Iran Update, October 23, 2025

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf--a retired military officer but still currently a senior civilian--reportedly took the unprecedented step of assuming an unspecified but very senior military command during the Israel-Iran War in June 2025 after the deaths of many top commanders. Ghalibaf’s assumption of command as a civilian due to command losses demonstrates that Israel caused significant disruption to Iranian command and control. Iranian Tourism and Cultural Heritage Minister Reza Salehi Amiri stated on October 22 that Ghalibaf assumed command of the Iranian armed forces as an emergency response to the deaths of prominent Iranian commanders during the Israel-Iran War.[i] Ghalibaf was once IRGC Air Force commander—the predecessor to the IRGC Aerospace Force—but his assumption of command is nonetheless unprecedented because he currently holds a senior civilian political office.[ii] Multiple IRGC Aerospace Force commanders were killed in the opening days of the conflict, and Ghalibaf could have stepped in on an interim basis to ensure continuity of command. An Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated outlet confirmed the veracity of Amiri’s statements, stating that his speech constituted an informational security breach and accusing him of spying for Israel.[iii] The outlet added that Ghalibaf’s role during the war was kept secret from the public and that his revelation now makes Ghalibaf a prime target for an Israeli assassination.[iv] Ghalibaf stated in an interview on September 24 that he was in ”daily contact” with IRGC Commander Major General Mohammad Pakpour over the course of the war.[v] IRGC Coordination Deputy Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naghdi acknowledged on October 20 that Iran was unable to respond in a timely fashion during the Israel-Iran War due to disruptions in its chain of command after Israel killed several Iranian senior commanders.[vi] Ghalibaf’s assumption of command demonstrates that Iran needed to opt for suboptimal interim measures to ensure continuity of command.

Ghalibaf may have assumed command of the Iranian military or elements of it during the Israel-Iran War without the approval of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Khamenei’s absence during the war suggests that Ghalibaf assumed command without Khamenei’s approval.[vii] The New York Times reported on June 21 that Khamenei isolated himself in a bunker during the war to avoid being assassinated by Israel and that various factions were forming within the Iranian regime to vie for power in Khamenei’s absence.[viii] Ghalibaf, who is a member of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), could have consulted the council. SNSC cannot make decisions without the supreme leader because he must approve all SNSC decisions, however.[ix]

Ghalibaf’s reported role during and after the Israel-Iran War demonstrates his enormous influence in the Iranian regime. Ghalibaf has vast experience in several of Iran’s most important institutions that serve to achieve the regime’s strategic objectives. He previously served as the IRGC Air Force commander, as noted above, but also as the Iranian Police Force chief and the IRGC Khatam al Anbiya Construction Headquarters commander before transitioning to political leadership.[x] There is no public reporting that indicates other Iranian leaders opposed Ghalibaf‘s decision to assume command of the military or some elements of it during the Israel-Iran War, which indicates that he retains significant influence across the regime security establishment or that other regime officials recognized the dire situation during the war. These explanations are not mutually exclusive. Ghalibaf also played an important role in creating the post-war National Defense Council, which Iran designed to fix key vulnerabilities in its defense, cybersecurity, and intelligence systems that Israel exploited during the war.[xi]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced on October 19 that Israeli forces began to conduct a five-day, division-level military exercise along the Israel-Lebanon border to prepare for “different scenarios.”[xii] US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack previously warned the Lebanese government on October 20 that there may be a “major confrontation“ between Israel and Hezbollah if the government does not take steps to disarm Hezbollah.[xiii] An unspecified security source told Lebanese media on October 23 that Hezbollah decided that it would directly respond to any Israeli ground operations and is expecting an imminent Israeli escalation.[xiv] The source noted that Hezbollah has developed a new military plan incorporating lessons learned from the November 2024 Israel-Hezbollah conflict.[xv]

