Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 3, 2025

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:40am ET on July 3. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 4 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected US President Donald Trump's call for a quick peace in Ukraine during a phone call with Trump on July 3.[i] Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov claimed on July 3 that Trump once again raised the issue of a quick end to Russia's war in Ukraine and that Putin claimed that Russia continues its efforts for a negotiated end to the war. Ushakov claimed, however, that Putin reiterated that Russia "will achieve its goals" and "eliminat[e] the root causes" that led to the war and that "Russia will not back down from these goals," essentially emphasizing that Russia will continue its war on its own terms. Ushakov claimed that Putin and Trump discussed the possibility of a third round of Ukrainian–Russian negotiations in Istanbul and agreed that peace negotiations will continue in a bilateral format at an unspecified date. Ushakov claimed that Putin and Trump did not discuss the recent US decision to halt military aid shipments to Ukraine but discussed bilateral economic projects, including in the energy and space spheres.

Putin's stated commitment to his goals in Ukraine, including eliminating the so-called "root causes" of the war directly contradicts his claim that Russia supports meaningful negotiations to end the war. Putin and other Kremlin officials have repeatedly referred to the need for any future peace settlement to eliminate the alleged "root causes" of the war to allude to Russia's unwavering demands for regime change in Ukraine, Ukrainian neutrality, and changes to NATO's foundational open-door policy.[ii] ISW continues to assess that Russia remains uninterested in good-faith peace negotiations to end the war. Putin's statement that Russia will not back down from its goals further demonstrates Putin's willingness to prolong the war in Ukraine and achieve his goals through military means should Russia be unable to force Ukraine to capitulate through diplomatic means — in direct contrast to Trump's calls for a speedy end to the war. The Kremlin has continually indicated in recent weeks that there are no plans yet for a third round of bilateral negotiations in Istanbul, so it is unclear if or when bilateral Ukrainian–Russian negotiations will resume.[iii] ISW continues to assess that Russia will likely leverage any future negotiations to try to extract concessions from Ukraine and the United States while Russian forces continue efforts to secure additional gains on the battlefield through creeping and highly attritional advances. Russia previously exploited peace talks with Ukraine in Istanbul to obfuscate its own uninterest in meaningful negotiations, and any future Ukrainian–Russian negotiations on anyone's terms but Kyiv's are very unlikely to bring about Trump's desired expeditious end to the war and just and lasting peace.

Details about the recent US suspension of aid to Ukraine remain unclear. Journalists for National Public Radio (NPR) and the Economist stated on July 2 and 3 that the United States halted aid shipments to Ukraine in Poland that included 30 PAC-3 interceptors for Patriot air defense systems; 8,496 155mm high explosive howitzer munitions; 142 AGM-114 Hellfire air-to-ground missiles; 252 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) rockets; 25 missiles for Stinger man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS); 125 AT-4 grenade launchers; and 92 AIM air-to-air missiles.[iv] The Economist reported on July 3 that the Pentagon turned around planes carrying air defense interceptors and other US military aid to Ukraine on June 30 and July 1, suspending deliveries.[v] US Department of State Spokesperson Tammy Bruce stated on July 3 that Trump has indicated his "remaining commitment" to US provisions of Patriot interceptors to Ukraine.[vi] Bruce stated that the United States "hasn't paused" sending weapons to Ukraine but that the recent suspension is "one aspect, one situation, one event that has been changed." Chief Pentagon Spokesperson Sean Parnell stated on July 2 that the US Department of Defense (DoD) “paused” weapons shipments to Ukraine to conduct a “capability review” to ensure that US military aid aligns with the DoD’s defense priorities while preserving US military readiness.[vii] Parnell stated that DoD recommendations about military aid to Ukraine are consistent with US President Donald Trump’s stated goal of ending the war in Ukraine.

