Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 23, 2025

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:45 pm ET on July 23. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 24 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russia is weaponizing ongoing domestic protests in Ukraine to intensify rhetoric designed to undermine Ukraine's legitimacy and discourage Western support. The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada (parliament) passed Draft Law No. 12414 on July 22, which subordinates Ukraine's two main anti-corruption agencies – the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAP) – to the Ukrainian Prosecutor General.[i] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed the draft bill into law later in the evening on July 22.[ii] The bill's passage comes after the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) and Ukrainian Prosecutor General's Office conducted a raid against NABU offices on July 21 as part of investigations into employees allegedly suspected of collaborating with Russia after the NABU opened investigations into SBU personnel for extortion.[iii] Ukrainians began protesting the law on June 22 in multiple large cities and continued protesting on June 23, citing concerns about the NABU's and SAP's ability to operate independent of government influence.[iv] Zelensky stated that law No. 12414 is necessary to ensure that Ukraine's anti-corruption bodies can operate without Russian influence and that he will soon propose bills to the Verkhovna Rada to support the NABU's and SAP's independent operations.[v]

Kremlin officials, propagandists, and mouthpieces have weaponized these protests to advance existing Russian narratives designed to portray the Ukrainian government as corrupt and illegitimate in order to discourage continued Western support for Ukraine. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on July 23, for example, that Ukrainian authorities stole a significant amount of money from the United States and the European Union (EU).[vi] Russian State Duma deputies and pro-Kremlin mouthpieces spoke to Russian state media outlets about the protests in Ukraine, broadly claiming that Ukrainians protesting the law are protesting against the continuation of the war, the government writ large and Zelensky individually; that the Ukrainian government is corrupt; and that the law intends to protect Ukrainian officials who have been embezzling Western funds intended for military assistance.[vii] Some of these Russian figures claimed that the West should "replace" Zelensky – repeating longstanding Kremlin narratives undermining Ukraine's autonomy and agency and calling for regime change– and reiterated frequent accusations that Zelensky and the Ukrainian government are "neo-Nazis."[viii] Russian state media outlets, Russian ultranationalist milbloggers, and high-ranking Kremlin officials, including leading Russian negotiator Kirill Dmitriev, also broadly amplified reports and statements that directly or indirectly support these narratives.[ix]

The central theme of the Russian narratives surrounding the protests – the claim that Ukrainian officials embezzle Western military assistance – fails to reflect the reality that very little of the funds that the West has allocated to Ukraine are funds that Ukraine spends itself.[x] The vast majority of US funds allocated to Ukraine are spent within the United States, not Ukraine.[xi] Much of the US and European military assistance to Ukraine funds activities related to the war, including training Ukrainian forces and intelligence support for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Ukraine.[xii] The Russian claims about Ukrainian corruption aim to exploit ongoing policy discussions and deter additional Western aid to Ukraine.

The ongoing Ukrainian protests are notably not anti-war demonstrations, but Russian commentators are trying to paint them as protests against Zelensky and Ukraine's war effort in order to accomplish informational effects that will generate benefits for Russian forces on the battlefield. Russian President Vladimir Putin's articulated theory of victory relies on the assumption that Russia will be able to outlast Western assistance to Ukraine while continuing to make creeping gains on the battlefield.[xiii] The Kremlin has previously attempted to capitalize on international discourse pertaining to Ukraine to sow or exacerbate divisions between Ukraine, the United States, and Europe in order to undermine Western will to continue providing military assistance to Ukraine and therefore degrade Ukraine's ability to defend itself.[xiv] The Kremlin will likely continue its informational effort surrounding the ongoing protests in Ukraine to divide Ukraine from its allies, including by continuing to deliberately mischaracterize the nature of these protests to fit Russia's existing rhetorical lines. Russia likely hopes that the rhetorical effort it is pursuing to undermine Ukraine will lead to a weakened Ukrainian military, which Russia can more readily defeat on the battlefield.

