Iran Update, October 9, 2025

Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is upda1ted daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Hamas and Israel agreed on October 8 to the first phase of US President Donald Trump’s plan for peace in the Gaza Strip.[i] The first phase will not be implemented until the Israeli cabinet approves it.[ii] The first phase stipulates that Israeli forces will immediately cease military operations in the Gaza Strip and withdraw to an agreed-upon line within 24 hours after the cabinet approves the plan.[iii] Israeli forces will retain control of approximately 53 percent of the Gaza Strip during the first phase.[iv] Hamas will release all 20 living hostages within 72 hours after Israel completes its withdrawal.[v] Hamas will also release all deceased hostages and Israel will release 2,000 Palestinian prisoners within an unspecified timeframe.  At least 400 truckloads of humanitarian aid will enter the Gaza Strip each day during the first phase.[vi] Both Israel and Hamas have reportedly begun initial preparations to implement the ceasefire agreement. Israeli Army Radio reported that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has halted offensive operations in the Gaza Strip and begun preparing to withdraw its forces.[vii] Hamas has reportedly started to transfer hostages to locations where medical care is available in preparation for their release.[viii] The Israeli government has convened to vote on the agreement but has not made an official decision at the time of this writing. Israeli media reported that the Israeli cabinet is expected to approve the deal.[ix]

The Hamas-Israel ceasefire in the Gaza Strip is a framework ceasefire agreement and not a comprehensive agreement to end the war. Hamas and Israel ended negotiations on Trump’s plan after both parties agreed to the first phase, and will not resume negotiations on outstanding issues until the first phase is implemented.[x] Hamas and Israeli officials have not discussed key outstanding aspects of the US plan, including governance over the Gaza Strip and Hamas’ disarmament.[xi] Western and Arab officials met in Paris on October 9 to discuss these issues.[xii] Hamas and Israeli officials did not participate in the talks in Paris.

It remains unclear if the Hamas-Israel ceasefire will impact how Hamas’ partners in the Axis of Resistance engage with Israel. The Houthis have justified their missile and drone campaign against Israel and international shipping as a response to Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip.[xiii] Houthi Political Bureau member Mohammad al Bukhaiti stated on October 6 that international mediators should not focus on disarming Hamas “because our weapon is Hamas' weapon, and our theater of operations is Hamas' theater of operations,” which suggests that the Houthis will continue to support Hamas even if Hamas is disarmed.[xiv] The Houthis have continued to attack Israel since Hamas agreed to the ceasefire on October 3.[xv] It is unclear if the Houthis would halt such attacks if the Hamas-Israel ceasefire holds. The Houthis would retain the ability to resume attacks against Israel or international shipping at any time and for any reason in the future even if they suspended attacks due to a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.

Key Takeaways

• Hamas-Israel Ceasefire: Hamas and Israel agreed on October 8 to the first phase of US President Donald Trump’s plan for peace in the Gaza Strip. The Hamas-Israel ceasefire in the Gaza Strip is a framework ceasefire agreement and not a comprehensive agreement to end the war. Hamas and Israeli officials have not yet discussed key outstanding aspects of the US plan, including governance over the Gaza Strip and Hamas’ disarmament. It remains unclear if the Hamas-Israel ceasefire will impact how Hamas’ partners in the Axis of Resistance engage with Israel.

Iran

Iranian news outlet Nour News highlighted the economic consequences of the Israel-Iran War in the second episode of its “Pathway” series, which aims to present perspectives on how Iran can navigate post-war challenges.[xvi] Nour News is affiliated with Ali Shamkhani, who is one of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s advisers to the Defense Council. Iranian economist Hamid Reza Fartouk Zadeh told Nour News on October 8 that sustained “external pressure” pushes Iranians to convert their savings into gold and foreign currency to preserve “purchasing power.”[xvii] Fartouk Zadeh added that this "outflow of capital” reduces demand for domestic goods, such as furniture, clothing, and leather and weakens industries that produce these goods. Fartouk Zadeh argued that Iran must restructure small, labor-intensive industries and focus on non-oil exports to regional countries to counter these “destructive” trends.[xviii] Fartouk Zadeh’s remarks are consistent with the regime’s long-standing effort to diversify exports in response to international sanctions on oil sales.[xix]