A Ukrainian strike killed the deputy commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy in Kursk Oblast, and an unknown actor may have assassinated a high-ranking Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) official in Moscow City. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) acknowledged on July 3 that Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy Major General Mikhail Gudkov died on July 2 during combat operations in the Kursk Oblast border area.[viii] Gudkov previously served as commander of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), and Russian President Vladimir Putin promoted him to deputy commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy in March 2025.[ix] Primorsky Krai Governor Oleg Kozhemyako reported on July 3 that Captain Second Rank Nariman Shikhaliev died alongside Gudkov.[x] Gudkov's obituary from the "Typhoon" All-Russian Organization of Naval Infantry stated that Ukrainian forces launched a missile strike against the command post of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade near Korenevo, Kursk Oblast, on July 2, killing over 10 servicemembers, including Gudkov and several senior officers.[xi] Ukrainian military observer Yuriy Butusov reported that the strike killed Gudkov's deputy and 20 other Russian servicemembers.[xii] Radio Svoboda stated that "unconfirmed official reports" suggest that a Ukrainian HIMARS strike killed Gudkov.[xiii] Telegram channel Nexta additionally claimed on July 3 that there are unconfirmed reports that Alexei Komkov, head of the FSB's Fifth Directorate, which is officially tasked with overseeing operational information and international relations, died after a car exploded in central Moscow City.[xiv] ISW cannot confirm the death of Komkov or the actor responsible for the reported car explosion in Moscow City.

Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reportedly assassinated the former occupation mayor of Luhansk City. Kremlin newswire TASS reported on July 3 that former occupation mayor of Luhansk City Manolis Pilavov died in an explosion in occupied Luhansk City.[xv] Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported on July 3 that sources stated that the SBU killed Pilavov by detonating an explosive device.[xvi] Pilavov was the occupation mayor of Luhansk City from 2014 to 2023.

Ukraine’s Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine, but the United States remains the only Ukrainian partner that can provide certain critical weapons systems – especially air defenses -- at scale and quickly. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on July 3 that Ukraine signed a memorandum on a long-term strategic partnership with US autonomous system engineering company Swift Beat, agreeing to produce hundreds of thousands of interceptor drones in 2025 that are capable of shooting down Russian Shahed drones and to expand production further in 2026.[xvii] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov also announced on July 1 that Ukraine is launching a joint arms production program with its international Ramstein format partners to produce weapons for the Ukrainian military in Ukraine and abroad.[xviii] Swedish Defense Minister Pål Jonson stated on July 3 that Sweden is allocating an additional 1.5 billion Swedish kroner (roughly $156 million) to purchase over 10 new Archer artillery barrels, augment long-range strike and underwater capabilities, and support unspecified logistical support for Ukraine.[xix] The Latvian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on July 2 that Belgium and Turkey joined the UK- and Latvian-led international drone coalition.[xx] The Latvian MoD also announced on July 1 that it approved the transfer of 42 Patria armored personnel carriers (APCs) and other military equipment to Ukraine.[xxi] UK defense and security enterprise Prevail Partners announced on July 2 that it launched a joint partnership with Ukrainian drone manufacturer Skyeton International to increase production of long-range drones as part of efforts to supply drones to Ukraine and provide the UK with modern military equipment.[xxii] Unspecified German security forces told German media outlet Die Welt on July 1 that Germany signed a contract to finance the production of over 500 Antonov-196 (AN-196) ”Lyutyi” long-range drones for Ukraine.[xxiii] ISW continues to assess that US aid to Ukraine, particularly Patriot air defense systems and interceptors, is critical to Ukraine's ability to protect its defense industrial base (DIB) and safeguard the capabilities it obtains from its partners in the face of long-range Russian strikes.[xxiv] Such US-provided systems are required soh that Ukraine's DIB can grow to be largely self-sufficient and able to sustain Ukraine's materiel requirements with domestic production.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected US President Donald Trump's call for a quick peace in Ukraine during a phone call with Trump on July 3.
• Putin's stated commitment to his goals in Ukraine, including eliminating the so-called "root causes" of the war directly contradicts his claim that Russia supports meaningful negotiations to end the war.
• Details about the recent US suspension of aid to Ukraine remain unclear.
• A Ukrainian strike killed the deputy commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy in Kursk Oblast, and an unknown actor may have assassinated a high-ranking Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) official in Moscow City.
• Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reportedly assassinated the former occupation mayor of Luhansk City.
• Ukraine’s Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine, but the United States remains the only Ukrainian partner that can provide certain critical weapons systems – especially air defenses -- at scale and quickly.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova and Siversk and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, and Velyka Novosilka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on July 3.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Iskryskivshchyna (southeast of Tetkino in Sumy Oblast).[xxv]

