Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 12, 2025

July 12, 2025, 5:00 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:00 pm ET on July 12. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 13 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russia launched another large-scale drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of July 11 to 12 — the third combined strike with over 500 drones and missiles in July alone. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 339 Shahed-type drones and 258 decoy drones (597 drones total) from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Millerovo, Rostov Oblast.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 26 Kh-101 cruise missiles from the airspace over Saratov Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 319 Shahed-type drones and 25 Kh-101 cruise missiles and that 258 drones were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged critical electrical networks and administrative and civilian infrastructure in Chernivtsi, Cherkasy, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Lviv, Sumy, and Volyn oblasts.[2] Ukraine’s State Emergency Service reported that Russian strikes killed two civilians in Chernivtsi City and injured 14.[3] Kyiv Oblast Military Administration Head Mykola Kalashnyk reported that Ukraine’s Clean Sky program, which uses interceptor drones to defend Kyiv Oblast against nightly Russian long-range drone strikes, downed over 50 drones during Russia’s overnight strike.[4] ISW continues to assess that Russia's ongoing large-scale strikes are intended to degrade Ukrainian and Western morale and underscore Ukraine's need for continued Western support for Ukraine's interceptor drone program and for the continued supply of Western air defense systems, especially US-provided Patriot systems.[5]

Russian forces recently advanced from the international border toward Velykyi Burluk in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast — likely in an effort to connect Russian operations near Vovchansk with those near Dvorichna, possibly to facilitate Russian efforts to establish a buffer zone along the international border. Geolocated footage published on July 12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Milove (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[6] Elements of the Russian 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and the 72nd Motorized Rifle Division (44th Army Corps [AC], LMD) first advanced into central Milove in early July 2025.[7] Elements of the 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment defended against limited Ukrainian attacks into northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast in March and April 2025, and elements of the 72nd Motorized Rifle Division participated in retaking Kursk Oblast and attacking into northern Sumy Oblast in Spring and early Summer 2025.[8] Some elements of the 72nd Motorized Rifle Division are reportedly continuing to operate in northern Sumy Oblast, although the Russian military command appears to have recently redeployed other elements of the division and the 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment to the Velykyi Burluk direction.[9]

This area of the international border between the Vovchansk and Kupyansk direction has been largely inactive over the last two years of the war, and the redeployment of elements of a regiment and a division to the area indicates that the Russian military command may be preparing to launch a more concerted offensive operation in this area. Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Shamshyn stated on July 8 that Russian forces have intensified their attacks near Milove and are leveraging artillery and drone support to strike Ukrainian positions in the area.[10] Russian milbloggers claimed on July 12 that Russian forces are shelling Khatnie (southwest of Milove) and Velykyi Burluk in order to facilitate further advances toward Khatnie and Ambarne (south of Milove).[11] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces are also attacking near Chuhunivka (northwest of Milove).[12] Russian and Ukrainian sources previously suggested in January 2025 that Russian forces intended to advance to Velykyi Burluk from the northwest near Vovchansk and the southeast near Dvorichna, and ISW noted at the time that Russian forces could spend six months to a year attempting to advance toward Velykyi Burluk from these areas before they could truly threaten the settlement.[13] Russian forces have failed to make any substantive advances toward Velykyi Burluk from Vovchansk or Dvorichna over the last six months, and the Russian military command appears to be activating another avenue of advance toward the settlement.

