Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 5, 2025

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:00 pm ET on August 5. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 6 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Private and public Kremlin statements indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to demand the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts before he will initiate a peace agreement. Helping Ukraine inflict battlefield setbacks on Russian forces remains essential to efforts to persuade Putin to reevaluate his position on the war and negotiations. Reuters reported on August 5 that three Kremlin sources familiar with the matter stated that Putin's belief that Russia is winning and his doubts that US sanctions will have a significant impact on Russia are driving Putin's decision to continue his war against Ukraine.[1] Two of the sources claimed that Putin's war aims take precedence over his efforts to improve relations with the United States and US President Donald Trump. One source claimed that the recent Ukrainian-Russian peace talks in Istanbul were a Russian attempt to convince Trump that Putin was open to peace but noted that the talks were devoid of any real substance. One source claimed that "Putin cannot afford to end the war just because Trump wants it." A source described Trump's reported March 2025 offer — in which Trump purportedly proposed to lift all US sanctions against Russia, to "de jure" recognize Russian sovereignty over occupied Crimea, and to "de facto" recognize Russian control over the other parts of Ukraine that Russian forces occupied at the time — as a "fantastic chance," but stated that stopping a war is more difficult than starting one. Putin rejected that offer.

The Kremlin insider sources likely leaked this information in an attempt to obfuscate Putin's actual, more extreme war aims. One of Reuters' sources stated that Putin does not see the logic in stopping Russian offensive operations, as Russian forces are making relatively more rapid advances on the battlefield.[2] The Kremlin sources implied that Putin would be willing to establish a ceasefire if Russia first occupied (or was given) the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts. Recent Kremlin statements, including from Putin himself, have repeatedly indicated that Putin remains committed to achieving his maximalist objectives that amount to full Ukrainian capitulation, however.[3] Putin claimed as recently as June 20 that "all of Ukraine is [Russia's]."[4] Russian State Duma Deputy Anatoly Wasserman said in an interview with Azerbaijani news outlet Minval published on August 3 that the stated goals of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine are "incompatible with the continued existence of Ukraine" as a sovereign state and that Russia alone will determine the end date for its war.[5] Kremlin newswire RIA Novosti published two op-eds on July 30 entitled "There is no other option: no one should remain alive in Ukraine" and "Noted: Ukraine will end very soon."[6] Kremlin insiders are likely speaking to Western media outlets in order to socialize Putin's demands to Western policymakers and audiences, frame Russia's demand for the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts as reasonable, and insinuate that there is a possibility for a full ceasefire and lasting peace should Ukraine and the West acquiesce to Putin's demands.

The Kremlin also likely intends for these leaks to Western media to advance its ongoing effort to break Ukrainian and Western morale. One Kremlin source told Reuters that the Russian General Staff recently told Putin that the front line in Ukraine will likely "crumble" in two to three months.[7] This source is likely providing an accurate reflection of the situation in the Kremlin and the Russian General Staff, as the Russian General Staff is almost certainly giving Putin a positive assessment of Russia's military campaign in Ukraine. The Russian military has a pervasive culture of lying and submitting overly positive reports to superiors, and this culture is likely also an issue at the upper echelon of the Russian military.[8] Deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin repeatedly claimed that Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov and then-Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu lied to Putin about issues in Russia's war effort.[9] The Russian General Staff significantly downplayed Ukraine's August 2024 incursion into Kursk Oblast to Putin, and Putin repeatedly falsely claimed that Russian forces encircled several groups of Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast — likely after being misinformed by the Russian General Staff.[10] Putin even appeared to scold  Gerasimov and current Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov on August 1, claiming that he recently pressed Belousov and Gerasimov to tell him "honestly" about the frontline in Ukraine.[11] Russian forces are continuing to advance in Ukraine only at a footpace, if more rapidly than previously, and the Kremlin sources' statement reflects the Russian General Staff's and Putin's confidence in continued gains rather than an objective assessment of prospects on the battlefield.

The Kremlin source likely leaked this information in order to project confidence in Russia's military capabilities and, in turn, to undermine Ukrainian and Western morale. The Kremlin routinely shifts its rhetorical efforts based on what Kremlin officials assess will be most impactful during particular geopolitical moments, such as the Kremlin's recent shift from feigning interest in good-faith peace negotiations in early 2025 to reiterating its commitment to Putin's long-standing war aims.[12] The Kremlin has been engaged in a significant effort since January 2025 to convince Trump that Putin was willing to conclude a peace agreement in the short term, but is now attempting to justify prolonging the war in hopes that Russia can militarily defeat Ukraine. The Kremlin likely assesses that projecting confidence in Russia's ability to militarily defeat Ukraine in Western media outlets will generate fear and distrust in Ukrainian and Western society, further degrading Ukraine's morale to continue defending against Russian aggression.