Russian forces continued attacks in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on July 2 and 3.[xxvi] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked toward Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) from Bezsalivka (east of Tetkino along the international border) and toward Glushkovo.[xxvii]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that the Russian military command transferred an unspecified number of elements of the Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) and 119th VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) from the Yunakivka area (northeast of Sumy City) to the Tetkino area and reinforced these forces with elements of the 346th Motorized Rifle Regiment ( Mobilization Reserve).[xxviii] Mashovets stated that these forces conducted a series of attacks along the Tetkino-Ryzhivka line intended to push Ukrainian forces from Russian territory but only advanced 150 meters.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on July 3 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in the Sumy Oblast border area on July 2 and 3.[xxix] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in several unspecified areas in the Sumy direction.[xxx]

A Russian milblogger rejected recent Russian claims that Russian forces seized all of Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City) as premature and claimed that elements of the 76th Airborne (VDV) Division control most but not all of the settlement.[xxxi]

Ukraine's Border Service Spokesperson Andriy Demchenko reported on July 3 that Russian forces are conducting assaults in small groups in northern Sumy Oblast at a significantly reduced tempo and noted that Russian forces are fielding fewer all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) and motorcycles.[xxxii] Demchenko reported that Russian forces continue to use guided bombs and unguided missiles in Sumy Oblast and that Russian forces have targeted Khotyn Hromada (north of Sumy City) and Yunakivka Hromada (northeast of Sumy City) the most intensively.[xxxiii] Demchenko noted that Russian forces have also recently conducted fewer sabotage and reconnaissance missions in the border areas of Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts.[xxxiv] A Ukrainian servicemember operating in northern Sumy Oblast reported that Russian fiber-optic drones have ranges of up to 20 kilometers and remain an issue for Ukrainian forces.[xxxv] The Ukrainian soldier reported that Russian forces are also equipping drones with electronic warfare (EW) jamming devices, impeding Ukrainian drone units from intercepting Russian drones.

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on July 3 that elements of the Russian 83rd and 11th VDV brigades are struggling to advance near Yablunivka (northeast of Sumy City) and that Ukrainian forces have pinned elements of the 106th VDV Division in northern Sumy Oblast and forced the Russian military command to delay plans to redeploy elements of this division elsewhere.[xxxvi]

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in northern Sumy Oblast.[xxxvii] Drone operators of the Smuglyanka Detachment continue to operate in northern Sumy Oblast.[xxxviii]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on July 3 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on July 3 that elements of the Russian 138th Motorized Rifle Brigade (reportedly now subordinated to the 68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) advanced up to 300 meters near the Vovchansk Oil Extraction Plant in northeastern Vovchansk.[xxxix]

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and Zelene and toward Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on July 2 and 3.[xl]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz "Bati" Detachment (204th "Akhmat" Spetsnaz Regiment) reportedly continue operating in the Kharkiv direction.[xli]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 3 indicates that Russian forces, including elements of the Russian 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and the 72nd Motorized Rifle Division (44th Army Corps [AC], LMD) advanced into central Milove (north of Kupyansk near the international border).[xlii] ISW is unable to confirm if Russian forces maintain enduring positions within Milove.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Milove.[xliii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Kindrashivka (north of Kupyansk) and northeast of Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk).[xliv]

Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka and toward Mala Shapkivka and near the international border toward Ambarne and Milove; northeast of Kupyansk toward Petro-Ivanivka and Mytrofanivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and toward Pishchane on July 2 and 3.[xlv]

The commander of a Ukrainian tank brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction stated that Russian forces have not fielded heavy equipment or unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) in this direction for a “long” time.[xlvi]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 2 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced within northeastern Zahryzove (northeast of Borova).[xlvii]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Kolisnykivka; east of Borova near Zelenyi Hai; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and Cherneshchyna on July 2 and 3.[xlviii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Lozova (northeast of Borova).[xlix]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Druzhelyubivka (southeast of Borova).[l]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on July 3 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman toward Shandryholove; north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Serednye, Novyi Myr, Karpivka, and Zelena Dolyna; northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka, Terny, and Kolodyazi;; east of Lyman near Torske; and southeast of Lyman near the Serebryanske forest area on July 2 and 3.[li]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated that elements of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Central Military District [CMD]) are continuously attempting to seize Torske and that the Russian military command removed the commander of the 25th CAA's 67th Motorized Rifle Division for failing to seize Torske despite having claimed to have seized it several times.[lii] Russian milbloggers recently complained about the Russian military command exaggerating successes east of Lyman and further southeast in the Siversk direction.[liii]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction. 