Russian forces have advanced roughly five kilometers from the international border over the last 10 days and appear to maintain positions roughly 16 kilometers northeast of Velykyi Burluk. Russian forces will likely attempt to widen their salient northeast of Velykyi Burluk and seize Khatnie before attacking further toward the settlement. Russian forces will also have to contend with water features in the area, including the Velykyi Burluk River that runs along the Shevchenkove-Mykhailivka-Velykyi Burluk line. This line of settlements situated along the river could pose a significant challenge for Russian troops should Ukrainian forces choose to defend here. The Russian military command almost certainly must further reinforce the units in this area if it intends to conduct an organized offensive operation against Velykyi Burluk, and Russia may reinforce this effort more rapidly if Russian forces are able to advance quickly in this previously inactive area. A Russian seizure of Velykyi Burluk would complicate Ukraine's defenses in the Vovchansk and Dvorichna directions, as Russian forces would likely be able to operate tube artillery from close enough to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and strike frontline and near rear Ukrainian positions in both directions. The collapse of Ukraine's defense in the Vovchansk and Dvorichna areas would allow Russian forces to establish their envisioned buffer zone to defend Belgorod Oblast from Ukrainian shelling in at least one area of northern Kharkiv Oblast.[14] The Vovchansk-Velykyi Burluk-Dvorichna line could also serve as a significant defensive line within a Russian buffer zone in northern Kharkiv Oblast if Russian forces are able to join their advances from these three directions in the medium- to long-term.

Ukraine signed several strategic agreements with Western defense companies to bolster Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) during the Ukraine Recovery Conference in Rome. Ukrainian Minister of Strategic Industries Herman Smetanin reported on July 12 that Ukraine secured five agreements in the defense sector with international partners on July 11 and 12.[15] Ukraine signed agreements with D&M Holding Company, an American defense manufacturer that specializes in ammunition and primers, to launch a joint production of special chemicals in the United States needed for ammunition production, including gunpowder. Ukraine also concluded agreements with the Italian Ministry of Defense to promote cooperation between unspecified Ukrainian and Italian defense companies to address demands for components and raw materials;  the Italian Industries Federation of Aerospace, Defense, and Security (AIAD) to establish cooperation initiatives in aviation with unspecified Italian companies and to create a joint working group and integrate joint research and production initiatives with the Ukrainian Council of Gunsmiths; and the Italian company IDV, which specializes in armored vehicle production, to establish the joint development and possible production of military equipment.

Key Takeaways:

• Russia launched another large-scale drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of July 11 to 12 — the third combined strike with over 500 drones and missiles in July alone.
• Russian forces recently advanced from the international border toward Velykyi Burluk in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast — likely in an effort to connect Russian operations near Vovchansk with those near Dvorichna, possibly to facilitate Russian efforts to establish a buffer zone along the international border.
• Ukraine signed several strategic agreements with Western defense companies to bolster Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) during the Ukraine Recovery Conference in Rome.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on July 12.

Russian forces continued attacks in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on July 11 and 12.[16] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked in unspecified areas along the Kursk Oblast border.[17]

A Russian source claimed that Russian forces are attempting to advance into northern Sumy Oblast from Guyevo.[18]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on July 12 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on July 11 that Ukrainian forces advanced into central Kindrativka (north of Sumy City).[19]

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of northern Sumy Oblast on July 11 and 12.[20]

A Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian military command redeployed elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) from Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City) to Kindrativka (west of Oleksiivka) in order to reinforce elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) and 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) trapped in the settlement by advancing Ukrainian forces.[21]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment are reportedly operating in the Sumy and Chernihiv border areas, including near Katerynivka (northwest of Sumy City).[22]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on July 12 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on July 12 that Russian forces advanced toward Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[23]

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv City near Zelene and Vovchansk on July 11 and 12.[24] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vovchansk.[25]

See topline text for reports of Russian advances in the Velykyi Burluk direction.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on July 12 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk toward Petro-Ivanivka, Kindrashivka, Radkivka, and Holubivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and toward Pishchane and Novoosynove on July 11 and 12.[26]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on July 12 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove; east of Borova near Zelenyi Hai; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka, Hlushchenkove, Cherneshchyna, and Novoyehorivka on July 11 and 12.[27]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Cherneshchyna.[28]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on July 12 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Karpivka and Serednie and toward Shandryholove, north of Lyman near Zelena Dolyna and Novyi Myr, northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi, and east of Lyman near Torske and Dibrova and the Serebryanske forest area on July 11 and 12.[29]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on July 12 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk toward Dronivka, north of Siversk toward Serebryanka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka and Vyimka on July 11 and 12.[30]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on July 12 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Markove and south of Maiske (both northwest of Chasiv Yar).[31]