Ukrainian and Russian delegations met on July 23 in Istanbul for the third round of bilateral negotiations. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky issued a decree on July 23 authorizing Ukrainian political and military officials to negotiate on Ukraine's behalf during the bilateral talks.[xv] Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council Secretary Rustem Umerov led the Ukrainian delegation, and Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky led the Russian delegation.[xvi] The Russian delegation is notably comprised of the same representatives as the May and June 2025 Istanbul negotiations. The Ukrainian delegation emphasized their focus on the return of prisoners of war (POWs) as well as deported Ukrainian children and the need for a meeting between Zelensky, US President Donald Trump, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Russian President Vladimir Putin to move toward more substantive negotiations to end the war.[xvii] ISW will report on the July 23 Ukrainian-Russian talks in more depth in the July 24 update as additional information becomes available.

Kremlin officials continue to undermine the negotiation process while reiterating Russia's commitment to achieving its original war aims. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on July 23 that Russia will achieve all of its goals in Ukraine - likely referring to Russia's original war aims, including regime change in Ukraine, changes to NATO’s open-door policy, and the reduction of Ukraine's military such that it cannot defend itself.[xviii] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on July 23 that no one expects the third round of Ukrainian-Russian talks in Istanbul to be an "easy road," that the talks will be "very difficult," and that both sides' draft memoranda are "diametrically opposed."[xix] Peskov claimed that Ukraine and Russia can only start to plan a bilateral presidential summit after completing work to coordinate their memoranda.[xx] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, in contrast, continued to demonstrate Ukraine's willingness to engage in the negotiation process, stating on July 23 that Ukraine is ready to work towards preparing for a presidential meeting to bring about an end to the war.[xxi] ISW continues to assess that Russia is deliberately delaying the negotiation process – including the possibility of a Zelensky-Putin meeting aimed at ending the war – in order to protract the war and make additional gains on the battlefield.[xxii]

Russia continues to diversify and bolster its security apparatus in an effort to centralize state power in a way that will worsen the already systematic abuse of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) and civilians in Russia and occupied Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on July 23 authorizing the Federal Security Service (FSB) to create autonomous pre-trial detention facilities (SIZO) to hold individuals accused of crimes under the FSB's jurisdiction.[xxiii] The decree will enter into force on January 1, 2026. The FSB is notably responsible for patrolling Russia's borders and serves law enforcement functions in Russia, suggesting that the FSB may leverage their new powers to target Russian citizens attempting to evade military registration or desert the Russian military. ISW has observed reports that the FSB uses various existing SIZO facilities to abuse and torture Ukrainian POWs and civilians.[xxiv] Putin's expansion of the FSB's powers aligns with the Kremlin's broader strategy of diversifying its security apparatus in order to tighten control of the Russian populace. The Kremlin has been implementing measures in recent years to expand both the FSB's and Rosgvardia's powers to detain and punish people in both Russia and occupied Ukraine.[xxv]

Key Takeaways:

• Russia is weaponizing ongoing domestic protests in Ukraine to intensify rhetoric designed to undermine Ukraine's legitimacy and discourage Western support.
• The ongoing Ukrainian protests are notably not anti-war demonstrations, but Russian commentators are trying to paint them as protests against Zelensky and Ukraine's war effort in order to accomplish informational effects that will generate benefits for Russian forces on the battlefield.
• Ukrainian and Russian delegations met on July 23 in Istanbul for the third round of bilateral negotiations.
• Kremlin officials continue to undermine the negotiation process while reiterating Russia's commitment to achieving its original war aims.
• Russia continues to diversify and bolster its security apparatus in an effort to centralize state power in a way that will worsen the already systematic abuse of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) and civilians in Russia and occupied Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy and in western Zaporizhia oblasts and near Borova.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. 

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on July 23.

