Iran Update, October 8, 2025

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Iranian officials have threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz, likely to try to discourage the United States from enforcing sanctions that target Iranian oil exports. An Iranian parliamentarian warned on October 4 that Iran would close the Strait of Hormuz if the United States or its allies prevent Iranian oil exports.[i] The head of the Iranian Armed Forces Judicial Organization similarly warned on October 5 that Iran would not allow a US presence in the Persian Gulf to threaten Iran’s economic or military security.[ii] US President Donald Trump reinstated his maximum pressure campaign against Iran in February 2025 to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon and curb its influence abroad.[iii] Trump’s maximum pressure campaign seeks to drive Iranian oil exports “to zero.”[iv] The United States previously seized Iranian oil tankers and weapons shipments between May 2018 and January 2021 as part of the first Trump administration’s maximum pressure campaign.[v]  Reuters reported in March 2025 that the United States was considering a plan for the United States and its allies to halt and inspect Iranian oil tankers at sea.[vi] Iran previously attempted to close the strait in 2019 in response to the US maximum pressure campaign by sabotaging Emirati tankers, seizing British ships, and launching cruise missiles at Saudi oil facilities.[vii] Iranian officials’ threats to close the Strait of Hormuz come as Iranian military commanders have recently increased inspections of naval units in the Persian Gulf, including naval units deployed at the Nazeat Islands.[viii] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) deployed naval mines, ballistic and anti-ship cruise missiles, and fast attack craft to these islands in May 2025.[ix] Iranian state-controlled outlet Mehr News detailed Iran’s anti-ship missile capabilities on October 7 and highlighted Iran’s development of new cruise missiles that reportedly have fully automated guidance systems.[x] These capabilities could support a potential Iranian effort to close the Strait of Hormuz.

The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) arrested several unidentified individuals in Anbar and Dhi Qar Provinces on October 2 and 8 for suspected Baath Party ties in what appear to be instances of sectarian targeting.[xi] The PMF Intelligence and Information Department launched a campaign on October 2 to pursue Baath Party remnants.[xii] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes several Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, some of which report to Iran instead of the Iraqi Prime Minister.[xiii] The 27th PMF Brigade, which the Iranian-backed Badr Organization controls, arrested a man in Karma District, Anbar Province, on October 2 for promoting Baath Party ideology.[xiv] PMF intelligence units separately arrested several alleged “senior” Baath Party members in Nasiriyah, Dhi Qar Province, on October 8.[xv] Prominent Iraqi Shia politicians have commonly conflated Sunnism with membership in the Sunni-dominated Baathist government under Saddam Hussein and have abused de-Baathification measures to target Sunnis.[xvi]

It is unclear if these arrests are related to the upcoming November 2025 parliamentary elections, but the arrests come as multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi actors have sought to disqualify alleged Baath Party remnants ahead of the elections.[xvii] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iraqi Shia politicians are likely attempting to sideline Sunni political opposition ahead of the November 2025 elections by accusing their opponents of having Baathist ties.[xviii] Iraqi law prohibits Baath Party members from participating in political activities, including competing in elections.[xix] Iraqi Shia political parties have weaponized this law and other de-Baathification mechanisms to target Sunnis, particularly Sunni political opposition.[xx]

Key Takeaways

• Iranian Threats to Close the Strait of Hormuz: Iranian officials have threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz, likely to try to discourage the United States from enforcing sanctions that target Iranian oil exports. Iranian officials have recently increased inspections of naval units in the Persian Gulf.
• Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces Arrest Campaign: The Popular Mobilization Forces arrested several unidentified individuals in Anbar and Dhi Qar Provinces on October 2 and 8 for suspected Baath Party ties in what appear to be instances of sectarian targeting. It is unclear if these arrests are related to the upcoming November 2025 parliamentary elections, but the arrests come as multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi actors have sought to disqualify alleged Baath Party remnants ahead of the elections.

