Iran Update, October 16, 2025

Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

 Iranian-backed Iraqi fighters likely assassinated Iraqi Sunni Sovereignty Alliance candidate and Baghdad Provincial Council member Safaa al Mashhadani on October 14 with an explosive device in al Dhubat neighborhood, Tarmiyah district, Iraq.[i] The perpetrators remotely detonated an explosive device on Mashhadani’s car, killing Mashhadani and injuring four others.[ii] Both the Iraqi parliament speaker and the prime minister announced investigations into the assassination.[iii] Iraqi Security Media Cell head Lieutenant General Saad Maan said on October 15 that unspecified actors had previously tried to assassinate Safaa al Mashhadani.[iv] No group has claimed responsibility for either incident at the time of this writing, which suggests the involvement of Iranian-backed actors.

Iranian-backed militias likely assassinated Safaa al Mashhadani. Iranian-backed Shia militias have long maintained a presence in Tarmiyah and other predominantly agricultural areas north of Baghdad, where they have murdered Sunni civilians and advocated sectarian cleansing of Sunni areas.[v] Both Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada and Kataib Hezbollah have explicitly and implicitly called for Sunnis in Tarmiyah to be displaced and presumably replaced with Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) facilities or other populations.[vi] Iranian-backed militias previously cleansed Jurf al Sakhr, a formerly Sunni area south of Baghdad, and replaced the Sunni town there with a PMF base that is inaccessible to the Iraqi government.[vii] These militias also recently denied the capable, apolitical, and US-trained Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS) access to Tarmiyah.[viii] Mashhadani continuously advocated for the removal of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias from Tarmiyah, which these groups would have perceived as a threat to their dominance north of Baghdad.[ix] Mashhadani’s assassination followed his October 14 announcement that the Baghdad Provincial Council voted to suspend the allocation of investment licenses for projects in the Baghdad Belts following reports of unspecified violations against local farmers and landowners.[x]

ISIS almost certainly did not conduct this attack. Several Iranian-backed Iraqi actors released statements on October 15 and 16 that deflected responsibility for the assassination and implied that ISIS was responsible.[xi] ISIS conducted three attacks in all of September, none of which occurred in or around Baghdad or demonstrated any tactical sophistication.[xii]  ISIS’s lack of tactical ability in Iraq suggests that it would be incapable of conducting an assassination of this sort. This assassination required a pattern-of-life assessment and capable bomb-makers. ISIS in Iraq has resorted to small arms harassment and relatively simple IEDs, not well-orchestrated assassinations.[xiii] ISIS in Iraq has previously assassinated ISF and PMF leadership in Tarmiyah, but it has almost always claimed these attacks.[xiv] ISIS would almost certainly claim this attack—given its high-profile nature—if it conducted the attack in order to present itself as capable and relevant even as its attack rates have fallen.

The Houthis confirmed on October 16 that Israeli airstrikes killed Houthi Chief of General Staff Mohammad Abd al Karim al Ghamari.[xv] Ghamari is the most senior Houthi official who has been killed since 2004, according to a Yemeni analyst.[xvi] Ghamari served as the Houthi military chief of staff since 2016.[xvii] Ghamari was responsible for overseeing Houthi military operations and directing the procurement of various weapons.[xviii] Ghamari reportedly had close ties to Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).[xix] The United States designated Ghamari a Specially Designated National and Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) in May 2021.[xx] The Houthis will almost certainly not immediately retaliate for Ghamari's death. The Houthis did not specify when Ghamari was killed, but Israeli airstrikes in June and August 2025 reportedly targeted him.[xxi] The Houthis have likely announced his death now because they view the recent Hamas-Israel ceasefire agreement as an end to the October 7 War.[xxii] Other Axis of Resistance groups have similarly delayed confirming the death of leaders. Israel killed former Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip, Mohammad Sinwar, in May 2025, but Hamas only confirmed his death months later in August 2025.[xxiii]

The Houthis appointed Major General Yousuf Hassan al Madani to replace Ghamari.[xxiv] Madani previously commanded the Houthis’ Fifth Military Region, which is headquartered in Hudaydah City and oversees Hudaydah, Hajjah, Raymah, and Mahwit governorates.[xxv] The United States also designated Madani as an SDGT in May 2021.[xxvi] Basha reported that Madani studied under Houthi cleric Majd al Din al Muayyad in Saada Governorate and joined the Houthis under Hussein al Houthi's Believing Youth movement, the predecessor to the Houthi Movement.[xxvii] Madani trained under the IRGC in 2002 and later returned to Yemen to train Houthi forces and send them to IRGC training camps in Iran and Syria, which suggests that Madani has well-established connections with other members of the Axis of Resistance.

Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser to the Defense Council Ali Shamkhani’s recent remarks on Iran’s missile doctrine and nuclear posture highlight an ongoing internal debate about the regime’s military strategies. This debate has focused on strategic missteps that led to the Israel–Iran War and the flaws in Iranian ideas about deterring Israel and the United States. Shamkhani gave an interview on October 12 to the Iranian podcast “Story of the War,” which features various senior Iranian officials’ perspectives on the Israel-Iran War.[xxviii]  Shamkhani expressed retrospective regret that he did not advocate more for the development of Iran's nuclear capability as defense minister and said that he would advocate for building a nuclear capability if he could return to the 1990s again.[xxix] Shamkhani was Iran’s Minister of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics from 1997 to 2005.

