Iran Update, October 2, 2025

Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy Commander   emphasized the role that Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities and national unity played in its “success” during the Israel-Iran War in June 2025.[i] Alaei claimed that Iran demonstrated the strength of its ballistic missiles and national unity during the war in an interview with Nour News on October 1.[ii] Alaei claimed that Iran‘s demonstration of these strengths caused the United States and Israel to call for a ceasefire.[iii]  Alaei also claimed that Iranian missiles became more precise throughout the war and that no segment of the Iranian population chose to side with Israel in support of internal division.[iv] Alaei’s reflections almost certainly reflect only some segments of the regime’s national security community, and CTP-ISW cannot determine whether Alaei’s statements are reflective of a broader trend in Iranian strategic thought or if it is isolated to only a small number of thinkers.

Alaei’s statements regarding Iran‘s ballistic missiles and national unity suggest that some elements of the regime’s national security community believe that the regime has enough domestic support to engage in a prolonged conflict with Israel and could inflict more damage through continued missile strikes.[v] These reflections indicate that some Iranian officials believe that at least some elements of its previous efforts to deter and defend against Israeli strikes could be successful in the future, presumably with some modifications. Israel accomplished its campaign objectives—the degradation of Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs—in the Israel-Iran War, but it needed to end the war rapidly and at a moment of its own choosing.[vi] Israel forced Iran to rapidly end the war by creating the perception of a credible existential threat to the Iranian regime.[vii] Israel struck Iranian institutions and other assets used by the Iranian regime to ensure regime stability.[viii] A series of strikes against these institutions and assets that the Israelis design to demonstrate a credible threat to the regime’s stability could be expanded or contracted depending on how the regime responds and Israel’s desire for a ceasefire. Israel calculated that the Iranian regime’s overwhelming interest in ensuring regime survival would compel it to agree to a ceasefire. Alaei appears to be implying that the war illustrated that, in the future, Iranian missiles could be more successful if Israeli interceptor stockpiles are depleted. Alaei also suggests that national unity would have sustained a longer war, but it is unclear if expanded Israeli strikes would change Iranian calculations about regime stability.

Alaei’s assumptions that the ballistic missile attack campaign and national unity were part of Iran’s ”success” appear to disregard the reality that Israeli operations did not intend to collapse the regime or even seriously threaten it. Israel only aimed to demonstrate its military capability to destroy Iran’s ability to control its population. Israel retains that capability, and as noted above, could decide to expand or contract its military campaign against regime targets and threaten regime stability as it deems necessary to accomplish its objectives.

Alaei also emphasized that Iran can strike the United States and Israel due to its geographic position in the Persian Gulf.[ix] Alaei described Iran’s location in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman as the security and military “center of gravity of the region.” Alaei’s statement may be attempting to highlight the potential threat that Iran could pose to US forces and allied partners.[x] The IRGC Navy has historically harassed commercial and military vessels in the Persian Gulf to signal its ability to disrupt maritime traffic and pressure the United States and its partners.[xi]

It is notable that Nour News chose to interview Alaei as the first guest in its new “Pathway” series, given that Alaei has historically criticized the regime and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Nour News is affiliated with the Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser to the Defense Council Ali Shamkhani. Alaei served as the first IRGC Navy Commander from 1985 to 1990 and later as IRGC chief of staff from 1997 to 1999.[xii] Shamkhani similarly served as the IRGC Navy Commander from 1990  to 1997 and then as Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister from 1997 and 2005.[xiii] Shamkhani would have probably coordinated with Alaei in both of these roles. Alaei has repeatedly challenged the regime’s policies, including in his 2009 letter about the regime’s prison abuses, a 2011 editorial that indirectly criticized Khamenei, and his opposition to Iran’s support for former Syrian President Bashar al Assad.[xiv] Alaei also publicly sympathized with anti-regime protesters in 2020 and suggested abolishing Iran’s morality patrol.[xv] Alaei’s criticism of the regime was underscored in his interview with Nour News. Alaei noted that both Iranian reformists and hardliners had managed the nuclear file but emphasized that all negotiations occurred under the Supreme Leader’s supervision, placing ultimate responsibility on Khamenei.[xvi] Alaei dismissed Iran’s foreign policy as no better than “acceptable” on the nuclear issue, which implicitly faulted Khamenei for the failure to achieve a resolution.[xvii]