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself, south of Chasiv Yar near Predtechyne and Stupochky, and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka and Bila Hora on July 11 and 12.[32]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on July 12 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces operating northwest of Toretsk advanced southeast of Poltavka and that Russian forces operating west of Toretsk advanced west of Novospaske, east of Shcherbynivka and east of Rusyn Yar and seized Popiv Yar.[33]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; northwest of Toretsk near Rusyn Yar, Popiv Yar, and Yablunivka and toward Katerynivka, Pleshchiivka, and Stepanivka; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka; and southwest of Toretsk near Novospaske on July 11 and 12.[34]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Popiv Yar.[35]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 11 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced south of Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[36]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Volodymyrivka, into southern Novotoretske, west of Razine, and northwest of Novoekonomichne (all northeast of Pokrovsk).[37]

Russian forces attacked toward Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk toward Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk toward Volodymyrivka, Novoekonomichne, and Krasne Lyman and near Razine, Myrne, and  Myrolyubivka;  east of Pokrovsk toward Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Serhiivka; south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko and Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Udachne, and Kotlyne and toward Molodetske on July 11 and 12.[38]

A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on July 12 that Russian forces are attempting to leverage foliage to obscure Russian advances from Ukrainian drone operators.[39] The NCO reported that the Russian military command is positioning drone operators as close to the front lines as possible to facilitate strikes in Ukrainian rear areas, and that Russian forces are using motorcycles and other light vehicles in lieu of armored vehicles in the area.

A Russian milblogger posted footage on July 12 purportedly showing a Russian Geran-2 drone striking Ukrainian forces near Dobropilliya (northwest of Pokrovsk).[40]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Novoukrainka.[41] Drone operators of the 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near Udachne.[42] Drone operators of the Typhoon Detachment of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA) are operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[43]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 11 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into northwestern Novokhatske (southwest of Novopavlivka).[44]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of and up to the administrative borders of Novokhatske but noted that Russian forces have not seized the settlement.[45] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced up to the eastern outskirts of Fedorivka (south of Novopavlivka).[46] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) advanced 2 kilometers north of Piddubne (south of Novopavlivka).[47]

Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself, northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and Muravka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove, Dachne, and Oleksiivka; south of Novopavlivka near Komar and Zaporizhzhia and toward Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka toward  Zelenyi Hai and near Myrne, Piddubne, Voskresenka, Tovste, and Novokhatske on July 11 and 12.[48]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk border area.[49] Elements of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating toward Voskresenka.[50]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on July 11 and 12 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Komyshuvakha (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) and southeast of Temyrivka, Zaporizhia Oblast (west of Velyka Novosilka).[51]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko and toward Komyshuvakha, west of Velyka Novosilka near Zelene Pole and Novosilka and toward Temyrivka, and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novovpil and Novosilka on July 11 and 12.[52]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly operating near Komyshuvakha.[53]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported on Russian assaults in the Hulyaipole direction on July 12.

Russian forces continued assaults southwest of Orikhiv near Kamyanske and Plavni and toward Stepnohirsk on July 11 and 12 but did make any confirmed advances.[54]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on July 11 that Russian forces advanced northeast of Kamyanske.[55]

Geolocated footage published on July 11 shows that Ukrainian forces struck a bridge over the Karachokrak River in occupied Vasylivka (southwest of Kamyanske).[56]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[57]

Russian forces continued assaults in the Kherson direction on July 11 and 12 but did not advance.[58]

Order of Battle: Artillery of the 7th VDV Division is reportedly striking Ukrainian positions on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River in the Kherson direction.[59]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Ukrainian military-focused outlet Militarnyi reported on July 12 that Belarus has developed a new "Antidrone" weapon system combining quadcopter interceptor drones with small arms.[60] Belarusian media outlet RadioSignal claimed that the system is capable of targeting first-person view (FPV) and reconnaissance drones that come within 100 meters of the system and that the system notably does not emit electronic signals and can thereby mask its location. Belarus appears to be attempting to replicate Ukraine's recent success using interceptor drones to down Russian Shahed drones.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://t.me/kpszsu/38277

