Iran Update, October 14, 2025

Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Commander Mazloum Abdi said on October 11 that he and the Syrian transitional government reached a “preliminary agreement” last week to integrate the SDF and Kurdish internal security forces into the state’s defense and interior ministries, respectively.[i] Abdi met with Syrian President Ahmed al Shara, Defense Minister Major General Marhaf Abu Qasra, and US officials in Damascus on October 7 to agree to a ceasefire following an outbreak of violence between government forces and the SDF in Aleppo City.[ii] Abdi previously agreed to integrate all forces in northeastern Syria into state security forces in a framework agreement that he reached with Shara in March, but neither side has implemented most of the terms of the agreement.[iii] Abdi referred to the new agreement as a “preliminary agreement” and “oral agreement,” which suggests that the new agreement may represent a renewed commitment by the SDF to integrate its forces into the state and will probably necessitate further negotiations on specific implementation mechanisms.[iv] A prominent People’s Protection Units (YPG) commander led a delegation of SDF and Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) officials to discuss “joint military and security cooperation” with Abu Qasra and Syrian Interior Minister Anas Khattab in Damascus on October 13.[v] The Kurdish and Syrian government officials presumably discussed mechanisms to implement the new agreement.[vi]

Shara and Abdi appear to have reached at least a partial agreement about certain elements of the SDF’s integration into the new Syrian army. Abdi told AFP that the SDF will be “restructured through its integration” into the Defense Ministry but did not provide further details.[vii] Shara and Abdi have disagreed thus far over how the SDF would join the military. The SDF has consistently demanded that it integrate into the Syrian army as a “bloc” and retain its attributes, including its female units and commanders.[viii] It is unclear if Shara and Abdi have fully addressed this issue. An unspecified "informed” source told Syria TV on October 13 that Shara and Abdi agreed to establish three divisions and several brigades “from the SDF” as army units in Hasakah, Raqqa, and Deir ez Zor provinces.[ix] CTP-ISW cannot confirm this claim, but such an agreement would be consistent with the SDF’s demand to remain deployed in northeastern Syria.[x] Abdi may also have been referring to a recent US proposal to form a joint SDF-government force to fight the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS).[xi] Abdi said that the SDF accepted this proposal.[xii]

The Syrian transitional government and the SDF have not yet agreed on a model for decentralized governance in Syria, however. Such disagreements may continue to delay or prevent the SDF's integration into the Syrian state. Abdi said that he and the Syrian government share an “understanding on the principle of decentralization" but that the SDF and government “have not agreed on it” and are “still discussing finding a common formula acceptable to all.”[xiii] The Syrian transitional government has consistently rejected decentralization and federalism and has accused the SDF of promoting "separatism.”[xiv] The two parties’ disagreement over decentralization has been one of the principal disagreements that has delayed the SDF’s integration into the Syrian state.

Senior Syrian officials likely discussed the status of talks with the SDF and Turkish support for the Syrian army with Turkish officials in Ankara on October 12.[xv] Syrian Defense Minister Major General Marhaf Abu Qasra, intelligence head Hussein al Salama, and Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani discussed counterterrorism, border control, and joint training with their Turkish counterparts in Ankara.[xvi] The officials very likely discussed the progress of talks with the SDF given Turkey’s role in pressuring the Syrian government to increase political and military pressure on the SDF to integrate into the Syrian state in recent months. Abdi told AFP on October 11 that successful negotiations with the Syrian government would depend on whether Turkey plays a “supportive and contributing role.”[xvii] Turkish Defense Minister Yaser Guler called on the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and “all affiliated groups...especially in Syria” to “surrender weapons immediately” in a statement on October 11 prior to the Syrian delegation’s visit.[xviii] Turkey often conflates the SDF with the PKK and uses “PKK” to refer to the entire SDF. Abu Qasra separately thanked Guler on October 12 for Turkey's “concrete efforts” to build the Syrian army.[xix] Turkey and Syria signed a defense agreement in August 2025 that commits Turkey to assisting Syria with military training and equipment procurement.[xx]

Key Takeaways

• SDF Integration: Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Commander Mazloum Abdi said on October 11 that he and the Syrian transitional government reached a “preliminary agreement” last week to integrate the SDF and Kurdish internal security forces into the state’s defense and interior ministries, respectively. The Syrian transitional government and the SDF have not yet agreed on a model for decentralized governance in Syria, however. Such disagreements may continue to delay or prevent the SDF's integration into the Syrian state.
• Iranian Oil Tanker Activity: Iran reportedly turned on the automatic identification systems (AIS) of most of its oil tankers on October 13, according to Tanker Trackers. This incident marks the first time that Iranian tankers have turned on their AIS signals since 2018.
• US Sanctions on Iranian-backed Iraqi militias: Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah criticized recent US sanctions targeting Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)-owned commercial entities, Iraqi bank executives, and Kataib Hezbollah officials. Kataib Hezbollah Spokesperson Abu Ali al Askari called the US sanctions “ridiculous” and denied any connection between Kataib Hezbollah and the sanctioned individuals.