Iran is attempting to improve and fix vulnerabilities in its air defense systems that Israel exploited during the Israel-Iran War. An Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS)-controlled outlet reported on October 1 that the Iranian army has replaced and strengthened its air defense systems and short-range air defenses to counter drones.[xviii] It is unclear what type of short-range systems the Iranians have strengthened or whether these systems include electronic warfare systems. The outlet also claimed that Iran is attempting to acquire HQ-9 long-range surface-to-air missile (SAMs) batteries to counter Israeli F-35 fighter jets. Iranian Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Commission head Abolfazl Zohrevand previously claimed in September 2025 that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) would supply Iran with HQ-9 SAMs.[xix] CTP-ISW has observed no evidence that the PRC delivered these systems. It is unlikely that an HQ-9 SAM could shoot down an F-35 fighter jet, however.[xx] Israel destroyed the target engagement radars of four Russian S-300s, which bear technical similarities to Chinese HQ-9 SAMs, in Iran in April and October 2024.[xxi] The IRGC Ground Forces also conducted an air defense drill in its eastern air defense zone south of Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi Province, on October 2 to bolster its air defenses.[xxii] Iran conducted a similar exercise in northwestern Iran on September 24.[xxiii]

Senior Syrian and Russian defense officials have continued to discuss possible defense cooperation, signaling a possible shift towards deeper Syrian-Russian defense relations. Syrian Chief of the General Staff Major General Ali al Naasan, Assistant Defense Minister for the Northern Region Brigadier General Fahim Issa, Air Force Commander Brigadier General Assem al Hawari, Navy Commander Brigadier General Mohammad al Saud, 52nd Division Commander Brigadier General Haitham al Ali, and other Syrian officials arrived in Moscow on October 2 to discuss “coordination mechanisms” with Russian defense officials.[xxiv] The inclusion of Fahim Issa, who is responsible for northern Syria, suggests that the two parties discussed the remaining Russian presence in Syria, particularly in Qamishli, Syria, which is surrounded by Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)-controlled territory. Fahim Issa is a Syrian Turkmen ethno-nationalist who is extremely hostile to Kurds and the SDF.[xxv] Issa is also close to Turkish ethno-nationalists aligned with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.[xxvi] Turkey has threatened to attack the SDF if the SDF fails to integrate with the Syrian state before December 31, 2025.[xxvii]

The Syrian Defense Ministry's visit to Russia suggests that Syrian officials may seek to increase military cooperation with Russia in the coming months, possibly through the exchange of military expertise. The Syrian delegation visited the Russian military’s Central National Military Park near Kubinka, Moscow Oblast, and viewed Russian air defense systems, reconnaissance and fixed-wing attack drones, anti-tank guided missiles, and armored vehicles.[xxviii] Russia is currently facing a serious materiel shortage, and its commitment to fighting in Ukraine will take priority over arms exports to Syria, despite previous Syrian interest in procuring Russian equipment.[xxix] Syrian officials may seek to increase cooperation with Russia to learn from the Russian military, however.

The Syrian defense officials’ visit to Moscow comes amid an increased number of high-level meetings between Syrian and Russian defense officials in the past month.[xxx]  The topics discussed and officials present at other recent Syria-Russia meetings also suggest that Syria may be interested in establishing more direct military cooperation with Russia in the coming months. The Syrian Air Force Training Department head, Brigadier General Yahya Bitar, and representatives from the Defense Ministry’s training, artillery, and armor departments met with a Russian military delegation in Syria on October 2.[xxxi] The delegations discussed ways to “develop these specialties,” presumably referring to developing the Syrian army’s training, artillery, and armor capabilities and readiness.[xxxii] Syrian President Ahmed al Shara is expected to travel to Moscow on October 15 for the Arab-Russian summit, during which Syrian and Russian officials may continue to discuss the two countries‘ relations.[xxxiii]

