Iran Update, October 6, 2025

Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Hamas agreed to a ceasefire with Israel on October 3 but called for negotiating other aspects of US President Donald Trump’s plan for peace in the Gaza Strip. Trump proposed a 20-point plan to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on September 29 that laid out a broad vision for the end of the Israel-Hamas War and the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip.[i] Trump warned that Hamas would face “all hell” if it did not agree to his peace plan by October 5.[ii] Hamas leaders agreed on October 3 to release all living and deceased Israeli hostages as part of the ceasefire and expressed openness to engaging in negotiations on other elements of Trump’s plan.[iii] Hamas endorsed one point of Trump’s plan that calls for a Palestinian body of independent technocrats to govern the Gaza Strip, but did not explicitly agree that an international transitional body chaired by Trump should have oversight and supervision over the Palestinian technocratic body.[iv] Hamas’ statement also did not acknowledge that Trump’s plan requires Hamas and other Palestinian factions to disarm.[v] US, Israeli, and Hamas negotiators held indirect negotiations on the ceasefire plan in Egypt on October 6.[vi] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has continued offensive operations and airstrikes in the Gaza Strip, but halted its major offensive into Gaza City due to the ceasefire agreement.[vii] Hamas and other Palestinian factions have continued to target Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip since Hamas agreed to the proposal on October 3.[viii]

Elements of Trump's plan require Hamas to concede on many of its long-held ceasefire demands, which raises questions about the viability of a long-term ceasefire agreement. Hamas and Israel last observed a ceasefire between January and March 2025. The ceasefire ended after Israel accused Hamas of delaying the release of hostages and failing to negotiate on next steps to end the war.[ix] Hamas has consistently demanded a full Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and a “permanent ceasefire,” but Trump’s plan only requires the IDF to fully withdraw after a set of undefined ”standards, milestones, and timeframes linked to demilitarization” are met in the opinion of the IDF, the United States, and additional guarantors.[x] Hamas previously demanded a “permanent” ceasefire in exchange for releasing Israeli hostages due to skepticism that the IDF would resume hostilities once Israel received the hostages.[xi] Hamas has seemingly conceded on this demand by agreeing to release all living and deceased Israeli hostages before receiving a guarantee of a full IDF withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. Hamas has also not yet addressed US and Israeli demands that it disarm and disband under Trump’s plan. Netanyahu remains adamant that Hamas will be disarmed either through diplomatic means with Trump’s plan or through IDF military action if the plan fails.[xii] Hamas would receive some elements of its long-held demands, namely aid, reconstruction, and the release of prisoners held in Israel, under the proposal.[xiii]

It is unclear if an end to the war in the Gaza Strip would impact how Hamas’ partners in the Axis of Resistance engage with Israel. Both Iran and Hezbollah supported Hamas’ agreement to the ceasefire and implicit rejection of the full US plan.[xiv] Iran and Hezbollah’s endorsement of Hamas’ objection to the later stages of Trump’s plan surrounding the political administration of the Gaza Strip suggests that both support Hamas continuing the war. The Houthis have justified their missile and drone campaign against Israel and international shipping as a response to Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip.[xv] It is unclear if the Houthis would halt these campaigns in response to a lasting Israel-Hamas ceasefire. The Houthis have continued to attack Israel since Hamas agreed to the ceasefire with Israel on October 3.[xvi] Houthi Political Bureau member Mohammad al Bukhaiti said on October 6 that international mediators should not focus on disarming Hamas “because our weapon is Hamas' weapon, and our theater of operations is Hamas' theater of operations,” suggesting that the Houthis will continue to support Hamas even if the group is disarmed.[xvii] 

Syria’s October 5 parliamentary elections are a positive step toward the development of a representative government in Syria, but the establishment of political parties will likely be necessary to form any meaningful opposition to Syrian President Ahmed al Shara. At least 6,000 subcommittee members voted within regional electoral districts to elect at least 119 members of the legislature.[xviii] A committee appointed by Shara previously finalized the 6,000 subcommittee members in early September 2025.[xix] Shara will soon appoint the remaining one-third of the legislature, or 70 seats, in the coming days.[xx] The assembly’s members will serve 30-month terms, according to the Syrian transitional constitution.[xxi] The assembly will propose, approve, and repeal legislation, ratify international treaties, and approve the state’s budget, among other responsibilities.[xxii] The assembly will maintain legislative authority until Syria adopts a permanent constitution with new legislative elections.[xxiii]   

