing a coordinated response to US President Donald Trump's August 1 statement that the United States would redeploy two nuclear submarines closer to Russia. The Kremlin did not immediately employ a coordinated response on August 2 and 3 following Trump's initial announcement, but more Kremlin officials began to coalesce around similar rhetorical lines on August 4.[1] Kremlin officials utilized three main framings to respond to Trump's decision to redeploy the submarines — posing Trump's decision to redeploy the submarines as "emotional," discounting the threat that this decision poses to Russia, and posturing Russia as a more responsible international actor than the United States. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on August 4 that discussions of nuclear escalation are premature and a "very emotional" perception of the situation.[2] Peskov claimed that Russia is "very careful" about any statements related to nuclear issues and that Russia takes a "responsible position" in regard to nuclear rhetoric.[3] Russian Federation Council Committee on Foreign Affairs Chairperson Grigory Karasin responded to Trump by claiming that it is always better to be less emotional and more rational in foreign policy.[4] Russian State Duma Deputy Mikhail Matveev also characterized Trump as "emotional" in response to Trump's August 1 statement.[5] Russian State Duma Deputy Viktor Volodatsky claimed that Trump is attempting to intimidate Russia, but that the redeployment of US nuclear submarines near Russia is not a real threat to Russia, and Russian Senator Vladimir Dzhabarov similarly claimed that Trump is mistaken if he assesses that this redeployment will scare Russia.[6] Dzhabarov claimed that Russia is not threatening anyone.

These official Russian responses ignore the Kremlin's history of frequently leveraging nuclear saber-rattling to push the West to make decisions that benefit Russia. Trump explicitly acknowledged on August 1 that he redeployed the submarines in response to Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev's July 31 nuclear threats.[7] Medvedev alluded on July 31 to Russia's automatic or semi-automatic nuclear weapons control system, referred to as the "Dead Hand" or the "Perimeter."[8] The Kremlin regularly uses Medvedev to introduce nuclear threats into the Russian and international information spaces, but more senior Russian officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin himself, also often make similar vague allusions to Russia's nuclear weapons capabilities.[9] Putin has routinely invoked Russia's Oreshnik ballistic missile system to allude to the possibility that Russia could conduct a nuclear strike against the West, and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko claimed during a media engagement with Putin on August 1 that Trump cannot dictate rules to a nuclear power like Russia.[10]

The Kremlin also responded to Trump's August 1 announcement by trying to downplay Medvedev's role in Russian decision-making in order to obfuscate the role Medvedev plays in Putin's information efforts targeting the West. Peskov claimed on August 4 that Russian officials, including Medvedev, have different assessments on current events but that Russian President Vladimir Putin alone determines Russia's foreign policy.[11] Peskov claimed that Putin's position is the "main thing" of import. Peskov's attempt to separate Medvedev's views from Putin's ignores the way that Putin and other high-level officials in Putin's inner circle have themselves frequently used similar nuclear saber-rattling to threaten the West.[12] Medvedev himself does not drive Russian foreign policy decisions, but ISW continues to assess that his statements are very likely part of a top-down, concerted Kremlin informational strategy.[13] Putin would be able to censor Medvedev's statements if he chose to do so, especially considering the Kremlin's demonstrated ability to coordinate official statements and overall grip on the Russian information space, internet, and media. Medvedev's aggressive statements serve a specific purpose for Putin, however, as they push the West to see Putin's statements as more moderate and rational by comparison and create space for Putin to make greater demands or larger threats. Peskov's August 4 claims are trying to conceal the way that the Kremlin is likely approving and encouraging Medvedev's use of his platforms to make statements against the West.

Russian authorities continue to intensify the use of bribery charges, including to to scapegoat regional government officials responsible for Russia's border defense and target defense industry officials and critical information space actors. Russian independent outlet Mozhem Obyasnit (We Can Explain), citing Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) data, reported on August 4 that the number of bribery cases in Russia increased by roughly 52 percent in bribe-taking cases and 84 percent in bribe-giving cases since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. [14] The MVD data showed a 33 percent increase in bribe-taking cases and 11 percent in bribe-giving cases in the first half of 2025 alone. Russian anti-corruption expert Ilya Shumanov told Mozhem Obyasnit that Russian authorities have created new offenses with fixed fines of up to 10 million rubles (roughly $125,300) as part of efforts to crack down on corruption and are actively investigating several large-scale bribery cases in the defense industry. Mozhem Obyasnit noted that Russian authorities have detained former Tambov Oblast Governor Maksim Yegorov; Gleb Trifonov, the editor-in-chief of Baza, a Russian outlet reportedly affiliated with Russian law enforcement; the editor-in-chief of state-owned Ural regional information agency Ura.ru; and former Rosgvardia Deputy Head Viktor Stigunov in July 2025 alone.