Iran

Iran reportedly turned on the automatic identification systems (AIS) of most of its oil tankers on October 13, according to Tanker Trackers.[xxi] This incident marks the first time that Iranian tankers have turned on their AIS signals since 2018.[xxii] Iranian oil tankers keep their AIS signals turned off to obfuscate their identity and location while illicitly transporting Iranian oil. It is unclear why Iran would turn on its tankers’ AIS signals, but this report notably comes amid Iranian threats to close the Strait of Hormuz if the international community enforces UNSC and US sanctions against illicit Iranian exports.[xxiii] 

Unspecified gunmen attacked a vehicle carrying engineers and contractors who were working on the Chabahar–Mashhad water transfer project in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on October 12.[xxiv] The Chabahar–Mashhad water transfer project aims to supply drinking and industrial water to Iran's eastern provinces by transporting water from the Sea of Oman to eastern Iran.[xxv] No group has claimed responsibility for the attack at the time of this writing.  

Former reformist President Hassan Rouhani proposed a series of diplomatic, military, and economic reforms to address challenges after the Israel-Iran War during a meeting with former provincial governors on October 12.[xxvi]  Rouhani urged the Iranian regime to strengthen its military and diplomatic capabilities to avoid further conflict. Rouhani advocated for negotiations but noted that negotiations under current circumstances would be “complex.”[xxvii] Rouhani called on Iranian officials to stop inflation growth by implementing liquidity control measures and supporting investments. Rouhani additionally urged the regime to implement legal and institutional changes, including reforming the Iranian election law to reflect public preferences.

Iraq

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah criticized on October 11 recent US sanctions targeting Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)-owned commercial entities, Iraqi bank executives, and Kataib Hezbollah officials.[xxviii] Kataib Hezbollah Spokesperson Abu Ali al Askari called the US sanctions “ridiculous” and denied any connection between Kataib Hezbollah and the sanctioned individuals.[xxix] Askari added that intelligence collection on “foreign occupation forces,” in reference to US forces stationed in Iraq, is “fundamental” to Kataib Hezbollah’s work. The United States sanctioned Kataib Hezbollah leader Hassan Qahtan al Saidi and two members of his “source network” for gathering intelligence—including on US forces in Iraq—on behalf of the IRGC.[xxx] The Iraqi federal government announced on October 11 the formation of a high-level committee to review the US sanctions.[xxxi] The committee will include officials from the Finance Ministry, Integrity Commission, and Iraqi Central Bank.

Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Committee Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh discussed border security and information sharing with Iranian Law Enforcement Commander Brigadier General Ahmad Reza Radan in Tehran on October 12.[xxxii] This meeting comes after Radan discussed Iran-Iraq security cooperation with several Iraqi officials, including Fayyadh, in Baghdad on September 13.[xxxiii] Iraqi media reported that Radan and Fayyadh discussed border security, which likely refers to Iranian concerns about the threat that Kurdish opposition groups in Iraqi Kurdistan pose to Iran. Iran views Iraqi Kurdistan as a rear area from which anti-regime Kurdish groups can foment instability against the regime.[xxxiv] Iran accused Kurdish opposition groups of inciting protests in western Iran during the Mahsa Amini protest movement and has frequently accused Kurdish opposition groups of cooperating with Israel to facilitate attacks in Iran.[xxxv] Fayyadh and Radan may have also discussed security issues ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections on November 11. The Law Enforcement Command plays a central role in protest crackdowns in Iran and helped Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) violently suppress protests in Iraq in 2019.[xxxvi]

The PMF provided additional details on October 11 about a “senior” Baath Party leader whom PMF intelligence units arrested in Nasiriyah, Dhi Qar Province, on October 8.[xxxvii] The PMF Intelligence and Information Department launched an operation on October 2 to pursue Baath Party remnants.[xxxviii] The PMF announced that its forces arrested “prominent” Baathist leader Abdul Razzaq Hasaj Awda in Nasiriyah. The PMF claimed that Awda was involved in unspecified activities that “threaten state security.”[xxxix] Iranian media reported that PMF Chief of Staff and US-designated terrorist Abu Fadak al Muhammadawi supervised the arrest.[xl] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the PMF’s claims nor confirm that the Baath Party remains organized and active in Dhi Qar Province. Prominent Iraqi Shia politicians have commonly conflated Sunnism with membership in the Sunni-dominated Baathist government under Saddam Hussein and have abused de-Baathification measures to target Sunnis, however.[xli]