The newly elected assembly members appear to at least minimally represent the diversity of Syria’s ethnic, religious, and sectarian communities, including Kurds, Alawites, Turkmen, and Ismailis, among others, according to Syrian and international observers.[xxiv] Many of the assembly members represent their region’s demographics. All three representatives for Afrin, a Kurdish stronghold in northern Aleppo Province, are Kurdish, for example.[xxv] The head of the committee that supervised the elections suggested on October 6 that Shara will use his appointment of 70 assembly members to address “gaps” in representation in the legislature, such as the small proportion of women and Christians.[xxvi] Candidates also appear to represent diverse political beliefs, ranging from moderates with a record of criticizing Shara and his new government to more conservative Islamists connected to the HTS-aligned Islamist coalition Ahrar al Sham.[xxvii] The election of many community representatives, activists, and dignitaries will probably present opportunities for them to engage more closely with Shara and his government, which is critical to build civil discourse and improve communication and trust between Syrian communities and the government. 

The assembly in its current form will likely not be able to meaningfully check the Syrian presidency. Shara has indirectly approved all of the elected candidates, given his oversight over their selection. Shara formed the Supreme Committee for People’s Assembly Elections in June 2025 to select at least 6,000 subcommittee members and approve 1,578 electoral candidates from among the subcommittee members.[xxviii] The newly elected assembly members may hold a diverse spectrum of political beliefs, but there is little transparency into the candidate selection process and whether or not Shara or his advisers had the authority to veto politically unfavorable candidates. The Supreme Committee faced criticism for rejecting numerous candidates on the basis of population demographics, cultural diversity, and “competence” without allowing appeals.[xxix] Syria’s transitional constitution also provides the assembly with very limited abilities to overrule Shara. A two-thirds majority of the assembly can overrule Shara’s veto of any legislation and require him to pass the legislation into law, but this check is somewhat offset by the fact that Shara will soon appoint one-third of the assembly members, which may limit the assembly’s ability to amass enough support to overturn Shara’s decisions.[xxx] The assembly lacks any other meaningful constitutionally provided powers through which it can push back against Shara’s decisions if needed.[xxxi] Diverse representation within the People’s Assembly is only valuable to the Syrian people if assembly members can meaningfully benefit or protect their communities.

The formation of political parties is one way through which assembly members can organize and build coalitions to advance the interests of the regions they represent and counter Shara’s policies. Syria’s transitional constitution protects the right to form political parties, though candidates ran independently in the October 5 election.[xxxii] Newly elected assembly members may organize into parties over time, and Shara’s tolerance for the creation of diverse parties or coalitions that may oppose him or push against his agenda will be an indicator of Shara’s commitment to forming a democratic society.

Neither Syrian Kurds in the northeast nor Druze in southern Syria participated in the October 5 elections. The Syrian government announced in late August 2025 that it would indefinitely suspend elections in Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)-controlled territory and in Suwayda Province.[xxxiii]  The 21 seats allocated to these provinces will remain empty until these territories join the Syrian state, according to the government.[xxxiv] It is unlikely that these territories will integrate in the near term, however. Many Druze factions in Suwayda Province continue to organize under the banner of the “National Guard,” which is a force that is loyal to the newly formed Suwayda Autonomous Government.[xxxv] This parallel government structure is staunchly opposed to Shara’s Damascus-based government.[xxxvi]

Kurdish officials criticized the results of the October 5 elections as unreflective of the Syrian “national will.”[xxxvii] These criticisms come as neither the SDF nor the Syrian government has made meaningful, concessionary steps toward integrating the SDF into the Syrian army since March 2025. The Syrian army and SDF have continued to exchange artillery fire along frontlines near Deir Hafer, Aleppo Province, since October 3.[xxxviii] The Syrian government reportedly conducted multiple drone strikes targeting SDF positions and fortifications in this region on October 5.[xxxix] SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi met with US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack and US Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander Admiral Brad Cooper in Hasakah on October 6.[xl] Abdi stated that they discussed “political integration” and counter-ISIS efforts, but it is unclear if any progress was made.[xli]

