Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 10, 2025

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:45 am ET on July 10. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 11 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio expressed frustration following a June 10 meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov about Russia's lack of progress towards ending the war in Ukraine.[i] Rubio stated after the meeting with Lavrov that he conveyed US President Donald Trump's frustration with Russia's insufficient "flexibility" to end the war.[ii] Rubio stated that he and Lavrov shared ideas about "a new or different approach" from Russia and that there must be a "roadmap moving forward" about how the war can end. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claimed that Rubio and Lavrov discussed their "mutual intention" to find a solution to the war.[iii] Kremlin officials' public statements continue to demonstrate that Russia remains committed to achieving its original war goals in Ukraine and is not interested in good faith negotiations to end the war, however. Russian MFA Spokesperson Maria Zakharova reiterated on July 9 Russia's original war demands for Ukrainian regime change and "demilitarization."[iv] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on July 10 that Russia prefers to achieve its war goals through peaceful and diplomatic means but that the war continues and the "realities on the ground" are changing every day.[v] Kremlin officials often call for Ukraine to recognize the "realities on the ground" (a reference to the frontline in Ukraine) to allude to the idea that Russia is in a stronger negotiating position given the battlefield situation and to demand that Ukraine concede to Russia's unwavering demands amounting to complete capitulation to Russia.[vi]

The Kremlin continues efforts to use its diplomatic engagements with the United States in an effort to divert attention from the war in Ukraine and toward the potential restoration of US-Russian relations. The Russian MFA readout of the Rubio-Lavrov meeting heavily emphasized Rubio and Lavrov's reported discussions about bilateral US-Russian issues unrelated to the war in Ukraine, including the restoration of US-Russian contacts, economic and humanitarian cooperation, direct air traffic, and diplomatic missions.[vii] The Russian MFA's readout concluded that the United States and Russia will continue dialogue about a "growing range of issues of mutual interest." Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov claimed on July 10 there has been no "slowdown in progress" in developing US-Russian relations.[viii] ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin attempted to use economic incentives unrelated to the war in Ukraine and the prospect of US-Russian arms control talks to extract concessions from the United States about the war in Ukraine.[ix] ISW also recently assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin unsuccessfully attempted to use Iranian nuclear negotiations and offers to mediate the Israel-Iran war to pose himself to Trump as an effective negotiator as part of efforts to secure concessions on the war in Ukraine.[x] The Kremlin is likely attempting to push the United States to suspend its diplomatic efforts to end the war in Ukraine in exchange for developing US-Russian bilateral relations and economic opportunities.

The Economist assessed that it would take Russia about 89 years to seize all of Ukraine at its current relatively accelerated rate of advance, which has fluctuated throughout the war and is unlikely to remain constant.[xi] The Economist published an analysis on July 9 about the ongoing Russian Summer 2025 offensive campaign, which the Economist assessed started on May 1. The Economist found that Russia has seized an average of about 15 square kilometers per day during this offensive effort -- roughly the area of the Los Angeles International Airport -- cohering with ISW's own assessment of the Russian rate of advance since May 2025.[xii] ISW assesses that Russian forces seized a total of 498.53 square kilometers in May 2025 and 466.71 square kilometers in June 2025, averaging about 15.8 square kilometers per day in May and June 2025. The Economist assessed that it would take Russian forces 89 years to seize the remainder of Ukraine at this rate of advance and until February 2028 to seize the remainder of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts, which Russia has illegally annexed. The Russian rate of advance of 15.8 square kilometers per day is unusually high compared to the Russian rate of advance in Winter 2024-2025 and Spring 2025, and is unlikely to remain constant. The rate of Russian advances in Ukraine has significantly varied throughout the war depending on multiple factors, including the number of active Russian offensive operations on various sectors of the front, the time of year and associated weather and terrain conditions, and Russian and Ukrainian forces' respective staffing levels and materiel stocks.[xiii] The Russian rate of advance will very likely continue to fluctuate in the coming months with the onset of the autumn rains and muddy terrain that affect maneuverability, as it has in the prior three years of war.[xiv]

