Iran Update, October 21, 2025

Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET 

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Different factions within the Iranian regime are fighting for influence in Iran to determine future Iranian policy after the Israel-Iran War and several scares over the health and availability of the supreme leader. This competition for influence comes after elements within the Iranian regime used Khamenei‘s absence during the Israel-Iran War to attempt to exert more influence over regime policy.[i] Khamenei gave a speech on October 20 after a month of absence, when he did not attend three events that he usually attends.[ii] An unspecified senior regime diplomat said in September 2025 that some Iranian officials are concerned for his health after communication from his office slowed after the Israel-Iran War.[iii] Khamenei, who is 86 years old, also had a major health scare in September 2022.[iv] Regime insiders, who possibly aim to limit any effort by moderate and former President Hassan Rouhani to reclaim political relevance, have reacted negatively to Rouhani’s post-war public criticism of the regime.  Rouhani has attempted to publicly reemerge as a prominent political actor since the start of the war in June 2025 and has positioned himself as a leading advocate for reform. Rouhani met with senior clerics in Qom during the war to urge them to persuade Khamenei to adjust the regime’s policy regarding the war.[v] Rouhani separately called on the regime to make concessions to the Iranian people, strengthen societal resilience, and reduce tensions with the West on August 13.[vi]  An Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) outlet accused Rouhani on October 20 of fueling division and serving as a cautionary example for political conduct amid Iran’s current conditions.[vii]

The resurgence of long-standing tensions between Rouhani and Khamenei’s representative to the Defense Council Ali Shamkhani may also be a reaction to Rouhani’s post-war criticism of the regime and Rouhani’s attempts to reassert himself. Shamkhani stated on October 12 that Rouhani knew ”from the first day” that Iran’s air defense shot down Ukraine Airlines Flight PS752 in January 2020 despite Rouhani’s public denial.[viii] The Iranian government initially denied any responsibility for the downing of the civilian plane.  The comments on Flight PS752 coincided with public backlash regarding Shamkhani’s daughter’s wedding, which critics viewed as evidence of elite privilege amid economic hardship. Some Iranian social media users and outlets speculated that Rouhani’s faction initiated the leak of footage from Shamkhani’s daughter’s wedding in response to Shamkhani’s statements about Rouhani and Flight PS752.[ix]

Long-standing tensions exist between Shamkhani and Rouhani. The Iranian Parliament passed the ”Strategic Action Law” in 2020 with Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) support when Shamkhani was SNSC Secretary.[x] The law mandated faster enrichment and reduced the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring, likely to influence the West regarding the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).[xi] Shamkhani later accused Rouhani’s government of blocking the implementation of the law, which prompted Rouhani to say that he regretted appointing Shamkhani as the SNSC Secretary and that he blamed Shamkhani for obstructing the JCPOA’s revival.[xii]

Some factions may seek to sideline Rouhani’s renewed activism to prevent him from shaping the succession narrative or rallying support among disaffected elites. These factions could see this effort as particularly important now due to the increasing concerns among senior Iranian officials about Khamenei’s health following reduced communication from his office since the beginning of the Israel-Iran War.[xiii] UK-based outlet “IranWire” previously reported on September 12 that an unspecified senior Iranian official stated that SNSC Secretary Ali Larijani and former First Vice President Mohammad Mokhber maintain the closest contact with Khamenei and are maneuvering to expand their influence ahead of a possible succession.[xiv]

The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) reported on October 20 that Iran is building unidentified structures at the former Taleghan 2 nuclear research site at Parchin Military Complex in southeastern Tehran Province.[xv] ISIS assessed that Iran has ”bunkered [two of the structures] over with earth,” likely to “improve their survivability” in the event of future Israeli strikes.[xvi] Covering these structures with dirt is unlikely to stop a concerted effort to destroy the facility, depending on the munitions used. Israel struck Taleghan 2 in October 2024 and destroyed equipment needed to design and test nuclear devices.[xvii] Iran previously used the Taleghan 2 facility for this purpose prior to stopping its nuclear weapons program in 2003.[xviii] This is part of Iran’s effort to reconstitute its nuclear and missile programs in the wake of the Israel-Iran War.