[2] https://suspilne dot media/chernivtsi/1064797-raketi-ta-droni-akou-bula-nicna-ataka-u-cerniveckij-oblasti/ ; https://www.facebook.com/RuslanZaparaniuk/videos/687090224290706/ ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/45959; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/12/chernivczi-palayut-vid-rosijskyh-udariv-ye-zhertvy-ta-znachni-rujnuvannya/ ; https://www.facebook.com/RuslanZaparaniuk/videos/687090224290706/; https://suspilne dot media/1064757-komitet-senatu-ssa-shvaliv-500-mln-dopomogi-ukraini-tramp-vidreaguvav-na-obstril-pologovogo-budinku-1235-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1752331655&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://suspilne dot media/cherkasy/1064819-poskodzeni-budinki-ta-piv-sotni-abonentiv-bez-svitla-naslidki-raketno-dronovoi-ataki-na-cerkasinu/ ; https://t.me/synegubov/15740; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/12/seriya-vybuhiv-u-harkovi-misto-pid-masovanoyu-atakoyu-droniv-i-aviabomb/ ; https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/23982; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/12/pravoohoronczi-pokazaly-naslidky-udariv-po-harkovu-ye-postrazhdali/ ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2808 ; https://t.me/andriysadovyi/2995; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/12/naslidky-nichnoyi-ataky-na-lviv-poshkodzheno-budynky-dytsadok-i-desyatky-avto/ ; https://t.me/kozytskyy_maksym_official/22592; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/12/u-lvovi-zbilshylas-kilkist-postrazhdalyh-vnaslidok-nichnoyi-ataky/ ; https://t.me/kozytskyy_maksym_official/22604 ; https://suspilne dot media/lviv/1064785-vnoci-12-lipna-u-lvovi-lunali-vibuhi-so-vidomo/ ; https://t.me/kobzarartemsn/4744; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/12/dvoye-lyudej-zagynulo-vnaslidok-rosijskogo-udaru-po-selu-pid-sumamy/ ; https://suspilne dot media/lutsk/1064783-vibuhi-u-lucku-misto-atakuut-rosijski-bpla/ ; https://www.facebook.com/Rudnytskyi.Ivan/posts/pfbid0YuWFzPpDBmUh4BUT1TsuMGG6bJybUtrWofuAjE8GtpMB7F9KezSReptUxhaRBLJrl ; https://t.me/mayorpolishchuk/1789; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/12/rosijska-ataka-na-luczk-zrujnovanyj-budynok-pozhezha-poshkodzheni-avtivky/

[3] https://t.me/dsns_telegram/45959; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/12/chernivczi-palayut-vid-rosijskyh-udariv-ye-zhertvy-ta-znachni-rujnuvannya/

[4] https://t.me/Mykola_Kalashnyk/6248

[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar070925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071025

[6] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9569;https://t.me/army_3otbr/2017

[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-3-2025

[8] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-27-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-28-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-14-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-15-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2025

[9] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-11-2025

[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-8-2025

[11] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31198  ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/172091

[12] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02A99tQvAomPQDPyWB2jTAyK1XDAZFX9B8zVsk6NzcMoH3mAG2gnGV1r3bquKSMF6Wl

[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar013125

[14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042224

[15] https://t.me/herman_smetanin_msp/708

[16] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02A99tQvAomPQDPyWB2jTAyK1XDAZFX9B8zVsk6NzcMoH3mAG2gnGV1r3bquKSMF6Wl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03282XaXrWQahhheS9JmAzoNobBCNGg1x6jZzHQU16ZsxJY4dba78b4tX2RT8hRdVwl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GxphnQUSgUiKJyCX1uiFnMdwp8UhnfYbWeG1F2EBsBc7nFkMhCx6vJL5FMrJuSZ9l; https://t.me/dva_majors/75217