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 2 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in eastern Serebryanka (northeast of Siversk).[liv]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk toward Dronivka; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka and Hryhorivka; southeast of Siversk toward Vyimka; and southwest of Siversk near Fedorivka and toward Bondarne on July 2 and 3.[lv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on July 3 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in southwestern Chasiv Yar and southeast of the settlement.[lvi] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced on the eastern outskirts of Chervone (west of Chasiv Yar).[lvii] A Russian milblogger credited elements of the Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) with the claimed seizure of Mykolaivka (west of Chasiv Yar).[lviii]

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself; north of Chasiv Yar toward Markove;  west of Chasiv Yar toward Chervone; and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and toward Bila Hora on July 2 and 3.[lix]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian “Dikaya Division of Donbas" (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[lx]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 3 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Toretsk.[lxi]

Russian forces continued ground attacks north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; northwest of Toretsk near Yablunivka, Rusyn Yar, and Popiv Yar and toward Pleshchiivka; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka and Novospaske on July 2 and 3.[lxii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Yablunivka and Stepanivka (northwest of Toretsk).[lxiii]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Southern Military District [SMD]) and 51st CAA (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) reduced the intensity of their offensive operations in the Toretsk direction and are regrouping.[lxiv] Mashovets stated that Russian forces are prioritizing two main directions of attack: the Romanivka-Katerynivka direction (northwest of Toretsk along the T-0516 Toretsk-Kostyantynivka highway) and the Dyliivka-Bila Hora direction (between northern Toretsk and southern Chasiv Yar).

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) are operating in the Romanivka-Katerynivka direction and that elements of the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are operating along the Dyliivka-Bila Hora line.[lxv] Mashovets stated that elements of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) are operating in the Yablunivka-Novoolenivka direction (northwest of Toretsk), and that drone operators of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division's 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Yablunivka and Rusyn Yar.[lxvi]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 3 that elements of Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) and the Ukrainian military struck a Russian ammunition depot near occupied Velyke Orikhove, Donetsk Oblast.[lxvii] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that there were secondary explosions indicative of air defense missiles and ammunition detonations. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, who often reports on successful Ukrainian strikes, published footage of a large explosion reportedly at a large Russian ammunition warehouse in occupied Khartsyzk (just south of Velyke Orikhove).[lxviii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on July 3 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Razine (northeast of Pokrovsk), and a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Razine.[lxix] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced within and north of Novoekonomichne (northeast of Pokrovsk).[lxx] A milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces retain positions in Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk) and that Russian forces control two-thirds of Udachne (west of Kotlyne).[lxxi] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces no longer control Bilhiika (south of Pokrovsk).

Russian forces continued ground assaults northeast of Pokrovsk near Myrne, Malynivka, and Novoekonomichne and toward Razine and Volodymyrivka; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka and Promin and toward Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne and Udachne and toward Molodestske and Novopidhorodne, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on July 2 and 3.[lxxii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bilhiika (south of Pokrovsk).[lxxiii]

Mashovets reported that the Russian rate of advance in the Pokrovsk direction remains low despite sustaining a relatively high tempo of operations.[lxxiv] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 150th Motorized Rifle Division have largely stopped making advances toward Novotoretske and Novoekonomichne after seizing Malynivka and Koptieve (all east to northeast of Pokrovsk) and that elements of the Russian 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) have also struggled to advance on Novoekonomichne from the south. Mashovets assessed that the Russian military command is likely struggling to sustain two simultaneous but diverging efforts: one to advance toward Rodinske (northeast of Pokrovsk) and bypass Pokrovsk alongits western flank, and another to reach Yablunivka and bypass the Kleban Buk Reservoir (both northwest of Toretsk) to advance toward Kostyantynivka.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the "Kaira" drone detachment of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Shakhove (northeast of Pokrovsk).[lxxv] Elements of the Russian 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces north and northeast of Pokrovsk.[lxxvi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on July 3 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Piddubne and north and northwest of Yalta (both south of Novopavlivka).[lxxvii]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations toward Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and Novomykolaivka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove, Oleksiivka, Dachne, Novoukrainka, Zelenyi Kut, and Bahatyr; south of Novopavlivka near Zaporizhzhia, Komar, Yalta, Myrne, Piddubne, and Zirka; and southwest of Novopavlivka toward Andriivka-Klevtsove (formerly Iskra) and Novokhatske on July 2 and 3.[lxxviii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Muravka (northeast of Novopavlivka) and near Kotlyarivka (east of Novopavlivka)[lxxix]