Iran and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have used barter systems that avoid monetary transactions on the international market to circumvent US sanctions on Iran since at least 2018, according to two US media reports published on October 5.[xlii] PRC companies began exporting motor vehicles to Iran in exchange for Iranian metals, including copper and zinc, around 2018 after US President Donald Trump launched his “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran, according to individuals with knowledge of the trade speaking to Bloomberg.[xliii] Hong Kong-registered PRC front companies have also recently paid PRC contractors to build infrastructure in Iran in exchange for Iranian crude oil exports to the PRC, according to current and former Western officials speaking to the Wall Street Journal.[xliv] Some of the officials stated that the PRC transmitted $8.4 billion in oil payments via this barter arrangement to finance PRC contracted infrastructure projects in Iran in 2024.[xlv] Iran and the PRC previously conducted negotiations in 2023 over a similar barter agreement in which Iran would provide the PRC with crude oil in exchange for the PRC’s assistance in constructing the Tehran-North freeway, which connects Tehran to the Caspian Sea.[xlvi] It is unclear whether Iran and the PRC signed the agreement in 2023. These transactions do not require Chinese or Iranian companies to trade on the international market using the US dollar and are not subject to US sanctions, according to the Wall Street Journal and Bloomberg reports.[xlvii] The PRC does not acknowledge the United States’ unilateral sanctions and subsequent secondary sanctions on Iran, claiming that PRC-Iran trade complies with international law.[xlviii]

Iran appears to be prioritizing strengthening its air power by purchasing foreign fighter jets to address weaknesses that Israel exploited during the Israel-Iran War. Iran allegedly agreed to buy 48 Su-35 fighter jets from Russia with electronic warfare components and avionic enhancements, according to documents from Russian military conglomerate Rostec that were leaked by the Ukrainian hacker group “Black Mirror.”[xlix] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the authenticity of the leaked documents. Iran would allegedly receive the first shipment of Su-35s as early as 2026, although Iran has previously experienced difficulties acquiring Russian military systems given Russia’s constraints and preoccupation with its war in Ukraine.[l] Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf advocated on September 24 for Iran to enhance its air power through the purchase of fighter jets.[li] The supposed Iran-Russia deal also comes amid reports that Iran may have acquired MiG-29 fighter jets from Russia.[lii]  Iranian Armed Forces General Staff-controlled Defa Press previously expressed support for the purchase of Chinese J-10 fighter jets in June 2025.[liii] Iran has sought advanced fighter jets from its partners because Israel achieved air superiority in Iran within the first few days of the Israel-Iran War, which helped Israel to achieve its objectives of degrading the Iranian nuclear and ballistic missile programs.[liv]

Iraqi Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr is reportedly planning to make an unspecified “move” regarding the upcoming November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections that will not cause “chaos or escalation,” according to a former Sadrist parliamentarian.[lv] The former parliamentarian’s statement that Sadr seeks to avoid “chaos and escalation” suggests that Sadr does not plan to incite protests surrounding the elections. Sadr announced in March 2025 that his Shia National Movement would not participate in the elections and has repeatedly urged his supporters, who are primarily Shia, not to vote.[lvi] Sadr reaffirmed his call for Sadrists to boycott the elections during a meeting with former Sadrist parliamentarians in Najaf on October 3.[lvii] Iran and Iraqi politicians across the political spectrum have expressed support for Sadr’s involvement in the elections, likely due to concerns that Sadr could try to destabilize a future government that doesn’t include his movement.[lviii] Sadr has periodically called for protests, including after the 2021 elections.[lix]

Iraqi politicians remain concerned about the potential of low voter turnout in the upcoming parliamentary elections. Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani, Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq head Qais al Khazali, and State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki all emphasized the importance of voter participation in the elections during speeches on October 4 and 5.[lx] These speeches follow reports that Shia Coordination Framework parties are concerned that voter turnout in the upcoming elections will fall below 20 percent due to the Sadrist boycott.[lxi] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. CTP-ISW assessed in June 2025 that Shia Coordination Framework parties may seek to win votes from Iraqis who would have voted for Sadr in the elections.[lxii]