The Kremlin has been particularly targeting high-ranking officials in border oblasts with corruption charges in order to punish them for their inability to repel Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024. Acting Kursk Oblast Governor Alexander Khinshtein claimed on August 4 that Russian authorities may soon decide to liquidate the state-owned Kursk Oblast Development Corporation (KODC) following a series of embezzlement charges against the organization.[15] Russian authorities previously detained and charged KODC executives and high-ranking regional officials in Kursk, Bryansk, and Belgorod oblasts with embezzling funds earmarked for the construction of defensive fortifications in Russia's border areas.[16] ISW continues to assess that the arrests of officials in border areas are part of a concerted Kremlin effort to scapegoat regional officials for failing to repel Ukraine's incursion, and the decision to liquidate the KODC is likely part of these scapegoat efforts.[17]

Key Takeaways:

• Kremlin officials are slowly organizing a coordinated response to US President Donald Trump's August 1 statement that the United States would redeploy two nuclear submarines closer to Russia.
• The Kremlin also responded to Trump's August 1 announcement by trying to downplay Medvedev's role in Russian decision-making in order to obfuscate the role Medvedev plays in Putin's information efforts targeting the West.
• Russian authorities continue to intensify the use of bribery charges, including to scapegoat regional government officials responsible for Russia's border defense and target defense industry officials and critical information space actors.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Siversk, Toretsk, and Velykomykhailivka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on August 3 and 4 but did not advance.[18]

Ukrainian forces likely conducted a drone strike against railway infrastructure in Volgograd Oblast. Ukrainian Center for Combatting Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, who often reports on successful Ukrainian strikes in Russia, implied on August 4 that railway infrastructure in Volgograd Oblast was on fire.[19] Geolocated footage published on August 4 shows a drone strike and subsequent explosion at a railway control station in Frolovo, Volgograd Oblast.[20] Volgograd Oblast Governor Andrei Bocharov claimed that Ukrainian forces launched a large drone strike against Volgograd Oblast on the night of August 3 to 4.[21] Bocharov claimed that the strike damaged a high-voltage power line in Ilovlynsky Raion and caused a fire at the Archeda Railway Station in Frolovo. Volga Railway claimed that Ukrainian drone debris caused five train delays at Archeda Station.[22]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on August 4 that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Novomykolaivka (north of Sumy City).[23] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces back between Kindrativka and Andriivka (both north of Sumy City) and that Russian forces in the area are surrounded by water on three sides.[24] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced marginally near the international border near Lukashivka (southeast of Sumy City).[25]

Russian forces attacked in northern Sumy Oblast, including north of Sumy City near Kindrativka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, on August 3 and 4.[26] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kindrativka and Yunakivka.[27] Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kindrativka and Andriivka.[28]

 Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 11th and 83rd separate airborne (VDV) brigades are operating near Yablunivka, Varachyne, and Vodolahy (all northeast of Sumy City).[29] Mashovets reported that elements of the 76th VDV Division are operating near Yunakivka. Elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[30]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 4 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City toward Kazacha Lopan and Hoptivka and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on August 3 and 4.[31] Ukrainian Derhachivskyi Raion Military Administration Head Vyacheslav Zadorenko reported on August 4 that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian attack on the Hoptivka international border checkpoint.[32]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian forces established fire control over all ground lines of communication (GLOCs) supplying Ukrainian forces on the south (left) bank of the Vovcha River in Vovchansk.[33]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 128th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and 68th and 69th motorized rifle divisions (both of the 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], LMD) are reportedly operating in Vovchansk.[34] Elements of the pro-Russian Chechen Sheikh Mansur volunteer battalion (subordinated to the Russian Ministry of Defense [MoD]) are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[35]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on August 4.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Russian forces advanced along the P-79 Kupyansk-Dvorichna highway on the northern outskirts of Kupyansk.[36]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in northern Kupyansk.[37]

 Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Kupyansk itself; northeast of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe, Myrove, and Fyholivka and toward Novovasylivka; north of Kupyansk near Holubivka and Zapadne and toward Kutkivka and Kolodyazne; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka and Stepova Novoselivka; and southeast of Kupyansk toward Novoosynove on August 3 and 4.[38]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction stated that the number of Russian assaults has decreased in recent weeks but that Russian artillery and drone strikes have increased.[39] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are attacking mostly on foot and have increased their use of motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs).