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on July 22 and 23.[xxvi] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked toward Glushkovo and Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo).[xxvii]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that roughly a battalion's worth of North Korean forces arrived in Rylsk, Kursk (north of Glushkovo) as of July 23.[xxviii] The milblogger claimed that North Korean forces will not participate in combat operations "yet" but will instead relieve the Russian forces currently in Rylsk, allowing these Russian forces to deploy to the frontline.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 23 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Kindrativka (north of Sumy City).[xxix]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[xxx]

Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City near Kindrativka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, Sadky, and Varachyne on July 22 and 23.[xxxi]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed on July 23 that Russian forces seized Varachyne (northeast of Sumy City) after ISW assessed that Russian forces seized Varachyne as of July 22.[xxxii] A Russian milblogger refuted reports that Russian forces seized Varachyne, claiming that fighting continues in the settlement even though Russian forces raised a flag in Varachyne.[xxxiii]

Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 11th and 83rd separate airborne (VDV) brigades are operating near Yablunivka (northeast of Sumy City).[xxxiv] Elements of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[xxxv] Elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating in Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City).[xxxvi]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on July 23 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[xxxvii]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Hatyshche on July 22 and 23.[xxxviii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Synelnykove (northeast of Kharkiv City).[xxxix]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Bati Detachment (204th Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment) are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[xl]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on July 23 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced along the international border between Milove and Chuhunivka (both northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[xli]

A Russian milblogger claimed on July 23 that Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Milove in the past day.[xlii]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on July 23 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued ground attacks west of Kupyansk near Maskivka and Sobolivka; north of Kupyansk near Holubivka and Zapadne; northeast of Kupyansk near Dvorichna and Kamyanka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and Pishchane on July 22 and 23.[xliii]

A Ukrainian drone regiment commander operating in the Kupyansk direction stated on July 23 that Russian forces are occasionally attacking with armored vehicles and are trying to infiltrate Kupyansk from the north via Holubivka and northwest via Kindrashivka.[xliv] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian drone operations are complicating Russian advances across open terrain near Maskivka and Sobolivka.[xlv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on July 23 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced north of Borivska Andriivka (northeast of Borova).[xlvi]

Russian forces continued ground attacks north of Borova near Novoplatonivka; northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Borivska Andriivka; east of Borova near Zelenyi Hai; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and Novoyehorivka on July 22 and 23.[xlvii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on July 23 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Torske and advanced in the Serebryanske forest area (both east of Lyman).[xlviii] One milblogger denied the Russian MoD’s previous claim that Russian forces seized Torske in May 2025.[xlix] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces only maintain positions in northern Torske.[l]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Lyman toward Serednie and Shandryholove; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi, Zelena Dolyna, Myrne, and Yampolivka; and east of Lyman near Torske and in the Serebryanske forest area on July 22 and 23.[li] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked in Torske.[lii]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated that the number of Russian infantry and motorcycle attacks is decreasing but that the duration of these attacks is increasing, with some starting in the early morning and lasting until the late evening as long as there is daylight.[liii] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are probing Ukrainian defenses with armored vehicle support.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on July 23 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Ivano-Darivka (southeast of Siversk).[liv]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk near Dronivka and northeast of Siversk near Shypylivka, Hryhorivka, and Serebryanka on July 22 and 23.[lv]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in Serebryanka.[lvi]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 22 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced along Zlahody Street in southwestern Chasiv Yar.[lvii]

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself on July 22 and 23.[lviii]

The commander of Ukrainian fire support company operating in the Chasiv Yar direction reported on July 23 that Russian forces are now conducting daytime assaults due to the concealment provided of increased foliage rather than only assaulting at dawn and dusk during periods of decreased visibility.[lix]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate in Chasiv Yar and drone operators of the Idris detachment, reportedly of the 8th Reconnaissance and Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps), are purportedly operating near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (northeast of Chasiv Yar).[lx] Other drone elements of the 98th VDV Division are also operating in Chasiv Yar.[lxi] Artillery elements of the 85th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Vasyukivka (northeast of Chasiv Yar).[lxii] Elements of the 77th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 7th Military Base, 49th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Bila Hora (south of Chasiv Yar).[lxiii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on July 23 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Yablunivka and southeast of Rusyn Yar (both northwest of Toretsk).[lxiv] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) and 20th Motorized Rifle Regiment (possibly a reformed Soviet unit) advanced into central Shcherbynivka (just west of Toretsk).[lxv] Another Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment advanced west of Novospaske (just southwest of Shcherbynivka).[lxvi] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces control half of Poltavka (northwest of Toretsk).[lxvii]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; and northwest of Toretsk near Kleban-Byk, Oleksandro-Kalynove, Rusyn Yar, Popiv Yar, and Poltavka on July 22 and 23.[lxviii]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Kleban-Byk, and elements of the 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly operating near Katerynivka (northwest of Toretsk).[lxix]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on July 23 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Pankivka and Volodymyrivka (both northeast of Pokrovsk) and advanced near Mayak (southwest of Pankivka), Razine (northeast of Pokrovsk), Novokostyantynivka, and Udachne (both southwest of Pokrovsk).[lxx] Another Russian milblogger claimed on July 22 that Russian forces are bypassing Pankivka and Volodymyrivka toward Shakhove (north of Volodymyrivka).[lxxi]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Zatyshok, Novotoretske, Boikivka, Krasnyi Lyman, Volodymyrivka, Novoekonmichne, Fedorivka, and Rodynske and toward Pankivka and Sukhetske; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Shevchenko, Kotlyne, and Udachne, and toward Molodetske on July 22 and 23.[lxxii]