Key Takeaways

• Factional Infighting Within the Iranian Regime: Different factions within the Iranian regime are fighting for influence in Iran to determine future Iran policy after the Israel-Iran War and several scares over the health and availability of the supreme leader. Regime insiders, who possibly aim to limit any effort by moderate and former President Hassan Rouhani to reclaim political relevance, have reacted negatively to Rouhani’s post-war public criticism of the regime.
• Iranian Nuclear Program Reconstitution: The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) reported on October 20 that Iran is building unidentified structures at the former Taleghan 2 nuclear research site at Parchin Military Complex in southeastern Tehran Province. ISIS assessed that Iran has ”bunkered [two of the structures] over with earth,” likely to “improve their survivability” in the event of future Israeli strikes.
• Iranian Failures During the Israel-Iran War: Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Coordination Deputy Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naghdi acknowledged that Iran failed to respond quickly during the Israel-Iran War. Naghdi stated that IRGC units requested authorization to strike Israel early on June 13, but the supreme leader delayed the order until the regime could appoint new commanders to replace those who Israel had just killed.
• Syria-Russia Relations: Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani outlined several requirements that Russia must meet to secure basing rights and other benefits. Russia is unlikely to meet these requirements.

Iran

Possible Jaish al Adl fighters killed a prominent Sunni tribal elder close to the Iranian regime in Iranshahr, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on October 19.[xix] The tribal elder was a well-known Baloch confidant and defender of the Iranian regime.[xx] He had previously opposed the regime but later came to an unofficial arrangement with the regime, in which he exchanged his opposition to the regime for safety from it.[xxi] Jaish al Adl would have had a motive to assassinate him for reconciling with the regime. Jaish al Adl could use the assassination to communicate an implied message to other elders to avoid cooperation with the regime. The IRGC Ground Forces Quds Operational Base, which oversees Sistan and Baluchistan Province, condemned the attack and blamed foreign-funded terrorist groups.[xxii] Jaish al Adl is a Baloch, Salafi-jihadi militant group that frequently attacks Iranian security forces in southeastern Iran. 

IRGC Coordination Deputy Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naghdi acknowledged that Iran failed to respond quickly during the Israel-Iran War.[xxiii] Naghdi gave an interview on October 20 to the Iranian podcast “Story of the War,” which features various senior Iranian officials’ perspectives on the Israel-Iran War. Israel Defense Forces (IDF) launched a large-scale strike campaign on Iranian command and control centers, several senior IRGC commanders, and nuclear and military facilities in the early morning of June 13 in Iran.[xxiv] Naghdi stated that IRGC units requested authorization to strike Israel early on June 13, but the supreme leader delayed the order until the regime could appoint new commanders to replace those who Israel had just killed.[xxv] Naghdi added that IRGC units remained ready to strike Israel but did not act until IRGC Ground Forces Commander Brigadier General Mohammad Pakpour became the IRGC Commander. Naghdi‘s comments confirm that Israel‘s targeting of senior commanders caused temporary disruptions in Iran’s chain of command that delayed its initial response and indicate that Iran faced coordination problems within its armed forces during wartime.  Naghdi’s remarks echoed Iranian Deputy Vice President for Strategic Affairs Ali Abdullah Khani’s operational- and tactical-level proposals on October 13 to decentralize supply chains, defense systems, and command and control authority to lower levels to make wartime decision-making more efficient and effective in light of the setbacks that Iran faced during the Israel-Iran War.[xxvi]

Iraq

Iraqi National Security Advisor Qassem al Araji met with IRGC Commander Major General Mohammad Pakpour in Tehran on October 21 to discuss border security.[xxvii] Pakpour called for Iraq‘s implementation of the March 2023 Iran-Iraq border security agreement that requires Iraqi authorities to disarm and relocate Kurdish opposition groups away from the Iran-Iraq border.[xxviii] Araji and Pakpour agreed to form a joint field committee to monitor border areas. Araji separately met with Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf on October 21.[xxix] Araji also discussed the March 2023 agreement with Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani on October 20.[xxx] Araji’s discussions with multiple Iranian officials about the 2023 agreement reflect the Iranian regime’s ongoing concerns about the threat that Kurdish opposition groups in Iraqi Kurdistan pose to Iran. Iran views Iraqi Kurdistan as a rear area from which anti-regime Kurdish groups can foment instability against the regime.[xxxi] Iran accused Kurdish opposition groups of inciting protests in western Iran during the Mahsa Amini protest movement and has frequently accused Kurdish opposition groups of cooperating with Israel to facilitate attacks in Iran.[xxxii]