Key Takeaways

• Gaza Ceasefire Plan: Hamas agreed to a ceasefire with Israel on October 3 but called for negotiating other aspects of US President Donald Trump’s plan for peace in the Gaza Strip. Elements of Trump's plan require Hamas to concede on many of its long-held ceasefire demands, which raises questions about the viability of a long-term ceasefire agreement.
• Syrian Parliamentary Elections: Syria’s October 5 parliamentary elections are a positive step toward the development of a representative government in Syria, but the establishment of political parties will likely be necessary to form any meaningful opposition to Syrian President Ahmed al Shara. Neither Syrian Kurds in the northeast nor Druze in southern Syria participated in the elections.
• Iran-PRC Trade: Iran and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have reportedly used barter systems that avoid monetary transactions on the international market to circumvent US sanctions on Iran since at least 2018, according to two US media reports published on October 5.
• Iranian Air Defense: Iran appears to be prioritizing strengthening its air power by purchasing foreign fighter jets to address weaknesses that Israel exploited during the Israel-Iran War.
• Iraqi Parliamentary Elections: Iraqi Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr is reportedly planning to make an unspecified “move” regarding the upcoming November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections that will not cause “chaos or escalation,” according to a former Sadrist parliamentarian. The former parliamentarian’s statement suggests that Sadr does not plan to incite protests surrounding the elections.

Iran

Iranian military commanders have recently increased inspections of naval units in the Persian Gulf. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Mohammad Pak Pour inspected the combat and operational readiness of Iranian naval units deployed on the Nazeat Islands in the Persian Gulf on October 5.[lxiii] The Nazeat Islands, which include the Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, Abu Musa, and Siri islands, are key positions for Iran’s ability to control maritime access to the Persian Gulf.[lxiv] Pak Pour’s visit comes after other Iranian military commanders, including Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi and Artesh Navy Commander Rear Admiral Shahram Irani, conducted inspections of southern Iranian naval units in recent weeks.[lxv] Former IRGC Navy Commander Hossein Alaei separately stated on October 1 that Iran has the ability to strike the United States and Israel due to its geographic position near the Persian Gulf.[lxvi] Alaei described Iran’s location near the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman as the security and military “center of gravity of the region.”[lxvii]

Iranian Artesh Navy Commander Rear Admiral Shahram Irani visited Russia on October 6 to attend a meeting for Caspian littoral state navy commanders.[lxviii] Irani met with Iranian Ambassador to Russia Kazem Jalali and Russian Navy Deputy Commander Vladimir Zemtsov in Saint Petersburg. Irani emphasized that Iran’s cooperation with Caspian littoral states aims not only to safeguard security but also to bolster economic growth and address shared environmental concerns.[lxix] Irani is expected to meet with the Azerbaijani and Kazakh navy commanders during his visit to Russia.[lxx]

Iraq

Iraqi Parliamentary Security and Defense Committee member and State Forces Alliance member Allawi al Bandawi claimed on October 5 that unspecified electoral candidates have attempted to “exploit the military establishment for political or electoral purposes.”[lxxi] It is unclear whether Bandawi was referring to the Iraqi armed forces, the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), or both. The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes a large number of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, some of which report to their respective militia commanders instead of the Iraqi Prime Minister. Many militias within the PMF have their own political units and participate in Iraqi parliamentary elections.[lxxii] The Iraqi National Security Service also arrested 46 individuals on October 4 for buying and selling electoral cards in Baghdad, Anbar, and Ninewa provinces.[lxxiii] The PMF General Directorate of Security and Discipline previously arrested an unspecified number of PMF members in June 2025 for using their positions in the PMF to conduct electoral fraud.[lxxiv] Iranian-backed Iraqi political actors have used the PMF to intimidate voters and interfere in previous elections.[lxxv] 

Syria

See topline section.

Arabian Peninsula

The Houthis launched a ballistic missile targeting several “sensitive” sites in Jerusalem on October 4.[lxxvi] The IDF intercepted the missile.[lxxvii] The IDF also intercepted a Houthi drone on October 5.[lxxviii] The Houthis have not claimed the drone attack at the time of this writing. The Houthis have launched hundreds of drones and ballistic missiles targeting Israel since October 2023.[lxxix]

Yemeni security forces seized a vessel that was transporting military equipment, including drone components and surveillance gear, to the Houthis on October 6.[lxxx] The Houthis could have used the equipment to strengthen their drone capabilities.[lxxxi] Yemeni authorities intercepted the vessel off the coast of Ras al Arah, Lahij Governorate.[lxxxii] The seized cargo included high-resolution cameras for drones and global positioning systems (GPS) tracking systems.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

See topline section.