Putin has intentionally put himself in a position where he cannot present any peace settlement that falls short of his original war aims as a victory to the Russian military or people. One Kremlin source told Reuters that Putin does not feel that now is the time to end the war because Russian society and the Russian military would not understand such a decision.[13] The Kremlin has been engaged in a concerted multi-year effort to justify Putin’s maximalist war objectives as necessary for the existence of the Russian state and to garner societal support for a protracted war until Russia achieves such goals.[14] Russian state and independent polling from early 2025 suggested that most Russians support continuing the war in Ukraine, and the Kremlin is likely seizing on these sentiments, which it has actively fostered, to justify Putin's decision to continue the war.[15] Putin is also increasing Russian society's reliance on military spending by heavily investing in Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB), which now accounts for a significant portion of overall Russian domestic production.[16] ISW continues to assess that any sharp decrease in Russia’s defensive spending will likely depress the Russian economy in the medium term, furthering Putin’s incentive to continue a protracted war in Ukraine and instigate future military conflicts despite high Russian losses on the battlefield and critical constraints on its economy.[17] Putin has intentionally cultivated Russian society's commitment to his war aims and has not set conditions to take any off-ramps to accept a peace settlement that falls short of his original war aims.

Russia announced on August 4 that it will withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, likely as a rhetorical response to US President Donald Trump's August 1 announcement about the redeployment of US nuclear submarines toward Russia. Russia's INF Treaty withdrawal does not portend a shift in Russia's use of shorter- and intermediate-range missiles, however. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claimed on August 4 that the conditions for Russia's "unilateral moratorium" on the deployment of weapons banned under the INF Treaty are "disappearing" such that Russia "no longer considers itself bound" by the INF Treaty's restrictions.[18] The Russian MFA claimed that the Russian leadership will decide on response measures after analyzing the deployment of Western land-based intermediate-range missiles. The Russian MFA claimed that Russia has "proactively made efforts to maintain restraint" following the US suspension of the INF treaty in 2019. The Russian MFA claimed that Western states have built up "destabilizing" missiles in areas near Russia, creating a "strategic" threat to Russian security. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded to the MFA's announcement, stating that Russia is no longer "limited" in any way and that Russia has the right to take "appropriate measures."[19] Peskov claimed that the West should not expect any announcements about the deployment of Russian shorter- and intermediate-range missiles as this information is "sensitive."[20] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on August 4 on his English-language X (formerly Twitter) account that the Russian MFA's statement is the result of NATO states' "anti-Russian policy" and that "this is a new reality all [Russia's] opponents will have to reckon with."[21] Medvedev vaguely threatened that the West should "expect further steps" from Russia. Medvedev's August 4 threat on his English-language account is the latest in a string of recent nuclear threats against the West that are part of the Kremlin's wider reflexive control campaign that aims to push the West to make decisions that benefit Russia.[22]

Russia has long violated the INF Treaty and publicly flaunted its use of shorter- and intermediate-range missiles banned under the treaty. The United States suspended participation in the INF Treaty on February 1, 2019, and withdrew from the treaty on August 2, 2019, due to Russian violations of the treaty with Russia's development, testing, and deployment of intermediate-range 9M729 (SSC-8) missiles. Russia suspended its participation in the INF in response on February 2, 2019, but had not formally withdrawn from the treaty.[23] Russia conducted a strike against Ukraine using an Oreshnik ballistic missile (reportedly an experimental variant of the RS-26 missile, which has a range of 2,000 to 5,800 kilometers) in November 2024, and Putin publicly claimed on August 1 that Russia produced its first serial Oreshnik complex and missiles and that the missile system entered into service.[24] Russia has also routinely launched Iskander missiles, with a reported range of 400 to 500 kilometers, against Ukraine and permanently deployed Iskanders to Kaliningrad Oblast in 2018.[25] High-ranking Russian officials began to set conditions in the information space for Russia to permanently withdraw from the INF Treaty in June 2025, suggesting that the Kremlin had made the decision to withdraw previously.[26] The Kremlin is attempting to posture its withdrawal from the treaty as a response to Trump's August 1 announcement, however.