Syria

Suwayda Province is facing resource shortages, which are contributing to insecurity and some instances of armed conflict in the province. Druze Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri sent a message to the United Nations and international aid organizations on October 11 in which he stated that Suwayda Province has endured a “siege” for months and lacks sufficient food, medicine, water, and fuel.[xlii] Hijri stated that the destruction of factories, hospitals, and food stores in the province has contributed to the resource shortages.[xliii] Suwayda-based media reported that gasoline has not been available since September 22 and that fuel smuggling has increased amid desperation over the province’s fuel shortage.[xliv] Internal security forces comprised of Druze militias interdicted and destroyed a vehicle that was smuggling petroleum in Suwayda’s eastern desert on October 6.[xlv]

Hijri also noted in his message to the UN that Suwayda’s “living conditions” are “inciting...internal strife” and causing violence.[xlvi] Syrian sources reported that Druze factions engaged each other with unspecified weapons in Suwayda City on October 14, and several Syrian sources alleged that the fighting erupted due to competition over smuggling revenue and aid theft.[xlvii] A member of the Druze National Guard was reportedly killed in the fighting.[xlviii] Hijri and Suwayda-based media blamed the Syrian transitional government for imposing a “siege” on the province and making resources difficult to acquire.[xlix] The Syrian government-affiliated governor of Suwayda blamed Suwayda’s acting authority, the Supreme Legal Committee, for the deterioration of public services. The governor stated that the committee has rejected the government’s requests to distribute flour and fuel in the province.[l]

The Syrian government has launched a reconstruction campaign to rebuild Suwayda Province’s damaged infrastructure, likely as part of a longer-term effort to rebuild trust with Syrian Druze and ultimately reintroduce some form of state authority over the province. Suwayda Governor Mustafa Bakour launched a campaign called “Suwayda is Part of Us” on October 10 to raise money to rebuild Suwayda Province’s damaged homes, water and electricity infrastructure, and schools.[li] The Syrian government hosted a fundraising event on October 12 that raised $14 million for the project.[lii] Pro-government Druze militia leader Laith al Balous said that the government intended to affirm that Suwayda is an integral part of the Syrian state through the event.[liii] The government has not provided many details about the campaign, but the government will likely use these funds in villages in northern and northwestern Suwayda Province, where government forces retain control.[liv] Hijri, who formed the new autonomous government in Suwayda, refers to these government-held towns as “occupied” territory.[lv] The Syrian government has not taken action to suppress Hijri’s movement, which includes about 40 Druze militias, likely in large part due to the international community’s sensitivity about the Syrian state’s suppression of minorities, and the Druze in particular.[lvi] The government is unlikely to attempt to forcefully reintroduce state authority over the province in the near term given its ongoing constraints but may seek to gradually reassert its control in the province through providing services and economic support to the local population. The reconstruction campaign is likely a way through which the government seeks to rebuild trust with Suwaydawi locals and fighters. It is unclear if this campaign will be successful in achieving this effect, however, given that the reconstruction money will presumably only be spent in government-held areas. The reconstruction campaign also may not adequately address the grievances that many Druze hold against the government for government forces’ involvement or complicity in attacks on Druze in July 2025.[lvii]

Arabian Peninsula

Nothing significant to report.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) reported that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) dropped a grenade near UNIFIL peacekeepers in southern Lebanon on October 11, injuring one peacekeeper.[lviii] UNIFIL stated that this incident marked the second time that the IDF has dropped a grenade near UNIFIL peacekeepers this month.[lix] UNIFIL previously reported on October 3 that the IDF dropped several grenades near peacekeepers who were providing security to civilian workers in southern Lebanon.[lx] UNIFIL said that it had informed the IDF of its security work in advance.[lxi] The IDF has not commented on either incident at the time of this writing.

Lebanese officials and Hezbollah condemned a recent Israeli airstrike that targeted engineering and construction equipment near Msayleh, southern Lebanon, on October 11.[lxii] The IDF reported that it struck a site containing engineering equipment used to rebuild Hezbollah infrastructure in southern Lebanon.[lxiii] Western media reported on October 11 that Israel struck a civilian site that sold heavy machinery.[lxiv] The Lebanese Health Ministry stated that the Israeli strike killed at least one individual and wounded seven others.[lxv]  Lebanese officials, including President Joseph Aoun, called the Israeli strike a “blatant aggression against civilian facilities” and called on the international community to pressure Israel to halt its airstrikes in Lebanon.[lxvi] Lebanese officials have continuously called on the international community to pressure Israel to cease its operations in Lebanon and withdraw from Lebanese territory.[lxvii] Hezbollah often uses Israel’s continued operations in Lebanon to justify retaining its arms.[lxviii]