Iran Update, October 29, 2025

The Critical Threats Proj ect (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

The Israel-Lebanon ceasefire monitoring committee has agreed to meet more frequently, likely to encourage greater dialogue between Israel and Lebanon. The US-led, five-member committee was established as part of the November 2024 Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire agreement and is responsible for monitoring Israel and Lebanon’s compliance with the agreement.[i] US, French, Lebanese, Israeli, and United Nations officials comprise the committee.[ii] The committee members agreed on October 29 to increase the frequency of committee meetings and scheduled three meetings, which will occur by the end of 2025, to ensure that all members are “aligned and informed.”[iii] Lebanon and Israel previously attempted to hold preliminary discussions to formally renew indirect negotiations, but the discussions reached a “dead end.”[iv] The committee is currently the only way through which Israel and Lebanon can raise concerns and engage with each other in indirect dialogue.[v] Regular and more frequent meetings between the committee members would require Israeli and Lebanese officials to engage with each other more frequently, thus increasing dialogue between the two parties.

The ceasefire monitoring committee may seek to increase dialogue between Israel and Lebanon to resolve ongoing disagreements between the two countries over the US and Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) plans to disarm Hezbollah. US and Lebanese officials have consistently called for the committee to serve as a mediator between Israel and Lebanon.[vi] Israel and Lebanon continue to disagree on the timelines of the US and LAF plans to disarm Hezbollah. Lebanese officials have consistently stated that indirect negotiations and the implementation of the LAF and US disarmament plans are contingent upon Israel ceasing its operations in Lebanon and fully withdrawing from Lebanese territory.[vii] Israel has maintained that it will continue to operate in Lebanon until Hezbollah has been disarmed.[viii] Israel previously refused to discuss the US proposal to disarm Hezbollah in August 2025 and has continued to reject any proposals that require an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and cessation of operations in Lebanon.[ix] Israeli officials have also criticized the speed at which the LAF is implementing its disarmament plan.[x] LAF and Lebanese officials have consistently rejected these criticisms, stating that the LAF’s limited capabilities and continued Israeli operations in Lebanon are hindering the LAF’s progress.[xi]

Hezbollah is continuing to try to smuggle weapons from Syria into Lebanon amid international discussions about Hezbollah’s disarmament. Senior Israeli officials told Israeli media on October 27 that Hezbollah has managed to smuggle “hundreds” of rockets from Syria into Lebanon in recent months.[xii] US Deputy Special Envoy to the Middle East Morgan Ortagus told Saudi media on October 28 that Israeli officials alerted the United States to Hezbollah’s recent cross-border smuggling.[xiii] Iran has historically supplied Hezbollah with weapons and funding using ground lines of communication that cross Syria.[xiv] The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) has increased patrols along the Lebanon-Syria border since June 2025 as part of an effort to prevent Iran and its partners from transferring arms and resources to Hezbollah to support the organization's reconstitution.[xv] The Syrian transitional government has also seized numerous weapons shipments likely bound for Hezbollah and sought to expel Iranian-backed militias and Iranian influence from Syria.[xvi] Senior Syrian and Lebanese officials have held a series of meetings throughout October to discuss border security issues.[xvii] Syrian and Lebanese officials most recently met in Beirut on October 29 to discuss efforts to combat terrorism and drug trafficking.

Key Takeaways

• Hezbollah Disarmament: The Israel-Lebanon ceasefire monitoring committee has agreed to meet more frequently, likely to encourage greater dialogue between Israel and Lebanon. The ceasefire monitoring committee may seek to increase dialogue between Israel and Lebanon to resolve ongoing disagreements between the two countries over the US and Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) plans to disarm Hezbollah.
• Hezbollah Disarmament: Hezbollah is continuing to try to smuggle weapons from Syria into Lebanon amid international discussions about Hezbollah’s disarmament. Senior Israeli officials told Israeli media on October 27 that Hezbollah has managed to smuggle “hundreds” of rockets from Syria into Lebanon in recent months.
• Iraqi Elections: Popular Mobilization Forces units, including the Asaib Ahl al Haq-affiliated 50th Brigade, are reportedly attempting to deter Sunnis in Sunni-majority areas of Ninewa Province from voting in the Iraqi parliamentary elections on November 11, 2025. CTP-ISW has also observed four instances of political violence since October 14.