European and NATO allies announced that they will purchase over one billion euros worth of US weapons for Ukraine through a new NATO funding mechanism. Ukraine’s Minister of Defense (MoD), Denis Shmyhal, announced on August 4 that the United States and NATO launched the Prioritized Ukrainian Requirements List (PURL) initiative, which is a new mechanism that will allow NATO members and partners to finance the supply of American weapons and technology to Ukraine through voluntary contributions.[27] Dutch Defense Minister Ruben Brekelmans stated on August 4 that the Netherlands is allocating 500 million euros (roughly $570 million) to purchase American weapons systems, including Patriot components and missiles, through the PURL initiative.[28] NATO announced on August 5 that Denmark, Norway, and Sweden will finance a combined $500 million military aid package to purchase air defense systems, Patriot munitions, anti-tank systems, ammunition, and spare parts from the United States through the PURL initiative.[29]

A Ukrainian company recently launched a new reusable interceptor drone designed to down Russian Shahed-variant drones. Ukrainian Technary design bureau CEO Hennadii Suldin told Ukrainian defense technology outlet Defender Media on July 30 that Technary has developed a reusable Mongoose interceptor drone, designed to intercept Russian Shahed-variant drones.[30] Suldin stated that the Mongoose interceptor drone has a jet engine and an automatic homing system, which allows the drone to approach an enemy drone, fire a projectile into a drone’s engine or propeller, and then continue its mission or return for refueling. Suldin stated that the drone can lock onto a target from 800 meters and that the drone's auto-guidance system activates when the target is within a range of 150-200 meters. Suldin stated that the Mongoose interceptor drone can reach speeds of up to 300 to 310 kilometers per hour with a maximum flight altitude of 5,000 meters and a combat radius of 12 kilometers. Suldin estimated that a Mongoose interceptor drone could likely destroy 10 to 12 Shahed drones over its lifecycle and noted that the drone’s reusability can help overcome Ukraine’s currently constrained interceptor drone production capabilities. Suldin stated that Ukrainian forces will begin integrating prototypes of the Mongoose interceptor drone in the near future. Ukrainian outlet Militarnyi noted that the Mongoose interceptor drone is designed to combat high-speed aerial threats such as the Shahed-136.[31] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat told RBC-Ukraine on July 31 that Russian forces are launching new, jet-powered Shahed drones that fly at speeds of 500 kilometers or more.[32] ISW previously observed reporting that Geran-3 drones can reach speeds of up to 800 kilometers per hour.[33]

Key Takeaways:

• Private and public Kremlin statements indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to demand the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts before he will initiate a peace agreement.
• Helping Ukraine inflict battlefield setbacks on Russian forces remains essential to efforts to persuade Putin to reevaluate his position on the war and negotiations.
• The Kremlin insider sources likely leaked this information in an attempt to obfuscate Putin's actual, more extreme war aims.
• The Kremlin also likely intends for these leaks to Western media to advance its ongoing effort to break Ukrainian and Western morale.
• Putin has intentionally put himself in a position where he cannot present any peace settlement that falls short of his original war aims as a victory to the Russian military or people.
• Russia announced on August 4 that it will withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, likely as a rhetorical response to US President Donald Trump's August 1 announcement about the redeployment of US nuclear submarines toward Russia. Russia's INF Treaty withdrawal does not portend a shift in Russia's use of shorter- and intermediate-range missiles, however.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar. Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Siversk, and Toretsk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on August 3 and 4 but did not advance.[34]

Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against railway infrastructure in Rostov Oblast on the night of August 4 to 5. Geolocated footage published on August 5 shows a drone strike and subsequent fire at the Tatsinskaya railway station in Tatsinskaya, Rostov Oblast.[35] Acting Rostov Oblast Governor Yury Slyusar claimed that Russian forces destroyed drones over Rostov Oblast, including over Tatsinsky Raion, and that a house caught fire in the raion.[36]

Satellite imagery and Western media sources indicate that Ukrainian drone strikes on the night of August 1 to 2 damaged a defense industrial enterprise and two oil refineries in Russia. Recent satellite imagery indicates that Ukrainian drone strikes against the Elektropribor plant in Penza City likely destroyed two workshops at the plant.[37] The Electropribor plant manufactures equipment for digital networks in Russian military control systems and devices for aircraft, armored vehicles, ships, and spacecraft.[38] Reuters reported on August 4 that three industry sources stated that Ukrainian drone strikes against the Ryazan Oil Refinery in Ryazan City halted two primary oil refining units, leaving the refinery able to produce roughly half of its total capacity.[39] Reuters reported that Ukrainian drone strikes also damaged and halted Rosneft's Novokuybyshevsk Oil Refinery near Samara City.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on August 5 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in and near Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[40]

Russian forces attacked in northern Sumy Oblast, including northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, Myropillya, and Oleksandriya, on August 4 and 5.[41] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the Sumy direction, including near Novokostyantynivka (north of Sumy City).[42]

Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on August 5 that GUR elements entered the Russian near rear in the Sumy direction, gained a foothold, and disrupted Russian supplies.[43]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly withdrawing from Oleksiivka to Gornal, Kursk Oblast after having lost their combat capability.[44] Elements of the 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Bezsalivka (northwest of Sumy); elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) and 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are reportedly operating in Novokostyantynivka; elements of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly operating near Kindrativka; and elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating near Oleksiivka (both north of Sumy).[45] Elements of the 51st VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Sadky (northeast of Sumy).[46] Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly operating in the Sumy region.[47] Drone operators of the Russian Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Luhivka (southeast of Sumy City) and Mykolaivka (north of Sumy City)[48]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 5 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City toward Kozacha Lopan, Kudiivka, and Hoptivka and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on August 4 and 5.[49]

A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast stated that poor weather is limiting Russian forces’ ability to conduct ground attacks with drone support in the Kharkiv direction.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed that fighting is intensifying near Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City).[51]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in Kharkiv Oblast.[52] Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that elements of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Bati Detachment (204th Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment) are reportedly operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[53]

A Russian milblogger claimed on August 5 that Russian forces attacked north of Velykyi Burluk near Dehtyarne and northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Milove.[54]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on August 5 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Hlushkivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[55]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; west of Kupyansk near Sobolivka; northwest of Kupyansk near Myrne; north of Kupyansk near Holubivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe, Dvorichna, and Fyholivka and toward Novovasylivka and Kolodyazne; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on August 4 and 5.[56]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on August 5 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Lozova and toward Bohuslavka and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and toward Cherneshchyne, Druzhelyubivka, and Olhivka on August 4 and 5.[57]

Russian forces recently marginally advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 5 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced north of Novomykhailivka (northeast of Lyman).[58]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) recently seized Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman).[59]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Karpivka toward Serednie and Shandryholove; north of Lyman near Zelena Dolyna, Hlushchenkove, and Novyi Myr; northeast of Lyman near Myrne and Novomykhailivka; east of Lyman near Torske and toward Zarichne on August 4 and 5.[60] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kolodyazi.[61]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone company operating in the Lyman direction stated that Russian forces are using motorcycles, and occasionally slower-moving electric bikes, to attack Ukrainian positions in the area.[62] A non-commissioned officer (NCO) in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated that the Russian military command deployed reserve forces in the Lyman direction.[63] The NCO estimated that Russian forces are suffering 25 to 30 casualties per day in the Lyman direction.[64]

Order of Battle: Elements of the 164th Motorized Rifle Brigade (25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating south of Torske (northeast of Lyman).[65]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 4 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced in eastern Serebryanka (northeast of Siversk) and northwest of Soledar (southwest of Siversk).[66]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Serebryanka; northwest, south, and southwest of Novoselivka (east of Siversk); and into the eastern outskirts of Siversk.[67]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk toward Dronivka, northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Vyimka on August 4 and 5.[68]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 6th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in Serebryanka.[69]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 4 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar).[70]

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself, northwest of Chasiv Yar toward Virolyubivka, south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora, and southwest of Chasiv Yar near Predtechyne on August 4 and 5.[71] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Bila Hora and near Predtechyne and Stupochky.[72]

Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin claimed on August 5 that it could take Russian forces weeks to completely clear Ukrainian forces from Chasiv Yar.[73]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 299th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Chasiv Yar.[74]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 4 and 5 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east and southeast of Nelipivka (northwest of Toretsk) and southeast of Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk).[75]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest and northeast of Poltavka (northwest of Toretsk), in southern Rusyn Yar and east of the settlement (northwest of Toretsk), and toward Oleksandro-Shultyne (north of Toretsk) and Nelipivka.[76] One of the milbloggers claimed that Russian forces interdicted Ukraine’s main ground line of communication (GLOC) between Shcherbynivka and Katerynivka.[77]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka and Oleksandro-Shultyne; northwest of Toretsk near Katerynivka, Popiv Yar, Poltavka, and south of the Kleban Buk Reservoir; southwest of Toretsk near Romanivka; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on August 4 and 5.[78]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 68th Tank Regiment and 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Katerynivka and Shcherbynivka.[79] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Rusyn Yar and Yablunivka (northwest of Toretsk).[80]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on August 5 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are consolidating positions on the eastern outskirts of Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk) and have advanced in southwestern and southeastern Pokrovsk and northeast of Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[81] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are advancing toward Rybizhne and Zolotyi Kolodyazi (both northeast of Pokrovsk).[82] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have encircled Ukrainian troops in Nove Shakhove (northeast of Pokrovsk) and are advancing toward Novyi Donbas (west of Nove Shakhove) and Kucheriv Yar (northeast of Nove Shakhove).[83]