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, CMD) are attacking near Muravka and south of Kotlyarivka and are defending in Horikhove.[lxxx] Mashovets stated that elements of the 74th and 137th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 41st CAA) are attacking along the Solona River from Novoserhiivka. Mashovets stated that elements of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, CMD) are attacking along the Zirka-Piddubne line and that elements of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 5th Tank Brigade (both of the 36th CAA, EMD), reinforced by elements of the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet), 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), and mobilization units including the 1443rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), are operating in the Vesele-Fedorivka-Komar-Perebudova area (south of Novopavlivka). Mashovets stated that elements of the 60th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) advanced to the southern outskirts of Voskresenka (southwest of Novopavlivka) and that elements of the 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th CAA, EMD) are attacking west of Fedorivka. Elements of the 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly operating near Dachne.[lxxxi] Drone operators of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Voskresenka and Myrne.[lxxxii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on July 3 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north and west of Novopil (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[lxxxiii]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole and Shevchenko on July 2 and 3.[lxxxiv]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Division and 57th and 60th separate motorized rifle brigades (all part of the 5th CAA, EMD), reinforced by elements of 69th Separate Cover Brigade (35th CAA, EMD), are operating along the Shevchenko-Burlatske-Pryvilne-Vilne Pole line and that elements of the 69th Separate Cover Brigade reached the Zelene Pole-Novosilka line.[lxxxv] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Maliivka (northwest of Velyka Novosilka in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast).[lxxxvi]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on July 3 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Hulyaipole near Novozlatopil on July 3.[lxxxvii]

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported that Russian forces launched "massive" motorcycle assaults in late June 2025 in the Hulyaipole and Orikhiv directions.[lxxxviii] Voloshyn stated that new Russian requirements hold that Russian companies should have 30 motorcycles for every 80 to 90 soldiers. Voloshyn reported that Russian forces are launching assaults with eight to nine motorcycles with electronic warfare (EW) support.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 63rd Separate Spetsnaz Company (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Polohy (Hulyaipole) direction.[lxxxix]

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 2 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southeastern Kamyanske (southwest of Orikhiv).[xc]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 2 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northwestern and eastern Kamyanske.[xci]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in western and eastern Kamyanske, south of Novoandriivka (west of Orikhiv), and southwest of Novodanylivka (south of Orikhiv).[xcii]

Russian forces conducted ground attacks southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; northwest of Orikhiv near Novopavlivka; west of Orikhiv near Shcherbaky; and southwest of Orikhiv near Kamyanske, on July 2 and 3.[xciii] A Russian milblogger claimed Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Mali Shcherbaky and Shcherbaky.[xciv]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Kamyanske.[xcv] Elements of the "Nemets" group of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) and the 19th Motorized Rifle Division (58th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[xcvi]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on July 3 but did not advance.[xcvii]

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 81st Artillery Regiment (70th Motorized Rifle Division, 18th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[xcviii]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 2 to 3. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 52 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Oryol City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[xcix] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 22 drones and that 18 drones were "lost" or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck Poltava, Kharkiv, and Odesa oblasts.[c]

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha reported on July 2 that Russia launched over 330 missiles, including nearly 80 ballistic missiles; over 5,000 strike drones; and over 5,000 glide bombs against Ukraine in June 2025.[ci]

The Ukrainian Western Air Command's Deputy Commander Brigadier General Oleh Zakharchuk told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne on July 3 that Russian forces are using new tactics to overload Ukrainian air defense systems by launching Shahed drones alongside ground-, air-, and sea-launched missiles.[cii] The deputy commander stated that Russian forces are increasing the density of their strike packages and length of time of each strike series.  

