The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is upda1ted daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Syrian Transitional President Ahmed al Shara’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on October 15 indicates that the Syrian government will likely pursue a pragmatic and multi-faceted relationship with Russia.[i] This meeting was the first between the two leaders since Shara came to power in December 2024.  Shara told Putin that he is attempting to “redefine” the Syrian-Russian relationship and that Russia will play a “significant role” in helping Syria advance its political goals.[ii] Putin stated that he is ”prepared to do everything possible” to implement new initiatives between the two countries in reference to discussions about Russian participation in the reconstruction of Syria’s energy sector. [iii] Syrian Defense Minister Major General Marhaf Abu Qasra, Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani, head of intelligence Hussein al Salama, and Maher al Shara, who is Shara’s brother and a Russian citizen, also attended the meeting.[iv]

The current Russia-Syria relationship consists of mutually beneficial arrangements and understandings that have developed since the fall of the regime. Russia, once a key Assad ally, has maintained a military presence at three military bases in Syria since the fall of the Assad regime, including an airbase and a naval base in coastal Syria that are critical for Russia’s power projection in the Mediterranean Sea.[v] Russia has attempted to use economic incentives to secure its basing rights in Syria under Shara’s government. The continued Russian presence in Syria suggests that this effort has been somewhat successful.[vi] The Syrian government has proven to be increasingly willing to engage directly with Russia since Spring 2025 on economic, military, and political issues that are advantageous to Syria.[vii]

CTP-ISW assesses that the Syrian government likely aims to achieve the following domestic political, economic, and military objectives from a “redefined” relationship with Russia: 

• Military Cooperation: Syria likely aims to gain military and technical lessons from the Russian military as the Syrian Defense Ministry builds and professionalizes the new Syrian army. Senior Syrian and Russian defense officials have continued to discuss possible defense cooperation in meetings since September 2025, including discussing the development of the Syrian army’s training, artillery, and armor capabilities and readiness.[viii] Russia is unlikely to provide Syria with Russian arms imports or direct Russian training given Russia's current need to prioritize materiel shortages in its war against Ukraine.[ix]
• Economic Aid: Syria likely seeks to continue to procure economic aid from Russia in order to address Syria’s critical resource shortages, particularly in the energy sector.[x] Russia has delivered crude and refined oil to Syria via sanctioned tankers since March 2025, when few states were willing to do so given remaining US and international sanctions on Syria.[xi] Shara told Putin during their meeting that Syria depends on Russia to operate its power plants and for food supplies.[xii] Russia has delivered wheat grown in Russian-occupied Ukraine to Syria since April 2025.[xiii] Shara and Putin discussed Russia’s future involvement in “oil projects” and in the restoration of energy and rail infrastructure damaged during the civil war, according to Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak.[xiv]
• Support for Assadists: Syrian officials likely intend to secure the Kremlin’s commitment to end its support for members of the Assad regime in order bolster the Syrian government’s domestic and international legitimacy. Russia is currently providing asylum to former Syrian President Bashar al Assad and his family.[xv] Shara declared in a recent interview that Syria will use ”all legal means possible” to demand that Assad be brought to justice and stand trial in Syria.[xvi] Russia also hosts several other former regime officials, some of whom were reportedly involved in instigating the pro-Assad coastal insurgency in March 2025.[xvii] An unspecified Syrian source told Reuters that Syrian officials sought guarantees from Putin that Russia will not help any regime remnants “rearm.”[xviii]
• Balancing Israel in Syria. Syria may seek to engage Russia and retain Russian forces in Syria in order to build a military and political counterweight to Israel. Israel maintains a presence in southern Syria and Israeli officials say that they want to institute a demilitarized zone in southern Syria. An unspecified Syrian source told Reuters that Shara may discuss the redeployment of Russian military police to southern Syria as a ”guarantor” against Israeli advances in the south.[xix] Russian forces formerly manned about 12 observation points along the Syria-Israel border prior to the fall of the regime.[xx] Turkey reportedly backs the effort to use Russia to ”balance” against Israel.[xxi]

Shara and his government are poised to strengthen relations with Russia in order to achieve the above objectives in the absence of international pressure to cut ties with Russia.  European Union parliamentarians called for Syria to end its ties with Russia in March 2025, but the effort has lost political momentum in more recent months.[xxii] Shara and his government may believe that Syria can forge a mutually beneficial relationship with Russia at this time and face few barriers to doing so.

Key Takeaways

• Russo-Syrian Cooperation: Syrian Transitional President Ahmed al Shara’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on October 15 indicates that the Syrian government will likely pursue a pragmatic and multi-faceted relationship with Russia.
• Iranian Sanctions Subversion: The People’s Republic of China (PRC) continues to receive Iranian oil exports at PRC port terminals despite five rounds of US sanctions that have targeted PRC port terminals and oil refineries for receiving illicit Iranian crude oil.
• US Sanctions in Iraq: Iraq's state-owned Rafidain Bank closed its office within the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) directorate on October 15, likely in reaction to recent US sanctions.