Iran

Iran is attempting to develop regional economic partnerships to counter increased economic pressure following the Israel-Iran War. Iran has faced mounting US, UN, and EU sanctions following the war, which has driven Iran to seek out alternative partners that can help it subvert these sanctions.[xviii] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian called for “resilient common frameworks” to build economic cooperation at the fourth Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) meeting in Tehran on October 28.[xix] The ECO is a multilateral economic organization that includes Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.[xx] Pezeshkian and Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani both called for increasing trade with Pakistan in separate meetings with Pakistani Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi on the sidelines of the ECO meeting.[xxi] Larijani called for Iran and Pakistan to develop a “sustainable strategic partnership” in his meeting with Naqvi.[xxii] Iranian and Pakistani officials recently met on October 26 to discuss joint trade routes and infrastructure, including the Islamabad-Tehran-Istanbul railway project and the Chabahar and Gwadar ports.[xxiii] Supreme Leader Military Affairs Adviser Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi emphasized the importance of regional trade routes, including routes that pass through Pakistan, on October 27.[xxiv] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi separately proposed that Iranian provinces engage in direct trade with neighboring states at a conference in North Khorasan Province on October 23.[xxv] Pezeshkian separately met with Tajikistan Interior Minister Ramadan Rahimzadeh on the sidelines of the ECO meeting and suggested that regional countries should use a ”common currency.” This proposal is consistent with Iran’s efforts to reduce its dependence on the US dollar.[xxvi]

Iran also continues to cooperate with regional states to address border security issues, which Iran perceives as a threat to its internal security and regime stability. Pezeshkian called on ECO members to establish a previously proposed regional police force called “ECOPOL” to address regional terrorism, human and drug trafficking, and illegal migration.[xxvii] Pezeshkian also underlined the importance of regional anti-trafficking measures in his meeting with Rahimzadeh and Iran and Pakistan’s joint counterterrorism efforts in his meeting with Naqvi.[xxviii] Iran remains concerned about Sunni militant group Jaish al Adl in Sistan and Baluchistan Province on Iran’s southeastern border with Pakistan.  Iranian security forces recently arrested an unspecified number of Jaish al Adl fighters on October 26 for killing 10 local security forces in Gohar Kuh, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, in October 2024.[xxix]

Iran has begun to clear and repair some military and intelligence sites that Israel struck during the Israel-Iran War. Iran has begun addressing damage at the following sites:

• Southwest Tabriz Missile Base, East Azerbaijan Province. This missile base houses several above-ground launch sites, two entrances to underground installations, and several underground launch facilities.[xxx] The site reportedly stored Shahab-variant missiles.[xxxi] Israeli airstrikes during the war destroyed at least a missile launch control center, one storage tunnel, an air defense battery, and two stationary launchers at the site.[xxxii] Satellite imagery from October 27 shows that Iran has partially rebuilt some of the infrastructure.

• Northern Shiraz Missile Base, Fars Province. This missile base manufactured and stored ballistic missiles. Israeli airstrikes on June 15 damaged at least 12 facilities, including ballistic missile launch pads, command buildings, and tunnel entrances, at the site.[xxxiii] Satellite imagery from October 27 shows that Iran has cleared debris from several destroyed buildings and partially reconstructed other buildings.

• Parchin Military Complex, Tehran Province. The Parchin Complex played a key role in Iran’s pre-2003 nuclear weapons program. Iran has used the site to develop and manufacture explosive materials and advanced munitions, including ballistic missiles.[xxxiv] Israel struck the Parchin Complex in October 2024 and during the 12-day war.[xxxv] Satellite imagery from August 28 showed that Iran is rebuilding facilities at the site that housed solid fuel mixers, which are essential for producing solid fuel for ballistic missiles.[xxxvi] The Institute for Science and International Security reported on October 20 that Iran is also building unspecified structures at the former Taleghan 2 nuclear research site at Parchin that Israel struck in October 2024.[xxxvii] Satellite imagery from October 28 shows that Iran has partially repaired another unspecified building at Parchin that Israel struck and destroyed during the war.

• Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Ground Forces Seyyed ol Shohada Provincial Unit, Tehran Province. The IDF reported that the Seyyed ol Shohada Provincial Unit is responsible for defending Iranian territory and suppressing internal unrest in Tehran City.[xxxviii] Israeli airstrikes on June 23 targeted the unit’s headquarters.[xxxix] Satellite imagery from October 3 shows that Iran has partially repaired one damaged building and demolished another at the site.

• Law Enforcement Command (LEC) intelligence facility, Tehran Province. The IDF reported that the LEC intelligence facility is responsible for intelligence collection and surveillance of the Iranian public, especially regime opponents.[xl] The LEC serves as Iran’s main internal security and law enforcement agency. Israeli airstrikes on June 23 targeted the LEC intelligence facility and destroyed at least two buildings and damaged another, according to satellite imagery from July 21.[xli] Satellite imagery from October 28 shows that Iran has demolished the damaged building and cleared debris from the two destroyed buildings.