Russia continues to expend staggeringly high amounts of manpower for its disproportionately small gains. The Economist used a modelling system that factors in "trends in war intensity, territory shifts, and credible open-source and intelligence assessments of losses" to assess Russian personnel casualties.[xv] The Economist used this model to estimate that Russia has suffered between 900,000 and 1.3 million personnel casualties since February 24, 2022, including between 190,000 and 350,000 killed-in-action (KIA). The Economist also estimated that Russia may have suffered about 31,000 KIA since May 1 in its Summer 2025 offensive and that Russia has gained about 0.038 square kilometers of territory (or about nine acres) per KIA soldier since about July 2024. Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Pavlo Palisa previously stated that Russia was sustaining roughly 167 KIA and wounded in action (WIA) per square kilometer of advance as of June 4, or about 0.0059 square kilometers or 1.45 acres per WIA or KIA soldier.[xvi] Russian forces will likely continue to burn through personnel in ongoing summer offensive operations that aim to seize the remainder of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts and advance into Dnipropetrovsk and Sumy oblasts.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg in Rome on July 9.[xvii] Zelensky noted that the discussion largely centered around arms supplies, strengthening Ukraine's air defense, and joint weapons production and localization against the backdrop of increased Russian strikes. Zelensky and Kellogg also discussed possible harsher US sanctions on Russia and those who support its energy and banking sector.

The United States reportedly resumed some military aid shipments to Ukraine. The Associated Press (AP) and Reuters, citing two US officials, reported on July 9 that the United States resumed military aid deliveries to Ukraine, including shipments of 155mm artillery shells and Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) rockets.[xviii] The officials did not specify the quantity of weapons in the resumed shipments or whether a new shipment has already arrived in Ukraine.

Ukraine’s Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine. The United Kingdom (UK) announced on July 10 a defense agreement with Ukraine that includes additional military assistance and joint defense production.[xix] The agreement will provide Ukraine with over five thousand air defense interceptors from Belfast-based Thales Air Defense, a subsidiary of the French defense company Thales Group.[xx] The UK will also commit an additional £283 million (roughly $384 million) in bilateral assistance for Ukraine over the 2025-2026 financial year, including £10.5 million (roughly $14 million) for the Ukrainian Governance Reform Program and £1 million (roughly $1.3 million) for Ukraine‘s Green Transition Office. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz stated on July 10 that Germany is prepared to purchase Patriot air defense systems for Ukraine from the United States.[xxi] The Czech Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on July 9 that the Czech government approved an F-16 training program for up to eight Ukrainian pilots, aiming to provide 150 hours of flight training per pilot by 2026.[xxii]

Russia launched another large-scale missile and drone strike against Ukraine on the night of July 9 to 10 that heavily targeted Kyiv City, resulting in civilian casualties and significant damage to civilian infrastructure. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 397 Shahed-type strike drones and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Millerovo, Rostov Oblast – of which about 200 were Shahed-type drones.[xxiii] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched eight Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Bryansk Oblast, six Kh-101 cruise missiles from Saratov Oblast airspace; and four S-300 air defense missiles at ground targets from Kursk Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 178 total projectiles, including 164 drones, all eight Iskander-M ballistic missiles, and all six Kh-101 cruise missiles, and that 204 drones and missiles were "lost" or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that the main targets of the Russian strike series were Kyiv City and Kyiv Oblast and that Russian strikes also damaged Chernihiv, Sumy, Poltava, Kirovohrad, and Kharkiv oblasts.[xxiv] Kyiv City and Kyiv Oblast officials reported that the Russian strikes damaged residential, medical, educational, commercial, and transport infrastructure, killing at least two civilians and injuring 26.[xxv]

[strikes graphic

Russia's strike tactics, coupled with the increased scale and concentrated targeting of Russia's recent strike packages, aim to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and are resulting in significant damage. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger stated that Russian forces are employing new strike tactics, which involve targeting massive strike packages against one or two main target cities.[xxvi] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian air defenses protecting the cities are unable to repel such large-scale and concentrated strike packages. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reiterated that Russian forces are launching drones and missiles from different directions and at different altitudes, which complicates Ukrainian air defense measures.[xxvii] Ihnat noted that Ukrainian forces are working to destroy Russian reconnaissance drones that use repeaters to fly deep into Ukraine's rear and that relay real-time targeting data to Russian forces. ISW previously observed reports of Russian forces adapting their strike tactics by launching missiles and drones from varying directions and altitudes.[xxviii] Russia continues to use these tactics while increasing the size of its strike packages and targeting particular cities to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and increase damage. ISW continues to assess that Russia's large-scale strike packages in recent weeks aim to maximize damage against Ukraine, are disproportionately affecting civilian areas, and support wider Russian efforts to degrade Ukrainian morale.[xxix] Russia's recent large-scale strike packages underscore Ukraine's need for both continued Western support to Ukraine's interceptor drone development and production capabilities and for the contribution of Western air defense systems like US Patriots. Ukraine requires both indigenous and partner-provided air defense integrated into its wider air defense umbrella in order to secure its cities.