Syria

Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani outlined several requirements that Russia must meet to secure basing rights and other benefits. Russia is unlikely to meet these requirements. Shaibani emphasized on October 18 that Syria aims to pursue a pragmatic and mutually beneficial relationship with Russia but listed several requirements Russia would need to meet to secure basing rights in Syria.[xxxiii] Shaibani criticized the terms that Russia dictated for its Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia Province during the Assad regime and emphasized that the transitional government is in the process of renegotiating terms for the base.[xxxiv] Shaibani added that any future agreements with Russia will prioritize transitional justice and reparations for damage caused by Russia’s involvement in the Syrian conflict.[xxxv] Shaibani stated that Russia acknowledged Syria’s request for compensation for its conduct in Syria but has not established any reparation mechanism.[xxxvi] Russia has not shown any public inclination to provide reparations to Syria for Russia’s conduct during the Syrian conflict or, for example, return Bashar al Assad to face trial. Shaibani’s comments on Russo-Syrian relations follow Syrian President Ahmed al Shara’s October 15 visit to Moscow, which sought to redefine Syria’s partnership with Russia through cooperation on energy, defense, and reconstruction.[xxxvii]

Shaibani also said that Syria is pursuing a transactional, economically-focused partnership with China to support Syria’s recovery.[xxxviii] Shaibani announced he would conduct his first diplomatic visit to Beijing in early November.[xxxix] Shaibani said that Syria is approaching China in a pragmatic, mutually beneficial manner. He acknowledged that China previously aided the Assad regime by vetoing UN Security Council resolutions to punish Assad during the Syrian conflict.[xl] Syrian Economic Minister Mohammad al Shaar announced that Syria is pursuing six Chinese investment projects that are worth hundreds of millions of dollars in total.[xli] Chinese company Fidi signed a memorandum of understanding with the Syrian General Authority for Land and Sea Ports to invest in free economic zones in Rif Dimashq and Hama provinces in May 2025.[xlii]

The United Kingdom removed Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) from its designated terrorist list on October 21.[xliii] The United Kingdom stated that HTS’s removal from the terrorist list will allow for closer cooperation with the Syrian transitional government and the former leader of HTS, Syrian President Ahmed al Shara.[xliv] The United Kingdom previously lifted Assad-era economic sanctions on the Syrian interior and defense ministries in April 2025.[xlv] The Syrian transitional government has lobbied for the United States to repeal the 2019 Caesar Act and the United Nations to remove members of the Syrian transitional government from the United Nations terrorism sanctions regime that subjects the members to asset freezes and travel bans in United Nations member states.[xlvi]

Arabian Peninsula

Nothing significant to report.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) will reportedly complete the first phase of its plan to disarm Hezbollah soon, according to Lebanese Deputy Prime Minister Tarek Mitri.[xlvii] The LAF is supposed to disarm Hezbollah south of the Litani River by November 2025 as the “first phase” of disarmament.[xlviii] Mitri noted that the LAF is seizing “opportunities” to perform its duties and has raided several Hezbollah sites.[xlix] CTP-ISW has not observed any reports of Hezbollah fighters turning over their weaponry to the LAF or the LAF raiding any active Hezbollah sites with Hezbollah personnel present, however. Mitri emphasized that the LAF is implementing the plan despite its limited capabilities and continued Israeli operations in Lebanon.[l] The LAF has historically faced resource deficits that have limited its ability to successfully counter Hezbollah.[li] Lebanese officials and the LAF have consistently stated that continued Israeli operations limit the LAF‘s ability to fully deploy its forces to southern Lebanon and disarm Hezbollah, but the officials and the LAF have failed to explain how the Israelis limit LAF activity.[lii]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) ground forces destroyed Hezbollah sites in southern Lebanon as part of the Israeli effort to destroy Hezbollah infrastructure and prevent Hezbollah’s reconstitution.[liii] The IDF 810th Regional Brigade demolished an unspecified number of Hezbollah positions in Jabal Rouss, Baabda District, on October 19.[liv] Jabal Rouss is located on the Lebanese side of Mount Hermon, directly across the border from Israel. This raid is a rare instance in which Israeli troops have operated outside of Israel’s five permanent positions in southern Lebanon in 2025.[lv] IDF ground forces previously conducted a similar raid in July 2025.[lvi]