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[i] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77354

[ii] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041825

[iii] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042225 ; https://tass dot ru/politika/24364571; https://t.me/tass_agency/320652; https://t.me/tass_agency/320447; https://t.me/tass_agency/323609; https://t.me/tass_agency/322403; https://t.me/tass_agency/322404; https://t.me/tass_agency/323487; https://t.me/tass_agency/322604; https://lenta dot ru/news/2025/06/17/v-rossii-vyskazalis-o-podgotovke-k-tretiemu-raundu-peregovorov-s-ukrainoy/ ; https://ura dot news/news/1052950067; https://t.me/tass_agency/320652 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062725 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/323609; https://t.me/tass_agency/323487 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/323330 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/322604 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/320447 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/320652 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/321277 ; https://t.me/sotaproject/99377 ; https://russian dot rt.com/ussr/news/1495164-peskov-rossiya-ukraina

[iv] https://x.com/TBowmanNPR/status/1940434066438054362; https://x.com/olliecarroll/status/1940690334700462553

[v] https://www.economist.com/europe/2025/07/02/americas-ominous-new-halt-on-weapons-to-ukraine;

[vi] https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-july-2-2025/#post-637744-UKRAINE2

[vii] https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/4234712/chief-pentagon-spokesman-sean-parnell-holds-press-briefing/

[viii] https://t.me/mod_russia/54344

[ix] https://meduza dot io/news/2025/07/03/gubernator-primorya-soobschil-o-gibeli-v-kurskoy-oblasti-zamestitelya-glavkoma-vmf-rossii-mihaila-gudkova-ego-naznachili-na-etu-dolzhnost-tri-mesyatsa-nazad

[x] https://t.me/kozhemiakoofficial/2511

[xi] https://www.svoboda dot org/a/v-kurskoy-oblasti-pogib-zamglavkoma-vmf-rossii-mihail-gudkov/33462871.html

[xii] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/20975

[xiii] https://t.me/radiosvoboda/82943;

[xiv] https://t.me/nexta_live/98228

[xv] https://tass dot ru/proisshestviya/24422837

[xvi] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1057889-u-luganski-vnaslidok-vibuhu-zaginuv-kolisnij-mer-mista-manolis-pilavov-ros-zmi/

[xvii] https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/ukrayina-ta-kompaniya-swift-beat-pidpisali-memorandum-pro-ro-98813; https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/memorandum-mizh-ukrayinoyu-ta-amerikanskoyu-kompaniyeyu-swif-98817; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/19SqbnHxpU/; https://armyinform.com dot a/2025/07/03/sotni-tysyach-droniv-za-sobivartistyu-shho-peredbachaye-nova-ugoda-minoborony-z-amerykanskym-vyrobnykom/;

[xviii] https://www.facebook.com/rustemumerov.ua/posts/pfbid033ZEokSNGELcM6qNMWPSAGyUYotkZ2HZqnPmnUGVnrLCHzDCrw34LZ5theEN3QpZ3l; https://suspilne dot media/1056375-ukraina-zapuskae-programu-spilnogo-virobnictva-zbroi-z-krainami-ramstajnu/

[xix] https://x.com/PlJonson/status/1940686115650130402; https://x.com/PlJonson/status/1940686120138035713; https://suspilne dot media/1057759-svecia-vidilae-130-mln-evro-na-stvoli-dla-ustanovok-archer-dla-ukraini/; https://suspilne dot media/1057759-svecia-vidilae-130-mln-evro-na-stvoli-dla-ustanovok-archer-dla-ukraini/

[xx] https://www.mod dot gov.lv/lv/zinas/starptautiskajai-dronu-koalicijai-oficiali-pievienojas-belgija-un-turcija

[xxi] https://www dot mod.gov.lv/lv/zinas/latvija-drizuma-ukrainai-nogadas-patria-6x6-brunutransportierus-un-militaro-ekipejumu ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/02/latviya-peredast-ukrayini-bronetransportery-patria-ta-vijskove-obladnannya/

[xxii] https://www.prevail-partners.com/first-new-uk-ukraine-drone-joint-venture-powers-the-zelenskyy-and-starmer-vision/

[xxiii] https://archive.ph/Fad0F; https://www.welt dot de/politik/ausland/plus256327668/ukraine-krieg-diese-drohnen-finanziert-deutschland-um-tief-in-russland-anzugreifen.html

[xxiv] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-long-term-path-success-jumpstarting-self-sufficient-defense-industrial-base ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040725; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2025;

[xxv] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30722

[xxvi] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26212 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0YJLMWK7aBDyFPEaMHVatY78ZMcGfyTxuRCSR1LccRJp6CXhywMPCHQq8chm795fkl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26185

[xxvii] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30722 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30748 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/74577

[xxviii] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2841

[xxix] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26212 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0YJLMWK7aBDyFPEaMHVatY78ZMcGfyTxuRCSR1LccRJp6CXhywMPCHQq8chm795fkl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26185 