Russian President Vladimir Putin dismissed Deputy Foreign Minister and Presidential Special Representative to the Middle East and Africa Mikhail Bogdanov on July 9.[xxx] Kremlin newswire TASS, citing unnamed sources, claimed that Putin released Bogdanov from his duties at Bogdanov's request for unspecified personal reasons.[xxxi] Bogdanov was heavily involved in the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)'s efforts to provide military support to the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in exchange for a Russian Red Sea naval base, as the Critical Threats Project's Africa File previously assessed.[xxxii] Sudan provides an alternative base for Russian efforts to project power into the Mediterranean and Red Seas and provide logistic support for its military operations across Africa given its bases in Syria are in jeopardy after the fall of the Assad regime.[xxxiii] Putin may have dismissed Bogdanov in favor of a replacement who can better manage the situation in the MENA region following the fall of Assad.

Key Takeaways:

• US Secretary of State Marco Rubio expressed frustration following a June 10 meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov about Russia's lack of progress towards ending the war in Ukraine.
• The Kremlin continues efforts to use its diplomatic engagements with the United States in an effort to divert attention from the war in Ukraine and toward the potential restoration of US-Russian relations.
• The Economist assessed that it would take Russia about 89 years to seize all of Ukraine at its current relatively accelerated rate of advance, which has fluctuated throughout the war and is unlikely to remain constant.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg in Rome on July 9.
• The United States reportedly resumed some military aid shipments to Ukraine.
• Ukraine’s Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine.
• Russia launched another large-scale missile and drone strike against Ukraine on the night of July 9 to 10 that heavily targeted Kyiv City, resulting in civilian casualties and significant damage to civilian infrastructure.
• Russia's strike tactics, coupled with the increased scale and concentrated targeting of Russia's recent strike packages, aim to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and are resulting in significant damage.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin dismissed Deputy Foreign Minister and Presidential Special Representative to the Middle East and Africa Mikhail Bogdanov on July 9.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Borova, Toretsk, and Novopavlivka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on July 10.

Russian forces continued attacks in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on July 9 and 10.[xxxiv] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked toward Glushkovo and Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo).[xxxv]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Tetkino.[xxxvi]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on July 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) advanced south of Bezsalivka (northwest of Sumy City).[xxxvii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Yunakivka and Varachyne (both northeast of Sumy City).[xxxviii]

Russian forces attacked in the Sumy Oblast border area near Ryzhivka (northwest of Sumy City) and Bezsalivka on July 9 and 10.[xxxix] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bezsalivka, Andriivka, and Kindrativka (both north of Sumy City).[xl]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian counterattacks in Sumy Oblast are complicating Russian advances and threatening to encircle Russian forces operating in Andriivka.[xli] A milblogger claimed that Russian forces are transferring reserves to reinforce Russian forces near Andriivka and Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City).[xlii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 98th VDV Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Sumy Oblast.[xliii] Elements of the Russian 76th and 106th VDV divisions and the 11th and 83rd Separate VDV brigades are reportedly operating in Sumy Oblast.[xliv] Elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating in Kindrativka and near Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City), respectively.[xlv] Drone operators of the Russian 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Pysarivka and Khotin (both north of Sumy City).[xlvi] Drone operators of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly operating near Kindrativka.[xlvii]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently advanced within Vovchansk and across the Siverskyi Donets River east of Buhruvatka (both northeast of Kharkiv City).[xlviii]

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City toward Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Starytsya on July 9 and 10.[xlix] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Vovchansk.[l]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar Volunteer Detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Vilcha (northeast of Kharkiv City).[li]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on July 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed Russian forces seized Holubivka (north of Kupyansk) and advanced west of Kamyanka and northwest and west of Topoli (both northeast of Kupyansk).[lii]

Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk near Radivka, Petro-Ivanivka, Ambarne, and Holubivka and toward Hryhorivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Novovasylivka, Krasne Pershe, and Kamyanka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and Pishchane and toward Novoosynove on July 9 and 10.[liii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar Volunteer Detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Bolohivka (northeast of Kupyansk near the international border).[liv]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 10 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Borivska Andriivka (northeast of Borova).[lv]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Borivska Andriivka and west of Zahryzove (northeast of Borova).[lvi]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and Novoyehorivka on July 9 and 10.[lvii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on July 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman); seized Zelena Dolyna and advanced west and south of Zelena Dolyna; and advanced within, east, and south of Karpivka; west and south of Novyi Myr; and south of Hlushchenkove (all north of Lyman).[lviii]

Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Karpivka, Zelena Dolyna, and Novyi Myr and toward Serednie; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; and east of Lyman near Torske and the Serebryanske forest area on July 9 and 10.[lix] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Katerynivka (north of Lyman).[lx]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], MMD) are reportedly operating near Karpivka, Zelena Dolyna, and Kolodyazi.[lxi]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on July 10 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk).[lxii]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka; east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske; and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka and toward Vyimka on June 9 and 10.[lxiii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk).[lxiv]

A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Siversk direction stated on July 9 that about 30 percent of Russian drones in the Siversk direction are fiber optic drones.[lxv]

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating north of Vyimka.[lxvi] Elements of the Russian 6th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are reportedly fighting in western Verkhnokamyanske.[lxvii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on July 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora, Predtechnye, and Stupochky on June 9 and 10.[lxviii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bila Hora.[lxix]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 215th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion, are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[lxx]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 10 indicates that Russian forces advanced along the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway north of Yablunivka (northwest of Toretsk).[lxxi]

Unconfirmed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Dachne (north of Toretsk).[lxxii]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; northwest of Toretsk toward Pleshchiivka, Katerynivka, Stepanivka, Rusyn Yar, Popiv Yar, Shakhove, and Poltavka; and west of Toretsk toward Shcherbynivka on June 9 and 10.[lxxiii]

A Ukrainian brigade published footage indicating that Ukrainian forces recently repelled a Russian reduced platoon-sized mechanized assault consisting of two tanks in the Toretsk direction, reportedly near Dyliivka.[lxxiv]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) and drone operators of the Russian 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka (northwest of Toretsk) direction.[lxxv] Drone operators of the 3rd Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Yablunivka.[lxxvi] Elements of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are reportedly operating along the railroad toward Oleksandro-Shultyne (north of Toretsk).[lxxvii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on July 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk near Razine, Novoekonomichne, Myrne, and Mykolaivka and toward Novotoretske and Rodynske; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka and Promin and toward Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko and Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne and toward Molodetske and Novopidhorodne on July 9 and 10.[lxxviii]

The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on July 10 that Russian forces continue to attack in small groups but are showing signs of exhaustion.[lxxix] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces continue to use heavy equipment primarily to transport personnel.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly operating near Novoukrainka.[lxxx] Drone operators of the Typhoon Detachment of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, Cental Military District [CMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Pokrovsk direction.[lxxxi] Artillery elements of the 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[lxxxii] Drone operators of the 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA) are also reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[lxxxiii]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 10 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Voskresenka (southwest of Novopavlivka).[lxxxiv]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced into eastern Voskresenka and north and west of Tovste (southwest of Novopavlivka).[lxxxv]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and Muravka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove, Oleksiivka, and Dachne; south of Novopavlivka near Yalta, Zaporizhzhia, Piddubne, Myrne, Hrushivske, and Komar; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Tovste on July 9 and 10.[lxxxvi] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Myrne.[lxxxvii]

A Ukrainian servicemember of a brigade operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported that Russian forces are increasingly relying on North Korean weapons, especially mortars, artillery, and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS).[lxxxviii] The servicemember noted that North Korean munitions often do not explode.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Novoukrainka.[lxxxix] Elements of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Tovste and toward Novokhatske (southwest of Novopavlivka), and elements of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Myrne.[xc]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on July 10 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces, including elements of the 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD), are advancing toward Komyshuvakha (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[xci]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko, Komyshuvakha, Maliivka, and Vilne Pole; and west of Velyka Novosilka near Zelene Pole and Novopil on July 9 and 10.[xcii]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Temyrivka (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[xciii]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on July 10.[xciv]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1466th Motorized Rifle Regiment (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Malynivka.[xcv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations southwest of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka and Kamyanske on July 9 and 10.[xcvi] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kamyanske and Plavni (just north of Kamyanske).[xcvii]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 429th Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) and 108th and 247th airborne (VDV) regiments (both of the 7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Kamyanske.[xcviii] Elements of the Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA) are reportedly operating near Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv).[xcix] Drone operators of the Nemets group of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[c]

Russian forces continued limited ground assaults in the Kherson direction on July 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted ground assaults in the Kherson direction, including toward Prydniprovske (east of Kherson City in west [right] bank Kherson Oblast) and Bilohrudnyi Island (southwest of Kherson City), on July 9 and 10.[ci]

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 31st Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions on the west bank of Kherson Oblast.[cii]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.