Hezbollah may have deterred the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) from disarming the group. A figure close to Saudi officials told Lebanese media on October 19 that Saudi Arabia has grown frustrated with the Lebanese government’s ”slowness” in implementing its Hezbollah disarmament plan and threatened to pull funding for the LAF, which suggests that Saudi Arabia has concerns about the government’s willingness to disarm Hezbollah on a reasonable timeline.[xvi] US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack stated on October 20 that the Lebanese government’s principle of monopolizing all weapons to the state remains more of an ”aspiration than [a] reality” due to the Lebanese government’s fear of civil unrest and Hezbollah’s political dominance.[xvii] Hezbollah officials, including Secretary General Naim Qassem, have continuously threatened to instigate armed conflict and anti-government protests since the Lebanese government agreed to disarm Hezbollah in August 2025.[xviii] Hezbollah, for example, informed Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and LAF Commander Brigadier General Rodolphe Haykal in August 2025 that the Lebanese government’s implementation of its plan to disarm Hezbollah would cause confrontation.[xix] LAF and Lebanese officials have consistently raised concerns about conflict breaking out between the Lebanese state and Hezbollah during the disarmament process. Haykal previously told Lebanese Parliament Speaker and Hezbollah ally Nabih Berri that the LAF will not ”clash with a key component of the country,” likely referring to Hezbollah.[xx] LAF leadership and members of Lebanon’s security forces were also reportedly divided over their willingness to act against Hezbollah, according to unspecified sources speaking to Lebanese and Saudi media in August 2025.[xxi] Hezbollah’s threats may have exacerbated Lebanese government officials' and security forces’ concerns about internal conflict, which may have deterred the Lebanese government from disarming Hezbollah.

LAF and Lebanese officials have consistently rejected claims that Hezbollah has successfully deterred its disarmament, stating that the LAF’s limited capabilities and continued Israeli operations in Lebanon are hindering its progress.[xxii] Lebanese officials and the LAF have failed to concretely explain how the Israelis limit LAF activity and why the LAF cannot implement its plan to disarm Hezbollah with its existing capabilities. Lebanese officials have also claimed that the LAF is implementing its disarmament plan despite these stated challenges and is expected to complete its first phase of disarmament in southern Lebanon soon.[xxiii] CTP-ISW has not observed any reports of Hezbollah fighters turning over their weaponry to the LAF or the LAF raiding any active Hezbollah sites with Hezbollah personnel present, however. The Lebanese government has taken steps to implement other components of the US proposal to disarm Hezbollah, however. The Lebanese government has started to work with Cyprus to begin negotiations on Lebanese-Israeli prisoner issues, to acquire funds for reconstruction in Lebanon, and to conduct talks with Syrian officials to demarcate the shared border.[xxiv] The Lebanese government’s progress on several other elements of the US proposal and inaction on disarming Hezbollah suggest that Hezbollah has successfully deterred the LAF from fully disarming it, even in the south.

Key Takeaways

• Iranian Command-and-Control: Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf--a retired military officer but still currently a senior civilian--reportedly took the unprecedented step of assuming an unspecified but very senior military command during the Israel-Iran War in June 2025 after the deaths of many top commanders. Ghalibaf’s assumption of command as a civilian due to command losses demonstrates that Israel caused significant disruption to Iranian command and control.
• Israeli Operations in Lebanon: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced on October 19 that Israeli forces began to conduct a five-day, division-level military exercise along the Israel-Lebanon border to prepare for “different scenarios.” Hezbollah has reportedly decided that it will directly respond to any Israeli ground operations and is expecting an imminent Israeli escalation.
• Hezbollah Disarmament: Hezbollah may have deterred the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) from disarming the group. Hezbollah’s threats may have exacerbated Lebanese government officials' and security forces’ concerns about internal conflict. The Lebanese government has made progress on several other elements of the US proposal, but has undertaken only tepid steps to disarm Hezbollah.

Iran

Iran may be trying to secure weapons from Belarus to replace military systems destroyed during the Israel-Iran War. Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh, who is responsible for the Iranian military’s weapon acquisitions, discussed bilateral cooperation with Belarusian State Military-Industrial Committee Head Dmitry Pantus in Tehran on October 23.[xxv] Nasir Zadeh stated that Iran welcomes the expansion of defense and industrial cooperation with Belarus, while Pantus emphasized strengthening cooperation in research, defense production, and industrial exchange. The Belarusian State Military-Industrial Committee is responsible for the development and maintenance of armaments, military and special equipment, military-technical cooperation, and export control policy.[xxvi] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko signed 12 memorandums of understanding intended to strengthen bilateral trade, military technical cooperation, and mutual investment in August 2025.[xxvii] Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) warned on August 22 that Iran is seeking Belarusian help to restore Iranian air defense systems and electronic warfare (EW) equipment.[xxviii]