[xxx] https://t.me/dva_majors/74577 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27664 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171084

[xxxi] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171084

[xxxii] https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1057573-zastosuvanna-rosijskih-malih-sturmovih-grup-znacno-znizilas-recnik-dpsu-pro-situaciu-na-sumsini/

[xxxiii] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/07/03/berezhut-navit-kvadroczykly-z-motoczyklamy-zmina-taktyky-rosiyan-na-kordoni/

[xxxiv] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/07/03/u-sylah-oborony-poyasnyly-navishho-rosiya-zapuskaye-drg-v-prykordonni-regiony/

[xxxv] https://suspilne dot media/1057403-front-na-sumsini-stabilizovano-ak-tam-zaraz-rozpovidaut-vijskovi/

[xxxvi] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2841

[xxxvii] https://t.me/wargonzo/27662 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27661

[xxxviii] https://t.me/dva_majors/74560

[xxxix] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2841

[xl] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0YJLMWK7aBDyFPEaMHVatY78ZMcGfyTxuRCSR1LccRJp6CXhywMPCHQq8chm795fkl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26185 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13107

[xli] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5814  

[xlii] https://t.me/warriorofnorth/9816; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1940782384129233016; https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/1940782156193976720; https://t.me/osintpen/1351

[xliii] https://t.me/mod_russia/54339

[xliv] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13524

[xlv] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26212; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0YJLMWK7aBDyFPEaMHVatY78ZMcGfyTxuRCSR1LccRJp6CXhywMPCHQq8chm795fkl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26185; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13107

[xlvi] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NnUiO5F0_UY; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/07/03/sydyat-i-chekayut-czilej-poblyzu-kupyanska-i-v-samomu-misti-spravzhnya-navala-zhduniv/

[xlvii] https://t.me/lihoradka_team/435; https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/1940540046802932167; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9504; https://t,me/lihoradka_team/435

[xlviii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26212; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0YJLMWK7aBDyFPEaMHVatY78ZMcGfyTxuRCSR1LccRJp6CXhywMPCHQq8chm795fkl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26185; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13107;

[xlix] https://t.me/rybar/71869

[l] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171118; https://lostarmour dot info/map?coord=49.2610681,37.8661505

[li] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26212; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0YJLMWK7aBDyFPEaMHVatY78ZMcGfyTxuRCSR1LccRJp6CXhywMPCHQq8chm795fkl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26185; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13107; https://t.me/rybar/71869

[lii] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZVMUSS0B0yo; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/03/pryyihala-komisiya-z-moskvy-i-poletily-golovy-selo-na-donechchyni-vbylo-karyery-komanduvannya-dyviziyi/

[liii] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar053025

[liv] https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/1940546879236067544 ; https://t.me/Ukr_G_M/60001

[lv] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26212 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0YJLMWK7aBDyFPEaMHVatY78ZMcGfyTxuRCSR1LccRJp6CXhywMPCHQq8chm795fkl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26185 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13107 

[lvi] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65600 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171173

[lvii] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65600 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171173 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30732  

[lviii] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30732  

[lix] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26212 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0YJLMWK7aBDyFPEaMHVatY78ZMcGfyTxuRCSR1LccRJp6CXhywMPCHQq8chm795fkl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26185 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13107  ; https://t.me/rusich_army/24483 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/74577  ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30732

[lx] https://t.me/wargonzo/27674

[lxi] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1940702095730266339; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1940721479227965684; https://t.me/UA_Military_Police/778

[lxii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26212; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0YJLMWK7aBDyFPEaMHVatY78ZMcGfyTxuRCSR1LccRJp6CXhywMPCHQq8chm795fkl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26185; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13107;

[lxiii] https://t.me/dva_majors/74577

[lxiv] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2841

[lxv] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2841

[lxvi] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171140; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2841

[lxvii] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid05bQbBsi37UPXHSbh3219zcbjqUxJ5Z85454RCCbwYx9y5hsStAq3oCgvtdiUzdk5l

[lxviii] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9479

[lxix] https://t.me/mod_russia/54339; https://t.me/mod_russia/54340; https://t.me/dva_majors/74589; https://t.me/sashakots/54698; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94988

[lxx] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94988; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65601

[lxxi] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30722

[lxxii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26212; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0YJLMWK7aBDyFPEaMHVatY78ZMcGfyTxuRCSR1LccRJp6CXhywMPCHQq8chm795fkl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26185; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13107; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65601; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94988