[17] https://t.me/dva_majors/75217

[18] https://t.me/tass_agency/324975

[19] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38522

[20] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02A99tQvAomPQDPyWB2jTAyK1XDAZFX9B8zVsk6NzcMoH3mAG2gnGV1r3bquKSMF6Wl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03282XaXrWQahhheS9JmAzoNobBCNGg1x6jZzHQU16ZsxJY4dba78b4tX2RT8hRdVwl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GxphnQUSgUiKJyCX1uiFnMdwp8UhnfYbWeG1F2EBsBc7nFkMhCx6vJL5FMrJuSZ9l

[21] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38522; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38605 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38606 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38607

[22] https://t.me/epoddubny/24121 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/172146; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/172146

[23] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31202

[24] ttps://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03282XaXrWQahhheS9JmAzoNobBCNGg1x6jZzHQU16ZsxJY4dba78b4tX2RT8hRdVwl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GxphnQUSgUiKJyCX1uiFnMdwp8UhnfYbWeG1F2EBsBc7nFkMhCx6vJL5FMrJuSZ9l  ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02A99tQvAomPQDPyWB2jTAyK1XDAZFX9B8zVsk6NzcMoH3mAG2gnGV1r3bquKSMF6Wl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13641

[25] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31202

[26] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03282XaXrWQahhheS9JmAzoNobBCNGg1x6jZzHQU16ZsxJY4dba78b4tX2RT8hRdVwl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GxphnQUSgUiKJyCX1uiFnMdwp8UhnfYbWeG1F2EBsBc7nFkMhCx6vJL5FMrJuSZ9l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02A99tQvAomPQDPyWB2jTAyK1XDAZFX9B8zVsk6NzcMoH3mAG2gnGV1r3bquKSMF6Wl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13641

[27] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03282XaXrWQahhheS9JmAzoNobBCNGg1x6jZzHQU16ZsxJY4dba78b4tX2RT8hRdVwl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GxphnQUSgUiKJyCX1uiFnMdwp8UhnfYbWeG1F2EBsBc7nFkMhCx6vJL5FMrJuSZ9l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02A99tQvAomPQDPyWB2jTAyK1XDAZFX9B8zVsk6NzcMoH3mAG2gnGV1r3bquKSMF6Wl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13641 

[28] https://t.me/voin_dv/15951

[29] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03282XaXrWQahhheS9JmAzoNobBCNGg1x6jZzHQU16ZsxJY4dba78b4tX2RT8hRdVwl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GxphnQUSgUiKJyCX1uiFnMdwp8UhnfYbWeG1F2EBsBc7nFkMhCx6vJL5FMrJuSZ9l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02A99tQvAomPQDPyWB2jTAyK1XDAZFX9B8zVsk6NzcMoH3mAG2gnGV1r3bquKSMF6Wl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13641 

[30] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02A99tQvAomPQDPyWB2jTAyK1XDAZFX9B8zVsk6NzcMoH3mAG2gnGV1r3bquKSMF6Wl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03282XaXrWQahhheS9JmAzoNobBCNGg1x6jZzHQU16ZsxJY4dba78b4tX2RT8hRdVwl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GxphnQUSgUiKJyCX1uiFnMdwp8UhnfYbWeG1F2EBsBc7nFkMhCx6vJL5FMrJuSZ9l ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13641

[31] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31974

[32] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02A99tQvAomPQDPyWB2jTAyK1XDAZFX9B8zVsk6NzcMoH3mAG2gnGV1r3bquKSMF6Wl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03282XaXrWQahhheS9JmAzoNobBCNGg1x6jZzHQU16ZsxJY4dba78b4tX2RT8hRdVwl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GxphnQUSgUiKJyCX1uiFnMdwp8UhnfYbWeG1F2EBsBc7nFkMhCx6vJL5FMrJuSZ9l ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13641

[33] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95605 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31977