Iraq

Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) units, including the Asaib Ahl al Haq-affiliated 50th Brigade, are reportedly attempting to deter Sunnis in Sunni-majority areas of Ninewa Province from voting in the Iraqi parliamentary elections on November 11, 2025.[xlii] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service primarily comprised of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, many of which report to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[xliii] Kurdish media reported on October 28 that unspecified PMF units are purchasing voter cards from Sunni Iraqis in Ninewa Province.[xliv] A Christian civil activist similarly told Qatari media in September 2025 that the 50th PMF Brigade had instructed all of its members to collect 10-25 electoral cards and pressure administrative employees in Hamdaniya, Ninewa Province, to vote for the brigade’s candidates in the elections.[xlv] The Badr Organization-affiliated 30th PMF Brigade also operates in the Ninewa Plains alongside the 50th PMF Brigade, though it is unclear if the 30th Brigade has attempted to deter Sunni voter participation in the November 2025 elections.[xlvi] Kurdish media also reported on October 28 that multiple unspecified political parties have conducted voter fraud in Ninewa.[xlvii] The Iraqi Electoral Commission’s office in Ninewa said that it is investigating the accusations of voter fraud.

CTP-ISW has observed four instances of political violence since the assassination of Sunni Sovereignty Alliance candidate and Baghdad Provincial Council member Safaa al Mashhadani on October 14.[xlviii] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias killed Mashhadani.[xlix] Unidentified gunmen shot at the home of Hasam Alliance leader Nawfal Hamad al Lahibi in an unspecified location in Kirkuk Province on October 20.[l] Iraqi Defense Minister Thabet al Abbasi leads the Hasam Alliance.[li] Unidentified gunmen assassinated the bodyguard of Badr Organization parliamentarian Mehdi Taqi Amerli in a neighborhood of Kirkuk City, Kirkuk Province, on October 27.[lii] Unidentified gunmen also shot at the car of State of Law candidate and Basra Oil Company employee Amjad Talib near Umm Qasr, Basra Province, on October 29.[liii] Unidentified gunmen also shot at the office of an unidentified Sadiqoun candidate near al Hay al Amil, southwest of Baghdad, on October 29.[liv] Sadiqoun is Asaib Ahl al Haq’s political wing.[lv]

Syria

Israel and Syria have reportedly made progress toward reaching a security agreement similar to the 1974 Syrian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement.[lvi] An unspecified Israeli official told Saudi media on October 29 that negotiations between Israel and Syria are “nearing completion.”[lvii] The Israeli official stated that the new agreement would resemble the 1974 Disengagement Agreement but include unspecified “minor modifications,” such as the establishment of joint US-Israeli-Syrian outposts along the border, including at Mount Hermon.[lviii] The 1974 Disengagement Agreement between Syria and Israel created a United Nations-patrolled buffer zone and enforced a ceasefire along the Israel-Syria border.[lix] The proposed agreement would also establish a joint US, Israeli, and Syrian committee to monitor developments on the Syrian border.[lx] The Israeli official stated that Israel dropped its demand for an Israel-Suwayda humanitarian corridor and accepted the Damascus-Suwayda corridor that was established in a separate US-Jordanian-Syrian agreement.[lxi] Israel’s previous insistence on establishing a humanitarian corridor between Israel and Suwayda contradicted the Syrian government’s demand to return to the 1974 Disengagement Agreement and led to the collapse of negotiations in September 2025.[lxii] Israel argued that this corridor was necessary to ensure the protection of the Druze community in southern Syria.[lxiii] Prominent anti-government Druze Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri declared an autonomous government in Suwayda in August 2025 after the Syrian transitional government committed violations against the Druze in Suwayda.[lxiv]  Israel assured the United States that it does not support Hijri or calls for Suwayda Province to secede from the Syrian state, according to the Israeli official.[lxv] Israeli media reported in September that the IDF had supplied arms and paid salaries for Druze militias in Suwayda Province since July in an effort to unite the militias against the Syrian transitional government.[lxvi] It is unclear whether Israel continues to do so.[lxvii] The Israeli official said that the Syrian government pledged to the United States and Israel that it will not harm the Druze and will provide Suwayda Province with necessary aid and jobs.[lxviii] No Syrian officials or media have commented on the status of negotiations between Syria and Israel at the time of this writing.

Arabian Peninsula

Nothing significant to report.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

See topline section.