Iran

Iranian, Azerbaijani, Russian, and Kazakh naval commanders signed a strategic cooperation agreement in Russia on October 8 in response to concerns about external influence in the region.[xxi] The agreement stipulates that “no foreign country or extra-regional power” shall intervene in Caspian Sea affairs. Turkmenistan, which also borders the Caspian Sea, did not sign the document. Iranian leaders have raised concerns about extra-regional influence in the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea in response to discussions about the construction of the Zangezur Corridor.[xxii] The Zangezur Corridor is a Turkish and Azerbaijani-proposed transit route that would grant Turkey access to the Caspian Sea.[xxiii]

Iraq

See topline section.

Syria

Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani criticized the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) for its “slow” implementation of the March 10 integration agreement during a press conference with his Turkish counterpart in Ankara on October 8.[xxiv] Shaibani and Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan both expressed support for a “one country, one army, and one territory” approach to integrating the SDF into the Syrian state.[xxv] Shaibani said that the Syrian government remains committed to “dialogue” and “diplomacy,” in reference to his presence in a US-mediated meeting between the Syrian government and SDF leaders on October 7 to negotiate a ceasefire following government-SDF fighting in Aleppo City.[xxvi] Turkey has reportedly given the Syrian government a “deadline” for the SDF to integrate into the Syrian state by the end of 2025, after which Turkey would take military action against the SDF.[xxvii]

Arabian Peninsula

The United States added 15 People’s Republic of China (PRC) companies to a restricted trade list on October 8 for helping the Axis of Resistance purchase US-origin electronic drone components.[xxviii] Ten of the PRC companies supplied electronic drone components to the Houthis since at least 2017, while the other five companies supplied drone components that Hamas and other Iranian-backed groups used against Israel around October 7, 2023.[xxix] Yemeni authorities have intercepted several shipments of PRC-origin military equipment in recent months.[xxx] Yemeni government-affiliated forces intercepted a military equipment shipment from China that was bound for the Houthis at the Port of Aden in August 2025, for example. The shipment included drone components and radios, among other equipment.[xxxi] A Chinese government-linked satellite company has also provided intelligence to the Houthis, according to Western media.[xxxii]

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and other unspecified ministers reportedly discussed potential diplomatic measures that the Lebanese government could take to pressure Israel to halt its operations in Lebanon.[xxxiii] An unspecified ministerial source told Hezbollah-aligned media on October 8 that unidentified ministers criticized Lebanese Foreign Minister Youssef Rajji for not doing enough diplomatically to stop Israeli operations in Lebanon.[xxxiv] Rajji has repeatedly emphasized the need for Israel to halt its operations in Lebanon in recent meetings with Western and Arab officials.[xxxv] The source noted that the ministers also demanded that Lebanese officials use their high-level regional and international contacts to pressure Israel to halt its operations and withdraw its forces from Lebanese territory.[xxxvi] Lebanese President Joseph Aoun previously called on the United States in August 2025 to pressure Israel to agree to the US-proposed Hezbollah disarmament proposal, which calls for an Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon and the cessation of Israeli military operations in Lebanon.[xxxvii] Aoun and other Lebanese officials have continued to call on the international community to maintain pressure on Israel to halt its operations.[xxxviii] Israel has maintained that it will continue to operate in Lebanon until Hezbollah is disarmed, however.[xxxix]

The Lebanese government has continued to try to acquire external military support for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and LAF Commander Brigadier General Rodolphe Haykal met with American Task Force on Lebanon (ATFL) CEO Edward M. Gabriel on October 3 and 4 to discuss the ATFL’s support for Lebanese security forces.[xl] Haykal separately met with Qatari Armed Forces Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Jassim Mohammad al Mannai in Qatar on October 8 to discuss strengthening military cooperation and Qatari support to the LAF.[xli] Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam additionally met with the newly appointed UK Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Christian Turner, to discuss the United Kingdom’s continued support for the LAF.[xlii] Lebanese Foreign Minister Youssef Rajji similarly met with UK officials on October 8 to discuss ways that the United Kingdom can provide further support to the LAF.[xliii] Lebanese officials have continuously emphasized that the LAF needs logistical and financial support to implement its plan to disarm Hezbollah.[xliv] The LAF has historically faced resource deficits that have limited its ability to successfully counter Hezbollah.[xlv]