Iran

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Mohammad Pakpour appointed Brigadier General Seyyed Musa Hosseini to command the IRGC Ground Forces Neynava Unit in Golestan Province on October 15.[xxiii] The Neynava Unit is an IRGC Ground Forces provincial unit.[xxiv] CTP-ISW cannot confirm the size or composition of provincial units, and it is unclear how they fit into the IRGC Ground Forces order of battle. Brigadier generals second class usually command provincial units, though sometimes colonels or brigadier generals first class.[xxv] The IRGC Ground Forces Ghadir Operational Base, which is based in Sari, Mazandaran Province, oversees IRGC Ground Forces units in Golestan, Gilan, and Mazandaran provinces. Hosseini previously served as the Deputy Commander of the Neynava Unit and replaced Brigadier General Ali Malek Shahkouhi.[xxvi]

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) continues to receive Iranian oil exports at Chinese port terminals despite five rounds of US sanctions that have targeted Chinese port terminals and oil refineries for receiving illicit Iranian crude oil.[xxvii] Trading firms diverted at least six crude oil tankers from a crude oil import terminal in Shandong Province that the United States sanctioned on October 9 to other eastern Chinese port terminals, according to shipping data and trading sources who spoke to Reuters on October 13 and 15.[xxviii] The PRC could, if it chose to do so, demand that these terminals and the ships entering them adhere to US sanctions and refuse to import Iranian oil. The PRC’s refusal to issue these demands illustrates that it continues to repudiate US sanctions against Iranian energy exports by accepting the ships at other terminals.[xxix] The PRC imports around 90 percent of Iranian crude oil exports, which remain an economic lifeline for Iran amid increased Western sanctions.[xxx] Shandong Province port authorities have issued notices previously banning terminal operators from receiving US-sanctioned or non-registered vessels, but these notices have had limited effects.[xxxi] These notices have not directly impacted the PRC’s ability to offload Iranian oil exports because sanctioned vessels carrying Iranian crude oil conduct ship-to-ship transfers with non-sanctioned vessels that then offload at Chinese ports.[xxxii] Iranian oil exports to the PRC have remained high, averaging 1.8 million barrels per day in the first half of 2025, despite US President Donald Trump’s second round of ”maximum pressure” campaign sanctions that seek to drive Iranian oil exports to zero.[xxxiii]

Iraq

Iraq's state-owned Rafidain Bank closed its office within the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) directorate on October 15, likely in reaction to recent US sanctions.[xxxiv] The US Treasury Department recently sanctioned two PMF-connected companies and three Iraqi bank executives on October 9 for helping Iran circumvent international sanctions and providing financial services to Iran-backed Iraqi militias.[xxxv] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service primarily comprised of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, many of which report to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[xxxvi] The Iraqi federal government has previously used Rafidain Bank to process and distribute salaries to PMF members, some of whom are members of newly US-designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada and Kataib al Imam Ali.[xxxvii] US pressure on the bank reportedly caused a multi-week delay in the distribution of PMF salaries in June 2025.[xxxviii] Rafidain Bank also reportedly closed its branch in Houthi-controlled Sanaa, Yemen, on October 5.[xxxix] The closure in Yemen comes after US Treasury Department officials reportedly pressured Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein in March 2025 to prevent Rafidain Bank from engaging in financial transactions with the Iranian-backed Iraqi militias’ partner, the Houthis.[xl] 

Syria

See topline section.

Arabian Peninsula

Nothing significant to report.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Lebanon and Israel may soon begin negotiations to resolve outstanding issues, which include the US proposal to disarm Hezbollah. Senior Lebanese diplomatic sources told Lebanese media on October 15 that the United States is preparing to start mediating talks between Israel and Lebanon soon.[xli] The talks will reportedly begin at the end of October or early November after newly appointed US Ambassador to Lebanon Michel Issa assumes his position.[xlii] Lebanese President Joseph Aoun recently called for Lebanon and Israel to begin talks to solve outstanding issues, which is likely a reference to the US proposal to disarm Hezbollah.[xliii] Aoun has consistently called for Israel to agree to the US disarmament proposal, which stipulates that Israel end its military operations in Lebanon and withdraw from Lebanese territory.[xliv] An Israeli journalist previously reported in August 2025 that the Israeli government will not discuss the US proposal and has no intention of responding to it, however.[xlv] Israel has maintained that it will continue to operate in Lebanon until Hezbollah is disarmed.[xlvi]

Hezbollah officials have reiterated that Hezbollah will not surrender its weapons. Hezbollah’s Media Office head Youssef al Zein told Saudi media on October 13 that the Gaza ceasefire agreement served as a lesson to Hezbollah to not surrender its arsenal.[xlvii] Zein claimed that Hamas’ weapons gave the group leverage that ultimately “forced Israel to back down.”[xlviii] Zein reiterated that Hezbollah will retain its weapons to protect Lebanon ”as long as the occupation exists.”[xlix] Hezbollah has used continued Israeli operations in Lebanon as justification for retaining its arms.[l] This excuse to retain weapons is the latest in a long line of Hezbollah excuses dating back to 2000, when Hezbollah refused to disarm even after Israel had withdrawn from Lebanon.[li] Hezbollah continued to argue that it should retain its weapons to challenge Israel’s control of Shebaa Farms, which is disputed between Israel, Lebanon, and Syria.[lii]

Hamas and Israeli officials have begun negotiating the outstanding details of the second phase of US President Donald Trump’s plan for peace in the Gaza Strip.[liii] The second phase reportedly addresses several key outstanding issues between Hamas and Israel, including Gaza’s governance, security arrangements, and Hamas’ disarmament.[liv] Hamas and Israel’s positions on these outstanding issues remain unchanged, however. Israel remains adamant that Hamas will be disarmed either through diplomatic means with Trump’s plan or through Israeli military action if the plan fails.[lv] Hamas and its allies in the Gaza Strip have continued to reject calls to disarm.[lvi]