The United States sanctioned over 90 individuals, entities, and vessels on October 9 for facilitating the illicit trade of Iranian oil and gas. The sanctions are part of US President Donald Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign against Iranian energy exports.[xx] The US Treasury Department designated three individuals, 28 entities, and 23 vessels, including a Chinese “teapot” oil refinery in Shandong Province, People’s Republic of China (PRC).[xxi] The US State Department concurrently sanctioned seven individuals, 10 vessels, and 21 entities, including a Chinese petrochemical terminal operator in Jiangyin, the PRC.[xxii] Approximately 90 percent of Iranian oil exports go to the PRC.[xxiii]

Iraq

Nothing significant to report.

Syria

A coalition of anti-government Druze militias in Suwayda Province aims to regain control over government-held territory in Suwayda Province, possibly through diplomatic engagement with the international community rather than through military action.[xxiv] The National Guard is a coalition of over 40 Druze militias that back the Supreme Legal Committee, which is an autonomous government that formed in early August to oppose the Syrian government’s rule over Suwayda.[xxv] The Supreme Legal Committee and National Guard have provided Suwaydawis with administrative and security services since both structures were established in August 2025.[xxvi] National Guard Spokesperson and former Assad regime Fourth Division Commander Captain Talal Amer told Suwaydawi media on October 6 that the National Guard seeks to regain control over Suwaydawi villages currently administered by the Syrian transitional government.[xxvii] Amer was referring to territory in rural northwestern and western Suwayda along the Daraa-Suwayda border that the Damascus-based Syrian government has continued to control since July 2025, when the government-Druze ceasefire stalled.[xxviii] The National Guard and other Druze militias control the province’s main population centers and larger towns.[xxix]  

The National Guard may seek to regain control over government-held territory in Suwayda through international engagement as opposed to military action or direct negotiations with the transitional government. The National Guard said on October 9 that it will wait for a “political solution” from “guarantor states” to regain control of all of Suwayda Province.[xxx] The National Guard did not specify which “guarantor states” it seeks to collaborate with, but Amer thanked the United States and Israel for “standing” with Suwayda and noted that the National Guard seeks further coordination with Israel.[xxxi] The Supreme Legal Committee has additionally not had any diplomatic contact with Syrian authorities in Damascus or shown any public interest in direct negotiations, according to the transitional government’s Suwayda governor.[xxxii] The National Guard also discouraged Suwaydawis from using force against government forces following an attack on October 9 in which unknown fighters attacked a government position in Walgha, northwest of Suwayda City. Walgha is located near a line of control between government and Druze forces.[xxxiii] The National Guard denied its involvement in the attack and said that the attackers were “local civilian groups.”[xxxiv] The National Guard’s call for Suwaydawis to avoid engaging government forces suggests that the National Guard opposes using military means to regain control of government-held territory.

Syrian government forces and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) engaged each other west of Tishreen Dam, Aleppo Province, on October 9, in violation of the ceasefire that both sides reached on October 7.[xxxv] The Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated that the SDF targeted MoD positions near the dam with unspecified munitions on October 9, killing one MoD soldier.[xxxvi] The SDF said that Syrian government forces armed with hand grenades attempted to infiltrate an SDF position west of the dam and that the SDF responded to the infiltration attempt. The SDF acknowledged that it killed an MoD fighter.[xxxvii] The SDF later stated on October 9 that government forces in Manbij shelled SDF positions on Syriatel hill, which is about three kilometers west of Tishreen Dam.[xxxviii] These engagements violate the recent ceasefire that Syrian Defense Minister Major General Marhaf Abu Qasra and SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi agreed to on October 7 following government-SDF fighting in Aleppo City.[xxxix] The ceasefire agreement applied to all fighting in northern and northeastern Syria.[xl]

Arabian Peninsula

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted two Houthi drones targeting unspecified sites in Israel on October 8.[xli] The Houthis have not claimed the drone attacks at the time of this writing. The Houthis have launched hundreds of drones and ballistic missiles targeting Israel since October 2023.[xlii]

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

See topline section.