Russian forces attacked north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Sukhetske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Volodymyrivka, Boykivka, Zapovidne (formerly Nykanorivka), Suvorove, Krasnyi Lyman, Novoekonomichne, Myrolyubivka, and Mykolaivka; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Leontovychi, Zvirove, Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on August 4 and 5.[84]

An officer in a Ukrainian National Guard brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on August 5 that Russian forces are mainly using first-person view (FPV) drones to deliver supplies and ammunition to frontline positions and that this is becoming a key aspect of frontline logistics.[85] The officer stated that further Russian advances are expanding the contested "gray zone" in Rodynske. A Russian milblogger claimed that superior Ukrainian drone operations are hindering Russia's ability to advance in the Pokrovsk direction.[86] The milblogger noted that the frontline is not continuous in the Pokrovsk direction and that Russian infantry groups and sabotage and reconnaissance teams are able to infiltrate behind Ukrainian positions. A Ukrainian source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence stated that Russian fiber optic drone operators are interdicting the M-30 Pokrovsk-Pavlohrad highway and complicating Ukrainian logistics.[87] The Ukrainian source noted that Russian forces are concentrating most of their assaults near Rodynske, but that Russian forces will likely have to regroup before launching the main assault on Pokrovsk from the north.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian AIRNOMAD Detachment are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[88]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on August 5 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest and southwest of Horikhove (east of Novopavlivka) and northeast of Dachne (southeast of Novopavlivka).[89]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations toward Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Novoukrainka, Oleksiivka, and Zelenyi Kut; south of Novopavlivka toward Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai and Ivanivka on August 4 and 5.[90] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kotlyarivka (east of Novopavlivka) and Dachne.[91]

A servicemember in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported that the level of training among Russian personnel varies, with better-trained soldiers able to evade Ukrainian drones.[92] A Russian milblogger claimed that the northern and western parts of Zelenyi Hai are contested "gray zones."[93]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) and drone operators of the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA) and 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Novopavlivka direction.[94]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on August 5 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on August 5 that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) seized Sichneve (east of Velykomykhailivka).[95] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Piddubne (northeast of Velykomykhailivka), northwest of Voskresenka (east of Velykomykhailivka), west and southwest of Vilne Pole (southeast of Velykomykhailivka), and toward Komyshuvakha (southeast of Velykomykhailivka) and retook Maliivka (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[96]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Piddubne, Myrne, Tovste, and Andriivka-Klevtsove; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Maliivka and Shevchenko; and east of Velykomykhailivka near Voskresenka and Oleksandrohrad on August 4 and 5.[97]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Hulyaipole near Zelene Pole and Temyrivka and east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on August 4 and 5 but did not advance.[98]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Plavni (west of Orikhiv).[99]

Russian forces attacked southwest of Orikhiv toward Novoandriivka and west of Orikhiv in Plavni and toward Prymorske on August 4 and 5.[100] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kamyanske (southwest of Orikhiv).[101]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kherson direction on August 4 and 5 but did not advance.[102]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Tuman Drone Group and Fobos Drone Group (reportedly of the 18th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Kherson direction.[103]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of August 4 to 5. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile from Bryansk Oblast and 46 Shahed-type drones and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Bryansk, and Oryol cities and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[104] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 29 drones over northern and eastern Ukraine and that 17 drones, one ballistic missile, and drone debris struck three locations in southern and northeastern Ukraine. Ukrainian officials reported on August 5 that Russian forces launched 35 Shahed drones and one Molniya drone at Lozova, Kharkiv Oblast, and damaged a train depot and station and killed two civilians.[105] The Ukrainian Southern Air Command reported that Russian forces launched another Iskander-M ballistic missile from occupied Crimea and struck Odesa Oblast on the night of August 4 to 5.[106] Ukrainian sources reported that a Russian missile also struck an agricultural business in Sumy City on the morning of August 5 and killed two civilians.

Ukrainian military expert Petro Chernyk stated that sanctions are forcing Russian forces to increasingly use cheaper Shahed-variant drones instead of more expensive cruise and ballistic missiles.[107] Chernyk noted that Shaheds can only carry a warhead up to 50 kilograms, while Kalibr cruise missiles, Kh-47 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles, and North Korean Kn-23 ballistic missiles can carry a warhead up to 500 kilograms. Chernyk noted that Ukrainian forces intercept 92 to 95 percent of Russian Shaheds and that the IRIS-T air defense system would be able to intercept jet-powered Shahed drones, likely referring to Geran-3 drones.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.