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and most of the 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are operating in the Kupyansk direction after regrouping in Spring and early Summer 2025.[40] Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 3rd and 144th motorized rifle divisions (both of the 20th CAA, MMD), with reinforcements from the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division (1st GTA), are operating in the Kupyansk and Borova directions.[41]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on August 4 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Hrekivka (southeast of Borova).[42]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and Olhivka and toward Cherneshchyna on August 3 and 4.[43] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hrekivka.[44]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on August 4 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Serednie and northeast of Shandryholove (both northwest of Lyman); north of Karpivka and southwest of Zelena Dolyna (both north of Lyman); northwest of Myrne (northeast of Lyman); and south of Dibrova and in the Serebryanske forest area (both east of Lyman).[45]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Lyman toward Serednie and Shandryholove; north of Lyman near Karpivka, Ridkodub, and Zelena Dolyna; northeast of Lyman near Myrne, Yampil, and Kolodyazi; and east of Lyman near Torske and in the Serebryanske forest area on August 3 and 4.[46] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Ridkodub, Kolodyazi, and Torske.[47]

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 254th Motorized Rifle Regiment (144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, MMD) are operating near Karpivka.[48] Mashovets stated that elements of the 67th Motorized Rifle Division (25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are operating near Torske. Elements of the 1428th Motorized Rifle Regiment (144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA) are reportedly operating near Shandryholove.[49] 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 3 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Novoselivka (east of Siversk), indicating that Russian forces seized the settlement.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) seized Novosilka.[51]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Siversk, south of Serebryanka (northeast of Siversk), west of Novoselivka, and northwest of Ivano-Darivka (southeast of Siversk).[52]

Russian forces attacked near Siversk itself; northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka and toward Dronivka; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka, and south of Siversk near Rozdolivka on August 3 and 4.[53]

Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 6th and 123rd motorized rifle brigades (both of the 3rd CAA) and 127th Motorized Rifle Brigade (reportedly of the 3rd CAA, SMD) are operating near Serebryanka, Verkhnokamyanske, Ivano-Darivka, and Vyiimka.[54] Elements of the 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are reportedly operating near Serebryanka.[55] Elements of the 88th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are reportedly operating near Rozdolivka (south of Siversk).[56]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on August 4 but did not make confirmed advances.

 Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Minkivka (north of Chasiv Yar) and northeast of Zaliznyanske (northeast of Chasiv Yar).[57]

Russian forces attacked north of Chasiv Yar near Novomarkove; northwest of Chasiv Yar toward Markove; and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky, Predtechyne, Oleksandro-Shultyne, and Bila Hora on August 3 and 4.[58]

Kramatorsk City Military Administration Head Oleksandr Honcharenko stated on August 4 that Russian forces struck Kramatorsk (northwest of Chasiv Yar) with a Molniya-2 strike drone, damaging civilian infrastructure.[59]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 331st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are operating in Chasiv Yar.[60]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 4 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Rusyn Yar (northwest of Toretsk).[61]

Unconfirmed claims: Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin claimed on August 4 that Russian forces seized both banks of the Kleban-Buk Reservoir (northwest of Toretsk) and an unspecified section of the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway near the reservoir.[62] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 20th and 150 motorized rifle divisions (both of the 8th CAA, SMD) recently pushed Ukrainian forces out of Poltavka (northwest of Toretsk).[63]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; northwest of Toretsk near Pleshchiivka, Katerynivka, Oleksandro-Kalynove, Yablunivka, Popiv Yar, Poltavka, and Rusyn Yar; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on August 3 and 4.[64]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage posted on August 4 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced northeast of Krasnyi Lyman (northeast of Pokrovsk) and into southeastern Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[65]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Leontovychi (south of Pokrovsk).[66]

Russian forces attacked north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Sukhetske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Novoekonomichne, Krasnyi Lyman, and Myrolyubivka; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Sukhyi Yar; south of Pokrovsk toward Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske and toward Novopidhorodne on August 3 and 4.[67] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Shevchenko (south of Pokrovsk).[68]

Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated that the Russian military command has allocated significant forces to the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad area and that Russian forces in the area are using their full arsenal of weapons, ranging from drones to glide bombs.[69] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces are attempting to use "drone swarms," in which one reconnaissance drone drops several first-person view (FPV) drones near a Ukrainian position.[70] Trehubov and the spokesperson added that Russian forces are attacking in fireteams of two to five soldiers that infiltrate Ukrainian lines and entrench in forests and near rear areas. The spokesperson of another Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces have decreased the intensity of their attacks southwest of Pokrovsk in order to concentrate on seizing Pokrovsk itself.[71] The spokesperson added that cloudy or rainy weather slightly hinders drone activity in the area, but that drones remain a threat in the 10-kilometer-wide "kill zone" along the frontline. A Russian milblogger criticized some open-source intelligence channels for framing limited Russian reconnaissance-in-force missions into Pokrovsk as evidence of enduring Russian positions and advances into the town.[72] Russian milbloggers claimed that Sukhetske, Chunyshyne, and the Krasnolymanska coal mine (north of Krasnyi Lyman) are already or will soon become contested "gray zones.”[73]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near Lysivka.[74]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on August 4 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Novoukrainka (southeast of Novopavlivka).[75]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove, Zelenyi Kut, and Novoukrainka; south of Novopavlivka near Zaporizhzhia and toward Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Novokhatske, Zirka, and Zelenyi Hai on August 3 and 4.[76]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating in the Novopavlivka direction.[77]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Velykomykhailivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 4 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Voskresenka (east of Velykomykhailivka).[78]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced toward Oleksandrohrad (east of Velykomykhailivka) and Andriivka-Klevtsove (northeast of Velykomykhailivka).[79]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Piddubne; east of Velykomykhailivka near Myrne and Voskresenka; and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Zelene Pole, Maliivka, Temyrivka, Novopil, and Vilne Pole and toward Komyshuvakha on August 3 and 4.[80]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly conducting glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian positions near Andriivka-Klevtsove.[81] Drone operators of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) and 16th Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Protection Brigade (EMD) are reportedly operating in the Vremivka (Velykomykhailivka) direction.[82]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Levadne and east of Hulyaipole near Maliivka on August 3 and 4 but did not advance.[83]

Russian forces continued ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 4 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked toward Orikhiv itself; west of Orikhiv near Plavni and Stepnohirsk; and southwest of Orikhiv near Kamyanske and Novoandriivka on August 4.[84] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Stepnohirsk.[85]

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn stated on August 4 that Russian forces are regrouping in preparation for future assaults in Zaporizhia Oblast.[86] Voloshyn stated that Russian forces are attempting to repel Ukrainian troops from the outskirts of Kamyanske and trying to infiltrate Stepnohirsk at night.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division and 4th Military Base (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to operate in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[87]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 4 that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian S-300 air defense system in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast on August 2.[88]

 Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of the Kherson direction on August 3 and 4 but did not advance.[89]

Voloshyn reported that Russian ground attacks decreased in the Kherson direction on August 3, likely as Russian forces regrouped in the area.[90] Voloshyn stated that Russian forces have intensified attacks on the islands in the Dnipro River Delta over the last week (since roughly July 28), including on Zabich and Nestriha islands (southwest of Kherson City) and near the Antonivskyi Bridge (northeast of Kherson City).

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 80th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in Kherson Oblast.[91]

Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reported on August 4 that SBU drones struck the Saky Airfield in occupied Crimea and destroyed a Russian Su-30SM fighter jet, damaged another Su-30SM, and struck three Su-24 tactical fighter-bombers.[92] The SBU reported that Ukrainian drones also struck an aviation weapon warehouse at the air base.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of August 3 to 4. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Kh-47 Kinzhal aeroballistic missile from an unspecified location and 162 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Bryansk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[93] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 161 drones and the Kh-47 aeroballistic missile. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that one drone and drone debris struck nine locations in Odesa and Kyiv oblasts. Ukrainian officials reported that unspecified Russian drones struck residential areas in Kyiv Oblast and that Shahed, Geran-2 (the Russian analogue of the Iranian Shahed-136), and Molniya drones struck civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv Oblast.[94]

A Ukrainian anti-aircraft battery commander told The Times on August 4 that Russian forces will likely launch thousands of Shahed-type drones against Ukraine per day by Winter 2025.[95] The commander stated that Russian forces have recently begun to maneuver Shahed-type drones just before impact in order to evade Ukrainian interception. ISW previously assessed that Russian forces may be able to strike Ukraine with up to 2,000 drones in a single night by November 2025, should the current pattern of growth in nightly Russian drone usage continue.[96]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.