Key Takeaways

• Iranian Strategic Re-Think: Former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy Commander emphasized in an interview with Nour News the role that Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities and national unity played in its “success” during the Israel-Iran War in June 2025. Alaei’s statements suggest the regime believes that it has enough domestic support to engage in a prolonged conflict with Israel and could inflict more damage through continued missile strikes in the future.
• Iranian Air Defense: Iran is attempting to improve and fix vulnerabilities in its air defense systems that Israel exploited during the Israel-Iran War. An Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS)-controlled outlet reported on October 1 that the Iranian army has replaced and strengthened its air defense systems and short-range air defenses to counter drones.
• Syrian-Russian Defense Cooperation: Senior Syrian and Russian defense officials have continued to discuss possible defense cooperation, signaling a possible shift towards deeper Syrian-Russian defense relations. Syrian officials’ visit to Moscow on October 2 suggests that Syria may seek to increase military cooperation with Russia in the coming months, possibly through the exchange of military expertise.

Iran

Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh met with Turkish Defense Minister General Yasar Guler in Ankara on October 1.[xxxiv] Nasir Zadeh and Guler discussed bilateral cooperation and unspecified regional security issues. Guler emphasized Turkey’s readiness to work with Iran to enhance regional stability and border security. Nasir Zadeh invited Guler to Tehran to follow up on the agreements that they reached. Nasir Zadeh noted that developing and strengthening defense relations with neighboring countries is one of Iran’s priorities.

Turkey sanctioned and froze the assets of 18 Iranian entities and 20 Iranian individuals on October 1 for supporting Iran’s nuclear program.[xxxv] The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Bank Sepah, and Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center are among the sanctioned entities.[xxxvi] The sanctions come after the United Nations Security Council reimposed snapback sanctions on Iran on September 27.[xxxvii]

Iraq

Nothing significant to report.

Syria

See topline section.

Arabian Peninsula

Nothing significant to report.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Lebanon and Syria have continued to take steps to resolve outstanding issues between the two countries. Lebanese and Syrian officials continued to discuss Syrian detainees held in Lebanese prisons, missing Lebanese civilians in Syria, Lebanese-Syrian border demarcation, and other security issues during the second Syria-Lebanon committee meeting in Beirut on October 1.[xxxviii] Lebanese and Syrian officials formed the specialized committee on September 1 and held the first committee meeting in Damascus on September 8.[xxxix] The officials also reportedly discussed a preliminary draft of a judicial cooperation agreement to resolve outstanding legal cases.[xl] Lebanese Deputy Prime Minister Tarek Mitri stated on October 1 that the Lebanese Parliament would ratify the draft agreement in a ”matter of weeks” once all parties agree to its text.[xli] These meetings and agreements are part of Lebanon and Syria’s efforts to resolve issues that have previously complicated Lebanese-Syrian relations, including prisoner repatriation and border demarcation.[xlii] The Syrian government has consistently demanded that the Lebanese government allow Syrian prisoners in Lebanon to serve their sentences in Syria, but Lebanese judicial officials have denied these requests.[xliii]

The Lebanese government has continued to try to acquire military support for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). Lebanese Interior Minister Ahmed al Hajjar met with the French Ambassador to Lebanon, Herve Magro, on October 1 to discuss military cooperation to train the Lebanese security services and improve their capabilities.[xliv] Lebanese media reported on October 1 that Lebanese and Saudi officials are continuing to prepare for the upcoming Saudi-French conference in Riyadh that aims to secure financial and logistical support for the LAF.[xlv] Lebanese Defense Minister Michel Menassa met with German Deputy Defense Minister Niels Helmer on October 2 to discuss German support to improve the LAF’s naval capabilities.[xlvi] Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam met with the US Charge d’Affaires in Lebanon, Keith Hanigan, on October 2 to discuss US support for the LAF and Internal Security Forces (ISF).[xlvii] These meetings are part of the Lebanese government’s efforts to acquire military support for the LAF. Lebanese officials have continuously emphasized that the LAF needs logistical and financial support to implement its plan to disarm Hezbollah.[xlviii] The LAF plan stipulates that the LAF will disarm Hezbollah south of the Litani River by the end of November 2025.[xlix] The LAF has historically faced resource deficits that have limited its ability to successfully counter Hezbollah.[l]