[34] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02A99tQvAomPQDPyWB2jTAyK1XDAZFX9B8zVsk6NzcMoH3mAG2gnGV1r3bquKSMF6Wl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03282XaXrWQahhheS9JmAzoNobBCNGg1x6jZzHQU16ZsxJY4dba78b4tX2RT8hRdVwl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GxphnQUSgUiKJyCX1uiFnMdwp8UhnfYbWeG1F2EBsBc7nFkMhCx6vJL5FMrJuSZ9l ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95605

[35] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14023

[36] https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/1943824655917494753; https://t.me/blackhussars/5028

[37] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31983

[38] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02A99tQvAomPQDPyWB2jTAyK1XDAZFX9B8zVsk6NzcMoH3mAG2gnGV1r3bquKSMF6Wl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03282XaXrWQahhheS9JmAzoNobBCNGg1x6jZzHQU16ZsxJY4dba78b4tX2RT8hRdVwl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GxphnQUSgUiKJyCX1uiFnMdwp8UhnfYbWeG1F2EBsBc7nFkMhCx6vJL5FMrJuSZ9l; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13641

[39] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/12/vorog-majzhe-ne-vykorystovuye-vazhku-tehniku-aerorozvidnyk-pro-boyi-za-pokrovsk/; https://youtu.be/kwqMIw9Hta4

[40] https://t.me/milinfolive/152794

[41] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14022

[42] https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/1943824655917494753; https://t.me/blackhussars/5028

[43] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38476

[44] https://t.me/sicariofly/58; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9568; https://t.me/osintpen/1411; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/29590

[45] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38475; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95611;

[46] https://t.me/wargonzo/27818; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31983

[47] https://t.me/voin_dv/15952

[48] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02A99tQvAomPQDPyWB2jTAyK1XDAZFX9B8zVsk6NzcMoH3mAG2gnGV1r3bquKSMF6Wl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03282XaXrWQahhheS9JmAzoNobBCNGg1x6jZzHQU16ZsxJY4dba78b4tX2RT8hRdVwl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GxphnQUSgUiKJyCX1uiFnMdwp8UhnfYbWeG1F2EBsBc7nFkMhCx6vJL5FMrJuSZ9l; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13641 

[49] https://t.me/voin_dv/15948

[50] https://t.me/voin_dv/15952

[51] https://t.me/voin_dv/15952

[52] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02A99tQvAomPQDPyWB2jTAyK1XDAZFX9B8zVsk6NzcMoH3mAG2gnGV1r3bquKSMF6Wl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03282XaXrWQahhheS9JmAzoNobBCNGg1x6jZzHQU16ZsxJY4dba78b4tX2RT8hRdVwl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GxphnQUSgUiKJyCX1uiFnMdwp8UhnfYbWeG1F2EBsBc7nFkMhCx6vJL5FMrJuSZ9l; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13641; https://t.me/voin_dv/15952

[53] https://t.me/voin_dv/15941 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15946

[54] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02A99tQvAomPQDPyWB2jTAyK1XDAZFX9B8zVsk6NzcMoH3mAG2gnGV1r3bquKSMF6Wl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03282XaXrWQahhheS9JmAzoNobBCNGg1x6jZzHQU16ZsxJY4dba78b4tX2RT8hRdVwl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GxphnQUSgUiKJyCX1uiFnMdwp8UhnfYbWeG1F2EBsBc7nFkMhCx6vJL5FMrJuSZ9 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/75217 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27818

[55] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31150

[56]

[57] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31166

[58] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02A99tQvAomPQDPyWB2jTAyK1XDAZFX9B8zVsk6NzcMoH3mAG2gnGV1r3bquKSMF6Wl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03282XaXrWQahhheS9JmAzoNobBCNGg1x6jZzHQU16ZsxJY4dba78b4tX2RT8hRdVwl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GxphnQUSgUiKJyCX1uiFnMdwp8UhnfYbWeG1F2EBsBc7nFkMhCx6vJL5FMrJuSZ9l

[59] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31166

[60] https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/belarus-develops-antidrone-system-equipped-with-interceptors-and-buckshot-defense/ ; https://radiosignal dot news/news/v-minske-otkryilas-oruzheynaya-vyistavka-milex/