Iraq

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) arrested five local Popular Mobilization Force (PMF) members from a Sunni unit on October 21 for the recent assassination of Sunni Sovereignty Alliance candidate and Baghdad Provincial Council member Safa al Mashhadani in Tarmiyah.[xxix] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias assassinated Mashhadani.[xxx] Iraqi media reported that five of an unspecified number of individuals arrested for Mashhadani’s assassination are members of the Tarmiyah Regiment.[xxxi] The Tarmiyah Regiment is a unit of the Iranian-backed PMF that is comprised of Sunni locals.[xxxii] The ISF reportedly arrested the individuals at the Tarmiyah Regiment’s headquarters under Article Four of the Iraqi Anti-Terrorism Law.[xxxiii] Iraqi media added that the arrests occurred under the jurisdiction of the 12th PMF Brigade, which is part of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba.[xxxiv] The extent of the 12th PMF Brigade’s involvement in the arrests is unclear, however.  The First Karkh Investigation Court in Baghdad told Iraqi media that it had ”technical” and video evidence that proved two of the five individuals were involved.  Two of the five members reportedly confessed to the assassination.[xxxv] The court added that the assassination occurred due to electoral competition.

CTP-ISW continues to assess that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are the most likely perpetrators of the assassination. The head of the Sunni Azm Alliance, which is a direct competitor to  Mashhadani’s Sovereignty Alliance, said on October 22 that Mashhadani had a strong relationship with the Tarmiyah Regiment.[xxxvi] Mashhadani was reportedly “in a dispute” with an unspecified group that had attempted to seize land in Tarmiyah, which is almost certainly in reference to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xxxvii] Iranian-backed Shia militias have long maintained a presence in Tarmiyah and other predominantly agricultural areas north of Baghdad.[xxxviii] Both Iranian-backed Kataib Hezbollah and Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada have explicitly and implicitly called for Sunnis in Tarmiyah to be displaced and presumably replaced with PMF facilities or other populations.[xxxix] Mashhadani continuously advocated for the removal of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias from Tarmiyah, which these groups would have perceived as a threat to their dominance north of Baghdad.[xl] It is possible that a local dispute between Mashhadani and members of the Tarmiyah Regiment or electoral competition were motives for the assassination, however.

Syria

Turkey is strengthening the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) as part of its August 2025 security agreement. Turkish officials confirmed to Al Jazeera on October 21 that Turkey will supply the Syrian MoD with advanced military equipment in the coming weeks, including armored vehicles, drones, artillery, and air defense systems.[xli] The officials added that the Syrian MoD will deploy the Turkish equipment in northern Syria to avoid conflict with Israel.[xlii] Israel and Turkey established a hotline for military activities in Syria in May 2025 and agreed that Turkey could deploy some military assets north of Palmyra, Homs Province.[xliii] A Syrian military source said that it “is only a matter of time before [Turkish] weapons, including armored vehicles and advanced air defense systems, begin arriving.”[xliv] The Syrian source could not confirm if the Turkish weapons shipment was related to any future offensive against the SDF and said it was instead linked to Syria and Turkey’s August 2025 security agreement.[xlv] Turkey agreed to train Syrian MoD forces and provide technical assistance to modernize Syrian military systems under the August 2025 security agreement.[xlvi] Turkish officials told Bloomberg on October 17 that Turkey plans to supply the MoD with advanced weapon systems imminently.[xlvii] Turkey reportedly deployed advanced weaponry to Kuweires Airbase on September 29, which is located about 10 kilometers west of the SDF and MoD front lines in Aleppo Province.[xlviii] Turkey recently warned that it will launch military action against the SDF—which it views as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)—by the end of 2025 if the group does not integrate into the Syrian state.[xlix] The Turkish parliament extended Turkey’s military mission in Syria and Iraq for three additional years on October 22.[l]

Turkey’s support to the Syrian MoD, which will increase Turkey’s influence within the army and other security services, could discourage SDF integration due to Turkey’s long history of supporting and encouraging ethnic violence by Syrian forces it supports against Kurds. The Syrian MoD sent a group of its officers to Turkish military colleges on October 22 to train on advanced weapon systems.[li] Turkish and Turkish-backed forces have historically engaged in atrocities and violations against the Kurdish minority in northern Syria, including ethnic cleansing and other ethnic violence.[lii] An SDF negotiator said on October 18 that the transitional government must implement justice mechanisms that address Turkish abuses in Afrin, Aleppo Province, in order to build trust between the SDF and the government.[liii] SDF negotiators have argued that if the SDF integrates or disbands, the SDF cannot trust the MoD to defend Kurds from attacks such as those in Suwayda Province in July and on the Syrian coast in March 2025.[liv] This and similar Turkish involvement with the Syrian MoD may discourage the SDF from integrating into a military apparatus trained and influenced by Turkish forces.

Arabian Peninsula

Nothing significant to report.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

See topline section.