Shamkhani also acknowledged shortcomings in Iran’s use of ballistic missiles, which contrasts sharply with the analysis of other Iranian leaders. Former IRGC Navy Commander Hossein Alaei claimed that Iran’s demonstration of missile capabilities caused the United States and Israel to call for a ceasefire in an interview on October 1.[xxx] Shamkhani acknowledged early operational errors during Iran’s missile strikes on Israel in April and October 2024 and stated that Iran’s shortcomings encouraged Israel to conclude that a large-scale attack on Iran ”with reasonable costs is possible.”[xxxi] Shamkhani described Iran’s April and October 2024 strikes as part of a learning process that exposed gaps in Iran’s understanding of Israeli air defenses and improved its missile performance during the 12-day war.[xxxii] Iran launched 500 to 550 ballistic missiles and over 1,000 drones during its Operation True Promise III in June 2025.[xxxiii] Israeli defenses intercepted 80 to 90 percent of Iran’s missiles and 99.99 percent of its drones, however.

Key Takeaways

• Sectarian Violence in Iraq: Iranian-backed Iraqi fighters likely assassinated Iraqi Sunni Sovereignty Alliance candidate and Baghdad Provincial Council member Safaa al Mashhadani on October 14 with an explosive device in al Dhubat neighborhood, Tarmiyah district, Iraq.
• Houthi Leadership: The Houthis confirmed on October 16 that Israeli airstrikes killed Houthi Chief of General Staff Mohammad Abd al Karim al Ghamari. Ghamari is the most senior Houthi official who has been killed since 2004, according to a Yemeni analyst. The Houthis appointed former Houthi 5th Military Region commander Major General Yousuf Hassan al Madani to replace Ghamari.
• Iran Defense Strategy: Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser to the Supreme Defense Council Ali Shamkhani’s recent remarks on Iran’s missile doctrine and nuclear posture highlight an ongoing internal debate about the regime’s military strategies.

Iran

The IRGC has reportedly appointed Seyed Jabar Hosseini as the new IRGC Quds Force Unit 190 commander, according to anti-regime hacktivist group Lab Dookhtegan.[xxxiv] Lab Dookhtegan has previously used language that suggests it sympathizes with Mojahedin-e-Khalq (MEK), an exiled Iranian opposition group based in Albania.[xxxv] ISW-CTP cannot independently verify whether Hosseini is the new Unit 190 commander at this time. Israel killed the former Unit 190 commander, Behnam Shahriari, during the Israel-Iran War in June 2025.[xxxvi] Unit 190 is a specialized branch within the IRGC Quds Force that is involved in oil smuggling and money laundering.[xxxvii] The unit also oversees Iran’s covert arms transfers and smuggling to Hezbollah and other members of the Axis of Resistance.[xxxviii]

Iraq

See topline section.

Syria

Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) officials confirmed on October 14 and 15 that the SDF will integrate into the new Syrian army in three divisions and several independent brigades.[xxxix] These divisions will operate in northeastern Syria.[xl] SDF negotiation committee member and Syriac Union Party co-chair Sanrib Barsoum stated that several SDF counterterrorism brigades will be deployed across the country as needed.[xli] US special operations forces have trained SDF counterterrorism brigades (known as Yekineyen Anti-Terror units, or YAT) since 2016.[xlii] The commander of the SDF-affiliated Northern Democratic Brigade told Kurdish media on October 14 that the SDF’s Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) will form a brigade in the new Syrian army.[xliii] Syrian government and SDF officials have disagreed throughout the negotiation process on the role that the YPJ and other Kurdish female fighters would play in the new army.[xliv] SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi and Syrian President Ahmed al Shara agreed to a ”preliminary agreement” for the SDF’s military integration into the Syrian army on October 7. This agreement and the details of SDF-comprised divisions have not been officially announced, however. Abu Omar said that an “initial timeline” for the SDF’s military integration is set for the end of 2024, but noted that this deadline is not “set in stone.”[xlv]

Arabian Peninsula

See topline section.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Lebanese President Joseph Aoun stated on October 16 that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) will deploy 10,000 soldiers to southern Lebanon by the end of 2025 during a meeting with UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) Commander Diodato Abagnara.[xlvi] Aoun noted that the LAF troops will not fully deploy to southern Lebanon until after Israeli forces withdraw, however.[xlvii] The November 2024 Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire agreement called for the LAF to deploy at least 10,000 LAF soldiers to southern Lebanon “as soon as possible.”[xlviii] The LAF’s plan to disarm Hezbollah similarly stipulates that the LAF will disarm Hezbollah south of the Litani by the end of November 2025.[xlix] Aoun and the LAF have consistently stated that continued Israeli operations limit the LAF‘s ability to fully deploy its forces to southern Lebanon and disarm Hezbollah, but Aoun and the LAF have failed to explain how the Israelis limit LAF activity.[l] Israel has maintained that it will continue to operate in Lebanon until Hezbollah is disarmed.[li]