[lxxiii] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30722

[lxxiv] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2842

[lxxv] https://t.me/otrad_kaira/98 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15805

[lxxvi] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171140

[lxxvii] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171173; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65604  

[lxxviii] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0YJLMWK7aBDyFPEaMHVatY78ZMcGfyTxuRCSR1LccRJp6CXhywMPCHQq8chm795fkl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26185; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26212 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13107; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30722

[lxxix] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65604

[lxxx] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2842 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2843  

[lxxxi] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65604

[lxxxii] https://t.me/voin_dv/15803; https://t.me/voin_dv/15793

[lxxxiii] https://t.me/wargonzo/27664

[lxxxiv] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26212; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0YJLMWK7aBDyFPEaMHVatY78ZMcGfyTxuRCSR1LccRJp6CXhywMPCHQq8chm795fkl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26185; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13107

[lxxxv] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2843  

[lxxxvi] https://t.me/voin_dv/15809

[lxxxvii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26212

[lxxxviii] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/03/na-90-soldativ-30-motobajkiv-motoczykly-staly-osnovnym-rosijskym-vydom-tehniky-na-pivdni/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lnrp2S2L6qk

[lxxxix] https://t.me/voin_dv/15807

[xc] https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/1940563367447744927; https://t.me/Viking_SpN/2957; https://x.com/Zeldamices/status/1940695231600775288

[xci] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1940511593416347700;  https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9502  ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9506; https://t.me/Bender_Group1/99

[xcii] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171173 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65602

[xciii] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0YJLMWK7aBDyFPEaMHVatY78ZMcGfyTxuRCSR1LccRJp6CXhywMPCHQq8chm795fkl ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid026BhVMXSD2Si28fTcru9Rtc3FkpF9vtXhAxR3fiYvfMWg89xLDKXB7dqMVhVkdFPgl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26185 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65602  ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27664 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94969

[xciv] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65602  

[xcv] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94969 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/74586

[xcvi] https://t.me/dva_majors/74571 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/74574 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/74583

[xcvii] https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid026BhVMXSD2Si28fTcru9Rtc3FkpF9vtXhAxR3fiYvfMWg89xLDKXB7dqMVhVkdFPgl  

[xcviii] https://t.me/dva_majors/74579  

[xcix] https://t.me/kpszsu/37535

[c] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/03/u-suhoputnyh-vijskah-poyasnyly-navishho-vorog-zavdaye-udariv-po-tczk/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZVMUSS0B0yo; https://t.me/synegubov/15417; https://t.me/poltavskaOVA/24316; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/03/u-poltavi-vnaslidok-udaru-rf-zagynuly-dvi-lyudyny/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/03/vorog-vdaryv-po-budivli-tczk-v-poltavi-ye-zagybli-ta-poraneni/; https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/24771; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0jyKzwtMaydvPaQXQy6Q3rkk6D1sSi3o3nxBR83WWxML68q2DvMomCR5SKzFqgGcdl; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/45329; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/07/03/v-odesi-palaye-zhytlovyj-budynok-rosijskyj-dron-vluchyv-u-bagatopoverhivku/; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid026BhVMXSD2Si28fTcru9Rtc3FkpF9vtXhAxR3fiYvfMWg89xLDKXB7dqMVhVkdFPgl; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/07/03/rosiya-vdaryla-iskanderom-po-inozemnomu-sudnu-v-portu-odesy-ye-zagybli-j-poraneni-moryaky/; https://t.me/OleksiiKuleba/6522 ; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1057799-ataka-na-odeskij-port-sered-poranenih-inozemni-moraki-e-zagibli/; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/07/03/rossiyskie-voennye-nanesli-raketnyy-udar-po-portu-odessy-est-pogibshie-i-ranenye-sredi-postradavshih-grazhdane-sirii; https://t.me/odeskaODA/10327 ; https://www.youtube.com/live/JFvyCBahZ_k ; https://suspilne dot media/1057295-v-ukraini-zasovuut-detali-sodo-risenna-ssa-prizupiniti-postacanna-pevnogo-ozbroenna-1226-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1751542659&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://t.me/truonline/6504

[ci] https://x.com/andrii_sybiha/status/1940443780639072554

[cii] https://suspilne dot media/1057789-u-povitranih-silah-rozpovili-naskilki-spravlaetsa-ppo-z-atakami-rf/