Iran Update, October 24, 2025

The  Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

The Israeli Air Force (IAF) conducted at least 18 airstrikes targeting Hezbollah sites and fighters across Lebanon on October 23 and 24, compared to 15 airstrikes between October 1 and 22. The airstrikes are part of Israel’s effort to prevent Hezbollah’s reconstitution.[i] Five IAF fighter jets struck 16 Hezbollah sites, including a training camp and a missile manufacturing site, in the Bekaa Valley and northern Lebanon on October 23.[ii] The Bekaa Valley has historically served as a Hezbollah stronghold and a key center for Hezbollah military activities.[iii] The IAF struck other Hezbollah sites and fighters in southern Lebanon on October 23 and 24.[iv] The IAF killed Hezbollah’s southern Lebanon Logistics Unit Chief, Abbas Hassan Karaki, on October 24.[v] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) stated that Karaki was responsible for leading Hezbollah’s efforts to rebuild its capabilities and infrastructure in southern Lebanon.[vi] Israel has consistently stated that the Lebanese government is not doing enough to disarm Hezbollah and prevent the group’s reconstitution.[vii]

The Israeli airstrikes come amid concerns about an imminent Israeli escalation in Lebanon. Lebanese media reported on October 23 that Hezbollah is expecting an imminent Israeli escalation.[viii] Hezbollah Parliamentarian Hassan Ezzedine similarly stated on October 24 that Hezbollah cannot discount the possibility that Israel is preparing for a large-scale escalation and noted that Hezbollah is ready to confront all possibilities.[ix] US and European officials warned on October 20 and 24, respectively, about the possibility of a large-scale Israeli operation targeting Hezbollah.[x] Unspecified Israeli military officials stated on October 24 that Israel is not prepared to enter a multi-front war due to budget constraints that limit its ability to rebuild its forces and weapons stockpiles, however.[xi] The IDF reportedly cancelled upcoming reserve call-ups and will release some reserve soldiers soon.[xii] The IDF ended its five-day, division-level military exercise along the Israel-Lebanon border on October 24.[xiii]

Some Iranian officials have emphasized the need to decentralize authority to provincial governors following the Israel-Iran War, likely, in part, to ensure continuity of governance during periods of crisis. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian announced in July that he had delegated “all of the president’s powers” to provincial governors, although it is unclear which specific powers Pezeshkian was referring to.[xiv] Pezeshkian stated that transferring authority to governors was necessary to ensure that local governments can continue to operate even if senior Iranian officials are killed.[xv] Iranian media previously claimed that Israel targeted a Supreme National Security Council meeting in Tehran that Pezeshkian was attending during the Israel-Iran War.[xvi] Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf stated on October 24 that he supports the government’s efforts to delegate authority to provincial governors but emphasized that these efforts must comply with the Iranian Constitution.[xvii] The Iranian Constitution allows the president to appoint special representatives whose decisions hold the same authority as the president’s in “special circumstances.”[xviii] Ghalibaf’s remarks about decentralization come after other senior Iranian officials have similarly expressed support for decentralization in recent weeks. Deputy Vice President for Strategic Affairs Ali Abdullah Khani recently emphasized the need for Iran to decentralize its supply chains, defense systems, and command-and-control structures, for example.[xix] These statements reflect a growing acknowledgement among Iranian officials that Israel exploited Iran’s centralized leadership structure during the Israel-Iran War.

Iran also appears to be empowering provinces to establish economic relations with other countries, likely as part of Iran’s effort to mitigate the impact of international sanctions. Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi stated during a “provincial diplomacy” conference in Khorasan Razavi Province on October 23 that Iran’s borders with neighboring countries have become “vital breathing channels” for Iran's economy.[xx] Araghchi described provincial diplomacy as a “paradigm shift” in how Iran conducts foreign relations.[xxi] Iran may calculate that it can ease the pressure of international sanctions by developing strong economic relationships between Iranian provinces and regional and extra-regional countries. The regime’s push for provincial diplomacy is one of numerous mechanisms that Iran has pursued to try to reduce the impact of sanctions.

Key Takeaways

• Israeli Airstrikes in Lebanon: The Israeli Air Force (IAF) conducted at least 18 airstrikes targeting Hezbollah sites and fighters across Lebanon on October 23 and 24, compared to 15 airstrikes between October 1 and 22. The Israeli airstrikes come amid concerns about an imminent Israeli escalation in Lebanon. Unspecified Israeli military officials stated on October 24 that Israel is not prepared to enter a multi-front war due to budget constraints, however.
• Iranian Reflections on the Israel-Iran War: Some Iranian officials have emphasized the need to decentralize authority to provincial governors following the Israel-Iran War, likely, in part, to ensure continuity of governance during periods of crisis. Iran also appears to be empowering provinces to establish economic relations with other countries, likely as part of Iran’s effort to mitigate the impact of international sanctions.

Iran

See topline section.

Iraq

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani reportedly urged Shia Coordination Framework members and Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders to “maintain neutrality” toward “US escalation” during his October 21 visit to Baghdad.[xxii] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. Ghaani’s reference to “US escalation” could refer to Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s announcement on October 20 that 250 to 350 US “military advisers and support personnel” will remain at Ain al Asad Airbase in Anbar Province, Iraq.[xxiii] One of Iran and the Axis of Resistance’s main strategic objectives is the removal of US forces from the Middle East, and Iran could view the decision to maintain some US advisers in Iraq as an “escalation.” Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have not publicly reacted to Sudani’s announcement at the time of this writing. Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi separately reportedly warned during his meeting with Iraqi National Security Adviser Qassem al Araji on October 22 that the United States seeks to “occupy Iraq” and called on the Iraqi federal government to review its level of security cooperation with the United States.[xxiv] It is unclear whether Mousavi’s remarks were a direct response to Sudani’s announcement that some US military advisers will remain in Iraq, however.

Syria

Nothing significant to report.

Arabian Peninsula

Nothing significant to report.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

See topline section.