A press officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on July 23 that the Russian military command is concentrating forces south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko in preparation for assaults and that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance units are constantly probing Ukrainian defenses in the area.[lxxiii]

Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that elements of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are operating near Novoekonomichne.[lxxiv] Drone operators of the Russian 80th Sparta Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Pankivka.[lxxv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on July 23 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced within Muravka (northeast of Novopavlivka), north of Zelenyi Kut (southeast of Novopavlivka), and west of Piddubne (southwest of Novopavlivka).[lxxvi]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Oleksiivka, Novoukrainka, Zelenyi Kut, Dachne, and Horikhove; south of Novopavlivka near Zaporizhzhia, Zirka, and Yalta; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Piddubne and Voskresenka and toward Oleksandrohrad on July 22 and 23.[lxxvii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kotlyarivka (northeast of Novopavlivka) and south of Filiya (south of Novopavlivka).[lxxviii] Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking south of Voskresenka.[lxxix]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) are operating in the Novokhatske-Zelenyi Kut direction (southwest of Novopavlivka) and the Piddubne-Andriivka-Klevtsove direction (southwest of Novopavlivka); that elements of the 430th Motorized Rifle Regiment (29th CAA) are operating in the Myrne-Oleksandrohrad direction (southwest of Novopavlivka) and north of Voskresenka; and that elements of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are operating in the Myrne-Voskresenka direction.[lxxx]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on July 23 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Novopil and south of Temyrivka (both southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[lxxxi]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Zelene Pole and toward Temyrivka on July 22 and 23.[lxxxii]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th CAA, EMD) are operating on the Zelene Pole-Novopil line.[lxxxiii]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Hulyaipole direction on July 23.

Order of Battle: Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Poltavka (east of Hulyaipole).[lxxxiv]

Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 23 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Plavni (west of Orikhiv).[lxxxv]

Russian milbloggers claimed on July 23 that Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka and west of Orikhiv toward Stepnohirsk.[lxxxvi] A Russian milblogger claimed that there is a contested "gray zone" between Kamyanske (southwest of Orikhiv) and Stepnohirsk.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating between Kamyanske and Stepnohirsk.[lxxxvii]

Russian forces conducted ground attacks in the Kherson direction on July 22 and 23 but did not advance.[lxxxviii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators and an electronic warfare (EW) company of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[lxxxix]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 22 to 23. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 71 Shahed-type strike drones and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[xc] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 27 drones and that 18 drones were "lost" or suppressed by Ukrainian EW systems. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that 26 drones hit 14 unspecified locations and that drone debris fell in five unspecified locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck civilian and energy infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Sumy oblasts.[xci]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Russia continues efforts to formalize Russian-Belarusian governmental integration through the Union State framework. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a protocol into law on July 23 allowing Belarusian citizens permanently residing in Russia to vote and run in local Russian elections as well as Russian citizens permanently residing in Belarus to vote and run in local Belarusian elections.[xcii] Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko signed the protocol on March 13, 2025; the Russian Federation Council ratified the protocol on July 16.[xciii] Lukashenko codified a similar protocol into Belarusian law in January 2025.[xciv]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.